

ISSN 2615-3718 (Online)  
ISSN 2621-5675 (Print)

*Asian Institute of Research*  
**Journal of Social and Political Sciences**  
Vol. 3, No.1 March 2020



ASIAN INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH  
Connecting Scholars Worldwide



ASIAN INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH  
*Connecting Scholars Worldwide*

Asian Institute of Research  
**Journal of Social and Political Sciences**  
Vol.3, No.1 March 2020

<b>Table of Contents</b>	i
<b>Journal of Social and Political Sciences Editorial Board</b>	iv
<b>Vote Shifting Patterns: Comparative Cases from the Constituent Assembly Elections in Nepal</b> Amrit Kumar Shrestha, Shyam Prasad Phuyel, Kamal Kumar Poudel	1
<b>India-China Competitive Coexistence: A New Era of Strategic Partnership</b> Sudeep Kumar	13
<b>An Evaluation of Fulfillment of Press Freedom as the Intrinsic Values of Psychological Contract of Macau Journalists After the Passing of Civil Protection Law under the Background of Economic Success With Once Over 75% Government Approval Rate</b> Vincent Lam Hing-Po	23
<b>Employee Motivation Factors in Banking Sector: A Study on Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis</b> K.W.S.N. Kumari, G.J.M.S.R. Jayasinghe, J.K.H. Sampath	32
<b>Public Perceptions of the City Landmark of Gianyar – Case Study: Landmarks of Ciung Wanara City Park in Gianyar</b> Gusti Ngurah Anom Gunawan, Agung Budi Sarjono, Suzanna Ratih Sari	39
<b>Money Politics vs. Political Cost; Enforcing and Honest Democracy</b> Edhy Prabowo, Dadang Rahmat Hidayat, Dadang Sugiana, Bachtiar Aly	51
<b>Life Below Water and Maritime Security</b> Desti Yuwastina, Sri Tunggul Pannindriya	59
<b>Conflict Resolution in the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: A Case Study of Conflict Within A Party in the Leadership Era of Suryadharma Ali in 2014</b> Sodikun, Sunarto, Jamalullail	72
<b>Political Violence in North Central Nigeria: Reflections and the Way Forward</b> Dalhatu Musa Yusha’u, Abdullahi Shehu Halidu, Ahmed Usman Egye	83
<b>EU Trade Policy Amid US-China Trade Confrontation</b> Asad Ullah, Asadullah Aria, Muhammad Nauman Akhter	90

<b>The Kori Agung Character of Heritage Temples: the Architectural References of Klungkung Identity</b>	103
Made Wina Satria, I Dewa Gede Agung Diasana Putra	
<b>Discrimination of Women at RMG Sector in Bangladesh</b>	112
Muhammad Faizul Haque, Md. Atiqur Rahman Sarker, Md Syfur Rahman, Mohammad Rakibuddin	
<b>Discourse of Gotong Royong Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle in Kulon Progo, Special Region of Yogyakarta</b>	119
Wahyu Hidayat, RB. Soemanto, Supriyadi	
<b>The Contextualization of the Nilotic Pastoralist Conflicts in Northern Kenya</b>	129
Jonathan Ltipalei, Dr. Joshua Kivuva, Prof. Fred O. Jonyo	
<b>Research on Social Psychology and Young People's Action in the Construction of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area</b>	152
Yang Liao, Li Meng	
<b>Assessment of Relationship Between Subjective Norms and Entrepreneurship Intention Among Students in Federal Polytechnic in Northern Nigeria</b>	176
S. I. Attahiru, M. A. Olaoye, B. Isyaku, M. Abubakar	
<b>Perception of Cruise Ship Tourists for Service in the Benoa Port, Bali Indonesia</b>	181
I Ketut Antara, Made Antara, I Nyoman Sunarta, I Gusti Ayu Oka Suryawardani, Ngakan Ketut Acwin Dwijendra	
<b>Dalem Ped Temple as Knowledge Source of Rajah Panyengker Practitioners in Bali, Indonesia</b>	186
I Made Gede Anadhi, I Nyoman Suarka, I Nyoman Sukiada, Ngakan Ketut Acwin Dwijendra	
<b>The Arminian Controversy: History, Theology, and Art</b>	196
James W. Ellis	
<b>The Meaning of Friendship in The Process of Self-Identity Development for Indonesian Adolescents</b>	214
Enung Hasanah, Supardi Supardi	
<b>The Speech of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 7th March 1971: A Historical Analysis</b>	222
Md. Shamsuddoha	

<b>Revisiting CPEC: A Corridor of Opportunities</b> Abbad Farooq	235
<b>Taleqani as a Humanitarian Islamist: His Activities and Ideologies under Pahlavi Regime</b> Qolamreza Nassr	243
<b>The Role of Internal Dynamics in the Political Reform Process in the ASC 2004-2010</b> Jawad El Hamad	256
<b>Soft Power Diplomacy on the African Continent: The Rise of China</b> Frederick Cloke	268
<b>The Paradigm Shift - India's Journey of Corporative Act to Producer Company Act; How Sustainable the Farmers' Producer Organization Model Has Been So Far?</b> Rehana Noor, Kalyanasundaram M., Nazma Sultana Lily, Mohammad Rubel Mia, Shanthi Venkatesh K., Anisur Rahman	277
<b>Interpreting the Assam Revolts of 1893-94: A Retrospective Discourse With Special Reference to its Unsuccessful Factor</b> Kamal Chandra Pathak	287

## **Journal of Social and Political Sciences Editorial Board**

### **Editor-In-Chief**

Assoc. Prof. Nada Adeeb Omar Eltaiba (Qatar)

### **Editorial Board**

Assoc. Prof. Françoise Le Lièvre (France)

Associate Prof. Shun-Yung Kevin Wang (United States)

Dr. Niki Alsford (United Kingdom)

Prof. Fabrizio Pezzani (Italy)

Prof. Dr. Elena Andreevska (Macedonia)

Associate Professor, Ph.D. Ana-Maria Bercu (Romania)

Prof. Muhammed Haron (Botswana)

Dr. Ezeibe Christian Chukwuebuka (Nigeria)

Kittisak Jermsittiparsert, Ph.D. (Thailand)

Silviu Stanciu, Ph.D. (Romania)

Prof. Mogopodi Lekorwe (Botswana)

Assistant Prof. Dr. S. Arulchelvan (India)

Assoc. Prof. Arshad Javed Rizvi (Pakistan)

Prof. Martina Blaskova (Slovak Republic)

Assoc. Prof. Pescaru Maria (Italy)

Sakip Karahman, Ph.D. (Turkey)

Assistant Prof. John Glynn (Thailand)

Prof. Munyae M. Mulinge (Kenya)

Manolis Adamkis, Ph.D. (Ireland)

Ghazali Bello Abubakar, Ph.D. (Nigeria)

Dr. Muhammad Uhaib As'ad (Indonesia)



# Vote Shifting Patterns: Comparative Cases from the Constituent Assembly Elections in Nepal

Amrit Kumar Shrestha<sup>1</sup>, Shyam Prasad Phuyel<sup>2</sup>, Kamal Kumar Poudel<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Associate Professor, Tribhuvan University, Central Department of Education, Kirtipur, Kathmandu, Nepal, Department of Political Science Education. Email: amrit365@gmail.com (Principal author)

<sup>2</sup> Lecturer, Tribhuvan University, Central Department of Education, Kirtipur, Kathmandu, Nepal, Department of Political Science Education. Email: shyamphuyal0@gmail.com (Co-author)

<sup>3</sup> Associate Professor, Tribhuvan University, Mahendra Ratna Campus Tahachal, Kathmandu, Nepal, Department of English Education. Email: kkpoudel2023@gmail.com (Co-author)

Correspondence: Shyam Prasad Phuyel. Email: shyamphuyal0@gmail.com

## Abstract

As the literature on electoral politics reveals, vote shifting is one of the most politically sensitive issues. This article focuses on the vote shifting pattern of electoral politics of Nepal. It is based on the secondary data from the first and the next Constituent Assembly (CA) elections held in 2008 and 2013 respectively, published by the Election Commission of Nepal. It aligns with the mixed of quantitative and qualitative approaches. It is limited to the data that belong to the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system covering 240 constituencies and party-wise vote shifting pattern. The results show that a higher vote shifting pattern was marked in the 2013 CA election in comparison to the 2008 CA election. The results also show that the Nepalese voters show a cyclic tendency towards electing a new political power at the cost of the traditional one(s) as their political aspirations are not achieved.

**Keywords:** Constituent Assembly (CA), First-Past-The-Post (FPTP), Vote Shifting, Electoral Politics, Elector

## Introduction

Election is one of the major components of the democratic system. It is a peaceful means to get political power and authority. During an election, people exercise a sovereign power, which is vested in people according to the constitutional provision. They would choose their representatives for a certain term, mostly for a five-year time. So, democratic politicians of the world always feel 'emotions of fear' of the next election (Butler, 1955, p. 93). This suggests that the result of every election is never certain. When a large number of voters of the same constituency change their voting decision to vote another political party rather than their previous choice and it seems in result of the election is considered as a vote shifting. In the Nepalese context, as a tendency, the electors change their voting decision in each election. Consequently, the prediction of the outcome of an election is not usually accurate in the context of Nepal.

The election of the Constituent Assembly (CA) is a rare phenomenon, which falls only once an era. However, Nepal made a record of two elections of the CA within six years. The first CA election was held in 2008; however, the CA could not meet its main objective to draft a new constitution for the country. So, the next CA election was held in 2013.

Nepal has a short history of electoral politics. The first declaration was made to elect CA in Nepal by the then Rana Prime minister Mohan Shamsher on 8 January 1951. The declaration of King Tribhuvan, which was announced on 18 February 1951, also mentioned the election of the CA to constitute a new constitution for the country. In the same way, the Interim Constitution of 1951 also repeated the same version. Unfortunately, the commitment did not meet during the regime of King Tribhuvan. His successor King Mahendra dilly-dallied for the CA election. Finally, he promulgated a constitution, The Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal, on 12 February 1959 drafted by Constitution Draft Commission, which was formed by the king (Devkota, 2058 BS, p. 526). He announced an election of the House of Representatives instead of the election of the Constituent Assembly. The voting started on 18 February (1959) and lasted for two months due to the difficulty of transporting the ballot boxes to and from the remote areas (Thapa, 2013, p. 118). In spite of dissatisfaction, the political parties took part in the election. The subject of the election of the CA had disappeared from the political scenario of Nepal for a long time thereafter.

Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched an armed revolt in 1996. During the 10 years of its 'People's War,' the Maoist strongly entered the election of the Constituent Assembly with a political agenda. This became a public discourse and the Nepalese society divided itself into two-parts, for and against the CA. Some supported and some doubted it. The CA election was a bottom-line agenda of the Maoist during the negotiation with the government. The uprising in April 2006 made the election of the CA as a national agenda. Ultimately, the election of the CA was held on 10 April 2008. In May 2012, after nearly four years of the political negotiation, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved without finalizing the long-awaited constitution (Pokharel & Rana, 2013, p. 4). Immediately, the new CA election had been declared. After two postponements, finally, the CA election was held on 19 November 2013. The CA election of 2013 has been called as a 'second Constituent Assembly elections' by media and people, however, the Election Commission (2070 BS, p. 1) has officially called it 'the other' (*arko*) Constituent Assembly election.

It is very difficult to find out the factors that determine the voting decision of the people. Do electors vote for the same party for a long time or change their choice at every election? Casting vote is a confidential act both by law and ethics. Electors would not like to disclose their voting decision. Similarly, a large number of electors is the other main cause that would not let researchers gather the accurate information about their voting behavior. However, many psephologists have tried to analyze election trends.

The election is a matter of interest and concern for most of the citizens, if not for all. In Nepal, during the campaign, the candidates become key figures, and election-related matters become wide public and private discourses from big media houses to teashops of the villages (Gaige & Scholz, 1991). The results become exciting for the mass to the extent that most of the people leave their daily routine or duty and take part in the discourse on the results of the election. Usually, it takes a few days for the common folk to return back to their usual life. Then only dim images of the election will remain in their minds. Researchers analyze the data of election at the micro-level by the various aspects. The matter of vote shifting, if any, is relatively a longer-lasting task among them, though. This article aims to explore the vote shifting patterns in two CA elections held in Nepal.

The results of these two CA elections were quite different. In the first CA election (2008), the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Terai-centered parties won the most of the constituencies. In the next CA election (2013), the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-UML) secured a greater number of seats. This article sets out to analyze the vote shifting in these two elections. More particularly, it is targeted to answer the following research questions.

- i) What were the political party-wise vote-shifting patterns in the two CA elections of 2008 and 2013?
- ii) What was the geography-wise vote shifting patterns in these two elections?

### Literature review

A considerable number of research studies have been conducted regarding the issue under consideration of this study. These studies mainly focus on the electoral politics of European and American countries. Some research articles are related to the Asian countries, too. Though to a small extent, local scholars have also contributed to the Nepalese electoral system and elections. The text that follows is an attempt to review the related literature.

Butler (1955) believes that our knowledge about voting behavior is based essentially on insights rather than scientific proofs. He indicates that there would be many "floating votes," which are uncertain, and they influence election outcomes significantly. There may be different variables that affect the "floating votes," but he claims that the great bulk of British citizens' vote from the habit for a particular party.

In a study, Jōji (1980) finds that there are different variables to shape the individual's selection for a particular political party or candidate in Japanese politics. According to him, the elector's occupations, age, level of education, sex, industry, firm size, and lifestyle stand out as the salient factors. Similarly, Archer & Johnson (1988) suggest that economic issues are more important for election outcomes in advanced industrial democracies.

According to Bartle (1998), in the context of the British electoral system, social class is indeed an important cause of the voting decision, but it does not 'dominate.' Similarly, he concludes that religion has no effect on the voting

Shastri (2003) examines the shifting paradigms in India's electoral politics. He has divided the Indian election into four phases: i) 1952 (the First General Election after Independence) - 1967; ii) 1967 - 1977; iii) 1977- 89; and iv) 1989 to 2003. According to him, the first phase was known as the *Nehruvian* phase, when one party (the Congress Party) had dominated at the national level and in most of the states of India. In the second phase (1967 - 1977), new social alliances across caste groups emerged at the state level and non-Congress governments came into being in several states. In the national election 1977, according to him, the Janata Party rose as a new political power and the monopoly of the Congress Party had ended. As Shastri claims, the third phase of India's electoral politics was a great paradigm shift. The fourth phase of the election created the competitive party system and completely eradicated a one-party monopoly. According to Shastri, new social and political alliances have been formed that altered the landscape of India's electoral politics. He argues that the states in India have emerged as the epicenter of the Indian politics.

A study by Blais (2004) in the five countries of North America and Europe finds that the amount of vote shift is much smaller in the United States and much larger in New Zealand (Table-1). The data show that even on the Election Day somewhere between 4% and 16% of the voters typically change their minds.

Table 1: The Propensity to Change over the Course of the Campaign

Country	Days before the Election						
	30	25	20	15	10	5	1
Canada	19%	19%	19%	17%	15%	12%	10%
Britain	13%	14%	13%	12%	10%	8%	7%
Netherlands	18%	19%	18%	16%	14%	11%	9%
New Zealand	30%	31%	30%	27%	24%	20%	16%
United States	8%	8%	7%	7%	6%	4%	4%

Source: Blais, 2004, p. 802

According to Johnston, Propper, Burgess, Sarker, Bolster & Jones (2005), there is a neighborhood effect on people's voting decisions. They claim that the immediate neighborhood, comprising the area within 250 meters, influence each other.

According to Toros (2014), political values are the major social factors that have a considerable impact on voting behavior in Turkey. These factors work differently in different situations. Similarly, he claims that there are many other different social and political factors that are salient in voting behavior. A study by Zamfira (2015) in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia suggests that ethnic issues, the territorial system of political administration, and socio-economic situations have important effects on voting behavior.

The reviews concerned electoral politics which especially focuses on vote shifting and voting behaviors. These trends are concerned with the context of American, European, and some Asian countries. Scholars have investigated Nepali electoral politics too. Gurung (1982) carries out a comparative study on two elections of Nepal that were held in 1959 and 1981. Nepal's first general election was held in 1959. Similarly, the first direct election of Rashtriya Panchayat was held in 1981. Both of the elections were conducted to elect the members of the national parliament, however, these two elections were held in different political environments; one was conducted in the democratic environment of the multiparty system, and the other was held in the partyless regime led by an active monarch. Gurung analyzes the sociological aspects of these two elections. He uncovers facts regarding the participation of the candidates from various castes and ethnic groups of Nepali society in these two elections. He found that most of the candidates were from the Chhetri caste followed by the Hill Brahmins set in the second position and the Newars situated in the third position in both of the elections. Gurung compares these two elections from various aspects; however, he is almost silent about the voting behavior of Nepali people.

Gaige & Scholz (1991) analyze the first election of the Parliament after the restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990. The election took place after a year of the restoration, i.e., in 1991. According to them, the party workers used to meet farming voters in the early evenings after they returned from the fields. Similarly, party workers used tape recorders to replay speeches from party leaders to villagers. They claim that vote-buying was common in the *Panchayat* elections. It got continued in the democratic elections too. It was a negative factor that influenced the voting behavior of the Nepali election system.

Baral (1995) analyzes the emerging trends of the Nepal election of 1994 and compares it with the election of 1991. The Nepali Congress (NC) became the largest party of Nepal after the result of the elections of House of Representatives (HoR) in 1991. Nonetheless, the NC had been relegated to the second position and the Communist Party of Nepal - Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) reached the first position in the 1994 election. It means the majority of the Nepali people preferred the communist candidates in 1994. In Kathmandu valley, for example, where the 'left' political parties won all of the 13 seats (11 by the CPN-UML and 2 by Nepal Workers and Peasants Party). According to Baral, why the voters in the capital showed a pro-left swing was unclear, and such a shift in the voting behavior did not indicate any definite trend. However, he indicates that the major reason for this was *antarghat* (sabotage) within the party (NC).

Likewise, Manchanda (2008) analyzes the changing political environment of Nepal after the 'People's War' of the Maoists, Peoples' Movement of 2006, and the election of Constituent Assembly (CA). Citing an example of Surya Bahadur Thapa, a royalist and former Prime Minister, who cast his vote for the "Republic" in the CA. She claims that Nepali politics and society has radically been restructured. Ironically, even from Bhadrakali, the headquarters of the Nepal Army, some 200 votes were cast in the name of the Maoists. She identifies that more than 60 percent of the newly elected members were associated with left-oriented politics in the CA and it was truly inclusive because the elected members were from different social dimensions, and it broke out of the mold of Nepal's socio-political culture of "institutionalized exclusion."

In a nutshell, several studies have been conducted in the field of electoral politics, voting behavior, and vote shifting. However, sufficient investigations have not been carried out in this specific area, especially in the

Nepalese context. This is a very potential area of study. This study aims to search the facts about vote shifting patterns of electoral politics of Nepal.

### Research methodology

This article mainly builds on secondary data. The CA election handbooks published by the Election Commission of Nepal in 2065 and 2070 BS were thoroughly utilized as the source of the data. Similarly, concerned the electronic databases were also consulted. Descriptive and analytical research designs were used for the analysis. The CA had 601 members. Among them, 575 members were elected through the voting system and 26 was nominated by the council of ministers as per the provision laid down by the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007. Of those elected members, 335 were elected through Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system and 240 were elected through the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system. Since this article's key concern is to examine the general voters' vote shifting tendency, it delimited only to the examination of statistics of the FPTP electoral system.

### Results and discussion

The 'first' CA election was held on 28 Chaitra 2064 BS (10 April 2008) and the 'next' on 4 Mangsir, 2070 BS (19 November 2013) (Election Commission, 2070 BS, p. 1). According to article 63, clause (1) sub-clause (a) of the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007, CA consisted of 601 members, of whom 240 were elected by the FPTP electoral system. To this end, 240 constituencies had been constituted and the eligible voters of each constituency elected one member through the majority system. The same constituencies were maintained for both of the CA elections. This facilitated the comparative study of those elections. There were outstanding distinctions between the results of the two CA elections. As figure-1 reveals, 174 (72.50%) constituencies contrasted in terms of vote shifting. It means about three-fourth of the constituencies shifted the votes from one political party in the 2008 election to another in the 2013 election. It can be argued that it is a huge case of vote shifting. Only 66 (27.50%) constituencies out of the total of 240 constituencies depicted the same result at both elections.




Figure 1: Results of CA elections 2008 & 2013 compared (Source: Adapted from Election Commission, 2065 & 2070 BS)

Nepal is naturally divided into three ecological regions. The Mountain region lies in the northern part of the country from east to west. The Hill region is in the middle part and the Terai region is in the southern part of Nepal; like the Mountain regions, these two regions are also spread from east to west. Now, Nepal has been adopted the federal system and there are seven provinces in accordance of constitution of Nepal, 2015. When the elections of CA were performing, Nepal had administratively divided into five development regions; eastern, central, western, mid-western, and far-western development regions. Analyze have made according to these ecological and development regions hereafter.

According to figure-2, the highest percentage of vote shifting took place in the Mountain region. In comparing the two elections, only 3 out of 19 constituencies (below 16%) remained unchanged in this region, which means that more than 84 percent of the total constituencies had different results in the 2013 election as compared to the 2008 election. In the case of no change result, the Terai region had a little more (28 out of 115 or above 24%) than in the Mountain region. Overall, more than 75 percent of the constituencies had changed the results in the 2013 election in the Terai region. It is generally believed that the Hill region has the lowest percent of inconsistent results. Yet, in this region more than two-third of the constituencies had contrasting results. It is not too a small number in the case of vote shifting patterns.




Figure 2: An ecological region-wise comparison of 2008 and 2013 elections (Adapted from: Election Commission, 2065 BS & 2070 BS)

The development region-wise comparison and contrast was of another interest. As Figure-3 (below) shows, the highest percentage of vote shifting occurred in the eastern part of Nepal. Similarly, the far-western part stood in second in this respect; the central, mid-western and western parts of the country stood third, fourth and fifth respectively.




Figure 3: Development region-wise comparison of vote shifting in the 2008 and 2013 CA elections (Adapted from: Election Commission, 2065 BS & 2070 BS)

### Party-wise vote shifting patterns

Overall, the participation of the then-existing political parties and their candidates were encouraging in both of the CA elections. Altogether 54 political parties participated in the CA election 2008 (Election Commission, 2065 BS, pp. 14-15). The number of political parties increased nearly as twice in the CA election 2013 in which 120 parties and their candidates participated in election fray (Election Commission, 2070 BS, pp. 19-22). However, only a few political parties could win their candidates in both of the elections. So, for the convenience of analysis in this study, we have grouped the winner parties into five categories. The Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of Nepal - Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), are treated as the first and the second categories. The Maoist party (led by Prachand) was the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) that participated in the 2008 election and was converted into the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in 2013. So, it is called 'Maoist' here and receives the third category status. Similarly, there were some Terai region centered parties; as a fourth category, they are called jointly 'Terai Centered parties.' Some other parties and independent candidates had also participated; they have been termed 'Others and Independents' and make the fifth category.




Figure 4: Number of party-wise winning candidates (Source: Election Commission, 2065 & 2070 BS)

As can be seen in figure-4, the Maoist won the greatest number of FPTP seats, 120 out of 240, or exactly 50 percent of the total FPTP seats in the 2008 election. However, the party reduced to 26 seats in the CA election 2013. It lost 94 seats in the 2013 CA election in comparison to 2008's election. Similarly, the Terai Centered parties also lost 31 seats in the CA election 2013. It shows that there was a huge amount of vote shifting. The NC and CPN-UML, increased their position in the CA election 2013 as compared to the 2008 election. It is also a case of vote shifting.




Figure 5: Party-wise position in CA elections 2008 and 2013 (Source: Election Commission, 2065 & 2070 BS)

Figure-5 indicates a huge change in the two CA elections. The NC considerably gained and the Maoist underwent a substantial loss in the CA election 2013 in comparison to the CA election 2008. Similarly, the CPN-UML also benefited in the latter election and Terai Centered parties dropped their position in the next CA election (2013).

### Region-wise position of individual parties in the two elections

There were dozens of political parties that participated in the both CA elections. For the convenience of study, parties are divided into different categories, as mentioned above. The status on vote shifting of these political parties and their position in ecological and administrative regions are analyzed in the following sub-headings.

#### The Nepali Congress (NC)

In the 2013 election, the Terai region proved the most favorable site for the NC because, in this election, it secured 44 more seats than it had achieved in the 2008 CA election (Table 2). It lost 9 places and sustained the same position in 7 constituencies. Similarly, it gained 34 more seats, lost 6 seats, and obtained the same result in 13 places in the Hill region. In the Mountain region, the NC secured 7 more seats and was lost 2 seats.

Table 2: Region-wise position of NC in two CA elections

Ecological Region	Increase		Decrease		No Change	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Mountain	7	8.24	2	11.76	0	0.00
Hill	34	40.00	6	35.29	13	65.00
Terai	44	51.76	9	52.94	7	35.00
Total	85	100.00	17	100.00	20	100.00

Development Region	Increase		Decrease		No Change	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Eastern	20	23.53	4	23.53	3	15.00
Central	28	32.94	7	41.18	9	45.00
Western	17	20.00	4	23.53	6	30.00
Mid-western	13	15.29	1	5.88	0	0.00
Far-western	7	8.24	1	5.88	2	10.00
Total	85	100.00	17	100.00	20	100.00

Source: Election Commission, 2065 BS & 2070 BS

As per the development region, the NC secured a higher number in the three increase, decrease, and no change-categories in the central region. It obtained 28 more, lost 7, and 9 constituencies are no change result. Similarly, the NC won outnumbered 7 more constituencies, lost 1, and 2 had no change in the 2013 CA election as compared to the in the 2008 election.

### The Maoist

The Maoist party underwent a great loss in the CA election 2013 in comparison to the 2008 election. It was unable to increase even a single seat (Table-3), in the Mountain and Hill regions, rather it lost 12 seats in the Mountain and 52 in Hill region. Yet, in the Terai region, it regained 7 more seats but lost 37 seats, and 5 places remained as they were in the 2008 CA election.

Table 3: Region-wise position of Maoist in two CA elections (Between 2008 and 2013)

Ecological Region	Increase		Decrease		No Change	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Mountain	0	0.00	12	11.88	1	5.26
Hill	0	0.00	52	51.49	13	68.42
Terai	7	100.00	37	36.63	5	26.32
Total	7	100.00	101	100.00	19	100.00

Development Region	Increase		Decrease		No Change	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Eastern	4	57.14	22	21.78	1	5.26
Central	3	42.86	33	32.67	4	21.05
Western	0	0.00	14	13.86	4	21.05
Mid-western	0	0.00	18	17.82	9	47.37
Far-western	0	0.00	14	13.86	1	5.26
Total	7	100.00	101	100.00	19	100.00

Source: Election Commission, 2065 BS & 2070 BS

In terms of the development regions, the Western, the Mid-western, and the Far-western regions remained unfriendly for the Maoist in the CA election 2013. In these regions, the Maoist could not increase its position at all. However, it increased 4 seats in the Eastern and 3 seats in the Central regions. Table-3 also shows that the Maoist lost a larger number of seats in all five development regions of the country. Only in a small number of constituencies, the Maoist could sustain its victory of the 2008 election in the 2013 election.

### The Communist Party of Nepal–United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML)

The first CA election in 2008 did not favor the CPN-UML but this party made improvements in the next CA election in 2013. As shown in Table-4, its improvement was marked in the Hill region, where it outnumbered 36 seats, lost 10, and stayed the same in 8 constituencies. In the Mountain and the Terai regions, it progressed far more in the 2013 election.

Table 4: Region-wise position of the CPN-UML in the two CA elections

Ecological Region	Increase		Decrease		No Change	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Mountain	9	12.00	2	11.76	2	12.50
Hill	36	48.00	10	58.82	8	50.00
Terai	30	40.00	5	29.41	6	37.50
Total	75	100.00	17	100.00	16	100.00

Development Region	Increase		Decrease		No Change	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Eastern	19	25.33	2	11.76	6	37.50
Central	27	36.00	5	29.41	3	18.75
Western	12	16.00	7	41.18	4	25.00
Mid-western	10	13.33	2	11.76	1	6.25
Far-western	7	9.33	1	5.88	2	12.50
Total	75	100.00	17	100.00	16	100.00

Source: Election Commission, 2065 BS & 2070 BS

As per the development regions, the CPM-UML made improvements in the CA election 2013 in comparison to that in 2008. In the Central region, it achieved a greater number of seats in the 2013 election than in the 2008 election. Though in a small number, the CPM-UML secured better results in the 2013 election than in the 2008.

### The Terai Centered parties

After the Madhes uprising of 2007, some Terai Centered parties and their leaders became popular figures in the Terai region. They had won more seats in the CA election 2008. However, they could not maintain their position in the CA election 2013. As shown in Table-5, in the 2013 CA election, they lost many constituencies, where they had won in the CA election 2008. These parties lost more than they gained in the 2013 election.

Table 5: Region-wise position of the Terai Centered parties in the two CA elections

Development Region	Increase		Decrease		No Change	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Eastern	2	22.22	15	44.12	2	22.22
Central	3	33.33	12	35.29	3	33.33
Western	4	44.44	5	14.71	4	44.44
Mid-western	0	0.00	2	5.88	0	0.00
Far-western	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Total	9	100.00	34	100.00	9	100.00

Source: Election Commission, 2065 BS & 2070 BS

The Nepalese history of electoral politics proves that the Nepalese people vote more for the party which had led the immediately past revolution. The Nepali Congress had played a significant role to abolish the century-long aristocracy Rana regime in 1951. Honoring the leading role of the Nepali Congress, the Nepalese people gave it a two-third majority (74 out of 109 seats) in the House of Representatives election held in 1959 (Gupta, 1964, p. 146). Similarly, the Nepali Congress and the Unified Leftist jointly led the revolution of 1990 that reestablished multiparty democracy in the country by displacing the partyless *Panchayat* system in 1990. The first election thereafter was held in 1991. The election was conducted to elect 205 members of House of Representatives, the lower house of the parliament. The result of the election shows that the Nepalese people chose the Nepali Congress as the first party with a simple majority. Similarly, the voters placed the CPN-UML in the second position, and after that there remained the other leftist parties (Election Commission, 1992). The decision of the Nepalese people seems justifiable in the sense that they cast vote according to the ratio of the role of the party in the preceding revolution.

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched 'People's War,' the armed revolt, in 1996. It spread all over the country in a relatively short time span. Among the demands set by the Maoist on the peaceful negotiations with the government, the election of the constituent assembly was the bottom line. After the 12-point multilateral agreement between the Maoist and the other parties in 2006, they fought together against the king's despotic regime. Consequently, the Nepalese people won and achieved democracy again. The story did not finish yet. After the promulgation of the Interim Constitution of Nepal, the Madhesi people did not satisfy themselves with

the provision of the constitution. Consequently, the Madhes revolt arose and spread from eastern Terai and entirely over the Terai region. It ended with the first amendment of the constitution that admitted the federal system as a form of government in the restructured 'new Nepal.' As the new revolutionary parties, the Nepali people cast more votes to the Maoist and the Terai centered parties in the first CA election 2008. So, it seems to be a political culture of the Nepalese people to flow electorally from one party to another.

The Nepalese people demonstrated a U-turn in the CA election 2013. They changed their voting decision by 180 degrees. As we discussed above, the Maoist party won in 120 constituencies, exactly 50 percent of the total FPTP seats of CA, in 2008's election, whereas it dropped down to 26 seats in the election 2013 (Election Commission, 2070 BS). The results of both of these elections were rather unexpected. As the zigzag line of figure-6 shows, it is an example of very high vote shifting patterns. It shows how drastically people change their voting decision within 5 years. Similarly, the vote shifting pattern practiced by the people over the Terai Centered parties in those two consecutive elections is also startling. It is also another example of a huge vote shifting in the Terai region.




Figure 6: Party-wise vote shifting patterns in CA elections 2013 and 2008 (Source: Election Commission, 2065 & 2070 BS)

We can analyze the result of the CA election 2013 by applying the zero-sum game in the FPTP electoral system. The result shows that the loss of the Maoist and the Terai Centered parties equaled the gain for the NC and the CPN-UML. The Nepalese people, who favored the Maoist and the Terai Centered parties in 2008, decided to return electorally to the traditional political power NC and CPN-UML in 2013.

## Conclusion

In the political history of Nepal, two CA elections were held: CA election 2008 (known as 'the first' CA election) and CA election 2013 (known as 'the next' CA election). Both of them were held in the same geographical constituencies, for the same propose, and applying the same electoral system. The internal structure and ideology of two major parties of Nepal, the NC and the CPN-UML, were alike in both 2008 and 2013 CA elections. Some structural changes had appeared with the CPN (Maoist) and the Terai Centered parties, although their ideology and leaders were the same in both cases.

Evidence shows that after the period of 5 years and 9 months, the Nepalese people changed their decisions to float from this party to that electorally. As the data support, the Nepalese people cast substantial votes to, thus, elected greater numbers of candidates of, the Maoist party and the Terai Centered parties in the CA election 2008. However, the voters considerably shifted to the others in the CA election 2013. This study indicates towards another fact that the Nepalese people, when dissatisfied with new political power(s), return to traditionally established political parties. As the authentic secondary data suggest, the previously held elections of the House of Representatives (1991, 1994 and 1999) had established the NC and the CPN-UML as two of the

major political powers respectively. However, the NC could secure 37 (15%) and the CPN-UML 33 (14%) out of the total of 240 FPTP CA seats in 2008. In the 2013 CA election, the NC won in 105 (44%) constituencies and the CPN-UML in 91 (38%). The Nepalese voters re-decided to cast votes to the traditional political powers in 2013. The comparative study of the results of these two CA elections has provided an overt example of vote shifting.

## References

- Archer, K., & Johnson, M. (1988). Inflation, unemployment and Canadian Federal voting behaviour. *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Comedienne De Science Politique*, 21(3), 569-584. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3228753>
- Baral, L. (1995). The 1994 Nepal Elections: Emerging trends in party politics. *Asian Survey*, 35(5), 426-440. doi:10.2307/2645746
- Bartle, J. (1998). Left-Right position matters, but does social class? Causal models of the 1992 British General Election. *British Journal of Political Science*, 28(3), 501-529. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/194267>
- Blais, A. (2004). How many voters change their minds in the month preceding an election? *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 37(4), 801-803. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4488912>
- Butler, D. (1955). Voting behaviour and its study in Britain. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 6(2), 93-103. doi:10.2307/587476
- Devkota, G. B. (2058 BS). *Political mirror of Nepal (Part 1)* (in Nepali). Kathmandu: Dhruva Bahadur Devkota.
- Election Commission (1992). *General election in Nepal 1991*, Kathmandu: Election Commission.
- . (2051 BS). *House of Representatives members' election – 2051 BS: election result description* (in Nepali). Kathmandu: Election Commission.
- . (2056 BS). *House of Representatives members' election – 2056 BS: Election result* (in Nepali). Kathmandu: Election Commission.
- . (2065 BS). *Constituent Assembly members' election 2064 BS: Election result manual* (in Nepali). Kathmandu: Election Commission.
- . (2070 BS). *Constituent Assembly members' election 2070 BS: Election result manual of first-past-the-post-election system* (in Nepali). Kathmandu: Election Commission.
- Gaige, F., & Scholz, J. (1991). The 1991 Parliamentary Elections in Nepal: Political Freedom and Stability. *Asian Survey*, 31(11), 1040-1060. doi:10.2307/2645306
- Government of Nepal (GoN) (2007). *The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007*. Kathmandu: Law Book Management Committee.
- . (2015). *Constitution of Nepal, 2015*. Kathmandu: Law Book Management Committee.
- Gupta, A. (1964). *Politics in Nepal*. Bombay: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd.
- Gurung, H. (1982). The sociology of elections in Nepal, 1959 to 1981. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 22(3), pp. 304-314. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644032>, Accessed: 05-11-2015.
- Johnston, R., Propper, C., Burgess, S., Rebecca Sarker, Anne Bolster, & Jones, K. (2005). Spatial scale and the neighbourhood effect: Multinomial models of voting at two recent British General Elections. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35(3), 487-514. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092241>
- Jōji, W. (1980). Social structure and voting in Japan: A multi-dimensional approach to the study of ideology and voting behaviour. *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice*, (5/6), 170-183. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23160424>
- Manchanda, R. (2001). Where are the women in South Asia conflicts? In R. Manchanda, *Women, war and peaces in South Asia: Beyond victimhood to agency* (pp. 9-39). New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd.
- Pokharel, B., & Rana, S. (2013). *Nepal: vote for peace*. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India Pvt. Ltd.
- Shastri, S. (2003). *Continuity with change: Shifting paradigms in India's electoral politics*. Paper prepared for presentation at the Conference on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems being jointly organized by CSES and IDEA at Stockholm, Sweden on 3-4 October 2003.
- Thapa, M. S. (2013). *Forget Kathmandu: An elegy for democracy*. New Delhi: Aleph Book Company.
- Toros, E. (2014). Social indicators and voting: The Turkish case. *Social Indicators Research*, 115(3), 1011-1029. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24720445>
- Zamfira, A. (2015). Methodological limitations in studying the effect of (inter) ethnicity on voting behaviour, with examples from Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. *Erdkunde*, 69(2), 161-173. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24585789>



# India-China Competitive Coexistence: A New Era of Strategic Partnership

Sudeep Kumar<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Department of Politics, East China Normal University (ECNU), Shanghai. Email: sudeepkumar85@yahoo.com

## Abstract

India and China are civilisational states with historical boundary disputes, whose roots lie in the colonial past. In modern times, both modern nation-states have taken a different politico-economic model in the global comity of nations. Both Asian powerhouses are separated by mighty Himalayan ranges geographically, but modern communication and transport technology have filled these geographical gaps. As a result, there is increasing Indian engagement in South-East Asia & East Asia; whereas Chinese engagement in South Asia and Indian Ocean region has brought them together to shape the Asian equilibrium in the multipolar world order. Over the years, both countries have transformed their relationship towards a cooperative framework in economic and military affairs for improving mutual trust and mutual understanding in their bilateral diplomatic relations. Furthermore, many developmental issues of common concern and global governance are acting as a catalyst to work towards their mutual benefit in regional and multilateral forums. Indeed, the India-China strategic partnership seems to be moving towards comprehensive partnership in the field of politics, economy, military, cultural and people to people contact. It is in these backdrops, one might wonder about the future trajectories of India-China bilateral relations in shaping the Asian equilibrium as well as the crucial role of their national interest in it.

**Keywords:** India, China, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Relations

## I. Introduction

Unlike modern nation-states, India and China are civilisational states which took a different politico-economic model of development. The communist party led China enjoyed the fruits of globalisation through multilateral diplomacy in the last four decades, while India as a multi-party largest democracy is catching-up the economic development comparatively with a slower speed. Meanwhile, according to the current projection of International Monetary Funds (IMF) and World Bank, India is going to remain the fastest growing Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in the next five years. As China's largest neighbour, India plays a vital role in the regional geopolitics and beyond. With the help of rising India, China seeks reform in the United Nations (UN), Bretton Woods Institutions such as IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO) to bring fair and more representative global order in trade, investments and diplomacy for building the Asian century. But both countries have a tumultuous shared history with root lies in the colonial past of both civilisational states. In the absence of agreed actual line of control, the regular incidents of border incursions and standoff burdened the bilateral

relationship from the last seven decades. In recent times, Indian refusal to join China's Belt and Road Initiative in disputed Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) through which China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes highlights the limitation and challenges in their bilateral relations. At the same time, China has blocked Indian candidature at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG), showed other complexities in their bilateral relations.

In fact, the India-China bilateral trade is around 100 billion USD, which showed another positive factor in their bilateral relations. At the ninth BRICS Xiamen summit (2017), India and China enhanced their security cooperation on counter-terrorism first time. The joint communique of this summit explicitly referred to Pakistan based anti-India terrorist organisations Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) responsible for committing, organising and supporting terrorist acts. However, as a sign of fresh breather recently China has agreed to put Masood Azhar, the founder of Pakistan based militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad under the 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In April 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping made a diplomatic breakthrough in the form of "Informal Wuhan Summit" after the 73-days long Doklam standoff. Furthermore, Xi Jinping led China formulated the "community of common destiny in a new era," while Narendra Modi led India conceptualised the "Act East Policy" (AEP) and "Free, Open, and Inclusive Indo-Pacific" (FOIIP) in the common pursuit of progress and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. In the new era of world politics, both India and China should think creatively to promote their economic interest in Free and Open Inclusive Indo-Pacific (FOIIP) by joining Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Thailand Economic Corridor (BIMSTEC), Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) on the one side, while promoting joint project in the existing infrastructure and connectivity projects like Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), and International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

In the emerging geopolitical centrality in the Indian Ocean region, India has further developed the traditional maritime policy from "net security provider" to a "leading power." As a leading power, India is working with China and other maritime actors towards an inclusive maritime security policy to ultimately enhance regional connectivity through improved maritime cooperation for ensuring effective humanitarian and disaster relief operations in the Indian Ocean region (Roy-Chaudhury, 2018). For small south Asian neighbours (Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bhutan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan), India-China competitive coexistence presents both opportunities and challenges to maximise their economic interests by getting the best deal out of both bilateral interactions and by bargaining best possible outcome within regional multilateral organisations. India's relations with these small south Asian states is best described by with historical, cultural, ethnic, and people to people linkages but, China's active engagement opens up a new range of possibilities for India and these small South Asian states. Both India and China should avoid any unnecessary geo-strategic and geo-economic traps by simultaneously working towards safeguarding their security and strategic interests. Under this pragmatic approach, India-China strategic partnership is all about making enough diplomatic space to maintain and protect their strategic autonomy. Indeed, India and China are confident enough to cooperate on issues such as energy security, trade negotiations, climate change, maritime security, maritime piracy, and so on (Fravel, 2011).

## **II. A Brief Overview of Historical Boundary Dispute**

The main reason behind the root of India-China boundary dispute lies in colonial past and more precisely the drawing of "McMahon Line" before the independence of India (1947) the establishment of People's Republic of China (1949). At the Shimla Convention (1913-14) of British India, the United Kingdom (represented by Henry McMahon), and the representatives of Tibet drew this line in the presence of Chinese representative (Republic of China). While the representatives of the Republic of China participated in the Shimla convention but did not sign

the resulting accord, thus became the reason to question the legitimacy of McMahon line by the people's republic of China. However, the successive Indian government continuously asserted the validity of McMahon line that constitutes Indian administered Arunachal Pradesh (83,743 square km, and China administered both Aksai Chin (37,555 square km) and the northern part of disputed Kashmir region known as Trans-Karakoram Tract (the 5,800 square km) are areas in dispute between the India and China. China administered Aksai Chin was occupied during the 1962 war, while Pakistan temporarily ceded disputed Trans-Karakoram tract (also known as Shaksgham Valley) to China on March 2nd 1963, until the final legal settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. India complained about this illegal transfer of disputed territory to China by Pakistan, therefore continued to claim sovereignty over the Trans-Karakoram tract and Aksai-Chin till today (Horimoto, 2014). The undefined and undemarcated territorial India-China boundary can be divided into three sectors primarily: the eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh), middle sector (Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh), and western sector (Aksai Chin and the Trans-Karakoram Tract). For the middle sector, however both sides exchanged map showing each believed where the line of actual control (LAC) lies. Since there is even no consensus on the LAC, the suspicion and tension remain over the demarcation and delineation of LAC in the eastern and western sectors until today (John, 2016). Even there is a disagreement over the total length of the line of actual control (LAC) in the eastern and western sectors. India claims the length of LAC about 400 square kilometers, but on the contrary, it is about 200 square kilometers as per the Chinese claim. Therefore, China claims Arunachal Pradesh as a part of southern Tibet, while India claims the Aksai Chin and Trans-Karakoram Tract annexed during the 1962 India-China war and illegal transfer of Trans-Karakoram Tract in 1963 respectively. There is no denying of the fact that the main reason for the India-China boundary dispute lies in the colonial past of both modern nation-states. Moreover, there was time to time border incursion, standoff and limited conflict that created a historical baggage and suspicion in the public of both countries e.g., four weeks long "1962 India-China limited war", 4-days long "1967 Nathula Pass skirmish in Sikkim", 8-months long "1986–1987 Sumdorong Chu confrontation in Tawang", and more recently 73-days long Doklam standoff at a disputed tri-junction border area with China, Bhutan and India's northeastern state of Sikkim (Roy-Chaudhury, 2018).

However, the pragmatic wisdom of both civilisation states pacified the historical boundary dispute from time to time in the broader interests of the ordinary people of both Asian giants. Both modern nation-states India and China reiterated their commitment to not allowing their differences to become a dispute. India as the first non-communist country recognised People's Republic of China (December 30, 1949), supported China's re-entry into the international community, and invited China to take part in the 1955 Bandung Conference. Although Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru supported "One China policy" but failed in materialising the "recognition of McMahon line" in exchange to solve the historical boundary disputes (Arun, 2008). This diplomatic failure in recognition of McMahon line resulted in the four weeks-long India-China 1962 war and the suspension of India-China diplomatic relations (1962-77), which marked as the lowest point in the bilateral ties (Horimoto, 2014). In the last seven decades of diplomatic ties, the mutual strategic distrust deepened the continued strategic partnership between China and Pakistan. The creation of Pakistan after the partition of India (14<sup>th</sup> August 1947) and resulted bilateral Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan primarily added another layer of mistrust and suspicion in the India-China strategic partnership (Ruisheng, Jianxue, Jiali, & Zhizhen, 2010). However, China has managed to settle seventeen land border disputes with their neighboring states except for India and Bhutan. One might wonder if People's Republic of China (PRC) had recognised the same McMahon line (i.e., drawn when Myanmar was part of British India) to solve China's boundary dispute then why there is a reluctance to legitimise the same McMahon line with India? In short, the historical boundary dispute, China's support to Pakistan, and India's support to Dalai Lama are a major irritant in India-China bilateral relations (Taylor, 2011). Both Asian giants have shown the pragmatism to make tactical adjustments to move towards deeper political and economic cooperation and to strengthen diplomatic relations. Indian recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet; and Chinese de facto recognition that Sikkim as part of India reflects their mutual desire to shift focus from more dominant historical boundary disputes towards more consultative cooperation in regional and multilateral forums for jointly raising the concerns of developing countries (Gupta, 2015). In the post-2000 scenarios, India-China diplomatic relations are driven by their shared desire to deepen

political, economic, multilateral and regional engagement to advance their broader economic and security interests. In a new era, the foundation of India-China bilateral relation is towards creating an international political situation to support their national interests through the institutionalization of bilateral, regional and multi-level engagements (Fravel, 2011).

### III. An Era of India-China Rapprochement

Driven by the common politico-economic aspirations and new realities of Asian geopolitics, there was a major diplomatic breakthrough, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988. This official visit, the first of its kind in the last 34 years, became a direct driver of improvement in political relations that opened a diplomatic opening to subsequent high-level official visits from both sides. Subsequently, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng's India visit (1991) set the table for political discussions in the light of collapse of Soviet Union, and emerging post-cold war era of world politics in the form of official Chinese position: "*We do not stand for the internationalisation of the Kashmir question,*" in the midst of Pakistan's ongoing effort to the internationalisation of Kashmir dispute. This official position also translated as the China-Pakistan strategic partnership is not against India, but it's a part of China's multi-dimensional friendly cooperative relations with all its neighbours. It is in positive spirit of these series of bilateral contours and pragmatic diplomatic overture, Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao's China visit (September 1993) signed "the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control" towards establishing a mechanism for further rounds of border discussion and negotiations (Garver, 2001). India-China relations are transformed significantly in the last two decades. Both countries learned to cooperate despite the boundary dispute as an irritant in their bilateral relationship. Indeed, the "1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement", and then after following confidence-building measures (CBM) have stabilised the status quo on both sides of the borders that helped in the improvement of infrastructures, capabilities and position in last two decades. This duality of cooperation and competition simultaneously in terms of core national interests has helped in improving the existing economic and security order of SA-IOR. Furthermore, in these changing geopolitical contexts, India too understands that China's iron brother Pakistan holds a more crucial role to check and balance religious extremism and terrorism in neighbouring Xinjiang region, which also provides alternate transit route to the Indian Ocean region (Menon, 2016).

During the 1990s, there was tremendous diplomatic pressure on the Indian government to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India became wary of resolution 984 of NPT, which can prevent India from acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Also, under the draft of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in United Nations Disarmament Conference, the "entry into force" provision put India on a tight spot. Thus India voted against CTBT draft treaty in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Since this was a significant setback for Indian diplomacy, thus India started to rethink about the relevance of multi-directional non-aligned foreign policy driven by the era of post-cold war politics. This serious regarding the foreign policy deliberations led to the Indian nuclear test in May 1998. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee ordered three underground nuclear tests and one hydrogen bomb test (Garver, 2016). There is no denying of this fact that India's 1998 nuclear test and "China justification theory" reversed the positive momentum in their bilateral relations but, this new-found nuclear parity and strategic confidence took the diplomatic trajectories of bilateral ties away from the dominant border dispute discourse. Indeed, Indian nuclear tests (May 1998) proved to be a turning point in India-China diplomatic relations because, China entered into a strategic dialogue with India in 2003, which was against Chinese official position to not hold strategic dialogue with India on the ground of non-signatory to "Non-Proliferation Treaty" (NPT) and "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty" (CTBT). As a result, India-China diplomatic relations became dynamic with the recently acquired nuclear technology to safe their strategic interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region (Fravel, 2011).

In April 2005, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited India, where both countries institutionalised the border discussion framework and most importantly signed an agreement on "India-China Strategic Partnership" to acknowledge their mutual aspirations and to cooperate in various fields including economics, trade, energy,

security and defence. With the significant rise in mutual investments, both countries later established three critical dialogue and consultative mechanism namely "India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue," "Joint Economic Group Dialogue," and "India-China Joint Group on Economic Relations and Trade, Science and Technology" to facilitate enhanced economic cooperation by proposing concrete measures to eliminate existing trade and investment barriers (Wojczewski, 2016). But the most crucial aspect of "*the 2005 agreement on the political parameters and guiding principles for the settlement of the India-China boundary question*" was ready to set guiding principles and parameters for settlement of the territorial issue. According to article 7 of 2005 agreement, a settlement "*shall safeguard due interests of... settled populations in the border areas.*" This line highlighted China's pragmatic intention to transform the existing line of actual control (LAC) into the international boundary between both countries in the eastern sector that also imply both Arunachal Pradesh (with one million population) and Tawang (with 39,000 population) in the eastern sector would remain with India. Furthermore, China recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim - that integrated into India after a long process of constitutional reform and democratic procedures into India. This was also first time both countries decided to move towards a more profound political, economic, strategic, and defence cooperation. Before this 2005 strategic partnership, the India-China relationship was a prisoner of the historical boundary dispute. Hence, this course correction was a welcoming boost in their diplomatic relations. Also, this strategic partnership developed a three-tier structure with political leaders of the top, special political representatives in the middle, and finally, joint working groups (JWG) comprising bureaucrats, officials, experts of various kinds, technical personnel, specialists and other representative groups to deal with any contradictions from time to time (Acharya, 2011).

Another takeaway from 2005 agreement is about growing cooperation in international institutions and negotiations as both India and China agreed on the convergences on global issues in regional and multilateral forums. To enhance mutual trust and mutual understanding between both armed forces, India and China fine-tuned their regular bilateral defence interactions. On May 2006, India and China established an annual "India-China Defense and Security Dialogue" for holding joint military exercises and regular goodwill visits, which helped in the institutionalisation of dialogues through a consultative mechanism for the exchanges of views on regional and global security issues. The first joint military exercises in 2007-08 helped in enhancing trust through several mutual visits of service chiefs of both countries (Li, 2009). These initial momentums were abruptly frustrated in 2010 after Chinese government's denial of visa to an Indian army commander from Arunachal Pradesh however within a year in December 2011, both countries resumed their defence exchanges and declared to broaden maritime security cooperation in the field of joint naval escorts and exercises in the Indo-Pacific region (Panda, 2013).

#### **IV. An Era of India-China Competitive Coexistence**

More than ever, both India and China acknowledged the relevance of multilateral diplomacy in the new era of competitive coexistence. It was evident that liberalisation, regionalisation and globalisation are inevitable trends, where multilateral diplomatic is quite helpful in safeguarding geopolitical and geo-economics interests. As a result, both India and China became members of BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations (UN), and a range of regional and multilateral forums as a dialogue partner. In the post-2000 era, both India and China engaged in regional and multilateral forums with a view that joint participation offered an opportunity to enhance political trust and reduce mutual insecurity. In November 2005, China had won observer status in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao explicitly articulated to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh about joint participation in regional forums to reduce mutual insecurity and enhance political trusts. This new positive spirit in their bilateral relations formalised "Russia-India-China Foreign Minister Meeting" (Uberoi, 2001).

In multilateral forums and summits like G20, World Trade Organization (WTO), Copenhagen Climate Change Summit 2009 and Paris Climate Change Summit 2015, United Nations and global financial reforms, India and China jointly raised the voices and concerns of developing countries. Both countries are founder members of the

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and BRICS National Development Bank (Roy-Chaudhury, 2018). India and China are increasingly cooperating in international institutions and negotiations like the Doha trade round, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota reforms, the global financial crisis, and climate change. Also, to various bilateral dialogue mechanisms, both countries have cooperated in the G20, BASIC, and BRICS to discuss and align their position. Unlike China's anti-western outlook, India does not use these multilateral groups as a political alliance against Western-led world order. India however, uses BASIC and BRICS as a useful policy instrument for deepening relations with other great powers, for defending the interests of developing countries and by promoting a more democratic multi-polar world order democratically. In 2009, both countries further increased their political leverage in global climate governance through BASIC grouping (India, China, Brazil and South Africa) to discuss and align their position during COP-15 Copenhagen conference to achieve a broader consensus on various socio-economic issues of developing countries (Mathai, 2012).

Under the broader Indian network, India and China need to develop the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor (BCIM) simultaneously for the development of Indian "Andaman & Nicobar Islands" as a shipping hub for the Bay of Bengal basin. In the meanwhile, India should link up Chabahar port to the west with "International North-South Transport Corridor" (INSTC) and "Eurasian Transport Corridor" while India needs to link up Trincomalee port to the east with the "Bay of Bengal littoral ports" and "Mekong-Ganga Corridor" with Laos, Cambodia & Vietnam; and "kaladan multi-modal transport corridor" in Myanmar, as well as the port of Sittwe (Saran, 2015). Because of this reason, India signed China led sub-regional group Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) in August 1999 to enhance trade and investment and to facilitate the construction of a 2,800-km economic corridor from Kunming (China) to Kolkata (India) via Mandalay (Myanmar), Manipur and Assam in India, and Dhaka and Jessore in Bangladesh. In January 2000, China became a dialogue partner of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) for pursuing economic and non-traditional cooperation in the Indian Ocean region (Panda, 2014). Additionally, while India is a full member of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the 21-members Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the 35-members Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), China is either an observer or a dialogue partner in these organisations in South Asia and Indian Ocean Region. However, India refused to join China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) based on sovereignty concern because the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) - the flagship project of BRI passes through disputed Kashmir region between India and Pakistan.

The India-China competitive coexistence, however, can be witnessed in the proximity of South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. The small south Asian states playoff between India and China to maximise their economic benefits hence, the ruling elites of these small south Asian states try to balance their relations amid domestic opposition in their excessive concessions from both Asian giants. These small states and islands in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region are in Indian geographical proximity, while communication and transport technology increased their economic cooperation with China. By 2017 all small south Asian states except Bhutan have joined Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Under the BRI, China has subsidised large infrastructure projects to these small states and islands for building harbours, ports, highways, bridges and telecommunication projects to integrate these small south Asian states into the Chinese economic sphere more closely (Garver, 2012). These small nations and islands aspire to have an independent nation-building process. Despite the geographical proximities of India, the best interests of these small south Asian states lie in to maximise their bargaining power vis-à-vis both Asian giants, India and China (Wagner, 2016). Indian strategists, however, are cautious about China's expanding military presence, security roles and involvement in dual-use infrastructure projects (civil and military) in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region (SA-IOR). Indeed, these transports and communication technologies created competition for India, but it's an overstatement to say that Indian security and strategic interests will be in jeopardy because both India and China have enough strategic space to protect their security interests in SA-IOR. In these contexts, only future holds the answer for how long, these small states in SA-IOR can manage to acquire a substantial amount of investment without losing their sovereignty and national interests (Paul, 2018)?

Now, India and China are discussing cooperation on oil exploration in African and Central Asian republics. Amid rising oil prices, both countries (as the largest importers of oil) are in constant touch and considering the joint purchase to negotiate the reasonable price on their placed order. Indeed, the bilateral relations of both countries are multifaceted which aligns and differs in a various range of issues (Reischer, 2012). Both Asian powerhouses share a common position on climate change. Both countries insistence on their “right to development” and rejection of binding emission targets for their economies share common concerns in the previous climate change conferences so far (Prys & Wojczewski, 2015).

## V. The Way Forward

Like all modern nation-states, India-China bilateral relations are multifaceted that converges and diverges on different sets of issues depending on their world-views. Some scholars still wonder about contemporary dynamics in India-China relations - is its common economic interests or boundary dispute continued to shape India-China bilateral relations? However, one does not see any reason why both neighbouring Asian giants should not encourage to improve socio-politic-economic-cultural interactions when both can equally complement their core strategic interests in the multipolar world order. Indeed, the new era of the strategic partnership is crucial in upholding Asian equilibrium and the multipolar world order.

A more systematic dialogue, high-level visits and acknowledging differences facilitate a better understanding of the domestic compulsions that drive the two countries’ foreign policies to help in managing their nationalist impulses, transforming public perceptions and learning to stop situations before they can develop into an armed confrontation (Malone & Mukherjee, 2010). Both India and China are looking towards expanding the generally stable bilateral relationship both quantitatively (in terms of areas of cooperation and convergence) and qualitatively (in terms of the type of collaboration). To push economic reforms, India needs Chinese investments in sectors such as manufacturing, assistance in infrastructure development, greater access to the lucrative Chinese markets, and so on. India’s policy towards China is in the predisposition of non-alignment and strategic autonomy along with the specific degree of mitigation on global issues such as climate change, energy security, counter-terrorism WTO reform for raising voices and concerns on behalf of the all developing countries in regional and multilateral forums (Tiang-Boon, 2016). John Garver rightly mentioned that India needs to break away from its low growth track and produce ingenious and confident policies leveraging its strengths in South Asia and Indian ocean region in the light of Chinese maximisation of security and strategic interests in Asia and beyond (John, 2001). The contemporary dynamics in India-China relations are towards the expansion of trade ties, sub-regional economic and connectivity projects and interactions in regional and global multilateral forums (Roy-Chaudhury, 2018). Both countries need to cooperate as they confront common non-traditional challenges such as the depletion of resources, environmental degradation, and pandemics in addition to traditional security challenges in contemporary times. China is observing not just current trends and directions in Indian foreign policy but, India’s rapid economic growth, military exercises and strategic partnership with major powers, as well as the rapid modernization of military, missile, space program and growing naval capabilities in South Asia and Indian Ocean region. However, the primary focus of Chinese strategic and military planning is towards the East China Sea, the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. China’s primary concern is to prepare for a military conflict in the case of Taiwan contingency (Pardesi, 2010). For these reasons, India needs to engage constructively with China to minimise their differences and maximise their opportunities in bilateral relations. India needs to safeguards its political influence, resources and markets; while India should modernise its armed forces, enhance its nuclear deterrence and space technology, to form strategic partnerships with other major powers like Japan, Russia, European Union and the United States. India should cooperate with China for cooperative security architecture, with the caution to safeguards Indian security and strategic interests from increasing China’s comprehensive national power in Asia and beyond (Wojczewski, 2016).

However, the only credible way to address core security and strategic interests is first to define Indian security interest in concrete terms. Secondly, both countries need to understand the contemporary dynamics in India-China relations and adjust their policies accordingly. In restoring a semblance of equality in bilateral

relationship, it is necessary to build up India's economic and security capabilities and begin to close the power gap with China. In the meantime, India's economic engagement and security cooperation with other major powers should also remain a key objective (Saran, 2017). Most importantly, to address the mutual suspicion and strategic mistrust promptly India-China diplomatic relations need to be pro-active. Indian and Chinese leaders need to interact at a regular interval, and institutionalisation of informal annual summit (e.g. "Wuhan Summit 2018" & "Mamallapuram Summit 2019") is a significant step in the right direction (Bambawale, 2019). The main feature of these annual informal summits is that both India and China should cooperate based on the merit of each case in bilateral and multilateral level interactions. India's development of Chabahar port in Iran can link up with China led Eurasian transport corridor. The triangular highway linking India-Myanmar-Thailand can link up with China led north-south rail and road links in the Laos-Cambodia-Vietnam with Mandalay as a nodal point. India should invite China to join the International Solar Alliance (ISA), which is an essential area of energy cooperation (Saran, 2019).

The former Chinese ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui mentioned four action plans to address mutual differences, which includes stepping up efforts to manage differences, keeping up the warmth of bilateral relations, raising the speed of cooperation in diverse fields and increasing people-to-people and cultural exchanges (Zhaohui, 2019). The contemporary Indian foreign policy is multi-aligned issue based, which gives the capacity to be flexible, and the ability to maintain Indian strategic autonomy in terms of the foreign policy decision-making process (Gokhle, 2019). Therefore, Indian foreign policy must keep equidistance from great powers like the US, China, and Russia to preserve their strategic autonomy in the multipolar world order.

To summarise, both India and China should try to configure different equations to complement their investment and connectivity projects for economic growth and social change in the multi-polar world order. The need of our time is to work towards connected Asia based on commonly agreed international norms, rules and practices for the global commons. In this regard, the "United Nations Charter" should be the guiding force for the freedom of navigation, use or use of threat of force and peaceful resolution of disputes (Jaishankar, 2016). This leads to the crucial question - Does national interest determine the way sovereign nation act & communicate, or vice versa? Probably the answer to this question lies in both state's mutual need to reconcile their domestic priorities with external priorities, which require strong political will, judiciousness and civilisational wisdom to address any contradictions promptly in their diplomatic relations.

## References

- Acharya, A. (2011). Course Correction: An Analysis of the origins and Implications of the Sino-Indian Agreements of 2003 and 2005. *China Report*, 47(2), 159-171.
- Arun, S. (2008). *Are We Deceiving Ourselves Again? Lessons the Chinese Taught Pandit Nehru but Which We Still Refuse to Learn*. New Delhi: ASA Publications.
- Bambawale, G. (2019, April 9). There is a series of steps that the new Indian govt should take to cement ties with China. *The Indian Express*, p. 1. Retrieved from <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/pune-china-india-relations-trade-5665764/>
- David, S. (2007). *China Stands Up: The PRC and the International System*. New York: Routledge.
- Freeman, C.P. (2018). China's Regionalism Foreign Policy and China-India relations in South Asia. *Contemporary Politics*, 24(1), 81-97.
- Garver, J. (2002). Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 25(4), 109-134.
- Garver, J. (2012). The Diplomacy of a Rising China in South Asia. *Orbis*, 56(3), 391-411.
- Gokhle, V. (2019, January 11). Observer Research Foundation. India must emerge as a rule maker in the 21st century. Retrieved January 15, 2019, from <https://www.orfonline.org/india-must-emerge-as-a-rule-maker-in-the-21st-century-foreign-secretary-gokhle/>
- Gupta, A. (2015, April 19). The China-India defense dialogue. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/the-china-india-defense-dialogue/>
- Horimoto, T. (2014). Ambivalent Relations of India and China: Cooperation and Caution. *Journal of Contemporary East Asian Studies*, 3(2), 61-92.

- Jaishankar, S. (2016, March 5). Raisina Dialogue 2016. Keynote Address by Foreign Secretary of India, Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Retrieved April 10, 2019, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8tdBuUJZGRI>
- Jiali, M. (2010). Zhong-Yin guanxi de huigui yu zhanwang [Relations and Prospects for Chinese-Indian Relations]. Heping yu fazhan [Peace and Development], 4, 9-10.
- Jianxue, L. (2010). Zhong-Yin guanxi zhili maixiang xintaijie [China-India Relations Strive to Move to a New Level]. Shijie zhishi [World Affairs], 9, 26-27.
- John, G. (2001). Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- John, G. (2016). China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Li, L. (2009). Security Perception and China-India Relations. India: Knowledge World.
- Malone, D., & Mukherjee, R. (2010). India and China: Conflict and Cooperation. *Survival*, 52(1), 137-158.
- Mastro, O.S. (2019). It takes two to tango: autocratic underbalancing, regime legitimacy and China's responses to India's rise. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 42(1), 114-152.
- Mathai, R. (2012, April 16). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Speech by Foreign Secretary on Building Global Security at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) – Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS). Retrieved May 5, 2019, from <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/19340/Speech+by+Foreign+Secretary+on+Building+Global+Security+at+the+Institute+of+Peace+and+Conflict+Studies+IPCS++Konrad+Adenauer+Stiftung+KAS>
- Menon, S. (2016). China, the World and India. *China Report*, 52(2), 129-137.
- Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2017, August 4). BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration. Retrieved March 14, 2019, from [http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/28912\\_XiamenDeclaration.pdf](http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/28912_XiamenDeclaration.pdf)
- Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2005, April 11). Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question. Retrieved March 15, 2019, from <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6534/Agreement+between+the+Government+of+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Government+of+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on+the+Political+Parameters+and+Guiding+Principles+for+the+Settlement+of+the+IndiaChina+Boundary+Question>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2006, November 22). Hu Jintao Holds Talks with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Retrieved April 19, 2019, from [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjb\\_663304/zzjg\\_663340/yzs\\_663350/gjlb\\_663354/2711\\_663426/2713\\_663430/t281563.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2711_663426/2713_663430/t281563.shtml)
- Prys, M., & Wojczewski, T. (2015). Rising Powers, NGOs and North-South Relations in Global Climate Governance: The Case of Climate Finance. *Politikon*, 42(1), 93-111.
- Panda, J. (2013, September 2). China-India Joint Military Drill: Time for a Review. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Comment. Retrieved from [https://idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinaIndiaJointMilitaryDrill\\_jppanda\\_020913](https://idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinaIndiaJointMilitaryDrill_jppanda_020913)
- Panda, J. (2014). China's tryst with the IORA: Factoring India and the Indian Ocean. *Strategic Analysis*, 38(5), 668-687.
- Pardesi, M.S. (2010). Understanding (Changing) Chinese Strategic Perceptions of India. *Strategic Analysis*, 34(4), 562-578.
- Paul, T.V. (2018). When Balance of Power meets globalization: China, India and the small states of South Asia. *Politics*, 39(1), 50-63.
- Reischer, R. (2012, July 11). China and India Unite on Energy. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2012/07/china-and-india-unite-on-energy/>
- Roy-Chaudhury, R. (2018). India's perspectives towards China in their shared South Asian neighbourhood: Cooperation versus competition. *Contemporary Politics*, 24(1), 98-112.
- Ruisheng, C. (2010). Zhong-Yin jianjiao 60 nian jingyan yu qishi [Experience and Inspiration in 60 Years of Establishing Chinese-Indian Relations]. *Dongnanya nanya yanjiu [Southeast Asia & South Asian Studies]*, 3, 21-22.
- Saran, S. (2015, October 9). What China's One Belt and One Road Strategy Means for India, Asia and the World. *The Wire*, p. 1. Retrieved from <https://thewire.in/external-affairs/what-chinas-one-belt-and-one-road-strategy-means-for-india-asia-and-the-world>
- Saran, S. (2017). Changing dynamics in India-China relations. *China Report*, 53(2), 259-263.

- Saran, S. (2019, May 7). China's emergence as a scientific power. Business Standard, p. 1. Retrieved from [https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/china-s-emergence-as-a-scientific-power-119050701349\\_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/china-s-emergence-as-a-scientific-power-119050701349_1.html)
- Skylar Mastro, O. (2019). It takes two to tango: autocratic underbalancing, regime legitimacy and China's responses to India's rise. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 42(1), 114-152.
- Taylor, F. (2011). *China Views India's Rise: Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differences. Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers - China and India*. Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research.
- Tiang-Boon, H. (2016). The hedging prong in India's evolving China strategy. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25(101), 792-804.
- Uberoi, P. (11, November 01). The BCIM forum: Retrospect and prospect. Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi Retrieved from <https://www.icsin.org/uploads/2015/04/12/df72872d10c0497dadfb52322bafd900.pdf>
- Wagner, C. (2016). The Role of India and China in South Asia. *Strategic Analysis*, 40(4), 307-320.
- Wang, Y. (2016). Offensive for defensive: The belt and road initiative and China's new grand strategy. *The Pacific Review*, 29(3), 455-463.
- Wojczewski, T. (2016). China's rise as a strategic challenge and opportunity: India's China discourse and strategy. *India Review*, 22-60.
- Zhaohui, L. (2019, April 1). Xiě zài jiniàn zhōng yìn jiànjiāo 69 zhōunián zhī jì [Written on the occasion of the 69th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India]. Lóng xiàng gòng wǔ, xiéshǒu kāichuàng yàzhōu shìjì: xiě zài jiniàn zhōng yìn jiànjiāo 69 zhōunián zhī jì [Can the Dragon and Elephant dance together to create the Asian Century?]. Retrieved April 2, 2019, from [https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?\\_\\_biz=MzIyNzI3MDM5Nw==&mid=2660812443&idx=1&sn=69427c2f7ec28a7a6cc98e1f7f30354d&chksm=f30fad09c478241fa8b436e65908b97810851b369224be3ac56abfd575fcac5e9defb15cb973&mpshare=1&scene=24&srcid=#rd](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzIyNzI3MDM5Nw==&mid=2660812443&idx=1&sn=69427c2f7ec28a7a6cc98e1f7f30354d&chksm=f30fad09c478241fa8b436e65908b97810851b369224be3ac56abfd575fcac5e9defb15cb973&mpshare=1&scene=24&srcid=#rd)
- Zhizhen, Y. (2010). Yindu zhizao Zhong-Yin guanxi bu hexie yuanyin tanxi" [Exploration of the Causes of Discord in Chinese-Indian Relations Created by India]. *Nanya yanjiu [South Asian Studies]*, 3, 37-



# An Evaluation of Fulfillment of Press Freedom as the Intrinsic Values of Psychological Contract of Macau Journalists After the Passing of Civil Protection Law under the Background of Economic Success With Once Over 75% Government Approval Rate

Dr Vincent Lam Hing-Po<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Senior Lecturer in International Journalism, Beijing Normal University-Hong Kong Baptist University United International College (UIC). Address: 28 Jinfeng Road, Tangjiawan, Zhuhai, Guangdong Province, China. E-mail: vincentlam@uic.edu.hk

## Abstract

The research is conducted with background that Macau government has had positive satisfaction rate from 1999 to 2018. According to Macau annual survey by HKU's public polling survey released in December 2018, Macau government received with highest satisfaction rate of 75.8% in 2014 and 62.6% of Macau residents evaluate the policy of the Central Government on Macau after the Handover to be very good and quite good. 62% of Macau residents rated trust in the Beijing Government in 2018 with highest rate at 79.9% during the research period. The Macau's GDP per capital recorded USD of USD 83,000 per capital in 2019 from USD15,000 in 1999 during the research period. Macau has no independence ranking on the league table the reporter without border ranking. The Article 27 of Macau Basic Law guarantees that Article 27 Macao residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, Of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike. On 10th June 2019, in order to prevent the spread of rumours, fake news or misinformation during emergency situations, the Legislative Assembly (AL) 1st Standing Committee passed the Civil Protection Law which defines crimes against public security, order and peace in sudden incidents of public nature, with a previous draft predicting a possible prison sentence of up to three years for spreading false, unfounded and biased news. This paper aims to apply requirements used by the reporter without border for measurement of the editorial independence to obtain the perspective of Macau Journalists towards the degree of press freedom in Macau and whether the organizations they work for fulfill the press freedom as the intrinsic values of Psychological Contract on their employment contract after the passing of this law. 10 news workers from Macau local media organizations were interviewed anonymously for this research.

**Keywords:** Press Freedom, Macau Journalists, Civil Protection Law

## Introduction

The research is conducted with background that Macau government has had positive satisfaction rate from 1999 to 2018. According to Macau annual survey by HKU's public polling survey released in December 2018, Macau government received with highest satisfaction rate of 75.8% in 2014 and 62.6% of Macau residents evaluate the policy of the Central Government on Macau after the Handover to be very good and quite good. 62% of Macau residents rated trust in the Beijing Government in 2018 with highest rate at 79.9% during the research period.<sup>1</sup>

The Macau's GDP per capital recorded USD of USD 83,000 per capital in 2019 from USD15,000 in 1999 during the research period. Macau has no independence ranking on the league table the reporter without border ranking. The Article 27 of Macau Basic Law guarantees that Article 27 Macao residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, Of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike.

On 10<sup>th</sup> June 2019, in order to prevent the spread of rumours, fake news or misinformation during emergency situations, the Legislative Assembly (AL) 1st Standing Committee passed the Civil Protection Law which defines crimes against public security, order and peace in sudden incidents of public nature, with a previous draft predicting a possible prison sentence of up to three years for spreading false, unfounded and biased news.

This paper aims to apply requirements used by the reporter without border for measurement of the editorial independence to obtain the perspective of Macau Journalists towards the degree of press freedom in Macau and whether the organizations they work for fulfill the press freedom as the intrinsic values of Psychological Contract on their employment contract after the passing of this law. 10 news workers from Macau local media organizations were interviewed anonymously for this research.

## How does psychological contract theory applied in Macau Media industry

Ideology-infused psychological contract is one of the constitutive elements of the psychological contract theory. Development in the ideology infused psychological contract opened up many new opportunities to examine the intrinsic values for employer to evaluate successful fulfillment and adaptation for an employee to integrate into the general ideology of an industry and a company.

According to the summary from BBC over the Macau Media industry , it notes that *The local government is the main media player in Macau; it runs terrestrial TV and radio stations and subsidises the press.*

*The law provides for freedom of expression and the media express a range of views. However, the local government "occasionally sought to restrict this right" the US Department of State said in its 2018 human rights assessment. It said that media sometimes self-censor.*

Macao Daily News - main daily, Chinese-language Va Kio Daily - Chinese-language Hoje Macau - Portuguese-language daily Jornal Tribuna de Macau - Portuguese-language daily Ponto Final - Portuguese-language daily Macao Daily Times - English-language MacaoNews - online news in English, Chinese	Press
Teledifusao Macau - operates Chinese and Portuguese-language networks Macao Asia Satellite TV (MASTV) - private	Television
Radio Macau - operates Chinese and Portuguese-language networks Radio Vila Verde - private	Radio

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.hkpop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/macau/>

The 10 interviewees have worked in the above-mentioned media organizations over 2 years. Civil Protection Law to the Legislative Assembly (AL) 1st Standing Committee, made amendments with Article 25, which proposes a prison sentence for spreading rumours, fake news or misinformation during emergency situations.

Passed in 10<sup>th</sup> June, 2019, the article 25 of the Civil Protection framework proposal defines crimes against public security, order and peace in sudden incidents of public nature, with a previous draft predicting a possible prison sentence of up to three years for spreading false, unfounded and biased news.<sup>2</sup>

This study is to apply the model used by Vincent Lam et, al (2019) from measurements used by the Reporter without Reporter for the measurement of fulfillment of the press freedom as the intrinsic values of Psychological Contract on their employment contract in Hong Kong for the replica research in Macau after the passing this act. The model is based on the Rousseau (2001) conceptualization of psychological contract to examine whether there an intrinsic value of expectation for employer and employee to form psychological contract for the successful employment relationship.

The psychological contract has been further developed by Thompson and Bunderson (2003) through introducing of the concept of intrinsic values of ideology-infused psychological contract. Ideological contract is founded on intrinsic motivation and ideologically infused psychological contracts have implications for perceptions of contract breach and outlined that ideology may infuse into psychological contract to lead to a direct impact on employee's role on an organization.

Thus, (Bingham et. al 2014) suggested that successful fulfillment of obligations from psychological contract is essential for an individual's relationship with his or her employer to form positive attributions of friendship and influence within the organization.

Therefore, this paper only looks at the ideology-infused psychological contract as intrinsic values for the employment bonding creation for the maintain of the same editorial management direction by employer to employee.

### Question Setting

This paper takes the widely-used survey from Reporter without Border for the measurement of press freedom index to apply on Macau. Twelve questions were asked to editors regarding their perception of whether their media company remain the same editorial direction with the factors of editorial interference from management and shareholder and government after passing of Civil Protection Law in June 2019.

#### Question1

What are the factors apparently preventing the creation of independent, privately owned media? Note: "1" signifies that the factor plays no part in preventing the creation of a media company; "10" signifies that the factor makes forming a media company impossible.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Political factor (political position, closeness to the opposition)										

#### Question 2

How difficult is it to launch an independent private media company in light of the following constraints? Note: "1" signifies no difficulty; "10" signifies an insurmountable obstacle

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Administrative constraints (tax reporting										

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.al.gov.mo/zh/law/lawcase/387>

procedures, professional competence requirements etc.)										
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

## Question 3

How difficult is it to launch an independent private media company in light of the following constraints? Note: "1" signifies no difficulty; "10" signifies an insurmountable obstacle

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Financial constraints (start-up costs, production costs, bank credit etc.)										

## Question 4

Is the process for granting TV and radio licences transparent? Note: "1" signifies no difficulty; "10" signifies an insurmountable obstacle

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Is the process for granting TV and radio licence transparent?										

## Question 5

What is the extent of official interference in appointments to these posts? Note: "1" signifies no difficulty; "10" signifies an insurmountable obstacle

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Directors of the TV and radio regulatory agency (1)										

## Question 6

How easy is it for authorities to force the firing of a... Note: '1' signifies that authorities are powerless to force a firing; '10' signifies that authorities can force a firing at will.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
private media executive?										

## Question 7 Do private media have to adjust their content in exchange for state subsidies?

Note: '1' signifies a situation in which officials show no favouritism; '10' signifies that favouritism is firmly established.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Do private media have to adjust their content in exchange for state subsidies?										

## Question 8

Is government advertising distributed equitably among different media? Note: All state paid publicity campaigns in the media should be considered together: public education (health, traffic safety etc.); information (operations of public services, new legislation etc.); employment (recruitment campaigns); public works (bid invitations).

Note: '1' signifies a situation in which officials show no favouritism; '10' signifies that favouritism is firmly established.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Is government advertising distributed equitably among different media										

## Question 9

Does the government pressure advertisers to favour certain media?

Note: '1' signifies a situation in which officials show no favouritism; '10' signifies that favouritism is firmly established.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Does the government pressure advertisers to favour certain media?										

## Question 10

Do officials favour certain media (access, interviews etc.) because of...

Note: '1' signifies a situation in which officials show no favouritism; '10' signifies that favouritism is firmly established.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
favourable editorial policy?										

## Question 11

Do officials favour certain media (access, interviews etc.) because of...

Note: '1' signifies a situation in which officials show no favouritism; '10' signifies that favouritism is firmly established.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
financial ties between politicians and media owners?										

## Question 12

Do you have any additional comment over the pressure of change of editorial direction?

**Response and Analysis**

The 10 editors were given the survey and replied on anonymous basis with the following reply:

## Question 1

What are the factors apparently preventing the creation of independent, privately owned media? Note: "1" signifies that the factor plays no part in preventing the creation of a media company; "10" signifies that the factor makes forming a media company impossible.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Political factor (political position, closeness to the opposition)	2	8								

## Question 2

How difficult is it to launch an independent private media company in light of the following constraints? Note: "1" signifies no difficulty; "10" signifies an insurmountable obstacle

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Administrative constraints (tax reporting procedures, professional competence requirements etc.)		9	1							

## Question 3

How difficult is it to launch an independent private media company in light of the following constraints? Note: "1" signifies no difficulty; "10" signifies an insurmountable obstacle

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Financial constraints (start-up costs, production costs, bank credit etc.)									7	3

## Question 4

Is the process for granting TV and radio licences transparent? Note: “1” signifies no difficulty; “10” signifies an insurmountable obstacle

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Is the process for granting TV and radio licence transparent?		1	7	2						

## Question 5

What is the extent of official interference in appointments to these posts? Note: “1” signifies no difficulty; “10” signifies an insurmountable obstacle

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Directors of the TV and radio regulatory agency			4	5						

## Question 6

How easy is it for authorities to force the firing of a... Note: '1' signifies that authorities are powerless to force a firing; '10' signifies that authorities can force a firing at will.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
private media executive?			7	3						

## Question 7 Do private media have to adjust their content in exchange for state subsidies?

Note: '1' signifies a situation in which officials show no favouritism; '10' signifies that favouritism is firmly established.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Do private media have to adjust their content in exchange for state subsidies?			1	1	8					

## Question 8

Is government advertising distributed equitably among different media? Note: All state paid publicity campaigns in the media should be considered together: public education (health, traffic safety etc.); information (operations of public services, new legislation etc.); employment (recruitment campaigns); public works (bid invitations).

Note: '1' signifies a situation in which officials show no favouritism; '10' signifies that favouritism is firmly established.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Is government advertising distributed equitably among different media				1	9					

## Question 9

Does the government pressure advertisers to favour certain media?

Note: '1' signifies a situation in which officials show no favouritism; '10' signifies that favouritism is firmly established.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Does the government pressure advertisers to favour certain media?		2	5	2	1					

## Question 10

Do officials favour certain media (access, interviews etc.) because of...

Note: '1' signifies a situation in which officials show no favouritism; '10' signifies that favouritism is firmly established.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
favourable editorial policy?			6	4						

## Question 11

Do officials favour certain media (access, interviews etc.) because of...

Note: '1' signifies a situation in which officials show no favouritism; '10' signifies that favouritism is firmly established.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
financial ties between politicians and media owners?				5	5					

## Question 12

Do you have any additional comment over fulfillment of the press freedom as the intrinsic values of Psychological Contract on their employment contract?

News worker 1	Since 1999, Macau has enjoyed economic boom and most people are better off since handover. The general public have strong confidence on the success of Macau and the ability of Macau government. Therefore, the high credibility of Macau government has earned the public trust over its administration and the passing of the Civil Protection Law does not alter any editorial independence.
News Worker 2	All Macau media is closely related to the government and privately-owned media has biggest advertising revenue from either Casinos and government. Therefore, it is better to rely on government for the operation. The general conception of Macau's journalists are to report truth and the government has proven as the most reliable source of information for journalists to cross-reference fact check. There is nothing for the Act to have an impact on Macau's general editorial independence.
News Worker 3	Journalists in Macus consider working in media as only just a job without much ideology values attached. Macau had very difficult economic situation and political instability before Handover. It is important to maintain and treasure the current stability with full collaboration with government. Fake news can risk the stability of society and the Act is good to ensure a transparent and creditable information in circulation.
News Worker 4	Macau has unofficially returned to China in 1960s following the Macau 123 incident in 1967. Since then, all media are all in very close relationship with Chinese government. The situation continues after Macau's return to China in 1999 and until now.
News Worker 5	People believe in fake news only because they have no trust in government. Macau Public has positive Satisfaction rate over Macau government and it is difficult for Macau public to believe negative intentions from government's policy and people in Macau has been taken well carefully by Macau and Central government. It is important to have the Act to protect the social stability of the Society.
News worker 6	There is so much fake news on internet and the jobs of journalists are to ensure the information correctness. The passing of the Civil Protection Law provides good guidance for editorial board in Macau media industry to understand the importance of fact checking before any news published.
News Worker 7	Basically, the major adverting revenue and shareholders of Macau Press is from Government, it is natural for news organization to fulfil their shareholder's requirements. Employers in Media company expect the employees to follow this ideology philosophy and most journalists also believe that it is necessary for fulfil employer's expectations for their job.
News worker 8	The editorial fact-checking system in most Macau media company is to seek

	information confirmation from government so that this is to reinforce the current fact checking system. Most journalists do not expect complete editorial freedom as media company is essentially a business. As long as what is reported is fact, the editorial freedom is enshrined.
News worker 9	Macau has only population of half million, there is really sensitive news so that this is not an issue for journalists. Macau journalists in general have the belief that the current economic success is based on support from Macau and Central government over the Casino business and reporters' job is to ensure the message from government correctly delivered to the society. Future success of Macau is a joint effort between Society, government and Media.
News Worker 10	Macau's news only focuses on Casino industry development, government new policies, relationship with Mainland especially Zhuhai over the Hengqin Development. Macau is in shortage of lands for the housing and people is mostly concerned if Hengqin Island from Zhuhai can offer sufficient lodging for Macau residents and other social benefit policies than political agenda.

## Conclusion

The research shows that the journalists do not consider the Act to have any impact on the editorial independence for major press in Macau as the media has long used government as source of information. The general belief is that Macau is a small city with population of half population and the government has successfully delivered economic boom.

That economic improvement has led the general public with strong belief in the ability of government as proven by the polling result of Macau Annual survey by HKU's public polling survey with highest satisfaction rate of 73.7% in 2014 and constant positive rating through out 1998 to 2018. Interviewees believed that the Act to be important to maintain the social stability of Macau. Macau and Central government are highly supportive to Macau so that social stability can not be compromised by fake news and editorial independence is already fully guaranteed by the Basic Law.

Media is either owned by the government or is closely connected with the government through the advertising revenue dependency so that the editorial board has been pro government even since 1960's until now. Journalists believe it is difficult to launch an independent private media company in light of the following constraints because of high financial investment but it is not difficult to obtain license to operate a private media.

Given the small size of market and small population in Macau, there is hardly any sensitive or very important news on domestic issues and the general public is more concerned about the Casino industry development and other Livelihood issues such as housing and land development with economic cooperation with Hengqin Island of Zhuhai.

A common belief of the common editorial freedom in Macau is that the editorial fact-checking system in most Macau media company is to seek information confirmation from government so that this is to reinforce the current fact checking system. As long as what has been reported is fact, the editorial freedom is enshrined.

## References

- Bingham, J. B., Oldroyd, J. B., Thompson, J. A., Bednar, J. S., & Bunderson, J. S. (2014). Status and the true believer: The impact of psychological contracts on social status attributions of friendship and influence. *Organization Science*, 25(1), 73-92.
- Macac Basic Law

- People's Satisfaction in the Macau SAR Government from 1998 to 2018, Macau Annual Survey by Public Polling Program of Hong Kong University.
- Proposta de Lei intitulada "Lei de bases de protecção civil"
- Vincent Lam (2017) How do perceptions about the presence or absence of press freedom ideology in job candidates affect Hong Kong media companies' hiring decisions?; *DBA Thesis*, University of Newcastle Australia.
- Vincent Lam Hing-Po and Lo Suk-fun, An Empirical Study of Potential Breach of Psychological Contract of Hong Kong Journalist Towards the Swift of Editorial Direction Between June and July 2019 After the Announcement of Fugitive Ordinance in Hong Kong (August 16, 2019). *Journal of Social and Political Sciences*, Vol.2 No.3 (2019).
- Reporter Without Border Survey 2018
- Rousseau, D. M. (2001). Schema, promise and mutuality: The building blocks of the psychological contract. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 74, 511-541.
- Thompson, J. A., & Bunderson, J. S. (2003). Violations of principle Ideological currency in the psychological contract. *Academy of Management Review*, 28(4), 571-586



# Employee Motivation Factors in Banking Sector: A Study on Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis

K.W.S.N. Kumari<sup>1</sup>, G.J.M.S.R. Jayasinghe<sup>1</sup>, J.K.H. Sampath<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Science and Technology, Faculty of Applied Sciences, Uva Wellassa University, Badulla, Srilanka

<sup>2</sup>Department of Biosystems Technology, Faculty of Technological Studies, Uva Wellassa University, Badulla, Srilanka

Correspondence: K.W.S.N. Kumari, Department of Science and Technology, Faculty of Applied Sciences, Uva Wellassa University, Badulla, Srilanka. Tel: +94-711244919 E-mail: sandya@uwu.ac.lk

## Abstract

Motivation is defined as thing that activates human behavior to attain a certain achievement. In the banking sector, the success of the organization mainly reflected by the hard works of employees. Therefore, to achieve the organizational goals employee should be motivated by the external and internal factors. The purposes of this study were to investigate motivation factors, and variation of the impact of demographic determinants on job satisfaction across public and private banking sectors in Sri Lanka. The employees of private and public banks in Uva province was the population of the study. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis was used to perform the analysis. In-depth interviews were done with 30 employees in all grades of private and public banking sector. In-depth analysis was conducted on views about job satisfaction, payments, promotions, recognition and working hours as motivation factors. The sample size of the quantitative data was 250. Narrator analysis was performed on the qualitative data to investigate motivation factors and top motivation factor among employees, while the chi-square test and ordinal logistic regression techniques were used in quantitative analysis. The results indicated that the majority of the employees considered job satisfaction as the top motivator among bankers. A number of dependents, education level and distance to the workplace are significant factors on job satisfaction of private sector bankers whereas age and experience had a significant impact on job satisfaction of public sector employees which implies that demographic determinants on job satisfaction vary with the banking sector.

**Keywords:** In-Depth Analysis, Job Satisfaction, Motivation, Ordinal Logistic Regression, Recognition

## 1. Introduction

Motivated workers utilize their skills efficiently for the success of the organization. Positive motivation reflects employee satisfaction towards the job and directly effects the profitability of the organization. Theoretically, motivation refers to what activates, leads human behavior and how this behavior is maintained to attain a particular goal (Srivastava and Bhatia, 2013). Motivation can be categorized as extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Extrinsic motivation denotes external factors, which can be measured in monetary terms, such as salary and benefits (Aronson, Wilson and Akert, 2002). Intrinsic motivation refers to internal factors such as job

satisfaction. Job satisfaction, salary, promotion, team spirit, working hours and recognition are some of the motivation factors analyzed in most of the studies (Srivastava and Bhatia, 2013). Further, past studies revealed that top motivator among workers is job satisfaction (Srivastava and Bhatia, 2013) and job satisfaction may vary with the demographic profile (Kamal and Sengupta, 2008). Therefore, it is worth investigating the employee motivation factors and job satisfaction of workers.

The economy of any country depends on three key regions; agricultural sector, industrial sector, and service sector (Farwin and Uthayakumar, 2018). Among their vital role is played by the service sector for the success of economic advancement. In the Sri Lankan financial system, the banking sector which is one of the service segments plays a major role. Banks make a bridge between savers and borrowers by accepting deposits and lending. This process establishes an equilibrium status in the economy. Further, banking sector accomplishes social responsibility such as providing financial support to self-employers through lending. It evidenced that the banking sector contributes to the massive extent to the financial development of the country directly and indirectly. However, with the global recession, due to the decline of income of borrower, there are unable to repay the installments. Therefore, non-performing loans (NPLs) increase and with respect to that the cost of provisions for potential losses associated with credit increase. Consequently, the profit of the bank falls. This matter causes an enormous effect on banking sector in Sri Lanka. To overcome this issue, authorities should effectively and efficiently utilize internal resources. Therefore, the hard work of motivated employees is recognized as the key element in successful navigation through these harsher financial issues (Kozarevic, Peric and Delic, 2014). Generally, banks are highly known for a heavy workload, long working hours and least motivated employees. By considering these facts, this study is conducted among employees in the banking sector to investigate the factors motivating employees, explore the topmost motivator among banking employees and the variation of influence of demographic determinants on job satisfaction along with banking sector; private and public.

### *1.1. Literature review*

Srivastava and Bhatia (2013) were conducted research to identify motivational factors on employee satisfaction in public sector banking employees. Self-administrated questionnaires were used to collect data among limited banks in Lucknow and individual communication was done to go in-depth of details. The respondent rated that the top five motivational factors as job satisfaction, promotions/expectations, recognition, good pay, and styles of organization/management. Further, the study revealed that the top motivator among prospective workers today is job satisfaction.

Kamal and Sengupta (2018) conducted research on the bank officer's job satisfaction. 100 officers from 28 branches of one of the largest Indian banks were used for the analysis. According to the analysis, job satisfaction of bank officers is related to various variables such as age, occupational level, size of the organization, organizational climate, educational qualifications, economic background, size of the family, and gender. It was concluded that the level of job satisfaction varies with the change of satisfaction determinants and with age, people are generally more satisfied with their jobs. This study reveals the relationship between job satisfaction and personal circumstances and the relativity of the overall concept of personal perception of job satisfaction.

Ahmad, Ahmed, Mangi, Palwishah, and Susan (2014) worked on a study to determine the factors motivating employees in the banking sector of Pakistan with respect to their demographic reflections. The questionnaire was filled from employees working in public sector banks. Motivational factors such as "Fair wages and Promotion," "Health and other services," "Work environment," "Job Specification," "Prestige and Request," "Management Policies and Style," "Non-Cash Benefits," "Sports" and lastly "Setting and Defining Goals" play a significant role in motivating employees. Since in public banks of Pakistan, didn't consider the motivation of employees though it is vital, this study directs their attention to the above-mentioned factors in order to increase their performance.

Amrizal (2016) investigated the impact of achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility and advancement on banking employee's job satisfaction. Both quantitative and qualitative research design was applied in this study. Snowball sampling technique was used in quantitative analysis and 900 employees were selected whereas for the qualitative data, 18 human resource and technology managers of Islamic and conventional banks were considered by using a purposive sampling technique. The structural equation model was used to perform quantitative analysis. In qualitative analysis, data was collected by conducting interviews and narrator analysis was used for the data analysis. Quantitative analysis revealed that all indicators of achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility and advancement have a positive significant association and very strong influence for Islamic and conventional banks. Finally, the results of the qualitative data analysis confirmed the quantitative findings.

## 2. Methodology

In this study, both qualitative and quantitative research design was used. Both private and public sector banking employees in the Uva province were considered as the population. Data were collected for the qualitative analysis by conducting individual interviews with 15 employees in the public banking sector and 15 private sector banking employees who were selected using a judgemental sampling technique. The selected sample comprises 30 individuals in all grades of banking sector. In-depth analysis was done on the views of Job satisfaction, Payment, recognition, working hours and promotions which are considered motivational factors. The narrator analysis used as the qualitative data analysis technique to identify the employee motivation factors and explore the top motivator among bankers.

The questionnaire which contains questions on demographic information and job satisfaction level in a five-point likert scale was used to collect the quantitative data. The sample size of each sector was determined by proportionate to the population size. Then, a multi-stage random sampling technique was adopted to obtain 250 samples, which consist of private and public sector banking employees in all grades who are working in the Uva province. The demographic factors; age, gender, civil status, education level, number of dependents, distance to workplace, experience and job grade were considered. Chi-square test and ordinal logistic regression techniques were used to investigate the influence of demographic factors on job satisfaction in each sector. The dependent variable was job satisfaction and independent variables were demographic profiles. Since the job satisfaction contained satisfaction levels in a five-point likert scale, the scale of the measurement of the variable is ordinal. Therefore ordinal logistic regression models were fitted to investigate the relationship between employee satisfaction and demographic determinants across two sectors.

## 3. Results

According to the interview session, data were collected on views of employees about payments, job satisfaction, promotion, working hours and recognition. Majority of the employees in both sectors expressed that satisfaction on a job plays a major role in work motivation. Since job satisfaction is the feeling towards a job and if they are happy about the work, they can perform well in a satisfactory manner. Secondly, most of them considered the salary as the motivator. Most of the public sector employees were satisfied with the payment than private-sector employees and they expressed that they were getting a high level of salary, overtime payments, and incentives also. Proportionate to the profit they were getting bonus payments well which motivate them highly.

One of the employees said:

"I am highly satisfied with my salary and other payments. My friends are still studying in universities and the others who are doing jobs after A/levels are not enjoying this much of benefits. I got this job when I was in the first year of my university life. I decided to choose this job other than higher education. The salary is one of the most reasons that motivate me to take this decision and to work hard on achieving daily targets."

Employees revealed that according to the experience, achievements, skills, and qualifications there are promotion policies in both sectors. In the public sector, annually authorities announced interviews and examinations to assess the employees for the promotions. They said that employees with higher educational qualifications would be able to get promoted shortly than others if they perform well. All others should gain experience or need to be an extra-ordinary character by working hard, achieving targets and doing innovative things. Therefore, it highly motivates the employee to work hard.

Most of the employees in both sectors expressed that they always like to obtain appreciation from the supervisor or Manager, which motivates them to work. Further, they said that employers organize Spirit awarding ceremony annually to appreciate and recognize the achievers and hard workers. Moreover, in some branches, they are selecting the best employee of the month and rewarding, and in monthly review meetings managers are appreciated for the achievements as well as if they would not be able to achieve them, they have to get negative feedback. Therefore, they said that managers always motivate employees and themselves to perform well to avoid getting negative feedback from the authorities.

One of the managers expressed:

“The dominant crisis in the bank was an increase in NPLs. Therefore, to motivate employees on this issue, our head office took a creative solution in last year. They sent daily updates on status of the branch position according to the NPL. Further, they motivated us by sending creative motivational wishing images via email according to the achievements. NPL rate was gradually increased in one of the branches and they sent an email by mentioning “...branch are you sleeping?”. Creatively, they sent negative feedbacks also. Therefore, all of us worked hard to decrease the NPL rate and we, as a bank won the first place last year by achieving the NPL target.”

Further, most of the employees in both sectors were less satisfied with the working hours. They said that sometimes they had to work until midnight to finish their daily works. Officers have to work long hours with fewer payments which causes demotivation about work, although staff assistants are paid well for overtime works. Female workers highly demotivated with long working hours than male workers and they said that it is very difficult since they have to pay more care to their children and family than male workers.

In quantitative analysis, Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the reliability of the data set. The overall Cronbach’s alpha of the test was 0.935 and all alpha values of respective variables also were greater than 0.7. It implies the prospects' reliability of the data set. The sample comprises 250 banking employees in Uva province. Among them, 48.7% were private sector banking employees while 51.3% were public sector bankers.

Table 1: Frequency statistics of demographic variables according to the sector and Chi-squared independent test for variables

Variable		Public		Private	
		Satisfaction Rate (%)	p-value (Chi-squared test)	Satisfaction Rate (%)	p-value (Chi-squared test)
Age (Years)	18-29	70.5%	0.391	62.5%	0.596
	30-39	44.4%		60.0%	
	40-49	62.5%		50.0%	
	Above 50	100.0%		50.0%	
Gender	Male	68.9%	0.145	58.1%	0.986
	Female	55.6%		62.5%	

Civil Status	Unmarried	70.5%		60.9%	0.740
	Married	53.6%		59.6%	
Education Level	GCE O/L	50.0%	0.087	50.0%	0.589
	GCE A/L	72.1%		72.4%	
	Diploma/Professional Qualification	50.0%		55.6%	
	Degree	44.4%		47.6%	
	Postgraduate	75.0%		75.0%	
Dependents	0	68.0%	0.709	67.6%	0.081
	One child	57.1%		52.4%	
Distance to work place	< 1 Km	75.0%	0.951	66.7%	0.088
	1-20 Km	59.1%		53.8%	
	21-50 Km	59.3%		54.2%	
	>50 Km	41.4%		50.0%	
Experience (Years)	<1	60.7%	0.694	57.1%	0.083
	1-3	60.6%		58.3%	
	3-5	58.3%		57.1%	
	5-7	60.0%		67.5%	
	7-10	59.0%		70.0%	
	>10	60.0%		71.5%	
Job Grade	Trainee	62.5%	0.071	0.0%	0.753
	Clerk	73.7%		83.3%	
	Staff Assistant	64.0%		59.5%	
	Officer	66.7%		66.7%	
	Assistant Manager	50.0%		44.4%	
	Manager	0.0%		0.0%	
	Senior Manager	0.0%		100.0%	

According to the frequency statistics in table 1, the utmost of the public sector female workers was satisfied with the job whereas the majority of male bankers in the private sector had satisfaction with the job. Advance level passed employees in both public and private banks were typically satisfied with the banking job. Both private and public sector banking employees in the age group of 18 to 29 years had considerable satisfaction with their job. This age group is the youngest group in the banking organization. Since they are energetic and enthusiastic, they may be able to attach with the workload and satisfy with the job. Further, unmarried bankers and also the employees who don't have dependents, in both banking sectors were mostly satisfied with their works. When employees are unmarried and independent, they have no responsibilities in their personal life. Therefore, they will only concentrate on the job and work with a satisfied mind. The majority of satisfied employees in both private and public sectors were coming from distances less than one kilometer to their workplaces and the job satisfaction rate was slightly declined with the distance to the workplace. Moreover, the private sector employees' job satisfaction rate remained constantly around 60.0% with each level of job experience. However, in public banks, worker's satisfaction rate was increased with the rise of years of job experience. With more experience, employees may have good confidence to work and they may be adjusted well with the working environment, which will be the motive for them to work happily. According to the results, compared to non-managerial employees, the employees who are in managerial grades had a lower satisfaction rate in both sectors. Regardless of the banking sector, when bankers are in managerial grades, responsibilities increase with respect

to the benefits. Those huge responsibilities may stress them and decrease their satisfaction level about the job. Chi-square analysis implies that the number of dependents, experience and the distance to the workplace had a significant association with job satisfaction of public sector employees while in private sector employee's job satisfaction was significantly related to education level and job grade.

Table 2: Ordinal logistic regression significant coefficients and odds ratios

Variable		Coefficient	p-value	Relative Risk Ratio
<b>Public sector</b>				
Gender	Male	-		
	Female	-1.286	0.086	0.276
Education Level	GCE O/L	-		
	Diploma/Professional qualification	-3.481	0.096	0.031
Dependents	0	-		
	One child	-2.176	0.095	0.114
Distance to workplace	< 1 Km	-		
	1-20 Km	-1.696	0.086	0.183
	21-50 Km	-1.726	0.060	0.178
<b>Private sector</b>				
Age (Years)	18-29	-		
	40-49	-4.179	0.047	0.015
Gender	Male	-		
	Female	0.898	0.099	2.455
Experience (Years)	<1	-		
	1-3	1.994	0.040	7.345
	3-5	1.810	0.041	6.110
	5-7	2.254	0.000	9.526
	>10	2.331	0.006	10.288

At the 1% significance level, fitted regression models in table 2, indicate that gender has a significant impact on employee satisfaction in both public and private banks. In private sector, female workers are 0.276 more likely to be satisfied with the job compared to male workers, while in public sector female employees are 2.455 times likely to be in the satisfied group other than the male employees. However, the number of dependents, education level and distance to the workplace are significant factors on job satisfaction of private sector bankers whereas age and experience had a significant impact on job satisfaction of public sector employees. In private banks, with the increase of distance to workplace and number of dependents, employee's job satisfaction rate is decreasing. Further, an employee who had diploma/professional qualification is 0.031 more likely to be satisfied with compared to one who passed the ordinary level examination. However, in public sector banker's satisfaction level is rising with an inclination of experience while banker whose age is in between 40 and 49 years is 0.015 times satisfied than one who is in the age group of 18 and 29 years. Therefore, descriptive results obtained using a frequency table was confirmed by these two models across each sector. Further, by fitting these regression models, it was able to detect the significant groups of socio-demographic factors, which form a noteworthy impact on job satisfaction according to the banking sector.

#### 4. Discussion

According to the qualitative analysis, it emphasizes that job satisfaction as the most important motivational factor among bankers. Therefore, employee job satisfaction along with the demographic profile was analyzed. Socio-demographic factors represent an employee's personal life and it makes a vast influence on the advancement of worker's motivation. If employers identify them, employees will contribute themselves to the growth of the organization with a satisfied mind about the job. Therefore, consideration of those factors directly opens a path to achieve organizational goals. Quantitative analysis results of this study reveal that the gender, age, education level, number of dependents, distance to workplace and experience are significant socio-demographic causes on job satisfaction of bankers and the impact of those socio-demographic determinants are varied with the banking sector. For instance, in both sectors, gender makes a significant influence on job satisfaction, although in private-sector male employees are mostly satisfied and in public sector female workers are enjoyed the work with respect to male workers. Therefore, it is advisable for the banking organizations to deliberate about the socio-demographic factors along with the banking sector when making policies of recruiting and facilitating an employee. Then, employers in the public and private sector would be able to generate a win-win environment for employees and organizational goals will be achieved productively by utilizing skills of motivated employees efficiently.

#### References

- Ahmad, N., Ahmed, R. R., Mangi, R. A., Palwishah, R. I., & Susan, A. (2014). Factors Motivating Employees in Public Sector Banks: An Empirical Investigation. *European Academic Research*, 2(5), 6005-6021.
- Akhtar, N., Aziz, S., Hussain, Z., Ali, S., & Salman, M. (2014). Factors Affecting Employees Motivation in Banking Sector of Pakistan. *Journal of Asian Business Strategy*, 4(10), 125-133.
- Amrizal, (2016). Quantitative and Qualitative Approach of Banking Performance measure Based on Job Satisfaction for Islamic and Conventional banks in Indonesia. *Journal Balance*, 13(2), 63-81.
- Aronson, E., Wilson, T., & Akert, R. (2002). *Social Psychology* (4th ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Farwin, A. S. S., & Uthayakumar, S. S. (2018). The relationship between underemployment and job satisfaction of commercial bank employees: evidence from Nuwaragama area, Anuradhapura district. *Journal of Management*, 14(1), 46-56.
- Kamal, R., & Sengupta, D. (2008-09). A Study of Job Satisfaction of Bank Officers. *Prajnan*, 36(3), 229-245. Retrieved from [http://nibmindia.org/pdfs/praj\\_sample/rajjkamal.pdf](http://nibmindia.org/pdfs/praj_sample/rajjkamal.pdf).
- Kozarevic, E., Peric, A., & Delic, A. (2014). Job satisfaction of banking sector employees in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Samiya, S. (2015). Comparison of Employee Satisfaction along Age and Gender: Study of Public and Private Sector. *Journal of Business and Management*, 17(8), 44-52.
- Shrestha, I. (2019). Influence of Demographic Factors on Job Satisfaction of University Faculties in Nepal. *NCC Journal*, 4(1), 59-67.
- Srivastava, A., & Bhatia, P. (2013). A Qualitative Study of Employee Motivation Factors In Nationalized Banking Sector Of India. *International Journal of Business and Management Invention*, 2(7), 18-22.



# Public Perceptions of the City Landmark of Gianyar – Case Study: Landmarks of Ciung Wanara City Park in Gianyar

Gusti Ngurah Anom Gunawan<sup>1</sup>, Agung Budi Sarjono<sup>2</sup>, Suzanna Ratih Sari<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Architecture, University of Diponegoro, Semarang, Indonesia. Email: anom.iap@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup>Department of Architecture, University of Diponegoro, Semarang, Indonesia.

Email: agungbsardjono@gmail.com

<sup>3</sup>Department of Architecture, University of Diponegoro, Semarang, Indonesia. Email: ratihsaris@yahoo.com

## Abstract

The City of Gianyar's Landmark is Ciung Wanara City Park, which is an active park located at the intersection of Ciung Wanara Street, Ngurah Rai Street, Dharma Giri By Pass Road and Kebo Iwa Street. Landmark takes the form of a Puppet Figure Statue in the form of a Kala Rau Statue, the most prominent Garuda Wisnu Statue supported by the presence of Indra on a Horse, the Dewi Ratih Statue strung together with one another as part of the storytelling that is story of Mount *Giri Mandara* in finding *Tirta Amertha*. *Kala Rau* and Garuda Wisnu which have a height of 12 meters can be observed from the four corners of the road. As for the purpose of the Government of the Gianyar Regency to build the Kala Rau Statue, Garuda Wisnu is used as a landmark for the City of Gianyar, and is able to support the existence of Ciung Wanara City Park in Gianyar, to be able to attract the interest of visitors to visit Ciung Wanara City Park as well as being able to support the face of a city that has the title of city of arts and culture. This study uses a qualitative rationalistic method. The purpose of this research is to find out whether the statues in Ciung Wanara City Park have functioned as a landmark of the City of Gianyar and are able to support the City of Gianyar as a City of Arts and Culture.

**Keywords:** City of Gianyar Landmark, Ciung Wanara City Park, City of Art and Culture.

## 1. Introduction

Gianyar Regency is a City of Arts and Culture. In an effort to support the City of Arts and Culture, the City Government of Gianyar continues to flourish by organizing the City of Gianyar by improving city parks, government buildings, school buildings arranged in traditional Balinese Architecture styles, as well as houses along the City of Gianyar reflecting Architecture Traditional Balinese.

To add to the impression that the City is getting more attractive, the Gianyar Regency Government has created a City Park, one of which is Ciung Wanara City Park, which is located at the intersection of Ciung Wanara Street, Ngurah Rai Street, Dharma Giri By Pass Road and Kebo Iwa Street. Ciung Wanara City Park is an active park with an area of 2,600 m<sup>2</sup>. Ciung Wanara City Park is an active park where the people of Gianyar relax. People usually start busy in the afternoon until evening, especially at night the more crowded the people who visit. Gianyar City Park which is arranged with a variety of beautiful flower plants with the concept of Tropical Bali

Garden can be seen in Figure 1, and also equipped with park benches as a place for people to gather to enjoy the beauty of the Park. In an effort to beautify Ciung Wanara City Park it is also equipped with statues that function as part of the Park and also function as a landmark of the City of Gianyar, so that it is expected to increase the interest of the community to visit. Landmarks take the form of puppet figures including Kala Rau Statue, Garuda Wisnu Statue, Indra Indra Statue, and Dewi Ratih Statue can be seen in Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4.



**Figure 1.** Ciung Wanara City Park



**Figure 2.** Statue of Kala Rau and Garuda Wisnu Statue



**Figure 3.** Statue of the God of Indra



**Figure 4.** Statue of the Goddess of Ruth

The statues in Ciung Wanara City Park are a unity that is part of the wayang story of the Gunung Giri Mandara screening in searching for Tirta Amertha. The Kala Rau statue and the Garuda Wisnu statue with a height of up to 12 meters are the most prominent and can be clearly observed from Jalan Ciung Wanara, Jalan Ngurah Rai, Jalan By Pass Ngurah Rai and Jalan Kebo Iwa, with white color very prominent in Ciung Wanara City Park. The effort of the City Government to increase the value of the City of Gianyar's landmarks was done by building a pond with a singing fountain around the Kala Rau Statue and the Garuda Wisnu Statue with colorful lights can be seen in Figure 5 reinforcing the impression of the landmark.



**Figure 5.** The statue of Kala Rau and Garuda Wisnu with singing fountains

Based on observations in the field, problems can be formulated including: (1). Are the Statues in the City Park already functioning as a landmark in the City of Gianyar; (2). Are the Statues able to support the City of Gianyar as a City of Arts and Culture; Whether the existence of these statues can support Ciung Wanara City Park becomes more beautiful.

The purpose of this study can be described as follows: (1). To find out people's perceptions of the Statue in the City Park of Gianyar that functions as a landmark of the City of Gianyar; (2). To determine the public perception of the relationship between landmarks in Ciung Wanara City Park with the existence of the City of Gianyar as a City of Arts and Culture; (3). To find out how much influence the Statues in Ciung Wanara City Park on the beauty of Ciung Wanara City Park in Gianyar. Seeing the urgency of the research, it is very much needed perception from the community to assess the existence of the landmarks of the City of Gianyar so that objective research results will be obtained.

## **2. Literature Review**

### ***Meaning of Landmark City***

Landmark is a form of physical sign that can provide information for observers from a certain distance, the observer is outside the scope of the object (Lynch, Kevin, *The image of city*, The M.I.T. Press, 1960). As for the three elements of landmarks, namely: 1. Physical signs, landmarks are physical objects that can be seen with the senses of sight easily; 2. Information, landmarks can provide observers with a precise and exact picture of a place, so as to form a physical and non-physical image of the location of landmarks and surrounding places; 3. Distance, landmarks can be recognized from a certain distance, where the observer is outside the scope of the building. Requirements needed for landmarks in a city include: a. Having the character of another physical form of the physical object around it, has a unique element and is easy to remember (unique, memorable); b. Can be easily identified (identifiable). This is very related to landmarks easily recognized by observers; c. Having a fairly clear shape in a sizeable expanse, by forming a contrast between the landmark object and the surrounding environment; d. Having a deeper value in a scope / area, the extra value can be in the form of more historical or aesthetic fields.

### ***Public Perception and Community Understanding***

According to Robbins (2001) states perception is a process by which individuals organize and interpret their sense impressions in order to give meaning to their environment, while Toha (1998) expresses the notion of perception as a cognitive process experienced by someone in understanding information about the environment through both vision and hearing. Adam (2000), states perception as a good reception or taking the initiative of a communication process. The factors that influence perception are internal factors: feelings, experience, ability to think, motivation and terms of reference. Meanwhile, what is meant by external factors are: the stimulus itself and the environmental conditions in which the perception takes place.

The word community comes from the word *syaraka* which means to participate (participation). According to the big Indonesian dictionary, people are a group of people who live in certain areas and have clear boundaries. Based on the description above it can be said that community perception is a process in which a group of people who live and live in a particular area and provide an understanding or response to events that occur in their environment. According to Stephen P. Robbins (2001) there are 3 factors that influence community perception, namely: 1 Perpetrators of perception, if someone views an object and tries to interpret what he has seen, and that interpretation is strongly influenced by the personal characteristics of the perpetrators of that perception; 2. Targets or objects, are the characteristics and the observed targets can influence perceived. The relationship of the target with his background greatly affects the perception; 3. Situation, is very important in seeing objects or events caused by elements of the surrounding environment can affect our perception.

### 3. Research Method

In the initial step, it is done by describing the background of the research to reveal the facts found in the field, then the formulation of the problem will be made as a research objective. The observation stage in the field is carried out to obtain physical signs from landmarks that can be seen through the sense of sight, to see landmarks in providing information to observers so that they can be understood easily, as well as to see the viewer's field of view visibility of landmarks can still be observed properly. Furthermore, a study will be conducted using the rationalistic qualitative method. At this stage the researcher conducted a direct interview with the perpetrators of activities on Ciung Wanara Street, Ngurah Rai Street, Dharma Giri By Pass Road, Kebo Iwa Street, and visitors who visited Ciung Wanara City Park in Gianyar. The interview was conducted openly to get the public's response to the landmark of the City of Gianyar located in Ciung Wanara City Park in Gianyar. Technically the determination of the number of samples representative of the population, as stated by Sugiyono (2012). Participants were taken by purposive sampling with the number of representatives of the city population in terms of gender, the level of education of participants who carry out daily activities on Jalan Ciung Wanara, Jalan Ngurah Rai, Jalan By Pass Dharma Giri, Jalan Kebo Iwa, and visitors who visit Gianyar City Park. This research method can be described in terms of schematic like in figure 6.




Figure 6. Study Process Diagram

#### 4. Results and Discussion

Landmark is one element of a city, the more interpretations of society, the higher the value of communication. To assess the landmarks of the city of Gianyar indicators can be used that can be assessed with various aspects of them: Physical Signs, Information, Distance and Community Arts and Culture.


##### *Physical Signs*

The following are the results of the study and responses from the physical signs of the city of Gianyar in Ciung Wanara Gianyar City Park. Based on the results of the questionnaire can be seen in table.1 below.

**Table 1.** Participants' Responses about the Physical Signs of the Landmark of the City of Gianyar.

Participant Assessment Remarks	Average	Participant	Percentage
Physical Signs Very good	3.01 – 4.00	35	88%
Physical Signs Pretty good	2.01 – 3.00	5	2,50%
Physical Signs Not good	1.01 – 2.00	0	
Physical Signs Very bad	0.00 – 1.00	0	
Amount		40	100%

Information Participants were randomly drawn to do activities on Ciung Wanara Street, Ngurah Rai Street, By Pass Dharma Giri Street, Kebo Iwa Street and Visitors of Ciung Wanara Gianyar City Park



Objective

Description: Very Good

Description: VB = Very Bad

NB = Not Bad

PG = Pretty Good

VG = Verry Good

The Landmark of the City of Gianyar which takes the form of the Kala Rau Statue and the Garuda Wisnu Statue located in Ciung Wanara City Park Gianyar is very easy for participants to see because the form of Kala Rau and Garuda Wisnu with white color contrasts sharply with plants in the Park. Based on the results of the questionnaire it can be said that the physical shape of landmarks is objectively very good.

##### *Landmark Information*


The following are the results of the study and feedback on the information about the landmark of the City of

Gianyar in Ciung Wanara City Park in Gianyar. Based on the results of the questionnaire can be seen in table.2 below.

**Table 2.** Participants' Responses about the Physical Signs of the Landmark of the City of Gianyar.

Participant Assessment Remarks	Average	Participant	Percentage
Very good information	3.01 – 4.00	34	85,00%
Information is quite good	2.01 – 3.00	3	7,50%
Information is not good enough	1.01 – 2.00	2	5,00%
Very bad information	0.00 – 1.00	1	2,50%
Amount		40	100,00%

Information Participants were randomly drawn to do activities on Ciung Wanara Street, Ngurah Rai Street, By Pass Dharma Giri Street, Kebo Iwa Street and Visitors of Ciung Wanara Gianyar City Park



Objective

Description: Very Good

Description: VB = Very Bad

NB = Not Bad

PG = Pretty Good

VG = Verry Good

According to the Participants, a typical form of landmark does not exist elsewhere so that it can provide information for participants about the place where the Landmark is located, the City of Gianyar.

Based on the results of the questionnaire it can be said that the landmark of the City of Gianyar can provide very good information for the viewers.

### ***Landmark Distance***

Based on the results of the study as well as responses from participants that the Landmark can be observed from all four sides of the road, namely Ciung Wanara Street, Ngurah Rai Street, Ngurah Rai By Pass Road, and Iwa Street can be seen in Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure. 10 and figure 11 below.




Figure 7. Location Landmark City of Gianyar

The height of the landmark which reaches 12 meters in the form of the Kala Rau Statue and the Garuda Wisnu can be observed from the four directions of the road by observers.



Figure 8. Landmarks are observed from Jalan Ciung Wanara



Figure 9. Landmarks are observed from Jalan Ngurah Rai



Figure 10. Landmarks are observed




Figure 11. Landmark observed from Jalan Kebo Iwa

The following are the results of the study and participant responses regarding the distance of the City of Gianyar landmarks in Ciung Wanara City Park in Gianyar. Based on the results of the questionnaire can be seen in table 3 below.

Table 3. Participant's response to the Distance of the Landmark of the City of Gianyar

Participant Assessment Remarks	Average	Participant	Percentage
Very Good Visibility	3.01 – 4.00	7	18%
Good View Distance	2.01 – 3.00	25	62,50%
Distance is not good enough	1.01 – 2.00	8	19,50%
Distance is very bad	0.00 – 1.00	0	
Amount		40	100%



Objective

Description: Very Good  
 Description: VB = Very Bad  
 NB = Not Bad  
 PG = Pretty Good  
 VG = Verry Good

Based on the results of the questionnaire it can be said that the landmark of the City of Gianyar from an observer's perspective can be said to be objectively quite good.

### City Art and Culture


The art and culture that is meant here is related to the arts that developed in Gianyar, one of which is the sculpture which is inspired by Balinese culture which integrates with Hinduism, physical form, so that it will be very easily observed and harmonized buildings, parks, and statues in the park along Ciung Wanara Street,

Ngurah Rai Street, Ngurah Rai By Pass Street, and Kebo Iwa Street. The following are the results of the research and the participant's responses regarding landmarks in terms of Art and Culture. Based on the results of the questionnaire can be seen in table.4 below.

**Table 4.** Participant's response to the Landmark relates to the City of Gianyar as a City of Arts and Culture.

Participant Assessment Remarks	Average	Participant	Percentage
Landmark in accordance with the city of Gianyar as the City of Arts & Culture Very Good	3.01 – 4.00	33	82,50%
Landmark in accordance with the city of Gianyar as the City of Arts & Culture Fairly Good	2.01 – 3.00	7	17,50%
Landmark in accordance with the city of Gianyar as the City of Arts & Culture Poor	1.01 – 2.00	0	
Landmark in accordance with the city of Gianyar as the City of Arts & Culture Very Not Good	0.00 – 1.00	0	
Amount		40	100,00%

Information Participants were randomly drawn to do activities on Ciung Wanara Street, Ngurah Rai Street, By Pass Dharma Giri Street, Kebo Iwa Street and Visitors of Ciung Wanara Gianyar City Park



Objective

Description: Very Good

Description: VB = Very Bad

NB = Not Bad

PG = Pretty Good

VG = Verry Good

Based on the results of the questionnaire Landmark City of Gianyar strongly supports the City of Gianyar as the City of Arts and Culture.


### 3. Making City Parks Become More Beautiful

The following are the results of the research and feedback on the landmarks of the City of Gianyar in supporting Ciung Wanara City Park in Gianyar to be more beautiful. Based on the results of the questionnaire can be seen in table.5 below.

**Table.5.** Participant's response to Landmark made Ciung Wanara Gianyar City Park more beautiful.

Participant Assessment Remarks	Average	Participant	Percentage
Landmarks make the park more beautiful very well	3.01 – 4.00	37	92,50%
Landmarks make the park more beautiful quite well	2.01 – 3.00	3	7,50%
Landmark makes the park more beautiful less good	1.01 – 2.00	0	
Landmark makes the park more beautiful is not very good	0.00 – 1.00	0	
Amount		40	100,00%

Information Participants were randomly drawn to do activities on Ciung Wanara Street, Ngurah Rai Street, By Pass Dharma Giri Street, Kebo Iwa Street and Visitors of Ciung Wanara Gianyar City Park



Objective

Description: Very Good  
 Description: VB = Very Bad  
 NB = Not Bad  
 PG = Pretty Good  
 VG = Very Good

Based on the results of the questionnaire it can be said that the landmark of the City of Gianyar in supporting Ciung Wanara City Park in Gianyar based on the perception of the observer can be said to be objectively very good.

The existence of landmarks in Ciung Wanara City Park in the form of puppet figures and the size, physical shape, color and position of statues in the Park, become an interrelated unity where the Statues will make the Park more beautiful, and the park supports the existence of Gianyar City landmarks more interesting to observe.

## 5. Conclusion

Based on the results of a research study, it can be concluded that the questionnaire that was submitted to participants contained several questions in the open and closed form aimed at providing a specification of the objectives of this study. The questionnaire provides an opportunity for participants to provide an assessment of the landmarks of the City of Gianyar located in Ciung Wanara City Park in Gianyar. Participants' opinions and assessments will be concluded in an assessment categorization table as in table 6 below.

**Table.6.** Results of Public Perceptions of the City of Gianyar Landmark.

No.	Participant Assessment Remarks	Percentage	Landmark of the city of Gianyar
1	Physical Sign	88%	Very Good
2	Information	85%	Very Good
3	Distance	62,50%	Pretty Good
4	Landmark in accordance with the city of Gianyar as a city of art and culture	82,50%	Very Good
5	Landmark makes the park more beautiful	92,50%	Very Good

Based on the results of public perception of the City of Gianyar Landmark which is the lowest point of the community assessment is the distance of 62.5% this is due to the visibility of the direction of Jalan Ngurah Rai and from the direction of Jalan Kebo Iwa which cannot be observed freely. The highest percentage of assessment based on community assessment is Landmark making the park more beautiful with a percentage of 92.5%. Thus it can be concluded that the City of Gianyar Landmark located in Ciung Wanara City Park has functioned as a landmark, supporting the City of Gianyar as a City of Arts and Culture and adding to the beautiful Ciung Wanara City Park in Gianyar.

#### Acknowledgement

May I hereby express my deepest gratitude to all those who have helped, as well as families who have always provided support, so that this article can be completed.

#### References

- Abdul Hadi, Mukhyar Amani. (2017). *Public Perceptions About Green House Buildings in Banjarmasin City*. Banjarmasin: Journal of Civic Education at Lambung Mangkurat University.
- Ade Jelita Ndolu, Dr., Ir, Ibnu Sasongko, MT, Mohammad Reza, ST, MURP. (2017). *Determination of Landmark Location In order to improve the City's Image in Kelapa Lima and Oebobo Subdistricts*, Kupang City, NTT Province. Malang: Regional and City Planning Study Program, Faculty of Civil Engineering and Planning, Malang National Institute of Technology.
- Angga Dwi Susilohadi, Bambang Soemardiono, Rabbani Kharismawan. (2014). *The Design Concept of Surabaya Tower as a Landmark in the "Iconisation" Phenomenon*. Surabaya: Sepuluh November Technology Institute.
- Ching, Francis, D.K. (1991). *Architecture, Form, Space and Order*. Jakarta: Erlangga
- Diah Intan Kusumo Dewi, Landung Esariti, (2016). *Community Perceptions of Determinants of Preservation of Ancient Buildings in Kampung Kauman Semarang*. Semarang: Ruang Ejournal2.Undip.
- Dicky Yusuf, Adnan, (2015). *Landmark Yogyakarta As an Object of Creating Photography Works*. Yogyakarta: Journal of Yogyakarta State University.
- Dwi Susilohadi, Angga; Soemardiono, Bambang; Kharismawan, Rabbani, (2014). *The Surabaya Tower Design Concept as Landmark in the 'Iconization' phenomenon*. Pomits Science and Art Journal of the Department of Architecture, Faculty of Civil Engineering and Planning, Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology Surabaya.
- Dwijendra, Ngakan Ketut Acwin, (2008). *Arsitektur Rumah Tradisional Bali Berdasarkan Asta Kosala-Kosali*, Denpasar: Udayana University Press.
- Dwijendra, NKA, (2009). *Arsitektur Kebudayaan Bali Kuno*, Denpasar: Udayana University Press.
- Dwijendra, NKA, (2003). Bali Traditional Housing and Settlements. *Journal of Settlement Natah*, Vol. 1 No. February 1.

- Juliarachman Lazuardi, Muhamad; Astuti, Winny; Fitria Rini, Erma, (2018): *Analysis of Kawasa Mangkunegaran Image based on Stakeholder Assessment with the Concept of Legibility*. journal.uns.ac.id/region. Regional and Urban Planning Study Program, Faculty of Engineering, UNS.
- Lang, J. (1987). *Creating Architectural Theory*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
- Lynch, Kevin, (1960). *The Image of The City*. The M.I.T. Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Mangunwijaya, Y.B. (1988). *Wastu Citra*. Jakarta: Gramedia.
- Mirsa, R. (2012). *Elements of Urban Spatial Planning. 1*. Yogyakarta: Graha Science.
- Moh.Yuditrinurcahyo, (2005). *Study of Community Perceptions of the Kendal City Spatial General Plan*. Semarang: Master of Engineering and City and City Development Program Diponegoro University Semarang.
- Muhadjir, N. (1989). *Qualitati Research Methodology*. Jogjakarta: Rake Sarasin.
- Mulyandari, H. (2011). *Introduction to City Architecture*. Yogyakarta: Andi.
- Nurmasari Sofiyah, (2008). The Relationship of Outdoor Space Media (Using artificial lighting) to the quality of the corridor at night according to the community's perception (Case Study of Jalan Pahlawan Semarang Corridor). Semarang: Diponegoro University Semarang.
- Prasetyo, Bastian, (2015). *Campaign of the City of Bandung through the Media "Glow in Dark" as a Media for Tourism Promotion in Bandung City*. Bandung: Sketch Journal of BSI University Bandung.
- Rufiati Safariah, Rahadian Eka Putra, (2011). *Public Perceptions About the Image of Cimahi City as a Military Zone*. Bandung: Indonesian Computer University.
- Smithes, K. (1987). *Principles of Design in Architecture*. Bandung: Intermatra.
- Steven Richard Kamurahan, Judy O. Waani, Octavianus H.A. Rogi, (2014). *Study of Community Perceptions of Aesthetics of Building Facade Design with Subjective Theory Approach*. Manado: Journal of Architecture Study Program Postgraduate Sam Ratulangi University.
- Sugiyono (1997). *Statistics for Research*. Bandung: Alfabeta.
- Tom Rees Budiman, Ival; M Rondonuwu, Dwight, E.Tungka, (2018). *Analysis of the Forming Elements of City Images in the Tahuna Urban Area, Sangihe Islands Regency*. Journal of Spatial Journal. Regional and Urban Planning Study Program. Faculty of Engineering. Sam Ratulangi University. Manado.



# Money Politics vs. Political Cost; Enforcing and Honest Democracy

Edhy Prabowo<sup>1</sup>, Dadang Rahmat Hidayat<sup>1</sup>, Dadang Sugiana<sup>1</sup>, Bachtiar Aly<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Faculty of Communication, the University of Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia

<sup>2</sup>Faculty of Communication, the University Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia

## Abstract

Elections require costs, because there are a number of expenses to succeed during the campaign, this is what is referred to as political costs. In addition to political costs, a phenomenon arises in the current democratic system in Indonesia, prevalently called by money politics. There were many cases of campaign violations that used money politics to get as many votes as possible. The purpose of writing this article is to explain the political costs and money politics in the process of democracy in Indonesia especially in the electoral district of South Sumatra 1. In addition, the study wanted to describe how persuasive political communication can be a strategy for low cost campaign but still effective to gain a lot of votes. This is a qualitative using the case study method. The subject of this study was the elected legislators during the period of 2014-2019 with a significant vote acquisition in their electoral district of South Sumatra 1. The results of the study showed that not all electoral participants practiced money politics, evidently there were successful candidates for the South Sumatra electoral district 1 without money politics, even only with low to moderate costs of politics. The legislative candidate for the South Sumatra electoral district 1 in his campaign carried out persuasive political communication as a campaign strategy. The candidates apply two main strategies; direct communication towards constituents and using an opinion leader (Opinion Leader). The communication patterns applied are face to face with constituents, as well as using mass media.

**Keywords:** Money Politic, Cost Politic, Democracy, Campaign

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Introduce the Problem

Elections are a way of political participation for all citizens and an absolute prerequisite for a country that adopts a democratic system. Citizens' political participation is a major foundation for the creation of a democratic climate. (Verba, Scholzman and Brad, 1995). Elections are a means for a country to show that there is a democratic process in choosing members of the board and president. In Indonesia, democracy is represented by people's representatives in the parliament building, this parliament officially called by the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia or commonly abbreviated to the DPR RI.

Referring to Surbakti (1992: 181) elections are defined as the mechanism of selecting and delegating or handing over sovereignty to people or parties that are trusted. While the notion of elections as stated in Law Number 8 of 2012 article 1 paragraph (1) is a means of exercising people's sovereignty in The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The purpose of the

General Election according to Prihatmoko (2003: 19) is: "First, as a mechanism for selecting government leaders and alternative public policies. Second, the election as a transfer of conflicts of interest from the community to the people's of representative bodies through elected representatives or parties that win seats so that community integration is guaranteed. And thirdly, elections as a tools of mobilization, or gathering popular support for the state and government by participating in the political process ".

Some people assume that joining political contestation is something that requires a very large cost. So it is common notion in the community that when a legislative candidate wins the election, the statement that emerges is "if you have money, you are the winner." In contrast, if someone is not elected, the statement will appear differently, but still has the same intention "what a pity, you must've spent a lot of money for the election." This seems to indicate that the nomination and victory in the election is solely about money. It might not a mistake entirely if such assumption arises in the minds of the people. Because winning the election requires a budget, and it is common called by political cost. These political costs are used during the campaign process, such as making campaign facilities in the form printed media such as posters, banners, etc. Also a face-to-face campaign to audiences which certainly requires transportation and accommodation costs.

It is interesting to see from one of the electoral districts in South Sumatera that has quite complete election dynamics. The South Sumatra electoral district is inseparable from areas where many violations have been reported. Some violations that are widely discussed by the media are vote markup, administration, and abuse of authority by the election organizers. This is certainly related to the ability of certain parties to "sacrifice" more and extra effort to win the election. In addition to the negative problems, the South Sumatra electoral district also presented a number of elected candidates with positive achievements during the election. Its success in several ways, namely the ability to identify environmental problems in the electoral district, offering solutions as stimulus campaigns, low-cost campaigns and far from the practice of money politics and intimidation. As one of the elected candidates for 2014-2019 electoral district Sumsel 1 said, the campaign can be carried out at a cost that is not so big, as long as using the appropriate approach.

Based on the trends of the election winners, ideology becomes the main message element which become a factor in voter behavior. But in overall, of course, in winning elections, political parties must be able to win the sympathy of the voters by accommodationg their wishes. Voters' hope for a political party is in the form of the party's purpose of struggle, goals and actions taken by the party in addressing daily developments and issues. Parties must be able to design programs that have a common vision with their voters. The party's program design and actions must reflect the wishes of the voting community.

Indeed it must be recognized on some parties that there are blemishes in democracy, so it is often interpreted that democracy creates wealthy leaders who can buy votes. The researchers wanted to respon to this challenge through this research. It is hoped that this research will reveal clearly how the precise persuasive approach of candidates and appropriate legislative members in gaining voters' votes can influence political preferences of voters. It is hoped that this research can bridge the gap of previous research and change the paradigm of stakeholders in the political world by preparing natural approaches and setting aside unfair money politics practices and tarnishing democracy.

This is also a concern of many parties both from within and outside the country as written by the following reuter:

*"Indonesia - the world's third-largest democracy - has some of the worst money politics in Southeast Asia, according to researchers. Handouts of cash and gifts, anti-graft advocates and politicians say, lead to rampant corruption in its national legislature as successful candidates recoup their election expenses, and more, once elected"* (<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-election-corruption/pushing-the-envelope-money-politics-mars-indonesian-poll-idUSKCN1RN06T>)

## 1.2 The Objective of research

The purpose of writing this article is to explain the money politics and the political costs in Indonesia's democratization process, specifically in the electoral district of South Sumatra 1. In addition, this study also wants to illustrate how persuasive political communication can be a strategy in campaigning with low political costs but succeeding in gathering large number of voters.

The South Sumatra electoral district 1 was chosen because of a number of elected legislative candidates from the region did not have huge political costs. They did not practice money politics but succeeded in gaining the most votes and qualifying to become a member of the council. It is hoped that this case can have a positive impact on candidates and voters to have a healthy democracy by choosing someone based on their vision and mission and not just because they give money.

## 1.3 Describe Relevant Scholarship

### Communication Campaigns as a Form of Persuasive Communication

Communication campaign is a process of individual or group communication activities carried out in an institutionalized and aims to create a certain effect or impact. The following are some definitions of communication campaigns: (Venus, 2004: 7). 1. Rogers and Storey (1987) define the Campaign as "a series of planned communication actions with the aim of creating a certain effect on a large number of audiences that are carried out sustainably over a certain period of time."

Political campaigns prioritize the communication process between candidates (candidates) and constituents. Sympathetic communication or persuasive communication is the most effective type of communication specifically in politics to influence the audiences. Persuasive communication refers to Soemirat's statement, (2012: 5.35) that the main purpose of persuasive communication is to influence others by changing the beliefs, values or nature of the target. Thus, the content of persuasive messages seeks to conditioning, strengthening or make changes to target responses. Therefore, there are three persuasive goals, that is (a) helping responses, (b) reinforcing responses, and (c) changing responses.

Every form of communication has obstacles, so does persuasive communication. In order to run the persuasive communication effectively between the candidates and their constituents to, the communicator or persuader or the candidate must have positive credibility in the eyes of his constituents. Persuaders should have a positive self-image.

### Political Communication Process

Political communication is basically a part of communication. The process also refers to the communication process components. Harold Laswell formulates components in the communication process, it is known as the Lasswell formula; "Who says what to whom in which channel with what effect," based on this formula, the components in the communication process are; Communicators, Messages, Communicators, Media, Effects.

What distinguishes political communication from other communication is seen from the actors involved in the communication process and the message delivered. Actors in political communication are;

1. Political communicators consist of individuals, groups, institutions or countries
2. Political messages such as campaigns, propaganda
3. Political communication, covers the small scope of society and the general public

From the explanation that has been described, it can be concluded that the process of political communication is the process of delivering political messages relating to power, government, and government policy by political

actors to the communicant through the media or channels of political communication so that it causes certain effects and feedback from the communicant.

### **Cost of Politics and Money Politics**

Political cost or cost of politics and money politics is a term that often appears in democratic parties in any country including Indonesia. These two terms have different meanings. Political costs in an election campaign are clearly needed, an activity including a campaign requires costs, such as the cost of making banners, posters, advertisements, and others. This includes travel costs from one region to another. Whereas money politics is buying people's votes by giving a certain amount of money to voters. The contextual understanding of these two terms must be distinguished to avoid misconception of using these two terms.

"Money politics can literally be interpreted as an exchange in a simple economic sense, it may have meaning in different cultural contexts, but the commercialization of this aspiration refers to the offer of particular profit to the voters by selling their votes according to market ideas where the process exchange also becomes a political conception that money becomes a facility of change (Ahmad, 2015: 3)."

"Political costs (cost of politics) is the price that must be incurred for politics such as purchasing campaign attributes, ordering party flags, shirts, or success team uniforms, etc. (Ariani, 2018: 137)".

Money politics emerged for the first time in Indonesia during the elections period in 2004 where the direct elections were started. According to experts there are several reasons that causes money politics in legislative elections as summarized by Taufiq ( in Hariyani, 2014: 179), as follows;

- a. Open Proportional System. This system is considered the most ideal, can create a climate of competition among fellow candidates in one party, and is considered more democratic.
- b. Political de-idealization. Thohari (2014) reviews the origins of the shift of ideological politics to non-ideological politics oriented to problem solving and pragmatism.
- c. Mental materialism & consumerism is getting stronger. According to Firmanzah (2008), money politics occurs because all elements involved in political affairs consider material importance. Both voters and contestants emphasize the material aspects, so everything must be cashed in and made into objects.
- d. Lack of communication between political parties and the constituents. Asrinaldi (2014) argues that the rise of money politics is caused by the misslead pattern of communication between political parties and the community; political communication began to bustle and rush only during the moment of campaign period some months before the election. After the election, the people were left behind and there was no communication at all, it because people became allergic and think that the ideas and ideology of political parties not more than a camouflage. As a result, transactional relations (votes equal to money) are the only approaches used by the community.
- e. Politicians use money to mobilize support.
- f. Poor regulation of political party financial management. In Indonesia, the regulation of campaign funds is stated in the Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government. The Law contains restrictions on election fund contributions. However, according to Badoh (2010), the arrangements are unclear and easily misused.
- g. The election is perceived as a celebration.
- h. Permissive attitude of the public towards money politics. The fertility of money politics is inseparable from the perspective of voters who are permissive of money politics

(Quoted from the Scientific Journal of Communication | MEANING Vol. 6 no. 2, August 2015-January 2016)

When we see from the voter's point of view, if it refers to an explanation of the behavior of the voters in general, it can be divided into two orientations at once, that is; (1) orientation of the 'policy-problem-solving' and (2)

orientation of the 'ideology.' When voters appraise evaluate a political party or a contestant in terms of 'policy-problem solving,' the most important thing for them is the extent to which the contestants are able to offer a work program for a solution to an existing problem.

## 2. Method

The research use a qualitative approach. A qualitative approach is used in research when someone tries to interpret reality and tries to build a theory based on what is experienced. The qualitative approach emphasizes the meaning, reasoning, definition of a particular situation (in certain contexts), more researching matters relating to daily life. A qualitative approach, moreover, places more importance on the process than the final result; therefore the sequence of activities can vary depending on the condition and the number of symptoms found. The purpose of research is usually related to things that are practical.

To examine the problem to be more specific, the qualitative approach used by researchers refers more to the type of case study research. Case Study is a series of scientific activities carried out intensively, in detail and in-depth about a program, event, and activity, both at the individual level, a group of people, institutions, or organizations to gain in-depth knowledge about the event (Rahardjo 2017: 5). The researchers use the types of descriptive case study, in this type of case study all conclusions will be described with a description that is associated with theory and findings.

The subjects of this study were elected legislators in the 2014-2019 period with a significant vote acquisition in the electoral district (dapil) of South Sumatra 1, with the use of minimum/ low (effective and efficient) campaign funds, as well as attractive persuasion communication.

## 3. Finding

From the explanation of the candidates who became informants in this study, all are agreed that cost of operation for campaigning is a must, the costs incurred depend on the needs and strategies of each. All informants in this study agreed not to use money politics. Money politics is a democratic flaws. A persuasive approach using social and cultural capital is more effective than distributing money to constituents.

*"Do not just rely on money politics, but rather promote clean democracy, such as ideas, missions and visions rather than 'promises for sale' and distribute money to the public"*<sup>1</sup>

That is how Erza explained his opinion on money politics in campaigning. In line with Erza, Junaidi as the othe candidates argues as follows:

*"I approached my constituents persuasively. I don't want to play money, at the most I give gimmicks according to the needs of the people who are my target voters. And I don't want direct money instead, I don't practice politics that relies on cash."*<sup>2</sup>

The types of voters according to Firmanzah quoted by Hariyani (Journal of Meaning of 2016) can be divided into;

- Rational Voters. Having a characteristic which is not too much concerned about the ideology of a party or a contestant.
- Critical Voters. This type of voter will always analyze the links between the party's value system (ideology) and the policies that will be made.
- Traditional Voters. Voters of this category have a very high ideological orientation and don't really see the policies of a political party or a contestant as something important in decision making.
- Skeptical Voters. Skeptical voters are voters who do not have a high enough ideological orientation with a political party or contestant.

---

<sup>1</sup> Interview with informan, Ezra.

<sup>2</sup> Interview with informan, Junaidi.

Based on these categories, if we relate to the case study of voters in South Sumatra, there is a distribution of all categories. Voter characteristics are the main concern of candidates in conducting outreach and communicating with constituents. What's interesting is that based on interviews with constituents in the city of Palembang, a description of the constituents' perceptions and opinions about money politics was obtained.

Voters in Palembang do not care about the candidate handing out cash during campaigns or dawn attacks. For them, they will receive the money given, but choosing candidates is another thing, they only choose in accordance with their expectations.

*"People are smart now, bro, it is not easy to be lured in with money, if the candidates are factually proven and have good performance, capable of fighting for the interests of small people, we will definitely choose them."*<sup>3</sup>

Another opinions of other informants from the mothers group are as follows;

*"Our residence was once visited by the candidate's 'success team' in the previous legislative election, they distributed groceries and cash and given for free. However, the candidate did not win in our region."*<sup>4</sup>

The people's opinion in the city of Palembang shows that money politics is no longer popular. The Palembangness people in urban areas are quite smart and educated to distinguish between good candidates who can meet the expectations of the community and those who don't. Likewise the people in the village or in the countryside, on average they already have a certain party ideology, the people here are in the category of traditional voters, they vote for their party, candidate figures are not a priority. If in certain regions the ideology is PDIP, then it is certain that candidates from this party is the winner, as well as in other regions that have cultural closeness to ideology and religion.

Opinion from the expert of political communication regarding money politics in the campaign according to Umaimah Wahid, said that:

*"It is undeniable that until now there are still parties who are conducting campaigns with money politics. Although some of our society is no longer easily seduced by money or goods. it may still be effective in some areas, but in general money politics has had no effect on the voters' choices"*<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, Umaimah explained about the phenomenon of politicians in Indonesia who were still using unsportsmanlike methods in winning votes. In addition, to negative campaign money politics also still often occurs. For this reason Umaimah suggested the need for political education for all groups. Political education is not only for the community, it is important that political education is given to legislative candidates and the success team.

The public is even more aware of and understand if they are used as tools for the political interests of power. Communities in the regions have become even smarter with negative campaign practices. In fact, politicians or the candidates who still continue to do money politics, they underestimate their constituents intentionally. The candidates must know the constituents in depth so that the political costs incurred are not in vain. Political costs can be use in proper way and wisely.

#### **4. Discussion**

##### **Successful Candidates With Low Political Costs.**

Successful candidates intensively use more direct persuasive communication strategies, and the media set as supporting tools only. It can be said that the success of a legislative candidate does not need a large cost, the use

---

<sup>3</sup> Interview with Fajrul, a Palembang resident who works as a security guard at a restaurant.

<sup>4</sup> Interview with the group of mothers in Musholla, the Palembang City Mall,

<sup>5</sup> Interview with political expert, Umaimah Wahid at C'Now Café on Monday, February 18, 2019 at 13:00.

of media both mass media and media certainly requires a substantial additional cost. One way to reduce the cost of political and campaigning done by successful candidates is through direct communication that is done very intensively. Psychologically the community feels more appreciated by direct meeting in person. Communication can go both ways so that the public will know more in advance about the candidates which they will choose later.

Direct campaigns as well as by using media need to pay attention to the message to be conveyed. Based on the analysis and research findings of candidates who managed to package the messages based on the issues that are developing in their area. Differences in social issues are a concern in conveying messages containing the candidates' programs. Like Mardiansyah for example, he focuses on land acquisition cases, how the system is, the applicable law, and so on. The message he delivered at the same time educated people who did not know about it. Another case with Sujarwoto and Budiarto Masrul, they pack messages about health and family welfare, because their constituents are housewives.

The message in the campaign really needs to be considered, understanding messages and strategies during political campaigns is a very important area because the purpose of campaign messages is to help candidates distinguish themselves from the other candidates.

The differences in content of messages and media used by each successful and unsuccessful legislative candidate is a characteristic of each. The differences make it easier for constituents to determine their choices during the election because this is the way where the constituents understand the vision and mission of each candidate.

## 5. Conclusion

Basically, a democratic party certainly requires costs, in legislative candidates campaign also incur costs, this is what is referred to as political costs. Political costs are legal and reasonable in an election event. In contrast to money politics, is buying people's votes by giving a certain amount of money to voters, this is illegal and violates rules in the democratic system.

Conclusions from the results of this study:

1. All candidates agreed that there is a need for political costs to launch the campaign process. Not all election participants carry out money politics; this is evidenced and proven fact through this research. There are candidates for South Sumatra electoral district 1 who managed to succeed without any money politics, even with only low to moderate political costs.
2. Legislative candidates for the Electoral District of South Sumatra 1 in their campaigns carry out persuasive political communication as a campaign strategy. The candidates applied two main strategies; first of all, directly communicating with constituents and second of all, by using an opinion leader. The direct communication pattern is used by face to face with constituents, as well as using mass media.
3. The message in the campaign is an important issue that gives rise to positive perceptions of the voters or constituents, this perception continues to be built by the persuader so that it sticks to the minds of the people who was persuaded. If trust has arisen in the target community, then it can be ascertained that the community has been persuaded, whose hope will also be to elect candidates who were carried out during the general election.

## Acknowledgments

This research supported by Faculty of Communication Science, University of Padjadjaran

## References

- Ahmad, Ikhsan. (2015). *Pilar Demokrasi Kelima*. Yogyakarta: CV Budi Utama.
- Ariani, Stepri. (2018). *Intelijen dan Pilkada, Pendekatan Strategis Menghadapi Dinamika Pemilu*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
- Hariyani, *Model Kampanye Pilkada Atasi Politik Uang dan Sikap Pesimis Pemilih (Telaah Teoritis Dan Konsep Implementasinya)* Jurnal Ilmiah Komunikasi [MAKNA Vol. 6 no. 2, Agustus 2015-Januari 2016
- Prihatmoko, Joko J. 2003. *Pemilu 2004 dan Konsolidasi Demokrasi*. LP2I Press:Semarang.
- Mudjia, Rahardjo. 2017. *Studi Kasus dalam Penelitian Kualitatif: Konsep dan Prosedurnya*. Universitas Islam Negeri: Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang
- Soemirat, Soleh. (2012). *Komunikasi Persuasif*. Tangerang Selatan:Universitas Terbuka
- Surbakti, Ramlan, 1992.*Memahami Ilmu Politik*, Gramedia Widya Sarana: Jakarta.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality, Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Venus, Antar. Drs. 2004, *Manajemen Kampanye*, Bandung, PT Remaja Rosdakarya
- <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-election-corruption/pushing-the-envelope-money-politics-mars-indonesian-poll-idUSKCN1RN06T>



# Life Below Water and Maritime Security

Desti Yuwastina<sup>1</sup>, Sri Tunggul Pannindriya<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>London School of Public Relations – Jakarta. Email: d.yuwastina@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup>London School of Public Relations – Jakarta

## Abstract

The paper analyses the UN Sustainable Development Goal “Life Below Water” as it relates to maritime security, particularly in the context of fisheries as the primary sector and marine and coastal tourism as the secondary sector. The structure of the analysis comprises a discussion of Life Below Water as Goal 14 of the UN’s in 17 Sustainable Development Goals, IUU fishing as one out of seven maritime security threats and linkages between both. The research includes the impacts of IUU fishing as a maritime security threat toward the goal Life Below Water instead of the other way around through the case study method. The discussion primarily includes the situation in the Indonesian context with a particular focus on Ambon using social constructivism theory and ‘grassroots’ or community organizing theory. The result of the analysis is used to investigate the capacity of national enforcement in carrying out the international agenda. It can be concluded that SDG 14 succeeds in tackling the problem of IUU fishing.

**Keywords:** Maritime Security, Life Below Water, Fisheries, Marine And Coastal Tourism, UN SDG Agenda, IUU Fishing Enforcement

## Introduction

In 2015, the United Nations formulated 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with the theme “Eradicating poverty and promoting prosperity in a changing world” (UN, 2017). One of the SDGs initiated is Life Below Water as Goal 14 with its specific purpose to promote sustainable use of marine resources. Threats to maritime security, such as Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, jeopardise the ability of the global community to achieve the SDGs, specifically Life Below Water. This paper will explore the ways in which IUU fishing threatens the advancement of Life Below Water as the UN SDG 14. First, the paper discusses the UN SDGs, including Life Below Water, especially the goals and targets aimed by Indonesia. Second, the paper discusses IUU fishing as one of maritime security threats, especially IUU fishing cases in Ambon, Indonesia. Third, the paper discusses linkages between IUU fishing and the UN SDG 14 in which one directly impacts the other.

While the paper does not further discuss how maritime security is universally defined, there are, at least, eight specific maritime security threats (IOM, 2016, p. 4-5) as follows.

1. piracy and armed robbery at sea;
2. terrorist acts involving shipping;
3. offshore installations and other maritime interests;
4. illicit trafficking in arms and weapons of mass destruction;
5. illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;
6. smuggling and trafficking of persons by sea;
7. illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; and
8. intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment.

Among the many different in the ocean economy, the fisheries sector itself is explained as the economic activity related to the production, processing and distribution of seafood consisting of four categories which are (1) fishing; (2) aquaculture; (3) seafood processing; and (4) seafood distribution and wholesale (Park & Kildow, 2014, p. 33). Aquaculture here is interpreted as offshore aquaculture. As illustrated, maritime security threat number seven, IUU fishing, is highly in line with the fisheries sector since both share the importance of direct fishing activity. The importance of the ocean economy here is key to comprehending the overall theme of the high-level political forum Sustainable Development Goals 2017.

Indonesia, as geopolitically destined to be a maritime country throughout history, participates in establishing the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals along with other countries. Standing out as the biggest archipelagic state all in the world, Indonesia's maritime zone stretches up to 5.9 million km<sup>2</sup> with its EEZ covering 6,159,032 km<sup>2</sup> (Marsetio, 2014 as cited in Ritonga, 2016, p. 115). Before the Republic of Indonesia took on its current form, many kingdoms dominating the archipelagic state were held to be maritime-oriented for centuries as they expanded their maritime power followed by the Western people coming and trading to attempt to occupy the archipelago (Ritonga, 2016, p. 121-122).

It is no wonder, then, that today Indonesia is part of many maritime-oriented international partnerships. For examples, the Coral Triangle Initiative with six other countries, the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) Hydrography Capacity Building Programme for Coastal States with 87 other governments (UN, n.d.). Indonesia also puts efforts against marine plastic debris under the Ministry of Environment Affairs and Forestry and substantially enlarges its maritime conservation area under the same ministry with the company of Ministry for Marine Affairs (UN, n.d.).

It should be borne in mind too that maritime security threat number eight, intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment, is also mentioned occasionally in the following discussion due to the reality that the non-living domain below water makes the living domain possible. The non-living domain basically includes unrenewable sources. On the contrary, the non-living domain below water would not be utilised to its fullest without the living domain. Therefore, the capacity of national enforcement to combat IUU fishing, would certainly have beneficial impacts in carrying out the international agenda, SDG 14 Life Below Water. All in all, this paper will argue that Indonesia's current enforcement efforts are sufficient to ensure the achievement of the SDG 14 Life Below Water which determine the success of the SDG initiative.

### **Problem and Purpose of Research**

This paper is guided by the following research questions.

1. How is Life Below Water employed in Indonesia?
2. How is IUU fishing employed in Indonesia?
3. What are the linkages between SDG 14 and IUU fishing?

The purpose of this paper is to this paper will argue that Indonesia's current enforcement efforts are sufficient to ensure the achievement of the SDG 14 Life Below Water which determine the success of the SDG initiative.

## Theoretical Review

There are two theories used in this paper. The first one is about international relations that is social constructivism. The last one is about theory of change related to advocacy and policy change effort that is 'grassroots' or community organizing theory.

### 1. Social constructivism

There are many international relations theories in which one of them is social constructivism. Compared to other theories that mostly focus on material power, such as military forces and economic capabilities, constructivists are not materialistic.

In general, social constructivism is "a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place" (Jackson and Sorensen, 2006, p. 162). Strictly speaking, social constructivism is about identities and interests of states in the international arena in which "the norms of international society are transmitted to states through international organizations and shape national policies by 'teaching' states what their interests should be" (p. 169).

UN as a nonstate actor as well as international organization helps states in achieving their goals based on collective interests. In this case, UN promotes SDGs in which SDG 14 Life Below Water covers the sustainable use and conservation of sources below water as the interests of a state like Indonesia possesses.

### 2. 'Grassroots' or community organizing theory

Every kind of advocates aim for changes in policy (Stachowiak, 2013, p. 1) which explains theory of change as "the conceptual model for achieving a collective vision" (Organizational Research Services, 2007 as cited in Stachowiak, 2013, p. 2). Specifically, 'grassroots' or community organizing theory as one of theories of change explains that "groups of people can create power by taking mutual action to achieve social change" and power is not exclusively owned by elites or few people (p. 20).

In this paper, combatting IUU fishing is the social change to achieve by taking mutual action through SDG 14. Moreover, the internationality of maritime security proves to be a collective vision despite national territories. In the case of Indonesia, particularly Ambon, this international issue can be overcome through the help of the local communities by maintaining their wisdom and practices. It means that such issue should be reached up to grassroots' level in the section of the linkages between IUU and SDG 14.

## Research Method

The research method used in case study which is often used in social science studies allowing "the exploration and understanding of complex issues" (Zainal, 2007). Furthermore, case study research method is defined as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (Yin, 1984, p. 23 as cited in Zainal, 2007). There are three categories of case study in which this paper uses exploratory case study "exploring any phenomenon in the data which serves as a point of interest to the researcher" (ibid).

In this paper, sustainable use and conservation of sources below water and maritime security are complex issues as these involve the human existence in the long run. The phenomenon of combatting IUU fishing as a collective need and the context in Indonesia further intersect. Multiple sources from a number of governmental and nongovernmental organizations are taken.

## Life Below Water

The concept of the Sustainable Development Goals itself was born at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20, in 2012 to replace the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP Indonesia, n.d.). These 17 Sustainable Development Goals by the United Nations are for countries to apply the agenda, which is not legally binding, to their national frameworks (UN, n. d.). Otherwise known as the Global Goals, “these goals are a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity” (UNDP Indonesia, n.d.). One proclaimed goal to name a few is Life Below Water as Goal 14 “to conserve and sustainably use the world’s oceans, seas and marine resources” (ibid). As water covers around 75% of the Earth’s surface, Life Below Water as Goal 14 represents an issue of great importance in the quest to protect the planet.

The terms poverty and prosperity, of course, have much to do with economy. Essentially, “the study of economy that is economics explores the rational behaviour of human being who endeavours to fulfil his or her needs and wants” (Yusgiantoro, 2014, p. 10). Over the course of ending poverty as well as enjoying prosperity, one must not exceed the limit of sustainability of needs and wants. Any resources below water, which are renewable by default, should be maintained in such a way to match human demands in the long run instead of exacerbating the mind-set of renewable for the sake of its renewable-ness. That could be the reason as to why Yusgiantoro (ibid) emphasises that "economics is about making sense of how an individual, a company or a country behaves in responding scarcity of resources, including natural resources." It is believed that "marine protected areas contribute to poverty reduction by increasing people's income and improving health" (UN, n.d.). Overall, there are three out of ten items of Goal 14 Life Below Water that are discussed in the paper as follows:

1. 14.1 By 2025, prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds, in particular from land-based activities, including marine debris and nutrient pollution;
2. 14.2 By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration in order to achieve healthy and productive oceans; and
3. 14.4 By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics. (UN, n.d., p. 28)

Even though the first two items are not directly linked to IUU fishing compared to item four, these two items could obviously enhance the marine environment which is crucial for fish to sustain their livelihood. Prohibiting any unsustainable fishing activity related to IUU fishing is not sufficient if the remaining destruction is purely left with biological recovery. Human participation in establishing a better marine environment is necessary to enhance the recovery of the destruction in the marine environment faster. Facilitating the inclusion of all stakeholders or four platforms of (1) academia and experts; (2) civil society and media; (3) philanthropy and business; and (4) government and parliament (National Development Planning/Head of National Development Planning Agency of the Republic of Indonesia, 2017), Indonesia focuses on two main aspects to eradicate poverty with the support of enabling factors, namely gender (Goal 5) and partnerships in various sectors, data and financing (Goal 17) as follows.

Table 1. Indonesia’s Voluntary National Review 2017

<b>(1) Improving the quality of human resources</b>	<b>(2) Enhancing economic opportunities for sustainable livelihood</b>
Focusing on achievements in: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The Health sector (Goal 3);</li> <li>b. Food Security and Sustainable Agriculture (Goal 2); and</li> <li>c. Education (Goal 4)</li> </ol>	Through increased efforts in: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Industrial sector, innovation and infrastructure (Goal 9); and</li> <li>b. Marine ecosystem conservation and its sustainable use (Goal 14);</li> </ol>

(UN, 2017)

In maintaining the sustainability of its maritime zone, Indonesia unquestionably appreciates the Sustainable Development Goals. As said, the substance and objective of Sustainable Development Goals are in line with “Nawacita” (Indonesia’s national development vision), National Long Term Development Plan (RPJPN) 2005-2025 and the National Long Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2015-2019 (Brodjonegoro, 2017, p. iv). The more thorough explanation of goals and targets as delivered in High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development 2017, United Nations, New York on July 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017 is in the following.

Table 2. Goals and Targets of Policy and Enabling Environment

Goals	Targets
Goal 1: No Poverty	End poverty in all its forms everywhere
Goal 2: Zero Hunger	End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
Goal 3: Good Health and Well-Being	Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
Goal 5: Gender Equality	Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
Goal 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure	Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation
Goal 14: Life Below Water	Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
Goal 17: Partnerships for The Goals	Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development

(National Development Planning/Head of National Development Planning Agency, 2017, p. 9-89)

The ocean is composed of two domains, equally living and non-living based on their type of resources in which living domain would go as renewable whereas non-living domain as non-renewable. The living domain which are renewable resources would be made up of aquaculture that could be processed as seafood, medicine, biofuel, cosmetics and tourist attraction. The non-living domain which are non-renewable resources would be made up of oil, gas and mining.

However, it is important to remember that the two domains discussed are those which are unlikely to trigger a dangerous situation or intrinsically not harmful to the environment. This is to say that to discuss certain protected marine biodiversity or oil-spilling and other toxic wastes would be a different topic despite their linkage. For example, Life Below Water as Goal 14 underlines the living aspect, specifically fisheries as aquaculture. Yet, to optimize the production of aquaculture, marine biodiversity is required to protect by regulating which areas can and cannot be accessed, which species that can and cannot be exploited, which procedure that can and cannot be applied in accessing the area and exploiting the species, so on and so forth. Thus, the protected marine biodiversity is not partially classified as aquaculture in this circumstance, but has a powerful significance to aquaculture due to the extent of accessing, exploiting and applying.

Remarkable as an archipelagic state with rich resources, Indonesia makes sure that these resources are well-managed for their own people to reap the benefits. In the context of fisheries sector, according to Prof. Dr. Ir. H. Rokhmin Dahuri, MS, a senior lecturer at IPB and the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of the Republic of Indonesia between 2001-2004 (Herdiawan, 2016, p. 21), “only 9.2% out of Indonesia’s total marine potential is used within the maritime zone that acquires the economic potential as large as US\$1.2 trillion rupiahs per year possibly providing jobs for more than 40 million people”. On top of that, “World Trade Organization announces in 2012 that six out of ten for the most beautiful coral ecosystems in the world are Raja Ampat, Wakatobi, Taka Bone Rate, Bunaken, Karimun Jawa and Weh Island”, all of which are settled in Indonesia (Herdiawan, 2016, p. 21). The following is the biannual report of marine and coastal tourism visit in Indonesia.

Table 3. Marine and Coastal Tourism Visit Report

Destination	Number of Visitor Per Year	Number of Visitor Per Year	Increase (%)
Komodo National Park	41,833 (2011)	45,776 (2013)	9.42
Raja Ampat Archipelago	3,858 (2010)	6,037 (2012)	56.48
Wakatobi	2,274 (2011)	3,315 (2013)	45.77
Sabang	3,932 (2010)	4,622 (2013)	17.5

(Ministry of Tourism on Indonesia's Marine and Coastal Tourism National Seminar, 2014 as cited in Herdiawan, 2016, p. 22)

Expressing praise for the increase percentage, nonetheless, should be accompanied with alertness on trends of marine and coastal tourism. The sector of marine leisure and tourism is defined as “the economic activity related to marine and coastal leisure and tourism, which includes eating & drinking places, hotels & lodging places, marinas, marine sporting goods retailers, zoos, aquariums, recreational vehicle parks & campgrounds” (Park & Kildow, 2014, p. 33). Even though the essay discusses fisheries as the major sector in ocean economy, marine leisure and tourism is in direct contact to fisheries as such sector heavily depends on fisheries sector. It can be suggested right away that the less life below water is taken care of means the less marine and coastal tourism is accomplished. Hence, marine leisure and tourism sector should be kept in mind that its economic activity should maintain the sustainability of ocean due to its direct toxic waste or debris to the ocean if the sector is still interested to make use of ocean as its root of attraction at while at the same time providing employment. With higher incomes and upward consumption trends pointing to greater demand for cruise tourism and dietary habits (OECD, 2016, p. 26), the world's coral reefs which have been effectively destroyed, are under imminent risk and are under a longer-term threat of collapse (UN, n.d.) are in need of proper marine management as these coral reefs are home for the fisheries sector.

On the strength on the links between fisheries and coral reefs, Indonesia definitely proves to cooperate internationally. As part of the Coral Triangle Initiative with other six countries, including Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste and Australia Government, this multilateral partnership for Sustainable Development Goals works on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security (UN, n.d.). Indonesia's marine wealth among others is as the largest *marine mega-biodiversity* in the world with 8,500 fish species, 555 seaweed species and 950 biota species associated with coral reefs (IOM, 2016, p. 10). Broad scientific consensus declare that the Coral Triangle represents the highest coral diversity with 76% of the world's known coral species and the highest reef fish diversity with 37% of the world's reef fish species concentrated in the area (ibid).

Against the backdrop of climate change, marine biodiversity is in either a loss or degradation of 50% of salt marshes, 35% of mangroves, 30% of coral reefs and 20% of sea grasses worldwide (Doney et al., 2009 as cited in OECD, 2016, p. 82). The extinction rate is 1,000 times higher—if humankind continues with the present unsustainable system of production and consumption it will be 10,000 times greater on average; affecting amphibians and birds, collapsing fisheries, diminishing forest cover, depleting fresh water systems (MA, 2005 as cited in Spring in Sosa-Nunez & Atkins, 2016, p. 32).

Another example of Indonesia's commitment to conserving the ocean environment can be seen from its partnership with the International Hydrographic Organization to support safety of navigation, safety of life at sea, the protection of the marine environment, coastal zone management and the better management, exploitation and governance of the seas and oceans and its resources (IHO, n.d.).

## IUU Fishing

Standing for illegal, unreported and unregulated, each of three components of IUU fishing differs according to the type of fishing activity. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing states that:


1. illegal fishing refers to activities conducted by vessels operating in contravention to national laws or international measures;
2. unreported fishing is catch not reported or misreported to national relevant authorities or RFMO (Regional Fisheries Management Organisation); and
3. unregulated fishing is conducted by vessels without nationality or flying the flag of States not parties of relevant fisheries organizations and who therefore consider themselves not bound by their rules. (Schmidt, n.d., p. 2)

In addition to that, IOM (2016, p. 6) describes that illegal fishing principally deals with any vessels operating in waters without the permission of that state whereas unreported fishing covers both intentional and unintentional fishing activities. The urgency to combat IUU fishing in general is driven by, in contrast, the compliance of those fishers who act accordingly in terms of their fishing authorizations (FAO, n.d.). Furthermore, when it comes to economic calculation, Indonesia is losing trillions of rupiahs due to illegal fishing as conceded by the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of the Republic of Indonesia, Susi Pudjiastuti (IOM, 2015 as cited in Chapsos & Malcolm, 2016). This is why IUU fishing should be enforced the fact that the strategic location gives the path to Indonesia as “strategic fishing ground besides strategic junction of international shipping, strategic potential business and strategic key partner for powerful countries” (Kurnia, 2017, p. 286).

The brief discussion previously strengthens that IUU fishing should be taken seriously. For example, in the economic point of view, there are three components of fishing activity to determine the economic status of fisheries stock which are overfished, depleted or recovering; fully exploited (fully fished); and underexploited (underfished) (OECD, 2016). More assistance in monitoring, control and surveillance would help to combat IUU fishing for the capacity building of developing countries (OECD, 2006). Indonesia as a developing country should welcome such recommendation as the archipelagic state consists of a plenty of small islands in remote areas which, if overlooked and not properly managed, could turn into targets of IUU fishing.

In respect to national security, the threat paradigm complements the maritime security of the Indonesia’s archipelagic state. “Compared to challenge, barrier and disturbance, the term threat is placed on the top of danger level” (Yusgiantoro, 2014, p. 525). Even though Yusgiantoro (2014), the former Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, does not explicitly mention IUU fishing, let alone maritime security, he divides threat into two forms, an actual form and a potential form, in which IUU fishing can fall into violation activity on land and at sea under actual form among five other actual threats. Nevertheless, this reveals the absoluteness of IUU fishing without any blurring lines that it must disadvantage a state actually straight to its core of security.

Since the analysis of this paper is on the state-level that is Indonesia with the focus on Ambon, it is important to give the idea of Indonesia’s maritime situation in brief. With more than 17,000 thousand islands in total (Geospatial Information Agency of Indonesia, n.d., 2017), Indonesia finally reached a diplomatic achievement in acknowledging its maritime zone from 3 miles up to 12 miles through the Djoeanda Declaration 1957, then, proceeded later up to 200 miles through UNCLOS 1982 (Herdiawan, 2016). It can be perceived that this diplomatic achievement was only the beginning of everything for Indonesia as a state in the eyes of the international community to secure its maritime zone. Moreover, there are three sea lanes of communication in Indonesia’s archipelagic state or *Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia* (ALKI) with four Asia-Pacific choke points embracing Malacca Straits, Sunda Straits, Lombok Straits and Makassar Straits (Ritonga, 2016).

Figure 1. Sea Lane of Communication and *Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia* (ALKI)

(Indonesian National Logistics Team, 2012)

Besides Malacca Straits in the western part of Indonesia which is well-known as one of the most crowded straits in the world, one recent shocking phenomenon of IUU fishing occurred in Ambon. To pinpoint the exact location, Ambon is near the northern part of ALKI III C in the eastern part of Indonesia. However, before proceeding with the complete case of IUU fishing precisely in Ambon, IUU fishing is not to be confused with “fisheries-related crime, such as corruption, money laundering, tax violation, customs related crime, immigration related crime, illicit drugs trafficking and human rights violations (human trafficking, forced labour and child labour)” (IOM, 2016, p. 16), although it is not uncommon that the case is presented with overlapping conditions of IUU fishing with another fisheries-related crime or the combination of these crimes. While such fisheries-related crimes are not particularly involved in IUU fishing, modus operandi of fisheries-related crimes which are, indeed, involved is in the following.

Table 4. Modus Operandi of Fisheries-Related Crime

<b>Types of Fisheries Crime (IUU Fishing)</b>
1. Forgery of vessel's document;
2. Double flagging & double registered;
3. Fishing without licences/appropriate documents (sailing without port and seaworthiness clearance);
4. Illegal modification of vessel (inc. marked down, changing call sign, machines);
5. Using foreign captain and seamen;
6. Deactivation of Vessel's Transmitter (VMS and AIS);
7. Illegal transshipment at sea;
8. Forgery of logbook record;
9. Absence of health certificate and export declaration;
10. Violation of fishing ground;
11. Using prohibited fishing gear;
12. Non-compliance in owning/partnering with a fish processing unit; and
13. Unlawful landing of catches.

(IOM, 2016, p. 18)

It is cautious to insist on no mutual correlation between the size of the island and the amount of IUU fishing. Thus, monitoring, control and surveillance should be asserted around the maritime zone in its entirety without overlooking smaller islands. Port system, then, should be taken into account, because port is the official gateway for ships to come and go. In Indonesia, a hierarchical port system is built over approximately 1,700 ports in which 111 main commercial ports are under the authority of four BUMNs (*Badan Usaha Milik Negara* or Indonesia State-Owned Entities), namely *Perum Pelabuhan Indonesia* (Pelindo) I, II, III and IV (Ray, 2008 as cited in Herdiawan, 2016).

Table 5. Main Ports under the Authority of Pelindo I, II, III and IV.

<b>Perum pelabuhan</b>	<b>Scope (province)</b>	<b>Ports controlled</b>
Pelindo I	Aceh, North Sumatera, Riau	Belawan, Pekanbaru, Dumai, Tanjung Pinang, Lhokseumawe
Pelindo II	West Sumatera, Jambi, South Sumatera, Bengkulu, Lampung, Jakarta	Tanjung Priok, Panjang, Palembang, Teluk Bayur, Pontianak, Cirebon, Jambi, Bengkulu, Banten, Sunda Kelapa, Pangkal Balam, Tanjung Pandan
Pelindo III	Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara (East Timor in the past)	Tanjung Perak, Tanjung Emas, Banjarmasin, Benoa, Tenau/Kupang
Pelindo IV	Sulawesi (South, Southeast, Central and North), Maluku and Irian Jaya	Makassar, Balikpapan, Samarinda, Bitung, Ambon, Sorong, Biak, Jayapura

(Ray, 2008 as cited in Herdiawan, 2016, p. 98)

As demonstrated in the table, Ambon port is controlled under the authority of Pelindo IV in the province of Maluku. On the subject of Ambon port, Yusriza & Desmonda (2015) with the support of International Organization for Migration Indonesia conducts a report of interviews with trafficking-in-person victims in relation to IUU fishing in Ambon Fishery Port or *Pelabuhan Perikanan Nusantara* (PPN). As brief samples, the report clearly documents two types of fisheries crime (IUU fishing) which are (5) using foreign captain and seamen; and (7) illegal transshipment at sea, while other types of fisheries crime are not necessarily claimed by respondents due to their partial awareness as victims of trafficking-in-person. In the second section of Respondent Profile (Yusriza & Desmonda, 2015, p. 1), all of the 285 respondents were male and claimed to be Myanmar citizens albeit one victim was born in Thailand. Additionally, in the sixth section of Gross Tonnage, Docking, Unloading and Transfer of Goods (Yusriza & Desmonda, 2015, p. 10), 58% of victims admit that the caught fish or other marine products have ever been transhipped to other boats in the middle of the sea or at the port. To specify whether in the sea or at the port, Yusriza & Desmonda (2015, p. 10) shows that 78% of victims opt out at the sea whereas 13% of victims opt out at the port.

In spite of this report, another case of IUU fishing is Silver Sea 2 arrested by the Indonesian Navy occurring in 2015 with its designated port in Ambon and its location of capture in Sabang (Northern Aceh). Types of fisheries crime (IUU fishing) revolve around (3) fishing without licences/appropriate documents (sailing without port and seaworthiness clearance); (5) using foreign captain and seamen; (6) deactivation of Vessel's Transmitter (VMS and AIS); and (7) illegal transshipment at sea as these all are in line with the report by the Head of Task Force on the Prevention, Deterrence and Elimination of IUU Fishing (KKP, 2015) that the alleged violations are transport fish without permit (carrier permit already expired), conduct illegal transshipment in Arafura Sea, deactivation of AIS and VMS and employ illegitimate crews.

There are several governmental bodies with reference to combat IUU fishing in Indonesia, such as the ministry, the navy and the police of the Republic of Indonesia. To display a statistical estimation of "SINK THE VESSELS," 38 vessels are sunk solely by the ministry between 2007-2014, 59 vessels between 2014-2015 and 37 vessels on 18 August 2015 (ibid). By the same token in The Symposium on FishCRIME on 12-13 October 2015, Cape Town, South Africa, KKP or Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (ibid) highlights "Sovereignty, Sustainability and Prosperity" in the sense of good governance in maritime power. Vessels primarily aimed by the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries are illegal ex-foreign vessels attributed with super intensive fishing gears and having a tendency of unsustainability, such as purse seine and trawl (Pudjiastuti, 2017 in Kurnia, 2017, p. xvii). As if capture fish is not enough to meet their demand, the report (Yusriza & Desmonda, 2015, p. 15) mentioned earlier states that the trawls and the seines frequently used by the boats have a characteristic to collect any other marine biodiversity like corals.

### **Linkages Between IUU and SDG 14**

By virtue of the transnational nature of maritime security, IUU fishing can be addressed as a global concern. IUU fishing incorporates global fish stock (Schmidt, n. d.) which is, then, relevant to address in an international forum, such as UN SDG. Both IUU fishing enforcement and UN SDG agenda have their own highlight. IUU fishing enforcement in Indonesia highlights "Sovereignty, Sustainability and Prosperity" for governmental bodies to sink the vessels (KKP, 2015). In combating IUU fishing in Indonesia, "sovereignty" plays a role regarding borders and territories, "sustainability" regarding fishing activity and environment and "prosperity" regarding economic value of fishing activity and environment. On the other hand, Life Below Water agenda in general highlights "People, Planet and Prosperity" for people to enjoy out of its goals (UN, n.d., p. 3). In strengthening universal peace in larger freedom, "people" plays a role regarding poverty and hunger eradication as well as human potential, "planet" regarding protection for the needs of the present and future generations and "prosperity" regarding life enjoyment and progress with nature (ibid). Both deliberately promote prosperity in different ways. Despite that "prosperity" in IUU fishing enforcement in Indonesia is not explained in depth, the UN explains "prosperity" that "we (UN) are determined to ensure that all human beings can enjoy prosperous and fulfilling lives and that economic, social and technological progress occurs in harmony with nature" (ibid).

IUU fishing economically disadvantages Indonesia due to the value of fisheries stock and also the value of marine environment the state is losing. Such activity discouragingly impacts an international agenda, such as UN SDG 14 Life Below Water, Indonesia has been trying to achieve. Again, IUU fishing enforcement surrounding Life Below Water agenda is vital if "prosperity" maintains to be the highlight of both. To conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development, Indonesia so far implements "marine spatial planning, sustainable management of the Fisheries Management Area (WPP), total allowable catch within biological sustainable level, combating IUU Fishing, and improvement of the Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) as well as the improvement of small-scale fisheries financial access" (National Development Planning/Head of National Development Planning Agency, 2017, p. 72). In the legal point of view, "Act No. 31/2004 Act and Act No. 45/2009 regarding fisheries" is the foundation to combat IUU fishing (ibid, p. 74).

Along the way, local wisdom, described as "community rules/traditions inherited from generation to generation recognized as customary law that applied to the coastal community," contributes to the management of marine and fisheries resources in Indonesia, such as Sasi in Maluku (National Development Planning/Head of National Development Planning Agency, 2017, p. 76). Local wisdom itself is precisely analysed to sustain Indonesia's food sovereignty, that Sasi is "a system to forbid harvesting or making use of nature (on land and at sea) for natural resources during certain periods of time" (Herdiawan, 2016, p. 161). Such local wisdom surely helps in combating IUU fishing, because the customary law could be regarded, for instance, as an action to combat unregulated fishing around Maluku, including Ambon.

Another highlight of IUU fishing enforcement is "sovereignty" that can be linked to "people" UN SDGs in general highlight. Borders and territories play a huge role in operating fishing activity, because nationality of

crews and vessels determines the maritime zone they can pass through. Sovereignty itself, in a broader sense, engage states and their citizens within. So, foreign crews and vessels proceeding any fishing activity fall into IUU fishing. IUU fishing, again, discouragingly impacts such UN SDG 14 Life Below Water that IUU fishing violates sovereignty, food sovereignty to be exact. UN (n.d., p. 3) explains "people" that "we (UN) are determined to end poverty and hunger, in all their forms and dimensions, and to ensure that all human beings can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality and in a healthy environment."

The last highlight of IUU fishing enforcement is "sustainability" that can be linked to "planet" UN SDGs in general highlight. Sustainability of fishing activity in the environment of each state also plays a huge role. In spite of the possibility that this could be understood in the sense of "sovereignty" and "people," yet, UN aims to protect the Earth as whole by embracing as many states as possible. UN (ibid) explains that "we (UN) are determined to protect the planet from degradation, including through sustainable consumption and production, sustainably managing its natural resources and taking urgent action on climate change, so that it can support the needs of the present and future generations." IUU fishing, again, discouragingly impacts UN SDG 14 Life Below Water that IUU fishing utilises unsustainable fishing activity with seines and trawls damaging coral reefs that are beneficial for the sustainability of marine environment that has high non-market value. Besides, IUU fishing also neglects the biological clock of fisheries production.

Now it can be said that three pairs of linked highlights respectively generate economic value loss, food sovereignty violation and unsustainable fishing activity to be examined as these three things are the discouraging impacts of IUU fishing toward UN SDG 14 Life Below Water. Approximately, there are "lower and upper estimates of the total value of current illegal and unreported fishing losses worldwide are between \$10 billion and \$23 billion annually, representing between 11 and 26 million tonnes" based on the review of the situation in 54 countries and on the high seas (Agnew, Pearce, Pramod, Peatman, Watson, Beddington and Pitcher, 2009). However, that only applies to the situation almost a decade ago. It should be kept in mind again that, quite recently, Indonesia loses trillions of rupiahs due to IUU fishing (IOM, 2015 as cited in Chapsos & Malcolm, 2016). As for food sovereignty violation, "SINK THE VESSELS" continues to expand the number of vessels sunk by Indonesia's governmental bodies since the report presented in Cape Town, Africa in 2015. To date, there are "317 boats sunk (since 2014) and another 191 (are) waiting" as told by the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti (Tani, 2017). Lastly, unsustainable fishing activity urges Indonesia to enhance the damaged coral reefs caused by unsustainable vessels and tools. Besides being part of the Coral Triangle Initiative with the other countries, an international board also participates in saving coral reefs in Indonesia, such as Coral Reef Information and Training Center (CRITC) through a program called Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Program (COREMAP) collaborating with the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. Statistically, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) notes that "one third of coral reefs in Indonesia are damaged, although they are recovering better in the past ten years" (Herdiawan, 2016, p. 54).

## Conclusion

What occurs on land reflects what occurs at sea. As a matter of fact, most people live on land. IUU fishing can be said as a human activity striving to satisfy food demand for people without paying attention to propriety at all. IUU fishing, of course, worsens the former situation, by its extensive unsustainability over the course of its activity regarding the livelihood of the marine environment.

Engaging more than a hundred countries, the United Nation (UN) launched the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in which Goal 14 is Life Below Water towards a better use of the marine environment. IUU fishing discouragingly impacts the UN SDG 14 as IUU fishing, as briefly stated earlier, is nowhere near sustainable. Thus, IUU fishing enforcement is necessary to bring out the best of the goal aimed. Indonesia, as one of those countries, applies several UN SDGs, including the UN SDG 14 Life Below Water, to its national framework as the goal aligns with its own national planning under the Ministry of National Development Planning or National Development Planning Agency of the Republic of Indonesia. Moreover, Indonesia even

mentions IUU fishing to combat in its voluntary national review of the UN SDGs applied in the section of the UN SDG 14 Life Below Water. This proves that the capacity of national enforcement in carrying out international agenda is already working on progress, that national enforcement of IUU fishing is connected to international agenda of Life Below Water on their shared highlights, “prosperity” in particular.

Nevertheless, IUU fishing enforcement in Indonesia is a case-by-case problem in which there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution. Even if there is, it needs to be enforced repetitively and strictly with the hope that the gap of uniqueness between each case of IUU fishing is not too wide to solve. It is true that national enforcement of IUU fishing towards international agenda of the UN SDG 14 Life Below Water is a long process, yet, situation will only be worse if countries give up on that. At least, as long as there is still something to do about it, no matter how little the effort is, it counts as some sort of integrity and responsibility of countries in their own realm. Indonesia proves its integrity and responsibility as a country in their own realm, their marine environment to be exact.

As the largest archipelagic state, Indonesia could be the country to set the tone regarding such national enforcement towards international agenda for other archipelagic states. With the information sharing in a conference in Africa, Indonesia is open to the subject. Also, Indonesia could be the source of learning for other countries in tackling similar problem related to marine activity in marine environment. As uttered, “if we (Indonesians) cannot utilise military power like the US, North Korea and China nor economic power like South Korea and Japan to put others in tremble, our country still has marine potential as a bargaining position” with the “SINK THE VESSELS” (Herdiawan, 2016, p. 152).

To conclude, SDG 14 proves to be effective as an international agenda to tackle the problem of IUU fishing. Additionally, national enforcement towards such international agenda in Indonesia is sufficient so far that even the public is aware of a maritime security threat, IUU fishing, and supports the governmental bodies to tackle more cases. Even though, recently, the maintenance of “SINK THE VESSELS” is questioned for the future, Jokowi implied that the past three years of the policy applied was valid and that the ministry did a good job (Ihsanuddin, 2018). It is also recommended for other researchers to explore other parts of Indonesia besides Ambon with regards to Life Below Water and IUU fishing.

## References

- Agnew, David J., John Pearce, Ganapathiraju Pramod, Tom Peatman, Reg Watson, John R. Beddington and Tony J. Pitcher. (2009). *Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing*. Retrieved from <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2646833/>
- Dalby, Gustavo Sosa-Nunez and Ed Atkins. (2016). *Environment and International Politics: Linking Humanity and Nature in Environment, Climate Change and International Relations*. Retrieved from <http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Environment-Climate-Change-and-International-Relations-E-IR.pdf>
- Geospatial Information Agency of Indonesia. (2017). *Identification of Islands and Standardization of Their Names*. Retrieved from [https://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/UNGEGN/docs/11th-uncsgn-docs/E\\_Conf.105\\_115\\_CRP.115\\_Agenda%20a%20Identification%20of%20Islands%20and%20Standardization%20of%20Their%20Names\\_BIG\\_Indonesia.pdf](https://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/UNGEGN/docs/11th-uncsgn-docs/E_Conf.105_115_CRP.115_Agenda%20a%20Identification%20of%20Islands%20and%20Standardization%20of%20Their%20Names_BIG_Indonesia.pdf)
- Herdiawan, Didit. (2016). *Kedaulatan Pangan Maritim: Dinamika & Problematika*. Jakarta: Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional RI.
- Husein, Yunus. (2015). *Strategy on Combating IUU Fishing and Post Moratorium Policies Plan*. Retrieved from <http://www.fishcrime.info/assets/Uploads/Yunus-Husein-Indonesian-Approach-To-Tackling-Fisheries-Crime.pdf>
- IHO. (n.d.). *IHO Hydrography Capacity Building Programme for Coastal States*. Retrieved from <https://oceanconference.un.org/commitments/?id=15447>
- Ihsanuddin. (2018). *Jokowi Tanggapi Silang Pendapat JK, Luhut, dan Susi soal Peneggelaman Kapal*. Retrieved from <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/01/10/18534331/jokowi-tanggapi-silang-pendapat-jk-luhut-dan-susi-soal-peneggelaman-kapal>

- Indonesian National Logistics Team. (2012) *The Challenge of Implementation of Presidential Regulation No.26/2012 on the Blueprint of Development of National Logistics System (Use of ICT As A Driver Toward: "Locally Integrated, Globally Connected for National Competitiveness and Social Welfare")*. Retrieved from <https://www.slideshare.net/muwasiq/101212-sislognas-ict-tools-to-reduce-costtime-and-uncertainty>
- IOM. (2016). *Report on Human Trafficking, Forced Labour and Fisheries Crime in the Indonesian Fishing Industry*. n.d. IOM.
- Jackson, Robert and Georg Sorensen. (2006). *Introduction to International Theories and Approaches*. Retrieved from [https://e-edu.nbu.bg/pluginfile.php/147644/mod\\_resource/content/0/jackson\\_sorensen\\_Intro\\_in\\_IR\\_chap06.pdf](https://e-edu.nbu.bg/pluginfile.php/147644/mod_resource/content/0/jackson_sorensen_Intro_in_IR_chap06.pdf)
- Kurnia, Laksamana Muda TNI Aan, S.Sos. (2017). *Between Threats & Opportunities: Facing Global Maritime Fulcrum*. Jakarta: PetroEnergy.
- National Development Planning/Head of National Development Planning Agency of the Republic of Indonesia. (2017). *Indonesia's SDGs Voluntary National Review*. Retrieved from [https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/25469INDONESIA\\_VNR\\_PPT.pdf](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/25469INDONESIA_VNR_PPT.pdf)
- OECD. (2016). *The Ocean Economy in 2030*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Park, Dr. Kwang Seo and Kildow, Dr. Judith T. (2014). *Rebuilding the Classification System of the Ocean Economy*. n.d. Digital Commons.
- Republic of Indonesia. (2017). *Voluntary National Review (VNR) "Eradicating Poverty and Promoting Prosperity in A Changing World"*. Retrieved from <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/15705Indonesia.pdf>
- Ritonga, Rajab. (2016). *Kesadaran Baru Maritim: Biografi Laksamana TNI Dr. Marsetio*. Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
- Schmidt, Carl-Christian. (n.d.). *Addressing Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing*. Retrieved from <http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/fisheries/34029751.pdf>
- Stachowiak, Sarah. (2013). *Pathways for Change: 10 Theories to Inform Advocacy and Policy Change Efforts*. Retrieved from [http://www.pointk.org/resources/files/Pathways\\_for\\_Change.pdf](http://www.pointk.org/resources/files/Pathways_for_Change.pdf)
- Tani, Shotaro. (2017). *Indonesia to continue blowing up illegal fishing vessels*. Nikkei. Retrieved from <http://www.google.co.id/amp/s/asia.nikkei.com/amp/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Indonesia-to-continue-blowing-up-illegal-fishing-vessels>
- UNDP Indonesia. (n.d). *Sustainable Development Goals*. Retrieved from <http://www.id.undp.org/content/indonesia/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html>
- UN. (n.d.). *Life Below Water: Why It Matters*. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/14\\_Why-it-Matters\\_Goal-14\\_Life-Below-Water\\_3p.pdf](http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/14_Why-it-Matters_Goal-14_Life-Below-Water_3p.pdf)
- UN. (n.d.). *Sustainable Development Goals*. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/>
- UN. (n.d.). *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. Retrieved from <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf>
- Yusgiantoro, Purnomo. (2014). *Ekonomi Pertahanan: Teori & Praktik*. Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
- Yusriza, Benni and Astrid Desmonda. (2015). *Ambon's Trafficking-In-Person Case in Relation to Illegal, Unreported and Undocumented (IUU) Fishing Report*. Retrieved from <https://indonesia.iom.int/sites/default/files/IUU%20Generated%20Data%20Report%20-%20Final%20%28Transshipment%20Process%29.pdf>
- Zainal, Zaidah. (2007). *Case study as a research method*. Retrieved from [http://psyking.net/htmlobj-3837/case\\_study\\_as\\_a\\_research\\_method.pdf](http://psyking.net/htmlobj-3837/case_study_as_a_research_method.pdf)



# Conflict Resolution in the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: A Case Study of Conflict Within A Party in the Leadership Era of Suryadharma Ali in 2014

Sodikun<sup>1</sup>, Sunarto<sup>2</sup>, Jamalullail<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Doctoral student of Post graduate School, Sahid University

<sup>2,3</sup> Lecturer of Ph.D. Program at Sahid University

## Abstract

Political communication in the form of political statements such as political supports that have been delivered by competent actors, in the right forum to hit the target might in fact trigger a conflict, therefore it needs a resolution to overcome such conflicts for it not to go further and waste our energy. This research used a case study to reveal a conflict resolution within the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) in the leadership period of Suryadharma Ali in 2014. The method and approach used in this research was qualitative with descriptive approach. Data collection used direct observation on field as well as deep interview with the resource and key informants. The research result shows that the conflicts occurred since there were many internal and external factors ahead of the 2014 general election. The effort for conflict resolution in PPP did not result in a satisfying solution for the conflicting parties. Ideally, political communication within PPP would run well if it was carried out by the right party actor, contained a clear message, and was transmitted through a good channel as well as hit the right target. However, in fact, the conflicts went on since there were some rules and ethical values that were breached. The conflict resolution effect should end in the interest and the goal of a party, instead of short term interest as taking over the power or changing the leader.

**Keywords:** PPP, Conflict Resolution, Political Communication, Party Actors

## I. Introduction

Political parties were established to reach a certain goal and aspiration and it could not be separated from the democracy. Political parties sit in a position as one of the facilities for people to participate politically and to be an intermediary between social powers and the government. A political party is a political group participating in the general election and through such general election, is able to put its candidates to sit in public positions (Budiardjo, 2008). The existence of political parties in Indonesia has various dynamics since the first general

election in 1955 until the last general election in 2019. Since 1955, Indonesia has been following multi parties so that the number of political parties are many.

The phenomena of the rise and fall of political parties have become common in Indonesia, either it was because of internal or internal factors. In the history of the development of political parties in Indonesia, many have had found parties that experienced internal conflict ended in fragmentation so that it disturbed the solidity of its cadre and slowed down the run of the party. Therefore, conflict reality in political parties is a challenge, not only for the future of the political party but also for the party leadership in the central level down to the local level. One of the political parties that had organizational conflict is the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP).

PPP is one of the major parties in Indonesia which was declared on January 5, 1973 or 30 Dzulqo'dah 1329 H, by KH. DR. Idham Cholid (Nahdlatul Ulama), Mintarja (Partai Muslimin Indonesia), H. Anwar Tjokrominoto (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia), Rusli Halil (Partai Islam Taarbiyah Islamiyah) and KH. Masykur (Nahdlatul Ulama). PPP that was established in the new order era is a fusion of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (NU), the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) and the Partai Islam Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti). PPP became the base of 3 large Islamic parties during the New Order era which had quite a large mass (Hasyim, 2002).

Since its inception, the existence of PPP has been full of turmoil, because the pressure from the New Order authorities forced the fusion of Islamic parties. The results of the PPP national conference in Jakarta on 6-8 November 1975 explained that the balance of power obtained by each element in the general election in 1971 was used as a benchmark in the distribution of PPP leadership power and the division of PPP seats in the house of representatives. Various complex internal problems have made the management of the PPP Central Board (DPP) of the results of the conference, the majority of which came from NU, experience turmoil. Before the internal PPP conflict was over with the NU element, a new conflict arose that was triggered by Soedarji (one of the leaders in party management) at the discretion of the PPP General Chairperson Naro, who was considered tyrannical. PPP internal conflicts continued and found no consensus, resulting in the formation of rival party management (Hasyim, 2002). This condition has a negative impact on PPP organizations and PPP cadres.

Post reformation, internal PPP conflict reoccurred. In the 1999 elections, PPP was again divided into several new parties, but PPP still had a base of mass so that it could go through *the electoral threshold*. Past internal conflicts within PPP have represented a failure to build cooperation within organizations, so that the internal conflict turmoil is repeated. The continuation of PPP's internal conflict reoccurred ahead of the presidential election in 2014. This conflict began on March 23, 2014, when the General Chairperson Suryadharma Ali together with Djan Faridz and Nur Muhammad Iskandar attended the grand campaign of Gerindra Party at Gelora Bung Karno Stadium (GBK) Jakarta. Not only attended the campaign, Suryadharma Ali also gave speeches, so that it was covered and published by the media. This was interpreted as a form of support for the candidate for President Prabowo Subianto. Activities without passing through organizational mechanisms received a negative response from the Deputy Chairperson of the PPP, Emron Pangkapi. This disagreement was followed by the Regional Leadership Council (DPW). The widespread conflict is not limited to the DPP, but also amongst the DPW and DPW, until eventually a firing of the Deputy Chairperson and Chairperson of the PPP DPW occurred.

Suryadharma Ali's support for Prabowo Subiyanto was immediately responded by the PPP DPP by holding a daily meeting of the board chaired by the Secretary General Romahurmuzyi who saw that it violated the Statutes and Bylaws. On April 20, 2014 the PPP National Leadership Meeting (Rapimnas) was held and decided to temporarily dismiss the General Chairperson, Suryadharma Ali and hand over his position to Emron Pangkapi as the executing officer (PLT) until the conference was held. According to Suryadharma Ali, the Rapimnas decision was invalid because it had to go through the PPP extraordinary conference forum.

The conflict became more complicated, after the faction of the Secretary General held a national conference (Mukernas) on October 28, 2014 in Surabaya and appointed Romahurmuzyi as PPP's Chairperson. On November

2, 2014, a counter-conference was held by the Suryadharma Ali faction in Jakarta, which resulted in the designation of Djan Faridz as PPP's Chairperson. Each claimed to be the legitimate general chairperson. Dualism of leadership in PPP not only exacerbates the conflict, but also complicates the efforts to realize reconciliation. The effort to compromise became increasingly difficult, after the Minister of Justice and Human Rights (Menkumham) Yasonna Laoly ratified the management of the PPP version of the Surabaya Congress. Suryadharma Ali's faction filed a lawsuit to the Jakarta State Administrative Court (PTUN) and decided that the ratification of Menkumham was cancelled because it violated the authority in issuing policies. The conflict has not diminished, because Romahurmuzi's faction will appeal to the PTUN High Court. This conflict dragged on until the presidential elections in 2019.

The series of conflicts within PPP seems to never stop and require more permanent conflict resolution so that the organization is healthy and can move optimally. This study tries to explore what factors caused the conflict in the late era of Suryadharma Ali's leadership and how the conflict resolution was carried out at that time. By scientifically studying this problem, it is hoped that this will become an important material for the continuity and integrity of the party so that it does not recur and also removes the community's stigma against PPP who are used to experiencing turmoil and conflict. Based on the description above, the problem was formulated as follows:

1. What internal factors and external factors caused the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) conflict in the era of Suryadharma Ali's leadership?
2. What are the efforts and steps taken by PPP in realizing party conflict resolution?

## II. Literature review

### *Political Communication*

Political communication is communication that refers to political activities. Political communication is the process of conveying opinions, attitudes and behavior of people, institutions, or political power, in order to influence political decision making. Flexibly, political communication is communication that refers to political activities (Nimmo, 2007; 2011). Political communication is any type of delivery of messages, especially those containing political information from a source to a number of recipients of the message (Arriane, 2010). Rush and Althoff explained that political communication is a dynamic element of the political system of political communication as a political function, together with the functions of articulation, aggregation, socialization and recruitment contained in a political system. Political communication is a prerequisite needed for the functioning of other functions (Anwar Arifin, 2011). While Angelita, Kholil, Titi Widaningsih and Jamalullail (2019) stated that communication is the most thing in all activities, included business and non business institutions.

The several functions of political communication according to Arifin, (2011) include the following:

- a. Political communication has a very important role in sensitivity to clearly capture the existence of something that is caused in politics.
- b. This political communication will later be needed in international communication, international relations, and in the international sphere of political communication.
- c. Political communication also has a chain of disciplines, which will then relate to social media, culture, religion, and so on.

Political communication is an interdisciplinary study. Because there are various kinds of scientific disciplines namely communication and politics. However, when the field of communication is linked to politics, sometimes there is recognition of the political aspects of public communication. So it is often associated with activities such as political campaigns, persuasive elections, to debates of government candidates by using mass media as a tool.

### *Conflicting*

The reality of conflict in society has existed since the presence of human beings on earth. As long as there is human life, the problem of conflict will always present. Both conflicts between individuals, between groups, between organizations and nations. Conflict is a relationship between two parties or preferably individuals or groups who feel they have incompatible goals (Fisher, 2001). According to Wirawan (2012: 59) conflict as a matter that must exist and its presence can not be negotiable. Potential conflicts in a social system are inherent. If traced historically, conflict theory was developed by Karl Marx and Max Weber. Marx saw social conflicts occurring between groups or classes rather than between individuals. While Weber placed the conflict in a central position in analyzing the society. For him, conflict is a basic element of human life.

Conflict theory is a theory which considers that social change does not occur through a process of adjusting values that bring about change, but occurs due to conflicts that produce compromises that are different from the original conditions (Raho, 2007). Insights into conflict theory provide inspiration and motivation for later generations, such as Rendhal Collins who built his conflict theory "more" synthetic and integrative, because it tends to be micro (Wirawan, 2012: 77). This approach is divided into three basic principles, namely (1) the population lives in a self-constructed subjective world; (2) other people have the power to control one's subjective experiences; and (3) other people continuously control someone who is against them. Then the conflict theory must depart from a reality not a fantasy and strength and social position must determine and influence the factors and degrees of interaction can even force the system of ideas to the entire social community.

Another figure who offers conflict theory is Rolf Dahrendorf. Dahrendorf acknowledged that the formation of a society cannot be separated from the existence of two elements namely consensus and conflict which are the requirements of each other (Ritzer, 2008). Dahrendorf criticized Marx's theory with the following reasons: (1) conceptually weak; (2) ownership of production facilities in the narrow sense; (3) capitalism has undergone a transformation; (4) capitalism is only one subtype of a post-industrial industrial society; (5) class conflict is more complicated, because it involves economic and political factors and then social phenomena. In Dahrendorf's view (Ritzer, 2008; Wirawan, 2012) conflict theory has the following functions:

- a. To help cleaning the atmosphere that is chaotic.
- b. The rescue valve serves as a way out that calms hostility.
- c. Aggressive energies in reality conflicts and non-reality conflicts may accumulate in other interactions before the dependence on conflict situations is alleviated.
- d. Conflict does not always end with hostility.
- e. Conflict can be used as an indicator of the strength and stability of a relationship.
- f. Conflict with various *outgroup* can strengthen the internal cohesion of a group.

### *Conflict Resolution*

Conflict resolution is an effort to deal with the causes of conflict and try to build new relationships that can last long between the hostile groups (Fischer, 2001). Liliweri (2014) said that conflict resolution is a set of theories and investigations that are experimental in order to understand the nature of conflict, examine the conflict strategy, and then make the conflict resolution. Weitzman & Weitzman (2000) defines conflict resolution as a joint problem-solving action (*solve a problem together*). Eben A Weitzman & Patricia Flynn Weitzman (2000) developed a PSDM conflict resolution model (*problem solving and decision making*) which consists of four general phases, namely diagnosing conflict, identifying alternative solutions, evaluating and having a solution that is mutually acceptable and committing the conflicting parties to a joint decision and implementing it.

Conflict resolution methods are very helpful for us to find out the nature and the function of conflict, distinguish the productive and destructive forms of conflict, and identify the conflict resolution strategies. Conflict

resolution focuses on the basic source of conflict between two parties, so that they together identify more real issues. If we don't agree, then we need a negotiator (Liliweri, 2014).

### III. Methodology

#### *Research Paradigms and Approaches*

The researcher chose the post-positivism paradigm, which is the improvement of positivism which is considered to have weaknesses and is considered to rely only on the ability to directly observe the objects. The approach used is qualitative. The research approach used is a qualitative approach. Qualitative approach is an approach taken in a reasonable situation and the data obtained is generally collected in a qualitative manner (Creswell, 2010; Neuman 2013).

#### *Research Time and Location*

The study was conducted from January 15, 2014 to January 15, 2016. The research location took place in DPP PPP in Jakarta and several leaders were involved during the conflict.

#### *Research Design*

Qualitative research, carried out in natural conditions, descriptive, emphasizes the process, conducts analysis inductively, and emphasizes more meaning (Creswell, 2010; Neuman, 2013)

#### *Data Collection Technique*

Data collection techniques used were interviews, observation, documentation studies, written media, electronic media, and FGDs which were expected to be able to describe it fully and applicably. Data obtained through in-depth interviews, to gain information as complete as possible and as deep as possible (Bungin, 2013). Also study documentation, to explore data and *Focus Group Discussion* (FGD) as an effort to explore the data and information needed according to the focus of the problem (Sugiyono, 2009).

#### *Research Subjects and Objects*

The research subjects were DPP PPP, the members of House of Representative who were both still active and no longer active, including political observers and community leaders who have ever been the historical actors/witnesses. The object of research was under the leadership of the SDA.

#### *Data analysis technique*

The data analysis used was descriptive narrative form. Following the concept of Miles and Huberman (Sugiono, 2009: 207-208), it was carried out interactively and continuously so that it was completed until the data was saturated. Data analysis activities consisted of *reduction* (selection process) *display* (presentation), and *conclusion drawing/verification* (interpretation/verification). All the three were something that was intertwined before, during, and after the data collection (Creswell, 2010)

#### *Data Validity*

Data validity can be seen from the credibility (using primary data from interviews), transferability (showing whether the results of the data can be used in other parties with the same ideology), and dependability (trying to be consistent with connecting theories in making interpretations, discussions, and conclusions) (Neuman, 2013).

#### IV. Discussion

##### *The History of PPP*

At the time of its establishment in 1973, PPP represented itself as the sole channel for the political aspirations of Muslims in Indonesia. The legitimacy of PPP as a single forum was so strong, because PPP was a political party that was born and stood up from the political fusion of the four considerable Islamic parties at that time. The four parties are based on Islam, they have national perspective, were humanity-oriented, democracy and justice. This reflects the level of awareness and responsibility of community leaders and party leaders to unite and work together to foster the community to enhance their faith and devotion to Allah SWT further.

PPP Has a Vision: "The realization of a justice and prosperous civil society, blessed by Allah SWT, *baladatul thoyyibatun wa rabbun ghofur* in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila. " While the PPP mission is

1. Striving to realize and foster humanity, faith, and devotion to Allah SWT and prevent the development of the ideology of Atheism, Communism, Marxism, Leninism, Secularism and religious silverion.
2. Fight for human rights and obligations according to Islamic teachings and prevent and oppose the development of neo-feudalism, harassment of human dignity, dehumanization, discrimination and a culture of violence.
3. Striving to maintain a sense of security, maintain and strengthen national unity and integrity and prevent and oppose the process of disintegration, division and social conflict that endangers the integrity of the Indonesian nation.
4. Fighting for democracy as a reflection of true people's sovereignty with the principles of deliberation and consensus as well as preventing and opposing authoritarianism, fascism, dictatorship, hegemony, and arbitrariness.
5. Fight for *balдах thayyibah*, a prosperous fair society that is blessed by Allah SWT and prevent the development of various forms of socio-economic and cultural gaps, consumerism and hedonistic, permissive, and materialistic lifestyles.

PPP has six frontier principles which become the cadre's spirit in its political activities. PPP holds several main principles, they are principles of worship as wide as possible to achieve the pleasure of God SWT; principle of truth, honesty, and justice who oppose all forms of evil; the principle of deliberation in collective decision making ; the principle of equality, unity, and togetherness as a fundamental belief; principle *istiqomah* in struggling; and the principle of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* in carrying out the functions of absorbing, accommodating, channelling, fighting for, and defending the aspirations of the people in social control. (Chumaidy, 2011; 2013)

The history of PPP since its establishment until now is full of internal and external dynamics, considering that it is not easy to unite several factions that have existed since the beginning of its establishment. When the reforms rolled out, the PPP continued to try to reform itself by formulating a new paradigm that was decided in the PPP Mukernas in 2000. The new paradigm includes at least some strategic aspects, namely returning to its original identity as an Islamic-based party, asserting it as an Islamic party that adheres to the principle of *ummah wasathan*, and party consolidation that promotes the principle of togetherness, unity, and constitutional path to avoid conflict and party divisions that are prolonged. (Badjeber, 2000)

In order to build a strong cadre base for public relations, PPP began to reform its cadre management. Cadre formation is one of the main activities that signifies the sustainability of party life. Cadre formation is one of recruitment media, strengthening political commitment and ideology, developing personal capacity, and strengthening institutions with a long-term orientation. Without regeneration, the party is like an organism that is difficult to breathe let alone produce. As a result, sooner or later will be destroyed because there is no

regeneration. Cadre formation in PPP since the reformation began to be planned, tiered and sustainable both formal, informal and integrated.

The political dynamics in Indonesia after the reformation posed special challenges for PPP, including the challenges of the cadre level, faction consolidation, amid the reopening of multiparty taps and direct presidential elections. The presidential election in 2014 gave a rise to a conflict in PPP which was then led by Suryadharma Ali (SDA). There were several internal and external factors that caused the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) conflict in the era of Suryadharma Ali's leadership which is briefly explained as follows:

#### *Internal factors*

The presence of the SDA in Gerindra Party campaign at the Jakarta GBK Stadium, which was not only a ceremonial meaning carried out by political party leaders, community organization figures, interest groups, and the government. Nor was it because it was seen by hundreds of thousands of people and received mass media coverage. However, it has enormous political significance and even quality. Especially when SDA is given the opportunity to make speeches and delivered political statements containing a support for the PS Presidential Candidates in the 2014-2019 elections. SDA Said "this support is a support that represents the aspirations of *ulama, kiai, pesantren*, PPP constituents, PPP administrators at the central, regional, branch, sub-branch and unit-branch level." For the PPP's elite (PPP's deputy chairman) who disagreed with the political steps of SDA, among others stated: "At that time we were all shocked and questioned that. I was there, and many DPW and DPC officials were asking why the General Chairperson was in the Gerindra's campaign". The statement of the informant does not intend to defend one of the parties, because the informant's background is now in the DPP.

While Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Gerindra Party, Prabowo Subianto (PS) as noted by Kompas Daily (3/23/2014), claimed to be confused by the arrival of the SDA. Nevertheless, PS appreciated the arrival of SDA. "Today, I see an unusual development. There is an abnormality, namely Gerindra Party campaign was attended by the Chairperson of the PPP, "Prabowo said when delivering his political speech at Bung Karno Main Stadium.

SDA considered that the accusations against him who considered breaching the rule were groundless. Then the split in the PPP camp does not need to be continued. "If my visit to Pak Prabowo's campaign is to become a base of chaos, let's look at it rationally together (Detik, 04/20/2014). Political maneuver by SDA, a problem that can trigger the conflict. Through the statements in the mass media, PPP leaders and top administrators rejected the essence of SDA's claim for the actions taken, one of which was to support PS Candidates that were contrary to party rules.

According to the informant, SDA was considered to be very confident that with this attitude the position became clearer and stronger because there were no challengers who could shake it up because the second person at PPP, Romahurmuziy (Romi) was his 'protégé,' who had been considered to participate in and agree with the word of SDA. Romi, although as the Secretary-General is one of SDA's people and not yet considered as a serious challenger. While other political figures were deemed not to have a strong support base, including a number of PPP deputy chairmen such as Emron Pangkapi. The reality is different, momentum occurred when SDA's people made mistakes that can ignite internal conflicts which ultimately brought SDA down.

#### *External factors*

The fact that there was a conflict in the internal of PPP after SDA's statement viewed from the perspective of political communication can be seen as a bullet that was deliberately fired at internal and external parties. The existence of PPP leadership dualism made the government unable to remain silent because it was considered to be disturbing the development of a healthy and constructive democratic and political climate. Especially when

the Surabaya Congress party clearly gave a signal to support Jokowi's government, while SDA became a suspect by the KPK, it was difficult to deny whom must Jokowi's government support.

The firmness of support was even clearer when the Surabaya Congress faction led by Romi won the management dispute in the Supreme Court (MA) and soon followed by official support for the Jokowi-JK government. Back to the political statement communicated by the SDA. With clear language, it could be considered as a political statement that was right on the target, especially if it was intended to provide assertiveness to other parties (those opposed to PS), that the PPP's position was clear in its direction and support, so there was no need to attempt to find support and attract PPP to Jokowi's side.

When an external party turns out to be the party that won the 2014 presidential election contestation, the likes and dislikes of that external party automatically become a very important actor in the PPP conflict. External parties who were previously expected to keep their distance or passive in responding to the PPP internal conflict by some groups in PPP seemed to be forced into or become part of the PPP conflict. By inviting or cooperating with the government, it is expected that one of the camps will have a stronger bargaining position. Likewise the government has an interest in resolving conflicts which at the same time also means overcoming the problem of national political chaos in general.

Factions or sides that were previously inclined to Jokowi seemed to be gaining support or benefited from the Jokowi-JK's victory, so that they directly or indirectly tried to drag the government into the internal PPP conflict cycle. The government actually also had an interest in quickly resolving the internal PPP conflict and clearly showing the direction in which PPP support was anchored, whether to take the position of opposition or counterweight or become part of the government. The government certainly hoped that the PPP will become part of the government, as can be seen from the appointment of the Minister of Religion from the PPP element (Lukman Hakim Saifuddin), even though at that time the direction of PPP support was not yet clear.

#### *PPP Conflict Resolution*

Regardless of who and what factors are causing the collapse of PPP votes in the 2014 legislative elections, SDA was one of the people who was considered as the most responsible, even if SDA did not deliver a statement supporting Prabowo Subianto (PS) or even support for PS was taken through a forum that had been agreed upon. The statement of SDA's support for PS increasingly showed the role of SDA in internal conflicts and the decline in PPP votes. As stated by a DPP PPP's executive informant "PPP has not yet determined the coalition to any presidential candidate, what SDA said is thus null and void." SDA political ethics and *fatsun* in the campaign was a wrong step. If it refers to the Dahrendorf's conflict theory (Ritzer, 2008) then in the case of PPP, the conflict actually made the party's atmosphere more uncomfortable, and tended to be "hostile" among cadres so that it disrupted the organization from the central level to the regions.

According to the PPP cadre, if SDA immediately revised or even revoked its statement after receiving criticism and rejection from a number of cadres and figures, then the polemic that emerged would not be prolonged. The facts showed the attitude of SDA that did not seem that he felt guilty or wrong, so the polemic that started from different points of view of the political support and the strategies used led to a prolonged internal conflict. This was the importance of knowing the effects of political communication as a means to achieve the objectives. Conflict resolution is part of the effort to achieve the objectives of political communication.

Understanding the effects here needs to be broadly understood to include impacts (*impact*) and result (*outcome*). The purpose of the political statement put forward by the SDA is certainly not to divide the party or cause conflict, but to strengthen solidity and promote the party. If the effect was different from the original purpose of a political statement, then it can be stated as a political communication that fails to achieve the mission or goal. "Instead of adding to the party's solidity, what happens is precisely to divide and drain party energy."

Legal mechanisms or channels are an option for resolving conflictual problems, but often the consequences are actually deepening the existing problems because legal mechanisms are often *zero sum game*, and no *win-win solutions*. Conflict resolution that takes the path of legal settlement is usually taken after negotiation and reconciliation, because each party is unwilling to change or shift his opinion. The ability to manage conflict and communicate the political action are the keys, where not all leaders can do it appropriately and productively.

As stated by the expert council/DPR PPP Ahmad Yani as follows: "There will not be a protracted conflict if every leader understands the principles of the PPP struggle. Even though the Sharia Council and the Advisory Council have tried to abandon it. But SDA did not immediately revise it or did not want to revoke its political statement, even though it could divide and drain the energy and authority of the party. And in fact this is evidence of his failure to lead and manage the party".

Seeing the reality of PPP internal conflicts that still continue both formally and informally, researcher offers a conflict resolution with the PSDM model (*problem solving and decision making*) Eben A Weitzman & Patricia Flynn Weitzman (2000) which consists of four general phases, namely diagnosing conflict, identifying alternative solutions, evaluating and having a mutually acceptable solution and the commitment of the conflicting parties to a joint decision and implementing it. Researchers have made a diagnosis and analysis of conflict resolution efforts, both from internal and external factors that are successful in resolving a conflict. The results need to be re-evaluated the roots of the emergence of conflict in the body of PPP. Where the SDA's decision to support PS candidates without going through a meeting of the party leadership council caused conflict in the body of party officials who were dissatisfied. This is due to the SDA leadership style which does not adhere to the party's statutes and articles and seems to be arbitrary by firing some central and regional officials who are not in line.

An alternative solution is to do reconciliation or peace by sitting together to find common ground. Then, choosing a solution that can be accepted together with favorable internal party conditions through Mbah Moen's figure, then a number of follow-up efforts are made to seek more permanent and substantive conflict resolution. The implementation phase of conflict resolution through a party mechanism through a predetermined decision should be acceptable to all parties within the conflict. However, these efforts have not yielded results in the implementation because many internal and external factors that emerge and increasingly protracted.

Ideally through the organizational mechanism managed by the PPP court by accommodating all the wishes of the parties to the conflict, it should be the right decision solution that must be trusted by all parties without involving external parties, through convention activities together with the conflicting sides and agreeing on joint decisions. Efforts to resolve conflict through this mechanism also face obstacles. Then internal factors in conflict resolution efforts can be realized immediately without having to involve external parties who want to find a moment of support from one of the conflicting camps. In this case external factors increasingly have a big influence on this round of conflict when legal solutions are deemed not to provide justice and tend to favor the pro-government side. Conflict resolution efforts apparently did not produce many common ground, even though the party organizations continued to run. The long impact of this conflict was the weakness of party consolidation which resulted in a decline in party votes.

Communication that was built by the warring parties and the presence of Mbah Moen as an internal factor that could unite experienced a deadlock because of many elite stakeholders and the pressure of a large external factor. The phenomenon of PPP conflict at the end of SDA management apparently continued until 2019. This conflict serves as an example that internal and external factors can actually be solved through a party mechanism regulated in the Statutes and By-Laws and efforts of *islah* which involves a mediator, but it takes time and is not easy to unite elite groups. Because of effort of *islah*, what had been agreed was apparently not going well so the legal efforts were finally made. Conflict resolution through legal remedies apparently did not revoke all the roots of the issue in dispute, because the conflict widened even more in the control of party resources and the interests of controlling other political assets. The legal path chosen or forced to use is actually a way of effective conflict

resolution but it must be realized that this legal effort must be followed by a spirit of reconciliation through the party's internal mechanism, rather than being used as legitimacy to suppress its political opponents, because essentially, these conflicting cadres are in one organization.

So far PPP has enjoyed calm conditions and internal conflicts have begun to subside because there is a clear legal solution, has closeness to the government, and PPP has become part of the incumbent. The 2019 elections gave a surprising result for PPP because ?????. The success of conflict resolution is largely determined by the solidity and internal strength of the party. PPP is still fortunate to have dignified figures such as Mbah Maimun Zubir. It is expected that after the death of Mbah Maimun, PPP regains their solidity and reunited. Although until now the PPP is still divided into two, at least the hot sphere of internal conflict has subsided and the efforts of *islah* re-appeared.

## CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

The internal dynamics of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan had taken place since its inception in 1973 because several factions had been formed. There are weaknesses in managing conflicts within the party so that PPP is vulnerable to internal conflicts. In 2014 internal party conflicts re-emerged which at that time was led by Suryadharma Ali (SDA). There are many factors that can be identified in the PPP conflict in 2014 which are grouped into internal factors and external factors. Internal factors, including SDA's leadership style that did not comply with the statute of PPP and acted arbitrary by firing several central and regional administrators who were not in line with him, lacking sportsmanship, and did not want to attract support and revise support despite pressure from the member PPP. External factors, external parties wanted to capture a moment of support from one of the conflicting parties who were very trying to win one of the conflicting parties even intervening PPP party's conflict. Government should play a role as a resolute actor and not in favor of one of the side.

The PPP conflict resolution approach referring to the Weitzman & Weitzman PSDM model begins by diagnosing PPP conflict that leads to the root of conflict, namely SDA support for Prabowo Subiyanto (PS) and SDA actions outside the Party's Statute mechanism so that it impacts on the internal divisions and external factors of elite interests the authorities contributed to prolonging the conflict. The resolution step began to be established by presenting the party court and the presence of a unifying figure, Mbah Moen, in fact the implementation did not take place well. PPP's efforts in carrying out the conflict resolution have not yet reached the realization of satisfactory reconciliation between the two sides, despite the efforts and optimal steps. In the end, the final conflict resolution was carried out with a legal path that had an impact on the organizational division of the party.

From this study, it can be conveyed several suggestions, including academically, a more in-depth study of the new model in conflict resolution of political parties in Indonesia is needed. In practical terms, the authors suggest that the government should be more careful not to get too deeply involved in political party conflicts to create a sense of justice for all parties. For PPP, learning from the conflicts that have taken place at PPP from its inception until now it is necessary to create legal and ethical mechanisms that become the organizational culture that specifically regulates party conflict resolution so that it does not recur in the future. PPP as an old Islamic party must be an example of how a conflict can be managed and find the best solution.

## References

- Arifin, Anwar. Political Communication Philosophy-Paradigm-Theory-Purpose-Strategy and Indonesian Political Communication. Yogyakarta: Graha Science. 2011
- Arriane, Lely Political Communication: Politicians and Imaging on the Political Stage. Bandung: Widya Padjadjaran. 2010
- Badjeber, Djafar Reformasi, PPP Is a Must, PT. Lucky Blessing Eleven, 2000.
- Budiardjo, Miriam, Fundamentals of Political Science (Revised Edition), Jakarta: Gramedia, 2008.

- Bungin, Burhan, *Sociology of Communication*, Kencana Prenada Media Group, Jakarta, 2013.
- Chozin Chumaidy, *Rise Up My Party*, Pustaka Indonesia Satu Jakarta, 2011.
- Chozin Chumaidy, *Reclaiming Belief in the People*, PPP Central Board of Leaders, Jakarta, 2013.
- Creswell, John W. 2010. *Research Design Qualitative, Quantitative, and Approach Mixed* Yogyakarta: Student Library
- , 2011. *PPP Congress VII Provisions Document*, PPP DPP, Jakarta, 2011.
- , 2013. *PPP Party Court Document*, Jakarta, 2013.
- Fisher, Simon, et al., 2001, *Managing Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action* . The British Council Indonesia, Jakarta.
- Angelita, G., Kholil, Titi Widaningsih and Jamalullail. 2019. *Corpaorate Communication Strategy for business repositioning a case study in PT Garuda Indonesia Tbk*. *International of Business and Social Science*. 10(4), p: 48-57.
- Hasyim, Masykur. *Menusantarakan Islam Politics: Long Journey of the United Party Development*, Surabaya: Sembilan Lima Foundation, 2002
- Liliweri, Alo. *Organizational Sociology and Communication*, Bumi Aksara, 2014.
- Neuman, W. Lawrence, 2013. *Social Research Method: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon
- Nimmo, D. (2007). *Political communication and public opinion in America, or political communication: communicators, messages and media*, The second printing, Tjun Surjaman's translation, Bandung: Youth Rosda Karya.
- Nimmo, and *Political Communication, Communication, Message and Media*, PT. Rosdakarya Youth, Bandung, 2011.
- Meriam Budiardjo, *Fundamentals of Political Science*, Gramedia, Jakarta, 2012.
- Raho, Bernard. *Modern Sociological Theory*. Jakarta: Literature Publisher Achievements, 2007
- Ritzer, George and Douglas J. Goodman, *Modern Sociological Theory*, 6th Edition, Jakarta: Kencana. 2008
- Wirawan, IB *Social Theories in Three Paradigms (Social Facts, Social Definitions, and Social Behavior)* First Edition . Jakarta: Kencana Prenada Media Group. 2012
- Weitzman, EA, & Flynn, PW 2000. *Problem Solving and Decision Making in Conflict Resolution*. In Morthon Deutsch & Peter Coleman (Eds). *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (p. 185-210). San Francisco: Josey



# Political Violence in North Central Nigeria: Reflections and the Way Forward

Dalhatu Musa Yusha<sup>1</sup>, Abdullahi Shehu Halidu<sup>2</sup>, Ahmed Usman Egye<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Department of Public Administration, Nasarawa State Polytechnic, Lafia. Email: musadalhat03@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup> Department of Political, Science Federal University Lafia. Email: halidasshehu@yahoo.com

<sup>3</sup> Department of Public Administration, Nasarawa State Polytechnic, Lafia

## Abstract

The problem of political violence in Nigeria has its root from colonial era and coupled with the military incursion into politics in 1966, it has continued unabated resulting in loss of precious lives and property. This paper attempts to X-ray political violence in North Central Nigeria using retrospective analysis and advances potent ways to ameliorate the menace in the Nigeria's body polity. The paper is explorative and theoretical in nature. Meanwhile, political intolerance, politics of ethnic and religious competition, unemployment and poverty, weak laws and poor adjudication are the fulcrums leading to political violence. The findings clearly revealed an alarming loss in lives and properties, with Plateau State being the highest victim in the zone. It also indicated that there would be no meaningful political and socio-economic progress in the country amidst political violence. Thus, it recommended the urgent review of our legislation to ensure a free and fair election and violators be properly and promptly punished by the judiciary in accordance with the law. Again, public offices must be made unattractive to reduce the 'do or die' contest syndrome as well as total reorientation against ethnic and religious politics with a genuine fight against poverty and unemployment.

**Keywords:** Democracy, Electoral Act, Politics, Thugs, Violence

## INTRODUCTION

The post-colonial state in Nigeria as indeed with most less developed countries (LDC'S) in Africa, Asia and Latin America is fraught with political disequilibrium (Adetumbo,1991), specifically the political laboratory in Nigeria is a theatre of violence, conflict and war for primitive accumulation through the power process, amongst the dominant forces with the inevitable consequences of political violence identifiable within the spate of the various recently experienced assassination galore.

The devastating effect of colonial and military rule on the third world nations is noticeable in all their undertakings, as dependency scholars have extensively analyzed. It is through this historical circumstances and configuration of social interest and classes, that the Nigerian political class, emerged, which accounts largely for

their political behavior. The logic is that being a creature of western imperialism, the natural tendency for them is to make the country safe for their selfish interests.

In other words, there is a very high probability that they will exploit and marginalize the led. Nonetheless, the Nigerian political environment in the post-colonial era has the rare opportunity to guarantee political stability, produce dedicated political elites and in turn, safeguard the nation's hard earned democracy. This is because the old images and structures were maintained. For example, the nature of leadership and their respective socio-economic and political policies remain unchanged. According to Ogunsawo (1990), Nigerian political elites are a hydra-headed, incoherent group who is a decisive factor in the exacerbating political violence in Nigeria. It is in the light of this relationship that the nature of political violence can be explained.

## **THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

The main aim of this research is to review the nature of political violence in Nigeria and its consequences. The specific objectives are to:-

1. Identify and examine the various political crises experienced in Nigeria from independence to 2015.
2. Evaluate the major causes of political violence in Nigeria.
3. Assess the impact of the violence to the political development of the country, particularly, the North Central.
4. Identify the possible ways of ameliorating the political crisis and improving political development in the country.

## **CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

### **Political violence:**

Political violence according to Agba (2011) is the use of thugs, private armies, and physical force to threaten or harm political opponents or rig election. As UNESCO (2005) observed, it could result in or has high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, deprivation or mal-development.

Feirabend, Raslind and Tobert (1972) have contended that political violence is usually the consequence of social discontent. In this light one possible cause of violence could be aggression arising from frustration. A theory popularized by Gurr (1970), political violence could also break out as a result of malfunctioning within a social structure (the systematic hypothesis) or fallout of clashes among dominant groups in a society.

Political violence according to Anifowose cited in (Ikyase and Egberi 2015) is the use of threat of physical act carried out by individual or individuals within a political system against another individuals or groups and property, with the intent to cause injury or death to persons, damage or destruction to property and whose objective, choice of targets or victims surrounding circumstance, implementation and effects have political significance that tends to modify or change the behavior of others in the existing arrangement for the political system.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW: POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA**

Politics can be seen as an activity associated with the governing of a country or an area. It is mostly tied to practice of democracy controlled by political parties. Those involved are called politicians. Partisan politics entails the conduct of election within the constitutionally stipulated periods. In pre-election period, politicians aspire from time to time to occupy their desired elective/political offices at various levels. Political killings are prevalent in every political system across the globe, but the degree marks the difference. America has the most developed democracy in the world, yet it had its fair share of suspected politically motivated killings. On the list in this regard were John F.Kennedy, Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther king. In India, Indra and Raji'v Ghandis were killed. There were also Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Patrick Lumumba of Congo, Acquinno of

Philippine, Olymipo of Togo to mention but a few. A thorough examination of the Nigeria political history has indicated the nature and manner of political violence in Nigeria. For example, in 1903 the colonial government had to assassinate the then Sultan Tambari. In Benin and Okpobo, the Monarchs were sent into exile after resisting colonialism. And the most recent one is the removal of Sultan Dasuki on April 20, 1996 by the then military government of Sani Abacha.

Between 1951 and 1960 the burgeoning national politicians equally perfected the strategy of colonial government in pursuing traditional rulers out of governance, and soon turn on themselves after the independence. The debut of the military in government and administration of Nigeria was the bloodiest one that set the tone for political violence in Nigeria.

During the first republic, the first Politician whose death raised suspicion of political undertone in its cheered political history was Chief Adegoke Adelasu, opposition leader, from western Nigeria in 1958. The popular Ibadan politician had died in a motor accident in circumstance that raised so many questions. It was followed by the death of Olusegun Awolowo in a suspected ghastly motor accident on the way to Lagos to defend his father, late chief Obafemi Awolowo who was facing a treasonable felony in an unprecedented political violence tagged operation wefie, which erupted following the alleged rigging of the 1964/1965 general elections in the region termed wildwildwest. The political violence spread to other regions and claimed the lives of Sir Ahmadu Bello, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Chief S.L. Akintola and Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh among others.

In the second republic the controversies that surrounded the 1983 gubernatorial polls in the old Ondo and Oyo states sparked off civil unrest, arson and assassination of some politicians, their supporters and even sympathizers, and with brashness.

Hired killings of key national figures popularly referred to as state organized murders believed to have serious political implications became pronounced during Babangida and Abacha regimes such as the death of Dele Giwa, Pa Alfred Rewane, Alhaja Kudirat Abiola, Major-General Shehu Yar-adua, Architect Layi Balogun etc.

There were also series of assassination attempts such as the attempts to kill NADECO leader Pa Abraham Adesanya, Mr. Alex Ibru. Moreover, another suspected political violence/murder was the death of MKO Abiola in prison in 1998.

Since election and post-election period of 1999 to 2008, there was hardly any state in Nigeria that has not witnessed political violence. These periods are fraught by what Agbaje (2004) described as allegation of rigging, incidence of violence and litigation over election outcomes in an increasing charged atmosphere.

Statistical data on political violence within this period are frightening, on November 7, 2002 in sokoto, Umaru Dan Maliki new breed politician was attacked and beaten to the point of death, he was suspected to be attacked on the premise of decamping from ANPP to PDP. Between March 10 and 11, 2003, Lagos recorded political clash between PDP and AD in which several people were feared dead. The convoy of Gani Fawehinmi, presidential candidate of National Conscience Party (NCP), was attacked on March 14, 2003 where his driver was seriously injured. Bola Ige (a federal Justice Minister and Attorney General were shot dead at his residence in Ibadan, Oyo state, on December 23, 2007. It was suspected to be a political killing (The Punch, April 25, 2008).

Moreover, between November 1, 2006, and March 10, 2007, the Nigerian press and other sources reported several assassinations attempts of Nigerian politicians, party officials, and other people linked to various electoral campaigns. Human Rights Watch (2006) estimated that a minimum of three hundred Nigerians was killed in violence linked to the 2007 general election. The most unfortunate death is the killing of two PDP Gubernatorial Aspirants; Funsho Williams in Lagos and Ayo Daramola in Ekiti states were murdered in July and August 2006, respectively.

The implication of political violence to Nigeria resulted in the current political desperation that characterized political contests and activities. This ultimately resulted in what Akindele (2002) describe as bad governance characterized by the following:

- i. Failure to make clear separation between what is public and what is private hence, a tendency to divert public resources for private gain.
- ii. Priority that is inconsistent with development, thus, resulting in a misallocation of resources
- iii. Excessive narrow based or non-transparency decision making (World bank, 1992 as cited in Akindele, 2002)

The case of sitting Governor prevented from getting to his office just because he decamped from his party is another example of political violence; House of Assemble members are prevented from sitting in their chambers, the most embarrassing is the attempt made by police to forcibly prevent a serving house of representative speaker from entering the premises of the National Assembly in 2014, the burning of Goodluck Jonathan campaign buses in Jos, Bauchi and so on are all clear manifestation of political violence in Nigeria.

## **METHODOLOGY**

The research is purely explorative and theoretical. Secondary instruments such as textbooks, journals, magazines newspapers and official documents and reports were used as sources of data. The main focal area of the study is North Central geo-political zone of Nigeria, from 1999 to 2015.

## **PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS**

This section present in relevant themes the findings of the work as it relates to the causes and impacts of political violence in the North Central States of Nigeria, which is in line with the research objectives.

### **CAUSES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTH CENTRAL NIGERIA**

1. Political Intolerance: This has to do with the character of 'do or die affair' as the political elites see election as a must win. When they lose through the verdict of the ballot box, it becomes difficult to accept defeat. Personal bitterness and existing rivalry between top contenders eventually result into political violence. The culture of political tolerance can hardly be seen in Nigerian politicians as winning at all costs becomes their mind set. An example is in Kogi State 2007 general elections where the idea of Ebira agenda was launched, meaning that an Ebira man must be the Governor of the state. Ohiare an (Ebira man) contested under the platform of Action Congress for the governorship of kogi state in 2007 but lost to Ibrahim Idris (a PDP candidate of Igala extraction). The Ebira found this too hard to swallow they felt robbed of opportunity to occupy the highest position in the state. This made them to vent their anger on Ebira, who were supporters of PDP in Ebiraland because they see them as betrayers of Ebira's collective interest leading to political turmoil in 2007 in Ebiraland (Nelson and Saliu, 2011, cited in Joshua 2013).
2. Politics of ethnic and religious competition: Politicians in Nigeria have always used ethnic and religious sentiments as a tool for campaign and in the process a lot of hatred is created within the contenders. Though this factor manifests in every facet of our life whether socially or economically but its political appeal is so much that it creates a lot of tensions which result to political violence. It degenerates to crises within people of different ethnic and religious groups. As Jega (2002) argued, contest for political power among the elites in their bid to capture the state is often characterized by cut throat competition, resulting in the mobilization of sentiments and negative messages and manipulations of ethno-religious and communal identities for their selfish interest end with attendant violence. According to the Nigeria Watch, third report, that covered the period 2006-2011, Plateau state, North Central, was the most dangerous state because of ethnic conflicts (Perouse, cited in Bello, 2015). The study further noted that electoral violence is thus linked to pre-existing ethno-religious conflicts. Plateau state has the highest number of deaths from political clashes and this is commensurate with ethno-religious tensions that fuel political violence. Nigeria Watch database further revealed that the Plateau state has the highest

number of deaths for a single political incident related to elections with 540 fatalities. The report for the number of fatalities from electoral violence per state and zone which covered (June 2006-May 2014) indicates the north-central zone recording the highest number. Under this period, states like Benue 109, Kogi 107, Kwara 53, Niger 86, FCT 59, Nasarawa 258 and Plateau 850 (Bello 2015). Plateau state recorded 850 fatalities within the period 2006-2014 because of the ethno-religious conflicts which created the fertile ground for all forms of political violence.

3. Lack of internal democratic structures and processes within individual political parties: Most political parties have been found wanting in respect to this, what is common is the imposition of candidates on party members by those who are called leaders or financiers of the party. This is as a result of weak democratic institutions and culture where internal democracy is neglected. When there is no level playing ground within political parties it creates room for aggrieved political contestants to orchestrate violence by sponsoring thugs and hooligans who end up causing instability during elections. The report of 2006-2014 indicates that for 2013 casualties, the majority can be accounted for by factional clashes between CPC rival groups which ignited ethnic tension between Gwandara and Eggon communities in Nasarawa state which resulted in 197 deaths during the turmoil (Cohen 2015). In another report on conflicts in Igalamela-odulu local government of Kogi State, it shows that between 2006 and 2014 there were at least 28 violent incidents which resulted to 48 fatalities, 10 of the fatalities were political conflicts (Titus 2015).
4. Poverty and unemployment: Widespread poverty and unemployment leave young people vulnerable to informal employment by politicians who engage them as thugs to maim and kill or snatch ballot boxes or intimidates their opponents on the day of election with arms. Pervasive poverty and unemployment have been the driving force pushing young people into thuggery for stipends earned as allowances to cause political violence.
5. Electoral body perceived bias and partiality: when there is an obvious willingness by the body in charge of conducting elections i.e. Independent Electoral Commission to favour a particular candidate or political party, it leads to loss of confidence as the aggrieved result to political violence as self-help solution. The partiality of the electoral body aggravates political violence especially post-election violence.
6. Weak laws and poor adjudication: the Electoral Act which guides the electoral process is in most cases weak and has lacunas which politicians exploit. For instance, the use of Smart Card Reader (SCR) for accreditation of voters is still a controversial issue within the Act given room for some politicians to insist that all votes cast must be counted even if not accredited by the SCR. The issue of monitoring campaign spending and its enforcement and penalty is another contentious problem. In addition to this, the judiciary which supposed to be the last arbiter lost its confidence in the face of the citizens. Situation where courts of similar jurisdiction passing contradictory judgments on a similar case are rampant. The Zamfara State All Progressive Congress (APC) crisis on fielding candidates for the 2019 general election, where two High Courts seating in Abuja and Gusau passed contradictory judgments, is a clear example. These can invariably breed political violence.

## **THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH CENTRAL**

The impact of political violence on the political development of North Central Nigeria is huge and enormous; some of them include the followings;

1. Political violence impacts on democratic culture, thereby creating disorder and political instability. Political violence distorts democratization in Nigeria through the truncating of the democratic process either before or after the election. Violence itself has not produced anything good, what it does in totality is distortion of peace. Political instability is the outcome of political violence which is unhealthy to democracy, it does generate an atmosphere of social insecurity through inter group conflicts that are capable of destabilizing the society.
2. Political violence negates the purpose of democracy which is enhanced through popular participations, where citizens exercise their will through periodic election. The electorates or voters are discouraged

from exercising their rights to vote for candidates of their choice and it is the reason Nigerian elections continue to witness low turnout because of the fear of violence. Low turnout of voters negates democracy tenets of popular participation, which gives desperate politicians the opportunity to rig elections massively. Its implication is the imposition of wrong candidates on the system.

3. Political violence discourages women from participating in democratic process either from party's primaries or general elections. Where the process is marred with heavy violence and thuggery activities of killings, maiming and other vices scare women away. This excludes women from participating because of the unhealthy pre and post-election processes.
4. Another impact of political violence is that it discourages credible and visionary political actors from participating in the democratic process. The activities of politicians who make it a do or die affair or a must win by all means have thrown descent politicians away from participating, it ends up leaving a wrong impression that politics and political processes are dirty. This impression leaves the field of politics for thugs, charlatans, hooligans to occupy the space.
5. Political violence leads to the killing of some citizens either involved directly or indirectly in electoral contest. For example, the killing of Action Congress of Democrats gubernatorial candidates in plateau state Jesse Arakwu in 2006 among so many others. Political violence has given rise to murders and political assassinations that are unhealthy for Nigeria's political development.
6. It leads to the destruction of public and private properties such as cars, office buildings and other government properties. Mostly, when there is political disagreement or post-election crises thugs engage in destruction of government properties. This is a serious obstacle to Nigeria political development. In 2011, report indicated that property worth hundreds of millions were destroyed in some areas of Plateau, Kaduna and Kano States, amongst others.

## CONCLUSION

Political violence has been part and parcel of Nigeria history but it has metamorphosed in different magnitudes, shapes and consequences. Political violence has always been pre-electoral and post electoral. The North Central part of Nigeria has had its own share of political violence which has been fuelled by ethno-religious conflicts, especially in Plateau state; while other North Central states like Benue and Nasarawa have their own aggravated by farmers-herders conflicts as it has created fertile ground for political violence. Political violence in Nigeria especially in the North Central states have it root causes from the do or die attitude of politicians, ethno-religious manipulations by the political elites, political parties failure to conduct free and fair primary elections among its contestants, the level of poverty and unemployment among others. It has negatively affected Nigeria political development, causing political instability and has led to death of so many souls and destruction of properties.

## RECOMMENDATIONS/WAY FORWARD

1. Seeking political office should not be a do or die affair; politicians should be able to accept the outcome of every political contestation. There is a need for political elites and actors to have political settlement machinery in resolving pre and post electoral issues in order not to degenerate into violence. Political offices should be made unattractive by reducing the overbearing privileges attached to the offices and ensure strict compliance to the rule of 'the game.' The Electoral Act should be properly strengthened and all ambiguities therein should be resolved. Perhaps, electronic voting with adequate cyber security protection will help the process.
2. There should be a re-orientation in order to change the narrative of using sentiment such as religion and ethnicity for politics. Choice of candidates should not be on the basis of religious and ethnic sentiments but merit. Government should set up genuine and reliable mechanisms for resolving existing disputes such as ethno-religious and farmers-herders crises and sanctioning perpetrators.
3. There should be deliberate attempt to tackle poverty and unemployment in the zone to discourage young people from taking up thuggery as alternative means of survival. Agriculture and entrepreneurship should be boosted, while soft loans should be given to youths who engage in the business. This will go a long way to discourage young people from been political gangsters and thugs.

4. There is need to build strong democratic culture that will allow smooth operations of democratic principles. Political parties should build strong internal democratic mechanisms and processes that will give a level playing ground for all party members. Internal democratic mechanisms should be able to resolve intra-party disputes to stop it from degenerating to political violence.
5. The body responsible for conducting election should be impartial in the discharge of its constitution mandate of conducting a free and fair election. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) must act above board to build confidence in the citizens during and after the electoral process.
6. The judiciary being the last hope of the common man should equally be up and doing. Pre and post electoral cases should be treated with dispatch, fairness and in accordance to the extant rules and regulation. This shall develop the confidence of not just the politicians but the entire citizens in the judiciary who will hence prefer to follow the civilized legal procedure in case of any misunderstanding other than taking arms.

## References

- Adebanwi, W. (2004) Democracy and violence: the challenge of communal clashes. In Abaje A.B. et al (eds) *Nigerians struggles for democracy and good governance* (pp. 327-348). Ibadan: Ibadan university press.
- Agba, M. S. (2011). Political thuggery and democratic dividends in Nigeria: an empirical study. *Higher education of social science*, 001. 1. 7 2007, pp. 58-65.
- Akindele, S.T. (2002). The concept of democracy and governance: A theoretical and empirical X-Ray of their linkage and practical application within the Nigerian political landscape. In *Journal of social science interdisciplinary reflection of contemporary society*. Sambalapur, India 30 (6) pp.173 – 199.
- Akindele, S.T (2005). A critical Analysis of cooperation and its problem. In *Nigerian Anthropologist*, 7 (1) pp. 7-18
- Adetumbo S. (1991) Political leadership and political decay: A synopsis of post-independent Nigeria. In Tyoden, S. C. (ed) *leadership, democracy and the poor*. Proceeding of the Annual conference of the Nigerian political Science Association held at Bwari, Abuja FCT Aug. 1991 pp. 26-29.
- Bello. S. K. (2015). Political and electoral violence in Nigeria: mapping, evolution and patterns (June 2006- May 2014). IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no 49.
- Cohen. C. (2015). Violence between and within political parties in Nigeria: statistics, structures and patterns (2006-2014). IFRA-Nigeria working papers series no 50.
- Feirabend, k., Raslind L. and Tobert, G. (1972). *Anger violence and politics: theories and research*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.
- Gurr, T. R, (1970). *Why men rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University press.
- Human Right Watch (2006). Introduction and summary of report on political violence in Nigeria. [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org) Retrieved 06/01/2019
- Ikyase. T. J and Egberi. A. E. (2015). Political violence and democratic stability in Nigeria: Reflecting on the past and chatting the way forward. *Review of public administration and management* Vol. 4, no 8.
- Jega, A. (2002). Tackling ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. *The Nigeria social scientist* 5(2) 35-39.
- Joshua, S. (2013). *Politics and conflicts: A study of Eberaland (1997-2007)*. NP
- Obadare, N. (1999). Democratic transition and political violence in Nigeria. *African development*, Vol. XXIV, Nos. 182, 1999. Pp. 203-219.
- Ogunsawo, A. (1990). *The transformation of Nigeria: scenarios and metaphors*. Inaugural lecture, University of Lagos, p.2  
The Punch, April 25, 2008, p.6
- Rafiu, O. O., Akintola, O. and Salam, F. (2009) The Nigerian state, Political assassination and democratic consolidation: a historical Exploration. *African Journal of political science and international Relations*, Vol. 3 (2). Pp. 156-164
- Titus, O. S. (2015). A study of violence-related deaths in Mopa-muro and Igalamela-odulu local government areas of kogi state and Toto local government of area of Nasarawa state (2006-2015). IFRA- Nigeria working papers series, no 52. <http://www.academicjournals.org>. Retrieved 05/02/2019
- UNESCO (2005). <http://www.portalunesco.org/education/en/evphp-urc-fs=36790>. Retrieved 06/02/2019



# EU Trade Policy Amid US-China Trade Confrontation

Asad Ullah<sup>1</sup>, Asadullah Aria<sup>2</sup>, Muhammad Nauman Akhter<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Shandong University Qingdao Campus China

<sup>2</sup>Assistant Professor, Al Beroni University Afghanistan

Correspondence: Asad Ullah. Email: Kasad30311@gmail.com, uasad@mail.sdu.edu.cn

## Abstract

The current United States' aggressive and unilateral trade policy, as well as the rapid rise of the Chinese unique economic system – now challenging the constant rules-based trade's institution and global trading system. In the current on-going US-China trade spat, the European Union (EU) has a substantial interest, even if it has been so far reasonably kept from the United States (US) aggressive trade policy and the reaction of China. In such unpredictable circumstances, I begin to argue that the EU should adopt a practically independent trade policy, which can be made rendering to the contemporary setup and going beyond. Finding that how the EU treated both the US and China, I found that the EU was more adjacent to the US than China, but as China became more open to the world and the EU demand upsurge, the EU today shared an equal interest with both China and the US. I then demonstrate that such situation makes it impossible for the EU to build an extensive trade policy. The EU must make a steady trade policy for protecting its economy; in such case, I never mean that the EU has to make an extensive choice or either siding China or the US, or one against the other – EU to protect its economic market can decide and act henceforth. The EU, even more than China and the US, abide and has a strategic interest in preserving global rules-based organization such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). As the US repeatedly challenged the WTO Appellate Body, I then recommend that the EU should take the leadership for making WTO reforms and negotiation together with other aligned states like China and Japan. The EU must reinforce its domestic tools for addressing present and future challenges, mostly in trade and security related areas. In the time being, I suggest that the EU should prepare itself for a more stringent time; the EU should review and rethink some of its trade policy. In such situations, I believe that the EU parliaments can play a vital role to contest with the current challenges and come up with new trade policy which could overwhelm the current punitive status quo without hurting the contemporary global trading system.

**Keywords:** United States, China, European Union, Trade Confrontation, Unilateral Measures, Tit-For-Tat Retaliation Strategy, Protectionism, Trade Policy

## 1. Introduction

The European Union economic market has never been so integrated into the world as it is today. In the EU's Gross Domestic Products (GDP), the part of extra-EU trade rose from 15% in 1980 to almost 25% in 2017,

while the intra-EU trade share has persisted 63% over the same period. Subsequently, the EU is now the world's largest trading bloc – reliant, typically on international trade. Nevertheless, the global trading system on which the EU trade contingent is now engulfed in crisis (Dadush and Wolff 2019).

Recently the Trump's administration protectionist attitude and the punitive trade war with China, indirectly affecting the EU's economy in many ways. Firstly, the current unilateral measures of the US is undermining the function of the rule-based organization such as the World Trade Organization (Jean, Martin, and Sapir 2018). Secondly, such unilateral measures of the US without push-force will open the door for additional trade barriers that could target the EU, which is the most substantial economic market. Lastly, the US regular duties against China and the Chinese tit-for-tat strategy affecting the EU member states (Garcia Herrero 2019).

Witnessing the contemporary trade spat through the Neo-Mercantilist<sup>1</sup> perspective, the Trump Advisor Peter Navarro said, the current trade deficit is mostly because of the Chinese conceited trade policy, the only choice is to make the US economy robust we need to import less and export more, he said (Smith 2019). Whereas (Kraneveld 2019, David 1817) argued that the US trade deficit had been increased since the Vietnam war long before China's economic rise, which highlights that the US trade deficit is not China's fault. The trade deficit is a general and natural phenomenon in the trading system, for example, the trade deficit problem between the countries are by their nature.

Most of the scholars like Polachek (1978-1980) claimed that trade enhances cooperation between states, others like (McMillian 1997, Barbieri 1996) argued that trade reduces conflict and some other disclosed constructive relations. Other studies linked trade with democracy (Polachek, 1994; Oneal et al., 1996; Gartzke, 1998), which means that trade-related issues and trade war in democratic states are far less than non-democratic states (Polachek, Robst, and Chang 1999).

It is perhaps an old idea; the current trade spat of the US with democratic states, the termination of Trans-Pacific Partnership, the unilateral measurement against the EU, in the same vein the Chinese Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) and other related trade with the rest of the world is more than many democratic countries.

The paper aims to highlight the current trade spat between the US and China and its impacts on the EU. The paper divided into six minor sections, the second section describes the landscape of changing trade policy and its effects on world trade system, the third section deal with the US trade policy towards China, the fourth section describes the Chinese tit-for-tat retaliation strategy, the fifth section describing the impacts of the trade war on the EU and the last section is conclusion and recommendation for the EU to avoid market collapse.

## 2. The Landscape of Changing Trade Policy

### 2.2. Background

In the previous seventy years, global trade has been overseen by well-reputed and well-organized rules, based on transparency, and non-discrimination – the states are bound to trade-related policies and commitment on duties and other related instruments. Such actions have brought much openness, solidity, and increase trust among

---

<sup>1</sup> Mercantilism is a national economic policy designed to help the country reduce its trade deficit; in such circumstances, the states trying to minimize its import and maximize the export which allows a country to overcome the trade deficit. The theory was more dominant from the 16<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> century in the modernized part of some European countries in the pro-industrialization period. For more critical study about the economic theory, mercantilism see, Lars Herlitz (1964) The concept of mercantilism, *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, 12:2, 101-120, DOI: 10.1080/03585522.1964.10407639 <https://doi.org/10.1080/03585522.1964.10407639>; Erik S. Reinert, Sophus A. Reinert, *Mercantilism and Economic Development: Schumpeterian Dynamics, Institution Building, and International Benchmarking*, Volume 10, n. 1 • 2011; for general understanding see, Samia Rekhi, mercantilism, concept factors and characteristics, available at, <http://www.economicdiscussion.net/mercantilism/mercantilism-concept-factors-and-characteristics/20980>

trading partners, which improved trade and expand the market. From the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the World Trade Organization (WTO) – both institutions ensure trade flow more efficiently and smoothly. The rules and regulations by both GATT and now WTO has helped and created trade prospers across the world (González and Veron 2019).

Even with dynamic and rules-based organizations, the international trade system in the last two years is at risk. In one vein, if trade spats increased technological advancement, the geopolitical competition, the trade and investment policy reshaping the global economy. The rules are fragmented, and international trade ascendancy has enfeebled.

The recent US-China trade war is the high-stake conflict, and the consequences of the current trade war are far behind from the two countries. The International Monetary Fund recent report projected that the global investment, trade, and out-put remained under threat, the worldwide growth rate was estimated to be 3.7% in 2018 due to weak performance and the trade war between the US and China the global economy is projected to grow 3.5% in 2019 and 3.6% in 2020 (IMF 2019).

The current trade war is based on technology (González 2019), disrupting the world order by the dominant states through military advantages that hold most of the world's updated and sophisticated techniques (Ciuriak 2018). Such actions have paved the way for cybersecurity-related trade conflict, which is a global phenomenon affecting almost every country around the world (Stuart Madnick 2019). These activities will allow the distribution and re-distribution of economic power with the strength of power politics and rivalry, which will disrupt the global economic order.

(Bergsten 2018) This showcase that the world is now entering to geo-economics world order using the economy as a tool for achieving strategic goals. Economic interdependence is vital for bringing and promoting peace and security, for most of the individual states with more military might trying alone to manage or reduce the reliance, which caused a severe threat to the global economy. Whether justifies or not, good or bad, security and economy are hard to separate; in the same vein, a healthy economy needs protection to safeguard (Roberts, Moraes, and Ferguson).

Coalescing all, the EU is the most open and most significant trading bloc in the world. To achieve its interest, the EU should not be a bystander in the US-China trade war – EU, both directly or indirectly affected by the Beijing policy and practice with responses to the US approach towards China. To avoid further consequences, the EU should decide its foreign policy to avoid many risks.

### ***2.3. America First, and the Rise of China, the impending Challenges for the EU***

Recent China's fast-growing power and economic influence are reshaping the global economy, Asian security, as well as changing the dynamics and structure of global governance in lasting ways. The rapid rise of China is not only limited to the EU but for the countries and societies around the world. A rising China is bringing enormous opportunities for cooperation in many areas, including trade, regional stability, besides ensuring world peace and security (Christiansen and Maher 2017). The EU and China are linked closely to enduring partnerships; both are the two of the three largest economies in the world. EU contended that China, because of its sheer size and dominant economic system China is no more a developing country. Still, China is a key global actor, its increasing presence in the world including in EU China should act most responsibly, transparent, ruled-based, non-discriminatory and open its market to the world (EuropeanCommission 2019b).

In 2018 recently, the attitude "*America First*" has put Beijing at the core of the trade policy plan through the combination of heavy duties, taxes, tariffs, and revised instruments of screening or import-export control. The US, for a very long time looking at China to amend its policy and set new measurements to normalize its relations with the US. The US also hopes China would adopt economic liberalization and avoid stealing intellectual property, which would bring China closer to the global world. The US deliberate that China is reluctant to such policy, consequently, Trump administration has taken specific features to protect the national

security of its own, the US is now decoupling the US and other aligned states (West States) from the Chinese economy (Mike 2018).

The current US government has espoused policy that is dealing alone with China, not only neglecting the traditional aligned states but also impose massive tariffs on goods like aluminum and steel with the new threat to impose more on autos sector. Thus, it indicates that the US exposed no limit in confronting WTO rules when getting in the means of imposing tariffs on metal. Instead of acting with other actors' concerns with China to reform and revise trade rules, the US government undermined global trade governance with power politics<sup>2</sup>. The US pressing bilateral talk with China, and still, the issue has increased threat to the agreement, which must not be merely one-sided – instead seems complicated, the question arises here if the deal reaches between China and the US in 2020 or later what would it look like? Moreover, to what promise the bilateral talk will hold? There was a chance of negotiation in 2018 in the G20 meeting when both leaders met, but the deal might have been struck, even though it is unpredictable to come with a standard solution (Beattie 2019).

Any outcome at the current stage is unpredictable; should a bilateral agreement reached, the other states, along with the EU, can enjoy a free ride for a particular time even if the deal is unsuccessful (Constantinescu et al. 2019). It is argued by Plummer that, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade Development (UNCTD) that the main EU' exports are the chief beneficiary of the current trade war between the US and China (Plummer 2019b). In the same vein, there is a possibility it will strengthen the way for EU-China bilateral trade-deal. On the other hand, even if the agreement between the US and China decided, it will create additional trials vis-à-vis businesses. If the deal reached on power base or unfair means, it would affect the whole trade system, and the US will hit the EU with more heavy tariffs. If the deal reached based on additional duties, as announced already, the new tariffs trade war will likely disrupt the supply chain, trigger a reduction in investment, slow productivity growth, and importantly will further hurt the already deteriorated rules-based order. Under the most critical time, the global income will reduce by 1.7%, almost 1.4 trillion US\$ (Constantinescu et al. 2019).

The US-China trade war created uncertainties and friction in trade; the EU will be affected both directly and indirectly. The predication is quite impossible to understand what will happen in the future. Nevertheless, what is apparent is that “America First” Trump administration the skepticism regarding some global institutions that the EU and the US created, becoming a threat to the EU as Trump administration challenging such institutions (Plummer 2019b)<sup>3</sup>.

The story of tit-for-tat could also cloud the EU-US relations by imposing tariffs on each other. The US administration has listed almost the targeted products amount nearly \$21 billion worth EU export to the US starting from high products including aircraft to hunting knives (USTR 2019a) for now they will await the final decision of WTO, the step was taken by the EU to share Huawei data of 5G to reduce security threat, and increased cooperation with China has also added fuel to the fire as the US pressured them to boycott Huawei to place pressure on China (Chee 2019).

### 3. US Trade Policy Towards China

Based on the US open trade policy and massive trade deficit, the Trump administration policy-makers believe that other nations have taken advantage of the US. (EuropeanParliment 2018). The trade policy of the US towards China might be called “the Trump Doctrine” in the global trade arena, which in turn based on or at least the part of comprehensive economic nationalist ideology. Such nationalist ideology always looks at the gains from trade, ignoring the international rules of trade, disregarding and altering way of the deal in the global and

<sup>2</sup> “EU Trade Policy amid the China-US Clash: Caught in the Cross-Fire? p. 5

<sup>3</sup> The decision to impose tariffs on steel and aluminium imports based on national security considerations of the US, it is currently being challenged by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is leading to global chaos in these newer sectors and industries. Such independent actions are undermining the EU-US created organisations which are tangible threat to such ruled-based organisations in global level. Similar automobiles and autos parts which are EU's main export commodity to the United States is also threatened. The US-China trade war stems from a robust new approach to US trade policy, but this is a common concern in Europe.

general value chains, and hamper the necessity for collaboration in global business to defend self-interest (Nordhaus 2018).

Further in such circumstances, trade policy interconnects with so-called national security, which means that trade is an essential factor for some nation to emphasize its effect in the supposed new-period of significant power rivalry with other peer competitors or adversaries (The Hudson Institute Washington 2018)

What lies behind the Trump aggressive trade policy toward China as to fulfill his pre-campaign promises; to bring and create jobs, to balance the prolonged imbalanced trade deficit and the production of reinvigoration. As the election concluded, Trump shifted his policy towards a balance and constraining Chinese non-market forces to balance the trade deficit with China (Tianhao and Yan 2018). According to recent 2019 statistics, the US runs a high trade deficit of almost \$419 billion with China (Amadeo 2019); for this, the US imposed steep tariffs on Chinese products to overwhelm the trade deficit, to overcome such deficit the Trump's administration using different strategies like antidumping and other discriminatory and independent trade policy.

Over the last twenty-five years, the antidumping and administered protections are the trade policy that the state used as a domestic tool of fighting against external competitors. The aggressive trade policy "*antidumping*"<sup>4</sup> was pioneered by the US administrations. Today antidumping is the most used remedy law of the US governments, where dumping means unfair – the Chinese markets dumping goods to the US market, where the US's anti-dumping laws provide tools to fight against unfair trade (Congressional Research Service 2019). Such discriminatory policy is now pragmatic to Chinese export aimed to investigate more frequently, which means more antidumping duties, of late China, is involved in many antidumping circumstances unlike other states (Bown and McCulloch 2007).

According to the official report released by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in 2019, defined that the central trade policy of the US to China or other trading partners are, to defend the US corporations as well as the US workforces from biased trading environment – which means to restore a balance trade relations between the trading partners and encourage China for fundamental structural changes in their trading system. (USTR 2019b)

### **Increased Tariffs and Other Unilateral Measures**


Increased tariffs on Chinese goods are at the forefront of the US trade policy towards China. These increased tariffs are based on long-dormant trade status under the different sections. For example, according to Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, this section authorizes the premier to restrict some imports, which are seriously injurious or cause harm to the domestic industries. This section is termed as (safeguard action). Secondly, according to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which describes the premier is allowed to impose duties and high tariffs and restrictions on goods and services, which are considered a threat to national security, which is called (national security clause). Lastly, according to section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, by which the US has the right to unilaterally enforce right under trade agreements and respond to other trade policies which are considered unfair and that cause burden to the US business – which is called the (reciprocity provision).

The above sections indicate that the increased tariffs on Chinese imports based on Section 301; actions against increased taxes on washing machines and solar panels approved under Section 201, while Steel and Aluminum import from EU, Mexico, South Korea, and Canada passed in section national security clause.

---

<sup>4</sup> The anti-dumping duties (ADD) apply to goods that have been "dumped" into the US market, sold at prices lower than those that would be charged in the domestic market of the exporting country. It can also be defined as An anti-dumping duty is a protectionist tariff that a national government imposes on foreign imports that it believes are priced below fair market value. Dumping is a process in which a company exports a product at a lower price than it normally charges in its own local market.

Fig.1 Timeline of tariffs planned and applied in 2018




Sources. European Central Bank (EUCentralBank 2019)<sup>5</sup>

According to Chad and Eva, the measurement of US trade protection in 2018, they argued that the five circles of duties passed by the Trump worth \$303.7 billion, while dealing with the duties most of its are imposed by the administrations adding to 14.9% increase in the volume of US imports (Chad Bown 2019). Among other trading partners, China is the first state knockout by massive US special unilateral trade duties. As per se May 10, 2019, Trump announced to increase taxes from 10% to 25%, which means if valid, the US will impose 18.3% tariffs on average (Chad P. Bown 2019). Bradsher also argued that China has lost almost some \$60 billion of its US imports with an extra 5% and 10% tariffs (Bradsher 2019).

It can be concluded that Trump's administration is trying to save their domestic industries and bring jobs by imposing taxes on other imported goods. Among all trading partners, China is the most vulnerable to such tariffs and involved in the tit-for-tat game with the US. The US discriminatory trade policy not only hurting China but also posing significant threats to the world economy and rules-based organizations such as WTO.

Fig. 2 Average Tariffs rates on imports from China before and Trump's protection act



Source. Peterson Institute for International Economics<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> [https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2019/html/ecb.ebart201903\\_01~e589a502e5.en.html#toc4](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2019/html/ecb.ebart201903_01~e589a502e5.en.html#toc4) retrieved at 12/11/2019 17.55

Most of the observers believe that it is still not clear what is the reason behind such high duties, on political statements, argued by most of the scholar that such high tariffs aim to reduce the bilateral trade deficit, renegotiate the old agreements and negotiate new deals which favor US interest, another aim is to bring all manufacturers back to the US or punish all those country who are involved vice-versa (Lawrence 2018). In the same vein, these high duties may not favor the international system; it will probably increase uncertainty destroying the market, disrupting the supply chain, an alarm for consumers and farmers. Subsequent retaliation by the trading partners would thus pose tremendous challenges – hampering global investment, and possibly the global economy (Kolb 2019). Smaller trading states which are more vulnerable to trade war are exemptions cases if they negotiate sooner.

#### 4. China's tit-for-tat Strategies

According to foreign trade laws, the main objective of the Chinese Trade policy is to increase its opening to the world, promote sound economic development, and develop foreign aid. For this, the Chinese government is effectively working to improve manufacturing value-added, and steady growth in exports and import of the latest technologies, as well as encourage foreign direct investments (Bin 2015).

For Beijing, it is now challenging to deal with the Trump trade agenda. More or less, it is even painful to understand what the Trump administration wants, which is extremely difficult for the Chinese policy-makers to respond effectively. The US and China are now involved in the tit-for-tat two-player game; the tit-for-tat is usually started from cooperations, which means doing good with others will be rewarded with good. In the case of the US-China trade war, the tit-for-tat is used as a counter-retaliation strategy. This means to start from cooperation but finish with selfishness and exploit cooperation or “teach them a lesson”(Naughton).

When Trump administration was ready to impose sanctions on China, China was not very serious about the trade war rumors. Once Trump Administration imposed high tariffs on Chinese products, China responded in tit-for-tat strategies on the one hand and proposed to listen to what Trump wants on the other side. The expectation that both states will reach on a deal in the G-20 meeting in Argentina was ineffective. The tension grew stronger when the US hit more sanctions on China's ZTE in 2018 and Huawei in 2019.

The tit-for-tat actions of the Chinese are stronger than the US reactions, but what matters in the international arena is power politics. For example, the escalation of the trade war between the two states is not just Huawei, when the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) restrict Chinese employees of Huawei of peer-reviewing the research papers, in the same vein, the Chinese scientist was susceptible to quit the IEEE editorial jobs and support the Huawei.

The Chinese netizens from across the world voiced to support Huawei and criticize the US sanctions. In the meantime, the Chinese Ministers of Commerce announced sharply that we are preparing a list of foreign organizations, enterprises and individual deemed if they fail to comply with the market rules and regulations would be blocked and will take severe actions against all enterprise that are seriously hurting Chinese domestics enterprises (Zhao and Yin 2019).

As the trade war escalated, President Xi announced that self-reliance and innovations are vital to prepare for significant challenges in the future. He mentioned on a visit to Jiangxi province that “Technological innovation is the root of life for businesses, only if we won our intellectual property and core technologies, then we can produce products with core competitiveness and [we] will not be beaten in intensifying competition” (Jun Mai 2019).

---

<sup>6</sup> [https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps-2019-protection-could-push-china-back-smooth-hawley?utm\\_source=updatenewsletter&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=2019-05-15](https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps-2019-protection-could-push-china-back-smooth-hawley?utm_source=updatenewsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2019-05-15) retrieved 12/11/2019 18.20

Nevertheless, China is taking all measures to remain stable and protect its economy from falling again. Meanwhile, China's economic despairs will make it a little modest rival in the long-term but will have a more significant threat to the US today. It is more rational when rising powers have experienced such slowdowns in the past; they become more oppressive at home and more aggressive abroad. Now many witnesses have realized China to be landed just on such a path (Beckley 2019).

It could be concluded that in the US-China trade war, China and the US are not only the victims –such escalation pose a significant threat to other developing or developed countries. Feldman argued that trade war is not a good thing, even the countries that seem to be profiting at the moment. He cited an old proverb “When two elephants fight, it is the grass who suffers” or, in other words, everyone else is crushed regardless of those who win. The reason for the other countries to be more worry is that the US and China are the two largest diverse economic markets in the world, which means that tariffs and duties on each other goods will affect the consumers across the globe (Finley 2019).

In most cases, according to most of the scholars who argued that in the US-China trade war, the European countries are more sufferer. If in one vein the US and EU work together to build a more liberal global system which helps to overcome many problems, so, on the other hand, the EU economies continue to participate in US-like-minded such the G-7, G-20, and the OECD, where the US considered the EU his best trade and investment partners. Dealing with the same problem at the same time, it would be difficult for the EU to decided their trade policy in such harsh circumstances. In such a situation, the EU should not choose either partner, but instead, wait and think for the right time to decide (Plummer 2019a).

The following part of the paper will discuss how the US-China trade war affecting the EU and how the EU maintaining its trade policy towards both China and the US, and if the trade war impacting the EU altogether, which measures should EU adopt to avoid harm to EU economy?

## **5. The European Union Amid the US-China Trade War**

As the trade war between the US and China intensify, the EU is increasingly caught between the dyadic trade confrontation. The European Union has been reconsidering its investment and trade policy towards China. Nevertheless, it is impossible to agree on how to handle the rise of China. While spotting the reality that China's amplified its contribution in the global economy and beveling that China will continue its efforts to embody substantial prospects for the EU corporations, the EU member states have become progressively curious in decrees about China. Recognizing that China is a strategic partner and source of jobs and investment for the EU, the EU following some belligerent policy for framing its way of approach to China (Legrain 2019).

The current EU Commission policy paper argued that “ China is, a simultaneously a cooperative partner with whom the EU has carefully aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests in many areas, and economic competitors in pursuit of technological leadership, and a systematic rival encouraging substitute models of governance.” (EuropeanCommission 2019a) Morelli claimed that deliberate political, and China rising commercial influence in many EU member states is also the cause of pushing the EU policymakers, which underlines the main objective of the EU concentration in China (Morelli 2019).

### **5.2. The Effect for the EU from the US-China Trade Confrontation and the EU's Response**

In one vein if the EU corporations might get benefits from the relieving Chinese export to the US marketplace and vice-versa, (Garcia Herrero 2019) on the other hand, the value chain disruption and regular costs of the US autonomous nuisance of huge duties and undermining WTO rules and regulation will spell trouble not only for the EU but will also affect the rest of the states. The highest victim of such actions is the EU, which is the most significant economic market after the US and China (European-Central-Bank 2019). Furthermore, as time has experienced, the US hostile measures for balancing its trade deficit is not only restricted to Chinese market

alone; it also has both direct and indirect impacts on EU and itself and perhaps there is no reason that the EU will be spared to any contrary measure functional on China. The EU has a realistically both direct and indirect stake in the present US-China conciliation, faltering the clash.

Apart from the query of whether Beijing and Washington may, or will soon reach a point where they will agree and accomplish conciliation and claim victory, the fallout for the EU would come in many forms, including substantive, systematic and strategic reflection. Any agreement by the two states (US, China) would thus have two sides for the EU. On the one hand, if the deal were about Chinese commitment to bring structural reform on industrial subsidies, increased market access in many services, forced technology transfer, or the so-called intellectual property rights, the EU would thus be enjoying the free-ride on the bilateral negotiation. On the other hand, if the deal reaches somehow where Chinese pledge to increase its purchases of the twisted American products under the auspicious of the miss-guided policy of balancing the trade deficit, such agreement will come at more expense of the EU and other countries' goods which may contest with the US in the Chinese market (González and Veron 2019).

From the strategic point of view, the US-China deal could bring most of the trade friction midst the most significant trading partners, dependent mostly on the contract and cooperation. Nevertheless, the probability is if the US and China reached on contract probably the US would possibly turn to the EU with harsher power – more notably afterward the conciliation with Japan as President Trump himself stated that the compensations or the advantages that EU has taken of the US on trade for many years would soon halt. The EU is already facing the US tariffs on aluminum and steel; Trump repeatedly threatened to hit EU cars with harsh duties. Despite the fact, the EU stressed for an amicable agreement with the US (Philip Blenkinsop 2019).

If Trump imposes more extra duties on the EU cars and related parts, one alternative for the EU is to fill a WTO case against such actions and to adopt re-balancing measurement under the WTO safeguard process as they did it in the steel and aluminum case (Peter CHASE 2019). The EU-US trade agreement is the only option that will better halt their tariffs, tenacity the trade differences, and minimalize the cost of both EU and US trade war. Failure to reach on negotiation will bring more tension in terms of more duties.

From the geo-economics perspective, the EU is likely to face three main challenges from the on-going US-China trade confrontation. Firstly, the US-China trade war is limiting global economic growth and may push all fragile economies to the recession, notably in the EU market, it is evident that recession likely rekindles political and economic tension. Secondly, the American unilateral measure put substantial pressure on world rules-based organizations the WTO. Such power politic maybe hampers EU vision for the universal laws, and the UE will regulate to learn how to operate, therefore in a logical manner where geopolitics play essential roles. Lastly, such escalation may lead to the geopolitical situation in the Middle East. The US import a massive amount of oil from these regions and has established a sharp military and political presence in the area. China, on the other hand, also relays on oil-importing from the Middle Eastern countries, while no such existence of military in the region. Growing political tension in the Middle East region has significant implications on the EU, notably in terms of security and migration (Basedow 2019).

In more realistic ways, amid trade confrontation between the US and China, most of the intellectuals argued that the EU is the biggest winner of the US-China trade war, believing that most of the EU companies are likely to get the US \$70 billion additional benefits in the trade war (Chad Bray 2019). While on the other hand, some argued that the EU in some sectors could get more from the US-China trade war (press 2019).

Herrero 2019 also explained that some specific areas would benefit subsequently; to some extent, it will double their production for exports. For example, in the first round of tariffs, both China and the US targeted the US \$50 billion on each other's products. Where the biggest winner with the potential gain of US \$10 billion was the EU from the Chinese market included the EU aircraft and aerospace and primary chemical sectors, as well as the general-purpose machinery sector of the US market. In the second, when the US hit \$200 billion imported

products from China, again give more extra room for the EU to get additional benefit recorded almost US \$96.7 billion. Such advantages indicate that the EU in some sectors is getting tremendous benefits from the dyadic trade confrontation between the US and China, The areas which typically paybacks are aircraft/spacecraft, chemical industries, motor vehicle and semiconductors industries (HERRERO 2019).

In sum, the US-China trade confrontation has created some uncertainties for the EU; the EU will no doubt face direct cost. The biggest threat comes from the US unilateral aggressive duties is unclear, and the probability of such behavior in the future is equivocal. In such circumstances, the EU ought to prepare itself for a difficult decision, which means the EU should revise some of its current red lines in global trade negotiations.

In fact, the EU feels more squash in the trade war and the strategic competition between the US and China. Even if the EU favors global prosperity in terms of supporting multilateralism – such support seems fruitless as the US is not on purpose in creating, particularly under the Trump administration. On such basis, taking the EU's unwillingness to perform it without the US, the dream of multilateralism seems more an option in the past than a possibility in the future. For the EU to avoid further duties from the US, the EU would be to increase its dependence on the US. Still, the probability of more dependency on the US is costly, which means losing more than winning thereof the EU must revise and rethink its trade policy towards the US. Finally, the EU should rebalance itself with China; this would not be a proper choice for the EU because of the limited access to the Chinese market, but indeed, the EU can avoid market collapsing (Garcia Herrero 2019, Plummer 2019b).

## 6. Conclusion and recommendation

The international trading system is now in jeopardy, the prospect for the EU as well as for the rest of the world – in the contemporary deviating trade-policy are thought-provoking. Such actions are not written on the stones; for instance, the confrontational attitude of the US towards China has created more friction, which will continue – such steps are possibly derelict the international trade environment. It is, of course, no exaggeration to say that the EU and other transatlantic alliance are getting full economic and political support from the US, the Trump's administration most harsh trade policy vis-à-vis the EU, which are experienced – duties on autos, steels, and aluminum. Such functions on the EU did not support by any US business community nor either by congress. Which gives a lesson to the EU to learn from the current dark outlook and respond accordingly.

Assorted decisions for the EU are in the interim; the EU should balance its way of trade with China and looks for a conceivable solution to negotiate with the US, like many other states, the EU should learn to address some internal and external trade imbalances and to open convincingly. Amid US-China trade confrontation, the EU should not be a bystander or free-rider for a short period; the EU must take a firm trade policy for protecting its economy and responding appropriately. It does not mean that the EU has to make an extensive choice or either siding China or the US, or one against the other – EU to protect its economic market can decide and act according to the circumstances the EU is facing.

To avoid additional fiasco, the EU should rethink on the following areas.

- As the trade confrontation between the US and China is getting worse, which indirectly hurting the EU's economy, the EU should cooperate now more with China and act to create more tangible progress to achieve rapid growth.
- As mentioned above, the EU should further fortify its domestic tools to respond to current and future challenges.
- The EU more than the US and China, preserving the WTO rules-based order; thus, the EU should continue to support and nurturing the WTO reforms even if the US autonomously undermining the rules and regulations of the WTO.
- The EU must impress the US and its role and importance in the multilateral efforts.
- The EU, to avoid further duties from the US, should respond more dynamically.

- Apart from China, the EU must also work to enhance cooperation with Japan, which is in the interest of both partners; such enhancement will at least minimize the real impacts.
- The EU can also expand the already signed trade agreements with the rest of the states to evade harmful implications.

## References

- Amadeo, Kimberly. 2019. "US Trade Deficit With China and Why It's So High The Real Reason American Jobs Are Going to China." US, accessed 12/11/2019. <https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-china-trade-deficit-causes-effects-and-solutions-3306277>.
- Basedow, Robert. 2019. *The US-China trade war: Risks and opportunities for the EU and the United Kingdom*. edited by The London School of Economic and Political Sciences.
- Beattie, Alan. 2019. "Hopes rise for US-China talks but do not expect an EU deal." *The Financial Times*, 11/9/2019.
- Beckley, Michael. 2019. "The United States Should Fear a Faltering China." *Council on Foreign Relations*.
- Bergsten, C Fred. 2018. "China and the United States: Trade Conflict and Systemic Competition." *Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)*. <https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/china-and-united-states-trade-conflict-and-systemic-competition>.
- Bin, Sheng. 2015. CHINA'S TRADE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND TRADE POLICY REFORMS: Overview and prospect. In *PIIE*, edited by PIIE: P.I.E.E.
- Bown, Chad P, and Rachel McCulloch. 2007. "US trade policy towards China: Discrimination and its implications." In *Challenges to the Global Trading System*, 76-100. Routledge.
- Bradsher, Keith. 2019. "With Higher Tariffs, China Retaliates Against the U.S." *The New York Times*. Accessed 12/11/2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/business/trump-trade-china.html>.
- Chad Bown, and Eva Zhang 2019. "The US has backtracked": China releases official document blaming America for the trade war." *CNBC*. Accessed 12/11/2019. <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/02/china-releases-official-document-that-blames-america-for-the-trade-war.html>.
- Chad Bray , and Finbarr Bermingham. 2019. "European Union likely to profit the most from US-China trade war, UN group says." *South China Morning Post*. Accessed 12/14/2019. <https://www.scmp.com/business/article/2185040/european-union-likely-profit-most-us-china-trade-war-un-group-says>.
- Chad P. Bown, Eva (Yiwen) Zhang. 2019. "Trump's 2019 Protection Could Push China Back to Smoot-Hawley Tariff Levels." *PIIE* (2019).
- Chee, Foo Yun. 2019. "EU demands scrutiny of 5G risks but no bloc-wide Huawei ban." *Reuters Business News* Accessed 11/9/2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-security-eu/eu-demands-scrutiny-of-5g-risks-but-no-bloc-wide-huawei-ban-idUSKCN1R71VK>.
- Christiansen, Thomas, and Richard Maher. 2017. *The rise of China—challenges and opportunities for the European Union*. Springer.
- Ciuriak, Dan. 2018. "The US-China Trade War: Costs, Causes, and Potential Responses by Tier II Powers." *Centre for International Governance Innovation* Centre for International Governance Innovation:8.
- CongressionalResearchService. 2019. Congressional Research Service U.S. Trade Policy Primer: Frequently Asked Questions. In *Congressional Research Service*, edited by Congressional Research Service. US: Congressional Research Service.
- Constantinescu, Cristina, Aaditya Mattoo, Michele Ruta, Maryla Maliszewska, and Israel Osorio-Rodarte. 2019. *Global Trade Watch 2018: Trade Amid Tensions*. World Bank.
- Dadush, Uri, and Guntram B Wolff. 2019. *The European Union's response to the trade crisis*. Bruegel Policy Contribution.
- David, Ricardo. 1817. "On the principles of political economy and taxation." *publicado en*.
- EU Central Bank. 2019. The economic implications of rising protectionism: a euro area and global perspective. ECB Economic Bulletin. In *European Central Bank*, edited by European Central Bank: European Central Bank.
- European-Central-Bank. 2019. The economic implications of rising protectionism: a euro area and global perspective. ECB Economic Bulletin. edited by European Central Bank. EU.
- European Commission. 2019a. EU-China – A strategic outlook. European Commission and HR/VP contribution to the European Council. edited by European Commission. EU.
- European Commission. 2019b. European Commission and HR/VP Contribution to the European Council EU-China – A strategic outlook. In *EU-China – A strategic outlook*. US.

- EuropeanParliament. 2018. "Consequences of US trade policy on EU-US trade relations and the global trading system." European Parliament accessed 11/12/2019.  
[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603882/EXPO\\_STU\(2018\)603882\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603882/EXPO_STU(2018)603882_EN.pdf).
- Finley, Klint. 2019. "Trump's Trade War Isn't Just a US-China Problem." *Wierd*
- Garcia Herrero, Alicia. 2019. "Europe in the Midst of China-US Strategic Economic Competition: What are the European Union's Options? Bruegel Working Paper." (April 2019).
- González, Anabel. 2019. "Bridging the Divide between Developed and Developing Countries in WTO Negotiations." *Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper*.
- González, Anabel, and Nicolas Veron. 2019. "EU Trade Policy amid the China-US Clash: Caught in the Cross-Fire?" *Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper* (19-13).
- HERRERO, ALICIA GARCIA. 2019. "EUROPE IN THE MIDST OF CHINA-US STRATEGIC ECONOMIC COMPETITION: WHAT ARE THE EUROPEAN UNION'S OPTIONS?".
- IMF. 2019. "World Economic Outlook Update. ."
- Jean, Sébastien, Philippe Martin, and André Sapir. 2018. "International trade under attack: what strategy for Europe?" *Notes du conseil d'analyse économique* (1):1-12.
- Jun Mai, and Amanda Lee 2019. "Xi Jinping calls for self-reliance as China grapples with long-term US challenge of trade war and ban on Huawei and other technology manufacturers." *South China Morning Post*. Accessed 12/12/2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3011388/xi-jinping-calls-self-reliance-china-grapples-long-term-us>.
- Kolb, Chad P. Bown and Melina. 2019. "Trump's Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide." PIIE, accessed 12/12/2019. <https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide>.
- Kraneveld, Peter. 2019. "Briefing: Trade war, a primer." *IPE*.
- Lawrence, Robert Z. 2018. "How the United States Should Confront China Without Threatening the Globa." *PIIE*:1-8.
- Legrain, Philippe. 2019. "The EU's China Conundrum." *Project Syndicate, the world opinion page*.
- Mike, Pence. 2018. Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China. US: The Hudson Institute Washington, D.C.
- Morelli, Vincent L. 2019. "The European Union and China. Congressional Research Service." *Congressional Research Service* (1-3):2.
- Naughton, Barry. "Economic Policy under Trade War Conditions: Can China Move Beyond Tit for Tat?". <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm57-bn-final.pdf>.
- Nordhaus, William. 2018. "The Trump doctrine on international trade: Part two." *VOX CEPR Policy Portal* (october 8 2018).
- Peter CHASE, Peter Sparding and Yuki Muka. 2019. Consequences of US trade policy on EU-US trade relations and the global trading system. edited by European Parliament's Committee.
- Philip Blenkinsop, Tim Hopher, Susan Heavey. 2019. "In new attack, Trump threatens more tariffs against European Union." *Reuters Business News* April 9 2019. Accessed 14/12/2019.  
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-eu/in-new-attack-trump-threatens-more-tariffs-against-european-union-idUSKCN1RL12E>.
- Plummer, Michael. 2019a. "The US-China Trade War and Its Implications for Europe." *Intereconomics Review of European Economic Policy* 54 (2019):195-196.
- Plummer, Michael G. 2019b. "The US-China Trade War and Its Implications for Europe." *Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy* 54 (3):195-196.
- Polachek, Solomon W, John Robst, and Yuan-Ching Chang. 1999. "Liberalism and interdependence: Extending the trade-conflict model." *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (4):405-422.
- press. 2019. "Collateral damage: in a US-China trade war, Europe could be the big loser." *South China Morning Post*. Accessed 12/14/2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/2153860/collateral-damage-us-china-trade-war-europe-could-be-big-loser>.
- Roberts, Anthea, Henrique Choer Moraes, and Victor Ferguson. "The Geoeconomic World Order." *Lawfare* (Nov. 19, 2018).
- Smith, Karl W. 2019. "The Theory That (Might) Explain Trump's Trade War." *Bloomberg*.
- Stuart Madnick, Simon Johnson, Keman Huang. 2019. "What Countries and Companies Can Do When Trade and Cybersecurity Overlap." *Harvard Business Review*.
- The Hudson Institute Washington, D.C. 2018. Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China. In *The Hudson Institute Washington, D.C.*
- Tianhao, Sun, and Wang Yan. 2018. "Trends of US-China Trade Disputes and Beijing's Policy Options." *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies* 4 (04):543-557.
- USTR. 2019a. Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan and the European Union. edited by United States Trade Representative: United Nation

USTR. 2019b. United States Trade Representative. Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance. edited by USTR. US: United States Trade Representative.

Zhao, Litao, and Xiangru Yin. 2019. "Technology as a Battleground: US Demands, China's Responses." *East Asian Policy* 11 (02):24-33.



# The Kori Agung Character of Heritage Temples: the Architectural References of Klungkung Identity

Made Wina Satria<sup>1</sup>, I Dewa Gede Agung Diasana Putra<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1,2</sup>School of Architecture, Udayana University, Bali, Australia

Correspondence: I Dewa Gede Agung Diasana Putra, School of Architecture, Udayana University, Bukit Jimbaran Bali 80364, Indonesia. E-mail: diasanaputra@unud.ac.id

## Abstract

Klungkung had an essential role in the history of Bali; it was the central kingdom in Bali during the 15-19 centuries. As the central kingdom and the role model, Klungkung had a variety of architectural works that were uniquely different from those in other regions. It was necessary to explore the potential and characteristics of its architecture so that it can be used as a reference in creating architectural style in Klungkung. To study this characteristic, this paper analyzed its building forms and ornaments. *Kori agungs*, the main gate of the Balinese temple, were selected as samples to outline the architectural style. This study used field works to measure the existing buildings, especially buildings that are still original or have undergone reconstruction using appropriate conservation ways.

**Keywords:** Style, Characteristic, Architecture, Ornament

## 1. Introduction

The rapid development of globalization has forced regions and cities to develop even faster. It is a worldwide standardization in cultural, social, economic, political, and technological aspects through exchanging and integrating international knowledge and principles among regions (HKU, 2012). This standardization provides a challenge to areas to develop without negotiating their identity. Losing this identity to a region means losing its uniqueness and values in this competitive era.

Architectural practice is one of the significant components that express the distinctive identity of a society in a particular region. According to Amundsen (2001), four elements distinguish one place or area from others, one of which is spatial qualities (including architecture) and culture or history. As a significant kingdom in Bali in the 15-19th century, Klungkung is not only the center of government but also the center of cultural and ritual activities. The vital role of Klungkung in the past has produced various cultural practices, including architecture

(Agung, 1991). Cultural and ritual practices, including architecture, are a mean to express the strength of a kingdom's influence and to express its distinctive identity (Geertz, 1980; Nordholt, 1986).

Architectural productions are cultural products that express a commonality of tradition and culture among the members of a society and an otherness, or sharp distinctiveness, from non-members. To create an otherness, or sharp distinctiveness with others, many parts of Bali, especially many kingdoms in the 18s century, have a variation of their architecture, such as *bebadungan* in Badung and *gegianyanan* in Gianyar. The architecture expresses their status differences among the kingdoms to express their superiority. The variations of the styles are dialects in architecture in which the styles vary, but they still resemble. The dialects have operated as an idea of uniqueness that offers a sense of dignity. Each region has a different dialect so that many regions express the diversity of architectural dialects in Bali. In this context, localization and difference of the architecture can be seen as a resource to create boundaries and identity of Bali. However, since there is a lack of studies about the dialects of Balinese architecture, the formulation of each character has not been well identified, which academically can be justified based on evidence-based research.

The localization and diversity of Balinese architectural dialects have been influenced by the political agenda in Bali, primarily since the 18th century when Majapahit kingdom from Java conquered Bali in which the palace that is the central government of the kingdom is called *puri*. Bali was then ruled from the single primary *puri* (palace) of Klungkung, and the other *puris* such as Badung, Bangli, Tabanan, Karangasem were described as secondary independent palaces (Geertz, 1980). To express their superiority, the primary and secondary kingdoms performed state cultural practices in their territories to reveal their status differences (Geertz, 1980; Nordholt, 1986). Every palace, including Klungkung as the main palace, developed independently the Balinese culture that led to the differences in the implementations of cultural practices, including the architecture. They expressed themselves and created boundaries with others. In this context, tradition and culture can be seen as a resource to develop boundaries and identity (Derek & Japha, 1991; Hall, 1990; Proshansky, 1983; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000).

Heritage temples as the highest result of Balinese cultural and ritual practices in Klungkung were selected as the study case. Pura Kentel Gumi, Pura Penataran Tutuan, and Pura Penataran Taman Sari are considered as heritage temples which possible to be studied as a reference for the type of the architectural practices in Klungkung. The temples consist of many buildings and the main significant part that can demonstrate the identity of architectural style is the main gate, called *kori agung*, of the temples. The existence of the *kori agung* is necessary to explore the typical character of the Klungkung traditional architecture. This character can be used as a model in the development of architectural practices around the temple area in particular and Klungkung in general, and to maintain the diversity of architecture in Bali.

## 2. Method

### 2.1. Methods

To explore the architectural identity of Klungkung, this study uses field study methods through measurements with both theodolite and meter tools in existing buildings. In this stage, sample building, especially the *kori agung* as the main front building in the temple, will be selected. In every selected sample building, ornaments, proportion, scale, material and texture were documented and investigated. The objects of investigation will be selected through method *stratified random sampling* in which the sample will be randomly selected, especially buildings that are still original or which have undergone restoration with appropriate conservation methods. Every selected building will be measured using a theodolite, especially for the locations that are difficult to be reached. On the other hand, ruler and other metre devices for the parts of the buildings that can easily be reached.

## 2.2. Identity and Ornaments

The word 'identity' is based on the Latin pronoun *idem*, which means 'the same.' Thus, identity is what is central, real and typical to something or someone (Hague, 2005). Hague (2005: 13) then quoted four elements typically present in a place identity that were identified by Amundsen (2001: 10-11) are:

- “ ● *Spatial qualities that distinguish the place from others – e.g. location, but also infrastructure, communication, and architecture.*
- *Characteristics or qualities of the inhabitants that distinguish them from inhabitants of other places – e.g. values, customs, physical appearance.*
- *Social conditions and social relations between the inhabitants.*
- *Culture and history, seen as a unifying element that connects the inhabitants to tradition and distinguishes them from 'the other.'*”

In the early days people built for protection. Then the more people improve their skills in building, the building becomes the language of form, which architecture begins to communicate. Up to a period, the word architecture is only intended for buildings whose motivation and "language" local community understand. In this case, there is no primitive term, but a modern one at that time (Gaudi, 1969). To form a Balinese cultural identity, the community had been influenced by the political and power conditions. This long history has been widely studied by various researchers such as Geertz (1980), Nordholt (1986), and Agung (1991). In this case, each era has tried to form own identity to express the boundaries and advantages of each era.

Architectural norms tend to be based on the exploitation of a combination of shapes, colors, and textures as simple technologies that designers want to develop and fight their own criticism (Gaudi, 1969). Ornaments, the proportion of buildings and their elements, as well as building materials, are components of traditional architecture that are different from others. There are differences in architectural styles from various places in Bali, such as the dominant style called *bebadungan*, which using bricks and the *gegianyaran* style, which prefers to use a combination of brick and *sandstones* (Putra, 2016; Putra, Lozanovska & Fuller 2013).

The word ornament comes from Latin, *onare*, which means decorating. This term initially includes elements and decorations that are adapted and developed from natural leaves. As far as these elements have stems, leaves, flowers, they are organic, while geometric elements are inorganic. In architecture, elements adapted into ornaments include geometric lines, natural leaves, artificial objects, and human and animal figures, in various settings or shapes, depending on specific 'recipes' that are recognized and referred to as 'principles' (Meyer, 1898).

Judging from its understanding, it can be said that the main function of the ornament is to add aesthetic value to it. But in its application to Balinese architecture, ornamentation is not only a decoration element or a mere decoration. The form and arrangement have a strong 'principle' and have been carried out for generations. Moreover, art in Bali is not only associated with nature but also social and religious life. This argument gives a different meaning than an ornament as a decorator in western architecture. As stated by Sunaryo (2009) that the presence of an ornament is not merely to fill in the empty and meaningless part, it is more so in past ornamental works. Various forms of ornaments have several functions, namely pure aesthetic functions, symbolic functions and useful functions.

In architectural Balinese ornaments and all decorative elements are known as decorative elements. Based on its basic form, this ornament is classified into four motifs, namely flora, fauna, nature, and religion. Which belongs to the flora are all elements that take the form of plants. The fauna motif takes the form of animals, such as *karang asti*, *karang goak*, *karang boma*, and various other animal statues, while those belonging to nature are those that take the forms and elements in the universe, such as fire, water, mountains, rocks, and others. The rest are classified into religious motives, including *murda*, *bentala*, *gegodeg*, and others.

### 3. Results and Discussions

#### 3.1. Kori Agung of Pura Kentel Gumi

In general, the form of *kori agung* consists of three parts. The first part is “the head” of the building, “the body” as the middle part, and “the legs” as the lowest part of the building (Figure 1). *Kori agung* of Pura Kentel Gumi consists of these three parts. The head consists of three levels and a *bentala* at the top; the body consists of one main structure and one *lelengen* on each side; and the legs as the lowest part. The body part is also equipped with doors and curves of carved wood. Through this door, the equipment and offerings for ceremonies go in and out. The legs, which are the base of the *kori agung* consists of five steps made of brick.




Figure 1. *Kori Agung* of Pura Kentel Gumi

*Kori agung* of Pura Kentel Gumi is made of a combination of brick and sandstone. In general, bricks are the main structure, while the ornament is generally made from sandstone. These sandstones are attached to the brick and carved in detail with the motifs of plants and animals (Figure 2). There are some types of motif used in this *kori agung* namely the anthropomorphic/ sub morphosis that use a part of animals or human body as an object, flora, geometric and *perimbunan* that combine some element of nature (Hartanti & Nediari, 2014). In some region, this ornament type is also called *keketusan*. As a part of the anthropomorphic/ sub morphosis type, fauna motifs, called *kekarangan* that can be found on the head of the building, is *karang goak* (the head of a crow). On the other side, the motifs at the top of the door consist of *karang boma* (the head of a giant), *karang tapel* (a mask) and *karang goak* (crow). The ornament on the legs as the base of the building is *karang asti* (the head of elephant). The other *kekarangan* is *karang boma*. This ornament is a giant head completed with flora ornament, crowns and hand. (Figure 2)




Figure 2. The ornaments on *Kori Agung* of Pura Kentel Gumi

The other dominant motifs used in this *kori agung* are the form of flora motifs, which are often called *patra*, which means leaves (Sudara, 1983). They are *patra samblung* and *patra tunjungan*, (see Figure 3). *Patra samblung* is an ornament that uses many parts of *golden pothos* or *creeper ceylon* (*Epipremnum aureum*) as an object. In Bali, this tree is called *samblung* so that the ornament that uses a combination of the leave, flowers and the fruit of the *golden pothos* as an ornament is called *patra samblung* (Jaya, 2013).

On the top of the *kori agung*, as a part of *bentala*, there are two *patra punggels*. *Patra Punggel* is inspired by the shape of plants. *Patra punggel* is mimesis of combination of many part of natural elements such as *batun poh* (mango seeds), *don paku* (young leaves that are still circular on the stalk of *diplazium esculentum*), *jengger siap* (crown of roosters), jack fruit pulp (wrapping skin of jackfruit which is inside jackfruit), *kuping guling* (the roasted suckling pig's ears), *pepusuhan* (new shoots), and *util* (the mimesis of scorpion's tail) (Gelebet et al, 1981).




Figure 3. The ornaments of *patra punggel*

Moreover, the other ornaments in this *kori* use geometric patterns and natural material such as sand and stone as objects of the ornaments called *keketusan*. In this kind of ornament, the essential parts of plants, animals and objects are repeated to be a unified ornament. There are many kinds of *keketusan* in this *kori agung* including of the *ilut*, *bias membah*, *watu*, *bungan tuwung* and *genggong*. *Ilut* is an ornament that uses rotated rope as an object. *Bias membah* uses the process of moving sand on a beach or river while *watu* is the mimesis of stone. *Tunjungan* uses *nymphaea* or water lily flower called *tunjung* in Bali as an ornament. Moreover, the *bungan tuwung* use flowers of eggplant as an ornament (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. The ornaments motif of *keketusan*

### 3.2. Kori Agung of Pura Penataran Tutuan

Similar to the *kori agung* of Pura Kentel Gumi, the form *kori agung* of Pura Penataran Tutuan consists of three parts. The head consists of one level and a *bentala* at the top. The body consists of one main structure with a wooden door and one *lelengen* on each sides. The legs, the lowest part of the *kori agung*, is equipped with only one step made of brick (see Figure 5).




Figure 5. The *Kori Agung* of Pura Penataran Tutuan

As the first object, the *kori agung* of Pura Penataran Tutuan is made of a combination of brick and *sandstones*. In general, bricks are the main structure, while the ornament is generally made from *sandstones*. These *sandstones* are attached to the brick and carved in detail with the motifs of plants and animals (see Figure 6). The gate also has *karang boma* above the door, statues at the front, some *patras* including *patra punggel*, some *keketusans* such as *kekakulan*. However, there are some differences in relation to the ornaments in some parts. *Bentala* on the first object uses *patra punggel* as a base while on the second uses *karang goak* (the ornament of the crow's head). Under the *bentala* is a statue of a deity that can be found in the first object.



Figure 6. The ornaments on *Kori Agung* of Pura Penataran Tutuan

### 3.3. Kori Agung of Pura Penataran Taman Sari

As other gates, the *kori agung* of Pura Penataran consists of three parts. The head consists of five levels and a *bentala* at the top. The body consists of one main structure with a wooden door and three *lelengen* on both sides. The leg is equipped with seven steps made of brick. In contrast to the temples in the abovementioned *kori agungs*, the *kori agung* of Pura Penataran Taman Sari has three doors. The main door for the ceremonial equipment is in the main structure of the body, while the other two doors are in the first *lelengen* that flanks on the main structure of the body. At the above of every door is *karang boma* (see Figure 7).

The material used in this *kori agung* is brick as the basic structure and sandstones as an ornament. Ornaments found on the roof are *bentala*, *karang naga*, *karang tapel*, three statues of deities, and various ornaments with plant motifs. In the body of the *kori agung*, there are *kekarangans* such as *karang goak*, *karang boma* and various *pepatra* and *kekutusan*. At the foot of the *kori agung*, there are *kekarangan* ornaments with fauna motif such as *karang asti*. Beside the three doors in this *kori agung*, the other difference is *karang naga* (the mimesis of dragon) on the roof of the *kori agung*. There is two *karang naga* in which their tail goes up to the *bentala* (see Figure 7).




Figure 7. The ornaments on *Kori Agung* of Pura Penataran Taman Sari

## CONCLUSIONS

The form of the three *kori agung* consists of three parts. They are the head as the upper part, the body as the middle part, and the legs as the bottom part. Each part has ornaments as decorative elements that are the combination of *anthropomorphic/ sub morphosis*, flora, geometric and *perimbunan*, which combines some elements of nature. The material used as ornaments is *sandstones*, while the main structure is made of brick. However, the differences between the three *kori agungs* are the number of doors and the ornament of *bentala* and roof. The variations present dialects in the architectural style of *kori agungs* in Klungkung in which the styles vary, but they still resemble. The dialects have operated as an idea of uniqueness to create an otherness or sharp distinctiveness with others.

## Acknowledgments

Our gratitude is addressed to the High Education Directorate of the Republic of Indonesia via Udayana University for their financial support. I offer a deep-felt thanks to the head of the village and the owner of the temple as well as colleagues and friends at Udayana University and elsewhere who offered spirited discussion and critical feedback. I also thank the students of the Department of Architecture, Udayana University, Bali, who assisted me during fieldwork in Klungkung.

## References

- Agung, I.A.A.G. (1991). *Bali in the 19th century*, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta
- Amundsen, A.B. (2001). Articulations of identity: A methodological essay and a report on Askim and Tidaholm, NoordXXI Report no. 19. Retrieved from – <http://www.Noordxxi.nl/>
- Brubaker, R. & Cooper, F. (2000). 'Beyond identity', *Theory and Society*, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 1-47.
- Derek & Japha, V. (1991). 'Identity through detail: an architecture and cultural aspiration in Montagu, South Africa, 1850-1915', *TDSR*, vol. II, pp. 17-33.
- Gaudi, S. (1969). *Architecture: Volume I of Appreciation of the Arts*. Michigan: Oxford University Press.
- Geertz, C. (1980). *Negara: the theatre state in nineteenth-century Bali*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
- Gelebet, I Nyoman dkk, (1981). *Arsitektur Tradisioanal Daerah Bali*. Denpasar:Departemen Pendidikan Dan Kebudayaan Propinsi Bali.
- Hartanti G., Nediari, A. (2014). Pendokumentasian Aplikasi Ragam Hias Budaya Bali, sebagai Upaya Konservasi Budaya Bangsa Khususnya pada Perancangan Interior: HUMANIORA. vol.5, no.1 pp. 521-540
- Hague, C. (2005). Planning and Place Identity. In C. Hague, & P. Jenkins, *Place Identity, Participations and Planning*. New York: Routledge.
- Hall, S. (1990). 'Cultural identity and diaspora', in J Rutherford (ed), *Identity, community, culture difference*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, pp. 222-237
- HKU. (2012). *Liberal Studies Teaching Kit for Senior Secondary Curriculum: Globalization and Localization of Architecture and Urban Planning*. Hong Kong: Faculty of Architecture, the University of Hong Kong.
- Jaya I.G.A. (2013). Ornamen 1, Institut Seni Indonesi Denpasar, <http://gungjayack.blogspot.com/2013/10/ornamen-pepatran-2.html>, accessed 17 th January 2020.
- Meyer, F. (1898). *Handbook of Ornament*. New York: Architectural Book Publishing Company.
- Nordholt, H.S. (1986). *Bali: colonial conceptions and political change 1700-1940 from shifting hierarchies to 'fixed' order*, Erasmus, Rotterdam.
- Proshansky, H.M. et al. (1983). 'Place identity: physical world socialization of the self', *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, vol. 3, pp. 57-83.
- Putra, I. D. G. A. D. (2016). The Tourism Economy and Viability of Traditional Settlements in the Balinese Urban Settings, The 3rd International Conference on Regional Development Enhancing Resilience: Bridging Knowledge and Policy for Cities and Regions, pp. 61-67.
- Putra, I. D. G. A. D., Lozanovska, M., & Fuller, R. (2013). The transformation of the traditional Balinese house for tourist facilities: managing a home-based enterprise and maintaining an architectural identity. *Journal of Asia Pacific Management and Business Application*, 2(2), 53-67.
- Sudara, I. G. N. (1983). *Ornamen Bali (Kumpulan Ragam Hias)*, Penerbit: Sekolah menengah Seni Rupa Denpasar: Denpasar Bali.
- Sunaryo, A. (2009). *Ornamen Nusantara*. Semarang: Dahara prize.



## Discrimination of Women at RMG Sector in Bangladesh

Muhammad Faizul Haque<sup>1</sup>, Md. Atiqur Rahman Sarker<sup>2</sup>, Md Syfur Rahman<sup>3</sup>, Mohammad Rakibuddin<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Qur'an and Sunnah Studies, Kulliyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Science, International Islamic University Malaysia. Email: faizulhaque1987@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup>Ph.D. Candidate, Int. Islamic University of Malaysia & Assistant Professor, East-West University, Bangladesh (On Study Leave). Phone: +60147341702, Email: sarker.limon@gmail.com / mars@ewubd.edu

<sup>3</sup>Manager (Compliance), Leather Goods and Footwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association of Bangladesh Email: syfur.rhmn@gmail.com

<sup>4</sup>Teacher (Individuals and Societies), Australian International School, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Email: mrakibuddin71@gmail.com

Correspondence: Md Atiqur Rahman Sarker, Email: sarker.limon@gmail.com

### Abstract

Women are discriminated in professional, personal and community levels by their male counterpart across the globe in general. More specifically, women are not treated equally at workplace in many societies due to the dominance of patriarchal social system and traditional norms. Women equity and empowerment are spoken widely, but these are not practiced in reality. The primary aim of this study is to explore the women's current position and status at the workplace in Ready Made Garments (RMG) sector in Bangladesh in terms of wages, promotions, safety and security. Secondly, this paper highlights the challenges that women face at RMG. This paper adopts qualitative approach to study this crucial issues. This study also congregates and analyses the most pertinent data both from the existing literature and primary sources. In-depth Interviews (IDIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) have been conducted among the female RMG workers appointed in different industrial zones in Bangladesh. This study has some remarkable findings such as, a) women employee do not get proper respect at workplace from their male colleagues. b) Women are often harassed verbally by their male coworkers. c) Owners, managers and supervisors have the bad intention to fulfill their sexual desire with female workers. d) Male supervisors often force their female subordinates to do overtime till the late night. e) Though female workers are doing the same job, but they do not get proper justice in terms of getting desired job posting, salary on time and promotions based on their skills and competencies. Finally, this study focuses on resolving the issues of gender discrimination at the workplace and contributes towards the equity and empowerment of women in RMG sector in Bangladesh.

**Keywords:** Discrimination, Equity, Empowerment, RMG and Women

## Introduction

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century one of the main objective of achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) across the globe is women's participation at the workplace. A proper job and source of income are the main components for women's economic development or empowerment (Svarer, et al., 2017). It is next to impossible to empower women in economic sector without creating a congenial working environment for women at the workplace. However, Bangladesh is receiving largest percentage of foreign revenue from the Ready-Made Garment sector (RMG). The total number of workers in this sector is approximately 4.2 million, where more than 90% workers are female who came from rural areas of Bangladesh. Unfortunately, the working environment in this sector is unfriendly and unhealthy for women to work comfortably and the labor rights and social compliance are violated (Ali, et al., 2008; Rubya, 2015). Women are contributing side by side to earn this huge amount of foreign revenue in every financial year which makes a stable GDP of Bangladesh.

Nonetheless, female workers are facing sexual harassment, pay inequity and improper benefits like maternity leave and daycare which is truly unfortunate and unacceptable (Haque, et al., 2019; Hossan, et al., 2012). The role of women on economic development in Bangladesh cannot be denied. Their efforts and contributions at RMG sector are highly remarkable. The skills, competency and learning behavior of female workers are comparatively better than their male counterparts. However, female workers are not well protected in terms of their safety, security and benefits. Women are often facing discrimination at the workplace and treated as disgraceful in comparison to their male co-workers particularly at RMG sector in Bangladesh (Islam, 2016; Mustafa, et al., 2016). Insufficient payment, wage delay, few promotions, inadequate health service, reluctance in maternity leave and unhealthy working environment are very common in this sector. Thus the image of RMG sector is getting worse internationally and it reduces the business prospect in recent time. It is also inhuman as the rights of women workers are violated. This current study emphasizes primarily to explore the women's current position and status at the workplace at RMG sector in Bangladesh in terms of wages, promotions, safety and security. It also identifies the specific areas where female workers are discriminated. The study also finds the ways to eradicate discrimination to women at the workplace.

## Literature review

Discriminating to women at the workplace is very common phenomenon around the world and Bangladesh is not behind in this realm. The participation of women as manufacturing workers in RMG sector is increasingly visible in Bangladesh (Islam, 2016). Most of the female workers are from poor rural family and they are under privileged (Mustafa, et al., 2016). Most of them are illiterate and unaware of their rights. They do not have any other option rather migrating to industrialized areas for work which often gives them tedious, hazardous and unhealthy life (Islam, 2016). Many organizations have been working for women's progress and advancement since the 20<sup>th</sup> century. One of the commissions, the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) was basically established in 1946 as a sub-commission of the commission on human rights (Badamasuiy & Shu'aib, 2012). Article 7 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 26 of the 1966 International Convention on Civil and political Rights (CCPR) was formed to eradicate discrimination against women in every aspect of their life (Nielsen, 1994). Consequently, it was determined through SCW to produce a single and comprehensive instrument which eliminates all forms of discrimination against women in all sectors based on their qualification and speciality rights (Badamasuiy & Shu'aib, 2012). The International Women's Rights Action Watch (IWRAW) was formed in 1985 in Nairobi, Kenya. It was formed under the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1992; Freeman, et al., 2012), with the main purpose of producing policymakers, scholarly students and activists who will work on human rights issues for decades to come. UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was formed in 1945 with 54 countries. The objective of ECOSOC is to examine inequalities between men and women caused by financial problems. In 1976, another institution was established under the United Nations named the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW). This institution is

highly focused on women's progress and advancement to allow them to participate in social activities through research and training and this was monitored by the government of each respective country.

However, among the south Asian countries, Bangladesh is one of the largest populated country in this region. In terms of rapid economic growth in Bangladesh, the manufacturing industries i.e., jute and jute related goods, leather related products, home textile, footwear, garments, etc. are highly contributing to this realm. Among these industries, the RMG sector is the most influential and successful industry that has a greater contribution in national GDP development. (Ali & Islam, 2017; Hossain et al., 2012). The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) conducted a survey on the wage gap between men and women in the garment sector from 2009 to 2010. In the RMG sector, the monthly wage for men is Taka 6,161 (BDT), which is approximately US\$75 per month. In contrast, women are getting lower than men, which is only Taka 4,264 (BDT) or US\$52 per month (ADB Briefs no. 68. October 2016, p. 7). It clearly shows from the data that the wage gap between men and women is quite high approximately US\$23. In RMG sector, women are usually exploited by the factory owners who give them lower wages. Hence, it is less attractive for women to work outside the home. In addition, it is found from the various studies that the law enforcement bodies for industrial rules and regulations are quite lenient and tranquil in concerning for disparity at work environment, health and safety in RMG sector of Bangladesh (Kabir et al., 2018). Discrimination of women at workplace is very common scenario across the world, particularly in RMG sector in Bangladesh. Before discussing in detail about the discrimination to women at workplace in RMG sector in Bangladesh, it is very much needed to highlight briefly about the definition of gender discrimination.

The meaning of 'gender discrimination' is "a situation in which someone is treated less well because of their sex, usually when a woman is treated less well than a man" (Cambridge Dictionary,). For instance, at the workplace, women are getting less salary than their male counterparts for the same work. It could also be in different types of discrimination in human life which are made by fellow humans to the opposite sex (women).

According to CEDAW, the definition of gender discrimination is:

For the purposes of the present Convention, the term 'discrimination against women' means any distinction, exclusion, or restriction made on the basis of sex, which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field (UN Women, 1981). Fatma Osman Ibnouf defines the meaning of gender discrimination as "the structural system of domination of women by men in all areas of aspects of life (which is also referred to as gender inequality) which has existed throughout history and has been labeled patriarchy" (Ibnouf, 2015).

Nevertheless, researchers define gender discrimination as, *any sort of action that is considered as a violation or creates an obstacle against women's rights in every aspect of human life, in terms of participation in education, politics, economics and social activities*. Women most often are discriminated at work. Though, sexual harassment is the common violence against women, there are many other areas where women are discriminated in RMG sector of Bangladesh such as inequality in pay and promotion, inadequate safety and security, long work duration and unhealthy work environment (Haque, et al., 2019; Hossan, et al., 2012). Therefore, the issue of injustice to women needs to be addressed and resolved in order to ensure equality and empowerment of women.

## Methodology

This study congregates and analyses the most pertinent data both from the existing literature and primary sources of data through four In-depth Interviews (IDIs) and four Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) held between October and December, 2019. Data have been collected from the female RMG workers and supervisors appointed in

different industrial zones in Bangladesh. The identities of the workers participated both in FGDs and IDIs are kept anonymous and their opinions and comments are only used for this academic research purpose. Collected data have been analyzed thematically and backed by existing literature.

### Findings and discussions

There are various types of discrimination exists in RMG sector in Bangladesh. During the FGDs in every session all the participants have shown their agony and dissatisfaction for the injustices take place at their work. The challenges women face at RMG in Bangladesh are discussed below with special focus on some critical areas.

Women at RMG work more hours than their male counterpart and they are often bound to do extra hour beyond their regular work schedule (F.1.3; F.2.6; F.3.3 & F.4.5). There are many causes which affect women's participation in the workplace. Long working hour often have negative impact on their family life which specifically affect their children's mental and physical health since they cannot take care of their kids properly (F.1.6; F.2.5; F.3.1 & F.4.1). Women often quit their job when they get pregnant or have infants at home (Tania and Saidur, 2017). For women, working such long hours creates lots of problems for their families because they could not take care of their household chores. According to interviewee P1, *"I start my day at 4 am. I prepare the food for everyone in the family and clean the house before I leave for work, which starts at 8 am. I finish my duty at 8 pm most of the day and return home at 9 pm. I cook again and clean. Do other household chores. After dinner and prayer, I go to sleep at 12 am. Do you think I am living life? I feel like my life is a curse."* The interviewee was crying silently after the comment she made and the room became quite all in sudden. Since women have the major role to play in home making, it is expected that their time after and before work should be sufficient enough for family duty and rest.

Female employees are not only deprived at the workplace by getting lower salaries compared to their male counterparts but they are also not getting their salary on time. According to the Bangladesh Labour Act (BLA, 2006, Chapter-10, Section-121), workers should be paid within seven days after the wage period expires. Interviewee P3 has stated as *"I always wait for second or third week of the next month for my previous month salary. Since I am the only bread earner of my family of three children without husband who left me for another woman, I am living life starving sometimes. I feel sorry and I cry every night when I see I cannot afford enough food for my children"*. Many women working at RMG are the only earning person for their family (F.1.3; F.2.4 & F.4.2). But the salary of RMG workers is not sufficient enough for standard of living (F.4.4). It is claimed that women at RMG are discriminated with pay and other employment benefits.

Uncongenial working environment is one of the most challenges issue for women at the workplace to continue their work. It is noticed that most of the time unpleasant working environment is seen where men and women are working together, particularly in the field of tradable sectors in many developing countries. Many RMG factories do not ensure health and safety issues in Bangladesh. According to the interviewee P4, *"In my factory, both men and women use the same toilets. We feel uncomfortable to use toilet during periods. Sanitary items and toiletries are not provided at work. We even do not get the soap for hand wash after the toilet use"*. P2 says, *"we have common dining and rest area for both men and women. Our male colleagues often give us bad look and try to touch our body while at common room where there is no CCTV camera"*. There is lack of ventilation and sunlight inside many RMG factories (F.1.1; F.2.2 & F.4.4). Dehydration and heat stroke are very common among the workers in RMG factories which also affect the physical and mental health of the workers. This uninviting working atmosphere creates a negative impact on women's mind and they do not feel safe to work (Ali, et al., 2018; Begum, 2014). The same comments are made by the participants of FGDs and they opine that uncongenial working environment is a barrier which discourages women from participating at the workplace and makes a bit awkward for women to work. Thus, the RMG management authority should focus in these areas stated above to avoid labor unrest.

## Conclusion

From the above mentioned issues, it can be concluded that working condition for women at RMG sector in Bangladesh is not favorable at all. Women employee do not get proper respect at workplace from their male colleagues. They are often harassed both verbally and physically by their male coworkers. Owners, managers and supervisors have the bad intention to fulfill their sexual desire with female workers. Male supervisors often force their female subordinates to do overtime till the late night. Though female workers are doing the same job, but they do not get proper justice in terms of getting desired job posting, salary on time and promotions based on their skills and competencies. The work environment is uncongenial for women at RMG sector. There is a lack of hygiene, safety and security. Since, the injustices are made toward women due to gender, it goes beyond humanity and legal aspect. Everyone must be paid based on their productive work not based on their gender. Working environment must be comfortable for women and the management should take initiative to stop sexual harassment and violence against women. Women's health and safety need to be given more attention in RMG sector along with other employment benefits such as maternity benefit, day care facilities for working mothers, pay on time, revised pay based on inflation etc. This study could not have collected data exclusively from every industrial zones through several data collection methods due to time limitation and restriction of RMG authorities. Thus, the findings of this study cannot be generalized to represent total population. Further study can be done with more sample especially from RMG authority (owners and managers), legal experts and government representative from labor department for more accurate and valid data which will sketch the real scenario of women's work life at RMG sector in Bangladesh.

## References

- Ali, M. L., & Islam, N (2017). Working Environment of Female Readymade Garment Workers in Bangladesh. *Conference: International Academy of Management and Business Conference 2017*, December, 2017, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
- Ali, M. M., Solihin, S. M., & Haque, M. F (2018). Empowerment of Women: An Analytical Study from the Islamic Perspective, *The Islamic Quarterly*, 62(2), 303-334.
- Ali, R. N., Begum, M. M., Salehim, K. S., & Farid, K. S. (2008). Livelihood pattern of rural women garment workers at Dhaka city. *Journal of the Bangladesh Agricultural University*, 6, 2 (452-2016-35506).
- Badamasuiy, J., & Shu'aib, U. M. (2011). Gender equality or gender equity? A critique of CEDAW from Shari'ah perspective.
- Begum, F. S. (2014). Gender equality and women's empowerment: suggested strategies for the 7th five-year plan. *General Economics Division: Planning Commission of Government Bangladesh*.
- CEDAW Committee. (1992). Committee on the elimination of discrimination against women. General recommendation No. 19. *Violence against women*.
- Freeman, M. A., Rudolf, B., Chinkin, C., Kroworsch, S., & Sherrier, A. (Eds.). (2012). *The UN convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women: A commentary*. Oxford University Press.
- Haque, M. F., Sarker, M. A. R., & Rahman, M. S. (2019). Sexual Harassment of Female Workers at Manufacturing Sectors in Bangladesh. *Journal of Economics and Business*, 2(3), 934-940. doi: 10.31014/aior.1992.02.03.140
- Hossan, C.G, Sarker, A.R, and Afroze, R. (2012). Recent unrest in RMG sector of Bangladesh: Is this an outcome of Poor Labour Practices? *International Journal of Business and Management*, 7(3), ISSN 1833-3850, Canada.
- Ibnouf, F. O. (Unpublished, 2015) *The Gender Equality and Human's Rights of Women in Islamic Texts (the Qur'an and Hadith)*, doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3421.1367.
- Islam, S. (2016). Feminization of Employment and Gender Inequality of Bangladesh Labor Market: The Case of Garment Industries. *Developing Country Studies*, 6(2), 157-168.
- Kabir, H., Maple, M., & Fatema, S. R. (2018). Vulnerabilities of Women Workers in the Readymade Garment Sector of Bangladesh: A Case Study of Rana Plaza. *Journal of International Women's Studies*, 19(6), 224-235.
- Mustafa, A., Islam, M., Islam, S. and Khatun, M. (2016). Impact of RMG Sector on Livelihood Change of Women Employees of Bangladesh. *Social and Economic Geography*, 2(1), 1-10. doi: 10.12691/seg-2-1-1.

- Nielsen, H. K. (1994). The concept of discrimination in ILO Convention No. 111. *International & Comparative Law Quarterly*, 43(4), 827-856.
- Rahman, T. & Rahman, S. (2017). Work Place Environment of Garment Industry in Bangladesh: An Opinion Survey of the Female Garments Workers, 2nd Putrajaya International Conference on Children, Women, Elderly and Disabled People (PICCWED-2). 20-21 May 2017 Putrajaya: Kuala Lumpur.
- Rubya, T. (2015). The Ready-Made Garment Industry: An Analysis of Bangladesh's Labor Law Provisions after the Savar Tragedy. *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, 40(2), 7.
- Svarer, C., Meiers, R., & Rothmeier, B. (2017). Empowering Female Workers in the Apparel Industry: Three Areas for Business Action: Reports. Retrieved on 8<sup>th</sup> January, 2020 from <https://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/report-view/empowering-female-workers-in-the-apparel-industry-business-action>.

## Appendix

### Appendix-I: List of Participant in Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

SL/ Code	Designation	SL/ Code	Designation	SL/ Code	Designation	SL/ Code	Designation
	<b>FGD-1</b> on Female Workers in RMG Factory-1 at Gazipur, Bangladesh on 22/10/2019		<b>FGD-2</b> on Female Workers in RMG Factory-2 at Savar (Dhaka), Bangladesh on 29/10/2019		<b>FGD-3</b> on Female workers in RMG Factory-3 at Narayanganj, Bangladesh on 05/11/2019		<b>FGD-4</b> on Female Supervisors from different RMG factories in Dhaka Division held at local restaurant in Dhaka, Bangladesh on 07/11/2019
F.1.1	Finishing Worker	F.2.1	Packaging Worker	F.3.1	Sewing & Machine Operator	F.4.1	Supervisor (Sewing)
F.1.2	Sewing Worker	F.2.2	Cutting Operator	F.3.2	Finishing Worker	F.4.2	Supervisor (Quality Control)
F.1.3	Cutting Operator	F.2.3	Production Worker	F.3.3	Machine Operator	F.4.3	Supervisor (Cutting)
F.1.4	Quality Control Assistant	F.2.4	Sewing Worker	F.3.4	Quality Control Assistant	F.4.4	Supervisor (Finishing)
F.1.5	Machine Operator	F.2.5	Lasting Worker	F.3.5	Cleaning Worker	F.4.5	Supervisor (Sewing)
F.1.6	Office Assistant	F.2.6	Quality Controller	F.3.6	Cutting Operator	F.4.6	Supervisor (Packaging)

### Appendix-II: List of Participants (Female Workers) in In-depth Interviews

SL/Code	Participants' details	Date
<b>P1</b>	Office Assistant in a RMG factory in Narsindi, Bangladesh	08/12/2019
<b>P2</b>	Machine Operator in a RMG factory in Rupganj (Narayanganj), Bangladesh	09/12/2019
<b>P3</b>	Cutting Worker in RMG factory in Savar (Dhaka), Bangladesh	10/12/2019
<b>P4</b>	Sewing & Machine Operator in a RMG factory in Kachpur (Dhaka), Bangladesh	11/12/2019



# Discourse of Gotong Royong Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle in Kulon Progo, Special Region of Yogyakarta

Wahyu Hidayat<sup>1</sup>, RB. Soemanto<sup>2</sup>, Supriyadi<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Postgraduate Sociology, Universitas Sebelas Maret Surakarta, Indonesia

<sup>2,3</sup> Department of Sociology, Universitas Sebelas Maret Surakarta, Indonesia

Correspondence: Ir. Sutami Street No. 36 A Surakarta 57126, Indonesia. Email: wahyuhidayat@student.uns.ac.id

## Abstract

Indonesian political party face high financing issues in each political momentum. This research aims to explain the discourse of *gotong royong* in the effort to be victorious couple of Hasto Wardoyo – Sutedjo in elections 2017 Kulon Progo Regency. This study is a qualitative study using the theoretical references of the thought of Michel Foucault. The research informant is the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle cadres in Kulon Progo regency. The research informant consisted main informant Kulon Progo Regent 2017-2023 and key informant were DPD Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle DIY and DPC Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle in Kulon Progo. Data collection techniques used interview and documentation. Technique of analysis used interactive model. The results of this study showed that the discourse of mutual assistance in the internal party of PDI struggle serves to activate party cadre militancy in carrying out the duties of the parties, especially in the effort to win the spouse of Hasto Wardoyo – Sutedjo at the momentum of the election 2017 in Kulon Progo. Then, *gotong royong* as a local genius has become the social norm of people in Kulon Progo, so the discourse is more easily accepted and considered as a form of truth by society.

**Keywords:** Discourse, Gotong Royong, Local Leader Election, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle

## 1. Introduction

The practice of political party in post-reformation is still an interesting thing to observe. The dynamics and contestation of the elite political parties are very impactful in social, economic and political life. Because of political parties have the different forms, ideology, platform, objectives and its functions. This distinction carries a potential influence on every action undertaken by political parties. The action was based on a political stance that had previously been a party policy.

The existence of the political party in new order government was still not able to push the function of non-electoral party. This is evident from the inactive of political party to create the prospective leader who has a commitment to the companionship. However, the presence of political parties has changed the people's relationship with the ruler, especially after the transition from authoritarian democracy to civilian democracy (reform). In this era of reform has changed the pattern to get a good position in the structure of the executive,

legislative and judicial institutions. For those who want to be reign, political parties become a source of production and reproduction of power so many are plunged into the party.

In principle, a political party established as a formal organization in the form of organizations representing an interest and political objectives that should be fought in the formal level and need to obtain legitimation (Firmanzah, 2013:199). As a country that adheres to the democratic system, the legitimacy of political struggles could be accommodated through the organization of political parties. The existence of political parties in the principles of democratic life, cannot be separated from the social reality. Therefore, political parties can be a distributor of aspirations and wishes of society. Political parties should also carry out a number of functions, namely function as a medium among government and people, nominating of candidates, organizing the government, encouraging public accountability, political education and regulating conflicts.

In the modern democracy system, political parties are institutions that are considered so relevant. The role of political parties cannot be replaced by any institution even by elements of civil society or other organisations representing the public interest. The party became an inevitable necessity, even difficult to imagine how a democracy representative could stand without the existence of a political party (Bryce, 2006:7). In addition, to be able to power linkage between the government and civil society, political parties also organise to the various ideological differences and interests in society. As Schattsneider said that it is difficult to think about how modern democracy can run safely without a party (Schattsneider, 1942:1).

In politics, structures are an important aspect to note. Duverger (2003) in his study introduces a simple division of political structures based on physical structures and social structures. Therefore, in the structure of legal political institutions, it has become the obligation of political parties to be consistent in the struggle for the interests of the people by always guiding the ideology of the party. Ideology in the political party in the break down in party manifesto and party program will be the basic attitude of the party in running the country policy management process (Sugiono, 2009:3). Ideology is also a basis for the struggle of political parties, because any member of the party or society cannot understand the pattern of thinking, being and acting without understanding the structure of the political ideology that builds it. As Wilcox and Clyde (2006:790) revealed that ideology as an idea bearer.

In the era of reform, the description of politics in Indonesia still shows that the position of political parties as an obstacle to democratic reform. Carothers (2006), Tomsa (2010), describe the party in Indonesia as a highly centric leader organization dominated by a small circle of politicians elite, so that management becomes less professional and rooted. However, the political liberalization of after reform has brought a new situation that is more conducive to ideological experimentation in the political sphere (Noor, 2014). Many political parties then conducted romanticism of political ideology, especially the great parties of the past who used ideological political bases as his political capital. Thus, it takes a clear ideological base in its construction process (Firmanzah, 2013:199).

The role of after reform political ideology became important as the fundamental changes in the body of political parties. The identity of political parties is important in the midst of an intensive rivalry. Meanwhile, the limited resources and infrastructure of political parties, making ideological positioning is a must. To support it, political parties need to think of strategies to strengthen identity. This is certainly one of the factors to raise trust in the middle of society.

In the reality of political parties that exist today, there are at least three large ideologies of the party that competed after reform those are nationalist ideology, religion and moderate. The ideology became the mirror of the party's identity and became the party instrument to realizing the ideal community order to be achieved as a achievement of political objectives. Firmanzah (2013, XLVI) said that the existence of a strict political identity will make it easier for voters to identify the alignments in the political issues of a party and the public policy who was made. In the other hand, the phenomenon of revival of ideology in the political in the early

democratization of Indonesia, as presented by a political party that chooses an ideological path, is still limited between the intellectual elite and its political activities (Sujito, 2015). Therefore, the ideology that belongs to political parties is still a lot that has not been formulated and translated into the real and concrete forms, and generally still fixed in abstract ideology.

Local leader election is one of the tools to realize the local democratization process. The elections were realized in hopes of becoming a political instrument that gave change in determining its local leaders. Elections were born to fix democracy practices amid political party pragmatism. In addition, the elections became the arena for political parties to better run the function as an equitable regeneration institution in all areas. Thus, political parties are required to present a leader figure who has strong character and meets the expectations of the public.

The strategy to install the people's role model and charismatic figure in the party is not obsolete, although the political trend is shifting from the political figure to the celebrity figure. However, political facts like this should be a challenge for political parties so that every local leader candidate has a commitment to concern and credible in the ideology.

In terms of maintenance, the violation of the elections, especially money politic, is a special study by the organizers of election. Since the enactment of the open proportional system resulted in the increasing practice of money politic. The system carries an incentive structure for candidates to compete openly with other candidates, both the different parties and the same party, in an effort to reap the vote. Indirectly, such fierce competition can increase the political use of money in obtaining votes from voters.

Political works in the community is very decisive in opening the opportunity of victory of the elections. Although, so many political parties which in the end still submit a prisoner in the election 2017. This fact shows that the political party has not fully assumed the regeneration function in accordance with expectations. Like Albana (2015) said the presence of the officials and the former head of the district has always been the capital to obtain the prospective head of the district that will be promoted or proposed by the political party.

In the momentum of the election in 2017, DPP Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle recommends 101 candidates, one of them in Kulon Progo regency. The main concept in the discourse relates to power and knowledge, where that power produces knowledge through discourse that contains ideas, ideas or concepts (Foucault: 2002). The discourse of *gotong royong* became the strategy of political actors in the victory of the elections. According to Foucault (Eriyanto; 2011) that the main characteristic of a discourse is being able to form and maintain power in society. The discourse of *gotong royong* as knowledge has the purpose of power, then produce the truth for society. This research aims to describe how the discourse of *gotong royong* affects Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle as an effort to victory the election 2017 in Kulon Progo Regency, Special region of Yogyakarta.

## 2. Methodology

### 2.1 Research Design

The location of this research is in Kulon Progo Regency, Special region of Yogyakarta. Primary Data for resource sources consist of major informant and supporting informant. This research approach uses a case study model (Milles et al., 2014; Yin, 2015). In this study, sample collection using purposive sampling technique, that is technique of obtaining samples by selecting individuals who are considered to be aware of the information and problems in depth and trustworthiness become the data resource (Sutopo, 2002).

The study uses a qualitative research type and a case study approach. Qualitative research refers to research strategies such as deep interviews, literature studies and documentation that allow researchers to obtain information related to Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. The case study approach is one of the methods of research in social sciences. Using the case study method, this research seeks to see *gotong royong* in the

ideological practice of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle in the local leader elections in Kulon Progo 2017 and its association in the winning of the 2017 elections in Kulon Progo.

The data source in this research consist of two types of primary data sources and secondary data. Firstly, the results of interviews and findings in the field. According to Moleong (2007:112), the main data source is the words or actions of people who were observed or interviewed. The recording of such data sources is the result of the combined efforts of viewing, listening and asking questions that are made consciously, purposefully and always aiming to obtain the necessary information. The informant is the party cadre involved in the activism of *gotong royong* in the ideologization practice of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle on local leader elections 2017 in Kulon Progo.

Secondly, secondary data is obtained by researchers from books and documents related to the research. According to Moleong (2007:113), in addition to words and actions as the main data source, there are also additional data such as documents and others as secondary data sources. The secondary data source is a source of data that is obtained indirectly support to the primary data. This data is data from KPU RI (General Elections Commission) about the acquisition of the results of the 2017 simultaneous regional elections and archives of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle.

## 2.2 Technique of Sampling

In this study, sample collection using purposive sampling technique or sampling aims, that is the technique to obtaining samples by selecting individuals who are considered to be aware of the information and problems in depth and trustworthiness become data resource (Sutopo, 2002). In the purposive sampling technique, researcher do not make everyone as an informant, but researcher prefer the informant that is perceived to know and understand the problem of research. Characteristics entered as informant is the regent of Kulon Progo in period 2017-2022, DPP (Central Leadership Board of Parties) Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, DPD (Regional Representative Assembly) Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle DIY and DPC (Sub-District Leadership Board of Parties) Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle Kulon Progo.

## 2.3 Technique of Data Collection

To obtain relevant data are needed data collection methods with several stages of data collection, namely first, interview technique. Interview can be done in a number of forms, but according to Robert K. Yin (2008:110), the most common is the open-ended case study interview, where researcher can ask key respondents about the facts of an event and their opinions about the events. The interview technique is conducted by researcher with discussions with the informant who is a cadre of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. Researcher are expected to obtain data that support in the formulation of the results in this research. The interview technique is conducted by conducting unstructured interview and the informants to be free to giving the information, in order to make possible the development of answers by the informant about the focus of this research. The following are the tables of research informants;

Table 1. List of Main Informants

	<b>Main Informants</b>
1	Hasto Wardoyo as Regent / Candidate of Regent in 2017-2022
2	Idham Samawi as Chairperson of Field in Ideology and Regeneration DPP Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle in 2015-2020
3	Yuni Satia Rahayu as Secretary DPD Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle DIY

Table 2. List of Key Informants and Supporting Informants

	<b>Key Informants and Supporting Informants</b>
1	Sudarto as Chairperson of Kulon Progo DPC Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
2	Istana as Secretary of Kulon Progo DPC Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
3	Aris Syarifuddin as Chairperson of Winning Election DPC Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
4	Yuli Yantoro as Victory Team of Hasto – Sutedjo/PAC Sentolo

Secondly, in this study used documentation technique. This method refers to one of the methods of collecting data used in social research methodology. According to Arikunto (2002:187), the data retrieval technique in the form of this documentation was used to obtain data on matters of record, transcript, book, newspaper, magazine, paper, agenda and so many others. Usage of the most important documents can support and add evidence from other sources.

#### **2.4 Data Validation**

Validity is a measure that will indicate the degree of validity or legality of an instrument. Arikunto (2007:160), said an instrument to be valid or invalid when able to measure what it should be measured. The research used triangulation technique in achieving the validity of data. Triangulation is a data checking technique that takes advantage of something else beyond the purpose of checking or as a comparison to the data (Moleong, 2007:178). Research was used the triangulation of source, namely by comparing and checking back the degree of trust of a source of information obtained through the informant, in the different times and tools in the qualitative method.

The study is to analyse by referring to the theoretical foundation to draw conclusion on data and information that has been gathered sustainably. In accordance with the technique of data collection that was done, the process of analysis was developed and continues to occur while data collection was done. In this case, researcher worked with the data or technical analysis data interactive of analysis that has the stages of data collection, data reduction, display data, and withdrawal of conclusions (Miles and Huberman, 1992:16)

### **3. Research Framework**

In the theory of this discourse, researcher emphasize the discourse of *gotong royong* that develops in the society. The discourse aims to construct topics, define and produce knowledge objects. It regulates how a topic not only discussed meaningless, but also affect ideas are transformed into practice and use as a form of regularity. Discourse has the power and influence within a social context and devise a structure of understanding of the reality and idea of identity.

The discourse, for Foucault, is a system of thought or a picture system that then builds the concept of a cultural. The discourse will create a knowledge and truth about the people who pronounce it. Behind this (the person who pronounces) is where the person has power or authority rights. The power refers to a person who has a higher position as the expert in the field or the person who has the assignment in that section. For Michel Foucault, the discourse will not be separated from power and knowledge.

The discourse of *gotong royong* was done by the elite and party cadres in Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle as a form of practice ideologization of the party. To see the ideological practice, the study used *gotong royong* as a local genius (local wisdom values). Using the theory of discourse, we can see the discourse of *gotong royong* which is delivered by the incumbent candidate in the campaign activities has established a set of knowledge and power. Relation of them has an important role in shaping of social norms in the victory of local leader election in 2017.

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle in Kulon Progo is a party that has a social base (cadre) and a clear mass. In this explanation of the power and knowledge by Foucault can be seen from the persuade of Hasto Wardoyo (Regent and candidate of Regent) as an institution or individual who has authority and he is deemed able to run governance. Hasto Wardoyo's invitation about this *gotong royong* for cadres is considered an obligation, so the invitation is regarded as the truth, the truth is not separated from the power and knowledge owned by Hasto Wardoyo as regent and candidate for regent.




Figure 1. Research Framework

#### 4. Result and Discussion

This research was conducted in Kulon Progo Regency, Special region of Yogyakarta. The area of this district are 586,627.512 ha consist of 12 sub-districts, 87 villages, 1 urban village, 918 Pedukuhan (village in smaller area), 1,825 hamlets and 4,469 neighbourhood. Final voter list in the election 2017 Kulon Progo Regency for men amount to 161,348 peoples and women amount to 170,863 peoples. So, total amount are 332,211 peoples. For voters participation, the vote were around 70% and who did not use the vote was 30%.

As one of party in electoral participants, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle in Kulon Progo is a party that has considerable influence in the society in every momentum of the elections. This is evidenced by the four period selected by the regent of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, including couple of Toyo Santoso Dipo (in period 2001 – 2006 and 2006 – 2011) and Hasto Wardoyo (in period 2011-2017 and 2017 – 2022). At the 2017 election, the vote for the candidate number 1, Zuhadmono Azhari and Iriani Pramastuti received 36,874 votes (14.32%) and the candidate number 2 Hasto Wardoyo and Sutedjo obtained 220,643 votes (85.68%) from the total valid votes was 257,517 votes.


### Perception of Actors about *Gotong Royong*

Local Leaders election have brought the change in fulfilling the political rights of the peoples to determine the leaders in their regions. For the society of Kulon Progo, appreciation of the election was evidenced by the level of attendance was quite significant. Although, various research on the electoral practice during the last decade still showed that the realm of political freedom was plowed by the power of oligarchy, so it was caused the election to be a high-budget of political practice, but it has not gave the guarantee for public welfare.

The victory of Hasto Wardoyo and Suttedjo as regent and vice regent of Kulon Progo in period 2017-2022 for the second time, it became proof that since the reform of 1998, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle was able to defend its power. Efforts to defend power at this election, political actors play a discourse of *gotong royong* as the main issue. The impact of the discourse affects the peoples to choose Hasto Wardoyo and Suttedjo pairs. As a candidate for the adjutant, through the discourse of *gotong royong*, political actors built a hegemonic narrative to achieve public sympathy before the 2017 local leaders election in Kulon Progo.

Power organizers always produce knowledge as the basis of power. *Gotong royong* has a position discourse as the knowledge that lubricated power. Discourse can produce truth and knowledge and it caused power effect. As a knowledge, the discourse is a local genius that is already present and inherent as the habit of the peoples of Kulon Progo. Knowledge and truth resulted from the discourse of *gotong royong*, its combined by the political actors by packing a program that was 'pro peoples'. *Gotong royong* is embodied in the program *Bela Beli* Kulon Progo, *Bedah Rumah* and *Gentong Rembes*. There are similarities to *gotong royong* that are built by political actors with habits that have grown in society. As an actor and regent who is still in office, Hasto has the legitimation of power in determining the policy, but the process of forming this discourse was also contracted by the network of actors from outside the government.

The role of this actor differs in the perception, production and build discourse of *gotong royong* as a tool of truth. Although, the contents of discourse is not the only one that can affect the belief of society, but also who convey the discourse. The knowledge form of *gotong royong* according to actors is a real implementation of Pancasila ideology. In the discourse, actors have power over knowledge, so that the discourse of *gotong royong* then become a social norm in the society that must be obeyed and executed. Thus, *gotong royong* discourse can be easily played to influence the society to be able to choose the partner of Hasto Wardoyo and Suttedjo at the 2017 election in Kulon Progo regency



Note. Data Analyzing, 2019

## **The Discourse of The *Gotong Royong* on Cadre of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle**

In Foucault Discourse, power forms discourse as a control of behaviour by forming a perspective on things. The power of Foucault does not work through suppression and repression, but through on the regulation and normalization. In this case, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle cadre must follow the rules that have been specified in Article of Association of party. Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle was constructed *gotong royong* as a tool of struggle, as stated in the vision of the party in article 6 of the Article of Association of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle that the struggle to oppose any form of individualism and to animate the soul and the spirit of *gotong royong* in the life of society, nation and state (*Eka Sila*). This regulation is to regulate the strategic steps and party program so that when the discourse of *Gotong Royong* has been established, then the cadres must run in every political activism. Meanwhile, in the society, this discourse can be delivered in the form of societal programs. Thus, power in Foucault's view can be applied through the social relations, where actors produce the discourse as a form of control to the society.

### **Actor Domination in Knowledge Power**

The discourse of *gotong royong* be the legitimacy of values was adopted by power holders. In power, the discourse then lubricated the actions performed by political actors in influencing society. In this case, for example, the discourse of *gotong royong* in *Bedah Rumah* program. *Gotong royong* discourse was presented by Hasto Wardoyo intended to move the spirit of mutual cooperation of people in dealing with poverty by cultivating awareness and solidarity in the society. The actor in the *Bedah Rumah* became a dominant program by defeating the role of local elites.

The discourse of *gotong royong* in the context of social relations serves the social elites who can also take the power of knowledge from the society. In this discussion of mutual assistance involving actors from Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle as the holder of the main knowledge power by utilizing the political space available as a winning strategy. The discourse of *gotong royong* was dominated by the actors as the principal knowledge power holders. When the actors of the knowledge holders do not come from the society then the discourse of mutual cooperation tends to produce a narrative of hegemonic policy. With the discourse of *gotong royong*, that the political actors are attempting to activate the military cadre of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle in carrying out the party's duties to win the local leaders election 2017 in Kulon Progo regency.

### **5. Conclusion**

Political parties have a big responsibility to present qualified candidates in the momentum of the elections. In addition, its roles and functions, political parties must also be strong in controlling every political dynamic that occur in the society. Especially for candidates who are the internal cadres of the party, solidity and cadre loyalty become the activator of party. The elections are influential for the future of a political party as well as local leadership in the future. This has become proof for the party to show strong social base in grass roots. In addition, political parties are also encouraged to be able to produce local leadership that has global insight. For the party who is unable to prepare, will lose momentum in any political contestation. *Gotong Royong* as an ideological practice on Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle is intended to activate the party cadre militancy in carrying out the duties of the party, especially in the effort to win the pair of Hasto Wardoyo - Sutedjo at the momentum of the elections 2017 in Kulon Progo. *Gotong royong* as a local genius becomes the social norm of the society in Kulon Progo, so the discourse of *gotong royong* in the society is more readily acceptable and regard as a form of truth.

## References

- Almond, Gabriel A dan Sidney Verba. 1990. *Budaya Politik: Tingkah Laku Politik dan Demokrasi di Lima Negara*. Jakarta: Bumi Aksara.
- Althusser, Louis. 2006. *Tentang Ideologi: Marxisme Strukturalis, Psikoanalisis, Cultural Studies*. Yogyakarta: Jalasutra.
- Arikunto. 2007. *Prosedur Penelitian: Suatu Pendekatan Praktik*. Jakarta: Rineka Aksara.
- Bryce, James dalam Richard S. Katz & William Crotty. 2006. *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: Sage Publications.
- Carothers, Thomas. 2006. *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in Nre Democracies*, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment in International Peace.
- C.S.T, Kansil dan Christine S.T, Kansil. 2005. *Sistem Pemerintahan Indonesia*. Jakarta: PT. Bumi Aksara.
- Damsar. 2010. *Pengantar Sosiologi Politik* (Edisi Revisi). Jakarta. Kencana.
- Duverger, Maurice. 2003. *Sosiologi Politik*. Jakarta: PT. Raja Grafindo Persada.
- Eagleton, Terry. 1991. *Ideologi: An Introduction*. New York: Verso.
- Eriyanto. 2003. *Analisis Wacana: Pengantar Analisis Teks Media*. Yogyakarta: LKiS.
- Eklouf, Stefan. 2003. *Power and political culture in Suharto's Indonesia: The Indonesia Democratic Party (PDI) and decline of the new order (1986-98)*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- Foucault, Michel. 2002. *Kegilaan dan Peradaban*. Yogyakarta: IKON.
- .....2002. *Arkeologi Pengetahuan*. Yogyakarta: Qalam.
- .....2002. *Wacana, Kuasa/ Pengetahuan*. Yogyakarta: Bentang.
- .....2007. *Agama, Budaya dan Seksualitas*. Yogyakarta: Jalasutra.
- Firmanzah, 2008. *Mengelola Partai Politik: Komunikasi dan Positioning, Ideologi Politik dan Era Demokrasi (Edisi Revisi)*. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia.
- , 2013. *Marketing Politik: Antara Pemahaman dan Realitas*. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia.
- H I, A Rahman, 2007. *Sistem Politik Indonesia*. Yogyakarta. Graha Ilmu.
- Kartodirjo, Sartono. 1987. *Gotong Royong: Saling Menolong dalam Pembangunan Masyarakat Indonesia, dalam Nat J Colleta dan Umar Khayam (editor)*. Kebudayaan dan Pembangunan sebuah pendekatan Terhadap Antropologi Terapan Ilmu Pengetahuan Sosial di Indonesia. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor.
- Larrain, Jorge. 1996. *Konsep Ideologi*. Yogyakarta: LKPSM.
- Mannheim, Kalr.1991. *Ideologi dan Utopia: Menyingkap Kaitan Pikiran dan Politik*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius.
- Marx, Kalr dan Friedrich Engels. 2012. *Ideologi Jerman: Jilid I Feuerbach*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Nusantara.
- Miriam, Budiardjo. 2008. *Dasar-Dasar Ilmu Politik*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka.
- , 1998. *Partisipasi dan Partai Politik*. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia.
- Michles, Robert. 1984. *Partai Politik: Kecenderungan Oligarkis dalam Birokrasi*. Jakarta. CV. Rajawali.
- Miles, Matthew B dan Huberman, A Michael. 1992. *Analisis Data Kualitatif*. Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia Press.
- Moleong, Lexy J. 2007. *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif*. Bandung: PT Remaja Rosdakarya Offset.
- Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD). 2006. *Suatu Kerangka Kerja Pengembangan Partai Politik Yang Demokratis*, Jakarta: NIMD.
- Neumann, Sigmund. 1963. *Modern Political Parties in Comparative Politics: A Reader*. London: The Free Pressof Glencoe.
- Sarman, Mukhtar. 2015. *Pilkada Serentak: Quo Vadis Kedaulatan Rakyat*. Banjarmasin: Program Magister Sains Administrasi Pembangunan UNLAM.
- Simon, Roger. 1999. *Gagasan-gagasan Politik Gramsci*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar dan Insist Press.
- Sutopo, HB. 2002. *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif: Dasar Teori dan Penerapannya dalam Penelitian*. Surakarta: UNS Press.
- Sumarno. 2006. *Drama Politik Pilkada Depok: Badrul Kamal Menggugat, Nur Mahmudi Menjawab*. Bandung: Harakatuna.
- Suseno, Franz-Magnis. 1992. *Filsafat Sebagai Ilmu Kritis*. Jakarta: Kanisium.
- Schattschneider, E.E. 1942. *Party Government in the United States*. New York: Rinehart.
- Slembrouck, Stef. 2006 "What is Meant by Discourse Analysis". Belgium: Ghent University.
- Shills, Edward. 1972. *Ideology*, dalam *International Encyclopedia of the Social Change*, Vol. 7, P.66-77. New York: The McMillan and The Free Press.
- Slamet, Yulis. 2006. *Metode Penelitian Sosial*. Surakarta: UNS Press.
- Takwim, Bagus. 2009. *Akar-Akar Ideologi: Pengantar Kajian Konsep Ideologi dari Plato hingga Bourdieu*. Yogyakarta: Jalasutra.
- Tew, J. 2002. *Social Theory, Power and Practive*. New York: Palgrave Macmilln.

- Tomsa, Dirk. 2010. *The Indonesian Party System After the 2009 Elections: Towards Stability? In Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions, and Society*, ed. Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Wilcox, Francesca Vassallo dan Clyde. 2006. *Part is a Carrier of Ideas*. London: Sage Publications.
- Yin, Robert K. 2008. *Studi Kasus: Desain dan Metode*; Penerjemah, M. Djauzi Mudzakir. Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada.



# The Contextualization of the Nilotic Pastoralist Conflicts in Northern Kenya

Jonathan Ltipalei<sup>1</sup>, Dr. Joshua Kivuva<sup>2</sup>, Prof. Fred O. Jonyo<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Kenya

<sup>2</sup>Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Kenya

<sup>3</sup>Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Kenya

Correspondence: Jonathan Ltipalei, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Kenya, Mobile, Email: lodompuij@gmail.com

## Abstract

This article gives a critical look at the genesis of protracted conflict in northern Kenya but more specifically among the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu Nilotic pastoral communities. To achieve this, the article progresses as follows; first, the chapter discusses the communities involved in the conflict. These are the Turkana, the Pokot and the Samburu. Second, the article discusses traditional cattle raiding and the role of age in the conflict sets paying special attention to the institution of Moranism. Lastly, the article discusses traditional coping mechanisms that have been employed throughout generations followed by how this ‘normal’ raiding was transformed with the advent of the British rule and the independent state to become a deadly affairs where lives are lost and properly destroyed.

**Keywords:** Conflict, Morans, Nilotes, Northern Kenya, Pastoralists

## 1. Introduction

Northern Kenya has in the past witnessed numerous cattle raids. These raids are widely believed to have increased after 1990, an escalation which was attributed to a variety of factors including resource scarcity (Dyson-Hudson, 1966; Ocan, 1992) and the criminal nature of the post-colonial state (Knighton, 2003). For the longest time the Turkana, Pokot and the Samburu communities in Northern Kenya have been perpetrators and victims within a cycle of conflict that has claimed lives and destroyed property.

The conflict among these communities has been attributed to many factors such as; celebration of a culture of heroism that elevates the social status of raiders, the decline of the role community elders play in the management of raids, competition over scarce and diminishing water and pastures for their animals, marginalization by successive governments and little presence of state security. Among these communities conflict can be seen as a cycle of revenge killings and cattle raids that often starts with *Morans* from one community raiding a rival community. Consequently, this spirals into attacks and counter attacks that after a while leads to long periods of hostilities punctuated by series of massacres. But has the conflict within these

communities been existence always as it is today? The answer is no. There has been a drastic change from normal tribal conflict through communal cattle rustling to a deadly warfare involving armed Morans from these communities.

### **1.1 Nilotic Pastoralists**

There are three Nilotic Pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya, namely the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot. Other Pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya are the Rendille, Borana, Gabra and Somali, who are Cushitic pastoralists. According to Roberts and Bainbridge (1963), the Cushitic Pastoral communities largely live in North Eastern Kenya and their Pastoral life revolves around the Camel due to the harsh environmental conditions in the region. The study further asserts that the Nilotic Pastoralist are predominantly cattle keepers.

There are major differences between the Cushitic and Nilotic Pastoralist. The Cushitic Pastoralist are light skinned and does not embrace Moranism while Nilotic Pastoralist are of dark skin with long limbs and with a standing Army of foot soldiers called Morans. It is this institution of Moranism among the Nilotic Pastoralist that makes escalation of conflict intermittent in Northern Kenya because the unfinished cattle raids assignments are handed over from one Moran age set to the next. The practice inculcates the need for conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralist intermittent and complex particularly when either internal or external conflict triggers are pressed.

## **2. Contextualizing the conflict: The parties involved**

### **2.1. The Turkana**

The Turkana people are estimated to be 800 000 within Kenya, accounting for around 2% of the entire Kenyan population as per the 2009 census. They are found predominantly in Turkana County. Being pastoralists, their primary commodities are livestock such as cattle, goats, camels, and sheep. They thus heavily rely on following the rains and tend to migrate from one location to another moving in temporary camps. Age is a key factor in the organizational structure of Turkana society, and commonly there is a generational structure of leadership with elders taking the helm in mediating disputes and directing trade defense. Authority is generally decentralized and while there are clan leaders, small communities generally decide collectively on actions to take. For defense purposes, enforcement is generally granted to village Morans and their age-mates (Mathew & Boyd, 2014). Although historically there has been a warrior sect of Turkana society, increasingly. This role has become increasingly voluntary for purposes of raiding which is generally a large-scale community effort.

There are two generation sets in the Turkana society, namely stone (*imuru*) and leopards (*eriat*) which alternate generations in each family. Generation-sets function as groups only during initiation or other ceremonies and raids (Gulliver, 1955). Moreover, the entry into the age-set is determined at birth, and every male child become a member of the opposite age set of the father. One of the major functions of age-sets is raiding to acquire territory, pasture, water supply, and animals, as well as to protect these homesteads from external aggression. Morans are always ready to fight and defend homesteads, herds, pastures, and water points. Age-set systems are built on the basis of military activities for raiding to acquire stock and pasture and kill enemies. The study reiterates that the elders from clans and generation-sets are also asked to say traditional prayers at these events.

### **2.2. The Pokot**

The Pokot people roughly number 512,690 according to census 2009 (KNBS, 2010). They inhabit the semi-arid plains of north of Lake Baringo, West Pokot and Tiaty sub county. They are mainly pastoralists keeping herds of cattle, camels and small stock of goats and sheep. The Pokots community is organized in similar fashion to the Turkana. The society is based on patrilineal heritage and is organized around a clan entity living in a village-style setting. The Pokot heavily rely on livestock and migratory patterns. Again, age is an important

organizational structure and a generational top-down approach is manifested in many aspects. The Pokot community is governed by a series of age-sets. Group membership is determined through the age at which one undergoes initiation. For young men this is done at around the age of twelve and at the onset of menarche (Wanjala, 1997).

According to Thomson (1884), after an encounter with the Pokot wrote that the Pokot were strong-boned fellows who went absolutely naked. He described them as very uncontrollable and generally quite a match for the Maasai or Samburu, in whose country they frequently made raids for livestock. Conflict in the Pokot community has been mainly attributed to the cultural concept of “we” and “they”. The Pokot people have no word or term for a visitor. Anybody who is not a *Pochon*- one of them is described as an enemy. This is used to differentiate an insider “we” Pokots and the non-Pokots “they”. Due to this perception, therefore, all the cows belong to “us” insiders and not to “them” outsiders. This is also embedded in their myth of creation story which has it that God created the first Pokot man and gave him the cattle. They usually use this kind of explanation to justify cattle rustling. They don’t regard cattle rustling as an act of stealing since they believe that they are bringing them back to where they belong.

For the Pokot, raiding livestock from enemies has been an integral aspect of their culture and they claim the practice has existed from time immemorial. For as far as can be traced back in the national archives, the Pokot and surrounding neighbors, most notably the Samburu and Turkana, have been raiding each other on a regular basis, at least since the end of the 19th century. The Pokot therefore generally refer to themselves as an isolated group that is surrounded by enemies (Bollig, 2006). Historically, this led to the ideological belief that in order for them to survive, they have to conceal their identity through adopting cultural characteristics of their neighbors.

### **2.3. The Samburu**

The Samburu are a Nilotic-speaking people originating in Sudan but most closely resembling the Maasai in terms of subsistence and cultural traditions to an extent that 98% of their language is shared between the two groups (Sommer & Vossen, 1993). They are nomadic pastoralists living in presently Samburu County and they rely most heavily on milk production from cattle and small stock (sheep and goats). Paul Spencer’s *The Samburu* (1965) and *Nomads in Alliance* (1973) are regarded as vital works in providing the most comprehensive account of Samburu organization, traditions and practices despite the majority of Spencer’s fieldwork being conducted under colonial administration. Much has changed for the Samburu from the colonial period until now in terms of environmental conditions, political influences, development initiatives, and livelihood pursuits. However, Spencer’s work continues to stand as the major authority in describing Samburu age set systems, genealogies, and kinship relationships.

Up to now, most Samburu remain pure pastoralists. However, there are agro-pastoralist areas found around the Maralal highlands where there are higher levels of precipitation. Samburu herds tend to have high numbers of small stock but the cow remains the most precious inclusion in the herd. However, due to an overall reduction in grass-cover and other grazing fodder, along with the cow’s high dependence on water, the number of cows in the herd have decreased substantially over the last generation.


Male Samburu youths remain children until the age of circumcision (between 14 and 15 years old). After this rite of passage, taken with other youth members of the same clan, the initiated age-set is collectively responsible of protecting their ethnic group’s livestock and personal safety. For this reason, all *Morans* carry weapons (knives, spears, or Arrows). High labor demands are placed on the Morans as they are required to herd animals far from home territory areas when the environmental conditions require substantial migrations in search of pasture and water. However, during rainy periods, the Morans are able to return to their home areas where they will be at leisure. Moran spend this free time singing and dancing in the evenings with young ladies from their area where the subject matter of these songs range from the re-telling of battles to where Morans have travelled during the

dry season to acts of bravery or praise for animals. The Moran age-set period ends when the new *Moran* age-set is ready to take its place, and the current Morans begin to marry when they reach approximately 26 to 30 years old.

### 3. Genesis of the Nilotic Pastoralist Conflicts

Between the Samburu and the Pokot, the conflict is bedeviled with territorial, livestock, murder, attempted murder and kidnapping claims and counter claims. According to Pokots the conflict between them is traced from Uasin Gishu when Samburu and East Pokot bulls fought resulting into a Samburu bull breaking the front leg of the Pokot's bull. This incidence infuriated the Pokot bull owner who demanded compensation from the Samburu. Consequently he was given a heifer. This incident marked the historical origin of the conflict between the two communities.

Between the Pokot and the Turkana, much of the existing literature is recent and biased that their relationship has always been conflictual. Lamphear (1992) speculates the Pokot and the Turkana were allies as they frequently combined to raid the Samburu to push them further south of Lake Turkana and must have come together to push the Samburu again from the Kerio Valley (Lamphear, 1992). The expulsion of the Samburu from Kerio Valley allowed the Pokot to descend from the hills to the valley they presently occupy. Lamphear further indicates that there was active trade between the two communities. In particular, the Turkana Keebotok (considered a poor clan) played a middlemen role between them. By 1900, there was considerable cultural exchange, linguistic and economic affinities. Many Pokot and Turkana became bilingual, a fact which misinformed colonial observers who mistook Suk for Turkana language (Barton, 1957). Johnson (1904) indicates that there was increased intermarriage between the Pokot and Turkana to the extent that the two communities could almost be described as one people. In the process, the Pokot adopted the *sapana* from the Karimojong a song and baboon dance from the Turkana. Colonial administrators' interests rudely punctured this beneficial exchange between the Pokot and Turkana since the British were determined to bring the Turkana under their control (Johnson, 1904). They used the Pokot to stop the Turkana's southward expansion. The settler community deprived the Pokot of grazing land, hence forced them to move nearer to the Turkana, leading to more frequent conflicts over limited resources.



Map 1: Traditional Raiding patterns between the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu Communities

### 3.1. Traditional Cattle Raiding

Cattle's raiding is a very old cultural practice that has been in existence for generations among Nilotic pastoralist of Northern Kenya. The practice has been defined as forceful attack by an 'outside group' whose main objective is stealing cattle rather than seeking territorial expansion. The 'theft' is culturally accepted and is carried out by groups of young male Morans who engage in the practice as part of the societal requirement for achieving manhood as well as in response to symbolic and economic motives. Raiding also occurs in retaliation to prior attacks in order to (re)acquire stolen stock or simply to intimidate enemy groups (Mulugeta & Hagmann, 2008). Customarily, raiding was done under very strict traditional control and raided cattle were to serve three key motives. Firstly, the raiding had a social and economic purpose of creating a better economic base and enhancing one's social status in the society. Secondly, it served the motive of territorial control of grazing areas which subsequently led to an entrenched position of the stronger group. Lastly, it had a motive of increasing one's herd as insurance against unexpected misfortunes such as drought, famine, and cattle epidemics.

Traditionally, raiding among pastoral societies had three main objectives. It had a social and economic base. An individual without livestock could not actively participate in the socio-political affairs of the society. Secondly, there was competition for grazing land and water. Due to scarcity or dwindling of resources as a result of overpopulation or adverse climatic changes, some groups are forced to move their livestock to territories that belong to other ethnic groups or clans and this led to conflicts. Thirdly, there are survival strategies. Loss of cattle could lead to raids which was one of the options of replenishing depleted herds. Similarly, raids could be undertaken as means of increasing one's stock as an insurance against unforeseen calamities. In other words, cattle wars constituted a communal response to natural calamities (Ocan, 1992).

Traditional raids had very limited economic gains in comparison with the more certain and peaceful mathematics of natural growth. Formal raiding acknowledged the emergence of a new age-set. The raids were shaped by numerous sets of taboos and restrictions. The raids were planned openly and the raided animals were usually distributed among the members of the clan or age-set. Historically, cattle raiding involved the entire society. It would begin with a consultation of seers, elders, renowned Morans and women to establish whether or not it was possible for a raid to be carried out. There was communal responsibility and reverence for the different roles played by different groups in the manyattas and kraals for the wellbeing of the society. For instance, before a raid, seers would be consulted for information on issues of rituals, timing, and routes to be followed. The Elders would perform all the required rituals (Almagor, 1979). The women also played a very important role of blessing the Morans and preparing the special meat that they took with them. Spies and guides would also be raised from the manyattas and kraals and the entire community would offer their support thus having a direct influence on the planning and implementation of all cattle raids.

Likewise, the returns would be shared by all members of the community as raided animals were amalgamated into the joint herds and everyone benefited from the proceeds. The Morans were particularly supposed to reciprocate by killing a bull for the elders as some form of pay back (taxes) to the elders for blessing the raid. The bulls were killed for the elders to feast on. Younger people say that sometimes the elders could withhold their blessings at the onset of a raid but readily share in the spoils of the raid once it was successful.

The raids were also integral to the cultural requirements for boys to demonstrate courage as they pass through the rites of passage to be declared men. Elders talk about the kind of special body tattoos that a Moran who kills several people in battle with enemies is decorated with and as such is considered as a great warrior. The more tattoo marks a warrior obtains, the more popular and respected he becomes in the community prompting more girls to will try to dance with him and want to marry that warrior. On the other hand, the men who grow to maturity without such body tattoos are ridiculed in the community prompting them to go on raiding expeditions so as to kill the enemy and earn respect, and prove that they are not useless men in the society. Girls and women normally sing war songs to praise successful Morans and ridicule those who have not raided a single cow or goat. Girls only choose to dance with brave Morans during the evening beer party or at the traditional festive dancing parties; the undecorated men are shunned and verbally abused as cowards.

Therefore, unique to this period, survival was the primary motive for cattle raiding, closely followed by factors such as maintaining group solidarity or accumulating prestige. Other socio-political reasons such as providing an opportunity for young men to prove their manhood were more of motivational factors. Redistributive raiding served to rebuild herds of cattle depleted by drought, diseases, and raids or serve the needs of marriage and rituals (Mkutu, 2008). Cattle raiding assumed a redistributive function as a traditionally recognized way of reallocating pastoral resources between rich and poor herders which has and have been an equally common feature of both intra- and inter-tribal relations (Dyson-Hudson, 1966; Lamphear, 1976). Through the diverse forms of engagements, cattle raiding served to rebuild herds after livestock have been devastated by drought or decimated by disease or seized in raids, and both the frequency and intensity of these happenings was often closely tied to climatic conditions and the prevailing state of the 'tribal peace'.

Key to raiding of this period was the concept of reciprocity. Historically, pastoral communities in Northern Kenya operated on communal grazing lands rather peacefully. Because grazing lands could only be used for several months of the year, arrangements on land sharing were made between communities. Reciprocal institutional arrangements were borne in which some communities allowed grazing on their lands during certain periods in return for grazing rights in neighboring regions (Ngaido, 2005). Reciprocity emerged as the key mechanism which enabled collective action among the pastoralist of Northern Kenya. However, with the onset of colonial land policies and the encroachment on pastoral grazing lands by administrative policies, reciprocity was interrupted. There could no longer be an internal guarantee of reciprocity.

Under the circumstances discussed above, raiding was traditionally managed within the context of the pastoralists' notion of a cattle being a communal property. The raiding operations by young Morans were sanctioned by elders and evolved according to strict rules governing preparation, engagement, disengagement and conflict resolution (Hendrickson, et al., 1998). Cattle's raiding was not perceived as stealing; instead, it was a social, economic as well as a heroic endeavor. This cultural practice was very important and was loaded with livelihood-enhancing functions. A warrior enhanced his status in society by acquiring wealth. The wealth in cattle which earned him a wife and reverence and above all, changed his social status. That is why pastoralists in Northern Kenya would never admit any fault as far as raiding is concerned (Knighton, 2005). The use of excessive violence especially against the elderly, women and children was taboo and socially intolerable. Raiding was more of a cultural prerequisite for the advancement of social, political and economic matters.

Rather than spark violence, traditional raiding contributed to the stability of the pastoral system as a whole. In the absence of any over-arching authority in pastoral society, raiding and other forms of warfare served to maintain separate identities and rule-governed relations between different groups as well as acting as a balance (Hendrickson, et al., 1998). From the above assertion it can be concluded that traditional raiding occurred within an acceptable social framework which was able to accommodate its excesses.

After independence, pastoralist communities in Kenya saw increasingly violent conflict with one another. Many scholars pinpoint the cause of these recurring conflicts to the fact that colonial administrators were pushing these ethnic communities out of their historical homelands to make room for farmland (Murunga & Nasong'o, 2007; Kanyinga, 2009). Consequently, these communities now found themselves fighting over new territories where they were often at odds with the previous inhabitants. Notably, the Turkana and Pokot communities adapted to these colonial policies by adopting 'transhumance forms of pastoralism' in which they generally abandoned a nomadic lifestyle for themselves but maintained nomadic herding of cattle (KHRC, 2010). This adaptation shifted the battlegrounds from the communities themselves to the grasslands on which the cattle were grazed; the rustling of livestock thus increased.

### ***3.2. Discipline and the Age-set system***

Whereas cattle raiding involved considerable use of force, the organization of the age-sets that nurtured warrior groups functioned like contemporary military formations that train disciplined military personnel. Military discipline here refers to a special form of principles that govern relations in the age - set system. Usually the conduct of the members of the forces is regulated by special rules delineating required standards of behavior as stipulated in the regulations and orders of commanders (superiors) and reflecting the specific features of the state (Spencer, 1973).

Inclusion in age-set is not necessarily a question of chronological age. Younger men could sometimes be initiated ahead of older ones because of greater physical maturity or for some other approved reasons. Sometimes members of the same age-set were never initiated together in the same year. The ceremonies are held for small groups, in their own neighborhood at an appropriate time and when the required sacrificial beasts can be offered. When an age-set is initiated, it may not adopt a name already in use by a superior generation set while any member of that set is still living. This is out of respect for those still living or it might be out of fear that some hurt or harm (violence) might follow, that is, out of superstition (Pazzaglia, 1982).

Therefore, the society through elders has proper means of controlling cattle raiding and limiting any excesses young men who would be tempted to engage in raiding. The elders do this in two ways; First is the religious way – which involves the elders taking control over the significant rituals linked to raiding itself and those that attend to the age-class system that defined the young men's rites of passage. Since the spiritual wellbeing of the society rests in their age old wisdom and links to the supernatural, they can make threats of a curse which is greatly most feared. Secondly, given the fact that cattle are collectively owned by families, the management of wealth falls directly on the authority of the elders who control the flow of wealth in the

community and their sons desire to get married (Lamphear, 1998; Knighton, 2005). The age-set organization provides the groups with the principles for political or military behavior. They are able to take corporate action by sanctioning a specific class to wield authority and exert obedience in public matters (Dyson-Hudson, 1966). Traditionally, control of the behavior of Morans was exercised within the age-set system. The Morans have a king in every age – set for disciplinary control and maintaining law and order as stipulated in the cultural values. And the society was able to control these young men whom they organized to move together through social roles as well as arming them to defend the society and its resources. In addition, it inculcated in them “the ‘queue discipline’ which encouraged young men to wait their turn, entailing group solidarity, communal brotherhood, and obedient deference until such time as they enter a new role where individual acquisitiveness and differentiation are the norm (Lamphear, 1998). Pastoral societies were always confronted with the problem of safeguarding internal peace and harmony which included persistently fighting enemies and raiders from other groups. For this reason a disciplined standing force was always required. Hence a sense of group consciousness and an almost constant condition of physical and emotional readiness to fight in defense of the society was imparted in the Morans. Additionally, they were armed, high discipline was necessary to keep them in check lest they go on the rampage and spread disorder in the society (Lamphear, 1998).

### **3.3 Moranism**

Moranism remains one of the most enduring aspects and tradition of pastoralists in Northern Kenya. Moranism is the social tradition among pastoral communities that involves the admission of young men into warrior-hood. The title of Moran has been conceived by some scholars as a metaphor for heroism due to the military and aesthetic exploits Morans are famed for. Traditionally, moranism was primarily meant to promote comradeship, self-esteem, courage, strength, perseverance, self-sacrifice and adventurism in young men (Almagor, 1979). While examining the role of Morans, Ndagala (1991) noted that Morans, among others, serve as the military wing of the community by keeping vigil against cattle raiders and wild animals preying on their cattle. They were socially-wired to believe that their foremost duty was to defend the community and their livestock. The defense and military like responsibility bestowed on the Morans demanded of them to exercise utmost perseverance, courage, glamour and freedom (Ndagala, 1991). These Morans were urged to kill fierce animals and even in extreme cases in some communities a human being as a sign of their bravery and courage. Such courageous and heroic acts would be marked by bodily tattoos carefully crafted on the body of the warrior for every killing committed. Through the socialization that elevates courage, bravery and heroism, Moranism became the most adored institution by the young boys to an extent that each of them looks up to the time they will become Morans.

Mburu (2002) asserts that the art of tattooing, which portrays one as a raiding maestro, exacerbates the unrelenting desire to kill those branded as enemies. Tattooing is an element of the quest of heroism and “pet-naming”. Pet names are associated with having big bulls and killing enemies. Special warrior names distinguish one from the rest of the men in the society. Constant reference and praise of heroes in meetings and cultural festivals encourages others to engage in raiding and in other acts of lawlessness as a way of emulating or surpassing the prowess of heroes. In Turkana county, raiding has traditionally been part of the ritual process by which young men proved they were ready for manhood (Mkutu, 2007). In addition, ‘the status of a warrior is determined once a man has killed his first enemy – an event he will mark by notching a scar on his right shoulder or chest (Masinde, et al., 2004). Among many pastoralist communities and especially the Turkana and Pokot people, youths are generally entrusted with implementation of the decisions of the elders and the security of the community. Extensively encouraged by a composition of anecdotes and proverbs, music, dance and drama, the youth execute this task at whatever cost.

Inevitably, this provokes counter revenge from the opponent party. Among the pastoralists, men are considered to be the breadwinners for their families. In times of scarcity, men must replenish food supplies through any means, which is not limited to raiding. Raiding is in fact considered by the society as the first option. Livestock rustling is believed to be the most direct way to wealth accumulation because livestock occupies such a central

place among pastoralists. Social status being determined by the number of livestock in one's possession. Those without cattle are rebuked as poor and enticed to raid other communities to overcome their condition. Rites of passage/ initiation ceremonies elevates a youth to an elder of a special age set are an entitlement to all men but they are only possible for those who have cattle. The need to go through this rite encourages those without cattle to go raiding to get cattle to undergo it. Without that ceremony, one becomes a laughing stock in the community. Every successful raid is accompanied by a traditional ceremony of "*Lokwa*" (Bull killed by the youth for the elders as a thanks giving for further blessings and for success in upcoming raids).

The significance attached to traditional institutions meant the community ensured that Morans were properly and adequately guided on their current and future roles. Consequently, the role of elders was very important. Social order hinged on the respect the Morans had for the elders. Buttressing such respect was Samburu community's belief in the curse of elders. Morans feared that disobedience would spell curse on them which served as deterrence to any wayward behavior (Baxter, 1993).

#### **4. Pastoral Communities Conflict Coping Mechanisms**

In Semi-Arid areas, pastoralists have to have a number of coping mechanisms. First, a high degree of mobility and open utilization of communal grazing land is of a vital importance. Herds can be moved away from unproductive to more productive lands (Bollig & Göbel, 1997). Movement for this purpose can be generally characterized as residing in wet season areas that lack permanent water supplies when rainfall allows the exploitation of these areas followed by an increased rate and range of movement during the dry season/at times of resource scarcity in search of perennial water sources and available grazing (Angassa & Beyene, 2003). Mobility not only allows for the use of productive tracts of land and water but it also enables previously-inhabited land to rest and recover after utilization which is an essential component of successful rangelands management (Oba & Lusigi, 1987; Cossins & Upton, 1988). With correct management, mobile pastoralism has been proven to be more economically profitable and productive than classical ranching models within paddocked and sedentarised areas (Behnke, 1994). Dyson-Hudson (1980) noted that, as a strategy, mobile herding is a favorable coping response to resource scarcity as it does not require a large capital investment nor high inputs of fuel energy neither does it entail the transference of foods suitable for human consumption into supporting livestock.

A second coping mechanism employed by pastoralists is accumulating herd stocks by effectively creating an insurance policy against drought extremes which often results to large herds of cattle dying. Coughenour et al., (1985) explain that accumulation allows for the keeping of large numbers of breeding females necessary for food requirements as it simultaneously allows for breeding herds to remain intact during scarcity periods so that when conditions once again become favorable. Herders are more able to rebuild herds close to pre-crisis numbers (Coughenour, et al., 1985). Accumulation for pastoralists in East Africa is vital; a place where livestock off-take due to the effects of drought can diminish herds by estimates of more than half (McCabe, 1985) and such devastation has the possibility of affecting herd numbers, particularly of breeding females, for up to ten years (Dahl & Hjort, 1976).

A third coping mechanism is building strong social networks through interethnic marriage. Far-reaching social networks allow alliances to be called upon in times of individual hardship (Almagor, 1979; Sobania, 1988). The result of these reciprocal relationships allows for affected parties to 'borrow' livestock from others in order to replenish breeding stocks after disturbances or to readily move animals into more productive pastures during times of environmental distress. Dyson-Hudson (1966) has estimated that maintaining social networks effectively opens up four or five times the amount of space within a pastoral territory than one herder would have access to if he were managing his herd in isolation (Dyson-Hudson, 1966).

Elders and conflict management institutions are another coping mechanism. Given a motivation to limit conflict, traditionally the ability of the elder age-set to act as an effective conflict management institution relied on three main sources of authority: control of access to resources/marriage; being part of a large cross-clan, cross-ethnic,

cross-generation network; and, supernatural legitimacy (Gulliver, 1955; Spencer, 1973). One customary means that they used to prevent or manage prevented or managed conflict was the neutralization of raiding rewards. In Turkana, raided cattle could only be given to a related elder as a gift or sold to buy weapons, and were not allowed to be used to build up a raider's own herd. Further, the raiders were prohibited from marrying abducted girls. The bride-wealth was smaller for a fostered daughter and not likely to be available to the raider in time to affect his chances to start an independent life. The prestige gained from raiding could not be converted into strengthened individual status or into an improved group position in the age system (Almagor, 1979).

#### ***4.1. Masculinity and the Associated Stereotypes***

It should be taken into account that pastoralism remains the foremost source of livelihood to most inhabitants of Northern Kenya. It should further be noted that all aspects of pastoral social and economic life are ordered in relation to livestock and the environment in which they live. To this extent, cattle does not only hold central value among most communities in Northern Kenya but also forms the basis of association in a complex of social, political and religious institutions. Possession of adequate livestock therefore remains one of the most aspirations of the inhabitants of the region. While inheritance and purchase are the only non-conflictual ways of owning livestock in the village, these avenues while appreciated, do not ensure ownership of adequate livestock. Further, they do afford the Morans the opportunity to express their masculinity. Cattle raiding are thus preferred not only as a means of acquiring adequate livestock but also an opportunity for the Morans to express their masculine-bravery, courage and related revered virtues.

Traditions, cultural songs and dances carried from one generation to another highlight the existence and significance of cattle raiding in Samburu community with other pastoral communities being no exception. Although the practice of cattle raiding has evolved over the years, it was understood in the traditional sense. The practice was considered to be a deeply entrenched cultural practice where young men would steal livestock as a means of re-stocking or acquiring more heads of cattle for various purposes which included raising enough animals for the payment of dowry or as a show of heroism and/or a means to wealth enhancement. In cases of theft, injury or death, there may be significant cultural pressure for youth to engage in revenge attacks. Failure by the Morans to avenge these deaths or injuries was interpreted as an act of cowardice and such men would even be shunned by potential girlfriends or wives. At the extreme end, they would be cursed and ostracized by the elders. Morans in their effort not to be seen as traitors would often engage in revenge attacks. It is adherence to such cultural norms and desire to express their masculinity that is primarily responsible for not only the escalation of conflicts but also cycles of violent conflict in northern Kenya.

Beading was yet another cultural practice in Samburu community that Morans used to express their masculinity. Beading involves Samburu Morans giving specialized beads to an uncircumcised young girl to signify the commencement of a sexual relationship with the girl. Some of these girls could be as young as 14 years. Morans would often approach the girl's mother and brothers who in most cases are also Morans. Once the relationship is agreed, the girl's mother builds a hut for the couple called a '*singira*' where the Moran will have access to the girl for sex. Most of these negotiations are done often at the total exclusion of the girl. Elders for example argue that beading reduces conflict between them and Morans because it provides Morans with sexual partners and prevents them from seducing the elders' wives. Similarly, Morans observe that the practice reduces conflict amongst themselves since it prevents intra-conflicts emanating from seducing the same potential sexual partners.

Although beading was ostensibly done to reduce conflicts between the Morans and the elders and between Morans themselves, closer examination of this practice reveals otherwise. The practice has in away emboldened the Morans to run roughshod on the girls. Morans have increasingly become violent towards girls if the accounts of girls that have undergone through the practice is anything to go by. There are numerous accounts of relatively elderly women who had been beaded as a young girl (*Surmelei*), describing the fact that the Moran beat them up whenever they went against what he wanted done. Several women described the fact that because of beating by the Moran who had beaded them they ran away and ultimately their families returned the beads rather than return

the girl to an abusive relationship. Equally, women described the fact that if Samburu girls refuse to be beaded, they will sometime be beaten by their mothers and brothers who have made the arrangement. Girls have also often described the practice as “torture” because they are forced to have sex while still young and because of the physical beatings they receive from the Morans (Spencer, 1973).

Beads that are used for these practices are very expensive and costs a lot of money that at times are beyond the reach of individual Moran. Such individuals have to be assisted to acquire sufficient beads to be used for beading. Where such assistance are lacking some Morans have to engage in cattle raids from neighboring communities to get cattle which they in turn, sell in order to raise money for the beads. Beading in this case increases conflicts between the community and its neighbors through organized cattle raids. From the forgoing, it is thus clear that beading has not resulted in reducing conflicts not even with the community as previously thought but has instead precipitated the gender-based and inter-community conflicts.

The institution of marriage was yet another important avenue that Morans have used to express their masculinity. Samburu Community is traditionally polygamous. This was thought to be a long standing and practical adaptation to high infant and warrior mortality rates. Most of the pastoral communities including the Samburu are yet to embrace modern demographic practices and trends and as such still perceive children as a source of wealth and insurance against old age. Consequently, many still consider polygamy as an important practice that guarantees them not only wives but also many children. Men with large families in the name of wives and children are highly valued hence the pressure to marry many wives.

While polygamy as a form of marriage and cultural practice is socially valued and approved among the pastoral communities including the Turkana and Pokot, the practice increases the potential for conflict. Men who wish to have several wives must engage multiple cattle raids so as to raise several heads of livestock not only as a bride price for their wives but also for their male children’s wives. The social prestige associated with polygamy may pressurize Morans to engage in unnecessary cattle raiding. Traditionally, all raids should first be approved by the elders but faced with this desire, young men often decide in secret and took action quickly without informing the elders of their intentions (Gulliver, 1951). Such raids may turn out to be large scale attacks typical of escalated conflict and all-out war that ordinarily require a degree of organization and mobilization that was only within the power of elders.

Polygamy as a cultural practice also increases the demand for land for settlement and grazing. The large family set up arising from polygamy requires huge tracks of land for settlement as well as for grazing the large herd acquired through cattle raiding and natural growth. Additionally, water is also needed by such families for their livestock. The fact that polygamy is preferred by most Morans implies that many of them will require large tracks of land and huge grazing fields for their livestock. This may lead to competition for land for settlement as well as pasture resulting in both intra and inter-community conflicts as each polygamous family tries to acquire as much land as possible for their settlement and grazing. Although access and utilization of land was regulated by the elders, Morans are increasing defying elders on this role and have thus engaged in self-acquisition of land, a move that has not only strained the relationship between them and the elders but also between them and other members of the community.

The desire to become a successful warrior has also contributed to the escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya. The social recognition individuals receive for conflict participation can be enormous. Successful Morans may receive honorific chest scars denoting the kills made, be entitled to a new name indicating their success in war, wear special insignia, have songs sung about them, and gain the respect of their peers. Similarly, females and elders may also encourage aggression during raids by teasing or mocking individuals to participate in conflict especially if there has been unavenged raid against their group. The prestige and symbolic capital for successful raiders is still a powerful motive particularly amongst Morans who have no chance of social advancement through formal education. It should be noted here that the taboo-regulated traditional nature of cattle raids shunned the killing of members of the rival communities. Morans driven by desire for social recognition

normally disregard the rules of reciprocal raiding which prompt many to indulge in looting great numbers of livestock, deliberate killings and cruelty among other related prohibited raiding practices. While it is clear that Morans at times engage in violent behaviors that are not sanctioned by the community, the teachings that Morans get is the community's most respected in the institution of elders, which seeks to instill bravery and courage largely served to instill aggression and violence in the minds of the young men. This has made most Morans to prefer aggression and violence as the most convenient means of resolving disputes even if other peaceful means would have generated amicable solution to the problem in existence.

While such indulgence will aid the Morans in massaging their heroic ego, the danger is the emotions and desire for revenge that such indulgence generates from the raided community. This definitely leads to an escalation in both frequency and intensity whose likely outcomes are more loss of human lives, more animals being looted as well as the development of deeply rooted mistrust and hate between the warring parties. Further, such escalation causes disruption to the pastoral routine, because the young men stop tending the cattle in order to go to war, and because cattle are forced to graze in restricted areas due to the danger of hostilities (Almagor, 1979). Almagor points out 'that once a raid gets started there is no guarantee that the excited raiders will not commit excesses which may attract a large-scale retaliation' (1979). Ultimately, escalation is prompted by one group's perception that the raiding practices of the other group have become "excessive". Such increased raiding may result in a campaign which involves organized recruitment and strategic decision-making process. Inter-tribal co-operation ceases and daily social life and economic routines are disrupted hence a creation of an intermittent cycle of conflicts.

#### ***4.2. Pastoral Economy***

Control of pastoral economy has been cited as a contributor to conflict escalation in Northern Kenya. It should be taken into account that pastoralism is the main source of livelihood in Northern Kenya thus making it the backbone of the region's economy. For a long time, pastoral economy used to be a monopoly of the elders. Elders own the livestock, control resources and dispose of marriages. The young are poor by definition to the point that should a young man inherit a herd and family responsibilities, he would become an "elder" regardless of his age (Baxter, 1979). Elders use different tactics to retain their foothold on the pastoral economy. For instance, they control cattle raiding, regulate access and use of pastoral resources such as grazing lands and watering points, as well as overseeing the distribution of livestock acquired through raids. While most of these interventions were important in preserving unity and cohesion in the community, some Morans increasingly perceived these as roadblocks placed on their way and are designed to confine them to perpetual poverty. For instance, it has been noted that while Morans are the ones who engage in the raids, a higher percentage almost 90% of the proceeds go to the elders, leaving hundreds of Morans with a paltry 10% to share amongst themselves (Baxter, 1979). The small herds of livestock left with hundreds of Morans to share imply that some of the Morans actually miss out despite risking their lives during the raids. Based on these perceptions of systematic exploitation, some Morans choose to ignore elders' role especially those relating to cattle raids and thus sought to engage in unsanctioned raids. In this light, raids may be seen as a form of competition for control over pastoral resources between the Morans and the elders.

An escalation of conflict through cattle raids causes economic disruption which damages the elders' position and prestige in society. When Morans raid other communities for livestock and the raided livestock are probably those belonging to the elderly in the other communities. In the event of counter-raids, there is a high likelihood that the elders of the raiding community will equally lose their livestock to the raiders. By virtue of their age and position Morans are likely to fiercely defend their newly acquired livestock thus leaving those belonging to the elders as the easy target. While there is strong evidence on this, Morans may capitalize on their rivalry with the elders and fail to offer protection to the elders' livestock thus exposing them to the raiders. Consequently, it weakens the elders economically as well as socially to the point of robbing them the prestige attached to the eldership. These political and economic transformations of the eldership disaggregate the attributes of the status of "elder". Political authority and economic control may thus become new forms of elder characterization. The

implication of this is that the social role of elder is not any more a prerogative of age. For instance, young people who are wealthy and have political authority may be regarded in the Samburu Community as elders.

Persistent and unrestrained intermittent conflict escalation occasioned by wealth and status inspired raids by Morans also has the potential of constraining elders' roles in peace making. The traditional peacemaking role of the elders was understood as the affirmation of the elders' interests as custodians of the inter-community co-existence. Elders are better placed to preside over peacemaking mechanism during in conflicts that they have full knowledge of and especially those that are occasioned by activities that they have sanctioned. However, it would be extremely difficult for elders to initiate peace between the Samburu and the neighboring communities over issues they are least informed about such as unsanctioned cattle raids. But failure by the elders to intervene could also be interpreted as their inability to exercise their institutional role of conflict management in the community while their intervention may also be seen as aiding wayward behavior among the Morans whose activities are largely for personal aggrandizement rather than collective interest. It is such half-hearted interventions on conflict situations that have contributed to strained relations between communities leading to revenge and counter-revenge missions.

The Morans' broader goal of challenging the inequality perpetrated by the elders who control a disproportionate share of community's resources and the elders' resolve to actively defend their advantages is what has led to the intermittent escalation of conflicts in the region. Morans' realization that their loyalty to the elders is not guided by any reasonable shared values but by the coercive powers of the elders' has inevitably led them to question the authority of the elders. Morans have used a variety of methods to defy elders' authority including engaging in unsanctioned raids, disobeying elders' authority over grazing areas and watering points and challenging the myth of elders' curse as a social control mechanism. Groups and individuals advance their own interests, struggling over control of societal resources. The result of this power struggle between Morans and elders has heightened the escalation of both inter-community and intra-community conflicts in Northern Kenya region.

#### ***4.3. Conflict Entrepreneurship***

Some of the conflict situations in Northern Kenya are motivated by greed and lust for power and prestige rather than grievance. Community Morans or Morans are at times not necessarily heroes struggling for any collective or worthwhile cause rather they sometimes fight for their own selfish ends. Some of these young men pretend that they are public-spirited individuals fighting against some form of injustice, unfairness, marginalization or exclusion but in the real sense, they are simply people who feel that they will not do well without a conflict. They therefore generate one grievance or another conjured by massaging one form of prejudice, propaganda or blackmail. Such promoters and profiteers of conflict are often referred to as conflict entrepreneurs. The study defines conflict entrepreneur as an individual who profits from conditions that promote conflict to undermine efforts of good governance. This narrative partly captures the situation in Northern Kenya and other parts of the country.

Some of the conflict situations in Northern Kenya are increasingly being organized around wage-labour. For instance, an increase in 'commercial' raiding includes cases of 'sponsored' raiding where guns are provided to young men by wealthy people who wish to acquire livestock for sale. These markets are unconstrained by national frontiers and are largely controlled by people in positions of political power or with access to weapons (Hendrickson et al. 1998). The existence of conflict entrepreneurs has been exemplified by the emergence of conflicts in non-traditional areas. Traditionally, most of the conflicts in Northern Kenya revolved around pastoralism; cattle raiding, conflicts over grazing land and watering points. Recent years has, however, seen the emergence of conflicts between Morans and wildlife agencies. Morans have especially been accused of engaging in poaching, an area that was traditionally unheard of among pastoral communities. In Kenya, for example about 60 rhinos were killed for their horns in 2013, compared to 30 in 2012 (KWS, 2014). Some of the poaching activities have been reported in wildlife conservancies located in Kenya's Northern counties notably Laikipia, Samburu and even Turkana. Further, Morans have also engaged in banditry and high robbery some of which

have resulted to large scale inter-community conflicts. For instance, incidences of banditry, which ideally are caused by a few opportunistic Moran criminals easily transform into a full blown inter-ethnic conflicts. When such wayward Morans are being pursued by members of a different ethnic group or government security agencies for their criminal activities, they often seek refuge in their communities thereby transforming an individual's problem into a communal concern which usually leads to strained relations between the concerned parties.

Similar incidences have also been reported among the Turkana Morans. The most noticeable incident of opportunistic warrior raids occurred in Kainuk, when three armed Turkana Morans ambushed a truck driver resulting in the death of the driver and his assistant (Bevan, 2008). The bandits made way with valuables including cash. There were further evidence that Morans from the Turkana community often engaged in banditry directly or had their firearms hired for raiding and other criminal activities. Morans from Northern Kenya have also in the past been enrolled as fighters in conflicts across the border where they received military training and weapons that they usually keep if they survive and return. Meanwhile, deserters and ex-combatants drift into Kenya from the areas of fighting in neighboring countries, swelling the ranks of bandits or making a living as mercenaries or cheap fighters in commercial raids. Schlee (1989) reports that during the Ogaden war, it was common that young men pretended to want to join the guerrillas but once armed and trained in Somalia, returned to Kenya and gave themselves to banditry. According to Goldsmith (1997), Somali internal conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s had a direct effect on the rate of banditry in northern Kenya, including Tana River and Lamu.

A more robust conflict entrepreneurship, and which Morans and their equivalents in other northern Kenya communities is the arms and ammunitions trade. For instance, while a brand new AK-47; much coveted for its firepower and simplicity-, can be purchased from a Russian factory at 240 US Dollars. In certain parts of Africa including northern Kenya where supplies are plentiful, it can be bought for as little as between 13 and 30 USD (Controlarms, 2006: SAS 2009). There are also instances where arms sellers often supply weapons on credit, a practice that is seen as a form of investment and equated to the old practice of richer people "investing" a camel (for a young man with no camel to ride) in Saharan raids and caravans and taking part of the profit from the operation as payment (Goldsmith, 1997).

The deployment of Morans as Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) by the government to help it maintain law and order in Northern Kenya has also seen the institution of Moranism contribute to conflict escalation in the region. While the original intention to arm the Turkana and Samburu community against their hostile neighbors was very noble, the conversion of some Morans into KPRs appeared to have not been a wise move. It should be noted here that Morans are well trained persons who were already feared even when they were using traditional weapons to defend the community. Therefore, arming this already strong group meant that they became lethal and vicious in their attacks. Morans did not only use the arms issued to them for purposes of defending the community against external aggression but also employed the guns to purposes of expanding their territory beyond its traditional borders. For instance, with help of well-armed Morans, the Samburu community has annexed a constituency in Marsabit called Laisamis with an MP, a division in Isiolo County with two county representatives and a constituency in Laikipia County with an MP. Morans and junior elders have stationed themselves in newly acquired territories so as to ensure that the areas remain under the custody of the Samburu community. Although there has never been any violent conflict reported following these annexations, silent protests and disapprovals of these activities of the Morans loom large. The ongoing government crackdown of the illegal grazers in Laikipia an initiative aimed to curb a potential annexation attempt by the Pokot and Samburu Morans.

The institution of Moranism is being seen here to have opened new frontiers of conflict with their neighbors. Traditionally, conflicts between Samburu community and its neighbors centered on pastoralism especially cattle raiding, competition for pastoral resources such as water, pasture and livestock migration corridors. Politics as a resource is emerging as a new frontier for potential conflicts in Northern Kenya as Morans and their equivalents

in other communities will surely play pivotal role in these conflicts. The next face of these conflicts are likely to move away from control over political units such as constituencies and wards to demand for equitable sharing of political offices such as county executive positions at the county level and national government resources that go to their counties. Communities with well trained and equipped Morans may use such social capital to force their agenda and load on others who do not possess such a social set up. Counties such as Marsabit, Wajir and Laikipia have had many incidences of conflicts arising from competition for the county's political resources-appointments, allocation of resources among others. These conflicts have taken the dimension of inter-clan conflicts. The trail of human lives lost, property destroyed and human displacements left behind in the wake of these conflicts clearly show a well-organized and structured conflicts. Such organizations witnessed in these conflicts cannot be executed by persons without prior training. It is such organizations of these conflicts that fuel the suspicion that clan Morans have been used in these conflicts.

From the foregoing, it is clear that conflict in Northern Kenya is being seen by some Morans more as an opportunity to profit from and will thus do whatever it takes to sustain the conflicts in their determination to continue profiteering from the same. From the provision of their military labour, engaging in poaching to arms trade, some Morans have discovered the opportunity of wage labour that conflicts offer them. As they profit from these conflicts, the rest of the population have remained helplessness due to the diminishing opportunities in non-conflict areas. The emergence of local elites notably Morans that aim to profit from conflicts is a fairly new phenomenon that has changed the scope of the conflict by creating economic incentives that did not previously exist. This has exacerbated the brutality of conflict especially those associated with raiding and has created links between the illicit trades in stolen cattle and small arms.

## **5. The Advent of Colonialism and Post-Independence**

Between 1885 and 1963, Kenya was under the 'protection' of the British administration. Morgan (1973) argues that for easier management, the British administration divided Kenya into three distinct regions: a highly developed White Highlands; a less developed nature lands which was a pool of cheap labor; and the frontier/pastoral zones that were out of bounds. The British were mainly interested in the 'White Highlands' (Morgan, 1973). According to Morgan (1973), the prime interest of the British in the 'white Highlands' was derived from a desire for transformation and intensification of crop production for export. The pastoral areas in Kenya were then seen by the British administration as areas where they could not develop reliable sources of strategic raw materials with which to supply their home industries. This was compounded by the distance of pastoral territories from the administrative center of the colonial powers. The pastoral areas were closed off and one needed a permit to travel there. Barber (1968) pointed out that the colonial government priority in pastoral areas was order rather than development. Left on their own, pastoralists suffered from negligence and lack of attention. They witnessed very little interaction with the other communities in Kenya, and development within their areas was only focused on preserving security and the culture of the community (Republic of Kenya, 1992).

Hendrickson, et al. (1998) argued that the isolation of the pastoralist people was generally because of the colonial government's mistrust of their lifestyle. The colonial government had a notion that pastoralists were politically unreliable and difficult to control, and therefore a threat to security. Furthermore, they were perceived as primitive, violent, and hostile towards change, and they lacked loyalty because of cross-border movements (Hendrickson, Armon, and Mearns, 1998). (Markasis (1993)) argues that the use of negative terms by the colonialists such as "uncontrollable" and "violent" was a way of creating an enemy image and using it as an ideological justification for counter aggression.

During this era, pastoralist in Northern Kenya suffered heavy losses in human life and destruction of property, and there was a complete disruption of their economy leaving many households impoverished (Lamphear, 1976; Barber, 1968). Lamphear (1992) describes the experiences as traumatic and devastating. Many were fired at from sight, and, on more than one occasion, they referred to themselves as wild animals hunted through the bush by the colonial government. Lamphear (1976) maintained that the imperial wars and punitive expeditions also

destroyed the existing institutional relationships amongst these groups, making the basis for inter-ethnic relations insecure. He further asserted that social security system of reciprocal assistance was completely disrupted. Due to such disruptions, the end of 1918, pastoralist in northern Kenya had lost nearly all their cattle, and as late as 1963, many had still not been able to rebuild their herds to former size (Barber, 1968; and Lamphear, 1976).

Further reports during the same period expressed the fear that the district was faced with the challenges of rapidly increasing human population and declining livestock numbers. Diseases and raids by the colonial troops were blamed for the depletion of the herds (Lamphear, 1976). Livestock diseases such as rinderpest and pleuropneumonia, which were unknown in the past, became a permanent scourge to the animal population during this period. By the mid-1920s, officers on the spot voiced concern that large captures had led to cases of human-induced starvation and hoped that the colonial policy towards pastoralists in the region would be reversed to avert a future economic crisis (Oba, 1992).

The colonial policy in relation to land use is of particular interest to the study, as the issue constitutes the major underlying causes for changes in livelihood strategies among pastoralist during the colonial era. Prior to the colonial rule, the laid tenure system was communal and that meant that no land boundaries separated the areas where the various communities lived or grazed their livestock herds. The Turkana had access to grazing lands of the Pokot, the Pokot to the Samburu land and vice versa (Lamphear, 1992). The situation drastically changed when the British colonial rule was enforced in the area. The British ratified borders, and embarked on policies which had profound ramifications for pastoralism. One policy prohibited pastoralists from crossing international borders. They created a no-man's land along the international frontiers. The idea was to make important pasture and water resources, which they depended upon during drought years, legally inaccessible (Oba, 1992). Lamphear (1976) reports that violators of these restrictions were punished by an instant fine of 20% of the total number of livestock found trespassing.

Fixed borders are alien to the pastoral mode of land use. The borders hinder free movement of pastoralists and livestock, and access to grazing land and water sources which are important during drought seasons (Spencer, 1983). Furthermore, the establishment of borders prohibited their movements between high and low seasons (Oba, 1992). Traditionally, pastoralists-maintained concessions over grazing and water rights, expecting reciprocal access when conditions were reversed. This important fact, though well-known, was ignored by the British administration (Turkana Development Annual Report, 1938).

These artificial boundaries imposed by the British to control human and capital livestock movements caused serious ecological problems in the region. Following the droughts of the 1930s and '40s, environmental degradation became a contentious issue in the whole of Northern Kenya. In efforts to rehabilitate the degraded range lands, the colonial government established controlled grazing schemes culminating in the first ten years development plan 1946- 1955 (Dietz, 1987).

According to Ocan (1992), colonialism made political relations in the area worse because as access to land shrunk and animal numbers and populations in restricted areas increased against available resources, acute competition for water and pasture between settlements became inevitable. Restricting movements meant that when animals of one group died, the only way to replenish stocks – the most natural and socially available to such levels of socio-economic and political formations – was cattle raiding. Ocan seems to concur with the fact that even before colonialism relations between neighboring pastoralists were already bad and therefore one cannot place the blame on colonialism for the cattle rustling conflict. However, colonialism made the situation worse (Ocan, 1992).

At independence in 1963, the Kenyan government realized the chronic conflict nature in pastoral areas of the north. A holistic development plan and strategies were therefore formulated for the areas recognizing the potential of livestock products for export and consumption (Republic of Kenya Annex Report, 1992). These measures saw some greater attention being focused on pastoral districts. However, these measures were still

limited. Policies to encourage pastoral production were only to be directed towards sedentary livestock production, a system not suited to climate and ecological conditions in pastoral areas (Brown, 1963; Dames, 1964). The measures also meant changing the pastoralists themselves, rather than the circumstances that surround their existence.

Characteristic to this post-independence period, conflict in Northern Kenya still had some resemblance of the traditional cultural conflict. Among the Samburu, guns available were the old Mark IV rifles, which were operated by Home guards, most of whom were for older men. Samburu Morans still preferred the more fashionable twin spears (*Mao*) in battles. The Turkana, on the other hand, had already started acquiring newer guns and other arms from the Sudanese SPLM, (Masinde, Adan, and Pkalya, 2004). Despite this, there was relative calmness in the North. The Samburu would graze as far west as Suguta valley as well as go for water at Lokalaale, a Turkana village. However, in 1962 Turkana from Lodwar attacked Samburu and made away with 400 cows. A large number of goats were stolen about and government then sold Turkana animals irrationally and compensated the Samburu later on; disarmament of the Turkana community was initiated by the Government albeit few guns were retrieved.

In 1970, the Turkana from Lodwar and Baragoi attacked Samburus once again and stole 800 cows. No was action taken by the government. Conflict abated from 1970 to 1990s because both communities were up against a foreign intervention called Shiftas, the Somali bandits. The first armed raid in Baragoi happened on 28<sup>th</sup> May 1994, when heavily armed raiders from Pokot Community came and raided villages occupied by both the Turkana and the Samburu and animals of unknown number were stolen, and still no action was taken by the government. In 1996 hundreds of men from the neighboring Turkana community conducted a morning raid on the Rendille and Samburu livestock which were grazing on Soito yo Lkokoyo, Lamirok, Suyian to Ltepes, 20,000 cattle were taken and dozens killed in the same year; besides, the Government District Commissioner (Mr. Nyandoro) together with 46 other people were killed by the Turkana raiders (Masinde, Adan, and Pkalya, 2004). The government of the day sent Kenya army which did little in terms of conflict resolution. Samburu bought guns and armed themselves from Ethiopia and Somalia, to defend themselves.

Towards the 1970s, the Turkana in collaboration with some elements in government and the security organs employed sophisticated raiding methods using heavy guns, military trucks for transport and large scale networks of smuggling extending up to Sudan (Markasis, 1993). After 1979, the Pokot adopted similar military tactics. Consequently, from a means of obtaining a few animals and improving one's fighting prowess, raiding evolved into military operations using conventional war tactics.

After 1979 the process of undermining pastoralism in Kenya gained momentum because of a combination of factors. First, cattle diseases wiped out most of the livestock. Secondly, a two-year drought caused harvest failure and famine. Thirdly, an upsurge in cattle raids and military attacks by heavily armed Turkana, collectively termed Ngorokos (bandits), took place. These bandits had sophisticated weapons which they had acquired from ex-president Idi Amin's fleeing soldiers in Uganda. In 1984 to 1986 the Kenyan government sent a punitive military operation to Pokot district purportedly to seize illegal firearms. During the operation, thousands of Pokot livestock were confiscated by the government while others died due to drought or lack of proper attention while in the hands of the security forces. The Pokot have never forgiven the government for this callous act against them and their livestock.

#### **4.4. Changing Role of Elders**

According to Duffield (1997), the elders' authority has been undermined by the introduction of a market economy and the increasing polarization of rich and poor which resulted in labor migration. The youth have found new sources of influence and wealth including the flourishing armed militias of young men and the new income available through banditry (Duffield, 1997). Odhiambo (1996) asserts that traditional authority is being eroded by the progressive replacement of council of elders and tribunals with government-appointed agencies

and functionaries. Meanwhile, urbanization and increasingly frequent migrations to town by young people especially men, expose them to other cultures and make them question traditional values (Odhiambo, 1996).

Another way in which elders may have lost their authority is through increasing distrust from the communities particularly from the warrior age sets. This may have various causes. One may be the association with an increasingly distrusted administration. The elders may increase their influence and prestige by providing an interface between their communities and local government. When the public sector is reduced, so is role of the elders. In a study of pastoral institutions in Somaliland, Hashi (1996) points out that traditional leaders, having been absorbed by urban political machinery, are rapidly losing the trust of the herders. The same happens when the association with administrative power is used for personal advantage through land speculation or bribery (Galaty, 1994).

Although relations between elders and their neighbors were dominated by common suspicion. Elders could not negotiate with neighbors since their neighbors' situation was equally precarious but more so, previous negotiations and terms of rescue had been abused by the Pokot elders so they could not take advantage of this option. Lack of reciprocal grazing rights with Turkana was occasional while the level of mistrust and suspicion between them was deep-rooted. The frequent Pokot incursions and livestock raids into Tugen, Turkana and Samburu territory diminished or extinguished the possibility of such a negotiation.

The progressive personalization of interests (through the introduction of a market economy and the creation of opportunities for individual entrepreneurship) has not been matched by the personalization of responsibility. The actions of the individuals even when aimed at personal interest, are likely to be treated as the responsibility of the whole community. The Pokot-Samburu clashes in 2006, for example, are commonly said to have started after a young Pokot man known to be involved in the illegal guns trade was killed by one of his clients, a Samburu during a fight over payment. Although the circumstances and the reasons for the incident could hardly have been less traditional, the episode was followed by a chain of mutual retaliations by young men of the two groups consequently, the situation rapidly escalated and were directed by and large against people who have nothing to do with the previous incidents. Within less than two months more than 20 people had been killed and several hundred families had been displaced, while those responsible for the first two or three incidents, although well known, had not been arrested (Wanjala, 1997).

#### ***4.5. From Raiders to Rustlers: The Escalation of Conflict in Northern Kenya***

As the preceding section has shown, traditional conflict among pastoralists in Northern Kenya had more in common with raiding than with the large scale, pitched battles of European history (Fukui and Markakis, 1994). However, at present, there is emerging an increasing tendency towards the Europeanization of war amongst the pastoralists of Northern Kenya. This has narrowed the distinction between raiding and rustling. As discussed earlier, traditional conflict was determined by socially accredited values and beliefs. However, this new form of conflict is one where the actor is an individual or small group acting with limited or without societal approval. As defined in the introduction, escalation of pastoral conflict refers to the increase in scale, intensity and frequency of pastoral conflicts. This includes the emergence of indiscriminate killings especially of women and children, groups which traditionally it was a taboo to kill. This section highlights the nature of conflict escalation in Northern Kenya. This is accomplished by the use of specific cases that illustrate increase in scale, intensity of frequency of conflict in Northern Kenya.

### **6. Changing role of Morans, from Raiders to cattle Rustlers**

After 1992, violence in Northern Kenya reached a new climax. Violent clashes took place not only between the pastoralists but also between the pastoralists and the agriculturalist and even with the Kenyan army. In addition to the normal cattle raiding, other forms of violence emerged. The Pokot attacked a school in Marakwet and left 50 pupils dead. In 1995, the Turkana invaded Pokot under the leadership of Lopurkoyan, a young warrior leader. Under Lopurkoyan, the Turkana were not organized as morans as they were in the company of women and

children moving with them. Also in their company were livestock and other household supplies, a complete new picture in the art of raiding in the region. In 1996, an alliance of the Samburu and the Pokot attacked a Turkana community near Baragoi (*Lokorkor attack*). Many Turkanas irrespective of age and sex were killed. In May, 1996, at least 13 people were killed on the spot in a raid by more than 200 heavily armed Pokot bandits, on a manyatta at Kapedo, Turkana. What is interesting to note is that no animals were stolen. It was purely a killing spree. Two months later in August 1996, fifteen people were killed in Samburu when they were attacked by Pokot cattle-rustlers. Among the victims were two children. Raiders, who were numbering over 400, escaped with 5000 head of cattle. Police eventually recovered only 1000 three days after attack.

In 1996, Samburu and Pokot bandits massacred people in which claimed the lives of over 50 Turkanas, most of them women and children (Umar, 1997). The Bandits made away with 15,000 heads of cattle. When security officers tried to follow and recover the stolen animals, the District Commissioner (DC) was dismembered and burnt by the bandits when his helicopter was shot down in Suguta Valley. Other security officers were engaged in a “Rambo-style” in pursuit of the bandits. However, the animals were never recovered. In a statement later released by political leaders from the region, the motive of such concerted and sustained attacks was not the supposed hunger for animals, but the need to terrorize and inflict fear among rivals, and by so doing, push them away from points of conflict – pasture and water.

In April 10, 1997, seven people were killed and four others injured by Pokot in a raid on Manyattas in Turkana District. The raiders made away with 400 animals from Kainuk and Laya in Katilu and Turkwel divisions. The following month in May, armed bandits said to be Turkanas killed four children and seriously injured three adults in an attack on a Samburu manyatta in Baragoi Division, Samburu. More than 50 bandits from Turkana also stole 500 cattle belonging to a local politician, late Peter Lekisaat. The attack came barely hours after a security team led by the Samburu District Commissioner Paul Yatich left Baragoi after camping there for two days following rumours of an impending attack in the same month of May, two armed bandits and an elderly man are killed during a raid in Samburu. Local police boss Kaua Mbijjiwe said 200 head of cattle were stolen. In June of the same year, eleven people perished in fierce fight between Turkana and Samburu communities in Baragoi Division, Samburu County. The battle was sparked by Samburu herdsmen pursuing stolen cattle who confronted by Turkana people in Nachola Location. These raids, in the same year, reflect an increase in frequency of cattle raids.

In September, 1997, at least 31 people were killed when armed raiders believed to be Pokot attacked a Turkana manyatta in the Lorengipi and Lokiriama areas of Turkana County. Nine of the dead are said to be raiders. Police sources say the raiders drove animals towards Alale Division, West Pokot. But as Turkana herdsmen from Lorengipi rushed to assist and reinforce their kinsmen, the attackers raided the manyatta left behind, which had nobody to guard. In the raid, the attackers killed five women, eight children and seriously injured eight women and two elderly men. The children are reportedly aged between one-and-half to three years. This indiscriminate killing point to negative side of conflict escalation in the region. At least seven of the raiders were also killed, two of them in uniforms used by Kenya police reservists.

In March, 1998, at least 100 people were killed and others wounded when armed Pokot cattle rustlers attacked manyattas in Turkana District. Interestingly, it seemed as though animals were not a target in this raid but only killing of the Turkana people. None of the bandits were captured despite a large security deployment in the region. In April the same year, a series of coordinated small raids led to deployment of armed security personnel to the border of Turkana and West Pokot districts. Despite this, a raid occurred, where 7,000 animals were stolen. A few weeks later, in the same month of April, 1998, 6 civilians died in crossfire when bandits invaded a police camp in West Pokot and stole firearms.

In May, 1998, the Government announced that the Army was to be deployed in trouble spots throughout Kenya with orders to disarm anyone holding illegal weapons. Troops were to work alongside police to end violence in areas hit by cattle rustling and ethnic clashes. Moi made the announcement at the Armed Forces Training

College, Eldoret, where he was the guest of honour during a passing-out parade of more than 2,000 new soldiers. According to the announcement, the police, directed by Commissioner Duncan Wachira, and the military was to be joined by other regular security units. He claimed that many illegal guns had been smuggled into Kenya because of insecurity in neighboring countries. At the same time the President cautioned politicians against inflammable language, saying it incited communities against one another. He said when leaders speak in such a tone it is the citizens who suffer while the same leaders are tucked safely away. Opposition politicians and the clergy roundly accused the Government of either laxity in its response or of condoning the violence. Cabinet Minister Francis Lotodo was cited as being involved in the raids. A parliamentary motion of censure against him, moved by Kimilili MP Mukhisa Kituyi, was defeated. Critics claimed Government response to the raids as erratic, uncoordinated and at best ineffective.

In the year 1999, the Pokot attacked the Turkana killing 60 Turkanas and stealing 8,000 cattle. The Pokots were made up of over 1,000 men armed with AK47 assault rifles. It is notable here that this attack was highly organized with a working chain of command. Similarly in March 1999, another violent attack occurred where 1,000 Pokot gunmen attacked a Turkana village killing 30 people and made away with 2,000 herds of cattle. The sheer numbers involved in terms of raiders and cattle stolen and the fact that 1,000 young men could be recruited to participate in violence also points out to the increase in the scale of cattle raiding.

In 2005, Pokot bandits attacked a Kainuk village in Turkana stealing 600 goats and sheep. This was an alleged revenge attack following an earlier Turkana killing of one Pokot herder and stealing of 47 herds of cattle in Turkwel. In the Kainuk attack, three Turkana businessmen and a Kenya Police Reserve Officer were killed after an ambush on their truck by Pokot bandits who fired at them even after establishing their identities. In 2006, Samburu Morans attacked Pokot patients in Maralal hospital, castrating patients and killing others. This attack is a classic case of conflict escalation as no animals were targeted. No animals are available in hospital. In addition, the victims were harmless patients who would not be able to defend themselves against the well-armed Morans.

## Conclusion

The intermittent conflict situation in Northern Kenya today has undergone massive transformation. Turkana, Samburu and Pokot societies respond negatively to one another's actions—violence begets violence. Cattle were indeed raided throughout their history. However, these raids were more of a form of wealth redistribution through cattle. There were customary rules in which cattle raids were limited to times of need, were small in number, and generally characterized by little violence. This marks the genesis of protracted social conflict in Northern Kenya. However, as rules began to be increasingly violated during the 20th century, these raids escalated in intensity. Victims responded with raids of increased intensity, and the conflict spiral was born.

A number of factors account for the conflict transformation. First, colonial policy which aimed at pacifying pastoralists and to ensure peace and order, this tendency had several implications. It tended to present the pastoralist as an unreliable people prone to violence and, hence, to encourage abandonment of the activity. This was an elite outsider's view of pastoralism as a primordial mode of production which should be discouraged. However, it is shown that the colonial period was marked by the increasing occurrence of conflicts as pastoralist rebelled against the British and tried to maintain their mode of livelihood.

The period witnessed the drawing of political boundaries and creation of block grazing schemes. Borders were fixed, and access to key resources was curtailed with little regard to seasonal variation and the needs of the people for pasture. These measures greatly affected the transhumant patterns already mastered by the pastoralists from their long experience with ecological hardships. The border restriction also destroyed the lubricating social rubric traditionally obtained through trade and intermarriages between pastoralist neighbors. All this resulted in increased conflict between pastoralists of the North.

Currently, each group perceives the other's actions as increasingly hostile and as aimed at cultural and social targets rather than commercial livestock targets alone. What is essentially a financial conflict erupts into full-scale ethnic war. The contention between the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot communities goes beyond a simple conflict. According to PSC theory, any refraining from an escalated response is generally perceived as weakness, and groups fear that failing to respond will invite further encroachment and aggression.

Transformation of cattle raiding to cattle-rustling and its transformation from a traditional practice to the current criminal activity of livestock theft can be traced back to the 1970s. In the early 1970s, the pastoralists were faced with acute and prolonged famine and were at the mercy of donor-assisted development programmes. In keeping in line with a "fend-for-yourselfes" approach which was anchored on government policies of developing the "high potential areas first", the government made no particular effort to alleviate the suffering of the pastoralist communities occasioned by the said famine. On the contrary, the government policies during the seventies, the eighties, the nineties as well as those ushering in the second millennium have focused on agriculture and cultivation, thereby persistently relegating and side-lining the development concerns of the pastoralists to the periphery. Naturally speaking, such endemic marginalization has led to the upsurge of livestock theft among the pastoralists, manifested through intense inter-clan and inter-tribal armed conflict, as a means of survival.

## References

- Almagor, U. (1979). Raiders and Elders: a confrontation of generations among the Dessanetch. In K. Fukui, and D. Turton (Eds.), *Warfare among East African Herders* (pp. 119-143). Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
- Angassa, A., and Beyene, F. (2003). Current range condition in southern Ethiopia in relation to traditional management strategies: The perceptions of Borana pastoralists. *Tropical Grasslands* , 53-59.
- Barber, J. (1968). *Imperial Frontier: A Study of Relations between the British and the Pastoral Tribes of North East Uganda*. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
- Barton, J. (1957). *Turkana Grammatical Notes and Vocabulary*. Unpublished.
- Baxter, P. T. (1993). The 'New' East African Pastoralism: An Overview. In J. Markakis (Ed.), *Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa* (pp. 143-162). London: MacMillan Press.
- Baxter, P., and Hogg, R. (Eds.). (1990). *Property, Poverty and People: Changing Rights in Property and Problems of Pastoral Development*. Manchester: University of Manchester.
- Behnke, R. (1994). Natural resource management in pastoral Africa. *Development Policy Review* , 5-27.
- Behnke, R., and Scoones, I. (1993). *Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models of Natural Variability and Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Bevan, J. (2008). *Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda's Most Deprived Region*. Geneva: Occasional Paper 21.
- Bollig, M. (2006). *Risk management in a hazardous environment: A comparative study of two pastoral societies*. New York: Springer.
- Bollig, M., and Göbel, B. (1997). Risk, Uncertainty and Pastoralism: An Introduction. *Nomadic Peoples* , 5-21.
- Bollig, M., and Österle, M. (2007). We Turned our Enemies into Baboons: Warfare, Ritual and Pastoral Identity Among the Pokot of Northern Kenya. In A. Rao, M. Bollig, and M. Böck (Eds.), *The practice of warfare: Production, reproduction and communion of armed violence* (pp. 23-51). New York: Berghahn.
- Brown, L. (1963). *The Development of Semi-Arid Areas of Kenya*. Nairobi: Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Water Resources.
- Cossins, N. J., and Upton, M. (1988). The Impact of Climate Variation on the Borana Pastoral System. *Agric. Systems* , 117-135.
- Coughenour, M., Ellis, B., Swift, M., Coppock, D., Galvin, K., McCabe, J., et al. (1985). Energy extraction and use in a nomadic pastoral ecosystem. *Science* , 619-625.
- CRA, (2011). *Improvement on the acceptance of a conflict resolution system by air traffic controllers*. In Proceedings of the Sixth USA/Europe Air Traffic Management R&D Seminar (ATM-2005). Baltimore, Maryland.
- Dahl, G., and Hjort, A. (1976). *Having herds: Pastoral herd growth and household economy*. Stockholm, Sweden: University of Stockholm.
- Dames, T. (1964). *Reconnaissance of the Agricultural Potential of the Turkana District*. Rome: FAO.

- Dietz, A. J. (1987). The State, the Market and the Decline of Pastoralism; Challenging Some Myths, with Evidence from West Pokot. In M. J (Ed.), *Conflict and Decline in Africa*. Oxford: Macmillan Press.
- Duffield, M. (1997). Ethnic War and International Humanitarian Intervention: A Broad Perspective. In D. Turton (Ed.), *War and Ethnicity. Global Connections and Local Violence*. Woodbridge: University of Rochester Press.
- Duffield, M. (1997). In E. W. Perspective, and D. Turton (Ed.), *War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
- Dyson-Hudson, N. (1966). *Karimojong politics*. Clarendon: Oxford University Press.
- East African Meteorological Department, (2009). *Climatological statistics for East Africa, Part 1: Kenya*. East African Community/East African Meteorological Department, Nairobi, 92 pp.
- Fukui, K., and Markakis, J. (Eds.). (1994). *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*. London: James Currey.
- Goldsmith, P. (1997). Cattle, Khat, and Guns: Trade, Conflict, and Security on northern Kenya's Highland-Lowland Interface. A Case Study. *USAID Conference on Conflict Resolution in the Great Horn of Africa*.
- Greiner, C., Bollig, M., and McCabe, T. (2011). Notes on Land-based Conflicts in Kenya's Arid Areas. *Africa Spectrum*, 77-81.
- Gulliver, P. (1951). *A Preliminary Survey of the Turkana*. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- Gulliver, P. H. (1955). *The Family Herds : A Study of Two Pastoral Tribes in East Africa, the Jie and Turkana*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.
- Hashi, A. (1996). *A Survey of Pastoral Institutions in Somaliland*. Penicuik: VETAID.
- Hendrickson, D., Armon, J., and Mearns, R. (1998). The Changing Nature of Conflict and Famine Vulnerability: The Case of Livestock Raiding in Turkana, Kenya. *Disasters*, 22 (3), 185-199.
- Hendrickson, D., Mearns, R., and Armon, J. (1996). Livestock Raiding among the Pastoral Turkana of Kenya. Redistribution, Predation and the Links to Famine. *IDS Bulletin*, 27(3), 17-30.
- Johnson, H. (1904). *The Uganda Protectorate*. London.
- KHRC. (2010). *Morans no more – The changing face of cattle-rustling in Kenya*. NAirobi: KHRC.
- Knighton, B. (2003). The state as raider among the Karamojong: Where there are no guns, they use the threat of guns. *Africa*, 73 (3), 427-455.
- Knighton, B. (2005). *The Vitality of the Karamojong Religion: Dying Tradition or Living Faith?* Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
- Lamphear, J. (1976). *The Traditional History of the Jie*. Oxford: Clarendon .
- Lamphear, J. (1992). *The Scattering Time*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lamphear, J. (1998). Brothers in arms: Military aspects of East African age-class systems in historical perspective. In E. Kurimoto, and S. Simonse (Eds.), *Conflict, age, and power in North East Africa* (pp. 79–97). Oxford: James Currey.
- Markasis, J. (1993). *Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa*. London: Macmillan.
- Masinde, I., Adan, M., and Pkalya, R. (2004). Indigenous democracy: Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms: Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and Marakwet. In B. Rabar, and M. Karimi (Eds.). Nairobi: Intermediate Technology Development Group-Eastern Africa.
- Mathew, S., and Boyd, R. (2014). The cost of cowardice: Punitive sentiments towards free riders in Turkana raids. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 35 (1), 58–64.
- Matthew, R., Brown, O., & Jensen, D. (2009). *From conflict to peace building: The role of natural resources and the environment*. UNEP.
- Mburu, N. (1999). Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa: Causes, History, and Political Implications. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 8(2), 89–107.
- McCabe, T. (2004). *Cattle Bring Us to Our Enemies: Turkana ecology, politics, and raiding in a disequilibrium system*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Mkutu, K. (2003). *Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya- Uganda Border Region*. Saferworld.
- Mkutu, K. (2006). Small Arms and Light Weapons Among Pastoral Groups in the Kenya-Uganda Border Area. *African Affairs*, 47–70.
- Mkutu, K. (2007). Impact of Small Arms Insecurity on the Public Health of Pastoralists in the Kenya-Uganda Border Regions. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 33-56.
- Morgan, W. T. (1973). *Geographies for Advanced Study*. London: Longman Group Limited .
- Mulugeta, A., and Hagmann, T. (2008). Governing violence in the pastoralist space: Karrayu and state notions of cattle raiding in the Ethiopian Awash Valley. *Afrika Focus*, 71-87.
- Murunga, G. R., and Nasong'o, S. W. (2007). *Kenya: The struggle for democracy*. New York: Zed Books Ltd.
- Ndagala, D. K. (1991). The Unmaking of the Dagota: decreasing resources and increasing conflict in rural Tanzania. *Nomadic Peoples*, 71-82.
- Ngaido, T. (2005). *Can pastoral institutions perform without access options? Collective action and property rights for sustainable rangeland management*. CAPRI (Collective Action and Property Rights).

- Oba, G. (1992). Ecological Factors in Land Use Conflicts, Land Administration and Food Insecurity in Turkana, Kenya. *Pastoral Development Network Papers*, 25(3), 146-160.
- Oba, G., and Lusigi, W. J. (1987). *An Overview of Drought Strategies and Land Use in African Pastoral Systems*. Pastoral Development Network.
- Ocan, C. (1992). *Pastoral crisis in North-Eastern Uganda: The changing significance of cattle raids*. Kampala: Centre for Basic Research.
- Odhiambo, M. (1996). Addressing Natural Resource Conflicts Through Community Forestry: the Case of Eastern Africa. *E-conference on Addressing natural resource conflicts through community forestry*. Rome: FAO.
- Odhiambo, T. R. (1996). *Hope Born out of Despair: Managing the African Crisis*. Nairobi: Heinemann.
- Pazzaglia, A. (1982). *The Karimojong: some aspects*. Bologna: Meseum Combonianum.
- Roberts, D., & Bainbridge D. (1963). Nilotic physique, *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, 3 (1), p. 341-370.
- Schlee G. (1989). *Identities on the Move: clanship and pastoralism in northern Kenya*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Sobania, N. (1988). In P. M. Kenya, D. Johnson, and D. Anderson (Eds.), *The Ecology of Survival: Case Studies from Northeastern African History* (pp. 219-39). London: Crook Greene.
- Sommer, G., and Vossen, R. (1993). Dialects, Sectiolects, or Simply Lects? The Maa Language in Time Perspective. In T. Spear, and R. Waller (Eds.), *Being Maasai - Ethnicity and Identity in East Africa* (pp. 25-37). London: James Currey.
- Spencer, I. (1983). In 1.-1. Pastoralism and Colonial Policy in Kenya, and R. Rotberg (Ed.), *Imperialism, Colonialism and Hunger: East and Central Africa*. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Spencer, P. (1973). *Nomads in Alliance*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Umar, A. (1997, March 27-29). Resource Utilisation, Conflict and Insecurity in Pastoral Areas of Kenya. *Methodist Guest House*. Nairobi: USAID Organised Seminar on Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa.
- UNESCO (1983). Learning needs and problems in Education, UNESCO Nairobi.
- Wanjala, T. (1997). *Report on Pokot-Marakwet Conflicts*. Nairobi: Peace Net - NGO Council.



# Assessment of Relationship Between Subjective Norms and Entrepreneurship Intention Among Students in Federal Polytechnic in Northern Nigeria

S. I. Attahiru<sup>1</sup>, M. A. Olaoye<sup>2</sup>, B. Isyaku<sup>3</sup>, M. Abubakar<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1,2,3,4</sup> Kaduna Polytechnic, Kaduna State. Nigeria

## Abstract

Entrepreneurship leads to massive economic benefits, such as economic growth, reduction in unemployment, and development of economies. This study was guided by a hypothesis. The study adopted causal-comparative (Ex-Post-factor) design. The population of the study was made up of all the students in federal polytechnics in Northern Nigeria. Simple random sampling method named Dip-hand sampling method was used to select the sampled states for the study while proportional sampling method was used in selecting respondents from each school in the selected federal polytechnics, while the sample size was 1,135. The instrument for the study was researcher's developed Likert-type questionnaire named influence of entrepreneur courses in the development of students' career opportunities in Universities Nigeria. Split-half reliability was used to test the reliability of the instrument with reliability index of 0.79. PPMC was used to test hypothesis six at 0.05 alpha level of significance. It was concluded that students in Federal Polytechnic in Northern Nigeria good subjective norms towards entrepreneurship intention. It was recommended that Government should provide loans to encourage small and medium scale enterprises.

**Keywords:** Subjective Norms, Entrepreneurship Intention, Federal Polytechnic, Students

## Introduction

Entrepreneurship emerged as an important concept in global economic transformation. Studies have shown that the entrepreneurship process is a vital source of developing human capital as well as plays a vital role in providing learning opportunities for individuals to improve their skills, attitudes, and abilities (Shane 2003). Various scholars have given different definitions to entrepreneurs. Nieman and Nieuwehuizen (2009) defined an entrepreneur as one who sees an opportunity in the market, creates, gathers resources and grows a business venture to meet needs.

The entrepreneur is an innovator, one who carries a combination of the following: the introduction of a new product; the opening of a new market; the conquest of new sources of materials; and the organization of new industry. Morrison's (1999) study, the profile of an entrepreneur is one who: (1) is intelligent and analytical, (2)

is an effective risk manager and a networker, (3) possesses a strong set of moral, social and business ethics, (4) exhibits a basic trader's instinct, and (5) is dedicated to life-long learning in many forms. The talents included in Morrison's definition are important requirements for becoming successful entrepreneurs in the knowledge era. Furthermore, Anayakoha (2006) described an entrepreneur as one who chooses or assumes risks, identifies a business opportunity, gathers resources, initiates actions and establishes an organization or enterprise to meet such demand or market opportunity.

Watson, Hogarth-Scott and Wilson's (1998) and Morrison's (1999) studies also contend that entrepreneurial spirit needs appropriate social and cultural background to initiate motives for venture creation and aspiration for excellence in various academic areas in order to create successful venture. Lee and Peterson (2000) state that even those individuals who are motivated by such factors as financial rewards, achievement, social, career, and individual fulfillment need a national culture that supports and encourages entrepreneurial activity. Watson et al. (1998), Morrison (1999), and Lee and Peterson (2000) agree that great entrepreneurs do not grow by themselves, but that they are products of entrepreneurship-oriented societies and cultures.

### **Hypotheses**

There is no relationship between subjective norms and entrepreneurship intention among students in Federal Polytechnic in Northern Nigeria.

### **Methodology**

In this study, the researcher adopted causal comparative (Ex-Post-factor) design, since the study was an existing identified phenomenon. According to Kerlinger (2000), the Ex-Post-Factor design is a design in which the investigation of the variable is done retrospectively whether they have occurred in natural cause of event. Because no variables are manipulated, an independent variable is the one in which the cause and effect are wanted. Ofo (1994), also supported that the causal-comparative or Ex-Post-Facto research attempts to determine the cause-and-effect relationships by examining conditions and tracing back the information and available data for probable causal factors. She furthered that Causal-comparative studies start with an identified effect and proceeds to find possible causes.

The population of this study is made up of all the students in federal polytechnics in Northern Nigeria. A simple random sampling method named Dip-hand sampling method by Adegboye (2001) was used to select the sampled states for the study while the proportional sampling method was used in selecting respondents from each school in the selected federal polytechnics. The procedure was used as follow:-

- i. The Northern Nigeria is made up of 19 states that are divided into 3 geo-political zones, namely:- North Central (6 states), North East (6 states) and North West (7 states). Three students were assigned to select sampled states. Each student represented each zone and the name of each state was written on pieces of paper, put in a container for the student assigned to the zone to pick. Students who represented North Central and North East picked two times each, that is, Federal Polytechnic, Damaturu and Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi for North East and Federal Polytechnic, Bida and Federal Polytechnic, kaffi, for North Central while student assigned to North West picked three times. Two states were selected from North Central and two states from North East while three states were selected from North West because of additional different of one state. that is, Federal Polytechnic, Kaura Namuda; Federal Polytechnic, Kauzare; and Kaduna Polytechnic, Kaduna. The picked states were used as sample Federal Polytechnic and a total of seven Federal Polytechnic were used.
- ii. Proportional sampling method was used in selecting respondents from the seven states and respondents were selected from the four faculties. This summed of 1,135 questionnaires will be distributed to the seven sampled federal universities.
- iii. Systematic sampling procedure will be used to assign questionnaires to respondents.

The instrument for the study was the researcher's developed Likert-type questionnaire named the influence of entrepreneur courses in the development of students' career opportunities in Universities Nigeria. This was divided into two (2) sections. Section "A" demanded data on the demographic characteristic of the respondents while section "B" requested information on the influence of entrepreneur courses in the development of students' career opportunities in polytechnics Nigeria. Responses to the statements are Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Undecided (U), Disagree (D) and Strongly Disagree (SD).

The responses for items in section B were rated as follows:

<b>Degree of response</b>		<b>Points</b>
Strongly Agree	(SA)	5
Agree	(A)	4
Undecided	(U)	3
Disagree	(D)	2
Strongly Disagree	(SD)	1

The instrument was validated by researcher's supervisors, experts entrepreneurship and business and also specialists in test and measurement to ensure face and content validity of the instrument. Corrections, suggestions and observations were incorporated in the final draft of the questionnaire, and subsequently approved by the supervisors before it was administered. To ascertain the reliability of the research instrument, the validated questionnaire will be subjected to pilot study using sixty (60) students of polytechnics which are not part of the study, these participants were not part of the study and twenty-four statements formulated from the variables were tested. The split-half method was used to examine the reliability of the instrument. Ofo (1994) stated that the split-half reliability is a type of internal consistency reliability. In its case only one test is administered and it eliminates measurement errors such as differences in testing conditions which could easily affect the test-retest reliability. The reliability coefficient was 0.79, which make the instrument reliable for the study.

To conduct the administration of the research instrument, an introductory letter will be collected from The Coordinator, Research, Innovation and Technology Transfer Office, Kaduna Polytechnic, Kaduna. The Researcher also requested the permission of the sampled federal polytechnics before questionnaires will be administered to the respondents. The researcher will go round the sampled states to administer the instrument with the help of five (5) trained research assistants in each Polytechnic, who interpreted the questions to the respondents in simple language that do not influence their responses. Person's Product Moment Correlation (PPMC) was used to test hypothesis six at 0.05 alpha level of significance.

## Result

### Hypothesis 2

There is no relationship between subjective norms and entrepreneurship intention

Table 4.3 Sub-Hypothesis 3: Summary of the person product moment correlation on the relationship between subjective norms and entrepreneurship intention

<b>Variable</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>Sd</b>	<b>Df</b>	<b>r</b>	<b>p</b>
<b>entrepreneurship intention</b>	1,135	12.44	1.71	1,133	.93	0.001
<b>subjective norms</b>	1,135	12.83	1.46			

**r=.93;df=1,133(P<0.05)**

The table presents that mean ( $\bar{x}$ ) score of entrepreneurship intention is 12.44, while that of the subjective norms is 12.83, the standard deviation (SD) for entrepreneurship intention is 1.71 and the subjective norms is 1.46, the statistical computation shows that a very strong relationship exists with  $df = 156$   $r = .93$  ( $P < 0.05$ ). The null hypothesis stated was rejected on the account that a significant relationship exists. There is a relationship between subjective norms and entrepreneurship intention.

## Discussion

Relationship exists between subjective norms and entrepreneurship intention. This is also in line with the study of Christina, (2017), Based on hypothesis she tested using t test values obtained the result showed that subjective norm, control individual behavior and education has significant impact on student entrepreneurship intention variables. The result of this study disagreed with the study of Dinc and Budic (2016) who studied Impact of Personal Attitude, Subjective Norm, and Perceived Behavioural Control on Entrepreneurial Intentions of Women. The result of their study revealed that subjective norms did not significantly affect Entrepreneurial Intentions, but it did have a significant and positive effect on personal attitude and perceived behavioural control. This means that the environment in which an individual acts and lives, as well as family, friends, and colleagues significantly impact the way an individual thinks about his/her own abilities to perform actions of entrepreneurship. This agreed with the study of Abina, Oyeniran, and Onikosi-Alliyu (2015) who studied determinants of eco entrepreneurial intention among students: A case study of University students in Ilorin and Malete. The result of their findings showed that attributes such as self-efficacy, environmental concern and perceived support have significant positive effect on entrepreneurial intention among students, while experience and entrepreneurial education do not have significant impact on entrepreneurship intention. Perceived barrier, on the other hand, significantly deter entrepreneurial intention among student. This is in line with the study of Kevin, Marina and Dragan (2013) who studied the Role of Perceived Abilities, Subjective Norm and Intentions in Entrepreneurial Activity. The results of their findings confirm that antecedents to entrepreneurial intentions, as defined by the theory of planned behaviour, have a significant impact on entrepreneurial intentions which, in turn, significantly influence entrepreneurial activity. The results for Croatia were mixed. Subjective norm had a limited relationship with intentions while perceived behavioural control did. This is in line with the study of Ummi, Ain, Suhana, Tunku Salha and Mohd (2018) who examining the relationships between attitude towards behaviour, subjective norms and entrepreneurial intention among engineering students. Results of the findings showed that entrepreneurial intention is positively associated with the attitude towards behaviour ( $\beta = .62$ ,  $p < .01$ ) and subjective norm ( $\beta = .25$ ,  $p < .01$ ). Thus, it is confirmed that both factors of Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), namely attitude towards behaviour and subjective norm are significantly related to entrepreneurial intention among the engineering students in this institution. Elevating the degree of attitude towards behaviour and subjective norm are the best strategies to enhance the level of entrepreneurial intention among the engineering students in this institution. This is supported the study of Sizong and Lingfei (2015) who studied the impact of higher education on entrepreneurial intentions of University Students in China The main results of their empirical research suggest that diversity of educational background offers plausible explanations on the difference of entrepreneurial intentions of Chinese university students. Higher educational institutions should develop more flexible approaches with focus on different groups of students in accordance with their various educational backgrounds.

## Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations were made:

Polytechnic are recommended to invite famous entrepreneurs and hold free entrepreneurship workshops for students.

## References

- Abina, M.B Oyeniran, I.W and Onikosi-Alliyu, S.O (2015). Determinants of eco entrepreneurial intention among students: A case study of University students in Ilorin and Maletse; Ethiopian Journal of Environmental Studies and Management
- Anyakoha I. L., (2006). Practical Tips for Economic Empowerment and Survival'. Nsukka: AP Express.
- Christina, W. U. (2017). Attitude, Subjective Norms, Perceived Behavior, Entrepreneurship Education and Self-efficacy toward Entrepreneurial Intention University Student in Indonesia: European Research Studies Journal Volume XX, Issue 2A, 2017 pp. 475-495'
- Dinc M. S. and Budic S. (2016). Impact of Personal Attitude, Subjective Norm, and Perceived Behavioural Control on Entrepreneurial Intentions of Women: Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, 9 (17), 23-35.
- Lee, S.M. & Peterson, S. (2000). 'Culture, entrepreneurial orientation, and global competitiveness'. Journal of World Business, 35: 401–416.
- Kevin, W, Marina J and Dragan K (2013). The Role of Perceived Abilities, Subjective Norm and Intentions in Entrepreneurial Activity; the Journal of Entrepreneurship.
- Nieman, G. and Nieuwenhuizen, C. (2009) Entrepreneurship. A South African Perspective. 2nd Edition, Van Schaik, Pretoria.
- Morrison, A. (1999). 'Entrepreneurship: What triggers it?' International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research, 6(2): 59–71.
- Shane, S., & Venkataraman, S. (2000). "The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of research". Academy of Management Review. 25(1): 217-226.
- Sizong Wu and Lingfei Wu (2015) The Impact Of Higher Education on Entrepreneurial Intentions of University Students in China; Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
- Umami, N. S. Ain, Z. Z. A. Suhana, A. M. Tunku, S. T. A. and Mohd, H. A. (2018). Examining The Relationships between Attitude Towards Behaviour, Subjective Norms and Entrepreneurial Intention among Engineering Students; MATEC Web of Conferences 150, 05011 (2018).
- Watson, K., Hogarth-Scott, S. & Wilson, N. (1998). "factors and support implications". International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research, 4: 217–238.



# Research on Social Psychology and Young People's Action in the Construction of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area\*

Yang Liao<sup>1</sup>, Li Meng<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>School of Public Management, South China Agricultural University Guangzhou 510642 China

<sup>2</sup>News Center of South China Agricultural University Guangzhou 510642 China

## Abstract

Based on a review of relevant literature, this article analyzes how different administrative management entities "same frequency resonance" from the perspective of symbiosis, and makes a "market theory" of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area proposed by Professor Zheng Yongnian of the National University of Singapore. A simple response. At the same time, the article also discusses the possibility and method of "same frequency" in the innovation-driven development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. It is believed that the "same frequency" in the innovation-driven development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area may come from the scientific and technological fields or intellectuals in areas such as technology, education and medicine where young people are concentrated. To this end, it is necessary to focus on investigating the attitudes, opinions, and action practices of young people in Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao, especially those in colleges and universities, and responding to the demands of young people, in order to better help the effective realization of national strategic goals. When discussing the issue of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, "one country, two systems" is a topic that cannot be bypassed. The implementation of "one country, two systems" is a pioneering initiative to solve China's sovereignty. However, the governance of state sovereignty is different from the governance of SAR affairs. From the perspective of social ecology and governance, "one country" should be the governance of state sovereignty, and "two systems" should be the governance of the SAR society. The different social ecology of Hong Kong and Macau affects different social attitudes and action practices of young people.

**Keywords:** The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, Social Psychology, Young People, Attitude and Action

## I. Introduction

The construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is a major strategic decision to promote the in-depth integration and development of the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions

---

\* The fifth article of a series of papers on social ecology and social change after Macao's sovereignty return to China.

and the Mainland of China. The study of the social mentality and young people's actions and practices in the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area not only helps Guangdong The concerted efforts of Hong Kong and Macao for development will also help deepen the theoretical study of "one country, two systems".

At the same time, important documents such as the Outline of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Construction Plan and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China "Supporting Shenzhen to Build a Socialist Pioneering Demonstration Area with Chinese Characteristics" have been released one after another. The social attitudes of the people of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau to the construction of the Greater Bay Area deserve attention.

The social mentality and young people's action practices in the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area involve many aspects, and many issues are worthy of in-depth discussion and analysis. This article focuses on three levels of theory, operation, and practice.

## II. Brief review of related literature

The Bay Area economy is an advanced form of regional economic development, which is essentially an open economy and an innovative economy. Mao Yanhua and Rong Jianxin(2018) believe that under the strategic background of the country's "two-way" opening, the "Belt and Road" construction and the transformation of the economic development mode, the planning and construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area should focus on consolidating regional cooperation consensus and innovating regional cooperation. Starting from five aspects, including institutional mechanisms, fostering a benefit-sharing industrial value chain, co-building a high-quality living area in the Bay Area, and improving the coordination mechanism for the development planning of the Bay Area, a pattern of coordinated development in the Bay Area has been formed to accelerate the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area into a world-class Bay Area and World Class City Cluster.

Zheng Yongnian(2018) believes that the establishment of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area indicates that "one country, two systems" has entered the era of the Greater Bay Area 3.0. The Greater Bay Area is to consider the next development of the Pearl River Delta together with the next development of Hong Kong and Macau. From this perspective, the Greater Bay Area is also known as the "internal EU". In China's future development, the Greater Bay Area is not only an economic project, but also not only the interconnection of transportation, but also the cooperation between enterprises and society, and ultimately achieves balanced urban development.

Liu Xiaobin and Zhong Jian(2018) used panel data from 44 cities in the Three Bay Areas of China in the late industrialization period (2004-2015) as a sample to conduct an empirical test on the financial capital output efficiency of the Three Bay Areas, and found that There is a large difference in the efficiency of financial capital output in the late industrialization period of the industrial zone. The financial capital efficiency of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is 1.73 times that of the Bohai Rim Greater Bay Area. Structure, the order of financial capital output efficiency is: low income group> middle income group> high income group. The higher the income group, the lower the financial capital output efficiency. maximum. Lin Changhua (2018) analyzed the collaborative development level and trend performance of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area by constructing a distance collaborative combination model based on TOPSIS comprehensive evaluation method.

Ou Xiaojun(2018) believes that the three world-class Great Bay Areas of New York, San Francisco and Tokyo have formed their own unique cluster development models, that is, the New York Bay Area has formed a "multi-center + axis" university cluster development mode; the San Francisco Bay Area has formed Multi-center

complementary university cluster development model; Tokyo Bay Area has formed a "central + frontier" university cluster development model.

China is a unitary country. The central government has full power to govern Hong Kong, the Macao Special Administrative Region and nine cities in the Mainland. Wang Yu(2018) believes that "one country, two systems" is the hard core of the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. "One country, two systems" is not only the institutional advantage of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area construction, but also constitutes serious legal conflicts and institutional obstacles in some aspects. The construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is a regional cooperation in domestic law, and comprehensive governance power is the legal basis for the construction of the rule of law in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. The path of the rule of comprehensive governance theory in the construction of the rule of law in the Greater Bay Area can be summarized as the path of interregional law and the path of district law. With the gradual advancement and in-depth development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area construction, it is necessary to build a set of interregional law and the theory system of regional law under the "one country, two systems".

Ecological sensitivity evaluation and analysis is an important method to study the potential problems of regional ecology, and plays an important role in regional ecological planning and management. Gan Lin et al.(2018) selected 7 sensitive factors from the aspects of natural ecology, urban expansion, and ecological services, and constructed a hierarchical index system of sensitive factors. Using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), a single factor and comprehensive ecology were obtained under the GIS analysis platform Results of sensitivity evaluation analysis.

Ma Zhongxin and Shen Yong(2018) believe that China's current development of the Bay Area economy already has a certain institutional-cultural basis, but compared with the world-class Bay Area, there are still certain gaps in the quality of market economy systems and the maturity of immigrant culture. Market economy system supply affects the level of economic development in the Bay Area through the path of "transaction costs-excess profits-prime agglomeration", while immigration culture affects the level of economic development in the Bay Area through the path of "entrepreneurship and inclusiveness-innovative ability-technological progress". The efficient system-cultural supply and the endowment advantages of the Bay Area economy itself form a superimposed effect, thus playing an engine role in the economic development of the Bay Area. China's implementation of the "Great Bay Area Economic Development Strategy" should focus on building urban clusters, accelerating the system and cultural supply of the Bay Area, promoting the symbiotic resonance between the Free Trade Area and the Bay Area, and forming a high-level economic form of "Free Trade Port + Bay Area" to cultivate a high degree The Bay Area immigration culture is open, deeply inclusive and has a higher degree of maturity. It enhances the "soft power" of the Bay Area, gathers global elites, and forms a new pattern of opening up and economic development led by the Bay Area economy.

Liu Zuoqing and Chen Jie(2019) analyzed the development status and practical experience of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Talent Cooperative Demonstration Zone in the context of the coordinated development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. Strategic direction of innovation and development in the cooperative demonstration area. As one of the world-class Greater Bay Areas, the Tokyo Greater Bay Area is not only an important engine of Japan's economic growth, but also a science and technology innovation center in Japan and an important area leading the development of global science and technology innovation. Yang Dongliang and Li Chunfeng(2019) hold that Japan's legal plan to support innovation and policies and measures aimed at talents, finance and taxation, intellectual property rights, industry-academia-government cooperation are important guarantees for the innovation and development of the Tokyo Bay Area, which is the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Developing innovative policies provides useful lessons.

Inter-city links are the basis for developing regional cooperation. The closer the inter-city links in a region, the more favorable the development of inter-city cooperation. Zhong Yun and Mei Min(2019) used gravitational

models, social network analysis, impulse response analysis, and Baidu index analysis to analyze the inter-city connections of Macau in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. It is believed that Macau should strengthen its inter-city connections, enhance its functional status, and promote the integration of Macau into the Greater Bay Area for coordinated development; unite surrounding cities to develop tourism, enhance Macau's urban characteristics, and enhance its urban functions; play a platform role and enhance technology with the Greater Bay Area Innovative connections and more.

Chen Jie et al. (2019) analyzed the talent synergy development situation in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and found that there are non-coordination issues in talent development, talent introduction mechanism, talent flow, platform carrier, etc. in the Bay Area talent development, talent exchange and cooperation, international headhunting training, platform carrier construction, smooth talent flow, talent environment optimization and other six aspects of the talent coordination mechanism proposal.

Xie Baojian and Hu Jieyi(2019) analyzed the opportunities and challenges faced by the development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and the youth development of Hong Kong and Macau, and proposed the main ideas for the development of Hong Kong-Macao youth in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, including strengthening youth development policy coordination And guidance to create an international and legal business environment; promote youth participation in regional collaborative innovation and improve Hong Kong and Macao talent policies; tap the development opportunities of Hong Kong and Macao youth directors; play the role of enterprises and industry groups to promote the organizational integration of Hong Kong and Macao youth The development of the Bay Area and encouraging young people from Hong Kong and Macao to play an active role in sharing the dividends of the development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area.

The return of popular hearts is the core of the return of Hong Kong and Macao. Subject to the original system setting, it is difficult for Hong Kong youth to share the fruits of national development. Peng Chunhua(2019)holds that the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area as a national strategy is to integrate the advantages of Hong Kong, Macao and the Mainland, take Hong Kong's youth integration as a guide, and promote system-oriented GSP for young people through system innovation, so that Hong Kong youth can fully participate in the country We will promote the return of people's hearts and realize the common development of Hong Kong, Macao and the country.

Youth is an important group of entrepreneurship. Youth entrepreneurship can stimulate the creative vitality of a country. Tan Kai (2019) believes that the introduction and implementation of the "Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Development Planning Outline" will provide a rare historical opportunity for youth entrepreneurship, which is of great significance to youth entrepreneurship, which is specifically reflected in four levels: The vast capital market provides a broad platform for youth entrepreneurship; the second is the strong development momentum of characteristic financial industries, the convergence of high-tech industries and cultural industries, and the provision of multiple entrepreneurial options for youth entrepreneurship; the third is the gradual improvement of the infrastructure and a positive entrepreneurial platform Construction, to provide assistance for youth entrepreneurship; Fourth, the government supports in various aspects and supports the introduction of entrepreneurship policies, which provides a guarantee for youth entrepreneurship.

Liang Liwen(2019) believes that based on the integration experience of the International Bay Area and the European Union, the focus is on deepening the development of the Greater Bay Area from the perspective of social integration. The Bay Area is not only an economy with a high concentration of factors, but also a synonym for high-quality living circles. Due to the lack of authority, regional integration difficulties, the "two systems" difference restricting public product supply and cooperation, administrative divisions restricting the free flow of factors in the region, and internal competition weakening the incentive for intergovernmental talent cooperation, the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is not yet mature. The functions, structure and internal operation mechanism that urban agglomerations should have. It is necessary to innovate the

cooperation and coordination mechanism of the Greater Bay Area, build an economic and social community in the Greater Bay Area, build a livable and livable high-quality living circle, expand the effect of regional talent gathering, and strive to build the Greater Bay Area into the world's best livable and livable life Circle, and then become the world's most attractive economic circle of talent and capital.

Lu Wenwen and Zou Pingxue(2019) believe that young people in Hong Kong have a high degree of recognition for the entrepreneurial atmosphere, government support and preferential measures in the cities in the Greater Bay Area, but most of them are still in the initial stage of entrepreneurship and face challenges in company operations and development. More difficult. In addition, it takes time and energy to become familiar with the entrepreneurial environment in the Mainland, which brings additional costs. Youth entrepreneurship requires long and patient cultivation in both places. The Greater Bay Area can solve the two major pain points of talents and the market for entrepreneurs and will continue to attract Hong Kong entrepreneurial talents in the future.

Zhu Feng and Chen Yonghua(2019) believe that youth development in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is complex and youth development policies have multiple policy objectives. Under the conditions of a new era in which the youth development policy system and working mechanism with Chinese characteristics are gradually being perfected, youth development will be placed on a more prominent strategic position in the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and top-level design will be implemented to realize the youth development policy of the Greater Bay Area urban agglomeration. The holistic construction and precise design will become the inevitable way for the reform and innovation test zone and international demonstration zone of the Youth Development Policy in the Greater Bay Area.

Jianfa Shen & Xiaolong Luo(2013) analyzed the various external and internal economic, political and social factors that led to the emergence of a government-led regional integration strategy in Hong Kong. It has been found that reaching consensus among the government, political parties, other interest groups and Hong Kong residents contributes to regional integration.

By applying the theories of state rescaling and city-cluster formation, Hong Yu(2019) intends to conduct a case study of the GBA to examine the state-initiated plan for city-cluster formation in China, to analyse the Chinese central and local governments' efforts to put this plan into action and the hurdles they face in formatting this city-cluster. The formulation of the GBA development plan for integrated development reflects a dynamic process of upscaling and downscaling of various levels of state power.

In summary, the current discussions on the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area are mainly Chinese scholars, and foreign scholars pay less attention. Relevant research results are also mainly published in Chinese. Although academic journals outside China have also published some related papers, they are still published in English by Chinese scholars or in English by Chinese scholars outside China. The existing research results of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area were mainly published during the period 2018-2019. A small number of results were published from 2014-2016 and increased in 2017, but the sharp increase in 2018-2019 may still be there after 2020 increase.

The research results of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area are currently focused on economic, scientific and technological, political, cultural and other related fields, and some of the results involve the study of youth-related issues. However, it seems that the research on the discussion of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area issue from the perspective of social ecology and youth action practice has not been seen.

### **III. How do different administrative management entities in the Greater Bay Area “resonate” from the perspective of symbiosis?**

In March 2017, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang first proposed in the "Government Work Report" the construction of the "Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area" urban agglomeration, marking the formal rise of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area development strategy as China's national regional development strategy. On July 1, 2017, under the witness of Chinese President Xi Jinping, the "Framework Agreement on Deepening Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Cooperation to Promote the Construction of the Greater Bay Area" was officially signed in Hong Kong.

The construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is a major national strategy planned, deployed and promoted by Xi Jinping. There are regional characteristics of "one country, two systems, three customs zones, three currencies, three legal systems, and four core cities." "How to achieve deep interconnectivity, including governance coordination, policy convergence, and talent mobility, under the complex conditions of the coexistence of one country, two systems, and three customs zones. Become an important factor affecting the future development of the Bay Area. "(Zhu Feng,2019) To this end, it is necessary to strengthen the foundation of "one country", make good use of the benefits of "two systems", and promote the protection of the rule of law in the three places; Mechanism, public participation cooperation mechanism, etc., to form a perfect regional government cooperation mechanism. (Huang Yalan,2019)

There are differences in the political, social, cultural, and economic systems of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. Not only are there significant differences between the nine cities in Guangdong Province and Hong Kong and Macau, but also the differences between Hong Kong and Macau. Relying solely on the "market" power of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is difficult to bridge the various institutional differences within the Bay Area, and the profitability of the capital market also affects the economic, political, social, cultural and other aspects of Bay Area institutional integration.

The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is an organic combination of "two systems" regions into a "regional development community" within the framework of "one country". The key to building the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is to correctly grasp the positioning of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in China's national development strategy. The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area internally should minimize the system operation cost caused by the "two systems" difference, and externally should use the system difference to provide multiple system interfaces.(Chen Xinxin,2019)

With the implementation of the Framework Agreement on Deepening Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Cooperation and Promoting the Construction of the Greater Bay Area, the construction of the collaborative governance mechanism of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area will enter a new stage. It is necessary to strengthen regional overall planning and build a "quartet agreement + Greater Bay Area Development Cooperation Committee + Joint conference + special cooperation" to improve the legal framework of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in order to advance the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area into a world-class bay area.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, especially after the return of Hong Kong and Macau, the changes in the relationship between Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macau and the evolution of collaborative affairs have been achieved. Cooperation in various fields such as property rights protection, border area cooperation, social security, emergency management, etc., and gradually established a policy-oriented regional collaborative governance mechanism guided by "administrative agreement + joint meeting + task force", and promoted the sustainable and healthy development of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao relations. The signing of the "Framework Agreement for the Construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area" in July 2017 indicates that the collaborative governance of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao has risen to the level of China's regional governance. Based on the new mission given by the country to the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and the particularity of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao relationship, under the general policy of national political mobilization, to strengthen the overall planning of the Greater Bay Area and build a "administrative agreement + rule of law framework" concurrent governance mechanism Promoting the

construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area has become an important guarantee for the world-class bay area.(Li Jianping,2017)

From the perspective of symbiosis, the main players in the construction of the Bay Area under different administrative systems should be based on the China's overall national development strategy, focus on economic construction, seek technological innovation to drive the development of the same economy, and maintain political, social and cultural systems Only minor differences can effectively achieve the "same frequency" and "resonance" of the economic construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, avoid market failures, and realize the direction and success of social construction.

#### **IV. "Co-frequency" Possibility, Method and Method in Innovation- Driven Development of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area**

According to the Hong Kong Statistics Bureau, about 520,000 people in Hong Kong currently live in Guangdong Province for a long time.(Anonymous,2018) Over the past three years, more than 15,000 Hong Kong students have gone to colleges and universities in mainland China each year. In 2016, there were more than 200 million person-to-person contacts between Guangdong and Hong Kong, with an average of more than 60 person-per-day contacts.( Anonymous,2017) Hong Kong's industrial structure is uneven, and the tertiary industry, which is dominated by the four major industries of transportation, real estate, trade and finance, accounts for more than 90% of Hong Kong's economy for a long time. The industrial structure affects the employment structure. Although the employment rate in Hong Kong is very high (unemployment rate is only 3%), a large number of young people are concentrated in low- and mid-end positions such as retail and catering. White-collar workers lack a rising channel. Young people are not very optimistic about their employment prospects, especially Hong Kong's middle class is feeling powerless and hopeless. At the same time, due to the scarcity of land resources and the high cost of entrepreneurship, young people in Hong Kong are more inclined to seek stable employment opportunities from the financial and real estate industries, which has led to Hong Kong young people's poor entrepreneurship. Surveys show that more than 80% of youth have no plans to start a business. In addition, young people believe that Hong Kong's entrepreneurial space is limited, which further causes a gap in entrepreneurial talent.( Liu Wei et al,2018)

On May 2, 2018, a survey of youth employment intentions in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area released by a youth group in Hong Kong revealed that 75% of respondents were optimistic about the development prospects of the Greater Bay Area; 57% of young people were unwilling to go to development. 57.2% of young people do not know the Greater Bay Area, and 42% of young people do not want to be too far away from Hong Kong. The channels for young people in Hong Kong to obtain information are different from those in the Mainland. Local young people in Hong Kong rarely use *Weibo* and *WeChat*. Instead, they use *Instagram*, telegram, and *snachat*. Television is rarely watched and newspapers are not read. Therefore, there is no way to know the situation in the Mainland, especially the construction of the Greater Bay Area. For example, as mentioned above, some young people "do not want to be too far away from Hong Kong" so that they do not consider going to the Greater Bay Area for development. When everyone understands the latest progress in transport infrastructure to the Greater Bay Area, distance is not a big issue.

With the opening of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge, the Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link and the new land crossing of Liantang-Xiangyuanwei in the coming year, a "one-hour living circle" in the Greater Bay Area will be created. Although there are no language and cultural barriers between Hong Kong and the cities of the Pearl River Delta, there are many differences in economic systems and mechanisms between Mainland China and Hong Kong, which makes it inconvenient and cost-effective to operate. Taking taxation as an example, Hong Kong's tax system is simple and straightforward, with few taxes and low tax rates. Mainland China's taxation is a relatively high tax area relative to Hong Kong. As Hong Kong people have been in the Mainland of China for more than 183 days, they need to pay taxes to the Mainland, which is a burden for entrepreneurs going to the Mainland of China. The head of a local youth

organization in Hong Kong said that this is one of the reasons why young people are deterred. The Chief Secretary for Administration of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Zhang Jianzong said that Hong Kong's young people have an international perspective and are a powerful new force for the development of emerging industries, especially science and technology innovation and cultural and creative industries. Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao will jointly promote the construction of youth entrepreneurship and employment bases and gather young talents, which will bring opportunities for entrepreneurship and employment development for young people.(Wang Yinghui,2018)

Although Hong Kong's young people are more willing to start a business, their business in Hong Kong faces several problems, such as higher rents and labor costs, a smaller and more conservative market, and relatively late development of innovative finance. Hong Kong young people going to start businesses in the Greater Bay Area also need to overcome the differences between the two places in terms of policies and laws, intellectual property protection, social culture and other areas. In this regard, the government can work with the business community to provide corresponding preferential policies and consulting services, and provide supporting measures for young people to live and settle in the Mainland, travel and transportation, and medical and health care.(Lin Zhiying,2018)

From the four dimensions of space, industry, system, and internal and external connectivity, the key to the coordinated development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is to solve the "one country, two systems", "three customs zones", "three jurisdictions", and "multi-center" issues of Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macau. Multi-synergy issues such as multiple synergy mechanisms, while building a modern industrial system of benefit-sharing value chains, a coordinated development pattern for polycentric cities, promoting the cross-border flow of factors, and promoting the formation of a unified market with internal and external linkages are key areas that require coordination.(Research Group of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Research Institute of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,2019)

Industry, science and technology innovation, enterprises and infrastructure are important components of the Bay Area. The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area should adhere to an international perspective, follow the industrial laws, and accelerate the construction of an industrial new industry led by the "three belts and one group" sentence, with the "science and technology corridor" as the highland, driven by the "pole", and supported by the "network" Layout to promote high-quality industrial development in the Bay Area. The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area has initially formed an industrial system dominated by electronic information and equipment manufacturing industries, supported by home appliances, petrochemicals, new materials, textiles, biomedicine and other industries. The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is rich in science and technology innovation resources, there are many colleges and universities, and the company has strong research and development capabilities. It has initially formed the characteristics of Hong Kong and Guangzhou as science and education centers, Shenzhen as a technology innovation center, and other areas of science and technology innovation. From the perspective of enterprise layout, the characteristics of division of labor and cooperation in Foshan, Zhuhai, Dongguan and other places are formed with Shensui as the core. The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area has a large number of strong leading companies such as Huawei, Tencent, Midea, Gree, and Guangzhou Automobile, as well as individual champion companies focusing on subdivided fields, forming a complete supply chain system upstream and downstream. From the perspective of infrastructure layout, it has the characteristics of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong as the core, airport-port-rail-road "sea-land-air-air network" linkage, and initially formed the airport-port-railway-bridge-road "sea-land-air network" linkage Traffic pattern. The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area needs to seize the opportunity of deep integration of the Internet, big data, artificial intelligence and the real economy to promote the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries in cities such as Dongguan, Zhongshan, Foshan, and accelerate new industries, new formats and new models in Hong Kong, Macau, Cultivation and growth of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and other places promote the integration and development of advanced manufacturing and modern service industries.(Kang Mengyue et al,2019)

In short, the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area must change the mindset of "new bottles and old wines" and shift from functional regional integration to institutional regional integration in a timely manner.(Zhang Jingen,2018) In the process of all-round development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, development opportunities exist in many areas, creating more opportunities for the employment and entrepreneurship of contemporary youth. With the further development of the Greater Bay Area, the governments of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau need to address a series of supporting policy issues such as social security, provident funds, medical care and housing in the process of employment development, innovation and entrepreneurship for young people from Hong Kong and Macau. Hong Kong and Macao youths working and living provide protection.

As young people in Hong Kong and Macau, they should seize the development opportunities in Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao, further strengthen the cooperation between Hong Kong, Macau, and the sense of belonging in the Mainland of China. Seize the opportunity to go out of the country and achieve your own employment goals and entrepreneurial dreams. As a Mainland Chinese youth, we should seize this opportunity more firmly, in the context of the "Belt and Road" initiative; under the macro policy of the "Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao Greater Bay Area"; Youths have established a new youth exchange and cooperation platform with complementary advantages, bringing together young people from different professional fields, establishing a cross-regional exchange system, and providing young people with more employment and entrepreneurship opportunities. At the same time, it will use its comprehensive knowledge of economy, technology and various fields to support the motherland, bring vitality and creativity to the Chinese younger generation, and further push the charm of Chinese traditional culture to the world.(Chen Jianshuo,2018)

#### **V. Attitudes and actions of young people from Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau participating in the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area**

Young people are the main force in the construction, reform and opening up of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. Supporting the development of Hong Kong-Macao young people in the Chinese mainland is an important task in the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. The "Community of Communist Youth League of Guangdong" and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Development Research Institute of *Sun Yat-sen* University conducted a "Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Youth Development Index Report" and found that there was a lack of awareness of the Hong Kong and Macao youth in the Greater Bay Area and youth exchange activity resources. Insufficient overall planning, insufficient supporting services for the integration of Hong Kong and Macao youths into the construction of the Bay Area, and insufficient excavation of the existing internship needs of Hong Kong and Macao youths.

Huo Qishan, Member of the Standing Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Political Consultative Conference and Deputy Director of the Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Committee, Executive Chairman of the Hong Kong Guangdong Youth Federation, and Vice President of the Huo Yingdong Group, said at the second meeting of the 12th Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CPPCC held on January 26-29, 2019. "Guangdong, Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao Greater Bay Area Youth Opportunities" put forward proposals to start with youth education, employment guidance, talent settlement, intercity transportation facilities, etc., set up a good youth exchange platform between Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao Greater Bay Area, and promote exchanges and cooperation among youth in the Greater Bay Area. In particular, it is necessary to deepen the "Youth Concentric Circle Plan", focusing on advancing youth exchanges and cooperation in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area; strengthening the construction of a service system for young people from Hong Kong and Macau to visit Guangdong; promoting the substantive operation of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Youth Action Alliance; Youth internship scale, etc.

According to information released by the official website of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the Guangdong Provincial People's Government, the key projects for youth exchanges between Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao before and after the implementation of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area

Strategy were mainly focused on youth internships, education and training, culture and arts, sports tourism, innovation and entrepreneurship, Comprehensive services. See Table 1 for details.

Table 1 Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Youth Exchange Program

Item category	Project theme	Project organization department	Date
Youth Internship	Hong Kong Youth Service <sup>1</sup>	The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council of China, and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League	2011
	Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program Coordination Matchmaking	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province and Home Affairs Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	2015.05.12
	Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program "launched" <sup>2</sup>	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province and Home Affairs Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	2015.06.06
	Deputy Director Ye Weiyuan visits Hong Kong university students in summer internship in Guangzhou	Hong Kong and Macao Office of Guangdong Province	2015.07.03
	Director Liao Jingshan visits Hong Kong students internship in Zhongshan, Foshan during the summer	Hong Kong and Macao Office of Guangdong Province	2015.07.09
	Guangdong and Hong Kong jointly visit Hong Kong university students in summer internship in Shenzhen	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2015.07.23
	2016 "Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program" successfully launched <sup>3</sup>	Representatives of relevant government departments of Guangdong and Hong Kong, and Hong Kong contractors	2016.06.11
	Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program <sup>4</sup>	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Bureau of Dongguan City	2016.07-08
	Deputy Director Ye Weiyuan visits Hong Kong university students in summer internship in Shenzhen	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Home Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, Hong Kong Youth Affairs Commission	2016.07.11
	Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program Summary Exchange Meeting	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2016.10.12
2017 Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office	2017.05.10	

<sup>1</sup> The "Hong Kong Youth Service Corps" program is a project organized by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, and the Youth League Central to launch volunteer services in mainland China. The scheme, which started in 2011, aims to strengthen the will of young people in Hong Kong, develop their potential, encourage them to serve others, and promote the spirit of voluntary work. The Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Communist Youth League of China and Shaoguan City and Meizhou City fully support it. After the first three phases of the plan were successfully implemented in Shaoguan City, the fourth phase from September 2013 to July 2014 was extended to Meizhou.

<sup>2</sup> 2015 was the first time that Guangdong and Hong Kong co-hosted the "Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program", which aims to respond to the country's innovation-driven development strategy on the theme of "mass entrepreneurship, innovation by all people", and promote young people of the two places to strengthen exchanges and learning and jointly explore the dream of innovation and entrepreneurship. During the internship in Guangdong, young people in Hong Kong will be guided by experienced instructors, and will participate in special training, entrepreneurship lectures, business inspections and other activities.

<sup>3</sup> In order to support more Hong Kong youths internships in Guangdong, in 2016 Guangdong's internship cities expanded from five in Guangzhou to seven in 2015, providing high-quality internships in areas such as finance, accounting, law, and community services.

<sup>4</sup> The Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program has been implemented since 2015. Since 2016, more than 1,100 Hong Kong youths have been organised for internships in Guangdong. It has become a key project for the governments of Guangdong and Hong Kong to strengthen exchanges and cooperation between Guangdong and Hong Kong youths.

	Internship Program Coordination Matchmaking	of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	
	2017 Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program Launching Ceremony	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2017.06.03
	2017 Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program Promotion Video (Cantonese) <sup>5</sup>	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2017.06.13
Youth Internship	"Joining Hong Kong, Macau and Enjoying Foshan" Summer Internship Program Sharing Session	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, and relevant government departments of Foshan	2017.07.06
	2017 Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program Promo Video in Mandarin	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2017.07.08
	Director Liao Jingshan visits Huizhou to visit Hong Kong interns	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2017.07.13
	Deputy Director Ye Weiyuan visits Hong Kong students in Guangzhou	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2017.07.19
	Liao Jingshan went to Zhuhai to visit Hong Kong summer internship students	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2017.07.27
	2017 Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program (Dongguan) Exchange and Sharing Session	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2017.08.11
	"Suigang and Hong Kong join hands to make a wonderful future-Guangzhou 2017 Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program Sharing Session and Guangzhou Guangdong-Hong Kong Internship Program Documentary Premiere"	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2017.08.21
	Deputy Director Ye Weiyuan visited Zhongshan to visit Hong Kong interns	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2017.08.22

<sup>5</sup> Beginning in 2015, the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the People's Government of Guangdong Province and the Home Affairs Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government jointly led the "Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program" to organize Hong Kong university students aged 18-29 who are studying in Hong Kong, the Mainland or overseas, and some working Hong Kong youths to make use of Summer internships in cities in the Pearl River Delta, Guangdong, to gain a deeper understanding of the economic and social development of the Mainland, to experience the employment and entrepreneurship environment and workplace culture in Guangdong, to expand the space for employment, entrepreneurship, innovation and development in the Mainland, and to experience the charm of Lingnan culture. During the period, the internship organization arranges experienced instructors to provide job guidance to help intern students become familiar with the position as soon as possible to adapt to the corporate culture. After-work weekends, the local Hong Kong and Macao departments assist in organizing visits, special trainings, entrepreneurship lectures, networking and other activities. The Hong Kong side is responsible for the daily management and services of recruitment, interview and internship of the internships. The Guangdong side is responsible for coordinating local well-known enterprises and industry leaders to provide internship positions, covering finance, law, accounting, communication, administrative management, creativity, Design, social services, etc. Since the implementation of the "Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program", it has exerted extensive influence in the society of Guangdong and Hong Kong. It has become a beautiful brand for the exchanges and cooperation between the youth of Guangdong and Hong Kong. sure. In 2015 and 2016, more than 1,000 Hong Kong youths participated in the "Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program". 2017 is the third year of project implementation. It is expected that about 900 young Hong Kong students will go to Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Huizhou, Dongguan, and Zhongshan for a 4-week to 6-week internship activity to deeply experience the University of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau. Opportunities for the development of Bay Area urban agglomerations.

Youth Internship	2017 Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program Summary Exchange Meeting	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2017.10.17
	2018 Guangdong, Hong Kong, Macao Greater Bay Area Macau Youth Internship Program Launching Ceremony	Hong Kong and Macao Office of Guangdong Province, Macao SAR Government Talent Development Committee	2018.06.29
	The Hong Kong Youth Mainland Internship Program	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, Guangdong Provincial Federation of Industry and Commerce	2018.07.23
	2018 Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Macau Youth Internship Program Sharing Session	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2018.07.31
	Zhongshan City Holds Sharing Session on Hong Kong Youth Internship Program in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area	Hong Kong and Macao Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, etc.	2018.08.17
	Macau youths share internship experience at the Palace Museum	Hong Kong and Macao Office of Guangdong Province, Macao Cultural Bureau	2018.08.27
	“Suigang and Hong Kong join hands to build a dream flower city”, 2018 “Hong Kong Youth Internship Program in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2018.09
	2018 Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Hong Kong Youth Internship Program Summary Exchange Meeting	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2018.10.31
	2019 Hong Kong and Macao young students Nansha "hundred enterprises and a thousand people" internship program	Guangzhou Nansha Free Trade Zone	2019.03
	2019 Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao Greater Bay Area Hong Kong Youth Internship Program	Hong Kong and Macao Office of Guangdong Province, Home Affairs Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, Hong Kong Youth Development Committee	2019.06.14
	2019 Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao Youth Vocational Training Camp	Department of Human Resources and Social Security of Guangdong Province	2019.07.15
2019 Beijing-Hong Kong-Taiwan University Student Exchange and New Fields • New Milestone Youth Internship Program	Clifford Group	2019.08.02	
2019 Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Hong Kong Youth Internship Program (Guangzhou) Summary Sharing Session	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2019.08.22	
Education and training	Guangdong and Hong Kong sister schools conclude plan <sup>6</sup>	Sponsored by the Guangdong Provincial Department of Education and the Education Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative	2016.11.04

<sup>6</sup>The "Guangdong-Hong Kong Sister School Consolidation Plan" provides a good platform for deepening the exchanges between teachers and students between primary and secondary schools in the two places. As of early November 2016, a total of 436 pairs of sister schools in Guangdong and Hong Kong have been concluded, accounting for about 70% of the total number of contracts between Mainland China and Hong Kong. Since Shenzhen participated in the "Guangdong-Hong Kong Sister School Concluding Plan", and the 34 pairs of schools signed this time, the city has 210 pairs of Guangdong-Hong Kong sister schools.

		Region Government, and sponsored by the Shenzhen Education Bureau	
	Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao University Alliance Annual Meeting & Principals' Forum	26 universities in Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau	2017.06.07
	Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (Guangdong-Hong Kong) Medical Institution Development and Medical Talent Training Seminar	Relevant divisions of the Guangdong Provincial Health and Family Planning Commission, the Health and Family Planning Commissions (Bureaus) of cities in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, Hong Kong Food and Health Bureau, Department of Health, Hospital Authority, Guangdong Economic and Trade Office, Public and private medical institutions, etc.	2018.08.06
	2018 Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao Youth Exchange and Cooperation Business Training Course	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Civil Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2018.09.12-14
	Director Liao Jingshan went to Hong Kong to meet with Yang Runxiong, director of the Education Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	Hong Kong and Macau Office of Guangdong Province, Education Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2018.09.18
	Mainland China and Hong Kong Sister School Experience Exchange Event and 2018 Guangdong-Hong Kong Sister School Conclusion Event	Supported by the Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Affairs Office of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Education and the Liaison Office of the Central Government in Hong Kong, jointly organized by the Education Department of Guangdong Province and the Education Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2018.12.14
Culture and art	The first "Shenzhen-Hong Kong Youth Fashion Festival"	Shenzhen Committee of China Communist Youth League, Hong Kong Youth Federation	2014.04.26
	2014 Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Youth Cultural Tour Summary Party <sup>7</sup>	Guangdong Provincial Department of Culture, Hong Kong SAR Government Home Affairs Bureau and Macau SAR Government Higher Education Support Office	2014.07.18
	"2015 Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau Youth Cultural Tour" Summary Party	Guangdong Provincial Department of Culture, Hong Kong SAR Government Home Affairs Bureau and Macau SAR Government Higher Education Support Office	2015.07.25
	2015 "Youth Concentric Circle Plan", "Love Me China" Cross-Strait Youth Meetings	Guangdong Youth Federation, Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups, Macau Youth Federation, Hong Kong and Taiwan Youth Exchange Promotion Association, etc.	2015.07.26
	The Hong Kong and Macau Office of Shaoguan City and the Macau Shao-Macao Youth Association successfully hosted the 2017 Youth Patriotism Exchange Event for the first time	Hong Kong and Macau Office of Shaoguan City, Macau Shao-Macao Youth Association	2017.11.10-12
	2017 Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao	ong Kong and Macau Affairs Bureau	2017.12.09

<sup>7</sup> The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Youth Cultural Tour has been held since 2009. University students from the three places have conducted 10-day cultural inspections, experiences, and exchanges in Hong Kong, Macau, Guangdong, and the Pan-Pearl Province. By 2014, there were nearly 600 Hong Kong and Macau university students Participation increased the understanding of the different ethnic cultures, folk customs and socio-economic development in the Chinese mainland, cultivated the feelings of family and the country, and built a friendship bridge between university students in Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao, which was generally welcomed.

	(Zhaoqing) Youth Cooking Exchange Competition	of Zhaoqing City, Tourism Bureau of Zhaoqing City	
	Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Music Education and Art Development Alliance established in Guangzhou	24 alliance members of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau	2017.12.12
	The Second Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Bay Area Youth Camp Opens in Shenzhen	Tencent, New World Group	2018.07.23
	Young artists from Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau create special exhibitions	Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Cultural and Creative Industry Experimental Park-Songshan Lake Productivity Building, HONG KONG OS Hong Kong Youth Self-Service Platform	2018.08
	2018 Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (Zhaoqing) Tourism Food Carnival and Youth Cooking Exchange Competition	Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Bureau of Zhaoqing City, Tourism Bureau of Zhaoqing City	2018.12.01
	Guangzhou-Hong Kong Youths "Time Back in Hong Kong" Performance Ceremony	Hosted by Hong Kong Repertory Theatre, supported by Hang Seng Bank	2018.12.28
	"Guangdong-Hong Kong Youth Cantonese Opera Art Show" received rave reviews	Guangdong Dance and Drama Vocational College, Zhongshan Xiangshan Cantonese Opera Research Institute, Hong Kong Shenghui Cantonese Opera Research Center	2019.04.12-14
	Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Youth Exchange and Concert to Commemorate the 100th Anniversary of May 4th Movement Held in Guangzhou	Jointly sponsored by the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Communist Youth League of China, the Youth Federation of Guangdong Province, the Guangzhou Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Youth Work Department of the Hong Kong China United Office, and the Education and Youth Work Department of the Macau China United Office	2019.12.24
	2019 Guangzhou-Hong Kong-Macao Youth Cultural Exchange Season kicks off in Guangzhou	Guangzhou Culture, Radio, Television and Tourism Bureau	2019
Sports and tourism	Members of the Hong Kong Youth Service Corps visit the Hakka Wai Mansion	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Shaoguan City, Shaoguan City Committee of Chinese Communist Youth League	2015.06.28
	Hong Kong youths trace the history of Mr. Sun Yat-sen	Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Committee of the CPPCC of Guangdong Province, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Hong Kong New Energy Think Tank	2016.11.5-6
	Deputy Director Lu Xingzhou Attends the Departure Ceremony of the Cross-Strait Youth Congregation Train Regiment	Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Communist Youth League of China, Guangdong Youth Federation, Hong Kong Youth Exchange Promotion Association, Hong Kong and Taiwan Youth Exchange Promotion Association, Chinese Young Entrepreneurs Association (Taiwan), etc.	2016.07.16
	2017 Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Youth Cultural Tour Summary Party	Guangdong Provincial Department of Culture, Hong Kong SAR Government Home Affairs Bureau, Macao SAR Government Higher Education Support Office	2017.07.19

	The signing ceremony of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Youth Action Framework Agreement	Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Communist Youth League of China, Guangdong Youth Federation, Hong Kong Youth Exchange Promotion Association, Hong Kong and Taiwan Youth Exchange Promotion Association, Chinese Young Entrepreneurs Association (Taiwan), etc.	2017.07.23
	Shaoguan Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office invites members of Hong Kong Youth Service Corps to visit Danxia Mountain	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Shaoguan City	2017.11.12
	"China's New Homeland Greater Bay Area Tour" was successfully held	<i>Unknown</i>	2018.04.19
Innovation and entrepreneurship	Guangdong and Hong Kong universities jointly hosted the "Challenge Cup" national college student extracurricular academic technology competition for the first time	China Communist Youth League Central Committee, China Science and Technology Association, Ministry of Education, National Student Union and Guangdong Provincial People's Government co-sponsored, Guangdong University of Technology, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology	2015.11.17
	Tutors from 8 universities in Hong Kong visit Shenzhen Innovation and Entrepreneurship Base	HKSAR Government Education Bureau	2016.05.06
	Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao College Alliance	The Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, the Ministry of Education, the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in Macao, etc.	2016.11.15
	2017 Guangdong "Chongchuang Cup" Entrepreneurship and Innovation Competition Enters Online Registration Stage <sup>8</sup>	Guangdong Provincial Department of Human Resources and Social Security led 14 units including Guangdong Development and Reform Commission, Guangdong Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office	2017.04.12
Innovation and entrepreneurship	"Finding the Roots and Dreaming, Walking Together" Youth Forum <sup>9</sup>	Hong Kong Chinese Import and Export Chamber of Commerce, Guangdong Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Cooperation Promotion Association	2017.06.15
	"Striving for youth and letting your dreams fly together-building a Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Youth Forum"	Relevant departments of the Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao governments	2018.10.12-13
	Hong Kong and Macau Youth Innovation and Entrepreneurship (Foshan Shunde) Base and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology-Bo Zhilin Joint Research Institute Unveiling Ceremony	People's Government of Shunde District, Foshan City, Bozhilin Robot Experimental Center, Shunde, Foshan, Guangdong	2019.04.09

<sup>8</sup> This competition is divided into six individual events: science and technology (returnee) personnel pilot competition, college student sailing competition, skill craftsman competition, disabled public welfare competition, mass entrepreneurship and wealth creation competition, rural e-commerce competition. Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and overseas personnel who are interested in starting a business in Guangdong and those who have already started business in Guangdong can apply.

<sup>9</sup> To celebrate the 20th anniversary of the return of Hong Kong, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Hong Kong promoted the "root-seeking dreams, walking together" program, which arranged 6 Hong Kong youths to visit five cities in China including Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Shenzhen, etc. last stop. 500 Hong Kong students studying in Guangdong universities, Hong Kong student representatives internships in Guangdong, 3 Hong Kong young entrepreneurs starting a business in the Mainland attended the forum and discussed how Hong Kong youths can seize the "Belt and Road", Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau Bay Area construction opportunities seek development and realize dreams.

	Guangzhou Nansha will provide over 1,200 internships for Hong Kong and Macau young students	Guangzhou Nansha's "One Hundred Enterprises and One Thousand People" internship program also jointly launched the "Tomorrow's Strength" training program for Hong Kong prospective college students jointly with the Hong Kong Cultural and Artistic Development Center, the Chinese Education Association of Macau, and the Macau Development Strategy Research Center.	2019.04.11-13
	Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Macao Launch "5A Action" for Youth Professional Development in the Greater Bay Area	Guided by the Central Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong, the Central Government Liaison Office in Macao, the All-China Youth Federation, the Communist Party Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the Guangzhou Municipal People's Government, sponsored by a total of 7 social organizations in Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Macau	2019.04.24
	Hong Kong Financial Secretary Chen Maobo: Many funding schemes support young people's development	Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	2019.05.12
	Shenzhen-Hong Kong Start-up Internship • Exchange Program <sup>10</sup>	Greater Bay Area International Innovation Institute	2019.07.24
	Hong Kong and Macao Youth Home headquarters opened in Tianhe District Zero rent settled in Guangzhou "Nathan Road" Hong Kong Young Entrepreneurs Guangdong Economic Mission	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Home Affairs Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2019.10.22
General Service	Hong Kong Young Entrepreneurs Guangdong Economic Mission	Guangdong Youth Federation	2014.2.28-3.2
	One to one" in-depth communication	Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League, Hong Kong Youth Federation	2016.09.23 起
	Guangdong-Hong Kong Youth Key Cooperation Project	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Education Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, and Home Affairs Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2016.12.13
	Hong Kong Guangdong Youth Association	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Guangdong Youth Association of Hong Kong, etc.	2016.12.13
	The Hong Kong Youth Service Corps Old Students' Association visits the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province	Related Offices of Guangdong Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office	2017.04.13
	Director Liao Jingshan met with representatives of Hong Kong Youth Association	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Mingzhi Youth Service Association of Hong Kong, Asia Pacific Hong Kong Innovation Alliance	2017.05.18

<sup>10</sup> The program is organized by the Greater Bay Area International Innovation Institute (co-founded by the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and Shenzhen University), and includes field visits to start-ups, multinational technology companies and creative cultivation bases in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, and investor arrangements for participants And entrepreneurial mentors, guiding entrepreneurial ideas, etc., attracted 76 young people from Hong Kong, mainland China and overseas to help them develop innovative entrepreneurial horizons and promote youth entrepreneurship in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area.

Director Liao Jingshan met with a delegation from the Guangdong Youth Federation of Hong Kong <sup>11</sup>	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Hong Kong and Guangdong Youth Federation	2017.08.25
Director Liao Jingshan went to Hong Kong to meet with the Director of the HKSAR Government's Home Affairs Bureau Liu Jianghua and the Director of the Education Bureau Yang Runxiong	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Home Affairs Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2017.09.14
The 1st Anniversary of the Establishment of the Hong Kong Guangdong Youth Association and the First Guangdong-Hong Kong Youth Forum	Department of Administration of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong China Joint Affairs Office, Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Hong Kong Special Administrative Bureau, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the Guangdong Province, United Front Work Department of the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, Guangdong Youth Federation, Hong Kong Guangdong Youth General meeting	2017.12.13
Director Liao Jingshan travels to Hong Kong to discuss work with Director Liu Jianghua	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Home Affairs Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government	2017.12.19
Deputy Director Ye Weiyuan Meets with Delegation from Hong Kong Federation of International Chamber of Commerce	Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, Hong Kong Federation of International Youth Chamber of Commerce	2018.06.26

**Source:** "Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao Youth Exchange" section of the official website of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the People's Government of Guangdong Province, <http://hmo.gd.gov.cn/ygaqsnjl/>

The statistical data in Table 1 show that the effectiveness of youth exchange work in Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao has been relatively obvious in the past decade, and has received support from all parties.

Opening up internship channels needs to provide more convenient conditions for Hong Kong and Macao youths to find employment and start businesses in the Mainland. First, the government guided the study and formulation of employment and entrepreneurship internship programs for young people from Hong Kong and Macau in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area to provide effective support for young people from Hong Kong and Macau to conduct employment and entrepreneurship internships in cities in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. The second is that government administrative departments, institutions, etc. provide some suitable positions to allow Hong Kong and Macao youths to gain internships in civil servant positions in the Mainland of China to better understand Mainland China's system reform, economic development, urban construction, environmental protection, people's livelihood services, social management and

<sup>11</sup> In recent years, about 2,000 Hong Kong youths have participated in the "Guangdong-Hong Kong Summer Internship Program", which has further deepened their understanding of Guangdong's economic and social development, experienced Guangdong's employment and entrepreneurship environment and workplace culture, and their impression of the Mainland has changed a lot. He hoped that the Guangdong Youth Federation of Hong Kong (referred to as "Yongzong") would actively understand the urgent needs of Hong Kong youths and take the initiative to make use of the channel and resource advantages of Yongzong's 21 cities in Guangdong Province. Opportunities for the development of the urban agglomeration in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. The Chief of the Youth Commission said that the association is cooperating with national policies and the construction and development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area to conduct research on the entrepreneurial development of young people in Hong Kong and the Mainland. It hopes to provide relevant suggestions and help the governments of Guangdong and Hong Kong launch Policies and measures for youth development in Guangdong and Hong Kong. At the same time, the president hopes to deepen the communication between the youth of Guangdong and Hong Kong and use the advantages of the funds of the association to build a development platform for Hong Kong youth in the Greater Bay Area.

other aspects. Specific practices. The third is that large state-owned enterprises provide suitable positions for professional counterparts from Hong Kong and Macao internships to help Hong Kong and Macao youth understand the operating characteristics of public-owned enterprises in Mainland China. The fourth is to encourage and guide the relevant units of the Federation of Industry and Commerce of the cities in the Greater Bay Area to provide suitable positions for employment and entrepreneurship internships for Hong Kong and Macao youths, expand channels for Hong Kong and Macao youths to work in the Mainland, entrepreneurship internships, accumulate work experience in the Mainland, and establish an extensive network of contacts. , And gradually integrate into the social and economic development of the Greater Bay Area.( Huo Qigang,2019) "Young entrepreneurs in Hong Kong all said that after starting their business in Shenzhen, they completely changed their previous views on the Mainland of China. The advantages of the Mainland of China are not only low cost, but also rich information that closely follows the demands of the international market. Young partners with experience in innovation and entrepreneurship, continuous improvement of policy and support services provided by the government and the park, and broad market space. "(Department of Social Affairs, Guangdong Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province,2016)

The construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is a new attempt to promote the formation of a new pattern of comprehensive opening-up in the new era and a new practice to promote the development of the "one country, two systems" cause. Enhancing the enthusiasm of Hong Kong and Macao youth is the key point to promote the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. The problem is that "Suigang, Hong Kong and Macao youth have formed a development view that has both commonality and characteristics under different economic, social, and cultural development environments. Seventy percent of the young people in the three places hold the same view on environmental protection. Pursue economic growth and sacrifice the environment. In terms of the focus and attention of socio-economic development, the differences between the youth development concepts in Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Macau are obvious. The youth development concept in Guangzhou is more homogeneous, which values social stability and economic development. Insufficient awareness of participation; Hong Kong's youth development concept is more complex, and it values freedom of speech and participation in decision-making, but it lacks national identity and attention; Macau's youth development concept has the most diversified characteristics. It values both economic development and other social policies and political rights. "(Deng Zhiping & Zhao Daojing,2017)

Promoting the integration of Hong Kong and Macao youths into the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is of great significance to politically strive for a new force that is beneficial to us and to promote politics through the economy. It is necessary to build more platforms and more ladders for the development of Hong Kong and Macao youths, help them solve practical difficulties and problems encountered in academics, employment, entrepreneurship, etc., and create a social environment that is conducive to the realization of young people's dreams in life. Comparatively speaking, Macau has a patriotic historical tradition, and Macao young people have more patriotic genes. However, under the current confluence of "Hong Kong independence" and "Taiwan independence", it is necessary to be highly vigilant of the negative impact of "Hong Kong independence" and "Taiwan independence" on the youth of Macao. In conjunction with the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, it is necessary to provide Macao youths with political and economic development opportunities, and cultivate and strengthen Macao youths' cultural identity to the motherland.

The important starting point for the youth exchange between Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao is project cooperation, and the important object of promoting and supporting the cooperation mechanism is the backbone of young entrepreneurs. While providing services, the government must give full play to the role of the market in allocating resources and clarify the power and responsibility relationship for employment of young people from Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau in the Greater Bay Area. Neither can the "green light" blindly cause dissatisfaction among the young people in the Mainland, nor can they "lazy" and "do nothing", and miss the opportunity to attract Hong Kong and Macao young people to develop in the Chinese mainland.

Attach great importance to cultivating the backbone of Hong Kong and Macao youth who have both morals and talents in the process of integration into the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. In the course of working with Hong Kong's youth, "Everyone who benefits is good, but the best is scattered." Only those highly motivated young people who are highly recognized by the country can better serve Hong Kong and Macao tomorrow. Effectively break the bottleneck of Hong Kong and Macao youth's employment and entrepreneurship in the Mainland. The main problem in Hong Kong is economic, not political. With the economic problems resolved, the lives of Hong Kong people improved, and the political problems were solved. The crux of the current problem in Hong Kong is the lack of land, which leads to high property prices and expensive rents.

It is worth noting that when we consider the prospects of Hong Kong and Macao youths integrating into the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area from a strategic perspective, we must pay more attention to attracting young people at the grass-roots level, paying attention to the issues and difficulties encountered by young people at the grass-roots level. Establish a platform for youth employment and entrepreneurship, so that young people in Hong Kong and Macao have a sense of belonging and belonging, and facilitate their living and working in the Greater Bay Area, and then attract them to identify with the country, gain development space and development momentum from the development of the country, and jointly compose a great rejuvenation Times chapter.(Sun Cuiping,2019)

In order to further solve the institutional and institutional problems encountered by young entrepreneurs in Hong Kong and Macao, the advantages of the "one country, two systems" system need to be brought into play, the continuity and applicability of the Hong Kong and Macao youth entrepreneurial mechanism guaranteed, the combination of government guidance and the fundamental role of the market, and the establishment of support Coordination mechanisms and institutions for youth entrepreneurship in Hong Kong and Macao, strengthening the construction of publicity and dissemination mechanisms for youth entrepreneurship policies in Hong Kong and Macao, and implementing solutions to the issue of entrepreneurship treatment for youth in Hong Kong and Macao.(Fang Muhuan,2019)

To make up for the shortcomings of innovative talents in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, it is necessary to transform the institutional differences in the Greater Bay Area into institutional advantages, adhere to the foundation of "one country", make good use of the benefits of "two systems", and face international competition and cooperation, and future strategies Layout, actively planning the current and future development of the field of talents and education, and making breakthroughs in increasing talent introduction, creating a "soft environment" for talent introduction, deepening the integration of production and education, and giving education more autonomy.(Yan Yugui,2019)

As a high-frequency term in the Outline of the Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, the word "talent" appears 39 times, far exceeding the "funds" element that only appeared 8 times. Forming an efficient and convenient flow of production factors in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is an important challenge for the development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. The core lies in promoting the efficient flow and concentration of talent factors. As a highly competitive city of talents in the "9 + 2" cities of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, Shenzhen should continue to promote three organic combinations: organic integration of talent concept change and institutional innovation; market integration and government guidance; The organic combination of ecological cultivation can continue to be a "pioneer" in the context of the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area.(Liu Jiancui & Chen Rui,2019)

In August 2018, relevant departments of the Chinese Central Government announced a number of measures to facilitate the development of Hong Kong and Macao compatriots in the Mainland, which ranged from buying train tickets to employment and social insurance. They responded to Hong Kong citizens living, studying and employment in the Mainland And other concerns. On December 18, 2018, the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs

Office of the State Council of China announced policies and measures to facilitate the study, employment and living of Hong Kong and Macao compatriots in the Mainland of China, including housing provident fund treatment, Hong Kong and Macao student scholarships, and Hong Kong and Macao researchers working in the Mainland of China can apply to the state agency. Section Fund and other aspects.(Anonymous,2019a)

In July 2019, the "Implementation Opinions on the Implementation of the" Outline of the Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area "" (hereinafter referred to as "Implementation Opinions") issued by the Guangdong Provincial Government proposed that the construction of social security systems should be improved to promote the People's livelihoods such as medical care, pensions, and housing enjoy the same treatment as residents in the Mainland of China. Taking pensions as an example, we support Hong Kong and Macao investors to set up social service agencies such as old-age pensions, sole investment, joint ventures or cooperation in the Pearl River Delta in accordance with regulations. Hong Kong and Macao investors set up pension institutions in Guangdong to enjoy the same treatment as private pension institutions in the Mainland. The software and hardware facilities are constantly being improved, and retirement in the Mainland has become a new choice for many Hong Kong and Macao residents. In the field of education, the activities of sister schools in Guangdong and Hong Kong primary and secondary schools have continued to advance, with a total of 721 pairs concluded at the end of 2018. At the same time, we support Hong Kong primary and secondary school teachers and preschool teachers to obtain teacher qualification certificates and teach in Guangdong, and continue to send outstanding teachers to Hong Kong for teaching Instructor; The policy of "welcome enrollment, treat all persons equally, and enter the nearest school" is implemented for children of Hong Kong and Macao residents attending schools in the Bay Area compulsory education stage. (Anonymous,2019b)

Promote high-quality development with the Guangdong-Hong Kong Industry-University-Research Alliance. Drawing on the successful experience of the Shenzhen Research Institute of the City University of Hong Kong, the 13 universities in Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Vocational Training Council, the Productivity Promotion Bureau and other institutions jointly discussed the establishment of the "Guangdong-Hong Kong Industry-University-Research Innovation Alliance" to form the "Incubator-Accelerator-Industrial Park" Level incubation system. Learn from the practice of the Guangdong-Hong Kong Robotics Research Institute, innovate the "campus + industrial park", "campus + enterprise" cooperation model, bring into play the driving effect of attracting talents and attracting talents from Hong Kong-funded enterprises, and actively guide Hong Kong young people with innovation and entrepreneurship needs to participate in the innovation drive In the strategic construction, through the establishment of graduate schools, science and technology information laboratories, and the support of knowledge talents, Hong Kong universities are responsible for day-to-day management, project research and guidance, and fostering high quality of practical ability, innovation ability and international competitiveness. Compound talents, engaged in applied research, industrial incubation, etc., to get through the "last mile" from theoretical research to applied practice. The governments of Guangdong and Hong Kong, Guangdong and Hong Kong enterprises, universities, and research institutes have jointly invested resources to create a research platform to promote the transformation and upgrading of Hong Kong enterprises in the Pearl River Delta and rely on innovation to drive the road to high-quality development. The success of Shenzhen DJI Innovation Technology Co., Ltd. lies in fully integrating the advantageous resources of Guangdong and Hong Kong. With the "Hong Kong Education + Shenzhen Innovation + Dongguan Smart Manufacturing" innovation model, it has reached the peak of the drone field. Relying on the Guangdong-Hong Kong Industry-University-Research Alliance as a platform link and based on the accumulated production strength of Hong Kong-funded enterprises, the rapid transformation of the concept of high-tech elements from laboratories to market products in Guangdong and Hong Kong has been promoted to promote the seamless connection of achievements with the social market. Promote the transformation and upgrading of the Guangdong-Hong Kong industry from quantitative change to qualitative change, and reshape the new driving force for the development of Hong Kong-funded enterprises.(Kong Jianzhong,2018)

Strive to be led by the Ministry of Science and Technology, build a consultative management mechanism between the governments of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao, science and technology departments and other

relevant functional departments, explore the establishment of a Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Science and Technology Co-development Leading Group, and establish Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Technology Innovation Joint meeting, comprehensively coordinating the science and technology development strategy and planning of the Greater Bay Area, supporting policies, and solving some key issues encountered in the process of cooperation; studying and formulating management measures for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area science and technology innovation cooperation project management and the open sharing of science and technology resources Management measures, etc. At the same time, a cooperation network for intellectual property protection in the Greater Bay Area will be established, a pilot program for mutual recognition of intellectual property rights in the Greater Bay Area, and a public service platform for intellectual property information in the Greater Bay Area will be established. Promote the efficient and free flow of talents. Establish a high-level research university such as the University of Science and Technology of the Greater Bay Area from a high starting point to strengthen exchanges and cooperation among young people in the Greater Bay Area; explore the "dual-appointment professor" mechanism to attract first-class scholars from Hong Kong and Macau to be recruited to universities in the Mainland for long-term simultaneous employment; The scope of practice has been extended to the entire Greater Bay Area, increasing areas of mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Aiming at the residence permit holders of Hong Kong and Macao residents enjoying public services such as education, medical treatment, sports, law, and social insurance in the Mainland, the relevant regulations or operating rules shall be issued as soon as possible to meet the working and living needs of Hong Kong and Macao residents in the Mainland. Build Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macau youth innovation and entrepreneurship platforms in cities such as Foshan, Dongguan, Zhongshan, explore the establishment of the Greater Bay Area Youth Innovation and Entrepreneurship Base Alliance with Hong Kong and Macau, regularly organize a series of youth week activities in the Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macau Greater Bay Area, and establish a one-stop promotion and service platform. Support Hong Kong and Macao young talents and college graduates to carry out innovation and entrepreneurship in the Bay Area. Explore the formation of a think tank for science and technology development in the Greater Bay Area, focusing on the theoretical and applied decision-making research on global technological innovation governance, and create a social innovation governance pattern of pluralism, co-governance, and common prosperity.(Li Zhijian & Ye Maogui,2019)

Generally speaking, the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area provides rare development opportunities for young talents in Hong Kong, Macau and Guangdong. However, the true innovation practice of youth in Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao also requires the country and Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau to provide good entrepreneurship Social ecological environment.

## VI. Conclusion

The united front work in the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area involves many aspects, and many issues are worth in-depth discussion and analysis. However, attention should be paid to the issues of political construction and direction in the economic construction of the Greater Bay Area. From the perspective of symbiosis, the question of how the main bodies of the construction of the Greater Bay Area under different administrative management systems "same frequency" and "resonance" should be A response to the "market theory" of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area proposed by Professor Zheng Yongnian of the National University of Singapore.

The "same frequency" in the innovation-driven development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area may come from the scientific and technological fields or intellectuals in areas such as technology, education and medicine where young people are more concentrated. To this end, it is necessary to focus on investigating the attitudes, opinions, and action practices of young people in Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao, especially those in colleges and universities, and responding to the demands of young people, in order to better help the effective realization of national strategic goals.

When discussing the issue of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, "one country, two systems" is a topic that cannot be bypassed. The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is another national strategy that has persisted and improved the "one country, two systems" over the past two decades since the sovereignty of Macau and Hong Kong returned to China. It is of great significance to promote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. However, many residents in Hong Kong and Macau lack a correct understanding of "one country, two systems". In fact, "one country, two systems" is an organic whole, "one country" is the premise of "two systems", and "two systems" are "two systems" based on "one country", which cannot be discussed "Two systems" without "one country". The implementation of "one country", "Two systems" is a pioneering initiative to resolve the issue of sovereignty. However, the governance of state sovereignty is different from the governance of SAR affairs. From the perspective of social ecology and governance, "one country" should be the governance of national sovereignty, and "Two systems" are the governance of the SAR society. In addition, the social and cultural environments of Hong Kong and Macau are different. Protestantism in Hong Kong is more prevalent, and values of universality are valued. Catholicism in Macau is relatively conservative. From the perspective of the legal system, Hong Kong is a marine law system, and Macau is a civil law system. The influence of the department on social ecology is different. The law system of Macau and the law system of the mainland of China are both civil law systems. Therefore, the social ecology of Macau is closer to that of mainland China than Hong Kong.

## References

- Anonymous.2017. Ma Xingrui: Guangdong-Hong Kong cooperation injected strong impetus into the economic development and improvement of people's livelihood of the two places. *People's Network (Hong Kong and Macao)*, 2017-05-20.
2018. Make the Bay Area the home of Hong Kong people. *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, 2018-01-05.
- 2019a. Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao personnel do not need to apply for an employment permit to work in the Mainland. *People's Network*, 2019-04-29 17:24:46.
- 2019b. Serving Hong Kong and Macau Youth Innovation and Entrepreneurship Sharing Development Benefiting People's Livelihood. *Nanfang Daily Online*, 2019-08-05 10:15:35.
- Chen Jianshuo.2018.New Opportunities for Young People Brought by the New Development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. *New horizons*, (6): 87-90.
- Chen Jie, Liu Zuoqing, Su Rong.2019. Research on Talent Cooperative Development Mechanism of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area: Based on the Experience Promotion of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Talent Cooperative Demonstration Zone. *Science and Technology Management Research*, (4): 114-120.
- Chen Xinxin.2019.Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and New Exploration of "One Country, Two Systems". *People's Forum*, 4 (Early): 28-30.
- Deng Zhiping, Zhao Daojing. 2017.A Study on the Basic Characteristics and Differences of Contemporary Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Macau Youth Development Views. *Youth Exploration*, (2): 98-104.
- Department of Social Affairs, Guangdong Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of Guangdong Province.2016. Mentors from 8 universities in Hong Kong inspect Shenzhen Innovation and Entrepreneurship Base. *Website of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the People's Government of Guangdong Province*. [http://hmo.gd.gov.cn/zdxm/content/post\\_42783.html](http://hmo.gd.gov.cn/zdxm/content/post_42783.html), 2016-05- 06.
- Fang Muhuan. 2019.Policy Mechanism and Optimization Path of Youth Entrepreneurship in Hong Kong and Macau in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area [J]. *Youth Growth and Development Research*, (5): 84-91.
- Gan Lin, Chen Yingbiao, Wu Zhifeng, etc.2018. Changes in Ecological Sensitivity of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in the Past 20 Years. *Journal of Ecology*, (8): 2453-2462.
- Hong Yu.2019.The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in the Making: development plan and challenges. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1679719>.
- Huo Qigang. 2019.Promoting the integration and development of youth in the Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau Greater Bay Area.Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, (5): 80-81.
- Huang Yalan. 2019.Difficulties and breakthroughs in the cooperation between Guangdong, Hong Kong, Macao and the Greater Bay Area Governments. *Journal of the Party School of Xiamen Special Economic Zone*, (5): 55-60.

- Jianfa Shen, Xiaolong Luo. 2013. From Fortress Hong Kong to Hong Kong–Shenzhen Metropolis: the emergence of government-led strategy for regional integration in Hong Kong. *Journal of Contemporary China*, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.795310>.
- Kang Mengyue, Hou Yanquan, Li Yang. 2019. New ideas for optimizing the industrial layout of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. *China Computer News*, 2019-08-12 (015).
- Kong Jianzhong. 2018. Research on the Industrial Integration Development of Xiayue, Guangdong and Hong Kong in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. *Contemporary Economy*, (14): 4-7.
- Li Jianping. 2017. The Evolution and Prospect of the Collaborative Governance Mechanism in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. *Planner*, 33 (11): 55-59.
- Li Zhijian, Ye Maogui. 2019. Problems and countermeasures of promoting collaborative innovation development in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. *Science and Technology China*, (10): 30-34.
- Liang Liwen. 2019. Research on the Paradigm of Economic and Social Community in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area from the Perspective of Social Integration. *Famous Chinese Cities*, (2): 12-16.
- Lin Changhua. 2018. Evaluation of the Coordinated Development Level of Hong Kong and Macao under the Background of the "Great Bay Area" Strategy and Its Enlightenment. *Asia-Pacific Economy*, (2): 143-148.
- Lin Zhiying. 2018. Opportunities, Challenges and Countermeasures for Hong Kong Youths to Go to Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau Greater Bay Area. *Hong Kong and Macau Research*, (1): 55-62.
- Liu Jiancui, Chen Rui. 2019. Promoting the construction of a talented highland in the Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau Greater Bay Area. *Shenzhen Special Economic Zone News*, 2019-04-02 (B06).
- Liu Wei, Huang Qi, Wang Jingwen, etc. 2018. Opportunities and Challenges Facing Hong Kong Youths in the Background of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. *Research on Social Construction (Seventh Series)*, Edited by Wang Ming and Chen Jianqiu, pp.161-170.
- Liu Xiaobin, Zhong Jian. 2018. A Review of the Financial Capital Output Efficiency of China's Three Bay Areas in the Late Industrialization Period. *China Soft Science*, (7): 80-104.
- Liu Zuojing, Chen Jie. 2019. Research on the Development Strategy of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Talent Cooperative Demonstration Zone in the New Period. *Science and Technology Management Research*, (8): 122-127.
- Lu Wenwen, Zou Pingxue. 2019. An Analysis of the Status Quo, Difficulties and Trends of Youth Entrepreneurship in the Cities of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau Greater Bay Area. *Youth Development Forum*, (1): 22-34.
- Ma Zhongxin, Shen Yong. 2018. Institutions for Developing Bay Area Economy-Cultural Supply. *Social Science Research*, (4): 11-18.
- Mao Yanhua, Rong Jianxin. 2018. Strategic positioning and coordinated development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. *Journal of South China Normal University (Social Science Edition)*, (4): 104-109.
- Ou Xiaojun. 2018. A Study on the Development of High-level University Clusters in the World-Class Greater Bay Area: Taking the Three Bay Areas of New York, San Francisco and Tokyo as Examples. *Journal of Sichuan University of Science and Technology (Social Science Edition)*, (3): 83-100.
- Peng Chunhua. 2019. Relying on the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area to promote the integration of Hong Kong youth into national development. *Journal of Guangdong Institute of Public Administration*, (2): 41-50.
- Research Group of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Research Institute of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies. 2019. Coordinated Development of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in the New Era: A Theoretical Analysis Framework. *Exploration in International Economics and Trade*, 35 (9): 105-118.
- Sun Cuiping. 2019. Give full play to the active role of Hong Kong and Macau youths in the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. *Tuanjie Bao*, 2019-04-25 (007).
- Tan Kai. 2019. Analysis of the Opportunities for Youth Entrepreneurship in the Development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. *Knowledge Economy*, (22): 15-16.
- Wang Yinghui. 2018. Hong Kong encourages young people to integrate into the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. *Economic Reference*, 2018-05-08 (003).
- Wang Yu. 2018. The theory of comprehensive governance power: the cornerstone of the rule of law in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. *People's Forum (Academic Frontiers)*, (21): 44-53.
- Xie Baojian, Hu Jieyi. 2019. Research on the Development of Hong Kong and Macau Youths in the Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau Greater Bay Area. *Youth Exploration*, (1): 5-14.
- Yan Yugui. 2019. Thinking of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area to build a world-class high-level creative talents height. *Macroeconomic Management*, (9): 59-65.
- Yang Dongliang, Li Chunfeng. 2019. Research on the Innovation Pattern of Tokyo Greater Bay Area and Japanese Innovation Policy. *Modern Japanese Economy*, (6): 80-92.

- Zhang Jinhe.2018.On the Regional Integration Transformation in the Construction of Guangdong, Hong Kong, Macao Greater Bay Area. *Academic Research*, (7): 58-65.
- Zheng Yongnian.2018. Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and China's Future. *China Real Estate*, (32): 42-47.
- Zhong Yun, Mei Min .2019. Macau's inter-city connections in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area since the return of 20 years. *Journal of South China Normal University (Social Science Edition)*, (5): 41-48.
- Zhu Feng.2019.Research on Youth Development Policy from the Perspective of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. *Youth Development Forum*, 29 (1):3.
- Zhu Feng, Chen Yonghua.2019.Imagination of China's Youth Development Experimental Demonstration Zone from the Perspective of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Strategy. *Youth Development Forum*, (1): 3-13.



# Perception of Cruise Ship Tourists for Service in the Benoa Port, Bali Indonesia

I Ketut Antara<sup>1</sup>, Made Antara<sup>2</sup>, I Nyoman Sunarta<sup>3</sup>, I Gusti Ayu Oka Suryawardani<sup>4</sup>, Ngakan Ketut Acwin Dwijendra<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1,2,3,4</sup> Faculty of Tourism, Udayana University, Bali, Indonesia

<sup>5</sup> Faculty of Engineering, Udayana University, Bali, Indonesia

Correspondence: I Ketut Antara and Ngakan Ketut Acwin Dwijendra, Udayana University, Bali, Indonesia,  
E-mail: acwin@unud.ac.id; ketutantara@unud.ac.id

## Abstract

Service at the seaport as the entrance of cruise ship tourists who come on vacation to various destinations in Bali. Therefore, the facilities at the port of Benoa including at the arrival terminal are part of the first impression that affects the quality of the expectations of cruise ship tourists who will make a visit. Bali is a barometer of Indonesia's tourist destinations developing and renovating port facilities to improve service quality. Foreign tourists who were visited Bali have increased over the past ten years. Not only they access via the Ngurah Rai airport, but many also through the port of Benoa. Guests who choose the port route have own considerations. The port as the first place seen by cruise ship tourists visiting Bali, in fact, there are still many foreign tourists who complain about the quality of service at the Benoa Port of Bali. This study aims to find out the perception of cruise ship tourists who visit Bali about services at the Port of Benoa, Bali. This type of research is descriptive by using a sample was 264 the cruise ship tourists by the purposive sampling technique. The results showed that cruise ship tourists who were visited Bali assessed the service of the Benoa port was good. The highest service dimension in Benoa port is the tangible dimension and the lowest is the empathy dimension.

**Keywords:** Perception, Cruise Ship, Tourist, Services, Port

## 1. Introduction

### *Background*

Bali is one of the main tourist destinations in Indonesia with the number of foreign tourists visiting Bali and Indonesia in the last ten years according to data sourced from the provincial statistical body of the province of Bali in 2018, that tourist visits have increased over the past 10 years. Increased tourist visits to Bali occur because of the natural appeal and uniqueness of Balinese culture, various arts, customs, cultural richness and social religious traditions of a society imbued with Hinduism. The great potential has been packaged as a tourist attraction so that Bali is a mainstay of Indonesian tourism by having cultural tourism characteristics, in accordance with Bali Provincial Regulation No. 2 of 2012 concerning Bali Cultural Tourism.

Benoa Harbor as one of the provincial strategic areas has a large position and responsibility in the tourism arena in Bali. Benoa Harbor functions as a passenger, freight, fuel and Tourism Port service. Efforts to strengthen the function of the Benoa Port have been carried out by preparing a master plan and layout of the port covering an area of 58 Ha. Benoa Port Development consists of 3.55 ha of cargo, 65 ha of cabin area, Marina tourism of 3.7 ha, 3.6 ha of offices, 5.6 ha of passenger terminal. Container terminal 2.63 ha. Liquid and gas bulk terminal 4.7 ha, public facilities 3.9 ha, industry 23.2 ha, and roads 2.4 ha. The development of the Benoa port is carried out in an effort to improve services to all parties who will use the Benoa Port.

Cruise tourists who visit Bali have different reasons than tourists who generally use airplanes, therefore these differences in interests need to be bridged and found a good solution. For example, customs, quarantine, and immigration services must certainly carry out their functions as security or inspection sites, as well as services or service points for cruise ship tourists. On the other hand, cruise ship tourists who have long been in the ship want to quickly get out of the harbor to then enjoy Bali and its beauty which will certainly affect tourist satisfaction. The purpose of this study was to determine the perception of cruise ship tourists about service at the port of Benoa.

### ***Research Question and Objective***

Base on the background above, the formulation of the problem from this study is what is the opinion of cruise ship tourists regarding the quality of service at Bali's Benoa port? While the purpose of this study is to analyze the influence of Bali Benoa Port service quality on cruise ship tourist satisfaction, then research was conducted at the Benoa Harbor in Bali. The cruise ship chosen as the research destination is a cruise ship anchored at the port of Benoa in Bali originating from various countries with the aim of getting heterogeneous respondents. So, this study aims is to analyze the effect of service quality at the Benoa Port of Bali and analyze the opinion of cruise ship tourists regarding service quality Benoa port of Bali.

## **2. Literature Review**

### ***Meaning of Cruise ship***

Cruise ship is a commercially managed accommodation that uses a boat/ship as a facility to get lodging, eating and drinking services, as well as other services for tourists who stay within a certain period of time. The cruise ship tourism industry is categorized into luxury hotels that can be found at sea/ocean, which are often called cruisers, marine hotels or floating hotels ([https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kapal\\_pesiar](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kapal_pesiar)).

Now a cruise is a favorite accommodation that is much in demand by tourists in enjoying their vacation. Perwani (1997: 6) states floating hotels are forms of accommodation found in river, canal or sea areas with special features, including using boats or ships that sail from one place to another, and have a number of guests certain during a predetermined trip.

While Bagyono (2012: 65), mentioned that a cruise ship (marine hotel) is a floating hotel that provides room facilities, restaurants and bars similar to five-star hotels. This means that the service activities of employees towards tourists who stay on cruise ships are not much different from the service activities that occur at other star-rated hotels on land (resorts). The difference is that tourists who stay in star hotels, they can do or enjoy entertainment activities that occur inside and outside the hotel, such as to tourism destinations. While tourists who live on cruise ships, they can only enjoy entertainment in the cruise ship environment within a certain period.

The cruise ship is a floating hotel that provides accommodation, food and beverage services and other services, including entertainment that is packaged in a tour package. Work carried out by officers who work on cruise

ships includes cleaning services, food and beverage services in restaurants, entertainment services, security, maintenance of ship facilities and so on. The control of the ship's activity is the head of the ship (ship's captain or shipmaster) while the affairs of service for tourists who live on cruise ships by their employees are the responsibility of the hotel manager. There are several large cruise companies that are generally well known in the world, including: Disney Cruise Line, Regent Seven Seas Cruise Line, Viking Line, Cunard, Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Holland American Line, Norwegian Cruise Line, Queen Mary, Mediterranean Shipping Company, Carnival Cruise Line, and Star Cruise and others.

### ***Service Quality Measurement***

Service Quality is the difference between the expectations and the reality of the customers for the service they receive. Service Quality can be known by comparing customer perceptions of the services they actually receive with the services they expect. Quality of service becomes the main thing that is taken seriously by the company, which involves all of the company's resources. Based on the opinion above, it can be concluded that the main factors that affect the quality of service are the expected services and perceived/perceived services. If the perceived service matches the expected service, the quality of the service will be perceived as good or positive. If the perceived service exceeds the expected service, the service quality is perceived as ideal quality.

To facilitate the assessment and measurement of service quality, a service quality measurement tool called SERVQUAL (service quality) was developed. SERVQUAL is a multi-item scale that can be used to measure customer perceptions of service quality which includes five dimensions (Zeithami, 2004). Zeithami (2004) identifies 5 (five dimensions of service quality used by customers in evaluating service quality. The five dimensions are tangible, direct empathy, reliability, responsiveness, responsiveness, and assurance (guarantees), which are described as follows.

1. Tangibles (direct evidence), namely the ability of a company to show its existence to external parties. The appearance and capability of the company's physical facilities and infrastructure and the condition of the surrounding environment are tangible evidence of the services provided by the company.
2. Empathy which gives sincere and individual or personal attention given to customers by trying to understand consumer desires.
3. Reliability is the ability to provide the promised service immediately, accurately, and satisfactorily.
4. Responsiveness is the ability of cruise ship employees to help and provide fast (responsive) and appropriate services to tourists by delivering clear information.
5. Assurance, the existence of certainty that is knowledge, courtesy, politeness and the ability of company employees to foster trust in customers for the services provided by the company.

### **3. Research Methods**

Research methods conducted at Bena port, Bali. This study uses data collection techniques with observation, interviews, questionnaires. The sampling technique used a purposive sampling method of 264 respondents. Descriptive qualitative data analysis method and use a Likert scale measurement. Each of the different weights is very good, good, good enough, not good and not good.

### **4. Results and Discussion**

#### ***Perception of Cruise Ship Tourists Who Visit to Bali***

In an analysis of services at the Bena port by cruise ship tourists visiting Bali, it is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Average Value of Benoa Port Services, Bali Indonesia

No	Dimensions	Mean
1	Tangible	4,19
2	Emphaty	4,11
3	Responsive	4,13
4	Reliability	4,16
5	Assurance	4,13
	Average	4,14

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Based on Table 1, it can be seen that the average score of statements regarding services at Benoa port is 4.11 which is in the range of 3.41-4.20 which means good. This means that cruise ship tourists who visit Bali assess that service is good.

Tangible of Benoa harbor includes professional, clean, and neat appearance of tasks, complete and modern equipment, clean and comfortable Benoa Harbor environment, cruise ship tourist assistance guide board for information, neat and comfortable room layout. This physical evidence can affect the comfort and fluency in providing services to every cruise ship tourist. This can be seen from the majority of respondents who stated their agreement, meaning that the physical conditions at the Benoa port service were in accordance with the wishes of the tourists.

Empathy of Benoa port services include officers able to understand the needs of cruise ship tourists, officers treat tourists with attentive attention, officers are easily contacted by cruise ship tourists, officers prioritize the interests of tourists, services do not discriminate. The attention of these officers can affect the comfort and fluency in providing services to every cruise ship tourist. This can be seen from the majority of respondents who expressed their agreement, meaning that sincere and individual or personal attention given by the Benoa port met tourists' expectations.

The responsiveness of Benoa port services includes the readiness of the officers in serving cruise ship tourists, the willingness to help tourists, the officers are quick to respond to the cruise ship cruise ship, provide clear information, and are easily understood by cruise ship tours. This responsiveness can affect the comfort and fluency in providing services to every cruise ship tourist. This can be seen from the majority of respondents who stated their agreement, meaning that the ability of officers at the Benoa port to help and provide fast services to the Benoa port meets the expectations of tourists.

The reliability of Benoa port services includes officers working quickly, officers keeping promises, officers are able to provide good and clear information. This reliability can affect the comfort and fluency in providing services to every cruise ship tourist. This can be seen from the majority of respondents who stated their agreement, meaning that the ability of officers at the Benoa port, the ability to provide the promised services immediately, accurately, and satisfactorily can be demonstrated by the Benoa port and meets the expectations of tourists.

Benoa harbor service assurance includes officers able to answer any questions asked by cruise ship tourists, tourists feeling safe and comfortable, friendly and courteous officers so as to foster confidence in cruise ship tourists, officers demonstrate the ability and knowledge of what is done. This can be seen from the majority of

respondents who stated their agreement, meaning that the certainty given by the Bena port could foster trust in cruise ship tourists.

## 5. Conclusion

The average service score at the port of Bena is 4.11 which is in the range of 3.41-4.20 which means good. Cruise tourists who visit Bali assess the service of the Bena port is good. The highest service dimension at Bena port is the tangible dimension and the lowest is the empathy dimension. In conclusion, the quality of services performed at Bali's Bena Port can be felt well by cruise ship tourists who visit Bali through the Bena port.

## References

- Abbot Tashakkori. 2010. Charles Teddlie. *SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research*. California Sage Publication Inc.
- Affecting Tourist Satisfaction and Its Consequences ". *Journal of Basic and Applied Scientific Research*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 1557-1560.
- Agung Kresnamurti. 2011. *Indonesian Science Management Research Methods. Indonesian Science Management Research Journal (JRMSIO)*. Vol. 2, No. 2, 2011.
- ARLI, P. (2014). The effects of Service Quality Perceptions of Turkish Cruise
- Astina, N. G.2017. Dissertation; *The Effect of Quality of Employee Services Based on Local Balinese Wisdom on the Satisfaction and Intention of Loyal Behavior of Foreign Tourists in Non-Star Hotels in Bali*
- Bagyono 2012. *Tourism and Hospitality*. Alfabeta. Bandung Bali
- Bali Province Manpower and Transmigration Office (Disnakertrans)*. 2017.
- Bali Provincial Statistics Agency. *Bali in Numbers - Bali in Figure 2017*.
- Bali Regional Tourism Office (Disparda Bali), 2017. *Bali Tourism Statistics*
- Bambang. S.2013 Development Policy for Tourism Destination Concepts and Its Applications in Indonesia. Yogyakarta 1. Edition: Gava Media Publisher.
- Fornell, C. 1992. *National customer satisfaction barometer: the Swedish Hospitality Industry*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Corp.pp 43-45. Hospitality Press Pty.
- Hossain, Mohammed Javed. 2012. "Impact of Service Quality on Customer"
- Kevin, Baker., Huyton, Jeremy. 2001. *Hospitality Management: an Introduction*.
- Kotler, Philip and Kevin Lane Keller. 2012. *Marketing Management 13*. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, Inc.
- Kozak, M. 2001. Repeaters' behavior at two distinct destinations. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 28 (3), 784-807.
- Kozak, Martin and Decrop, Alain. 2009. *Handbook of Tourist Behavior*. New
- Mowen, John, C., and Minor, M. 2010. *Consumer Behavior Volume 1, Fifth Edition*
- Oliver, R. L. 1981. *Measurment and evaluation of satisfaction processes in retail settings*. Journal of Retailing, 57 (3), 25-48.
- Parasuraman, et al. 2009. *Delivering Quality Service*. New York: The Free Press. Responsible Tourism, Pine Book Publisher, Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Indonesia.
- Pizam, A., Neumann, Y., Reichel, A. 1978. *Dimensions of tourist satisfaction*
- Regional Regulation (Perda) Number 2 of 2012 concerning *Perspective Cultural Tourism*. Editor: Gee, C. Y., Co-Editor: Sola, E. F. Madrid, Spain: World Tourism Organization.
- Sarbini. M.B.2018. *Tourism Philosophy A Practical Philosophy Study*. 1st edition. Yogyakarta:
- Service Quality on Customer Satisfaction: The Case of Singapore.
- Thai Vinh V (2015) article on maritime economic & logistics, *The Impact of Port*
- Tjiptono, Fandy and Gregorius Chandra, 2012



# Dalem Ped Temple as Knowledge Source of *Rajah Panyengker* Practitioners in Bali, Indonesia

I Made Gede Anadhi<sup>1</sup>, I Nyoman Suarka<sup>2</sup>, I Nyoman Sukiada<sup>3</sup>, Ngakan Ketut Acwin Dwijendra<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1,2,3</sup> Faculty of Cultural Studies, Udayana University, Bali, Indonesia

<sup>4</sup> Faculty of Engineering, Udayana University, Bali, Indonesia

Correspondence: I Made Gede Anadhi and Ngakan Ketut Acwin Dwijendra, Udayana University, Bali, Indonesia, E-mail: acwindwijendra71@gmail; acwin@unud.ac.id; anadhi\_jay@yahoo.com

## Abstract

This article is an implementation of Foucault's theory of knowledge-power relations which is used as a basis for thinking about discussing Dalem Ped Temple as a source of knowledge of practitioners of *panyengker* in Bali today. By asking a question how practitioner *rajah panyengker* thinks about or interpret Dalem Ped Temple. *Rajah panyengker* is a means to get protection from the black magic that is provided by traditional healers on the basis of the level of knowledge about reverence. One of the elements that make up this knowledge is the epistémé or structure of their interpretation of Dalem Ped Temple, which is interpreted by traditional Balinese healers as a source of mystical power in Bali. The results showed that there was a tendency for traditional Balinese healers whether he as *balian*, stakeholder, *sulinggih* who wanted to improve his career as a practitioner of *rajah panyenger*, had to come to this temple, then build a hermitage, his representation in each home where the patients had to pray to the *Bhatara* in Dalem Ped Temple before getting services from the *rajah panyengker* practitioners.

**Keywords:** Knowledge, Source, *Rajah Panyengker*, Practitioners

## 1. Introduction

Talking about the formation of practitioners' knowledge about the *panyengker*'s tattoo, inevitably, we must also look at its genealogy. But not to seek authenticity, starting from when the Balinese use *panyengker rajah* as a media to avoid all forms of magical threats to get prosperity. Because as said by Foucault to look for authenticity or truth like that is no longer possible to do, because like the 'body' he was crushed oppressed by the systems that play behind him (Rusbiantoro, 2001: 15).

Hooykas (1980: 11) did say that Bali had known the art of writing thousands of years ago. When referring to archaeological findings in 882 AD (804 çaka), the Sukawana inscription appears written in Old Javanese. On the contents of the inscription can be seen the existence of a similar situation between Bali and Java in 882 AD. In this inscription, as explained by Goris, the king ordered the monks to build a hermitage in Cintâmani (R. Goris,

1948: 16). But it is uncertain whether Balinese have used *rarajahan* as a medium of healing and protection from black magic.

On the basis of the authenticity of the truth of historical objects, it is not necessary to look for origins when the Balinese first used *rarajahan* as an antidote to magical power attacks. More important than that is the search for interrelated knowledge and power in *raja panyengker* in the present, so as to be able to analyze trajectories of plural, heterogeneous and open events, and how the formation of patterns of knowledge-power relations in *raja panyengker*, without being trapped in truth claims (developed from Dean's thinking, 1994: 35-36, in Ritzer, 2015: 575).

## 2. Literature Review

Even though it is not burdened by the desire to search for truth claims, but there are other things that need to be revealed through this study which is to look for something hidden in the knowledge-power relations in *raja panyengker* that must be found in texts that have been eroded, scratched and reproduced many times (Rabinow, 2002: 270) as seen in the picture of *rarajahan* written by Hooykaas (1980a).

In it there is the fact, that the face of contemporary images is the result of adjusting to Western interests or tastes, so that traditional Balinese portrayal models must yield. The Balinese usually write *rarajahan* on the surface of palm leaves measuring between 350-400 mm and 300-345 mm. Most are drawn horizontally as long as 200-400 mm, but there are also some vertical ones. Horizontal wide picture is very difficult to be reproduced in Western-style books printed on vertical paper. Even though forced to be disposed, but here and there are forced to have reductions (Hooykaas, 1980). Therefore, there are now a variety of improvisations in painting vertical areas (*see Figure 1*).

On that basis the metahistoric of the ideal truth and the texts are not limited to the *raja panyengker* need not be discussed or disseminated through this study. Although it does not focus on the search for the origin of the *ursprung* model, the search for the origins of *raja panyengker* through the *entstehung* and *herkunft* genealogies still needs to be used.

The most important reason for ignoring *ursprung* genealogy is in the *raja panyengker*, which is because he has many weaknesses. One of the forms of weakness is because he is looking for the right essence in *raja panyengker*. *Ursprung* also wants to find the purest possibility and at the same time be able to find out the identity that has been carefully covered for thousands of years regarding *raja panyengker*. If the search is forced it means it must be able to move all the veils to cover the identity of the real *panyengker* tattoo. As Foucault said, such an effort to search for identity is impossible because it is the same thing as asking when God must bear the origin of evil origin (Rabinow, 2002: 272-274).



Figure 1. *Rajah Panyengker* - in Painting Vertical Areas

Source: C. Hooykas, 1980: pp. 16-22

If the search for the identity of the *rajah panyengker* to get the original imposed, then the result is no more than an expansion of metaphysics that arises from the belief that the discovery is actually the most essential and right when the *rajah panyengker* is used for the first time in Bali. However, as said by Foucault, people who like to search for the origin of this model, think that they have found the most incredible moment in the history of the use of *rajah panyengker* in Bali, even though as Foucault said that the origins always precede the history of human birth and are always related with the gods, and the story is always sung as the theogoni, the song of the god (Foucault, 1971: 79).

On that basis, it needs to be reiterated that the history of the birth of *rajah panyengker* does not need to be touched on, because there is more important than that to pay attention to Entstehung and Herkunft from the *rajah panyengker*. The model Genealogy has no desire to bring back the *rajah panyengker* to a period of time in the past, for example in the *Warmadewa* dynasty. The Genealogy of the model is also not intended to fill in a relentless continuity that operates on the spread of negligent depictions of the colony as described by Hooykaas above. Therefore there is no point in asking when the Balinese people start to recognize or use a long-distance tattoo and continue to the present. This means that the description in this section is not intended to prove that the practice of *rajah panyengker* in the past actively still exists in the present. Nor is it to prove that the practice of using the panyengker tattoo of the past continues to revive the present. Nor is it to describe the form of *rajah panyengker* that can be proven in all its changes (developed from Foucault's thoughts as revealed in Paul Robinow, 2002: 279).

There is also no need to follow the complex path of derivation or the existence of the *rajah panyengker* of the past in the present, which also means that it does not maintain the continuation of past events in the appropriate distribution. Means it is not necessary also to identify a disaster, time lapses. There is also no need to reverse a wrong assessment, and a failed calculation, which is left on the *rajah panyengker* which is constantly allowed to emerge in a healing practice and search for timber that exists and is of value to the Balinese people. Also do not need to find the truth or lies that have existed in the *rajah panyengker* in the past (developed from Foucault's thoughts as revealed in Paul Robinow, 2002: 279-280).

### 3. Research Method

Even if we have to go to the past, an important thing to do is to match the documents of the *raja panyenger* today with those that can be found in the past. The rest, what will be done is to rearrange a diverse system of how people today think and interpret the *panyenger*, not the power of meaning that is anticipatory, but a game full of domination. At this point, knowledge-power relations in *raja panyenger* will turn to the surface, meaning whether in the relationship visible knowledge hidden in *raja panyenger* are used as power in the sense of tactics, strategies, techniques and maneuvers to dominate others to be obedient and useful to the truth articulated in it.

The analysis must be able to describe the interaction of knowledge-power relations in the *raja panyenger*, look for patterns of struggle in which the forces in it conflict with one another or are not in accordance with the environment. Until then all these forces to oppose themselves. This analysis must also be able to understand enough strengths in the articulation of the *raja panyenger* in the way practitioners and *raja panyenger* practitioners at this time to turn against themselves, make him ashamed in history and his own body, and give spirit of spirituality to himself towards awareness of the pure Siwa Sidhantha Religion (Rabinow, 2002: 284).

At the last mentioned point there is an opportunity to uncover hidden forces in the *raja panyenger* as thought and interpreted by practitioners and diligents who are able to make him 'laugh' at themselves, so that without being forced to reveal the *raja panyenger* themselves the relations are hidden in it. It will also be clear how relations of knowledge of power form themselves in the *raja panyenger* (developed from Foucault's thought in Rabinow, 2002: 24).

### 4. Results and Discussion

#### *Meaning Structure of Batara*

Not all practitioners' knowledge is driven by the values and norms held by the Balinese, that mastery of Balinese script is a basic requirement to be able to provide services in the procurement of *raja panyenger*, but there are still many who compromise with the discourse developed by people who have the power to speak on behalf of the science of reverence *balinese* that there is something higher than letters and language that is the power of the spirits, *batara*, according to their respective levels of reasoning and experience of these spirits (developed from Foucault's thought as revealed in C. Behan Mc Cullagh 2004: 95).

Knowledge obtained that way can be called togetherness. Lots of knowledge found in Bali, which was taken for granted without having been prepared before. Actually it happens to people who previously did not think or aspire to become traditional healers, do not know age, can be at a young age and even old, even six decades.

The esoteric experience takes various forms, but it can always be related to events in the area of a temple. Suddenly someone is confronted by a small black and white striped snake just in front of the door to enter the temple. Realizing that the snake was found still in the area, the snake was taken to be placed in another part, still in the environment of the temple. Then another esoteric experience takes place, for example suddenly disturbances, trance. After a while being appointed as my uncle of the temple (Interview with Jro Mangku Nyoman Rendi, 7 June 2019).

The Balinese interpret *pamangku* also as a healer (*balian*), because there began to be people who came to him for treatment. There are all kinds of necessities which are due to veins, sprains and some are headaches. In accordance with the type of illness the patient is facing, he will also be known as massage sequence. More than that, nothing can be done. Cannot give medicine or *raja panyenger*. If there are patients who beg for things like that they will immediately ask for the temple, the place where my uncle is serving, being a servant of the

people. In such conditions, the position is no longer a sequence, but *pamangku*. Because the *panyengker* is given only in the form of holy water and discourses (Interview with Jro Mangku Nyoman Rendi, 7 June 2019).

Regarding the level of experience and reasoning, the *balian* trust their esoteric experience with *batara* more than with a *rajah panyengker* in the form of literary drawings on the means of protection for their patients. They believe that if they have requested permission from their spirits or *batara* lords, by only scratching a line on the floor or ground, then a *panyengker* has been created, which serves to protect their patients from disturbances at once and noisily. So it is similar to the story in *Ramayana* when *Laksmāna* drew a *panyengker* line to protect her sister-in-law *Dewi Sita* on a scale and noetic basis. There is no need for special exercises to master this knowledge, because people who have the gift of a certain deity whose power is higher than other deities will be able to do that, so as soon as he scratches his hand, the stroke has turned into a *rajah panyengker* (Interview with Jero Mangku Baruna, 2 June 2019).

There are also *balian* that give *rajah panyengker* without following the standard, because they do not have the ability or can not write *Balinese* characters as they should. But if there are patients who ask for the sake of adding a sense of security in living his life, then *balian* will give *rajah panyengker* which he called as *bekel* (talisman). Made of cloth with *Rajah Dasa Bayu* who then was asked by the *Pasupati* to his lord *batara*. But they do not know whether the thing is functioning, because previously they had no experience of the workings of the characters in the *rajah panyengker*. But patients themselves later find it useful when they come again for treatment (interview with Jro Mangku Dalem Peninjoan, 3 June 2019).

The efficacy of this model's *bekel* is not in its script, because the script could have been an imitation that could easily be taken from the *dasa bayu* script used by the *sulinggih* at the traditional Balinese building construction ceremony. By reasoning remembering the name of the *dasa bayu* script, which means the ten forces of nature, then the logic of thinking is that the script can certainly be used for other purposes, namely to protect patients from interference with magical powers. The series of *dasa bayu* scripts is then invented, written on a white cloth and wrapped in black cloth and the *Pasupati* grace is given to the *Batara* lord to have strength. Further, it is given to patients who ask for protection from wherever they come from (Interview with Jro Mangku Dalem Peninjoan, 3 June 2019).

Once a protector (*bekel*) shows its function, the patient will be more obedient and useful to the truth contained in practitioners' knowledge. The knowledge was then used as a power in the sense of tactics, techniques, strategies, and maneuvers to make patients compliant and useful to the science of reverence by means of discourse, which one should not only depend on *Rajah Panyengker* but must continue to ask them always sincerely beg for God's protection through the intermediaries of *Batara Hyang Guru* in *Sanggah Kemulan* and in the *Kayangan Tiga temple* (Puseh, Desa and Dalem) in their respective places of origin (Interview with Jro Mangku Dalem Peninjoan, 3 June 2019).

The thought or the meaning of *rajah panyengker* as mentioned above further confirms that humans are always compromising with people who have the power to speak in this case is a *balian* who dares to state that over the strength of *bekel* or *panyengker*, there is a high power namely *Batara Hyang Guru* in *Sanggah Kemulan* and *batara* residing in *Kayangan Tiga* temple. But not all *balian* agree with these articulations. Armed with reasoning, experience, and the structure of the meaning of black magic (*leak*). They dare to mention that the highest science of *leak* called *Pudak Sategal*, is said to be able to penetrate the strongholds of all temples, so there is no point in taking refuge in the temple. However, before carrying out the action the *leak pudak sategal* authorities should still have the blessing of the Dalem temple authorities, namely *Dewi Dhurga* (Interview with Jro Mangku Dalem Peninjoan, 3 June 2019).

The above phenomenon shows that the level of *connaissance* knowledge in the sense of return is influenced by the reasoning power, esoteric experience, and the structure of their respective meanings of the universe. Therefore, in some cases until there is said *Batara Baruna* (ruler of the sea) is everything, more than the power

of God. They believe it because by whatever means used to treat patients of origin has been blessed by *Batara Baruna*, patients will get benefits and everything they want will be realized (Interview with Jro Mangku Baruna, 3 June 2019).

Getting a gift from *Batara Baruna* becomes a very specific thing, it is not a common thing in *balian*. In general *balian* relies on his belief in the *batara* in the *Dalem* temple which places the goddess *Dhurga* as the highest and the *batara* who rests on the sacred statues they have. In addition, no less important are ancestral weapons (heirlooms) which are believed to still be magical because they are always nourished spiritually by making offerings in the form of offerings on certain days (Interview with Ida Rsi Agung Bang Pinatih, 17 March 2019).

In providing therapy, practitioners of typology *balian* usually ask for help from the lord *batara*. Not long after they will trance, *kerauhan*, possessed by the lord's *batara* spirit. Once giving a touch, the patient will scream hysterically and some even faint. When dealing with a paralyzed patient, by only patting his body, the patient is cured and protected from mystical diseases (Interview with Ida Rsi Agung Bang Pinatih, 17 March 2019).

Connaissance knowledge hidden in such healing practices does not recognize territoriality, so that it easily and very quickly spreads across time and space, until it is captured by patients across districts. They generally complain of an incurable illness, commonly called *babai*. Without being realized by the patient's introductory family, in themselves they have formed a discourse (language in action), that only by treating the *balian* who treats his patients while complaining, then patients who suffer from even the most ignorant diseases such as *babai* can be cured and at the same time get protection (*panyenger*) from all the destructive actions or *ugig* (Interview with Ida Rsi Agung Bang Pinatih, March 17, 2019).

By being touched while being heeded by the healer, the patient affected by the *babai* disease will name the people who ordered him to hurt the patient and anyone involved in the process makes him sick. Then proceed with the process of expelling evil spirits from the patient's body. Very often healing with this method results in a quarrel in the patient's household, because they are upset and angry with those who are declared involved in the procurement of the family's illness. However, the mention of the names was not accompanied by physical evidence, so that here and there appeared denial and continued resistance to the authorities. They accused the healers of slander, so that the authorities intervened to conduct an investigation (Interview with Ida Rsi Agung Bang Pinatih, 17 March 2019).

But not all *balian* use a similar method when dealing with *babai* disease. Once touched, the patient has been screaming, but there are *balian* who do not want to pursue further the source of the disease suffered by the patient so as not to be opposed by the source of the disease. Thus while treating his patients he was still conscious. It can still separate itself from the lord *batara*, so that it is able to deal with the patient more subtly, for example by saying, "*nah jani megedi cai, suwud nyakitang anak nenenan*" (now you go away from this person's body, stop hurting him). After that the patient is conscious then again continued with the massage (Interview with Jro Mangku Nyoman Rendi, dated June 7, 2019).

The esoteric experience initially only formed *connaissance* knowledge in the self of a *balian kاپican* like this. Even though I have never studied formal massage techniques, but because of constantly undergoing balanced practice, the *connaissance* knowledge finally turns into *savoir*, which is able to explain scientifically the anatomy of the body, many ailments basically originate from veins, whatever is blocked must cause pain in the body especially that is blocked is blood circulation (Interview with Jro Mangku Nyoman Rendi, dated June 7, 2019).

On the other hand, there are also things like that that are not satisfied with their abilities. They do not want to treat by way of monkeyism (trance). This method can be very dangerous for himself and others. On that basis, unnoticed by frequent changes to the *epistémé*, the structure of its interpretation of the *batara* residing in *Dalem* Temple, the place where he became the executor of the ceremony and then sought the blessing of the *batara* whose position, strength, supernatural power was higher than the previous lord *Batara, Dalem Ped* Temple in

Nusa Penida. Changes in epistème which they did not realize gave birth to a discourse (language in action), that only by getting closer, asking for grace on the batara in *Dalem Ped temple* would be obtained by supernatural powers that were more adequate in healing and providing protection to patients (Interview with Ida Rsi Agung Bang Pinatih, March 17, 2019).

### ***Compromising with Dalem Ped Temple***

Compromising with the batara in the Dalem Ped temple and other symbolic elements, is part of the formation of the Balinese epistème regarding the *raja panyenger*. Requests for grace at *Dalem Ped temple* should not be done remotely, but must prostrate before the altar of worship by offering offerings first. Armed with reasoning, the request must also not deviate far from the goal, namely so that there is no longer a concern when he is healing and providing protection to patients, because the ways of complaints have proven to cause problems in the patient environment that continues to legal issues. If the request is granted it means that the healer is no longer complaining when treating his patients (interview with Ida Rsi Agung Bang Pinatih, 17 March 2019).

The change in epistémé marked the change in the structure of Balinese traditional healers for the supernatural world, that there was something higher than the real experience, namely the difference in consciousness between *Buana Alit* (human being) and *Buana Agung* (the universe), that a healer should not only be only a healer utilize the blessings of *batara* when providing services, but must also use literature, which serves to awaken the gods from within the human body (*Bhuana Alit*) to harmonize with the gods in the universe (*Bhuana Agung*), which will create abilities in heal and provide protection to patients become sharper (Interview with Ida Rsi Agung Bang Pinatih, 17 March 2019).

In Bourdieu's language, this phenomenon shows the ongoing process of maturation of habitus or internalization which then thickens the cultural capital of *Balian* practitioners. Efforts to strengthen the capital are done outside of consciousness, which contains efforts to always distinguish themselves from what is done by *balian* in general. Unwittingly, this effort is also one of the strategies, tactics, and maneuvering techniques used by traditional healers to maintain dominance and on the other hand as a means to accumulate the types of symbolic capital they have (Developed from Foucault's thought in Haryatmoko 2017: 45).

This phenomenon also shows that the dominance strategy varies depending on the type of arena. In the arena of social struggle of the *Balian*, the strategy of domination is always related to the effort to draw closer to a source of power that is more powerful than previously possessed, which in this case is the batara in the *Dalem Ped temple*. This step in Foucault's language is called epistémé, because it cannot be separated from how the structure of the meaning of the sacred *balian* in general to the temple.

The name *Dalem Ped temple* takes its own village name, namely *Ped Village*, which belongs to the *Sampalan* region, Nusa Penida, Klungkung Regency, whose name is very well known throughout Bali, which is therefore included in the typology of the *Kahyangan Jagat Temple*. This temple is also referred to as the *Dalem temple*, but not in the Hindu Majapahit conception of the temple which is located in the cemetery as a form or place of worship of Shiva's worship, but refers to *Dalem*, the ruler in Nusa Penida, namely *Ratu Gede Nusa* or also called *Ratu Gede Macaling*. There are so many mythic and mystical stories about the existence of this temple, including the three magic tapels which are believed to be able to cure various diseases, both suffered by humans and plants (the results of the author's field research, January 17, 2018).



Figure 2. *Dalem Ped* Temple in Nusa Penida

Source: Documentation, 2018

There are four locations of this temple which is united in the area of *Penataran Agung Ped* Temple. *Segara* Temple, as the place where *Batara* is based, is located at the northernmost point close to the shoreline of the *Nusa Straits* sea. A few meters to the south is the *Taman* temple with a pond around the worship altar in it. This temple functions as a purification place. Heading west is the location of *Ratu Gede Macaling's* temple as a symbol of the ruler of Nusa Penida. *Penataran Ratu Mas* Temple is located on the east side complete with the Central *Jaba* area with *Bale Agung* building. The *Bale Agung* building is an altar of worshipping *batara* statues from all major temples and statues from twenty-three traditional villages on the island of Nusa Penida, at the grand ceremony of *Ngusaba* (the results of the author's field research, January 17, 2018).

When it comes to this temple, traditional Balinese healers do not question the origin of this temple in detail, they only come to worship to get a gift in accordance with their respective needs. One thing that is more benevolent they do is get closer to all the *batara* in *Dalem Ped* temple by coming directly to make prayers on *piodalan* day (celebrations every 210 days) or on certain holy days and in each place of residence erecting altars worship as his representation and ask all patients to worship and beg for his help.

In Bourdieu it belongs to the stage of strengthening dominance. Domination is not only determined by the ownership of capital, but also habitus and capital placement strategies. Domination through discourse, which is part of the ruler's strategy, turns out to be covering symbolic violence. Therefore objective structures (structures embodied in social space) that cannot be separated from the analysis of the origin of mental structures within biological individuals, which are partly a product of the union of social structures and analysis of origins social structures themselves.

In the case of the healers, their visit to *Dalem Ped* Temple which aims to request an increase in strength and supernatural power ultimately unravels the mechanisms and strategies of domination that they carry out on their patients. The existence of domination is no longer solely from external consequences, that they have come to the *Dalem Ped* temple, but it can also be seen also the consequences that are binded, that patients who request healing assistance to themselves must make prayers to the *Dalem Ped* temple from a distance through *palinggih*, a worship altar that has been built in each practitioner's home (developed from Haryatmoko's thoughts about Bourdieu, 2017).

All *balian* in Bali know the existence of the *Dalem Ped* temple, but not all also compromise with it. It all depends on the level of awareness of each. There are *balian* who are very satisfied because they have received the *batara* award as a massage *balian*. He treats the gift well through the realization that he is just an ordinary person, who has never learned anything about illness and healing, but only touches the diseased part of his patient, instantly he knows the wrong paths in his muscles, for example his muscles seemed to cross, he was sure that was the cause of his illness, then he would return the position of the muscles back to be straight and parallel (Interview with Jro Mangku Nyoman Rendi, 7 June 2019).

So compromising whether or not a *balian* with *Dalem Ped* temple is very dependent on reasoning, esoteric experience, and the structure of their meaning of the universe in Bali. Because it can be understood there are *balian* who dare to disclaim the temple of *Dalem Ped* is nothing compared to the *god Baruna* and vice versa. Or in the case of 'Balian Now' the most powerful is *Basudewa Krisna* and *Dewa Indra*, but must get the blessing from God in accordance with the religion of each patient, Allah for Muslims and Jesus for Christianity.

Finally, it can be said that in every discourse put forward by *balian* there are interrelated relations between the expressions of the discourse, with the underlying *connaissance* knowledge and power relations in the sense of strategy, tactics, techniques, and maneuvers that operate behind them which they use to dominate the the patient. This means that every discourse they make that there is a higher power than *bekel* or *panyengker* is obliged to pray to the *Batara Hyang Guru* in *Sanggah Kemulan* and in the *Kayangan Tiga* temple or *Dalem Ped* temple is a reflection of their esoteric reasoning and understanding structure of the *batara* residing in each of these temples. Thus, the relationship between the expression of the discourse with *connaissance* knowledge which underlies hiding the power relation, which is a product of the practice of power. But that power is plural not centralistic, which grows from various peripheral spaces and is everywhere, including in the spaces of traditional healing practices (developed by Foucault's thought as explained in Piliang, 2004: 223).

## 5. Conclusion

An important conclusion that can be drawn from this study is the relationship between knowledge and power in *raja panyengker* practitioners is not merely a form of practices related to body regulation, behavior regulation, but also the structure of their interpretation of *batara* (God). If they want to enhance their career as practitioners of *raja panyengker*, one way is to ask for strength from the *batara* in *Dalem Ped* Temple. The knowledge hidden in the power of *Dalem Ped* Temple is used as power, in the sense of tactics, strategy, technique, maneuvering to disperse the bodies of patients so that they are obedient and useful to the discourse they offer. The discourse is a *raja panyengker* will not be able to provide protection if it is not accompanied by praying to the *batara* in *Dalem Ped* Temple.

## References

- Dwijendra, Ngakan Ketut Acwin and I Putu Gede Suyoga (2018) 'How A Power Relationship Affects the Practice of Traditional Architecture in Bali, Indonesia', *International Journal of Current Advanced Research*, 07(6), pp. 13350-13354. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.24327/ijcar.2018.13354.2377>
- Dwijendra, NKA (2003). Bali Traditional Housing and Settlements. *Journal of Settlement Natak*, Vol. 1 No. February 1, 2003: 8 - 24.
- Dwijendra, NKA (2008) *Arsitektur Rumah Tradisional Bali, Berdasarkan Asta Kosal Kosali*, Denpasar: Udayana University Press.
- Dwijendra, NKA (2009) *Arsitektur Kebudayaan Bali Kuno*, Denpasar: Udayana University Press.
- Foucault, Michel. 1971. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." Esai ini pertama kali muncul di *Hommage a Jean Hyppolite*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Goris, R. *Sejarah Bali Kuno* (Singaraja: tanpa penerbit, Oktober-November 1948), p.16.
- Haryatmoko. 2017. *Critical Discourse Analysis (Analisis Wacana Kritis) Landasan Teori, Metodologi dan Penerapan*. Jakarta: Rajawali Press.
- Hooykaas, C. 1980. *Drawings Of Balinese Sorcery. Institute Of Religious Iconography State University Groningen*. Leiden EJ Brill: Tuta Sb Aegide Pallas. EJB.
- McCullagh, C Behan. 2004. *The Logic Of History: Putting Postmodernism in Perspective*. London: Routledge.
- Ni Made Emmi Nutrisia Dewi, Ngakan Ketut Acwin Dwijendra (2018) 'Transformation of Bale Daja Architecture in Housing of Sading Village, Badung, Bali, Indonesia', *International Journal of Current Advanced Research*, 07(6), pp. 13221-13225. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.24327/ijcar.2018.13225.2347>
- Piliang, Yasraf Amir. 2004. *Dunia Yang Dilipat: Tamasya Melampaui Batas-Batas Kebudayaan*. Yogyakarta: Jalasutra.
- Rabinow, Paul. 2002. *Pengetahuan dan Metode Karya-Karya Penting Michel Foucault* (Trj. Arief) Yogyakarta: Adipura.

- Ritzer, George.2014. *Teori Sosiologi Modern*. (Terj. Tribowo B.S). Jakarta: Kencana.
- Rusbiantoro, Dadang. 2001. *Bahasa Dekonstruksi ala Foucault dan Derrida*. Yogyakarta: PT Tiara Wacana Yogya.



# The Arminian Controversy: History, Theology, and Art

James W. Ellis<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA

Correspondence: James W. Ellis, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA. E-mail: [jellis@yu.edu](mailto:jellis@yu.edu)

## Abstract

Arminianism is a Biblical interpretive construct and a theological response to Calvinism. Calvinism is the theology advanced by John Calvin, the leading French theologian of the Protestant Reformation. Arminians and Calvinists disagreed on fundamental Christian doctrine, including the doctrine of predestination and the role human free will plays in the process of Christian redemption and salvation. In the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century and in English theological disputes of the eighteenth century, the Arminian-Calvinist conflict divided societies and Christian fellowships. This essay analyzes these historical Protestant conflicts by analyzing relevant historical, theological, and artistic contexts.

**Keywords:** Arminianism, Calvinism, Dutch Golden Age, predestination, Protestant theology, Wesleyan theology

## 1. Introduction

The Dutch Golden Age spanned the last decades of the sixteenth century and the entirety of the seventeenth century. During this time, the Low Countries' Northern Provinces (the Netherlands) revolted against the rule of the devout Catholic Habsburg King Philip II of Spain (1527-1598). The people of the new Dutch Republic adopted the theology and practices of Protestant Calvinism. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, a separate group of Protestants, known as the Remonstrants, or Arminians, split from the Calvinists. The Arminians rejected the Calvinist doctrine of predestination and embraced the concept of free will in the process of Christian redemption; the Dutch nation split along theological lines.

The seventeenth century was also a Golden Age for Dutch painting and printmaking, with the emergence of masters such as Johannes Vermeer (1632-1675) and Rembrandt van Rijn (1606-1669). Rembrandt specialized in portraits and Biblical scenes of the life of Christ. Rembrandt's passionate explorations of Biblical topics, however, were relatively unusual for Dutch art of the Golden Age. Dutch artists tended to depict secular topics and contemporary society in realistic styles. To some extent, the artistic focus on secular subjects reflected a Calvinist cultural ethos. In 1545, the Protestant theologian John Calvin explained his views on art:

I am not ... so superstitious as to think that all visible representations of every kind are unlawful. But as sculpture and painting are gifts of God, what I insist for is, that both shall be used purely and lawfully, that gifts which the Lord has bestowed upon us, for his glory and our good, shall not be preposterously abused, nay, shall not be perverted to our destruction. We think it unlawful to give a visible shape to God, because God himself has forbidden it, and because it cannot be done without, in some degree, tarnishing his glory. ... The only things, therefore, which ought to be painted or sculptured, are things which can be presented to the eye; the majesty of God, which is far beyond the reach of any eye, must not be dishonoured by unbecoming representations (Calvin 1846: 12).

This essay primarily explores the conflicts over Calvinist and Arminian theology that divided the Dutch Reformed Church and Dutch society. Artists visually represented the conflict by creating portraits of the leading figures and popular prints of contemporary events, and, occasionally, by producing allegorical scenes suggesting doctrinal issues. In the eighteenth century, John and Charles Wesley also created literature and musical verses reflecting the differences between Calvinism and Arminianism. These art forms will help contextualize the religious dispute and help explain complex theological topics.

## 2. John Calvin and TULIP Calvinism

Calvinism is the theology advanced by John Calvin (1509-1564), or Jehan Cauvin, the leading French theologian of the Protestant Reformation (Figure 1). John Calvin elaborated his systematic interpretation of Christianity and the Bible in his 1536 treatise entitled *Institutio Christianae religionis*, or Institutes of the Christian Religion, which is perhaps the single most influential statement of Protestant belief (see Calvin 1846). Calvin completed the first edition of Institutes soon after he arrived in Basel, Switzerland, as he fled Catholic persecution of Protestant Christians in his native France. The treatise, which was reprinted in several revised editions and translated into many languages, has been particularly important to Congregational, Presbyterian, and Reformed (or Calvinist) Christians. In 1559, John Calvin assisted with the production of the fifth and final edition, which scholars and theologians treat as the authoritative text. A Dutch translation of the final edition was published in 1560.



Figure 1. Anonymous French painter. Portrait of John Calvin, ca. 1550.  
Public Domain.

Figure 2a shows the title page of the final edition of *Institutio Christianae religionis*, which Robert I. Estienne (1503-1559) printed in Geneva in 1559. Like John Calvin, the printer Robert I. Estienne was a French-born Catholic who became a Protestant. Also like Calvin, Estienne fled from persecution in his home country and eventually settled in Geneva, where he (and his sons) were proprietors of a successful print shop. Figure 2b shows Estienne's device, or symbolic mark, known as *Oliva Stephanorum*. The device depicts the apostle Paul reaching toward an olive tree, perhaps representing the tree of knowledge (Genesis 2:9, The Bible, King James



Arminianism is a Biblical interpretive construct and a theological response to Calvinism. Arminianism differs from Calvinism on the role free will faith plays in divine election, on the extent and purpose of Christ's atonement, and on whether a saint may fall away from faith. Arminians and Calvinists differ, however, most fundamentally, on the concept of predestination. The debate over the respective functions of God's grace and human free will extends back to the controversy involving *Church Father* Augustine of Hippo (354-430) and the theologian and free will advocate Pelagius (ca. 354-418). The Council of Carthage, in 418, ultimately declared Pelagianism (that people may chose good without God's intervening assistance) heretical. Pelagius was expelled to Egypt and the First Council of Ephesus declared him a heretic in 431 (Schaff 2013 edition). Arminianism's immediate historical roots though were the theological debates of late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century Dutch Protestantism.

### 3. Jacobus Arminius and the Remonstrants

Arminianism is named for Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609) (Figure 3). Jacobus Arminius is a Latinized form of his original name Jakob Hermanszoon. Arminius was a Dutch theologian and professor at the University of Leiden. Arminius professed views that formed the basis of Arminianism and the Dutch Remonstrant movement. Figure 3 shows Arminius in his office at the University of Leiden. He looks out of the scene and jesters toward an open Bible, seemingly offering his Biblical interpretations to the viewer.



Figure 3. Posthumous Portrait of Jacobus Arminius, ca. 1650, engraving.  
Public Domain.

Arminius was born in the town of Oudewater, which is between Utrecht and Gouda. He studied at the University of Leiden, and, between 1582 and 1586, he also studied at the universities of Basel and Geneva. The early 1580s were an opportune time for Arminius to be away from his home country. In 1581, the seven Northern Provinces of the Netherlands (which included Arminius' hometown of Oudewater) established the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, and they formally renounced their allegiance to Philip II of Spain. Three years later, Phillip II offered 25,000 crowns for the death of William I, Prince of Orange (1533-1584), stadtholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, and Friesland, and a key Protestant leader in the Dutch Revolt against the Spanish Habsburgs at the beginning of the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648). On July 10, 1584, Balthasar Gérard (ca. 1557-1584), a fanatical Roman Catholic from the Franche-Comté region of eastern France, succeeded in assassinating William I in Delft, by shooting him with two pistols. While battles and bloodshed ravaged his homeland, Arminius was far away in Switzerland closely studying the Bible and the writings of John Calvin and his followers.

Arminius returned to the Netherlands in 1587. The following year he was ordained and the authorities in Amsterdam bestowed upon Arminius a license to preach. At the very beginning of his ministry, events led Arminius to question his Calvinist doctrinal views. A professor of the Dutch town of Franeker named Martin Lydius (ca. 1539-1601) forwarded to Arminius a pamphlet written by certain ministers of Delft assailing John Calvin's views on predestination, justification, and other related matters. The ecclesiastical senate of Amsterdam

asked Arminius to publically repudiate the pamphlets' errors. However, during his research the pamphlets' claims and reasoning gradually won over Arminius. According to his biographer, William R. Bagnall, Arminius,

betook himself to the most diligent study of the Scriptures, and carefully compared with them the writings of the early Fathers, and of later divines. The result of this investigation was his adoption of the particular theory of Predestination which bears his name [Arminianism]. At first, for the sake of peace, he was very guarded in his expressions, and avoided special reference to the subject, but soon, becoming satisfied that such a course was inconsistent with his duty as a professed teacher of religion, he began modestly to testify his dissent from the received errors, especially in his occasional discourses on such passages of Scripture as obviously required an interpretation in accordance with his enlarged views of the Divine economy in the salvation of sinners (Bagnall in Arminius 1853, vol. 1: 12-13).

Krzysztof Lubieniecki (1659-1729) was a painter and printmaker who was born in Pommerania (in a town that is now part of Poland). As a child, Lubieniecki moved to Amsterdam and served an apprenticeship with the portrait painter Adriaen Backer (1635-1684). In Lubieniecki's portrait of Arminius (Figure 4), the theologian holds the pamphlet Martin Lydius sent to him. On his desk, is a collection of Arminius' own publications that outline his divergences with Calvinism.



Figure 4. Krzysztof Lubieniecki. Portrait of Jacobus Arminius, ca. 1705.  
Public Domain.

Jacobus Arminius' public denunciations of predestination met aggressive resistance, most famously from the Calvinist theologian and professor Franciscus Gomarus, or François Gomar (1563-1641). During the 1580s and 1590s, Gomarus was a Dutch Reformed pastor in Frankfurt am Main, a *Reichsstadt*, or Imperial Free City, in the Holy Roman Empire. He then became a professor of theology at the University of Leiden. When Arminius joined Leiden's faculty, Gomarus became his chief theological adversary. In 1608, Arminius and Gomarus debated Calvinism before a gathering of Holland's regional governmental estates. At the Synod of Dort, Gomarus led the opposition (or Contra-Remonstrants) to the Arminians (or Remonstrants) and to the document published by Arminius' followers, popularly known as The Remonstrance.

The word remonstrance is a Renaissance-era variation of the Medieval Latin term *remonstratus* (to show or demonstrate) and it normally denotes a systematic presentation of points of opposition. In 1610, a group of Dutch Reformed pastors met to draft a publication of their shared concerns regarding Calvinism. Johannes Wtenbogaert (1557-1644) had responsibility for completing the final version. Wtenbogaert studied theology in Geneva, where he fell under the spell of Arminianism, and he eventually became a pastor in The Hague. When Arminius died in 1609, Wtenbogaert took on his mantle. The Remonstrance, or *Remonstrantie*, was completed, signed, and officially presented to the States of Holland and Friesland in July 1610. The Remonstrance contained five articles and assertions, which are summarized thusly:

1. God's election to salvation is conditioned upon faith in Jesus Christ; God elects to save those he has known for eternity will have faith.
2. Jesus Christ died for all men and women, but election and salvation is limited to those who believe in Christ.
3. Men and women are unable to do the will of God in and of themselves, and cannot save themselves apart from God's grace.
4. People have the free will to resist God's prevenient grace.
5. Perseverance of the saints *may be* conditioned upon their continued faith in Christ [this issue was later resolved, with many Arminians believing perseverance of the saints *indeed is* conditioned upon their continued faith] (The Full Original Act 2016).

The Remonstrance's articles challenged Calvinism generally, but also challenged The Belgic Confession (or *Confessio Belgica*) specifically. The Belgic Confession (also known as The Confession of Faith) is a standard doctrinal statement of the Dutch Reformed Church and other international Reformed denominations. The term *Belgica* comes from Gallia Belgica, a province of the ancient Roman Empire that encompassed areas of modern Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and Germany. Guido de Brès (1522-1567), a Walloon pastor, reformer, and theologian, who had studied under John Calvin in Geneva, compiled and published the Belgic Confession in 1561. The first Latin translation of Brès' revised text was the *Harmonia Confessionum*, of 1581. Festus Hommius (1576-1642), the leading publicist of the Contra-Remonstrants completed a second Latin translation for the Synod of Dort.

#### 4. The Synod of Dort

The Synod of Dort was held between November 13, 1618, and May 29, 1619, in Dort's *Kloveniersdoelen*, a large civic building that usually housed the city's militia and armory. At the close of the proceedings, the Canons of Dort were publically presented at Dort's *Grote Kerk*, or Great Church, a medieval Catholic structure that was converted into a Protestant church building (Selderhuis, Moser, & Sinnema 2014: xxiv).

The Synod convened in a highly charged political environment. Between 1568 and 1648, the largely Protestant United Provinces of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg fought The Eighty Years' War, also known as the Dutch War of Independence, against Spain's ruling Catholic monarchs. At the turn of the seventeenth century, Spain seemed poised for victory, but a credible counteroffensive allowed the United Provinces to turn the struggle into an unproductive war of attrition and to secure the Twelve Year's Truce, of 1609-1621. Throughout the truce, the provinces (known within historiography as the Dutch Republic), strained to maintain public order and cohesion, and often failed, particularly in religious affairs.

The Protestant Reformation came to the Dutch provinces in stages. Lutheranism had little impact. Anabaptism, which placed special emphasis on believers' faith at the time of conversion, as outlined in the Schleithem Confession of 1527, proved popular in the northwestern provinces of Friesland and Holland. Calvinism, which arrived in the mid-sixteenth century, was also strongest in the Dutch western and northern provinces. Calvinist forces liberated the provinces of Holland (where Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague were located) and Zeeland of Spanish Catholic influence in 1572. The majority of residents in these provinces converted to Calvinism, either voluntarily or by compulsion. In the following decade, Arminianism presented its test of Calvinist hegemony. One possible means of soothing tensions caused by a state's religious diversity is seeking after unity or understanding, seeking common ground among traditionalists and reformers. This type of unity proved difficult to achieve in the Dutch federal republic. "Both the character of the [Dutch] Reformed Church as a gathered rather than a national Church, and the decentralized structure of the secular power, made a comprehensive Protestant Church illusory" (Spaans 2002: 78).

Fourteen Remonstrants were called to defend their views at the Synod of Dort, and they were seated at a long central table, surrounded by their opponents (Figure 5). The Contra-Remonstrants, however, not only accused

the Arminians of preaching false, heretical doctrine, they also claimed the Arminians favored compromising with the demands of Spain's despised Catholic monarchs, including Philip III (1578-1621).




Figure 5. The Synod of Dort, ca. 1608-1609, engraving.  
Public Domain.


As the Synod opened, Simon Bisschop (1583-1643), whose Latinized name was Simon Episcopus, stood to offer the Remonstrants' defense. Episcopus was a former student of Jacobus Arminius and professor of theology at the University of Leiden. He had already defended the Remonstrants at conferences held in The Hague (1611) and at Delft (1613). At Dort, Episcopus rose from the Arminians' table and asked if he could speak (Figure 6).

[Episcopus] insisted on being permitted to begin with a refutation of the Calvinistic doctrines, especially that of reprobation, hoping that, by placing his objections to this doctrine in front of all the rest, he might excite such prejudice against the other articles of the system, as to secure the popular voice in his favour. The Synod, however, very properly, reminded him that they had not convened for the purpose of trying the Confession of Faith of the Belgic Churches, which had been long established and well known; but that, as the Remonstrants were accused of departing from the Reformed faith, they were bound *first to justify themselves*, by giving Scriptural proof in support of their opinions. To this plan of procedure, they would by no means submit. It disconcerted their whole scheme; but the Synod firmly refused to adopt any other plan. This refusal, of course, shut the Remonstrants out from taking any part in the deliberations of the body [emphasis in original] (Scott 1856: 27-28).



Figure 6. Episcopus addressing the members of the Synod of Dort, 1889, engraving.  
Public Domain.

Even though Episcopius and the others were effectively excluded from the proceedings, during the Synod of Dort the Remonstrants' supporters continued to publish statements and produce artwork endorsing their side. The popular Amsterdam engraver Salomon Savery (1594-1683) provided a printed image for a fierce broadside attacking the Contra-Remonstrants entitled *Hollantsche Transformatie*, or "Dutch Transformation." Savery's image is known by the clever title *In the Balance* (Figures 7a and 7b). A huge scale, or balance, stands in an interior that resembles Dort's *Kloveniersdoelen*. The theology of John Calvin, represented by his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, sits on the balance's left pan. Contra-Romonstrant Franciscus Gomarus stands behind the pan admiring Calvin's treatise. The right pan holds Arminian writings and the heavy fur robes of Holland's numerous town magistrates who supported Remonstrant theology, including Johan van Oldenbarnevelt. Jacobus Arminius (who had died a decade earlier) is shown standing beside the left pan. The *Arminian pan* seems capable of outweighing the *Calvinist pan*, if not for a heavy military sword, which Maurice of Orange, standing to the left, has placed on the Calvinist side. James I (1566-1625), the King of England and a key proponent of the Calvinist doctrine of predestination sits on a throne in the background looking on approvingly (The Balance 2020).



Figures 7a and 7b. Salomon Savery, *Hollantsche Transformatie*, ca. 1617; Detail. Public Domain.

Artists aligned with the strict Calvinist side of the doctrinal debate also published visual and verbal attacks on the Remonstrants' views. "Artistic allegory is when the subject of an artwork, or the various elements that form the composition, is used to symbolize a deeper or more spiritual meaning" (Tate 2020). An allegorical print issued during the closing days of the Synod of Dort casts a dark cloud on the Arminians, their doctrine, and their motivations (Figure 8). An avian humanoid with five heads and four arms, representing Arminianism, symbolically wreaks havoc and spreads evil. In one hand, the creature holds a sword of *bellum* (Latin for war); in the other hand, he holds a heart pierced by the dagger of *invidia* (envy). He stands both on a baby identified as *innocentia* (innocence or integrity) and on a crushed olive branch, representing peace. A broken sword labelled *justicia* (justice) lies nearby. The figure's grotesque five heads are labelled *avaritia* (greed), *aeothis* (Godlessness or atheism), *seditio* (sedition or inciting rebellion against the state), and *opinio* (perhaps suggesting mere opinion or belief, rather than fact). The Latin inscription at the bottom - warning against the fatal consequences of fervently held, false beliefs - serves as a thinly veiled, foreboding threat.



Figure 8. Polemic allegory depicting Arminianism as a five-headed monster, 1618. Engraving. Public Domain.

### 5. The fall of Dutch Arminianism

Although the Remonstrants has a significant number of advocates among the Dutch populace, the Synod of Dort was less an impartial debate over the merits of the Remonstrants' theological positions, and more an official denunciation of those positions by a series of testifying Contra-Remonstrants, who supported traditional Calvinist doctrine. The Synod delegates drafted a judicial decision entitled *The Decision of the Synod of Dort on the Five Main Points of Doctrine in Dispute in the Netherlands*, commonly known as *The Canons of Dort*, which expressly rejected the Remonstrance's five articles and enshrined the stricter form of Calvinism reflected in the *Belgic Confession*, represented by the acronym TULIP: [T]otal depravity, [U]nconditional election, [L]imited atonement, [I]rresistible grace, and the [P]erseverance of the saints. Having failed to adequately *justify themselves*, the fourteen Dort Remonstrants were ordered to refrain from ministering, preaching, and exhorting in government-ordained churches and were ordered to sign *The Act of Cessation*, a document that would have made the restrictions legally enforceable. The authorities directed *Episcopius* to cease and desist writing letters and books endorsing Arminianism. The Remonstrants refused to sign *The Act of Cessation*, so the Dutch States-General pronounced its punishment:

[I]n consequence of their contumacy and disobedience, the [denounced Remonstrants] shall be conducted by certain officers appointed by their High Mightinesses out of the United Provinces, without ever being allowed to come or return thither, till the said States shall be fully satisfied that they are willing to subscribe the same act, and leave be given then to return, on pain of being treated as disturbers of the public peace, for an example to others (reprinted in Calder 1835: 390).

The Synod of Dort's condemnation led to religious and political persecution of Dutch Remonstrants for a time. Only in 1630-1631 did the Netherlands' magistrates again tolerate the worship of the nation's Arminian community, which by that time numbered in the thousands. Still, even after the authorities tolerated Dutch Arminians, they were not permitted to build their own church buildings or to ring bells or otherwise publically summon worshipers. Therefore, from their exteriors Arminian churches of the latter seventeenth century appeared to be ordinary houses, but their interiors contained religious furnishings. Dutch Jews, though also officially tolerated, worshipped under similar restrictions (Marshall 2006: 140). According to Dutch theology scholar Jo Spaans, though the seventeenth century Dutch Republic was a religious "haven for those persecuted elsewhere in Europe ... toleration had its limits," and penal laws against Catholics and Arminians, and occasionally even Jews, were enforced (Spaans 2002: 75). Contra-Remonstrant intolerance of Arminians could be defended theologically. The influential letters of the Church Father Augustine asserted the state has "a pastoral duty not only to protect the true Church, but also to take disciplinary measures against dissent. This is a pastoral duty, because forcing dissenters, both the wilfully obstinate and the honestly misled, into the Church is

ultimately for their own good. Instead of tolerating error, the state should use its strong arm to make the dissenters listen to the instruction of the official Church” (Spaans 2002: 76-77; see also Goldie 1991).

The 1618-1619 decisions of the delegates to the Synod of Dort brought to a conclusion one stage of the decade-long *Quinquarticular Controversy* (the controversy “having to do with the five points”) that had divided Dutch society and the Dutch Reformed Church since the Remonstrance was published in 1610. The Quinquarticular Controversy had always had political overtones and after the Synod concluded Arminian ministers and Arminian political leaders suffered persecution and discrimination. The most famous, or infamous, incident involved the de-facto leader of the Dutch States of Holland and West Friesland, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547-1619), a supporter of the Arminians.

During the years just preceding the Synod of Dort, the States of Holland was beset by widespread, often-violent public conflicts between Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants. The States of Holland did not have a sufficient peace keeping force, so Johan van Oldenbarnevelt appealed for assistance from the stadtholder of the Dutch Republic, Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625). Maurice declined to offer military aid. Maurice of Nassau, later Maurice of Orange, was the son of William I, the Prince of Orange, and a strict Calvinist. After his call for help was denied, Van Oldenbarnevelt proposed that Holland establish its own independent peace keeping force. This was a clear indication that Van Oldenbarnevelt was inclined toward a sovereign Holland. Around the same time, the Dutch States-General and Contra-Remonstrants approved summoning the Synod of Dort, an idea Van Oldenbarnevelt firmly opposed. Finally, in August 1617 the States of Holland and West Friesland passed the *Scherpe Resolutie* (or Sharp Resolution), which both condemned convening a national synod and authorized recruiting peace-keeping mercenaries named *waardgelders*.

Maurice of Nassau subsequently led a military force through Holland to disband the *waardgelders* and to quell what seemed to be a quickly developing rebellion. Maurice and his troops met little resistance and in the summer of 1618 they arrested Van Oldenbarnevelt and his chief assistants at the Binnenhof, the provincial seat of government in The Hague. The next year the men appeared before an ad hoc tribunal of Van Oldenbarnevelt’s religious and political enemies. The tribunal sentenced Van Oldenbarnevelt to death by beheading. The sentence was carried out in The Hague on May 13, 1619 (Figure 9), just a couple of weeks before the Synod of Dort concluded. Like the Synod and Canons of Dort, the execution symbolized the victory of the Contra-Remonstrants over the Remonstrants. On the day of Van Oldenbarnevelt’s beheading, the keeper of records made the following entry in the register of the States of Holland: “Monday, 13<sup>th</sup> May 1619. To-day was executed with the sword here in the Hague, on a scaffold thereto erected in the Binnenhof before the steps of the great hall, Mr. John of Barneveld (sic) ... He that stands let him see that he does not fall, and may God be merciful to his soul. Amen!” (Motley 1874: 392). The final statement is a reference to a verse in the Bible: “Wherefore let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall” (1 Corinthians 10:12).



Figure 9. Claes Janszoon Visscher II. Decapitation of Van Oldenbarnevelt, ca. 1619. Engraving. Public Domain.

Claes Janszoon Visscher II (1587–1652) produced the most popular print depicting the decapitation of Van Oldenbarnevelt (Figure 9). Visscher was from a successful family of printers and mapmakers in Amsterdam. The Visscher family created portraits and landscapes for new Protestant Bibles that replaced older Roman Catholic Bibles, such as Jerome's Latin Vulgate, which the Catholic Church affirmed as its official Latin translation at the Council of Trent (1545-1563). Traditional Catholic Bibles contained Biblical apocrypha that Calvinists did not want to include in their new translations. Four years after the death of Van Oldenbarnevelt, Claes Janszoon Visscher II produced a new set of prints showing Arminians being executed in the town square of Leiden, the university town where Jacobus Arminius first formulated his critical views of predestination. Such executions were well-attended public spectacles. For those unable to attend the executions, the events were publicized in popular prints and broadsides that were illustrated with remarkably graphic and disturbing scenes. Figure 11 shows an executioner chopping off an Arminian's head with a hatchet, as a crowd watches a few feet away. The Arminian's decapitated head lies on the ground at the bottom of the image.



Figure 10. Claes Janszoon Visscher II. Execution of four Arminians in Leiden, 1623.  
Public Domain.



Figure 11. Claes Janszoon Visscher II. Execution of Arminians in The Hague, 1623. Etching.  
Public Domain.

## 6. John Wesley and the spread of Arminianism

After Maurice of Nassau (the Prince of Orange) died in 1625, Remonstrants were again granted a degree of tolerance and were allowed to practice their faith without official condemnation. Simon Episcopius and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) established and taught at a Remonstrant theological seminary in Amsterdam during the 1630s. Grotius, a polemicist who supported religious tolerance of the Remonstrants, had been tried with Van

Oldenbarnevelt, but had been given a life sentence. He escaped his imprisonment and lived for years as an expatriate theologian, diplomat, and author.

Politico-religious debates over Arminianism also tore apart English society during the seventeenth century. For example, the propagation of Arminianism, or what one author called “Anti-Calvinism,” within the (Anglican) Church of England was a key factor in the English Civil War (1642-1651) (Tyacke 1987). King Charles I (1600-1649) defended Arminianism against the attacks of the Puritans, a diverse group of English Protestants who wished to rid, or purify, the Church of England of Catholic and insufficiently Protestant (or Calvinist) doctrines and practices. In spite of religious differences, the English monarchy granted charters to the Plymouth Company and London Company to establish settlements in North America. English Puritans, now known as the Pilgrims, founded the Plymouth Colony after landing at *Plymouth Rock* (Massachusetts) in December 1620. The Pilgrims practiced strict Calvinist Protestantism, independently from the Church of England. John Winthrop (1588-1649) established the Puritan Massachusetts Bay Colony approximately a decade later.

In England and Britain’s later North American colonies, further south along the eastern Atlantic seaboard, colonists enjoyed greater religious freedom. In 1649, the Province of Maryland passed the “Act Concerning Religion,” the first law requiring religious tolerance in the English American colonies, though struggles between Anglicans, Catholics, Puritans, and others continued. The Province of Georgia was the last and southernmost of the thirteen original British colonies in North America. Georgia would be particularly important in the history of Arminianism’s introduction to America.

In 1735, James Oglethorpe (1696-1785), the founder of the Georgia colony, invited John Wesley (1703-1791) and his brother Charles Wesley (1707-1788) to come to the newly formed Savannah parish to serve the Anglican community. John Wesley was an English clergyman, evangelist, and co-founder of the Methodist movement, and he was among history’s foremost proponents of Arminianism and Arminian *soteriology*. Soteriology, from the Greek *sōtēria*, meaning salvation, is the systematic study of the doctrine of salvation. During his two years in Georgia, Wesley led small-scale evangelical revivals among the Anglican colonial adherents and ministered to leaders of the local Chickasaw Native American tribe (Figure 12). Wesley wrote that Native Americans “appear the most likely of all the Americans to receive and rejoice in the glorious Gospel of Christ” (Wason 2017: 27).



Figure 12. John Wesley Preaching to a Tribe of Native Americans.  
Public Domain.

Although scholarly opinions differ, there is a growing consensus that John Wesley was a faithful representative of Jacobus Arminius (Gunter 2000). In his posthumously published essay entitled *The Question, What is an Arminian? Answered by a Lover of Free Grace*, John Wesley defended Arminian theology against Calvinist accusations (Wesley 2011: 1171-3). According to Wesley, the delegates to the Synod of Dort had levied five charges against the Remonstrants:

1. That they [denied] original sin;
2. That they [denied] justification by faith;
3. That they [denied] absolute predestination;
4. That they [denied] the grace of God to be irresistible; and,
5. That they [affirmed] a believer may fall from grace (Wesley 1798).

With regard to the first two allegations, Wesley wrote the Arminians plead “Not Guilty.” Wesley continued, “No man ever lived, not John Calvin himself, [who] ever asserted either original sin or justification by faith in more strong, more clear and express terms than Arminius has done. ... But there is an undeniable difference between the Calvinists and Arminians with regard to the three other questions.”

Wesley asserted Arminians’ believe in conditional predestination, rather than absolute predestination. He wrote, “the Arminians hold: God has decreed from all eternity touching all who have the written word, ‘One who believes will be saved; one who does not believe will be condemned’ [see John 3:18]. And in order to this: ‘Christ died for all, all who were dead in trespasses and sins’ [Colossians 2:13]; that is, for every child of Adam, since ‘in Adam all died’ [1 Corinthians 15:22].” Wesley further asserted that Arminians hold “that, although there may be some moments in which the grace of God acts irresistibly, yet in general any one may resist, and that to his eternal ruin, the grace whereby it was the will of God he should have been eternally saved.” Finally, Wesley averred that “Arminians hold that a true believer may make ‘shipwreck’ of faith and a good conscience (1 Timothy 1:19), so that he may fall not only foully but finally, so as to perish forever” (Wesley 2011: 1171-3).

John Wesley founded Arminian Magazine in 1778. It became the longest-lasting religious periodical in history, ceasing publication only in 1969. During the years that Wesley oversaw the magazine’s content, it continually featured articles, essays, and poems disputing John Calvin’s theories of predestination and endorsing the idea that “Christ died for all,” or unlimited atonement (see Allen 2016). Arminian Magazine’s subtitle was “Consisting of Extracts and Original Treatises on Universal Redemption.” The frontispiece of each volume’s new edition featured a printed portrait of a clergyman or theologian who supported the cause of Arminian theology. The first edition showed a bust length portrait of “The Revd. John Wesley” (Figure 13). Often, John Wesley’s brother Charles Wesley contributed poems and hymn verses he had written for Arminian Magazine.




Figure 13. Frontispiece (John Wesley portrait) and first page. Arminian Magazine 1 (1778).  
Public Domain.

## 7. Predestination

Arminian Magazine and John Wesley were outspoken, consistent critics of John Calvin’s views on predestination. In Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin wrote that before God created the world, he foreordained a select group of people, whom Calvin called *the elect*, for eternal life. According to Calvin, the evidence of a person’s membership among the elect includes 1) their *calling* (a subjective internal awareness of

selection) and 2) *justification* (grasping the righteousness of Christ through faith, and being clothed in his righteousness) (see Miller 2013). Calvin maintained that God barred all other people (*the reprobate*) from access to salvation and allotted these unfortunate souls the just punishment for their sins, namely eternal death. Again, according to Calvin, humanity's reprobate are marked by 1) their exclusion from the knowledge of his name, and 2) their exclusion from the sanctification of the Holy Spirit. Calvin acknowledged that predestination may seem unfair, but asserted God's ultimate purpose is a mystery to humanity (Theologians & Theology 2019).

Western art history includes many vivid depictions of God's Last Judgment. The Italian Renaissance artist, Michelangelo's (1475-1564) Last Judgment fresco, of 1534-1541, in Vatican City's Sistine Chapel is one notable example (Camara 2020). The doctrine of predestination is esoteric and rarely depicted in the visual arts. Enea Vico (1523-1567), a late-Renaissance engraver from Parma, produced one illustration of predestination (Figure 14). During the early decades of the Reformation, Enea Vico worked for Cosimo I de' Medici (1519-1574), Grand Duke of Tuscany. Cosimo was a Roman Catholic, a Florentine nobleman, and an important patron of the arts. In the 1540s, Cosimo commissioned Vico to create a series of engravings representing various religious and philosophical concepts.

Vico's engraving Predestination, of ca. 1555, shows a divine agent, perhaps an angel, placing a crown of life symbolizing divine election on a farmer's head. The crown is an unconditional gift; the farmer is doing nothing to earn it. In the background, a large bird descends ready to devour another man who is running away with his hands lifted up in terror or desperation. A Latin superscription reads, roughly, "If it is God's desire, suddenly the farmer becomes a king." The background scene may reference Jesus' Parable of the Sower (Matthew 13:3-23). In the Parable of the Sower, Jesus described a sower going forth to scatter seeds. "[W]hen he sowed, some seeds fell by the way side, and the fowls [birds] came and devoured them up." Jesus later explained the meaning of the parable, "When any one heareth the word of the kingdom, and understandeth it not, then cometh the wicked one, and catcheth away that which was sown in his heart" (Matthew 13:4, 19).



Figure 14. Enea Vico. Predestination, ca. 1555. Engraving. Public Domain.

Arminians, generally, and John Wesley, specifically, taught what theologians call the doctrine of *conditional election*. According to the doctrine of conditional election, throughout eternity God has possessed foreknowledge of how each person will freely respond to the offer of salvation contained in the gospel of Jesus Christ. God's eternal choice of whom he will elect to eternal salvation has been based upon, or conditioned upon, his foreknowledge of each person's response. A person can choose to resist God's grace and even if a person initially accepts God's grace, he or she can thereafter fall from grace and be lost for eternity.

## 8. A “horrible decree”

John Wesley devised a fictive conversation entitled *A Dialogue Between a Predestinarian and his Friend* that was posthumously published in 1799 (Wesley 1799; Rack 2011: 259-266). The dialogue consists of a Friend interviewing a strict Calvinist (or Predestinarian) about absolute predestination and unconditional election. Wesley clearly identified with the Friend. During the conversation, the following exchanges occur:

- Friend. - Did God then make Adam on purpose that he might fall?  
Predestinarian. - Undoubtedly. ‘God made Adam and Eve to this very purpose, that they might be tempted and led into sin. And by force of his decree, it could not otherwise be but they must sin.’  
Friend. - But do not you ground God’s decree on God’s foreknowledge rather than his will?  
Pred. - No: ‘God foresees nothing but what he has decreed, and his decree precedes his knowledge.’  
Friend. - Well, this may truly be termed *a horrible decree* [emphasis added].  
Pred. - ‘I confess it is a horrible decree; yet no one can deny but God foreknew Adam’s fall, and therefore foreknew it, because he had ordained it so by his own decree.’  
Friend. - Do you believe, then, that God has by his own positive decree, not only elected some men to life, but also reprobated all the rest?  
Pred. - Most surely, if I believe one, I believe the other. ‘Many indeed (thinking to excuse God) own election, and yet deny reprobation; but this is quite silly and childish. For without reprobation, election itself cannot stand; whom God passes by, those he reprobates.’  
Friend. - Pray explain what you mean by election and reprobation.  
Pred. - With all my heart. ‘All men are not created for the same end; but some are fore-ordained to eternal life; others to eternal damnation. So according as every man was created for the one end or the other, we say he was elected or predestinated to life, or reprobated, that is, predestinated to destruction.’ [...]   
Friend. - How is this? I say, if God has created them for never-ending death, why does he call to them to turn and live?  
Pred. - "He calls to them, that they may be more deaf; he kindles a light, that they may be the more blind; he brings his doctrine to them, that they may be more ignorant; and applies the remedy to them, that they may not be healed."

John Wesley’s brother, Charles Wesley, was a clergyman and co-founder of Methodism; however, Protestant Christians remember Charles Wesley perhaps most of all for the thousands of Christian hymns that he wrote, such as “Love divine, all loves excelling.” Through his hymns, Charles Wesley provided evangelical interpretations of Old Testament psalms and other passages. In this, Wesley emulated his illustrious predecessor, Isaac Watts (1674-1748). Isaac Watts, who came from an English family of zealous Nonconformists, was a Congregationalist minister and a prolific and popular hymn writer. Although Watts identified as a Calvinist, he espoused Arminian beliefs. In his book *Ruin and Recovery*, Watts wrote that there is no reason “the strictest Calvinist should be angry that the all sufficient merit of Christ should overflow so far in its influence, as to provide a conditional salvation for all mankind, since the elect of God have that certain and absolute salvation which they contend for, secured to them by the same merit” (Davis 1943: 108).

John and Charles Wesley founded the Wesleyan or Wesleyan-Arminian theological movement, known as Methodism, which originally aimed to reform the Church of England from within. Although the Wesleys’ personal theology was forthright Arminianism, they never left the Church of England. Many of their immediate followers and associates, however, remained committed Calvinists. Frequently “doctrinal divergences” emerged

between the Wesleys and the Anglican clergyman credited as the third co-founder of Methodism, George Whitefield (1714-1770). Whitefield never strayed from his Calvinist belief in limited atonement, that it was God's intention and plan that Jesus Christ die for the elect only, and that Christ's death had only an incidental reference to others and only to the extent that are partakers of common grace (see Scotland 2019). The Arminian theology of John and Charles Wesley, on the other hand, stressed unlimited atonement, that Christ died for all though his sacrifice is only effectual when a person receives him in faith. Charles Wesley's hymns and John Wesley's prose and sermons conveyed the idea that no one "is predestined to damnation. [All people] can be saved if they follow the light they have. God does not force our wills" (Wesley & Wesley 1981: 37).

Charles Wesley published two volumes of hymns in 1741-1742 entitled *Hymns on God's Everlasting Love* (Figure 15). The hymnals contained musical verses and satirical poems many of which seem to be direct attacks on the Calvinist concept of absolute, unconditional election. John Wesley appreciated his brother's work so much he included three selections from *Hymns on God's Everlasting Love* in the first volume of his *Arminian Magazine* (Figure 13).




Figure 15. Title page of *Hymns on God's Everlasting Love*, 1741.  
Public Domain.

John Wesley particularly appreciated a thirteen-verse song included in the original edition of *Hymns on God's Everlasting Love* entitled *The Lord's Controversy*. It is now known by various names, including *The Horrible Decree*. In his *Dialogue Between a Predestinarian and his Friend*, John Wesley suggested that if God had indeed predestined Adam's sin, and the fall of man, without providing for unlimited atonement, this was a "horrible decree." Charles Wesley echoed those sentiments in *The Lord's Controversy*, which is among the Wesleys' most strongly worded polemics against the doctrine of limited atonement.

Jesu, my hope, my help, my power,  
On thee I ever call,  
O save me from temptation's hour,  
Or into hell I fall. [...]

The blackest crime upon record  
I freely could commit,  
The sins by nature most abhorred  
My nature could repeat.

I could the devil's law receive,  
Unless restrained by thee;  
I could (good God!) I could believe  
The HORRIBLE DECREE.

I could believe that God is hate,  
 The God of love and grace  
 Did damn, pass by, and reprobate  
 The most of human race. [...]

My strength will I ascribe to thee,  
 My wisdom from above,  
 And praise to all eternity  
 Thine all-redeeming love (The Loss of Eternal Life 1789).

## 9. Conclusion

This brief essay has addressed the Calvinism-Arminianism debate in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic and a few further developments in the eighteenth-century rise of Wesleyan theology within the Church of England. Several scholars have written helpful books about the broader historical progression of Arminian theology (see, for example, Stanglin, Bilby, & Mann 2014; Van Leeuwen, Stanglin, & Tolsma 2009), and theologians from various denominations and traditions continue to discuss and advocate differing interpretations. Members of modern Presbyterian and Reformed Churches often disagree with members of Methodist, Pentecostal, and Restoration congregations, for instance. Although there may never be a consensus among Protestant Christians concerning the respective merits of classical Calvinism and Arminianism, reflecting on the historical debate, as has been done in this essay, may help individuals reach their own conclusions.

## References

- Allen, D. (2016). *The extent of the atonement: A historical and critical review*. Nashville: B. & H. Academic.
- Arminius, J. (1828, 1853). *The works of James Arminius* (J. Nichols Trans.) (Vols. 1-3). London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green; Auburn & Buffalo: Derby, Miller, and Orton.
- Boice, J., & Ryken, P. (2009). *The doctrines of grace: Rediscovering the evangelical gospel*. Wheaton: Crossway.
- Boettner, L. (2015). *The Reformed doctrine of predestination*. West Linn: Monergism.
- Calder, F. (1835). *Memoirs of Simon Episcopius, the celebrated pupil of Arminius*. London: Simpkin & Marshall.
- Calvin, J. (1846). *Institutes of the Christian religion* (H. Beveridge Trans.) (Vols. 1-3). Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society.
- Camara, E. (2020). *Last Judgment - Essay by Dr. Esperanca Camara*. Retrieved From <https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/renaissance-reformation/high-ren-florence-rome/michelangelo/a/michelangelo-last-judgment>.
- Dash, M. (2001). *Tulipomania: The story of the world's most coveted flower & the extraordinary passions it aroused*. New York: Broadway Books.
- Davis, A. (1943). *Isaac Watts: His life and works*. New York: The Dryden Press.
- Goldie, M. (1991). The theory of religious intolerance in Restoration England. In Grell, O., Israel, J., & Tyacke, N. (Ed.), *From persecution to toleration. The Glorious Revolution and religion in England* (pp. 331-368). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gunter, S. (2000). *John Wesley: A faithful representative of Jacobus Arminius*. Retrieved from <https://oimts.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/2002-2-gunter.pdf>.
- Marshall, J. (2006). *John Locke, Toleration and early Enlightenment culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, D. (2013). *The foundation of election: An overview of classical Arminianism*. Retrieved from [https://www.academia.edu/3614511/The\\_Foundation\\_of\\_Election\\_An\\_Overview\\_of\\_Classical\\_Arminianism](https://www.academia.edu/3614511/The_Foundation_of_Election_An_Overview_of_Classical_Arminianism).
- Motley, J. (1874). *The life and death of John of Barneveld: Advocate of Holland* (Vol. 2). New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Palmer, E. (2010). *The Five Points of Calvinism: A study guide*. Grand Rapids: Baker Books.

- Rack, H. (Ed.). (2011). *The works of John Wesley* (Vol. 10). Nashville: Abingdon.
- Schaff, P. (2013). *The Seven Ecumenical Councils: Excursus on Pelagianism, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* (Series II, Vol 14). Retrieved from [https://www.academia.edu/38484257/Philip\\_Schaff\\_Nicene\\_and\\_Post-Nicene\\_Fathers\\_Series\\_II\\_vol\\_14](https://www.academia.edu/38484257/Philip_Schaff_Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers_Series_II_vol_14).
- Scotland, N. (2019). *George Whitefield: The first transatlantic revivalist*. Oxford: Lion Hudson.
- Scott, T. (1856). *The Articles of Synod of Dort*. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.
- Selderhuis, H., Moser, C., & Sinnema, D. (Ed.). (2014). *Acta of the Synod of Dort*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Spaans, J. (2002). Religious policies in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic. In Hsia, R. & Van Nierop, H. (Eds.), *Calvinism and religious toleration in the Dutch Golden Age* (pp. 72-86). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stanglin, K., Bilby, M. & Mann, M. (2014). *Reconsidering Arminius*. Nashville: Kingswood Books.
- Tate Museum. (2020). Allegory. Retrieved from <https://www.tate.org.uk/art/art-terms/a/allegory>.
- The Balance. (2020). Leiden American Pilgrim Museum. Retrieved from <http://www.leidenamericanpilgrimuseum.org/Page34B.htm>.
- The full original Act of Remonstrance in English and Dutch. (2016) (Trans. Dicou, B. & Schaff, P.). Retrieved from <http://evangelicalarminians.org/the-full-original-act-of-remonstrance-in-english-and-dutch/>.
- The Loss of Eternal Life Not Owing to Any Absolute Decree. (1789). *Arminian Magazine* 1 (September 1789), 451-452.
- Theologians & Theology: Christian theologians and their theology. (2019). Retrieved from <http://www.theologian-theology.com/theologians/john-calvin-predestination/>.
- Tyacke, N. (1987). *Anti-Calvinists: The rise of English Arminianism, c. 1590-1640*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Clarendon).
- Van Leeuwen, T., Stanglin, K., & Tolsma, M. (Eds.). (2009). *Arminius, Arminianism, and Europe*. Leiden: Brill.
- Wason, B. (2017). *Religion of the heart: John Wesley & the legacy of Methodism in America*. Atlanta: Emory University Pitts Theology Library.
- Wesley, J. (1798). *The question, What is an Arminian? Answered*. London: Methodist Preaching-houses.
- Wesley, J. (1799). *A dialogue between a Predestinarian and his friend*. London: Methodist Preaching-houses.
- Wesley, J. & Wesley, C. (1981). *John and Charles Wesley: Selected prayers, hymns, journal notes, sermons, letters and treatises*. Mahwah: Paulist Press.
- Wesley, J. (2011). *The essential works of John Wesley*. Uhrichsville: Barbour Publishing.
- Westminster Confession of Faith. (1647). (Ch. IX, Sec. III; Question 31; Ch. XVII, Sec. 1). London: Company of Stationers.



# The Meaning of Friendship in The Process of Self-Identity Development for Indonesian Adolescents

Enung Hasanah<sup>1</sup>, Supardi Supardi<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Educational Management, Universitas Ahmad Dahlan

<sup>2</sup>Faculty of Social Studies, Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta

Correspondence: Enung Hasanah, Educational Management of Universitas Ahmad Dahlan, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Email: enung.hasanah@mp.uad.ac.id

## Abstract

In this research, we aimed to explore adolescents' experiences concerning the function of friendship in the process of the development of self-identity. We enacted the phenomenological approach as the method in this research. We conducted in-depth individual interviews for the data sampling. The research results show that friendship becomes a prominent point in the process of the development of middle adolescents' self-identity. It would happen if, in the relationship of a group of adolescents, there are similar values and trust. Therefore, they can influence each other and strengthen the identity of each individual.

**Keywords:** Friendship, Adolescent, Self-Identity

## Introduction

Adolescence is a transition period of children psychologically, physically (Steinberg & Morris, 2001), and socially. Socio structurally, adolescents become more sensitive and start thinking about their self-existence (Blakemore & Mills, 2013). Adolescents desire autonomy for themselves, which not only autonomy for freeing from parents' authority but also including responsibility, self-expression, self-sufficient, and decision making (Hoang, 2015). This matter is a natural phenomenon that escorts and occurs in the process of developing self-identity.

Self-identity is a self-awareness regarding a self that continuously developed through social interaction processes with other people (Erikson, 1950; 1968; 1975). In the process of developing self-identity, someone appraises and values themselves, which then creates an image of "who I am" (Swann & Bosson, 2010). Self-identity has a strong relation with character (Klimstra & van Doeselaar, 2017), and someone's behavior (Birgitta, Niamh, & Wokje, 2014). Therefore, sometimes adolescents display various forms of behavior to show their self-identities. These form behaviors sometimes come positively, but it is not rare to find negative behaviors of adolescents that

deviate from the norms of communities (Qidwai & Ishaque, Shah, & Rahim, 2010; Hasanah, Zamroni, Dardiri, Setyabudi, & Supardi, 2018).

Marcia, (1980) laid out the self-identity of adolescents into four groups, namely, identity diffusion, foreclosure, moratorium, and achievement. These four groups of self-identity is not a stage or level. Therefore, someone does not need to pass through every step to attain the other group. However, in researches (Kroger, 2007; Hejazi, Shahraray, Farsinejad, & Asgary, Ali, 2009; Puspoky, 2018), achievement identity is believed to be the ideal group of self-identity for adolescents because this group succeeded identifying their self-identity thoroughly.

Many factors influence the ability of adolescents to identify their self-identity. Ones of many factors are parenting style (Smits, Soenens, Bart, Luyckx, Duriez, Berzonsky, & Goossens, 2008) and friendship (Jones, Vaterlaus, Jackson, & Morril, 2013). Some researches showed that parenting style has a significant role in the process of the development of adolescents' self-identity (Moscatelli & Rubini, 2011; Hasanah, Susanti, & Panjaitan, 2019; Hasanah, Zamroni, Dardiri, & Supardi, 2019). However, to some extent, the interaction of same-aged friends could take over the role of parents in influencing the behavior of children and or adolescents (Hartup, 1983; 2005). This extent could happen when there is an asymmetrical structure between adolescents and parents (Sullivan, 1953; Ciairano, Rabaglietti, Roggero, Bonino, & Beyers, 2007). When the role of parents become weak, the interaction of same-aged friends could replace the main factor of influence in the behavior of adolescents (Youniss, & Haynie, 1992; Ciairano, Rabaglietti, Roggero, Bonino, & Beyers, 2007; Albert & Steinberg, 2011). Therefore, friendship and same-aged friends interaction could become a prominent factor for adolescents in behaving and developing their self-identity if the relationship between parents and children adolescent is not or less harmonious.

Friendship and best friends mainly influence the psychological and mental development (Youniss & Haynie, 1992; Vitaro, Boivin, & Bukowski, 2009), which directly affect the process of the development of adolescents' self-identity. In this context, the association or friendship of adolescents interpreted as a subject that influences the development of the moral motivation of adolescents (Malti & Buchmann, 2010), which affects their self-identity development. However, it is essential to understand that the causality of social relationships and behavior could be different in every culture (Rubin, Coplan, Chen, Bowker, McDonald, & Heverly, 2015). As an example, in the west, friendship emphasizes the importance of the development of self and the affiliation (Chen, 2012; Rubin et al., 2011), whereas in Asian culture (particularly in Indonesia) the thing taken as essential in friendship is the process of self-identity development and the function of instrument assistance. This research tried to see how is the effect of the influence of friendship in the process of the development of self-identity in Indonesian culture based on the adolescents' experiences. This research is relevant to conduct because Indonesian parents sometimes worry about the association or friendship of their children (Van Zalk, Tillfors, & Trost, 2018), excessively without objectively knowing the causality of the relationship.

### **Research Question**

How is the adolescents' experiences about friendship in the process of the development of self-identity?

### **Research Method**

We used the phenomenological point of view in looking at the data. Namely, the validity of data is the viewpoint of the subject phenomenon (Van Manen, 2014). Based on the literature review (Moerer-Urdahl & Creswell, 2004), this research focusing on the research about the interactivity of individual and their group. Therefore, this research tried to find how the individual makes their experiences when interacting with others become something meaningful.

## Data sources

The data sources of this research are the experiences of adolescents about the function of friendship and its meaning for their self-identity development. Therefore, the participants were determined using a purposive sampling technique (Etikan, 2016). The criteria for the sampling are teenager or adolescent, high school student, living in Javanese culture society. The number of participants in the research is four adolescents, this is determined after studying the writing of Langdbridge, (2007), that phenomenological study does not require a large number of participants in it, it is enough with 2-7 participants. From the four adolescent participants, every participant has a different community or group.

The process of sampling began by visiting two schools with different grades. The first school is a high school well known for one of the best high school in Yogyakarta, the other school is a school renowned for many of its students often deviate and are anti-social by the society. We asked for help from both schools' teachers to determine the students to be the participants according to the criteria noted, based on the school history. From the first school, we got 2 participants. We also got 2 participants from the other school.

## Data Analysis

The process of data analysis conducted based on Moustakas' phenomenological analysis steps (1994). At the beginning of the analysis, the researchers read every transcript thoroughly and repeatedly to find the statements relevant to the research objectives. In reading every statement, we ensured to do epoche, that every statement has equal value. The next step is horizontalization, which then followed with creating themes. The themes are a result of internalization from the statements of the individual, which can represent the whole participants' experiences. To make the research result more contrast, the representation of the data of the research result carried out using a qualitative research method (Cresswel, 2012).

## Findings

The research result is presented in themes, where each theme is a picture of the experiences of the participants. The theme is not a fact that can be generalized. It is an image of a phenomenon of the research in its context. Based on the result of data analysis, three themes became the essence from the friendship experiences in the process of the development of self-identity, namely, 1) Having similarities; 2) Trusting each other; 3) Community strengthen self-identity.

### Theme 1: Having similarities

The participants stated that the similarities are what make them becoming friends. In the community, the participants felt that there is a place for them to self-express accordingly with the values that they believe is right. Therefore their self-identities can grow if they are with the community. The participants stated that the beginning of friendship is coming from the similarities they have. These similarities are including values of living, hobby, and situation. This matter presented in the statements of the participants that they convey explicitly. P1 for example, P1 stated that P1 had a hobby for dancing, hence since the beginning of the high school freshman, P1 joined dancing communities at school and outside school. It shows that P1 had a view that dancing is virtuous for them, which then P1 started finding people who have similar values in dancing. The encounter of the individuals who hold similarities in hobby stimulated the forming of friendship between them and encouraged them to form more extensive dancing communities.

P2 also stated the similar to P1. Fundamentally, P2 liked organizational activities, especially organizations that can improve their leadership. Since junior high school P2 was an OSIS (student council) member, therefore when P2 became a high school student, P2 choose to join MPK (class representative assembly) rather than the other organizations. The statements of P2 about their reasons for joining MPK as follows:

Yes, I have made friends with many people, sometimes I play with them even it is rare. I would instead spend my time with my friends in the MPK, conducting events, meeting, activities coordination, and many more. The point is, managing the organizations. My close friends, most of them are school activists, people who love to organize, just like me (P2, 209-213) I also am active in the scout because scout gives me many good experiences and training for me to develop my leadership (P2, 15-21).

P8, who is known to be a disobedient kid and likely to make troubles in the school environment, also stated that they tried to find the community suitable for them and their living values. Below is the snippet from the interview with P8 regarding the reasons of why P8 joined school gang community:

Yes, I admit it, I am a member of a school gang. I was approached by a friend, well I joined the gang to find good friends, close friends. I mean, I wanted to have friends that kinda like... It was when I first started high school, I wanted some friends, I was curious about how my friends would be... So that I can also have friends who have the same thinking as me (P8, Line 83-85).

P6 also stated that they tried to find some friends who also loved playing games and hanging out. P6 felt that friends who have similar hobbies could become comrade-in-arms. The following is one of the statements of P6 regarding this matter: "I make friends so that I can play with them, chat with them, at cafés ... Playing games... Yes, that kind of thing (P6, line 55-56).

## **Theme 2: Trusting each other**

One of the feelings that became significant matters for the participants is trust. When they decided to befriend with someone or with a group of people, the participants viewed that trust makes friendship bond tighter. They could comfortably with no worries or pressure express their true self and honesty in front of their friends, even when they did something that deviates from the norm of society.

The participants felt troubled to trust people, but it is not implied for their close friends. They believed that their friends are trustworthy. Therefore they could be more honest to express their thinking, feeling, and acts in front of them. Below is one of the statements of P5 about the thing:

Hmmm... Sometimes I *curhat* (Indonesian slang for *curahan hati* or confide their feeling) to my friends... Or sometimes I borrow money from them when I am out of pocket money, and conversely (P5, Line 57-58).

P6 also stated that P6 felt the liberty to express themselves as is in front of their friends. Even when they did something that they knew that it deviated from the values or norms eld by society, they did not dare to be honest with their parents or teacher, but it is okay to tell their companions.

P8 also stated a similar thing:

When I together with my friends, I can tell everything, there is no secret between us, including things we have done that may be deemed to be something wrong by other people. I wouldn't tell my parents, but if it's my friend I would gladly tell them. They would never give bad comments about what I had done. That's what makes me able to be honest with them (P8, Line 65-69).

P4 stated that they loved to befriend with good people. In this context, the word "good" stated by P4 referred to a universal standard of "good," not a subjective assessment of "good." This matter showed in the statement of P4 as follows:

I love to befriend someone who is able to make me better, I don't care who it be, how much money they have or whose child is they don't matter for me. If their character is good then it's a go...being friend...together. We can walk together, study together, the point is it will be fun. To have friends means I can share secrets and we can remind each other (P4, lines 78-83)

### **Theme 3. Community strengthen self-identity**

The participants asserted that when they were together in a community with similar values, it will strengthen their self-identity as the potential they had before joining the community. P1 for example, P1 loved dancing since a child. P1 visited the dancing community in their high school and joined it. P1 did not join any other community. Therefore, their dancing ability kept improving. P1's self-identity as a dancer became more apparent when P1 got along with people who loved dancing. In this context, the community was the one influencing P1, but in the first place, P1 is the one who chooses whom they would befriend.

P3 also stated that in the early of their high school life, P3 started to find a community at their school. P3 liked research. When P3 came into high school, P3 joined the youth research community. In the community, P3 felt that their hobby and potential were developing and gradually becoming her self-identity. The following is one of the statements of P3 regarding this matter:

At the beginning of high school, I was unsure to befriend with whom and where I should go, we didn't know each other after all. However, there were flyers for new members recruitment at school. There were scout, student council, basketball, youth research, and many more. I loved to learn something new, I asked for many things, then I decided to join the youth research community. Well... From the community, I could develop my ability in research (P3, Line 49-56).

P7 stated the similar statements with the other participants P7 loved to live freely and had started smoking since junior high school. P7 did not like to study. Therefore, P7 did not want to join high school organizations voluntarily. P7 only joined compulsory activities at school, that too, P7 only filled the registration and rarely presented in the activities. P7 liked to play games with their friends. Hence P7 decided to join a community known as student gang in their school because P7 thought the community knew more about their condition. The statements of P7 as follows:

Since junior high school, I had started smoking, and my parents knew that. They were angry, but I kept smoking, my father did it too. When I graduated from junior high school, I didn't know where I should go... My exam scores were so low, this school is the one that would accept someone with scores like mine. Well, that's it, importantly, I could get into school, following what my parents want...and also, I can play. Honestly, I hate studying, but I was told to go to school, well, I just go to school. After schools, I change my clothes and go hanging out with my friends in the barracks where the gang usually gathers... Just chatting, playing games, and some cigars... Haha (P7, line 98-107)

In the other section, P7 also asserted that the main activity of the gang was just hanging out and playing games, sometimes they make a convoy just for fun. The statement as follows: "Well, sometimes I go around the city by motorcycles with the gang. I love riding a bike and having fun (P7, lines 109-111)".

### **Discussion**

Based on the research result data presented, we can see that fundamentally, friendship is necessary for adolescents. However, friendship does not just show up. There is a background process of it. Through this research result, we can make clear about the claims that friendship influence adolescents' behavior.

Based on the research result, there are three keywords highlighted by the participants and considered as the factors that make a friendship to be a good or bad influence in the process of the development of self-identity for middle adolescents. These three keywords are similarities, encounters, and trust.

The existence of values similarities stimulates the beginning process of friendship. From the research result, we found that the pattern of the beginning process of friendship (Flynn, 2018) of middle adolescents started by the existence of values similarities held by the adolescent since before they coming into high school. The participants tended to join a community with similar views and values. These values had already formed in the mind of adolescents far before they joined the new community at the high school. Therefore, in this context, the middle adolescent joining a community or middle adolescents gathering to form a community are not the subjects or account of behavior. In this case, the values similarities are the cause that creates a particular friendship and or community. This matter is in line with some researches that people joining a particular club, dating frequency, and academic motivation started by them who have already had the similar values since the beginning (Kinderman, 2007; Zalk, Branje, & Meeus, 2007; Solomon. & Knafo-Noam, 2012)

Intensive meetings and encounters between community members who have similarities create trust.

When middle adolescents who held similar values joining a group or community, they will intensely associate with the community. Association that includes high intensive meetings tends to create closeness (Crosnoe,2000), which results in trust in the members. Trust gives a sense of comfort to every member to be more honest with each other and make self-image unnecessary in front of members. They fell comfortable showing who they are in front of their close friends. The harm is, if a community where middle adolescents are joining is a community with the understanding that not match with the universal values (gangs, for example), the adolescents would be comfortable showing deviant behaviors in front of their community friends. Conversely, a group of adolescents who gather in a community with proper understanding with universal values (dancing community or school communities), make the adolescents express freely and positively in front of their group. Summary, someone's view about values will develop stronger when they affiliate in a friendship/community which has similar values. In other words, a friendship formed from values similarities of each member can make members influence each other and strengthen their self-identity. Visually, middle adolescents' experiences about friendship in the process of self-identity development can be pictured as follows:




Figure 1 Middle adolescents' experiences about friendship in the process of self-identity development

## References

- Albert, Dustin & Steinberg, Laurence. (2011). Peer Influences on Adolescent Risk Behavior. 10.1007/978-1-4419-1268-8\_11.
- Birgitta Gatersleben, Niamh Murtagh & Wokje Abrahamse (2014) Values, identity and pro-environmental behaviour, *Contemporary Social Science*, 9:4, 374-392, DOI: 10.1080/21582041.2012.682086
- Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne & Mills, Kathryn. (2013). Is Adolescence a Sensitive Period for Sociocultural Processing?. *Annual review of psychology*. 65. 10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115202.
- Ciairano, Sylvia & Rabaglietti, Emanuela & Roggero, Antonella & Bonino, Silvia & Beyers, Wim. (2007). Patterns of adolescent friendships, psychological adjustment and antisocial behavior: The moderating role of family stress and friendship reciprocity. *International Journal of Behavioral Development*. 31. 539-548. 10.1177/0165025407080573.
- Cohen, G.L. and Garcia, J. 2008. Identity, Belonging, and Achievement A Model, Interventions, Implications. *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 2008 17: 365. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2008.00607.x>.
- Crosnoe, Robert. (2000). Friendships in Childhood and Adolescence: The Life Course and New Directions. *Social Psychology Quarterly*. 63. 377. 10.2307/2695847.
- Erikson EH. 1950. *Childhood and Society*. New York: Norton.
- Erikson EH. 1968. *Identity: Youth and Crisis*. New York: Norton.
- Erikson EH. 1975. *Life History and the Historical Moment*. New York: Norton
- Etikan, Ilker. (2016). Comparison of Convenience Sampling and Purposive Sampling. *American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Statistics*. 5. 1. 10.11648/j.ajtas.20160501.11.
- Flynn, Heather. (2018). Friendships of Adolescence. n book: *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*. Publisher: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 10.1002/9781405165518.
- Gössling, S. (2017). Community, Friends, Family. *The Psychology of the Car*, 171–184. doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-811008-9.00008-9
- Hartup, W. W. (1983). Peer relations. In P. H. Mussen (Series Ed.) & E. M. Hetherington (Vol. Ed.), *Handbook of child psychology* (Vol. 4, pp. 103-196). New York: Wiley. Google Scholar
- Hartup, W.W. 2005. Peer Interaction: What Causes What?. *Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology*, Vol. 33, No. 3, June 2005, pp. 387–394 (C 2005) DOI: 10.1007/s10802-005-3578-0
- Hasanah, E., Zamroni, Dardiri, A., Setyabudi, I., & Supardi. (2018). Literature review of parenting style to support the development of adolescent identity. *Asian Social Science*, 14(6), 1911-2025. <https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v14n6p157>
- Hasanah, E., Zamroni, Z., Dardiri, A., & Supardi, S. (2019). Indonesian Adolescents Experience of Parenting Processes that Positively Impacted Youth Identity. *The Qualitative Report*, 24(3), 499-512. Retrieved from <https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol24/iss3/5>
- Hasanah, U., Susanti, H. & Panjaitan, R.U. 2019. Family experience in facilitating adolescents during self-identity development in ex-localization in Indonesia. *BMC Nurs* 18, 35 doi:10.1186/s12912-019-0358-7
- Hejazi, Elaheh & Shahraray, Mehrnaz & Farsinejad, Masomeh & Asgary, Ali. (2009). Identity Styles and Academic Achievement: Mediating Role of Academic Self-Efficacy. *Social Psychology of Education*. 12. 123-135. 10.1007/s11218-008-9067-x.
- Hoang, K.N. 2015. Conceptualizing Adolescents' Autonomy: Parental Support and Adolescents' Perception. *International Journal of Education and Research* Vol. 3 No. 11. pp. 273-282 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10802-005-3578-0>
- Jones, Randall & Vaterlaus, J. & Jackson, Mark & Morrill, Torrey. (2013). Friendship characteristics, psychosocial development, and adolescent identity formation. *Personal Relationships*. 21. 10.1111/per.12017.
- Kindermann, T. A. (2007). Effects of naturally existing peer groups on changes in academic engagement in a cohort of sixth graders. *Child Development*, 78, 1186-1203. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01060.x
- Klimstra, Theo & van Doeselaar, Lotte. (2017). Identity formation in adolescence and young adulthood. 10.1016/B978-0-12-804674-6.00018-1.
- Kroger, Jane. (2007). Why Is Identity Achievement So Elusive?. *IDENTITY: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THEORY AND RESEARCH*. 7. 331-348. 10.1080/15283480701600793.
- Malti, Tina & Buchmann, Marlis. (2010). Socialization and Individual Antecedents of Adolescents' and Young Adults' Moral Motivation. *Journal of youth and adolescence*. 39. 138-49. 10.1007/s10964-009-9400-5.
- Marcia, J.E. (1980) Identity in Adolescence, in Adelson, J. (Ed.) *Handbook of Adolescent Psychology*, 159–187. New York: Wiley.
- Moerer-Urdahl, T., & Creswell, J. (2004). Using transcendental phenomenology to explore the ripple effect in a leadership mentoring program. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 3(2), 1 – 28.

- Monica Pellerone, M., Spinello, C., Sidotia, A., & Micciche, S. 2014. Identity, perception of parent-adolescent relation and adjustment in a group of university students. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences* 190 ( 2015 ) 459 – 464.
- Montell, G. (2008, November 17). As economy sours, presidential pay draws increased scrutiny. *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. Retrieved from <http://chronicle.com/blogs/onhiring/as-economy-sours-presidential-pay-draws-increased-scrutiny/750>
- Moscatelli, Silvia & Rubini, Monica. (2011). Parenting styles in adolescence: The role of warmth, strictness, and psychological autonomy granting in influencing collective self-esteem and expectations for the future. 341-349.
- Moustakas, C. (1994). *Phenomenological research methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Puspoky, Brina. 2018. Identity Status, Achievement Goal Orientation, and Academic Engagement. Undergraduate Honors Theses. 76. [https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/psychK\\_uht/76](https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/psychK_uht/76)
- Qidwai, Waris & Ishaque, Sidra & Shah, Sabeen & Rahim, Maheen. (2010). Adolescent Lifestyle and Behaviour: A Survey from a Developing Country. *PloS one*. 5. e12914. 10.1371/journal.pone.0012914.
- Rubin, K.H., Oh, W., Menzer, M., & Ellison, K. (2011). Dyadic relationships from a cross cultural perspective: Parent-child relationships and friendship. In X. Chen, & K.H. Rubin, (Eds.) *Socioemotional Development in Cultural Context*. New York: Guilford
- Rubin, Kenneth & Coplan, Robert & Chen, Xinyin & Bowker, Julie & McDonald, Kristina & Heverly-Fitt, Sara. (2015). Peer relationships. In book: *Developmental Science: An Advanced Textbook*. Edition: 7. Chapter: Peer relationships. Psychology Press. Editors: Marc H. Bornstein, Michael E. Lamb
- Smits, Ilse & Soenens, Bart & Luyckx, Koen & Duriez, Bart & Berzonsky, Michael & Goossens, Luc. (2008). Perceived parenting dimensions and identity styles: Exploring the socialization of adolescents' processing of identity-relevant information. *Journal of adolescence*. 31. 151-64. 10.1016/j.adolescence.2007.08.007.
- Solomon, S. & Knafo-Noam, Ariel. (2012). Value similarity in adolescent friendships. *Friendships: Types, Cultural, Psychological and Social Aspects*. 197-218.
- Steinberg, Laurence & Morris, Amanda. (2001). Adolescent Development. *Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology*. 2. 55-87. 10.1891/194589501787383444.
- Sullivan, Harry S. *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*. New York: Norton, 1953.
- Swann, William & Bosson, Jennifer. (2010). Self and Identity. 10.1002/9780470561119.socpsy001016.
- van Manen, Max (2014). *Phenomenology of Practice: Meaning-Giving Methods in Phenomenological Research and Writing*. Left Coast Press.
- Van Zalk, Nejra & Tillfors, Maria & Trost, Kari. (2018). Mothers' and Fathers' Worry and Over-Control: One Step Closer to Understanding Early Adolescent Social Anxiety. *Child Psychiatry and Human Development*. 49. 10.1007/s10578-018-0807-7.
- Vitaro, F., Boivin, M., & Bukowski, W. M. (2009). The role of friendship in child and adolescent psychosocial development. In K. H. Rubin, W. M. Bukowski, & B. Laursen (Eds.), *Social, emotional, and personality development in context. Handbook of peer interactions, relationships, and groups* (p. 568-585). The Guilford Press.
- Youniss, James & Haynie, Denise. (1992). Friendship in Adolescence. *Journal of developmental and behavioral pediatrics* : JDBP. 13. 59-66. 10.1097/00004703-199202000-00013.
- Youniss, James & Haynie, Denise. (1992). Friendship in Adolescence. *Journal of developmental and behavioral pediatrics* : JDBP. 13. 59-66. 10.1097/00004703-199202000-00013.
- Yudha, N.C. (2017). Pengorganisasian ketakutan dalam identitas sosial: Studi kasus gangster klitih kursi putih di Yogyakarta, Skripsi. [https://repository.usd.ac.id/12318/2/129114016\\_full.pdf](https://repository.usd.ac.id/12318/2/129114016_full.pdf).
- Zalk, Maarten & Branje, Susan & Meeus, Wim. (2007). Similarity in adolescent best friendships: The role of gender. *Netherlands Journal of*



# The Speech of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 7th March 1971: A Historical Analysis

Md. Shamsuddoha<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Brac University, Bangladesh

Correspondence: Md. Shamsuddoha, Senior Faculty Member, Emergence of Bangladesh, Brac University, Dhaka, Bangladesh. E-mail: shamsuddoha@bracu.ac.bd and mshamsuddoha.moni@gmail.com  
ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5931-8000>

## Abstract

The 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed a lot of nationalist movements, which gave the birth of many independent states. All these nationalist movements were led by some charismatic leaders who could convince, organize, and motivate people by their character, speech, and wonderful leadership. Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was one of them. He was such a leader who opened the eyes of the East Pakistani people about their right and led them towards independence. He could ignite the light of the nationalist spirit among the people by his public speaking capacity and heart-rending speech. His historic speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March 1971 is often considered as one of the most influential speeches over the world. UNESCO recognized the 7<sup>th</sup> March speech of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as part of the world's documentary heritage in 2017. This study sheds light on the historical importance of that speech. An extensive historical background of this speech will also be demonstrated based on the documents of the liberation war of Bangladesh and other reliable sources. This study shows that the 7<sup>th</sup> March speech of Bangabandhu paved the way for independent Bangladesh in 1971.

**Keywords:** Speech of Bangabandhu, 7<sup>th</sup> March 1971, Independence, Bangladesh, World Heritage, UNESCO

## 1. Introduction

Bangladesh is one of those countries which gained their independence through struggle and series of movements. In the case of Bangladesh, it was even tougher because it had to achieve independence twice-once from the British colonial rule and another from the semi-colonial rule of Pakistan. Pakistan emerged as an independent country in 1947, splitting off from India. The Muslim majority province of East Bengal joined Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan to form an undivided Pakistan, a separate homeland for Muslims. These latter four provinces altogether comprised West Pakistan, being separated from the East by 1100 miles of Indian Territory (Asadullah, 2006). This partition and the birth of a separate state was an expected victory for the Muslims of Pakistan. But the way the partition was done, that eventually contributed to the disintegration because of three main reasons. First, the long-distance between the two wings of Pakistan, which

was covered by India, turned into a discomfort both for India and Pakistan and mistrust between the East and West Pakistan. Second, after the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911, the capital was transferred from Calcutta to Delhi. As a result, the central leadership of the Muslims in undivided India mostly fell into the hand of people living in Delhi (irrespective of their origin). Even though, All India Muslim League, the proponent of a separate homeland for Muslim, was founded in Dhaka in 1906; the main leadership during and after the partition of India fell into the hand of Muhajir leaders who migrated from Delhi to West Pakistan after the partition of India in 1947. Along with that, Muslims of Punjab became very influential in the politics of Pakistan with their overrepresentation in British armed forces and advancement in agriculture, which also continued in Pakistan (Schendel, 2012, p. 110). This entire leadership remained indifferent to East Pakistan and its people, which increased the gap instead of conciliation. Third, Dhaka lost the status of capital during the rule of Nawab Murshid Kuli Khan. Since then, East Bengal started witnessing a huge disintegration. This declining process of East Bengal continued during British era even faster than ever. This disparity was supposed to be immediately addressed by the West Pakistani leadership, but they increased the gulf instead, which contributed to the emergence of a new nationalism among Bengali people.




Figure 1. Map of East Pakistan and West Pakistan (University of Central Arkansas, 2019)

The people of East Pakistan joined with West Pakistan during the partition of India in 1947 with an aspiration that it will put an end to all the deprivations which used to occur under British colonial rule. But their expectations started to vanish in the ashes from the very first year of the independence of Pakistan. It mainly happened due to the arrogant attitude of West Pakistani vernacular elites who tried to make Urdu as the only state language denying Bangla, the language of the majority (Jahan, 1973). This attitude of West Pakistani leaders towards Bengali language and culture initiated language movement, which sewed the seed of Bengali nationalism among East Pakistani people. This nationalist spirit ultimately laid down the foundation of independent Bangladesh by influencing the continuous struggle for 23 years against the repression of West Pakistan (Shamsuddoha, Influence of Bengali Nationalism and the Emergence of Independent Bangladesh in 1971, 2017). Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman recalled the memory of these 23 years in his historic speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March. However, the Language Movement erected a curtain between the two wings of Pakistan. One of the best examples is the division in the Muslim League and the birth of the Awami Muslim League in East Pakistan in 1949 (later renamed as Awami League in 1955), which led most of the movements in the 1950s, 1960s and finally the liberation war in 1971.

The disunity between the two wings of Pakistan became more fatal due to the dominating attitude of West Pakistani elites and the repeated military interventions starting from its inception. East Pakistan was the main victim of this dominating attitude and frequent military intervention because they were the demographic majority which could only reflect in democracy and equal distribution of constituencies based on adult franchise which was impossible in a military rule and continuous denial of participatory democracy (Shamsuddoha, *Refugees in India during the Liberation War of Bangladesh and Human Rights: A Historical Analysis*, 2017). The Landslide victory of the United Front in 1954 (alliance of popular East Pakistani Political Parties) and the denial of power, Two Unit System in the constitution of 1956, and the victory of Awami League in the election of 1970 are some examples where West Pakistani authorities did not show any respect to the popular mandate rather tried to suppress it under autocratic rule and military intervention. For instance, after the victory in the election of 1954, United Front formed the provincial government, but they were not allowed to rule the province accusing them responsible for the failure to control the riot between Bengali and non-Bengali workers of the Adamjee Jute Mills at Narayanganj. Denying the people's verdict, Governor Rule was imposed in East Pakistan. Bangabandhu defined this as a preplanned conspiracy by the West Pakistani authority (S. M. Rahman 2012). The demand of the East Pakistani people was not even reflected in the first constitution of Pakistan in 1956 which has been portrayed in the following statement of H. S. Sahrawardy in the parliament where he stated: "The people in East Bengal have no confidence in the Ministry here or in the constitution prepared by them and they desire that adequate provision should be made in the constitution for their welfare and development (Rahman H. H., 2009, pp. 467-68)". Following this trend, Field Martial Ayub Khan came to power in 1958 by overthrowing Eskandar Mirza and continued autocracy under military rule for almost ten years. During his era, he wanted to suppress democracy under his 'Basic Democracies Order' which curtailed the power of the people and empowered the President by narrowing down the voting right to only elite class people. This was not the only story; Ayub Khan initiated such an education policy that went against the interest of the common people of Pakistan. Thus, a lot of dissatisfactions grew up against Ayub Khan by the early 60s. Awami League and other political parties continued their movement demanding the fall of Ayub Khan.

Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman became the president of the Awami League in 1963 after the death of Hussein Shahid Sahrawardi. In the meantime, Indo-Pak War started in 1965, where West Pakistani authority did not take enough security measures for the safety of East Pakistan. Subsequently, Awami League declared Six Point Program in 1966, which rapidly gained huge popularity and acceptance among the people. As a result, the Agartala Conspiracy Case was filed in 1968 against Bangabandhu and other prominent Awami League leaders, which led to a movement demanding the release of those leaders. Along with this, six points and other demands turned the protest into a Mass Upsurge Movement, which ensured the fall of Ayub Khan in 1969 and welcomed General Yahya Khan in power. Following the promise of General Yahya Khan, there was an election in December 1970. In that election, Awami League backed the majority not only in the Provincial Assembly of East Pakistan but also in the National Assembly of Pakistan. Awami League won 160 seats out of 300 in the National Assembly and 288 seats out of 300 in the Provincial Assembly (Rahim 1997). Even after getting this landslide victory, Yahya Khan and Pakistan People's Party leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto started procrastinating in handing over power to Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Instead, they started a conspiracy to form a coalition government that was against the mandate of the people. As a part of post-election development, negotiation continued from January to March 1971. As all went in vain by March, Bangabandhu appeared with his historic speech on 7<sup>th</sup> March with an outline of his upcoming move for the emancipation of East Bengali people.

## 2. Objectives

This paper is expected to analyze the speech of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman delivered on 7 March 1971. In addition to that, it will also be involved in the discussion of the background of that historic speech.

### 3. Methodology

As this is historical research, it will mainly depend on historical sources. Here, the speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March will be seen from the historical point of view. A detailed background analysis will be done to clarify the historical context of the speech. Hence, the video clip and the text of this speech are the main sources of the study. Often it will be seen in the light of modern techniques of public speaking to understand the contextual meaning and the quality of articulation. The efficient use of historical facts in the speech in the guise of storytelling method will also be analyzed.

### 4. Analysis

The historic speech of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is often considered as one of the best speeches delivered around the world. The speech has been included by Jacob F. Field in his famous book "We Shall Fight on the Beaches: The Speeches That Inspired History", where the writer listed out the most rousing and inspirational wartime speeches in the last 2,500 years (Field, 2013). Furthermore, the 7<sup>th</sup> March Speech of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was submitted to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for the perusal in 2016. Finally, UNESCO declared the inscription of the 7<sup>th</sup> March speech of Bangabandhu on the Memory of the World Register in 2017. UNESCO wrote in its introduction, "The speech effectively declared the independence of Bangladesh. The speech constitutes faithful documentation of how the failure of post-colonial nation-states to develop inclusive, democratic society alienates their population belonging to different ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious groups" (UNESCO, 2017). Here it admitted the speech as the declaration of the independence of Bangladesh and conversed the disparities between two wings of former Pakistan. The Director-General of UNESCO, Irina Mokova, defined this speech as the historical source of inspiration and emancipation (Centre for Research and Information, 2018). This inscription has been a great honor and recognition for Bangladesh. The speech delivered at the Ramna Racecourse Maidan (currently known as Suhrawardy Udyan) encouraged the Bengali people to start their nine-month-long struggle for independence.



Figure 2: Bangabandhu, addressing to the mass on 7<sup>th</sup> March 1971 (Bangabandhu Museum, 2019)

Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman delivered his historic speech on 7<sup>th</sup> March after the landslide victory in the election of 1970. The election of 1970 was the first election in Pakistan based on universal adult franchise. As the East Pakistani people were the oppressed majority in united Pakistan, it reflected in the election like sunshine where East Pakistani political party Awami League got a total victory not only in the Provincial Assembly of East Pakistan but also in the National Assembly of Pakistan. This victory of the Awami League was unanticipated by the West Pakistani leaders. Therefore, they started procrastination about the transfer of power to the elected representatives. This delayed the session of the National Assembly for several times. On March 5, 1971, President Yahya Khan addressed to the nation in radio where Bangabandhu, the leader of the majority, was held responsible for the deadlock. Furthermore, his speech could not come with an acceptable solution but a conspiracy to neutralize the majority. Meanwhile, the Non-cooperation Movement, coupled with continuous Hartal (strike), was going on in East Pakistan demanding the political solution of the crisis. During the first week of March 1971, several people were killed by the authority of Pakistan to control the situation. But this could not stop the resentment of the people as they wanted to see that their elected people are ruling the country, which could only put an end to the plight of the toiling mass.

The Public meeting on 7<sup>th</sup> March was very crucial for Bangabandhu as well as for the Bengali nation. Therefore, Bangabandhu had to remain very tactful while delivering the speech; because West Pakistani authority would have got a chance to prove him as a secessionist for any wrong decision or statement in his speech. Bangabandhu had been suffering from cold fever on the day of 7 March 1971. He was very apprehensive as well in this critical situation. The context before the speech can be understood from the following statement of Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of Bangabandhu: “The historic 7<sup>th</sup> March. Many suggestions came to my father. He listened to all the suggestions with patience....When my father was getting ready, my mother brought him to a room and told him to take rest for a while...My mother said to my father, ‘the fate of the nation depends on you today. You should remember that you have ‘stick’ in front and ‘gun’ in your behind...You have been suggested by many to speak so many things. As the fate of the mass depends on your statement, follow your way. Whatever you will deliver that will go right because the people of the country loves you and depends on you’ (Hasina, The historic speech of 7th March: Some Memories, 2014, pp. 91-92)’”.

As this research is an initiative to analyze the speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, it is better to start the process by denoting the full text which has been attached in the appendix-1 (Department of Films and Publications- Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2017). The Bengali version of the speech can be found from the document of the Independence War of Bangladesh (Rahman H. H., 2009, pp. 703-705) or the web content (Kaler Kantho 2017). Bangabandhu covered a lot of issues in his 19 minutes speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March 1971. This script had become a complete prescription for the War of Liberation. He tried to cover the interest and expectations of all classes of society. He initiated his speech with the discussion of historical memories of deprivations and concluded with the strategic directives and hope for the emancipation of the nation.

Table 1. Different segments in the speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March 1971

	Issue/Subject Covered	Approximate Number of Words Uttered (it may vary because of the use of phrase/s as the original speech was in Bengali)	Percentage of words uttered
Step 1	Creating common ground with the recent update	Around 85	7.72%
Step 2	Recalling the memory of oppression and disparity to arouse the mass	Around 109	9.90%
Step 3	Post-election (1970) political development and negotiation for solution	Around 439	39.90%
Step 4	Four Strategic preconditions to the authority of Pakistan for solution	Around 59	5.36%
Step 5	Thoughtful Tactical directives and call for peaceful non-cooperation	Around 384	34.90%
Step 6	Strategic declaration for the War of 1971	Around 24	2.18%

The entire speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March can be categorized into six stages. The starting of a speech is considered very crucial. Bangabandhu started his speech with the phrase 'My brothers'. These two words became able to grab the attention of the entire mob in a non-communal manner (Haque, 2017). Then, he began with the recent incidents as a clincher, which helped him to bring the audience into the common ground. That also helped the audience to relate to the recent happenings. Bangabandhu had started his speech in this way: "Brothers of mine! Today I appear before you with a heavy heart. You know and understand everything. We tried with our lives. But the painful matter is that now the streets of Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, Rajshahi and Rangpur are stained with the blood of my brothers. Now the people of Bangla want freedom. The people of Bangla want to live. The people of Bangla want to have their rights" (Department of Films and Publications- Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 2017). This was a very powerful introduction to the speech, which clearly defined the subjects of the speech to the audience and involved them in the session. At this point, he utilized around 8% words of his speech (see table 1).

Afterward, Bangabandhu recalled the historical memory of twenty-three years under the rule of Pakistan, where he stated: "But it's a matter of great sorrow that today I have to tell painfully the pitiful history of the last twenty-three years. The bloody history of Bangalis tortured in Bangla itself. The history of the last twenty- three years is the history of the wailing of dying men and women. The history of Bangla is the history of the staining of streets with the blood of the People of this country..." (Department of Films and Publications- Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 2017). In this part, he covered the brief historical journey under Pakistan from 1952 to 1971. This helped him to arouse people with emotional memories. He utilized around 10% words of his speech for historical arousal (see table 1). Here he mentioned all the disparities and deprivations under the rule of Pakistan, which provoked them for emancipation. Recently, Imran Khan, the Prime minister of Pakistan, admitted that the disparity against the Bengali people was mainly responsible for the disintegration of Pakistan (Shahnawaz, 2019, p. 84). As a result of this inequality, the demand for autonomy became very prominent.

In the 3<sup>rd</sup> stage of the speech, Bangabandhu mentioned about the political development followed by the election of 1970 and the negotiations between Yahya Khan and Bangabandhu after the election. He added: "As President, Mr. Yahya Khan had summoned the Assembly. I said that I would attend. Mr. Bhutto said that he won't. Thirty-five members from West Pakistan came here. Then all of a sudden, the Assembly was closed. The people of Bangla were blamed; I was blamed too...What did we get? The weapons we bought at the expense of our money to protect the country from the invasion of foreign enemies are now being used against the poor and unarmed people of our country; they are being shot down. We are the majority of the people of Pakistan. Whenever we Bangalees tried to gain power; tried to rule this country as our own, they assaulted..." (Department of Films and Publications- Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 2017). This was the largest segment in his speech (see table 1), where he tried to justify his political stand and to refute the blames of West Pakistani authorities.

In the fourth stage of the speech, Bangabandhu mentioned four preconditions to the solution where he added the withdrawal of Martial Law, withdrawal of the army, justice for the people who had been killed in the recent political move, and the transfer of the power to the people's representatives. With these strategic demands, he wanted to create pressure on Pakistani authority. He said that only after the fulfillment of these demands, he would consider whether he can sit in the Assembly or not. Before that, he cannot sit in the Assembly. The people have not given him that right. With this, he again showed his political charisma by considering people as the source of his power and inspiration.

In the fifth stage of the speech, Bangabandhu shared further directives for his followers, where he also outlined a peaceful Non-cooperation Movement comprising ten points. In this part, he appeared like a de facto ruler of East Pakistan. In his ten-point program (Rahman H. H., 2009, p. 706), he instructed the people from all walks of life to get engaged in civil disobedience and non-cooperation to create pressure on the West Pakistani authorities. He also warned his people not to be trapped in the conspiracy of the Pakistani authority. He stated: "Listen and bear in mind, the enemy has penetrated us to create divisions amongst us and to start looting. Hindus, Muslims,

Bengalis and non-Bengalis, all those who live in this Bangla are our brothers. The responsibility of protecting them is on you. Ensure that our reputation is not smeared in any way” (Department of Films and Publications-Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2017). With this caution, he instructed the people to maintain communal harmony under any situation.

Bangabandhu gave further directives for the coming days to ensure a systematic movement. Even, things to be done in his absence were also clarified in this speech. He added: “Secondly, in every village, every locality, every union, and every sub-division, establish ‘Resistant Council’ under the leadership of the Awami League. And be ready with whatever you have. Bear in mind that since we have given blood, we will give more. By the grace of Allah, we will surely liberate the people of this country” (Department of Films and Publications-Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2017). At this stage, he uttered around 35% of his speech (see table1) where he clarified every minor detail of the strategic directives. This is how the 7<sup>th</sup> March speech of Bangabandhu became a complete code of revolution of a nation. Fidel Castro stated regarding this speech: “The 7<sup>th</sup> March speech of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was not only a speech, but it was also an outline of war strategy (Mahmud, 2019).”

Finally, in the sixth stage of the speech, Bangabandhu tactfully gave the declaration of the struggle for Independence, where the choice of his phrasing was praiseworthy. He came with the awaited declaration at the end in a way that people had got what they wanted, and it was done in such a way that the West Pakistani authority could not accuse him with secession. He stated in his bold voice:

**“The struggle this time is the struggle for our emancipation.  
The struggle this time is the struggle for our independence”.**

These two lines were more than enough to declare independence and to provide the source of inspiration to the people to fight for the liberation of their country. With this call of Bangabandhu, the unarmed civilians of Bangladesh took arms in their hands and liberated their country with a war of independence.

In the speech of Bangabandhu, most of the modern techniques of public speaking were applied. His articulation and intonation were outstanding. While delivering a speech, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman used to speak spontaneously. He never read the speech written by anybody else. Therefore, spontaneity used to be reflected in all of his speeches (Wahab, 2014, p. 51). This spontaneity helped him to get emotionally attached to the people.

Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman preferred to speak in a conversational language. His effective conversational style was also visible in the speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March. He used ‘I’ and ‘we’ a lot of times in his speech (Noor, 2019). Gerard O’Grady (2017) analyzed the use of “I think” in political speeches where he tried to examine the categories and effectiveness of ‘I think’ in political speech. According to him, ‘I think’ is often used to place semantic views or strong arguments. In the speech of Bangabandhu, he often used ‘I’, ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘ours’ to create the ownership and to justify his statements (see table 2). This kind of use of pronouns helps the speaker to speak in a conversational tone, which eventually creates the attachment with the audience. Bangabandhu anchored with some significant phrases in a conversational manner, which helped him to create a common ground and better attachment with the audience. For instance, he often used the phrase ‘brothers of mine’, which probably allowed him to reach the core of the heart of the people. Even while pointing to the armies of Pakistan, he stated: “You are our brothers. You stay in your barracks; no one will say anything to you. But don’t ever try to shoot us. This will do you no good. You can’t keep seven crores of people subjugated. Since we have learned to die, no one can dominate us”. The effective use of this kind of phrase has also been found in most of the other speeches of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Wahab, 2014, p. 45). In the 19 minutes long speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March, he used ‘I’ for 20 times, ‘We’ for 20 times, ‘Our’ for 14 times and ‘My/Mine’ for 17 times (Noor, 2019).

Table 2. The art of questioning, use of pronouns in a conversational manner, and political negotiation with preconditions in the speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March

Questions are highlighted in 'red', preconditions are in 'green' and pronouns are in 'yellow'.	
Some parts of the speech (Bengali Version)	<p>কি অন্যায় করেছিলাম?... কি পেলাম আমরা? আমার পয়সা দিয়ে অস্ত্র কিনেছি বহিঃশত্রুর আক্রমণ থেকে দেশকে রক্ষা করার জন্য, আজ সেই অস্ত্র ব্যবহার হচ্ছে আমার দেশের গরীব-দুঃখী নিরস্ত্র মানুষের বিরুদ্ধে তার বুকের ওপরে হচ্ছে গুলি। আমরা পাকিস্তানের সংখ্যাগুরু আমরা বাঙালীরা যখনই ক্ষমতায় যাবার চেষ্টা করেছি তখনই তারা আমাদের উপর বাঁপিয়ে পড়েছে। ... ভায়েরা আমার, ২৫ তারিখে এসেম্বলি কল করেছে। রক্তের দাগ শুকায় নাই। আমি ১০ তারিখে বলে দিয়েছি, ওই শহীদের রক্তের ওপর পাড়া দিয়ে আরটিসিতে মুজিবুর রহমান যোগদান করতে পারেনা। এসেম্বলি কল করেছেন, আমার দাবী মানতে হবে। প্রথম, সামরিক আইন- মার্শাল ল' উইথড্র' করতে হবে। সমস্ত সামরিক বাহিনীর লোকদের ব্যারাকে ফেরত নিতে হবে। যেভাবে হত্যা করা হয়েছে তার তদন্ত করতে হবে। আর জনগণের প্রতিনিধির কাছে ক্ষমতা হস্তান্তর করতে হবে। তারপর বিবেচনা করে দেখবো, আমরা এসেম্বলিতে বসতে পারবো কি পারবো না। এর পূর্বে এসেম্বলিতে বসতে আমরা পারি না। আমি প্রধানমন্ত্রীত্ব চাই না। আমরা এদেশের মানুষের অধিকার চাই।</p>
Questions are highlighted in 'red', preconditions are in 'green' and pronouns are in 'yellow'.	
Some parts of the speech (English Version)	<p>What wrong did we commit? What did we get? The weapons we bought at the expense of our money to protect the country from the invasion of foreign enemies, are now being used against the poor and unarmed people of our country; they are being shot down. We are the majority of the people of Pakistan. Whenever we Bangalis tried to gain power; tried to rule this country as our own, they assaulted.... Brothers of mine, the Assembly has summoned on the 25<sup>th</sup> March. The marks of bloods have not yet dried. I had clearly said on 10<sup>th</sup> March that Mujib Rahman can't join RTC, treading the bloods of martyrs. They have called the Assembly. They have got to accept my demands: First, martial law must be withdrawn. All army personnel must go back to the barracks. There has to be an inquiry into the way the killings were carried out. And the power has to be handed over to the people's representatives. Only then, we will consider whether we can sit in the Assembly or not. Before that we can't sit in the Assembly. The people have not given me that right. I don't want Prime Ministership. We want to establish the right of the people of this country.</p>

Bangabandhu raised questions at different stages of his speech. Five specific questions engaged the audience in his conversational speech: “What wrong did we commit? What did we get? What R-T-C? With whom shall we sit? Shall we sit with those who had taken the blood of my people?”(see table 2 and appendix 1). He asked and answered all of these questions in a way that effectively connected the audience in the discussion (Siddique, 2016). Bangabandhu often spoke in a colloquial language to create an attachment with his people. He covered a lot of historical incidents in his speech in a story-telling method to make that easier for the audience.

Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman stressed the emancipation of the Bengali nation in his speech. He coupled emancipation with the word ‘independence’ for several times in this speech. Bangabandhu knew that without autonomy and economic emancipation, it is not possible to achieve real independence. That is why he mentioned ‘emancipation’ before the word ‘independence’. In his short speech, he mentioned the word ‘emancipation’ three times (Husain, 2019). He would have finished his speech by the ‘phrase struggle for freedom’, but he ended with the phrase ‘struggle for emancipation’ instead. With this, in reality, he became the leader of humanity (Wahab, 2014). Amartya Sen evaluated the speech of Bangabandhu in this way: “The value of the articulateness of his speech is not only recognized in Bangladesh but also in the whole world. Sheikh Hasina, the elder daughter of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, shared her reflection about the speech in this way: “The imperishable speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March attracted and gathered every Bengali people. Being inspired by this speech, the brave Bengalese fought in the war, and brought victory by defeating enemies (Hasina, 2019, p. 44).” The way the 19 minutes speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March of Bangabandhu ignited a nation and triggered the birth of a country will be always remembered by the world.

## 5. Conclusion

The liberation war of 1971 was one of the epoch-making events not only in the history of Bangladesh but also in the history of the world, which gave the birth of a new country and created a new identity for 70 million people. But the birth of Bangladesh was not only the result of nine months of the war; rather it was the ultimate result of the continuous struggle for 23 years. In this struggle for independence, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman played an unparalleled role for which the whole nation would be indebted to him forever. He, himself, dreamed about independence and sparked the light of that spirit among the whole nation which ultimately led to an all-out war. In this process, his speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March 1971 can undoubtedly be considered as a milestone in the struggle for the independence of Bangladesh. It did not only motivate the people but also presented the outline and strategy of the movement. For instance, he said in his speech, “In case I can’t give you any further order, I tell you; close all roads and highway indefinitely... Whatever you have, be ready with that... Bear in mind that since we have given blood, we will give more. By the grace of Allah, we will surely liberate the people of this country. The struggle this time is the struggle for our emancipation. The struggle this time is the struggle for our independence.” This is how he covered almost every preparatory steps and instructions of the liberation war in his speech of 7<sup>th</sup> March. Therefore, it can be considered as the precursor of the independence of Bangladesh.

## References

- Asadullah, M. N. (2006, July). Educational disparity in East and West Pakistan, 1947-71: Was east Pakistan discriminated against? (J. Humphries, & A. Offer, Eds.) *Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History (Paper No-63)*, 63, pp. 1-60.
- Bangabandhu Museum. (2019). Retrieved 2019, from <https://bangabandhumuseum.org.bd>:  
<https://bangabandhumuseum.org.bd/en/page/17/Exhibition-Gallery-2>
- Centre for Research and Information. (2018). Retrieved 2019, from YouTube:  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xkxj9rT5Azk>
- Department of Films and Publications- Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. (2017). Retrieved April 28, 2017, from 7th March Foundation: <http://www.7thmarch.com/the-speech-text/>
- Field, J. F. (2013). *We Shall Fight on the Beaches: The Speeches That Inspired History*. UK: Michael O'Mara Books Limited.
- Haque, M. (2017). Bangabandhur 7 E Marcher Bahashon: Bachik O Bhashik Boishishtyo (7th March Speech of Bangabandhu : Articulative and Linguistic Features). In A. Wahab (Ed.), *Bangabandhur Shaat Marcher Bahshon: Itihash O Totto (Bangabandhu's Speech of 7th March: History and Theory)* (Vol. II, p. 272). Mowla Brothers.
- Hasina, S. (2019). *Sheikh Mujib Amar Pita (Sheikh Mujib: My Father)*. Dhaka: Agamee Prakashani.
- Hasina, S. (2014). The historic speech of 7th March: Some Memories. In A. Wahab (Ed.), *Bangabandhur Shaat Marcher Bahshon: Itihash O Totto (Bangabandhu's Speech of 7th March: History and Theory)* (Vol. I, pp. 91-92). Dhaka: Mowla Brothers.
- Husain, S. A. (2019). *Youtube*. Retrieved 2019, from Views (Youtube Channel):  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vQFh5G4Rj3w>
- Jahan, R. (1973). *Pakistan: failure in national integration*. London, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Kaler Kantho. (2017, November). Retrieved 2018, from Kaler Kantho:  
<https://www.kalerkantho.com/online/miscellaneous/2017/11/24/569631>
- Mahmud, A. (2019). Introduction. In A. Mahmud (Ed.), *Bangabandhur Shaat Marcher Bhashon Boishyik Pramanno Oitijhya (The 7th March Speech of Bangabandhu : World's Documentary Heritage)* (p. 9). Dhaka: National Publications.
- Mujib. (n.d.). Video.
- Noor, S. (2019). The Struggle this Time is the Struggle for Our Independence: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Historic 7th March Speech. *Advances in Language and Literature Studies*, 20 (2), 107-120.
- O’Grady, G. (2017). “I think” in political speech. *International Review of Pragmatics*, 9, 269–303.
- Rahim, E. (1997). Prelude to war of Liberation. In S. Islam (Ed.), *History of Bangladesh: 1704-1971* (Vol. 1, pp. 604-605). Asiatic Society of Bangladesh.

- Rahman, H. H. (Ed.). (2009). *The Documents of the Independence War of Bangladesh* (Vol. 2). Dhaka: Hakkani Publishers (on behalf of Ministry of Information, Government of People's Republic of Bangladesh).
- Rahman, H. H. (Ed.). (2009). *The Documents of the Independence War of Bangladesh* (Vol. 1). Dhaka, Bangladesh: Hakkani Publishers (on behalf of Ministry of Information, Government of People's Republic of Bangladesh).
- Rahman, S. M. (2012). *Ausamapta Atmajiboni (Unfinished Memoirs)*. Dhaka: The University Press Limited.
- Schendel, W. V. (2012). *A History of Bangladesh*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Shahnawaz, A. K. (2019). Shat Marcher Bhashon :Bishyo Oitijhya Dolil (The 7th March Speech: Document of World Heritage). Dhaka: Protik Prokashona Shongstha.
- Shamsuddoha, M. (2017). Influence of Bengali Nationalism and the Emergence of Independent Bangladesh in 1971. *i-Proclaim 3rd Annual Research Conference on Business, Humanity and Law (ARCBHL-2017)*. Kuala Lumpur: i-Proclaim, Malaysia.
- Shamsuddoha, M. (2017). Refugees in India during the Liberation War of Bangladesh and Human Rights: A Historical Analysis. *14th International Conference on Social Science and Humanities (ICSSH)*. Bangkok: PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences .
- Siddique, A. A. (2016). *Bangabandhu: The Man Behind the Nation*. Retrieved 2019, from <http://www.bangabandhu.com.bd/download/the-greatest-speech-of-the-greatest-bangali-by-a-a-m-s-arefin-siddique/>: <http://www.bangabandhu.com.bd/download/the-greatest-speech-of-the-greatest-bangali-by-a-a-m-s-arefin-siddique/>
- UNESCO. (2017). Retrieved 2019, from <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/memory-of-the-world/register/full-list-of-registered-heritage/registered-heritage-page-4/the-historic-7th-march-speech-of-bangabandhu-sheikh-mujibur-rahman/>
- University of Central Arkansas. (2019). Retrieved 2019, from <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/pakistanbangladesh-1947-1971/>
- Wahab, A. (2014). Bangabandhur 7 Marcher Bhashon : Folklore O Manobotar Joyogaan : (7th March Speech of Bangabandhu : Folklore and Humanity). In A. Wahab (Ed.), *Bangabandhur Shaat Marcher Bahshon: Itihash O Tatto (Bangabandhu's Speech of 7th March: History and Theory)* (Vol. I, p. 51). Dhaka: Mowla Brothers.

## 7. Appendix 1.

The Historic Speech (Translated from Bengali) of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 07 March 1971 (Department of Films and Publications- Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 2017)

### **The Historic Speech (Translated from Bangla) of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 07 March 1971**

#### **Brothers of mine!**

Today I appear before you with a heavy heart. You know and understand everything. We tried with our lives. But the painful matter is that now the streets of Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, Rajshahi and Rangpur are stained with the bloods of my brothers. Now the people of Bangla want freedom. The people of Bangla want to live. The people of Bangla want to have their rights.

What wrong did we commit?

The people of Bangladesh cast their vote overwhelmingly for me, for Awami League.

Our National Assembly will sit. We will draw up the Constitution there. And we will build this country. The people of this country will have economic, political and cultural freedom.

But it's a matter of great sorrow that today I have to tell painfully the pitiful history of the last twenty three years. The bloody history of Bangalis tortured in Bangla itself. The history of the last twenty- three years is the history of the wailing of dying men and women. The history of Bangla is the history of the staining of streets with the blood of the People of this country. We gave blood in 1952. After winning the election in 1954, we couldn't even form the government. Proclaiming martial law in 1958, Ayub Khan made us slaves for ten years. During the 'Six Point Movement', my children were gunned down on 7<sup>th</sup> June 1966. After, the fall of Ayub Khan brought about the 'Mass Movement' of 1969 where Yahya Khan usurped power. He said he would give constitution and democracy to the nation. We Agreed. Thereafter the rest is history. There was an election. You know the fault was not ours.

Today I met President Yahya Khan and discussed everything with him. Being the leader of not only of Bangla but of the majority party of Pakistan, I requested him to convene the National Assembly of 15<sup>th</sup> February. He didn't agree with me, rather he yielded to Mr Bhutto's demand to hold the assembly in the first week of March. We said that was alright. We would sit in the Assembly. I went even to the extent of saying that if anybody, even a lone person proposed something reasonable, we, although the majority will accept the proposal. Mr Bhutto came here. He conferred with us and said that the door for discussion was not closed. There would be more discussions. Then we talked with other leaders and said 'please come and sit together; let's prepare the Constitution through discussion'. Mr Bhutto said that if the members of West Pakistan came here, the Assembly would turn into a slaughter house. He said whoever would come would be killed. If they came to the Assembly, then from Peshawar to Karachi, all shops will be closed down by force. I said that Assembly would continue, then all of a sudden, the Assembly was closed on 1<sup>st</sup> March.

As President, Mr Yahya Khan had summoned the Assembly. I said that I would attend. Mr Bhutto said that he won't. Thirty- five members from West Pakistan came here. Then all of a sudden, the Assembly was closed. The people of Bangla were blamed; I was blamed too. Because of the closure, the people of this country burst into protest. I told them to observe 'hartal' (strike) in a peaceful manner I told them to close down all mills and factories. The people responded. The people spontaneously came out on the streets. They firmly pledged to continue their resistance in a peaceful manner.

What did we get? The weapons we bought at the expense of our money to protect the country from the invasion of foreign enemies, are now being used against the poor and unarmed people of our country;

they are being shot down. We are the majority of the people of Pakistan. Whenever we Bangalis tried to gain power; tried to rule this country as our own, they assaulted. They are our brother; I asked them 'Why must you shoot your brother? You were deployed to protect this country from the attack of foreign enemies'.

Mr Yahya said that I had agreed that there would be a Round Table Conference (RTC) on 10<sup>th</sup> March. I said no such thing to him. I had a talk with him over the telephone. I told him 'General Yahya Khan, you are President of Pakistan. Come to Dhaka and see the how my poor people, my people of Bangla are being shot down. How the bosom of our mothers are being emptied of their sons. How my people are being killed. You come, see and do justice and then finalise. That's exactly what I told him. I told him long ago, RTC for what? Who do we sit with? With them... who spilled the blood of my people? Without any consultation, with me or any discussion with us, suddenly after 5 hours of secret meeting, Yahya Khan delivered his speech, in which he dumped all the blame squarely on me, squarely on the people of Bangla. (The crowds says shame, shame)

I have said in the meeting, the struggle this time is our struggle for emancipation, the struggle this time is the struggle for our independence.

### **Brothers of mine.**

The Assembly has summoned on the 25<sup>th</sup> March. The marks of bloods have not yet dried. I had clearly said on 10<sup>th</sup> March that Mujib Rahman can't joint RTC, treading the bloods of martyrs.

They have called the Assembly. They have got to accept my demands:

- First, martial law must be withdrawn;
- All army personnel must go back to the barracks;
- There has to be an inquiry into the way the killings were carried out;
- And the power has to be handed over to the people's representatives.

Only then, we will consider whether we can sit in the Assembly or not. Before that we can't sit in the Assembly. The people have not given me that right.

### **Brothers of mine**

Do you have faith in me? (The crowds says yes yes)

I don't want Prime Ministership. We want to establish the right of the people of this country.

I want to say in clear terms that from now on all courts, magistrates, offices and educational institutions in Bangladesh will remain closed sine die.

To ensure that no suffering is inflicted on the poor people, to ensure that my people do not suffer, from tomorrow the following things will be put out of range of the 'hartal'. Rickshaws and hackney carriages will work; railway trains and launches will run. But the Secretariat, Supreme Court, High Court, Judge's Court and semi-government offices like WAPDA (Pakistan Water Development Authority) will not function. All employees will draw their salaries on the 28<sup>th</sup> of the month. If salaries are not paid; if one more shot is fired and if my people are killed again then my request to you is; build a fortress in each and every home. Face the enemy with whatever you have. In case I can't give you any further order, I tell

you; close all roads and highway indefinitely. We will starve them to death. We will make them go without water and choke them to death.

You are our brothers. You stay in your barracks; no one will say anything to you. But don't ever try to shoot us. This will do you no good. You can't keep seven crores of people subjugated. Since we have learnt to die, no one can dominate us.

We, from Awami League, will try our best to help those who are embracing martyrdom and those who have received injuries. Those who are capable, please extend your monetary support, whatever you can to our relief fund. And every owner of industries will pay salaries to all workers who participated in the 7-day 'hartal'.

My instruction to government officials is that you must obey what I say. From now on, tax will not be paid till such time as the freedom of our country is achieved; no one will pay anything. Listen and bear in mind, the enemy has penetrated us in order to create divisions amongst us and to start looting.

Hindus, Muslims, Bengalis and non-Bengalis, all those who live in this Bangla are our brothers. The responsibility of protecting them is on you. Ensure that our reputation is not smeared in any way.

The employees of the Radio and Television; please bear in mind that if our words are not broadcasted by the radio, then no Bangali shall go to the radio station. If our news is not broadcasted by Television, then no Bangali will go to the Television station. The ban shall remain open for two hours every day so that the people can get their salaries.

But from East Bangla, a single paisa will not be allowed to be remitted to West Pakistan.

Telephone and Telegraph service will remain operative in our East Bangla. They shall keep on sending our news to foreign news media. But if there is any sinister move to annihilate the people of this country, the Bangalis, you will have to keep very careful watch.

I am requesting you, you are my brothers .Do not make this country a hell and destroy it.

Do not make this country a hell and destroy it. We will not see each other's face in the future.

If we can solve things in a peaceful manner, we can at least live as brothers. That is why I am requesting you; do not try and run military rule in my country.

Secondly, in every village, every locality, every union and every sub-division establish 'Resistant Council' under the leadership of the Awami League. And be ready with whatever you have.

Bear in mind that since we have given blood, we will give more. By the grace of Allah, we will surely liberate the people of this country.

**The struggle this time is the struggle for our emancipation.**

**The struggle this time is the struggle for our independence.**



# Revisiting CPEC: A Corridor of Opportunities

Abbad Farooq<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>CEO and Founder, Trade Bone United Kingdom. He is an alumnus of Texas A&M University

## Abstract

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a "game-changer" mega project that offers colossal developmental changes at all levels in Pakistan. It is not just an economic project but has many dimensions to add to the cultural, political and societal landscape of the two countries. The geo-economics of CPEC remains crucial for the realization of 21st century as "the century belonging to Asia". Pakistan and China, have a history of close state-to-state relations at various bilateral and multilateral forums. The flagship project of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides the same for a people to people and society interaction, which can allow Pakistan to learn from the best practices of the 'Chinese Dream'. The paper examines primary and secondary literature from a qualitative approach to study the 'trickle down effects' of CPEC in various branches of public and private sectors of Pakistan.

**Keywords:** Trade Corridors, CPEC, Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese Dream

## Introduction

The landmark developmental project known as the *China-Pakistan Economic Corridor* (CPEC) to link Pakistan's seaport of Gwadar with the Chinese city of Kashgar under the overarching Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was signed on April 20, 2015 (Irshad, 2015). The BRI, also known as One Belt One Road (OBOR) came into the limelight with the 13<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan proposed by the Central Committee of Communist Party of China (CCP) endorsing China to "open up to the East and the West" under the new institutional framework set in the wake of international and regional development. CPEC is defined by the Government of Pakistan as "the growth axis and development belt featuring complementary advantage, collaboration, mutual benefits and common prosperity" (Syed, 2020). This joint venture of \$62 billion remains a flagship project to resuscitate the ancient Silk Road via an ambitious grid of rail, road and maritime networks involving more than 150 states across the continent (Huang, 2016). The grandeur nature of the project allows considerable opportunities for local and international investors to participate in developing Pakistan's competitive market largely untapped and laden with tremendous growth opportunities.

The project brings immense advantages to Pakistan, a country that has an enormous populace at its dispersal and has liberally been bestowed with resources (in material and human). CPEC can provide Pakistan access to previously untapped markets in Central Asia and Europe. The geostrategic location of Pakistan in this way would certainly be revamped into a hub of the economic activity. The resulting economic growth is likely to open new skylines of advancement, harmony and thriving for all areas and provinces of Pakistan, also providing

positive ramifications for South Asia at large. The joint-venture is also focused in providing new economic opportunities that can tackle poverty and relative deprivation of the population. A number of studies have been previously undertaken, on outlining the economic, strategic and security concept of the project (Cai, 2017). However, the literature on CPEC as "a destiny changer for the masses of Pakistan" and its multiplier effects on various sectors of Pakistan remains scanty. It is for this purpose that this study has been undertaken to visit those opportunities in culture, society, language, and tourism that have for some reason or another remained apart from the limelight regarding flagship project of BRI.

### Literature Review

An "economic corridor" is defined as a territorial or sea-based transportation grid used for the moving goods, services and people for facilitating economic activity (Askari, 2014). CPEC, one of its kind corridor initiative undertaken by government of China and Pakistan would improve socio-economic development of Pakistan. The venture project provides necessary impetus for trade across the region, serving as catalyst of regional prosperity and stability (Bhattacharjee, 2015). Pundits are of the view that investment by China in Pakistan has been more successful than their American counterparts. CPEC project is focused on development of almost all sectors, whereas the Americans have been attentive to the security subjects due to their vested interests. (Latif, 2017). The stark contrasts between the "Kerry Lugar Berman Act" which provided a mere \$5 billion in comparison to almost \$62 billion Chinese investment in diversified infrastructural projects that pass through all provinces of Pakistan, is considerably more likely to benefit the common man in Pakistan. The country's largest and mineral-rich province, Balochistan is central to the CPEC project (Jamil, 2015). Gwadar port has begun operationalization to Gulf countries and to Central Asian states. Energy shortage issues in the province are addressed by power projects planted under CPEC.

BRI, the overarching project of CPEC has been compared with the Marshall Plan. The former has been dubbed as "21st century's unique and game changing plan" (White, 2017). In order to realize the affluences of CPEC, a capacity-building framework requires to be devised to develop indigenous human resources and development of labour force. (Khan, 2015). CPEC is analyzed as China's strategic approach to apprehend economic challenges and passivity's in the years ahead. Xi Jinping, considering the volatility of international markets in the long-term, realized need for 'a productive commitment' in the region to make the "Chinese Dream" sustainable. It was these underlying factors that arranged the groundwork for CPEC (Ramay, 2016). The role of the venture is multifold for regional integration and peace, furthering the element of interdependence, a rational element to dissuade potential adversaries from undertaking hostile actions. In order to strategically market CPEC, Pakistan needs professional, well-experienced businessman, engineers and other professionals. (Farooq, 2020).

CPEC cannot be fully operational until both countries develop contacts on local, national, regional and international. It should be supported with cultural exchange programs in order to bring understanding between the people of both nations. People of both countries need to understand one another's customs and traditions. Joint think tanks and public policy institutes are required to be developed to bring the positive aspects of the projects. These will generate vital discourse for the policy circles in the promotion of the project for investments and infrastructure (Khalid, 2015).

### Cultural Development and Trade Routes

Trade routes have contributed a major share in developing centers of culture, ideas and new techniques by providing contact linkages between individuals from a diverse set of regions, culture, religious and skill-set since immemorial times. They served as the main 'arteries of contact' among the realms of the ancient world (Finamore, 2004). The historic Silk Road connecting China with the West through Central Asia, Iran and Mesopotamia, and the Spice Routes running among West and South Asia are two noticeable instances to be called precursors of modern economic corridors of land and sea. As this trade node grew with the passage of time, there developed rich and prospering urban centers. These urban settlements not only obliged to the need of

commercial centers and service providers for the merchants and voyagers but they also developed into gathering spots for the individuals with various social and cultural backgrounds, diverse origins and languages (Vaisierre, 2012).

Trade routes have a history of serving as 'highways of communication,' which facilitated the movement of commodities, and most importantly exchange of new ideas, knowledge about new inventions, innovative business practices, social customs, languages and religious beliefs. The people travelling primarily for directing business along these courses were the disseminator of 'new ideas and facilitators of social trades'. In this way, a trade route, which by definition is a passage by land or ocean utilized by merchants and caravans for economic purpose which has the potential to aid in upward mobility in the society and politics at large (Seland, 2013). For CPEC, there are important implications and lessons to be learnt from the ancient trade corridors. However, lot has changed in the political economy with the unprecedented revolutions in transportation and communication. The world has become interdependent to levels scarcely experienced previously. Internet and media have provided real-time communication facility which can be used to foster closer ties and address the challenges encountered in culminating the project (Iqbal, 2017).

The improvement in the transportation network is to further help in boosting collaboration and correspondence among the inhabitants of the two nations. The social part of CPEC is particularly addressing the needs of people in the Pakistan province of Balochistan, home to port of Gwadar (Saleem, 2017). A number of youth development programs have been started for their education and capacity building. The indigenous fishermen community of Balochistan are regularly provided with modern equipment and training by the Chinese embassy under CPEC. In the near future, exchange visits of Pakistani fishermen to China and vice versa will also be carried for mutual education and knowledge of each other's practices (Godfrey, 2019) Such similar undertakings are regularly being carried in multiple sectors, which are steps to increase understanding of inhabitants in China and Pakistan. Thus, significance of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as a propelled venture working towards improving daily lives of the people cannot be denied. Such participation by the people from each country would give an opportunity of better instruction and improve the everyday comforts of the individuals of Pakistan.

### **People to People Contact under CPEC**

Traditionally, interaction between Pakistan and China has to a great extent been in the form of visit exchanges at official levels, including those by the respected heads of state, military professionals, authorities in various ministries working in tandem with those of their counterparts and business delegations from the traders' communities. These contacts date back from the 1950s and were solidified with the agreement on airspace and land border in the 1960s. From that point forward, there hardly been a Pakistani or Chinese head of the government that did not visit each other in their respected state. The emphasis on expanding trade ties has added to the development of monetary and exchange relations, accentuated by advancing social binds and individuals to-individuals contacts as "a key component of the strategic relationship between the two nations" (Khan, 2014).

The legacy of social trades between China those in the regions presently part of Pakistan has a rich history of more than two thousand years. The southern route of the Silk Road going through the north-western parts and Balochistan encouraged the development of merchandise as well as the individuals of India and China to one another's spaces. The visits of the Chinese voyagers, Fa Xian (B.C 400) and Xuanzang (B.C 630), are a testimony to the social linkages between earliest empires of China and India (Rahman, 2013). At the point when the People's Republic China was established in 1949, diplomatic relations were set up among Pakistan and China and the two nations have since the time kept up close and inviting relations in political, military and social fields. Pakistan and China with CPEC have enhanced their collaboration in the culture and individuals to-individuals contacts. The number of cultural delegations by senior officials of the two nations has also increased from the past six decades. In addition to that, the two sides are also collaborating in "art, literature, training, sports, youth affairs, cultural and social relics, health and women affairs" (Ali, 2020).

Media is considered an important 'pillar of the state,' more so in the era of fake news, disinformation and information explosion than ever before (Nam, 2012). CPEC, therefore, has been tapping in the potential of mass media to create awareness regarding the opportunity provided by the joint-venture. Advertisement relating to CPEC and those of brotherly relations between China and Pakistan are often featured on television. Lok Virsa, a cultural museum based in Islamabad frequently organizes Chinese theatre plays and films to promote the culture of neighboring states. In the years, since CPEC agreement, media houses, art and telecommunication companies have shown keen interest in Pakistan. Pakistan and China have centered programs particularly centered on youth for advancing social collaboration and individual-to-individual contacts. Furthermore, Chinese Government has increased the number of scholarships being offered to students of Pakistani origins. Due to these measures, students from Pakistan have grown considerably to undertake higher studies in various institutes based in China (Ahmad, 2020).

Pakistan is positioned third in the quantity of international students at present contemplating in China with 28,023 scholars, according to China's Ministry of Education. There was an increase in the statistics of international students from across the globe which has also expanded the aggregate number by 6.86 percent. Those pursuing doctorate and master's degrees have also notably increased by 12.28 percent to 85,062 of those scholars from across the world. The official information shows that China has become the top international destination for Pakistani scholars, majority of them have enrolled in Chinese universities and colleges, with 7,034 based on scholarship grants. The increase has been on account of a preferential policy of the Chinese government and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In the year 2019, 6,156 Pakistani were pursuing Ph.D. degrees, 3,600 Masters Degrees, whereas 11,100 undertaking their Bachelor's degrees and 3,000 students taking Short Term Exchange Programs across China. Pakistani students generally concentrate on Chinese language, medical, software engineering and other different fields. Different grants are provided by the Chinese government to draw worldwide attention, to fully-funded research grants for BRI nations (Tribune, 2019).

Language initially served as a major barrier in advancing cultural collaboration and individuals-to-individuals contacts among Pakistan and China. The two nations under CPEC have taken joint measures to set up study centers of Chinese and Urdu languages. The National University of Modern Languages (NUML), Islamabad, offers classes in Chinese language. Pakistan has set up China Study Centers and Confucius Institutes in different colleges of Pakistan. Karachi University and Faisalabad University have Confucius Institutes; while China Study Centers have been set up in Government College University (GCU), Lahore, and COMSATS, Islamabad. The Chinese language had just been presented as an optional subject in the curriculum of Pakistan (Syed, 2020).

## **Tourism**

Tourism is one of the best strategic approaches to advance people-to-people contacts and earn valuable revenues. For the latter reason, it has emerged as a rapidly growing enterprise. According to World Tourism Organization (WTO), worldwide receipts from the travel industry in 2002 were as high as US\$474 billion, which increased to a magnificent US\$8.8 trillion in 2018 (WTO, 2018). Europe represents 50 percent of the world's visitors, followed by the Americas, whose share is 26 percent. Compared with this, the portion of the South Asia in worldwide the travel industry receipts is only a mere 1 percent. States across the world are according to top priority to the development of tourism as an industry. However, for that, a large investment in tourist infrastructure is required which most developing states sadly lack on their own. On a more optimistic, South Asian states including those of Maldives and Bangladesh have impressively developed their travel and tourist industry as a result of market-friendly reforms that have eased Public-Private enterprise and has brought investment from international hotel chains (Zang, 2020).

China has emerged as one of the most attractive tourist destinations in the world. The quantity of inbound Chinese tourists has enlisted an increase in the course of the most recent couple of years. China saw a record number of 65 million traveler appearances. The Chinese have also been one of the quickest to advance tourist ties with all the countries of South Asia. They have also expressed their readiness to assist the countries of the

region in the development of their tourism enterprises through various means, including direct investment (Farooq, 2020).

There is incredible potential for religious travel in Pakistan not only for Hindus and Sikhs, as Pakistan has recently provided unprecedented access via Kartarpur Corridor, but for Buddhists as well. The ancient Buddhist Kingdom of Gandhara contained the regions of modern-day Peshawar, Swat and the Northern Punjab. The archeological sites of Taxila and Takhtbai help remind of the civilizations grandeur. Through these regions, Buddhism spread out to China and Central Asia and remained for a considerable length of time “a source of inspiration for the spiritual life, arts, lifestyle, politics, philosophy, and medicine and material culture” in China. With Chinese Buddhists comprising of more than 250 million, which is close to 18 percent of the country’s population, there lies a major potential for Chinese religious tourism in the northern Pakistan. The World Bank estimates that travel industry for Pakistan has a mere share of 2.93 percent to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in contrast with other states of the region (Medhekar, 2017).

The Pakistani government has grabbed the attention of leisure seekers across the world by relaxing its visa policy. The policy of giving e-visas and visa on travel, exclusively for tourists has worked remarkably well. Prestigious magazine, Forbes named Pakistan to be “the coolest spot to visit” in 2019. The British Backpacker Society, positioned Pakistan as its “best experience travel destination” and “perhaps the friendliest nation on earth that is past anybody’s most stunning creative mind.” Conde Nast Traveler has as of late positioned Pakistan as the “number one holiday destination in 2020”. These improvements will no doubt be helpful in also raising awareness for potential investors and entrepreneurs interested in collaborating with CPEC projects. However, for that government of Pakistan must continue to fabricate economical and business friendly policies.

### **Maritime Tourism**

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) by tapping in the maritime capability of Pakistan and Gwadar port specifically, is anticipated by pundits to give the fundamental force to a prosperous sea-based tourist industry in Pakistan. Maritime Tourism has become the 'popular expression' in the worldwide financial industry. A survey by the World Economic Forum concluded that sea-based tourism industry would develop at a worldwide pace of 3.5 percent every year by 2030. It has recently also acquired attention of leisure seekers across Pakistan, who dream of visiting coastal areas of Pakistan to experience boat rides, snorkeling, scuba-diving, presently being offered by private parties in Karachi and Kund Malir (Farooq, 2020).

The coastline of Pakistan is 1050 km along the Arabian Sea, of which Sindh province has 350 km and Balochistan fragments 700 km. The coastal belt of Balochistan has international fascination, specifically due to its number of sand beaches with “shifting sand dunes” (Farooq, 2020). The diversity in the species, adds to the magnificence and significance of the beach front, where migratory birds can be seen at Pasni, Jiwani and Miani Hor. Astola Island, nation's first Marine Protected Area (MPA), is a known settling ground for imperiled green turtles that can be made into “sustainable tourist attraction”. (Farooq, 2020). The Balochistan government, in collaboration with international investors, has announced to build tourist resorts at Kund Malir and Kalamat.

Karachi, provincial capital of Sindh, is the seaside city that has for years remained part of a mainstream goal of international and local vacationers. The Clifton sea shore is a popular spot to visit where camel and buggy rides are offered for families on outing. Hawke's Bay is one more of the sea shore for recreation searchers who for the most part stay in a rented hut to go through their ends of the week. The Indus Delta and the mangroves at the Sindh coast additionally offers a potential fishing spot is an asset for the maritime sector of Pakistan. It merits referencing that China expanded its incomes to multiple times over from RMB 147.8 billion (2002) to RMB 1463.6 billion (2017), as a result of sea-based tourism. The two nations can broaden the scope and horizon of CPEC, whereby China can be asked to share and assist from its fruitful experience to build a suitable sea-based tourism industry in Pakistan (Haider, 2017).

## Conclusion

The expansion of cooperation in the economic, trade and investment areas under CPEC would prompt welfare and greater prosperity of the two brotherly countries. The recognition of bringing the people of the two nations closer to one another is being felt by the policymakers in the wake of CPEC. The two governments have since then made efforts to synchronize their institutional components for the advancement of people-to-people contacts in Pakistan and China.

The direct people-to-people contacts remained limited owing to various constraints, chief among them being the language barrier. This had been addressed to some extent under CPEC where the governments have started measures to create awareness regarding the cultures, social norms and values. For this purpose, the Pakistani government with Chinese assistance has opened China Study Programs for the teaching of the Chinese language in various local universities. The travel and tourism industry is yet another area that needs more scoping, as there is huge potential for expanding social participation and elevating people-to-people contacts. Presently, tourism between the two countries remains at a level far below its potential. It is one of the recommendations of this paper that officials from both sides need to consider upon as China is fast rising as a nation with record number of both inbound and outbound leisure-seekers. In the view of vast potential for religious and recreational tourism, Pakistan can turn into an appealing destination for the Chinese tourists given that Pakistan provides the required tourist infrastructure. The cultural and commercial ties between Pakistan and China will undoubtedly increment under the CPEC as the venture aims to construct a system of rail and road network between the two countries. The corridor between the brotherly countries provides an ample opportunity to all the regions of Pakistan to share 'the fruits of economic development'.

The massive investment in the economic zones of CPEC will bring in great number of laborers of both Pakistani and Chinese origin, which will give them a chance to interact and share their experiences with each another. It is also a reality that the new generation of Chinese know little about Pakistan and more about the West. Similarly, indigenous Pakistani workers have little knowledge about the Chinese people. This can be improved by promoting people-to-contact via the media. Pakistan's first Baloch channel, WSH News already has a number of such segments for ease of both Chinese and Pakistani viewers. Pakistan's business condition has extensively improved considerably, as a consequence of CPEC venture. It is presently positioned by World Bank Ease of Doing Business as 108 among 190, an impressive improvement by 28 spots. Moody's International has likewise updated Pakistan rating standpoint to 'stable' from 'negative'. Foreign companies, including Hong Kong based Hutchinson Port Holdings have contributed \$240 million for the up gradation of container terminal at Karachi Port, which as of late left a mark by docking largest ever vessel in the maritime history of the nation. According to the Parliamentary Secretary for Planning Development and Reform, Pakistan has completed 13 projects worth 11 billion dollars, while 13 other CPEC related projects worth 18 billion dollars are under in progress, and another 21 billion dollar ventures are in the pipeline. According to the pundits of finance, the completion of CPEC can give Pakistan a growth impetus at the rate of 10 to 15 percent by another decade.

It is also recommended that a public campaign with the help of media maybe started to educate the masses regarding the various possibilities and openings of CPEC. Institutes within the academia have previously successfully carried out seminars, conferences and workshops for the CPEC cause. These include *Obortunity*, an initiative of National Defence University, Islamabad which brought in experts from organizations of all cadres who participated to share their feedback, insight and experience regarding CPEC. The first *International China Pakistan Economic Corridor Workshop* (ICPECW) was in 2019 at Gwadar, Beijing and Islamabad. The second International CPEC Workshop (ICPECW) is to be held in March of this year, which would be devoted to bridging the gap between the private and government circles on various aspects of CPEC. Similar activities are also held by the Higher Education Commission (HEC), which has set up CPEC Consortium of Universities in Islamabad to elevate business-to-business linkages between students, professors and work force of China and Pakistan. The extent of the Consortium has of late been upgraded by including 56 colleges from the two nations, to cover every significant region of advanced education.

All these steps are taken in the right direction; however for a project like CPEC, grandeur in scope and vision, effort needs to be made from local and regional to international level. It is suggested that Foreign Office and associated Pakistani trade missions across the world may be taken into loop, to organize seminar and workshops like *Obortunity* in various financial capitals of the globe. Added to that the good offices of multilateral organizations such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Organization Islamic Cooperation (OIC) should be taken into confidence and used to promote the narrative regarding CPEC. The CPEC is a lucky opening and distinct advantage for the region and beyond. The advancement of CPEC would help bring China and Pakistan even closer. The neighborly collaboration between both the states would prove as a 'multiplier-effect' in all sectors and would significantly uplift the lives of the masses. The association of Gwadar with Kashgar will help in building up the most remote regions of Pakistan and China.

## References

- Abbad Farooq. (2020, January 30). Maritime Tourism: A New Paradigm for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Retrieved from <https://thegeopolitics.com/maritime-tourism-a-new-paradigm-for-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/>
- Abid, M., & Ashfaq, A. (2015). CPEC: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan. *Journal of Pakistan Vision*, 16(2), 142-169.
- Ahmad, M. (2017, December 15). Good Governance, Reforms Must to Make Most of CPEC: ADB. *The News*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/256129-good-governance-reforms-must-to-make-most-of-cpec-adb>.
- Ahmad, R., & Hong, M. (2017). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Its Social Implication on Pakistan: How Will CPEC Boost Pakistan's Infrastructures and Overcome the Challenges. *Arts and Social Sciences Journal*, 2, doi 10.4172/2151-6200.1000265
- Ahmad, S. I. (1992). *Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance*. Karachi, Pakistan: Royal Book Co.
- Ahmar, M. (2014). Strategic Meaning of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. *Strategic Studies*, 34(4/1). 6.
- Ali, A. (2015). China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Prospects and Challenges for Regional Integration. *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies*, 7(1), 1-15.
- Ali, G. (2017). *China-Pakistan Relations: A Historical Analysis*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Ali, Syed Raghav, and Ishtiaq Ahmed Chaudhri. "CPEC—A Flagship of New Silk Road: Perceptions of 'Sinophilia' and 'Sinophobia' in Pakistan." *Journal of Political Studies* 25, no. 2 (2018): 137-155.
- Ali, T. N., Ali, W., Ali, M., Raza, B., & Niazi, A. A. K. (2018). China-Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC): Economic Transformation-Challenges and Opportunities for the Local Residents. *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 1, 17-30.
- Ali, Y., Rasheed, Z., Muhammad, N., & Yousaf, S. (2018). Energy Optimization in the Wake of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). *Journal of Control and Decision*, 5(2), 129-147.
- British Council. (2010). *New Silk Road: Trade, Creativity and Collaboration in Central South Asia, 2007-2010*. London.
- Doyle, T. (2017). *Geoeconomics and Geosecurities in the Indian Ocean Region*. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Farooq, A. (2020, January 22). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Promoting Perspectives from Pakistan. Retrieved from <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/01/23/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-promoting-perspectives-from-pakistan/>
- Farooq, A. (2020, January 29). Tourism Can Save Pakistan's Economy. Retrieved from <https://intpolicydigest.org/2020/01/29/tourism-can-save-pakistan-s-economy/>
- Förster Nadine. (2010). *Maritime Tourism: Development and Implementation of a New Product*. Saarbrücken: Vdm Verlag Dr. Müller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. Kg.
- Huang, Y. (2016). *Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, Framework and Assessment*, *China Economic Review*, Volume 40, ISSN 1043-951X, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.07.007>.
- Ishaque, Brigadier Waseem. "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Prospects, Challenges and Way Forward." *NDU Journal* 30, no. 1 (2016).
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. (2015). *Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience; Trans. By Cynthia Schoch*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Khetrn, Mir Sherbaz. "CPEC Benefits for Balochistan." *Issue Brief* (2016).

- Kundi, I. A. (2018, April 18). Govt Needs to Improve Governance to Make CPEC a Success. *The Nation*. Retrieved from <https://nation.com.pk/18-Apr-2018/govt-needs-to-improve-governance-to-make-cpec-a-success-salman?show=756>.
- Roy, P. (2019). *China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Realigning Realities*. New Delhi: Surendra Publications.
- Saleem, A. (2017). CPEC and Balochistan: Prospects of Socio-political Stability. *Strategic Studies*, 37(4), 118-132. doi:10.2307/48537575
- Saleem, Ali Haider. "CPEC and Balochistan." *Strategic Studies* 37, no. 4 (2017): 118-132.
- Seland, E. (2013). Networks and Social Cohesion in Ancient Indian Ocean Trade: Geography, Ethnicity, Religion. *Journal of Global History*, 8(3), 373-390. doi:10.1017/S1740022813000338
- Taohong Li, Hong Shi, Zhenzhi Yang & Yun Ren (2020) Does the Belt and Road Initiative Boost Tourism Economy?, *Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research*, 25:3, 311-322, DOI: 10.1080/10941665.2019.1708758
- The Nation*. (2015, November 25). CPEC Will Be a Symbol of Good Governance, Transparency: Chinese Minister. Retrieved from <https://nation.com.pk/25-Nov-2015/cpec-will-be-a-symbol-of-good-governance-transparency-chinese-minister>.
- Weidong, S., 2017. Pakistan-China Relations: CPEC and Beyond. *Policy Perspectives: The Journal of the Institute of Policy Studies*, 14(2), pp.3-12.
- Xinhua. (2017, December 27). *China, Pakistan, Afghanistan Agree to Discuss Extending Economic Corridor*.



# Taleqani as a Humanitarian Islamist: His Activities and Ideologies under Pahlavi Regime

Qolamreza Nassr<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Graduate School of Integrated Arts and Sciences, Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan

Correspondence: Correspondence: Qolamreza Nassr, Graduate School of Integrated Arts and Sciences, Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan. Address: 1 Chome-3-3-2 Kagamiyama, Higashihiroshima, Hiroshima 739-0046. Tel: +81-82-424-6315. E-mail: kevin202me@gmail.com

## Abstract

Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmoud Taleqani (1911-1979) spent most of his life opposing the tyrannical regime of Pahlavi. To save the Iranians from their tyranny, he referred to Quran because he believed it is the book for mankind's salvation. His Quranic interpretation which was opposed by some prominent ulama, attracted some secular intellectuals who were under strong influence of ideologies such as Communism. He also expressed his discontent of ulama who condoned Pahlavi regime's suppression, and neglected their own religious duties. Such a Taleqani's criticism of the fellow ulama, together with his consistent support of Mosaddeq, has been regarded revolutionary. Although Taleqani has been examined in relation to the Iranian Revolution, this research aims to analyze his ideology and activity to extract some unknown characteristics under the Pahlavi's. And the outstanding characteristic of Taleqani as a humanitarian Islamist will be finally found through the above consideration.

**Keywords:** Intellectuals, Revolutionary, Ideology, Unknown Characteristics

## 1. Introduction

In short, they (Taleqani and Bazargan) aimed at resolving the deep-seated issues that had helped wreck the constitutional movement as well as the 1945-1953 national struggles.

Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (1982, 459)

It is evident that Taleqani is being distinguished through his Islamic ideologies. In particular, the ideology that makes Taleqani unique among the other fellow ulama is his perception of mankind, which is remarkably different from that of other religious leaders and activists of his time. Another factor is the way he considered religion as a path leading man toward perfection, and ultimately God. Thus, in his words, "Religion has been sent to human beings to act as a savior, not the one to be saved." The noble tasks of Taleqani such as *Partovi az*

*Quran*<sup>1</sup> (A Ray From Quran), and his new Quranic exegesis are outstanding and has been referred to as the splendid horizon that shows the dimensionality of Quran and the way it deals with every situational problem, encompassing the contemporary ones. Another prominent feature of Taleqani that distinguished him from many ulama was his liberality, and being sympathetic to both religious and secular individuals and groups.

Although there are several noteworthy books and articles, written by renowned scholars and researchers, focusing on Taleqani's characteristics, a few aspects of his characteristics seem to have remained unsought. Most of them have examined Taleqani's ideology, religiosity and his anti-Pahlavi regime political activities. However, very little has been said about his outstanding characteristics such as his humanitarian aspect. And the actual reasons of Taleqani's activities and his approach toward socio-political problems have hardly ever been examined. Thus, this paper aims to re-examine the characteristics of Taleqani and his ideological elements which have been overlooked so far. It hopefully gives us sufficient clue and enables us to unveil the diverse ideology and characteristic of Taleqani as a humanitarian and liberal revolutionary who took a firm stand against the tyranny of Pahlavi regime.

## 2. Taleqani's Biography and Education

### 2.1. Early Life

The 20<sup>th</sup> Century can be named the century of revolutions in Iran. These revolutions cost lives of thousands of innocent people who fought for freedom which is every human beings' inalienable right. Although, the Constitutional revolution (1905-1911) did not achieve the desired success, it can be considered as the fundamental stimulant of most political movements that led to the Iranian revolution of 1979, which is said to be quite unique among the modern revolutions. It was led by great thinkers and ideologues amongst who Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani (1910-1979) was one of the most prominent and influential.

Taleqani, whose birth coincided with the post-Constitutional Revolution chaos, was the son of Seyed Abolhasan, one of the most renowned and trustworthy ulama in Taleghan. Having finished his primary Islamic lessons in Qazin, Seyed Abolhasan went to Najaf to complete his studying. He was the *Imam-e jama't* in Qanat abad Mosque, and regarding his piety, Chehabi says, "Unlike many *ulama* who were notoriously venal and led quite comfortable lives, S. Abolhasan had a reputation for incorruptible honesty." (Chehabi 1990, 104) He made a living by repairing watches. His Islamic principles and Quranic lessons had a great influence on his son, Ayatollah Seyed Mahmoud Taleqani, and caused him to become an outstanding symbol of faith and grew him to an important Revolutionary figure that was highly admired. Taleqani grew up in fear and anxiety, and his early life was either filled with or shadowed by a misery that neither left him nor seemed to abate to his very last years. But it was just the beginning, because Reza Shah who got himself into throne shortly after the Coup d'état of 1921 exacerbated the situation, thus increased Taleqani's pain and sorrow.

### 2.2. His Islamic Education

After learning basic reading and writing in his hometown, Galird, Taleqani moved in to live with his parents in Tehran where he continued his studies. At the age of ten, he was sent to Qom to study at Razaviye and then Feiziye School under Shaikh Abdolkarim Ha'eri's guidance. During this period, he was highly influenced by some well-known ulama such as Ayatollah Kamare'i, known as an intellectual due to his broad knowledge and interest in philosophy. Shortly after his father's death in 1931, Taleqani secretly went to Najaf to study *Kharej*

---

<sup>1</sup> Partovi az Quran (A ray from Quran) is a series of new Interpretation of Quran written in six volumes, which looks at almost every verse of it from a different angle and deals with them in a unique way. It basically focuses on the essential relationship of Quran and the society. This new interpretation shows the evolutionary aspect of Quran's messages and how it is connected with the social, political and economic matters.

lessons (an Islamic advanced requisite lesson for ulama)<sup>2</sup> under the guidance of Ayatollah Esfahani, Haj Shaikh Muhammad Gharavi, and Agha Zia Al-din Araqi. He finally received *ejazeh* (permission of *ejtehad*) from Ayatollah Esfahani in 1937. Having returned to Iran, he also received *ejazeh* from Ayatollah Ha'eri in Qom. It goes without question that Taleqani was strongly influenced by one of the most prominent ulama of Constitutional Revolution era, Ayatollah Na'ini and his book *Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanzih al-Millah*, which was an endorsement to the Constitutional Law. Under this influence, Taleqani spent most of his life in anti-dictatorship activities seeking a solution to save the Iranians from excessive exploitation of the Pahlavi regime.

### 3. Taleqani's Political Activities

#### 3.1. Background

Reza Shah constantly imposed new rules and suppressed Iranians on an unprecedented scale making the situation intolerable. In 1928, Reza Shah established a law standardizing the dress code for the officials, from which some ulama were exempted.<sup>3</sup> However, this exemption was an evidential appease for ulama in order to keep them quiet. Because, before stabilizing his power, Reza Shah did not want to be confronted by the religious leaders or activists. In 1935, he supplemented the previous law with another which forced Iranian women out of their traditional veils.

Taleqani was arrested and imprisoned for the first time in 1939 because he had forgotten to carry the license for his *ammameh* (turban). Needless to say, this imprisonment played a crucial role in Shaping Taleqani's ideology, as well as his religious and revolutionary movements. Following his first detention that lasted five days, he was summoned to show his license and was sentenced to three months in prison. It was then that Taleqani found the opportunity to meet some prominent political activists, including Ehsan Tabari and some other activists, who later founded the Tudeh Party in 1941. It was quite the beginning of acquainting with other ideologies through discussions with his cellmates. He was not only getting to know various people with different ideologies, but he was striving to attract them to the Islamic principles. Through these discussions, due to their dimensionalities, he found new horizons. However, he consistently took a firm hold to his Islamic beliefs and his faith was never shaken. The torture and the execution of the other prisoners increased his anger toward Reza Shah's dictatorial regime and made him much more determined than ever to fight. Thus, on his release, Taleqani commenced his vast anti-regime activity which turned him to a prominent revolutionary for the rest of life.

Taleqani's early ideological changes toward socio-political matters can be observed in the expression of his view and understanding in *Hokumat az Nazar e Eslam (Government in Islam's View)*. He argues, "As Islam appeared, it brought about a great change in people's thought, morality, and the order of the society. Islam brought ideal and just governments that surpassed humans' expectations and imagination, into existence. But then those governments got different colors and names, and ruled people under the concept of Islamic Khilafat and Velayat, consequently, Islam's fundamental ideas were neither known by the Muslims, nor were they understood by the others. Thus, what we perceive is the outcome of the discussions. Therefore, it is theoretically and superficially religious, and practically has no clear approach, definition or even validity." (Taleqani 1999, 9) Consequently, Taleqani decided to show the genuine principles of Islam which were either compromised or misinterpreted.

After Reza Shah's abdication, there was a quite free political atmosphere. Political activities were not as restricted as they used to be, and a great number of political activists, including members of Tudeh party as well as Mohammad Mosaddeq, were released. As the limitation of political activities decreased, every single political group strived to expand their activities and attract more members that led to several distinctive groups and

<sup>2</sup> Moqaddame (Introductory lessons), Sath (Surface, i.e. Intermediate lessons), and Kharej (Beyond, i.e. Advanced lessons) are the required Lessons for the Islamic clerics to receive *ejazeh* (the Permission of *Ejtehad*)

<sup>3</sup> High rank clerics (ulama), Imam-e jama'at of Mosques, and some of the religious preachers (*va'ez*) who had received license for their turban and gown were exempted from the dress code regulations. However, after his return from Turkey, Reza Shah who was now influenced by modernism changed his policy toward the religious sections and put lots of pressure on them.

movements such as: Nationalist Movement founded by Mosaddeq in 1949; Pro-Soviet Communist party, known as Tudeh party founded in 1941; Religious Organizations and Groups such as Feda'iyān-e Eslām founded by Navvab Safavi in 1946; Pro-Government Movement which was highly supported by Imperialists, particularly Great Britain. This open atmosphere gave Taleqani the proper opportunity to get more politically active.

### 3.2. *Awakening the Youth*

The commencement of Taleqani's political activities and the development of his ideology found a new dynamic characteristic by awakening the youth and the secular intellectuals. Having suffered from the suppression of the dictator regime, Taleqani saw the ultimate solution in the solidarity of the masses and a unified opposition. He believed that small political groups and opposition parties were not able to bring about any significant changes opposing the powerful regime, particularly because it was strongly supported by the West. Taking advantage of the similarities between the goals of various political groups including the religious and the secular, he looked at the problem from a different angle. Taleqani consistently strived not to be distracted by religious prejudice in order to stay aware of the sacredness of the non-Islamic groups' goals. For this very reason, his thorough understanding and sympathy earned him an outstanding popularity among the members of different groups, particularly the intellectuals and the active youths. However, it also caused some ulama and religious activists to consider his ideologies a combination of the Western modernism if not completely derived from it. Consequently, some of them did not accept his ideologies and some other ulama even went farther and condemned the modern ideologies introduced by Taleqani. Of course, this fact should not be neglected that Taleqani's ideologies which were strongly influenced by Islamic principles and messages of the Quran would not, in some cases, fit the secular groups' ideologies. Therefore, his effort in explaining some of the non-Islamic theories either fell victim to ambiguity or led to complexity or paradox.

Between 1939 and 1941 Taleqani, like his father, began his Islamic teachings based on Quran's interpretation. However, he was attacked by some of the traditional ulama who argued that ordinary people should merely recite the Holy Book. (Chehabi 1990, 123-124) Taleqani recalls, "When I started interpreting the Quran in Qanat Abad Mosque, I was attacked from two sides. From one side, religious communities that said no one has the right to interpret Quran, and it should only be read and sometimes recited for the deceased. And I did suffer for proving that the Quran is for research and pondering upon, not for reading." (Taleqani 1979a, 8-9) And the other side Taleqani was attacked by was some of the fellow ulama who considered his Quranic exegeses intellectually inferior to those of other ulama's interpretations, including the contemporary work of Allame Tabataba'i. Following his anti-dictatorial activities, right after Reza Shah's abdication, Taleqani also took advantage of the opportunity and followed the other political activists, thus established Kanun-e Islam (Islamic Center) in September 1941. He succeeded in attracting a great number of young professionals and students. His aim was to show them the true face of Islam.<sup>4</sup> Like Shariati, Taleqani basically believed that Quran was either totally neglected or completely misinterpreted. It was in Hedayat Mosque that Taleqani developed his Islamic teachings based on his unique Quranic exegesis that mostly dealt with the contemporary circumstances. He used the modern interpretation of Quran to deliver its social and political messages. In relation to his Quranic exegeses, Haj Sadeq, a lifelong friend of Taleqani and father of Nasser Sadeq<sup>5</sup> says, "We had never heard anyone speak about Islam with such freshness and clarity. On weekends, young men from neighboring areas would travel 70 or 80 kilometers to attend Taleqani's lesson." (Irfani 1983, 139) It goes without question that his Quranic exegeses got a remarkable popularity among the Islamic activists as well as the secular intellectuals.

### 3.3. *Challenging the Obstacles*

---

<sup>4</sup> By true face of Islam, Taleqani meant: Islam is the religion of Salvation, Equality, Peace, and Brotherhood. Thus, it has answer for all questions, solutions for all conflicts and social problems including political and economic ones. Taleqani did it because, in his words, "With the consciousness that has appeared in almost everyone, some aware youths who have, either deliberately or inadvertently, come across with various ideologies are asking questions about Islam and its messages."

<sup>5</sup> Nasser Sadeq was a member of the Leadership Cadre (central committee) of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization

Awakening the Youth was probably the most difficult and crucial task that Taleqani accomplished. However, he was not alone in this mission. Such great Islamic ideologues as Bazargan and Shariati were of remarkable assistance to him, and they all faced with many obstacles in achieving their goals.<sup>6</sup> Religious activism had become a victim of Reza Shah's dictatorship and the secular ideologies propagated by the Tudeh party. When Tudeh party was perceived as a great danger, it was challenged in three different ways: Repression, which was used by some of the conservative groups such as Seyyed Zia al-din Tabatabai's National Will Party between 1941 and 1953. It was also used by various governments, especially after 1953; Political, national and governmental action, which was the way of National Movement; Ideological level, which was the method that Taleqani and Bazargan found the most effective.<sup>7</sup>

Weren't it for the widespread institutional dissemination, the revolutionary idea of Taleqani, Bazargan, Shariati, and the other Islamic thinkers would have remained socially of no significance. Two of the most prominent religious institutions were "Islamic Societies" and "Muslim Student Associations" which frequently invited Taleqani to give lectures on a number of issues that mattered to young professionals and students. Through contact with them, Taleqani gradually developed a sense of practical politics, without any sentimental attachment to unnecessary pieties, which gave him a discerning understanding. And through the very same contacts, Taleqani became aware of the prevalence of Marxist ideas among the professionals and found it a fast-spreading threat. Thus, confronting Marxism on both ideological and material levels became his most important political plan.

However, the above-mentioned difficulties were not the only obstacles Taleqani and the other Islamic thinkers confronted with. In fact, as far as the Islamic ideology is concerned, they would have to cope with a bigger problem, and that was the destructive propaganda of the politically conservative ulama. Whether those obscurantist ulama were royalist or formalist, they all shared one commonality. In relation to that, Taleqani stipulates, "They called every young and creative thinker an 'infidel'." (Taleqani 1999, 16) They (conservative ulama) also believed that Muslim intellectuals 'wearing suits and neckties had no business mixing themselves with Islam'.

### *3.4. Proponent of the Political Activists*

As an intellectual alim, Taleqani not only tried to understand the ideas of, both secular and religious, socio-political activists, but also he respected them and made a great effort to support them by all possible means. Mojahedin-e Khalq, Fada'iyān-e Eslām, and Fada'iyān-e Khalq were among the groups which were strongly supported and even assisted by Taleqani. Apart from some of the political groups that Taleqani actively participated in, most of his activities were in such a way, i.e. Spiritual guidance and support of political activists. He strived to crystalize the way to the ultimate victory for everyone, especially by Quranic lessons. Even after his death he was considered as a guiding leader. Regarding Taleqani's role, Najmabady says, "To the best of my knowledge the Mojahedin still consider Taleqani their theoretical and spiritual father figure, as they have always." Mojahedin had roots in Nehzat-e Azadi Iran (Iran's Freedom Movement) which will be explained later. It is true to say that contrary to many other ideologues, Taleqani never withdrew supporting Mojahedin. "They (Mojahedin) do have continuity to Taleqani since they originally came from the Freedom Movement. And for a long time even though other figures in the Freedom Movement like Bazargan openly disassociated themselves, Taleqani went out of the way to protect the Mojahedin in both political and material ways." (Keddie 1986, 167)

---

<sup>6</sup> Although Taleqani, Bazargan and Shariati are mentioned to have shared the grave responsibility of awakening the youth, their personal relationship is not at focus here.

<sup>7</sup> Taleqani and Bazargan believed that the third approach i.e. ideological level is the most effective way because in their opinion an ideology could not be fought with or destroyed by force.

In 1969, the Mojahedin had published a book on Imam Hussein<sup>8</sup> in which they praised his personality and struggle. Taleqani, Montazeri, Motahhari, and several other opponents ulama had read the book and liked it because of its combative aspects. Khomeini, however, reacted to the book in a different way. He argued that the Mojahedin were not true Muslims and that they were not subject to Islam, but used Islam as a pretext. (Kian 1998, 217)

Fada'iyān-e Islam was also, to a great extent, assisted by Taleqani. On one occasion he helped Hossein Emami when he found refuge in Taleqani's house after the periodic assassination he masterminded. In this regard, Chehabi states, "Taleqani, despite having sided with Mosaddeq after the Devotees of Islam (Fada'iyān-e Eslām) had fallen out with the prime minister, extended his help to the terrorist organization and sheltered Navvab Safavi on a few occasions."

Taleqani, Rafsanjani, Motahhari and Montazeri not only supported the Mojahedin, but also the Fada'iyān-e Khalq. When Ahmadzadeh, one of the leading members of Fada'iyān, was arrested, they urged Khomeini to try to save Ahmadzadeh's life. (Kian 1998, 171) Among the political groups and activists that Taleqani took a firm stand for, Mosaddeq and the National Front must be mentioned. Not only before the coup (1953) that brought Mosaddeq's government to its end, but also after that, Taleqani strongly supported Mosaddeq and his Movement. Later on, he even consistently supported Nehzat e Moqavemat-e Melli (National Resistance Movement) which was founded in 1953 in order to continue what Mosaddeq had initiated, and finally joined the Movement. In relation to the National Front and the significance of Taleqani's role, Chehabi states, "Had the National Front been allowed to function openly, in due course Bazargan and Taleqani might have taken Kashani's place at the center of a reconstituted and reformulated religious wing of the National Front." In 1957, when Taleqani, Zanjani, Bazargan, and some other leading political activists were arrested, the life of Nehzat-e Moqavemat-e Melli as an anti-Shah political group came to a definite end.

### *3.5. Active Political Participation and Contribution*

The political activities of Taleqani can be examined from different dimensions. Founding Kanun-e Eslām (the Islamic Center) can be considered as an initiation of Taleqani's political activities in early 1940s, the decade of Modern ideologies' growth in Iran. Regarding these ideologies' development, Taleqani maintained that, "The greatest challenge confronting religion and the people after August 1941 was the rapid spread of Marxist and materialist principles and the Tudeh party." (Bazargan 2006, 116) Thus, it can be inferred that Taleqani founded Kanun-e Eslām, because he felt a serious threat by the progress of Marxism in Iran. Consequently, he made a solemn determination to expound Islamic ideology in comparison with the Western ideologies and leave the rational decision to the addressee, particularly the youths.

Although the government was trying to annihilate the Tudeh party and hence the Marxist idea, Taleqani constantly held on this belief that the Iranian rulers have always made mistakes trying to destroy or change an ideology that they perceived harmful, by force, jail, or even killing people. Taleqani believed ideology could not be destroyed. He thought it would reappear in a new different shape as soon as it found the proper ground or opportunity. As a matter of fact, by founding Kanun-e Eslām, Taleqani saw himself one step closer to his ultimate goal because lots of young professionals, intellectuals and students were attracted to it and their number was continuously and quite rapidly increasing.

---

<sup>8</sup> Husain ibn Ali, also spelled as Hussein; The third Shi'i imam (626-680) who is highly respected by Shia Muslim because he refused to pledge allegiance to Yazid I, the Umayyad Caliph, for he considered the Umayyad's rule unjust. Imam Husain was killed and beheaded on the tenth of Muharram, 61 AH, in the Battle of Karbala (680 AD)

As Taleqani believed awakening people by his lectures were more important than his direct involvement in political activities, to fulfill his mission, he became very active in Anjoman-e Mohandesan (the Engineers association) founded in 1942. Taleqani was invited to the institute frequently and gave lectures on several different issues related to the concomitant socio-economic problems. In relation to the importance of his mission, in one of his lectures, he says, "Before being a political activist, I am a disciple of Quran's school and a teacher of Quranic lessons. Therefore, in such communities, I try to follow the same way, i.e. teaching Islamic principles, because the most significant power which can free all Muslims including Iranians from despotism and colonization is in Quranic revelation." (Taleqani 1979b, 51-52) Following the establishment of Anjoman-e Mohandesan, Anjoman-e Daneshjuyan-e Mosalman (Muslim Student Association) was founded with the aim of resisting against the anti-religious propaganda. Particularly, after Tudeh party began its activities in the campus of Tehran University and developed them, students who felt a threat could no longer put up with this malevolent situation. Thus, they decided to take an action. Anjoman-e Daneshjuyan-e Mosalman was formed by the students of Faculty of Medicine. Taleqani gave lectures under the title of "Ownership in Islam" that several years later became an inspiration for the Islamic economy. And in this regard Chehabi says, "These early talks by Bazargan, Sahabi and Taleqani became the seeds of the LMI's (Liberation Movement of Iran) ideological canon." (Chehabi 1990, 123)

Taleqani was politically active in different dimensions and one of his most remarkable and daring activities was using the mass media. In early 1947, the Internal Propaganda office of the Ministry of Labor and Propaganda invited Taleqani as a distinguished orator to contribute articles which could be read over the radio. (Chehabi 1990, 124) Taleqani's response to the ulama who condemned using radio because it spread corruption was impressive. He said, "Although this mysterious device is used for corruption (*Lahw*) or spreading that, it was not invented for this purpose. And ulama by avoiding that leave the field free for the propaganda of the ignorant." And in 1952, when lots of immigrants from Taleqan in the north invited him for the election of the seventeen Majles (Parliament), Taleqani become the candidate of the Caspian province. His candidacy was warmly endorsed by Ayatollah Kashani. (Chehabi 1990, 127)

In 1961, Taleqani, Bazargan, and Sahabi founded Nehzat-e Azadi Iran, basically because the performance of parties had become dramatically disappointing and the Iranians were too individualistic to cooperate. The fundamental principles of the movement were as follows: Its members were Muslim, Iranian, adhered to the Constitution, and Mosaddeqist. The Movement was active for less than two years because most of its leaders were imprisoned. During its nineteen months activity, it put out regular "internal publications," and important junctures which were widely distributed in Tehran.

### 3.6. His Role as a Prominent Link

Taleqani has been considered by many Iranians as an outstanding link between the secular activists and ulama, especially Khomeini. Regarding Taleqani's prominent role as a link, Hamid Algar says, "There has been operating within Iran a group the special concern of which is to create and maintain links between the ulama and other elements opposed to the regime. This is the Nehzat-e Azadi, or Freedom Movement." (Algar 1972, 254-255) And Jahanbakhsh stipulates, "Taleqani was generally regarded as the most liberal and progressive among the Iranian ulama both before and after the 1979 Revolution, serving as he did as a link between lay and religious groups. Taleqani played a significant role in establishing the clerical leadership. He was crucial in bridging the political gap between the opposition ulama and radical intellectuals." (Kian 1998, 217-218) Considering the above-mentioned facts about Taleqani, it is quite obvious that his liberal stand toward different ideologies made him a strong link between the revolutionary elements, thus earned him a remarkable popularity, particularly among the youth and secular activists. However, he did not gain the same popularity among the fellow ulama. But Taleqani did not mind it because he believed that solidarity was the important message of the Quran and said, "We Muslims should make it known to all the people around the world that unification (*wahdat*)

is our ultimate goal and we are all responsible toward it. It is unity and solidarity against the despotism and idolatry that brings them to their end.” (Taleqani 1979c, 48)

### 3.7. *Criticizing the Fellow Ulama*

Like Shari’ati, Taleqani in some cases severely criticized ulama. He believed that some prominent ulama either assisted the dictator regime of Pahlavi, or condoned the tyranny of the rulers. Regarding this matter he says, "Again, certain ulama, using the messages of Quran and the traditions of the prophet, impose a conceited selfish man (Reza Shah) upon people. Some other ulama, with their quietism or conservatism, have endorsed his dictatorial government. But, when he got the power and got people devastated and destroyed whatsoever they had, the very same ulama started praying and asking God to send Imam-e Zaman (the twelfth Imam of the Shiite Muslim who is in occultation)." (Taleqani 1999, 11) In this relation, Taleqani refers to a hadith from Mohammad, narrated by Imam Hussein in Karbala, “Anyone who witnesses a dictator authority breaking the divine law and opposing the Sunnah of the prophet, and does not stand against him/her or does not cause them to change their behavior, either by advising or forcing them, God may have no mercy on them, because they are the accomplice of the dictator.” (Taleqani 1979d, 25)

Having faced with the rapid increase of Reza Shah’s tyranny, and seeing the ulama supporting him Taleqani consulted the Quran and Nahj al-Balagheh (the Shitte Book derived from Imam Ali’s sermons) for guidance and inspiration. He admits, “This contradictory practice of some leading ulama, this dark environment, caused me to study the Quran, the Nahj al-Balagheh, the Sunnah and the righteous Imams much more carefully.” (Taleqani 1979d, 11-12)

Taleqani also criticized the religiosity of the ulama who had confined themselves in their private faith and had kept silent. He believed that they had left the external world in the control of the absolute rulers. Thus, asked, “What is the point of sincere faith?” (Taleqani 1979d, 14) He argued that the absolute rulers always opposed the prophets because they felt a threat. If the religions were separated from politics and were restricted to the practicing of the private faith, the rulers would never stand against the prophets because it would never harm them. (Taleqani 1979d, 14-16) He criticized Ayatollah Borujerdi for the very same reason. In Taleqani’s view his quietism caused the Pahlavi’s government to hold firm on to the power.

Taleqani did not only criticize the quietism of the ulama, but also constantly stood for righteous actions, regardless of the consequences. He even criticized Ayatollah Kashani<sup>9</sup> whom he highly admired, while he withdrew his support from Mosaddeq. Although, Taleqani admitted that it was not all Ayatollah Kashani’s fault. Because the agent of internal despotism and the external spies came to Ayatollah Kashani, after disparaging Mosaddeq and causing the Fada’iyan-e Eslam to part with him, and told him that the movement was actually his and would not make without him. They convinced Kashani that Mosaddeq was not important. (Afrasiyabi and Dehghan 1982, 139-140) However, it is also believed that Ayatollah Kashani expected Mosaddeq to offer him a higher position in the government. It was due to the opinion that whitout Kashani and his support, Mosaddeq could not have definitely succeeded in regaining the power. Therefore, when Mosaddeq refused to do so, Ayatollah Kashani withdrew his support. Taleqani, not only criticized Kashani, but also warned him not to part with Mosaddeq, but when it happened, like many other ulama Taleqani stood by Mosaddeq.

---

<sup>9</sup> Ayatollah Seyed abol-Ghasem Kashani (1882-1962) was a prominent Anti-capitalist. He consistently opposed oppression, despotism and colonization. Because of his beliefs, he was highly respected by the poor, and for the same reasons Taleqani admired him. Ayatollah Kashani was a Twelver Shia Muslim cleric and former Chairman of the Parliament of Iran. Due to his Nationalist position, he was arrested and exiled by the British and Soviets. After he returned from the second exile in 1950, he organized a movement and joined Mohammad Mosaddeq in his campaign to nationalize the Iranian oil industry.

#### 4. Taleqani's Islamic Ideology

##### 4.1. Resuscitating an Old Book

As it was mentioned earlier, Taleqani was under great influence of Ayatollah Na'ini<sup>10</sup> and his Book, *Tanbih al-Ommah va Tanzih al-Mellah*. And since he believed that the Islamic Ideology could not be limited to opposing the modern ideologies of the West or the authoritative terms of Marxist economics, Taleqani determined to revitalize the Islamic texts. Therefore, he decided to give a revolutionary manifestation to Na'ini's Book, and in July 1955, after consulting with Bazargan and Sahabi, who consistently encouraged him in this crucial task, he edited the Book and published it with an introduction and extensive commentaries. In Taleqani's view, constitutional government could bring rampant despotism under control, and he emphatically urged that such a government could be brought quite closer to the supreme objective of divine government. His rhetorical question "Do we have no other solution?" (Taleqani 1999, 15) can be considered as an indicator of a reform or a revolution, which he puts forward in this way: "I hope that the vigilant religious leaders, as well as the honorable Muslims, would carefully consider the issues discussed in this book, open their eyes to the conditions of the Muslim nation, and with unity struggle for the salvation and redemption of Muslims. I hope they would no longer tolerate this wretchedness and indignity of Muslims perpetrated by a gang of lecherous hoodlums who are instruments of others." (Taleqani 1999, 15-16) As Taleqani persuasively asks Muslims, particularly the religious leaders, not to tolerate the wretchedness and indignity, a message for a thorough revolutionary action might be inferred.

Taleqani's intention, by editing this book, was to introduce an "Islamic Government" and to give ulama an important role in active politics. According to Taleqani, "Although this book has been written to validate the religious legitimacy of a constitutional government, its significance lies more in its having mandated the Islamic social and political principles, as well as the blueprint and the overall aims of the Islamic governments." (Taleqani 1999, 28) It was Taleqani's bravery in stating such opinions that earned him popularity among the Iranians, though it afflicted him and cost him years in prison.

To speak of the Islamic government in 1955, when Mohammad Reza Shah's increasing reliance on American power made him bolder in his egocentric self-perception, was not only courageous but also indicative of the firm determination of a committed religious leader on his political aspiration. (Dabashi 1993, 229)

Taleqani also made a significant statement in showing the contemporary relevance of the book. His intention was to validate a politically active religiosity in the model of Na'ini and to demand ideological obedience on the part of the masses. According to Taleqani, this book is firstly *Rational* [estedlali], i.e. Political activists do not need to believe dogmatically in the fundamental doctrine of Islam in order to follow Na'ini's political mandates; secondly *Judicially binding* [ejtehad], by which Taleqani wished to make it equally authoritative for ulama and lay Shi'ite; thirdly *Exemplary* [taqlidi], in other words, Taleqani wanted to make it virtually compulsory for all Shi'i Muslim to consider and obey the contents of the book. Therefore, Taleqani's attraction to Na'ini's book can be considered a part of a larger method of appealing to historical figures and text of authorities.

##### 4.2. Taleqani's Understanding of Mankind

---

<sup>10</sup> Allameh Shaikh Mirza Muhammad Hossein Na'ini (1860-1936) born in Na'in, was a prominent Shia cleric and a distinguished jurist of the constitutional and early Pahlavi period who was actively involved in political event of his time. Having finished his early education, he moved to Esfahan and then to Najaf to pursue his studies with the celebrated Mirza-ye Shirazi. He was also closely associated with such pro-Constitutional jurists as Akhond Molla Muhammad Kazem Khorasani. During World War I, he joined Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shirazi in opposing the British presence in Iraq, and was also instrumental in boycotting the Iraqi election when the country was under British occupation.

Taleqani's ideology, as it can be seen through his works, enjoys a basic stability that depicts his unique personality. However, once faced with or exposed to other ideologies, subtle changes and flexibilities can be perceived. As Taleqani considers mankind free and of autonomy, his perceptions contradict some of the Islamic thinkers' and fellow ulama such as Ayatollah Khomeini's, or at least do not fall in the same categories. (Dabashi 1993, 263)

In Taleqani's view, human is free and decides freely for his future, however, he does not deny the opinion expressed by Khomeini that man's salvation is in avoiding what is 'other than God'. What makes Khomeini's opinion very different from that of Taleqani is considering all the existence as an illusion, and God as the only reality. Accordingly, man has no independence and, in fact, is appropriately seen as a 'non-being'. Taleqani, on the other hand, believes that God has provided mankind with *tafviz* (ability to own) so that man can realize his 'inner capacities' as the God's vicegerent on earth. (Taleqani 1979d, 5) And hence, man having the agency should use his unlimited capacity in thinking and decision-making. It does not definitely mean that God has left man on his/her own, or forgotten them. In fact, by doing this, God has put a burden on man's shoulder and given them a grave responsibility which is to act in accordance with the divine law on an evolutionary path toward perfection. It should not also be neglected that man is ultimately going to take the charge for their action on the great judgment day. In contradiction to Khomeini, Taleqani strongly believes that mankind is composed of *nafsiyat* (inner frames) which in turn contains scientific curiosity, searching for truth, justice, logicity, power, love and spiritual values. (Taleqani 1948, 115-116) These inner frames' roles, making rational decisions as well as the conflict between the man's desire and logic, are the elements that distinctively separate man from other creatures. Shariati, one of the prominent Islamic ideologues, shares the concept of man's free will as an autonomous being with Taleqani. However, he makes it somewhat complicated by expressing the fusion of God, man and nature.<sup>11</sup>

#### 4.3. Taleqani and the Theory of Reason

Another remarkable feature that makes Taleqani stand unique among some other prominent ulama and the religious leaders is his perception of aql (Reason) and his approach toward it. If one accepts that the key to faith is the heart, as stated by Khomeini, the truthfulness of the faith will sound compromised, because it could be regarded as an emulative faith, i.e. the faith that man has not reached or gained all by himself. True faith must be obtained through reasoning, rationality and knowledge, which are the greatest gifts bestowed upon human beings by God. Therefore, Taleqani argues that aql is the key to man's development and spiritual perfection, and this matter causes Taleqani to be regarded more rationalist. He also argues this point that the more knowledge and rationality dominate the emotion of man, the more the aspect of his humanity evolves and develops. (Taleqani 1948, 115)

Taleqani considers reasoning a controlling mechanism over other qualities and as he has mentioned it in his book *Jahad va Shahadat*, man's reason directs his other faculties. (Akhavi 1988, 407) Thus, as far as reason and rationality are concerned, if they are separated from religion, they can be destructive or at least can cause man to go astray. On the other hand, if the spiritual side of man overindulges in the effort to please God, it might lead to abandonment of responsibility for social action and commitment in the world. (Taleqani 1979d, 44)

In contradiction with Taleqani, Khomeini believes that reason betrays man, formal learning is the thickest veil, and that man can only obtain a single dimension of the truth which is God. He also believes that Quranic interpretations can only express the possibility and the plausibility of the truth and not the precise explanation of it. (Akhavi 1988, 406) Shahrough Akhavi, regarding this contradiction by crystalizing Taleqani's opinion, delicately stipulates, "Man's continuing search for knowledge is a manifestation of his greatness and the one thing that preempts stagnation and decay." (Akhavi 1988, 408) Taleqani agrees that human's mind is too limited

---

<sup>11</sup> Shariati, in fact, insists on the separation of the three elements, i.e. God, man and nature. He argues that the source is the same and ALL have a single direction, move and live with one will and spirit, but they are separated from one another.

to understand the supreme essence that is God. However, mind does not stop trying to comprehend it. That in turn is significant and outstanding about human's mind.

Concerning man's agency and rationality, Shariati holds a similar stand with that of Taleqani., and makes a great effort in defending man's free will. Nevertheless, he does not explicitly explain if this free will truly makes changes in the concrete objects of the everyday world, or only changes the appearances. Because Shariati believes whatever exists in this world is capable of being known, experienced and scientifically studied and what is perceived by us is appearances, not its existence.

In Taleqani's opinion, the bright and glorifying world that Quran causes man to enter is the world of *tawhid* (unity). The unity of inner mind, the unity of power, the unity of existence, the unity of world's order, rules and regulations, the unity of thought and human's will. He believes that this clear aim of Quran has been either neglected or remained veiled. The first message of the prophets, according to Taleqani, is to distinguish right from wrong, to refute and reject other than God and to verify and prove the existence of God through reasoning. The aim of Quran has not only been to ask man to have a sincere believe in God and to pray. (Taleqani 1999, 12-13)

#### 4.4. *Confronting Marxism*

Since Marxism was steadily and at a very high speed spreading and dominating the political discourse in the 1940s and afterward, Taleqani could not but pay serious attention to the economic issues, too. As a Muslim intellectual he believed it was his responsibility to show the folly and the weak points of this very ideology that had dominated an immense part of the world and greatly influenced the Iranian young professionals, secular and Muslim intellectuals, as well as the students. In Dabashi's words, "Because of primacy that Marxist historiography and sociology gave to economic factors, Taleqani felt obliged to address 'Islamically' the issue thus raised." (Dabashi 1993, 224) Therefore, Taleqani wrote the book, *Islam and the Ownership* in which centralized and free market economies were both criticized. In fact he borrows the idea from Quran and the traditions of the Prophet as well as the Hadith. In Taleqani's opinion worshipping a school of thought is a kind of idolatry, and in this regard he says, "Our progressed parties are trapped in hypocrisy, because they worship their ideology and are not willing to see beyond it to realize the realities of human and their lives." (Taleqani 1979d, 39) He argues that the righteous ownership and the absolute power of expenditure belong to God and that God, according to his own judgment, gives the power of ownership to whomever he wills. One of the main reasons why Taleqani criticizes Marxism is the unacceptable concept of religion being placed at the second level next to the economic matters. According to his opinion, it means to denigrate human who is the true and righteous God's vicegerent, the shaper of the society, the creator of the economy and the history. Taleqani also says that, "It is wrong to think man takes economy over everything, because what matters to man most is freedom and agency." (Taleqani 1979d, 43) In addition, he expressed his thought that in communist countries the individuals are deprived of their freedom and exploited by economic ideas.

#### 4.5. *His Stance on Minorities*

As Islam is the religion of equality, most religious individuals and groups appear to care about minorities, and Taleqani's stance on minorities remarkably differ from the other fellow ulama, because he takes a step beyond theory and goes out of the way to support them. He does not only take a firm stand for ethno-religious minorities, but also supports individuals and groups with ideologies that stand at odd. For he strongly believes that all human beings, as long as they do not break the norm of the society, have the same rights, including the freedom of speech and ideology. He also supports them and says, "In prison and out of prison, I have witnessed how these young leftists, whose thought and inspiration are freedom, sacrifice their lives. For some reasons they

have been attracted toward left. We do respect them.” (Taleqani 1979d, 43) Like Bazargan, Taleqani highly regarded the identity of Iranians, and this matter also caused him to be considered as a nationalist.

Certainly Taleqani withdrew his support from the ethno-religious minorities for a short time after the Islamic revolution. But he returned to his stance before long, maintaining that it was all because he feared the country would face a chaos. Thus, he later declared, “You, young people with any kind of ideology, your nature is pure and you are Iranians. You are in pain. You are skeptical to religions. I know all these facts, and I know them even better than you, because I have been with you for years. But at this critical moment these people are not looking for an ideology. They are looking for freedom, and they are afraid of being beaten again. From this aspect I humbly request you to be awake and aware of the schemes of the tyrants. We seem to have won the victory, but our enemy is still alive and looking for an opportunity to backlash.” (Taleqani 1979d, 49)

## 5. Conclusion

Taleqani’s ideology was remarkably influenced not only by his studies but also by interactions with Intellectuals, other Islamic ideologues, as well as religious and secular political activists. It consequently caused him to feel more and more responsible toward mankind, particularly his fellow Iranians. They were exploited by the dictatorial regime of Pahlavi and were on the verge of being drowned in modern secular ideologies such as Marxism. In Taleqani’s view the latter one was really dreadful, because it would not free them from the exploitation, but also would cause them to lose their dignity, agency and eventually would deprive them of their rights.

The Islamic aspect of Taleqani’s ideology can be perceived quite easily at the very first glance over his teachings and activities, whereas, one would probably become aware of Taleqani’s humanitarian aspect by examining his approaches toward socio-political problems and reasons of his actions. Taleqani’s liberal approach toward secular ideologies, for instance, was based on his opinion which is expressed in this tangible way: “Whatever idea or action, as long as they get mankind closer to freedom from slavery is sacred and of Islamic view, even though they are not the ultimate goals of Islam.” (Taleqani 1999, 15) Another significant approach of Taleqani that indicates his humanitarianism is his support of ethno-religious minorities. He takes a firm stand for them due to his belief that all human beings are entitled to enjoy the commons which are given to them by Almighty God.

Taleqani confronts Marxism for two obvious reasons at least. First: He believes it desecrates the religions, particularly Islam because in Taleqani’s opinion, Islam is the perfect religion which has solutions for every grave as well as trifle problems mankind faces with. And second: In Taleqani’s opinion it devaluates human’s glory and dignity. He believes Islam considers man, God’s true vicegerent, i.e. they are being given the right and the power to solve their own social, economic and political problems.

The reason Taleqani criticizes the fellow ulama is also one of the most outstanding proofs of his humanitarian aspect. Taleqani cannot but castigate the leading ulama once he figures out that their quietism, deliberately or inadvertently, endorses despotism of the regime and gives it eligibility to keep exploiting the Iranians, and on the other hand it diminishes people’s faith and makes them skeptical toward Islam, thus causing them to seek a non-religious solution.

In contrast with the conservative ulama, Taleqani always took the risk of confronting the Pahlavi regime, and never cared about his own profit and desire. He strongly believed it was the worldly desire that caused man to forget the other human’s pain. It would also cause them to overlook their responsibilities toward the others and eventually to forget God. In closing, it is necessary to mention that Taleqani as a Muslim alim<sup>12</sup> believed Islam

---

<sup>12</sup> Although ulama is considered uncountable in English, alim is suggested as its singular form, both in Persian and Arabic, for a Muslim scholar.

was a perfect religion. Therefore, it has solutions to all human's afflictions and answer to every social, economic and political problem. Once he felt man's dignity and glory were disparaged and that they were exploited, he raised his voice for the righteousness without being afraid of the consequences, even though he would have to stand against other Muslim ulama including the ones he admired like Ayatollah Kashani and Khomeini.

## References

- Abrahamian, Ervand. *Iran between Two Revolutions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
- Afrasiabi, Bahram, and Sa'id Dehqan. *Taleqani va Tarikh*. Teheran: Entesharat-e Nilufar, 1981.
- Akhavi, Shahrough. "Islam, Politics and Society in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Taleqani and Ali Shariati." *Middle Eastern Studies* 24, (1988): pp. 404-431.
- Algar, Hamid. (Nikki R. Keddie, ed.) *The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth-Century Iran*. London: University of California Press, 1972.
- Bazargan, Mehdi. *Modafe'at-e Mohandes Mehdi Bazargaan dar Dadgah-e Badavi va Tajdid-e Nazar-e Nezami*, (Tehran: Enteshar Co., 2006), 116.
- Chehabi, H. E. *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1990.
- Dabashi, Hamid. *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran*. New York: New York University Press, 1993.
- Irfani, Suroosh. *Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship?*. London: Zed Books, 1983.
- Jahanbakhsh, Forough. *Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran (1953-1997): From Bazargan to Soroush*. Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies McGill University, 1997.
- Kamrava, Mehran. *Iran's Intellectual Revolution*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Katouzian, Homa. *Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society*. London: Routledge Curzon, 2003.
- Katouzian, Homa. *Mosaddeq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1990.
- Keddie, Nikki R. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.
- Keddie, Nikki R., ed. *Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Question to Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.
- Keddie, Nikki R., and Eric Hooglund, eds. *The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic*. Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1982; Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986.
- Kian-Thiebaut Azadeh. *Secularization of Iran: A Doomed Failure?: The New Middle Class and the Making of Modern Iran*. France: Peeters, 1998.
- Na'ini, Shaykh Mohammad Hossein. *Tanbih al-Ummah va Tanzih al-Mellah: ya Hokumat az Nazar-e Islam*. Introduction and Explanatory Notes by Seyyed Mahmoud Taleqani. Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-ye Enteshar, 1955.
- Taleqani, Seyyed Mahmoud. *Do Shahid*. Tehran: Entesharat-e Nas, 1979.
- Taleqani, Seyyed Mahmoud. *Dars-e Vahdat*. Tehran: Entesharat-e Nas, 1979.
- Taleqani, Seyyed Mahmoud. *Azadi va Estebdad*. Tehran: Entesharat-e Nas, 1979.
- Taleqani, Seyyed Mahmoud. *Jahad va Shahadat*. Tehran: Entesharat-e Masoud, 1979.
- Taleqani, Seyyed Mahmoud. *Islam and Ownership*. Translated by Ahmad Jabbari and Farhang Rajaei. Lexington: Mazda, 1983.
- Taleqani, Seyyed Mahmoud. *Partovi az Quran*. 2 vols. Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-ye Enteshar, 1979.
- Taleqani, Seyyed Mahmoud. *Partovi az Quran*. 4 vols. Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-ye Enteshar,



# The Role of Internal Dynamics in the Political Reform Process in the ASC 2004-2010

Jawad El Hamad<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Middle East Studies Center, Jordan. Email: hamadj2001@yahoo.com

## Abstract

This main paper's objective is to evaluate the role of the internal dynamics in the political reform process in the ASC. Its main problem is the deficit of political reform achievements compared to the people's demands in the period under study. Its central question is why this process couldn't overcome the deficit and what are the main repercussions of such failure on the political stability of the ASC regimes. A reform process is generally wide-reaching. It is economical and social and goes much deeper to affect change in society as a comprehensive process as per (Kroeber, 1996). However, the focus of this paper is mainly on the internal dynamics of the political reform process. Therefore, the paper analyzes the internal efforts, roles, and results of the political reform dynamics and initiatives and their applications. These efforts should be understood within the political scene that prevailed in the Arab Spring Countries "ASC" in 2004, which this paper considers as the start of the benchmark period for the political reform process. The paper analyzes the internal leading reform initiatives and efforts. It examines their elements, conditions, ability to affect the political reform process. It evaluates their results within the ASC context in the period under study 2004-2010 with a particular focus on the cases of Egypt and Jordan.

**Keywords:** Internal Dynamics, Political Reform Process, ASC

## Introduction

This main paper's objective is to evaluate the role of the internal dynamics in the political reform process in the ASC. Its main problem is the deficit of political reform achievements compared to the people's demands in the period under study. Its central question is why this process couldn't overcome the deficit and what are the main repercussions of such failure on the political stability of the ASC regimes.

A reform process is generally wide-reaching. It is economical and social and goes much deeper to affect change in society as a comprehensive process as per (Kroeber, 1996). However, the focus of this paper is mainly on the internal dynamics of the political reform process. Therefore, the paper analyzes the internal efforts, roles, and results of the political reform dynamics and initiatives and their applications. These efforts should be understood

within the political scene that prevailed in the Arab Spring Countries "ASC"<sup>1</sup> in 2004, which this paper considers as the start of the benchmark period for the political reform process.

The paper analyzes the internal leading reform initiatives and efforts. It examines their elements, conditions, ability to affect the political reform process. It evaluates their results within the ASC context in the period under study 2004-2010 with a particular focus on the cases of Egypt and Jordan.

### **The political scene in the ASC by 2004**

The dramatic political changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 made the people in the ASC believe in the “need for qualitative transform[ation]” towards more freedom and democracy. [These] developments (since [the] late 1980s to 2004) provided the emergence of new dynamics to enhance the political change process (Elhamad, 2007).

The political scene and its dimensions provide the framework for evaluating different political programs and emerging players and factors in the ASC during the political transformation period of 2004–2010. The political dynamic in 2004 concentrated on the popular struggles against corruption, oppression, and the respect of the rights of people and the honor of their dignity.

People’s demands included more liberties, constraining the security apparatuses, and measures to fight poverty and unemployment. Besides, youth citizens were uncertain of their future under these regimes. Thus, non-democratic practices became of primary common concern in many ASC in 2004. However, such struggles were ineffective because the gap between governments and people widened, and there was an increase in suppression and marginalization as well as corruption and abuse of power in the ASC in 2004.

Intellectuals, political parties, and civil society organizations failed to mobilize mass support for political reform as witnessed regarding Iraq and Palestine issue. The main dynamic was for political reform, freedom, and dignity, against the violation of different laws, and for respect for human rights. The leading players were political parties and civil society organizations (NGOs), including professional associations, youth, and women. They were against unfair government practices and the U.S. and Israeli policies toward Arabs at the same time (CCDP, 2012, p. 3).

Furthermore, the international community became aware of the potential threat to their interests in the ASC if they continued to support non-democratic regimes. In particular, the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the continued Israeli occupation of Palestine created fears of a threat to the political stability of the autocratic Arab regimes that were mostly U.S. allies.

Many ASC regimes such as Jordan, Yemen, and Egypt faced political challenges in spite of legislative elections being practiced in their countries. Nevertheless, the Arab situation deteriorated regarding democracy, freedom, and the economy, as noted in the 2003 U.N. *Arab Human Development Report* that drew a gloomy picture of the Arab world on all levels (Cofman Wittes, 2004). The U.S., with the G8,<sup>2</sup> sought to boost political reform in the ASC in 2004. Thus the race among governments, civil organizations and political parties, as well as international actors, especially the U.S., to produce reform initiatives, gained momentum, creating what seemed to be a window of opportunity for a better life in the future that would be achieved through a political reform dynamic

---

<sup>1</sup> Arab Spring Countries will be referred to as "ASC" in this article. They include: Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and Libya.

<sup>2</sup> The Group of Eight (G8) refers to the group of great industrialized nations—France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States, Canada, and Russia—that hold an annual meeting to foster consensus on global issues like economic growth and crisis management, global security, energy, and terrorism.

regardless of restrictions imposed by governments<sup>3</sup>. (Cofman Wittes, 2004) Affirms that there were increasing discussions focused on the need for reform. These discussions were inevitable and could not be ignored by most of the ASC governments (Cofman Wittes, 2004).

By the end of 2004, there was considerable pressure for new political transformations, including popular mobilization in the form of protests and demonstrations by different sectors who were seeking improved political, economic, and human rights (Dunne, Hamzawy, & Brown, 2007).

The changed mood of the Arab people toward their governments, and the rise of new political players, as Kefaya and 6 April in Egypt, and other activists on the local, regional and international level, led to many efforts, initiatives, and action plans, as the change in the law of presidential elections in Egypt in 2007, to promote peaceful means for political change. The general regional scene encouraged the Arab people to react positively toward such new trends and energies. The role of the Islamic movement, Pan-Arabists, and leftists crystallized to cooperate, coinciding with the emerging influence of some Arab youth via violent "Islamic" organizations such as al-Qaida. The deteriorating economy, increasing poverty rates, increased rates of unemployment, and the rise in the cost of living were also considered to be catalysts for the consolidation of a reform movement among the Arab population (United Nations Development Program, 2004). The highly tightened security measures under the excuse of fighting terrorism created much frustration among the Arab people who became involved in different types of protests in Egypt and Jordan as examples.

Consequently, ASC governments started to contribute to the new reform dynamic and instituted some changes to counteract the emerging mood and trends and to contain protests, as in the cases of Yemen, Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt. Also, many non-governmental players contributed to political reform initiatives. Such players included the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, civil society organizations, secular activists, and even research centers such as the Middle East Studies Center in Jordan.

Interaction from within these internal initiatives consolidated the Arab reform movement in general and energized the public to participate in mass protests to apply such needed political reform in Jordan, Egypt, and other ASC from 2004 onwards. External initiatives also, especially those of the U.S., played a role in encouraging debate on reform. The mutual role of both the external and internal reform dynamics energized the reform process, which passed through two main phases. In the first phase, from 2004 to 2008, the U.S. can be considered as a proactive actor and in the second phase, from 2008 to 2010, as an inactive one that sought to "drawback," a U.S. position that was held by 2008 (Gill, 2013).

In spite of the "varying" U.S. role, the Arab reform movement learned to take full responsibility and a whole part to consolidate its call for political change with broader popular support, as was the cases in Jordan, Yemen, and Egypt. As such, 2004 deserves to be considered as the benchmark year for this article as well as for the Arab reform movement in the ASC.

### **Main internal initiatives for reform**

Many internal political reform proposals and initiatives, emerged for the first time in such quantity, quality, and from different parties during the period under study. Some of these initiatives were non-governmental, and others were governmental in origin. This paper clarifies the internal dynamics of reform in the ASC by examining the development of the main popular demands and the government responses to those demands, especially in Jordan and Egypt. In doing so, this paper looks at both the regional and local political reform dynamics.

---

<sup>3</sup> This assessment is a summary of separate discussions the researcher had with different Arab intellectuals and prominent figures in Amman, Jordan in 2013.

## 1. Non-governmental initiatives

In this paper, the main aim is to explore and analyze the different reform initiatives that were put forward by a range of non-governmental players in the ASC, including Jordan and Egypt. This paper considers mainly the initiatives proposed by Islamists, civil society organizations, and other public bodies as well as those put forward by political parties. It compares these initiatives to identify any common or distinctive and different approaches or elements as well as their bases and goals. Hence, this paper crystallizes the primary internal dynamics and evaluates the impact of such initiatives on the political reform process.

The most notable, and seemingly inclusive and comprehensive of the non-governmental initiatives, were those made by the Islamic movement, especially in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan in 2004–2005. The proposed political reform initiatives were within the Arab cultural spectrum, recognizing, on the one hand, the need for democratic change and, on the other, the existence of diversity across the Arab nations. They called for the consensus of all factions, religious and ideological affiliations, and political elite on the main ideas and approaches to achieve political change that would improve democracy in the ASC, including Jordan and Egypt. They also acknowledged the need for the renewal of a religious discourse regarding democratic principles and public legitimacy from their side as well as other Islamic institutions. As such, they advocated for democracy in the political system to improve the social and political as well as the economic development of the country (Elhamad, 2017).

Civil society organizations (NGOs) as Kefaya and 6 April in Egypt also contributed to reform proposals. However, most of their demands were focused on modernization rather than democratization. They stressed that there was a need for reform to guarantee people's basic rights while acknowledging the social and cultural diversity of ASC societies. They mostly emphasized individual freedoms, women's rights, governance, and transparency. Generally speaking, their models were developed in such a way to tolerate "moderate" Islamic movements as a part of the reform movement in the ASC (Elhamad, 2017, p. 93).

In spite of their conservative ideological approaches regarding Islam's role in the state and in politics, these movements accepted the Islamists as they explicitly acknowledged the need for political reform that would develop into a democratic political system. As such, both civil society organizations (CSO's) and Islamic movements paved the way for cooperation among non-governmental players. This paper explores and analyzes the content of a sample of the non-governmental reform initiatives and their main impacts on the political reform process in the ASC, including Jordan and Egypt, in the following analysis.

### A. Reform initiatives of Islamist movements

The Islamic movements in the ASC are mostly represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, as it is considered the main widespread mobility, and whoever is affiliated to the Brotherhood's political and Islamic ideology (Hamid, 2014).

The Islamists in the ASC, especially Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, are grappling with the issue of democracy and political participation (Hamid, 2014). They emphasize that there should be a transformation of the political system to one of democratic. They believe that religion should have a role in social and political life and that it can be introduced within a democratic framework. They recognize the citizens', individual, and public rights, including the rights of women, youth, and minorities. They also acknowledge that there are particular 'limitations' that need to be taken into account in each country, such as the 'Copts' in Egypt, the 'tribal' issue and the issue of 'citizens' origins in Jordan, and the sectarianism and 'Alawiyat' ruling minority issue in Syria (Vidino, 2013).

The Egyptian Islamists' version of a political change program was published in 2004 (Muslim Brotherhood, 2004). They stated that the people should be the source of all authorities and that the transfer of power should occur through free general elections. They also called for an end to torture, the release of political detainees, the repeal of emergency laws, and a consolidation of the independence of the legal system (p. 3).

On the other hand, the Syrian Islamists' version, which was also published in 2004 (Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 2004), addressed the issue of just governance based on constitutional principles. They also supported the peaceful transfer of power in line with the people's will through ballots and that the right of people to choose their beliefs should be protected (p. 26).

The Jordanian Islamists' version was leaked and published in 2005 (Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, 2005). They called for comprehensive political reform to establish democracy and that pluralism should be respected, and that there should be no racism or discrimination on ethnic, religious, or geographical bases. They also promoted the protection of public freedoms, democratic norms, freedom of the press and expression, the establishment of civil society organizations (NGOs), and the modification of the election law (p. 2).

## **B. Reform initiatives of civil society organizations**

Many civil society organizations have proposed different initiatives at many conferences during the period under study. They resulted in numerous political reform documents. The most well known of these are the Beirut Declaration in 2004, the Doha Declaration in 2004, the Bibliotheca Alexandrina Declaration of 2004, and the Sana'a Declaration of 2004.

These initiatives had many commonalities in terms of their advocacy for reform, including the call for free and transparent elections, the repealing of emergency laws, and any extraordinary courts. They also agreed on calling for a peaceful transfer of power to form "accountable" governments (Heydemann, 2007, p. 10). They yet decided to create an independent judiciary and to respect the separation of power.

They also contained some distinctive approaches to the political reform process. For instance, the Beirut Declaration emphasized the empowerment of legislative councils, while the Doha Declaration urged that Arab culture and Islam support the main democratic principles. It also called for the transformation of absolute monarchies into constitutional ones.

On the other hand, the Bibliotheca Alexandrina Declaration recognized that freedom was a paramount value, while the Sana'a Declaration called on governments to reinforce the role of women. A summary of the output of each of the above conference's Declaration is provided in the following content analysis.

The Beirut Declaration of 2004 called for the repeal of emergency laws and any extraordinary courts, the release of political prisoners, and a cessation of any forms of torture, as well as a respect of freedoms and the empowerment of legislative councils (Yacoubian, 2005).

The Doha Declaration of 2004 asserted that Arab culture and Islam should support the main democratic principles. It also called for the transformation of absolute monarchies into constitutional ones. On the other hand, it also called on republics to empower governments rather than presidents. Also, it affirmed the need for free and transparent elections to be held (Yacoubian, 2005, pp. 6–7).

The Bibliotheca Alexandrina Declaration of 2004 (Arab Reform Forum, 2004) affirmed that the Arab people ought to take charge of their affairs to build their democratic systems. The Declaration recognized that freedom was a "paramount value," and that this included respect of all rights for all people. It considered the political

pluralism as a means to lead a regulated and peaceful transfer of power to form accountable governments. It also called for the creation of an independent judiciary and respect for the separation of powers (Arab Reform Forum, 2004).

Lastly, the Sana'a Declaration of 2004 called on governments to "reinforce" the role of women and their public participation. The Declaration advocated for the creation of an independent judicial system and to put the separation of powers into effect. It also advocated for the respect of equality before the law and the right to a just trial for all citizens (No Peace without Justice NPWJ, 2004).

### **C. Other reform initiatives**

Other popular reform movements emerged in the period 2004–2010. In Egypt, two such movements emerged: the Kefaya (Egyptian Movement for Change) in 2004 and the 6th April Movement in 2008. The main goals of Kefaya include preventing the extension of the presidential term of Muhammad Husni Mubarak who had been in power since 1982. It also aims not to allow him to pass the presidency to his son Jamal, and to call for civil freedoms and rights to be respected (Oweidat et al., 2008). Hundreds of academics and activists of different political persuasions joined the movement.

The 6 April Movement, on the other hand, was established on 28 June 2008 as a youth organization rather than a political movement with the first conference to convene in the Journalists' Syndicate in Cairo. The movement called for solving some problems, including the high prices, the minimum labor wages, the exporting of Egyptian gas to Israel at low prices. They contributed to many activities concerning reform as well as in support of the Palestinian cause. They usually join events organized by other civil political parties. They could not express a comprehensive vision for change in Egypt<sup>4</sup>.

In the case of Jordan, a conference was convened on the future of political reform in Jordan in 2005 (Middle East Studies Center, 2006) in which diverse political currents participated, ranging from political parties to civil society organizations and reform activists as well as some government officials. The communiqué issued by the conference advocated for political reform as well as economic reform to be adhered to by the government in the coming years. It also affirmed the need for the election law and political parties' law to be amended accordingly.

It also called for freedoms to be strengthened and the corruption in the government to be contained. It also advocated building national unity through national dialogue, including government and different civil society organizations, to agree on the path, content, and program for the reform process in the country so that it would succeed (Middle East Studies Center, 2006).

On the other hand, the opposition political parties (11 parties) in Jordan formed a coordination council to promote other goals for democracy and freedoms in the country (Muasher, 2011). As such, this council uncovered obstacles that hindered the success of the reform process in the country. The council's dynamic depended on communication, protest to advocate, and exert pressure for political reform in Jordan.

The two examples of Egypt and Jordan above are just examples of the other advocates of public reform in the Arab Spring. All those concerned were interested in ensuring the democratic practices of government, and at the same time, they were willing to support other efforts for reform.

---

<sup>4</sup> See Dr. Mostafa Al-Najjar analysis for more detail (<https://bit.ly/2SCSYkU>)

## 2. Governmental reform initiatives

Governments also contributed to the trend toward freedom and democracy by taking their approach. This contribution included initiatives made by governments under pressure from their people and the U.S., each of which had their perspectives. The governments aimed to diffuse international pressure, especially from the U.S., which was encouraging the promotion of reform and democratic change through peaceful means (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2004).

As a result, governments such as those in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, among others, initiated different forms of reform in, for example, their constitutions, laws, and governance. These reforms included permitting some freedom of speech and establishing contact with the opposition. They also allowed discussions on democracy and any related issues; they were considered to be “premature steps to openness,” (p. 5) as governments aimed “to sustain their authority” (p. 1). They never proposed that democratic change would happen as a continuous process (Ahmad, 2005). They are yet to legalize these governments’ continuous control. As such, many of the reform activists questioned and rejected such cosmetic and controlled reforms.

Most governments’ reform programs were “ad hoc” programs, as in the case of changing election law in Jordan and Egypt. They were designed to address specific issues but merely on the superficial level. They were not “holistic” in terms of looking at all necessary elements for change, nor were earnest attempts at real reform process (Muasher, 2011, p. 17). At the ASC governments’ level, there were some collective initiatives aimed at reform, while others were at the country level. Both types of effort are explored and analyzed in this paper.

After the attacks on Washington and New York on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, Arab governments proposed political reform as a means of “jump[ing] on the reform bandwagon” of the U.S. to consolidate their stability (Yacoubian, 2005, p. 11); (Ahmad, 2005, p. 2). However, the government of each country had its interests and approach concerning reform initiatives. Thus, they differed in “scope and intent.” The proposed changes are of cosmetic sort and superficial to relief domestic and international quarters’ pressure. The governments did not implement a real substantial reform (Yacoubian, 2005; Ahmad, 2005).

### A. Collective governmental reform initiatives

Some of the joint initiatives were made by bodies such as the League of the Arab States<sup>5</sup>, which is comprised of all the Arab countries, including the ASC. Representatives of each country convened and adopted the final documents for reform. However, some other initiatives were organized by international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (U.S. Department of State Archive, 2005)<sup>6</sup>. This paper explores two examples of such initiatives.

The first is the Tunisia Declaration (2004) (League of Arab States, 2004), which was articulated in Tunisia on March 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2004. The declaration asserted a commitment to humanitarian principles and to reinforce freedom of expression, thought, and belief. The declaration announced that Arab governments would be obliged to respect the independence of the judiciary. They would also consolidate democratic practices by widening political participation to include women.

---

<sup>5</sup> League of Arab States is the organization that includes all Arab states. It represents the major sort of collective Arab Council at different levels to decide on the Arab affairs and security. The main bodies are the summit, the ministerial councils and the permanent council of representatives. <http://www.lasportal.org/ar/Pages/default.aspx>

<sup>6</sup> <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/other/42298.htm>

The second is the Dead Sea Declaration (2005)<sup>7</sup> (League of Arab States, 2005); (United Nations Development Program, 2005). The declaration reconfirmed the mentioned Tunisia Declaration. Besides, it reaffirmed that the signatories would “respect the principles of fairness and equality before the law” and the need for good governance to “respond to people’s needs and [establish] social justice.” It also called for the implementation of “accountability measures, to combat corruption [and] reduce poverty rates” (UNDP, 2005, p. 2).

As such, the two declarations contained similar statements. Their assertions and commitments were all cosmetics rather than real political reforms. They seemed to be aimed at controlling authority and enhancing popular participation (Muasher, 2011, p. 5), which would improve their international image (especially, regarding the U.S. reform initiatives 2002,2004), and release people’s pressure on governments that calling for comprehensive reform. However, when the content of these declarations is examined in detail in conjunction with the people’s demands that had emerged by the year 2004, these declarations can be considered as part of a process of containing reformists rather than driving a shift to democracy.

The ASC governments were keen to retain their current norms of governing rather than allow all political parties to contribute to the shaping of the political system respecting major democratic principles. These principles are to include transparency, accountability, respect for human rights, and the proper response to the needs of their people, as was claimed in these declarations. Therefore, the political parties, civil society organizations, and the public did not take these declarations seriously. Instead, they evaluated the evidence for actual transformation and the practice of democratic norms, which showed that these governments' records on these issues were poor (Ottaway & Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 161).

## **B. Individual governmental reform initiatives**

Many Arab governments, as mentioned above, collectively contributed to reform efforts. Some also individually proposed different reforms. This paper highlights two examples, one from Egypt and one from Jordan, to show the sort of individual government’s efforts that were put forward and their impact on political reform.

In 2004, the governing National Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt, which was the party of the president, introduced reform measures and “endorsed the fifth term for President Hosni Mubarak,” but it did not make any promises “to lift the emergency law of 1982” (Yacoubian, 2005, p. 13; Dunne, 2006, p. 3). Indeed, the government seemed reluctant “to implement several key elements” of reform that were necessary for a “meaningful reform package.” However, they agreed to “lift restrictions on political parties” (Yacoubian, 2005; Dunne, 2006, p. 13).

On another hand, the lack of reform has crystalized under the amended constitutional article no. 76. By such amendment, President Mubarak could run for the sixth term (he was in office since 1981) as an evident false sign of reform (Dunne, 2006, p. 8).

Then, in 2005, the government cracked down on Islamist opposition activists, which resulted in many arrests and the closing down of the Muslim Brotherhood’s website. Hosni Mubarak's will to run for the sixth term was considered as a clear example of the Egyptian government’s non-democratic behaviors against reform activists (Yacoubian, 2005).

---

<sup>7</sup> The venue was near the Dead Sea in Jordan and the meeting was held on February 6th and 7th, 2005. It was organized by the UNDP and the OECD and Jordan’s Justice Ministry and included representatives of Arab governments.

In the case of Jordan, in specific, there is a “low-profile” democracy in the Jordanian political system, whereby the members of parliament’s lower house and the municipalities are directly elected. The constitution of Jordan requires the government to hold parliamentary and municipal elections regularly, and in general, elections have occurred since 1989.

During the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and the 2000s, many developments in Palestine, Iraq, and Syria weighed heavily on Jordanian decision-makers during the period under study. As such, parliamentary elections were suspended in June 2001 but then resumed and were held in June 2003 two years after dismissing parliament. However, the 2003 elections were widely boycotted by political parties, especially the Islamic Action Front (IAF) of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Jordan as a protest against the existing system of vote that restricts the right of voters to choose one candidate for the multi-candidate seats of the district (Muasher, 2011, p.21).

The following year, in 2004, the Jordanian government established the Ministry of Political Development and the Royal Human Rights Center, both of which had limited authority (Yacoubian, 2005, p. 12). Then, in 2005, a plan to decentralize the government was endorsed, but it was received cautiously by political parties as it overrode their “demands for political reform in the country” (Yacoubian, 2005, p. 12; Shonaq et al., 2006, p. 66; Elhamad, 2007).

The political discourse in Jordan during this time indicated that different efforts were being made by society and government together to develop and implement political reform and democracy. The most distinctive of these efforts were the Jordan First initiative of 2002, the National Agenda of 2005, and the We Are All Jordan initiative of 2006 (Muasher, 2011).

The King appointed all committees in charge of these initiatives. They consisted of a range of political and social sectors, including opposition representatives. The outcomes addressed the reform process as well as the development of government practices (Muasher, 2011, p. 220). They recommended many amendments to the relevant legislation concerning the laws on freedoms, elections, and parties as well as the participation of women in political life (IDEA, 2005, p. 6).

However, successive Jordanian governments during the period 2004–2010 only applied a little of the reform agenda, and at the same time, they instituted new restrictions on movement and freedom of expression as well as on the forming of NGOs and political parties (Muasher, 2011, p. 22).

Therefore, in spite of these initiatives and promising announcements, the Jordanian people began to lose their trust in the political process as well as in the ability of their government to lead the country to an era of democracy and stability (Mahafzah, 2012, p. 2).

Many such as Marwan Muasher (2011) argue that the main obstacle to reform in Jordan was the ruling elite who were “built-in structurally” into the system. Others, such as Yacoubian (2005), state that regional political and security developments were the main hindrance to such reform. Also, some researchers such as Freer et al. (2010) conclude that the supposed potential threat of the Islamists gaining enough seats to influence parliament is behind the elite’s opposition to real political reform. In support of their perspective, the ruling elite refers to the results of Egyptian and Palestinian elections in which Islamists won numerous seats in 2005 and 2006, respectively (Freer, Kubinec, & Tatum, 2010; Mahafzah, 2012; Majed, 2005; Muasher, 2011).

It is noticeable that government loyalists-controlled parliament for the whole period under study as in 2010 elections when the opposition occupied only 17 seats out of 120, and 103 for loyalists to government, i.e., 14.2% for the opposition and 85.8% for loyalists.<sup>8</sup>

The parliament contributed to the reform process in spite of the loyalists' majority to some extent (Freihat, 2012, p. 307). Furthermore, at the same time, the government of Jordan approved more than 211 pieces of legislation during the dissolution of parliament in 2001..., and while they defined them as "provisional laws," they included major laws on freedom, syndicates, and elections (Muasher, 2011, p. 6). Most of these laws continued for the whole period under study as considered the base and reference for any later improvement or amendments.

## **Analysis and Discussion**

### **At non-governmental level**

This paper has explored some examples of the reform efforts that were made by non-governmental parties and actors. It illustrated the principal elements and conditions of their advocacy for political reform. It showed that there were many common aspects in their approaches to change, especially concerning free elections and the low density of democratic practices by governments. It also revealed that there were differences as well. However, whether these were based on ideological background or the prioritization approach of each party, they did not come to the surface in the initial stages and didn't hinder these players' overall efforts and cooperation in reform advocacy.

The main outputs of non-governmental efforts for reform were advocacy papers and communique. There were also some organized protests and demonstrations. This two-pronged approach (announcements and mobilizations) succeeded in creating a broader awareness of the issues among the general public and the media. Through these means, these non-governmental actors were able to pressure governments to propose some cosmetic changes, at least.

It should also be mentioned that activists sometimes sacrificed their freedom to continue to convey their message to the people. The impact of such efforts was twofold. First, they created a public reform movement, even if it was not well organized. Second, they created a dynamic for reform in the governments' programs as governments wished to contain protests and be seen to advocate for political change. The governments want to create their image to respond to people's demands at the international level, as there was an awareness that these governments needed to address the violation of human rights and abide by the results of free elections.

### **At governmental level**

In the ASC, and especially in Egypt, the study of the evidence shows that the cosmetic changes in legislation concerning political change were frustrating and that there was continuous harassment of the opposition (Dunne & Hamzawy, 2010). The governments in the ASC continued to behave in such a way as to allow non-democratic practices to prevail in their countries. The regimes couldn't meet the people's demands for freedom and dignity. People became angry and filled with anxiety, especially youth and political actors. Many activists and organizations, as Kefaya and the Muslim Brotherhood, created their discourse on the reform agenda and established reform movements (Dunne and Hamzawy, 2007, p. 3).

---

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/11/2010111011597439770.html>

Jordan, in specific witnessed the dynamics of “pro-reform” initiatives and advocacy during the period 2004–2010, but there was “little effective change” in the political system (Ryan, 2011, p. 1.). The ruling elite “resisted [anything] more than cosmetic reform,” and they hindered real democratic developments (Ryan, 2011, p. 1). Successive Jordanian governments during this period could not convince their people of the results of reform trends, as many efforts were invested in articulating different reform proposals (Muasher, 2011). These efforts included proposals from political parties, civil society organizations as well as the collective proposals by Arab governments. The same situation prevailed in dealing with the outcomes of the committees formed by the King that included representatives from most of Jordan’s political, social and economic spectra. These committees’ proposals included the National Agenda of 2005 as well as We Are All Jordan initiative of 2006. The few changes in the legislation and the behaviors of governments, which was called reform, was secondary to the policy of containing people’s demands, and so these changes did not meet these demands.

## Conclusion

The paper addressed its problem clearly of deficit in political reform achievements. It evaluated the internal dynamics in this process, yet it found out that such efforts didn’t produce the goals of these dynamics. The main reason for such failure to achieve the goals of political reform is the ruling elite as per the analysis. The main research prediction provided that instability is inevitable if this problem of democracy deficit is not solved at the time. It depended on the content analysis of both governmental and non-governmental initiatives and actions regarding political reform which provided the shortage of its achievements. As such, people got frustrated and anger against their governments which is the primary source of instability for the political system of the ASC regimes in the next years.

Hence, the lack of democracy and the continued refusal to acknowledge or accede to people’s demands as well as the continuous non-democratic practices of governments prevailed by the end of the period under study in the ASC, including Jordan and Egypt. The political climate became filled with anger and frustration, especially among reform activists, including political parties from different political left and right, pro-democracy institutions, youth movements, and social media. The potential consequences of instability were predicted by many experts and alarmed both the reformists and the incumbent politicians.

However, despite the warnings, the governments of Jordan, Egypt, and other ASC did not pay enough attention to solving the problem of lack of democracy in good time with the appropriate measures.

## References

- Ahmad, A. M. (2005). *Milafi al’iislah alsiyasaa fa alealam aleurbaa [Political Reform in the Arab World]. Alhiwar Almutamadin [Civilised Dialogue]*. Retrieved from <http://www.m.ahewar.org/s.asp?aid=47971&r=0>
- Arab Reform Forum. (2004). Alexandria Declaration. Retrieved from <http://www.bibalex.org/arf/en/document.html#>
- CCDP. (2012). Arab Civil Societies after the Uprisings: Challenges during Political Transitions. Centre on Conflict Development and Peacebuilding CCDP.
- Cofman Wittes, T. (2004). *The New U.S. Proposal for a Greater Middle East Initiative: An Evaluation*.
- Dunne, M. (2006). Evaluating Egyptian Reform. *Carnegie Papers*, 66.
- Dunne, M., & Hamzawy, A. (2010). *From Too Much Egyptian Opposition to Too Little and Legal Worries Besides*.
- Dunne, M., Hamzawy, A., & Brown, N. J. (2007). Egypt - don’t give up on democracy promotion, 8. Retrieved from [http://www.wiso-net.de/webcgi?START=A60&DOKV\\_DB=ZDZI&DOKV\\_NO=WAOD817960&DOKV\\_HS=0&PP=1](http://www.wiso-net.de/webcgi?START=A60&DOKV_DB=ZDZI&DOKV_NO=WAOD817960&DOKV_HS=0&PP=1)
- Elhamad, J. (2007, February 5). The freedom and democratic change in the Arab world, the scene, and the

- future. *Addostour Newspaper*.
- Elhamad, J. (2017). Tatawur alfikr alsiyasiu ladaa tayar al'islam alsiyasii fi alealam alearabii alharakat al'iislatiati fi al'urduni nmwdhjaan 2007-2017 [The evolution of political thought in the political Islam in the Arab world; The Islamic Movement in Jordan model 2007-2017. *Middle Eastern Studies Journal*, 81.
- Freer, C., Kubinec, R., & Tatum, D. (2010). *The struggle for Reform in Jordan: Elites, Non-Elites, and Fashion Cafe. IMES Capstone Paper Series*.
- Freihat, E. (2012). Altatowor altareekhi lilahzab alsiyasiah alordinyah 1921-2011 [The Historical Development of the Political Parties' Laws in Jordan 1921-2011]. *Social and Political Science Studies Journal*, 39(2), 301–324.
- Gill, B. (2013). Did Bush Democratize the Middle East? The Effects of External-Internal Linkages. *Political Science Quarterly*, 128(4), 653–685. <https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12141>
- Hamid, S. (2014). *Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East*. Oxford University Press.
- Heydemann, S. (2007). *Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World*. Wahington D.C.
- Kroeber, C. (1996). Theory of History of Revolution. *Journal of World History*, 7(1), 21–40.
- League of Arab States. (2004). Tunis Declaration. *The Summit Conference of the Arab League Council - 16th ordinary session*.
- Mahafzah, A. (2012). Jordan : The Difficult Path towards Reform, (December), 9.
- Majed, Z. (2005). *Al-Tatawor Al-Democraty fil Ordon [Democratic Development in Jordan]*.
- Middle East Studies Center. (2006). *Afaq Aleslah Waldemocratiyah fi Al Urdun 2005-2010 [The prospects of reform and democracy in Jordan 2005-2010]* (first). Amman: Middle East studies center.
- Muasher, M. (2011). *A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan: The Resilience of the Rentier System. The Carnegie Papers*. Washington D.C.
- Muslim Brotherhood. (2004). Muslim Brotherhood Initiatives For Reform in Egypt. Retrieved from <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/>
- Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. (2005). *Ruyat alharakat al'iislatiati lil'iislah fi al'urdun [Vision of the Islamic Movement for Reform in Jordan]*. Retrieved from <http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/>
- Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. (2004). *Almashrue Alsiyasiu Lisuria Almustaqbal [Syria's Future Political Project]*.
- No Peace without Justice NPWJ. (2004). Sana'a Inter-Governmental Regional Conference on Democracy, Human rights, and the Role of the International Criminal Court. NPWJ. Retrieved from <http://www.npwj.org/MENA/Sanaa-Inter-Governmental-Regional-Conference-Democracy-Human-rights-and-Role-International-Crim>
- Ottaway, M., & Choucair-Vizoso, J. (2008). Beyond the façade : political reform in the Arab world, 295.
- Ottaway, M., & Hamzawy, A. (2004). Political Reform in the Middle East Can the United States and Europe Work Together?, (December), 1–7.
- Oweidat, N., Benard, C., Stahl, D., Kildani, W., O'Connell, E., & Grant, A. K. (2008). *The Kefaya movement: A case study of a grassroots reform initiative. National Defense Research Institute RAND*.
- Ryan, C. R. (2011). Political Opposition and Reform Coalitions in Jordan. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 38(3), 367–390. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2011.621699>
- United Nations Development Program. (2004). *Arab Human Development Report, 2004. Human Development*.
- United Nations Development Program. (2005). *Declaration of the good governance for development in Arab countries initiative*.
- Vidino, L. (2013). The West and the Muslim Brothers After the Arab Spring. *AlMesbar Studies and Research Center*.
- Yacoubian, M. (2005). *Promoting Middle East democracy II : Arab initiatives*. U.S. Institute of Peace.



# Soft Power Diplomacy on the African Continent: The Rise of China

Frederick Cloke<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Wuhan University, China

## Abstract

China's soft power push is accelerating at a time traditional powers such as the European Union and the United States are perceived to be scaling back their global commitments on the African continent. This has given more vigour and focus on what continues to be a deliberate, long term, and sustained Grand Strategy for China and its ambition. China's leaders have become more adept and attentive to pursuing strategic goals without relying on traditional tools of foreign relations. Moreover, with the growth of China's global influence, Beijing is less averse to boldly promoting China's values and models than it had been in the past. Many within the Chinese political establishment welcome this as a strategic opportunity to offer alternatives to Western norms on the African continent and beyond. Likewise, many African leaders, states, regional organizations as well as the continental organization on the African continent welcome this alternative option. With China's Grand Strategy now well-articulated, its soft power initiatives can be expected to expand in tandem with its political and economic activities. Nowhere is this more evident than on the continent of Africa. With a diverse and nearly endless potential of untapped natural resources, nations worldwide look to strengthen their ties with African nations. This article analyzes aspects of current Sino-African relations and seeks to explore the potential motives and activities of China in Africa and the potential corollaries concerning the global economy. With a focus that highlights the approach China has taken in Africa this article goes further to analyze China's methodology and the potential influence on future and present geopolitical relations, it has become clear that the continent of Africa holds a highly valuable piece of the global puzzle. This article aims to stimulate and implore further study regarding the implication of soft power politics and its long-term effects on numerous developing nations situated in Africa. Furthermore, this article provides insight into China's rising global influence and various policies and practices that have led to diverse views throughout the continent. Lastly, this article takes a look at China and the strengthening of its position on the continent and how China potentially possesses the ability to outperform many of its foreign rivals on the continent.

**Keywords:** African Union, China, Soft Power, Development, Multi-lateral, Realism

## Background

China's ever-extending reach is a semblance of its increasing presence in Africa. This presence is a manifestation of China's growing role as a major global power. China has announced its commitment to improving education, cultural exchange, and infrastructural development in Africa. Furthermore, an active development agenda has been adopted by China as a means of facilitating assistance to the continent as well as

furthering its own goals on the continent. The Sino-African relationship dates back many years with the present status being predicated upon China initially showing political support for the African liberation movement in which African nations fought against western colonisers for their eventual liberation. China proved to be a worthwhile ally in the initial stages of the birth of the modern African states.

In the 1950s, at the start of the cold war, the PRC (People's Republic of China) actively extended a hand to newly independent nations many of whom were on the continent of Africa. Initially, the PRC's approach was one that was in line with the communist ideals which it shared with the Soviets, but with diminishing relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, the basis under which Sino-African relations were established, changed. During this period the PRC was facing a decrepit economy, notwithstanding the newly established PRC was able to assist various nations in Africa with financial assistance amounting to over 2.5 Billion USD. With a closer historical glance, the Chinese government had taken an unprecedented step to initiating a relationship, which is today a clear illustration of what South-South relations are. During this period fifty-eight per cent of China's total foreign aid went to various countries in Africa (Li 2006).

Later, in 1971, it was African countries that lent a hand of solidarity to China by lending political support for China's greater involvement in global affairs. It was this support that allowed for the PRC to join the United Nations taking over the seat of the ROC (Republic of China), which was then represented by Taiwan. It was African states such as Ethiopia, Zambia, Egypt and Algeria that stressed their support in regards to the "One China policy" at the United Nations conference. Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, China's eventual warming of relations with various superpower nations began to take place and the simultaneous scaling down of assistance to Africa occurred. China now set its attention towards "great power politics". This period of "great power politics" eventually led to a period in which Africa experienced more than two decades of disregard. From 1976 to 1982, total Chinese aid pledges to Africa fell from \$100.9 million to 13.8 million (Snow1995). Nonetheless, a few western nations such as France, Portugal, Spain and Britain continued to exert a monopoly-like control over large parts of Africa by utilizing previous colonial mandates that were enforced by the utilization of "hard power" tactics (Nkrumah, K.).

In more contemporary times the rise of China and its accompanying soft power has allowed China to present an alternative model to various developing nations that do not endorse the so-called Washington Consensus. In this regard, China has aggressively pursued its very own development agenda in Africa. As the US economy floundered and China's economy continued to grow in the recession of 2008-2009, Beijing's development model gained more popularity in the developing world. Compared with western countries' emphasis on democracy and numerous conditional reforms, China's Western development-first approach presented itself as a more appealing option for numerous African nations. China's own success story of poverty alleviation gave it more credibility with the upholding and promotion of its China model. Various methods of assistance were presented as options in regards to the development of various African nations. These forms of assistance came in the form of low-interest fee loans, construction of vital infrastructure, which included government facilities, schools, hospitals, telecommunications, power stations etc... Throughout the continent, from north to south, there are numerous examples of these mega projects taking place (China's Infrastructure Footprint in Africa). It is these projects that prove to be a major form of Chinese soft power on the continent.

With further involvement of Chinese soft power projection within the region, closely coupled with economic goods specifically, trade, aid, grants, loans, investment and debt relief. This issue begs the question on what distinguishes soft power from economic hard power. China has intricately interwoven these two policies.

A conscious use of soft power in Africa was instituted by the beginning of the 2000s, propelled principally by an increasing economic clout and rising need for energy and commodities to sustain the means of China's soft power. The Chinese government has made sure to dedicate a remarkable amount of economic capital in its

dealings with numerous African states, which has in turn led to a blossoming of Sino-African relations. Beijing has instituted policies that have allowed for state-run as well as private enterprises to obtain assistance and receive governmental policy support through low-interest loans and funds to trade with and do business in Africa (The Role of Chinas Financial Institutions).

Beijing has made it a priority to fight poverty domestically to properly address China's disparities in development. Simultaneously, China has been willing to provide financial support that is unequal to its own level of economic improvement and relative to the contribution made by highly developed nations. To some degree, this can be seen as unconditional payments that involve considerable generosity or sacrifice on the part of China or it may be a clear example of a push from China to considerably grow and utilize its soft power in the age of great power politics.

China's steady assistance through the years dating back to the last five decades still reverberates strongly with Africa. China has made it clear that a close partnership with African nations is of great interest. There has undoubtedly been a major shift in China's Africa approach, which is a departure from relations of the 1950s and 1960s that was predominantly political to now purely economic and logic-based relations.

Beijing always contends that its recent interest in Africa is building on a long history of friendship. China's South-South policy has been well represented in its continued engagement in Africa. With China's acceptance into the World Trade Organization in the year 2001, China has further experienced another major shift in its policies especially in regards to its south-south engagements. China has now adopted a policy that is based on pragmatic economic interest. The recent pursuit of influence especially in the areas of markets and energy has reinvigorated once again the outside world's interest in Africa. With this being said the major driving force behind China's policies toward Africa have and continue to be resource-based financial and profit-orientated with a key political blend.

### **Key concept abilities and limitations**

Soft Power has proven to be one of the most attractive methods the Chinese government has adopted in its approach to dealing with African nations. Soft Power was a term coined by Joseph Nye, a political science scholar who termed this unique concept as an influential force evolving parallel to the growth of the nation-state and nationalism. Soft power depends on attraction and persuasion instead of force and inducement, which is different from hard power that is based on partial economic and military power. China's soft power and influence undeniably are viewed by numerous actors as a consequence of its lure, cultural charm, policies, political ideology and approach. Soft power is significantly increased when an actors method appears presumably attractive and deemed legitimate by others. Eventually, such exercise of Soft power allows for that actor to position itself to easily have its way and obtain results especially if it understands the dynamics of taking advantage of what it sees is required to achieve what it needs. Soft Power has proven itself to be the most viable and long-lasting option in regards to influence and power in diplomacy. War, the threat of war, negotiations and other modes of states' behaviour are all geared towards obtaining favourable results. The speedy evolution of soft power has given credence to its overall value as well as it's relative importance in attractiveness as opposed to hard power which has proven to be more pricey as well as costly in terms of the loss of life (Nye, J. S. 1990).

In practical application, China's growing ability to advance its strategic interests through cooperation, and inducements are ultimately strengthening China's soft power. At the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC) Congress in October 2017, President Xi Jinping referred to China's influence as "soft power with Chinese characteristics." Xi went further to say, "We will improve our capacity to tell our stories, present a multidimensional view, and enhance China's cultural soft power" (n.d.) China has many contrasts. Although, it

is now the second-largest economy in the world, according to the World Bank China's GDP per capita of about 10,000 USD per annum, which puts it in 70th place on the world index followed by Argentina and Lebanon (Projected GDP Ranking). Despite China being a global economic powerhouse on the national level, the business practices of Chinese firms in Africa are often still constrained by China's overall domestic lower level per capita economic progress. China has benefited immensely from the fact that it identifies itself as a member of the developing world. For this reason, China has made use of the numerous political opportunities of standing shoulder to shoulder with African countries. The relationship between China and various nations on the continent is presented, as a symmetrical relationship as opposed to an "arrogant donor" relationship in which a particular nation presents itself as the moral authority as opposed to being an equal partner.

The African continent with the largest number of developing countries and symmetrically China as the largest developing country in the world share a resemblance that allows for such contrasting nations to support and assist each other in the struggle for resources, national liberation and development.

According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the guiding principles for China - Africa exchange and cooperation are sincerity, equality, mutual benefit, solidarity, and common development (Liang, W. 2012). China has therefore always emphasized "equality" and "Win-Win" in its interaction with African states, in contrast with the West's unequal "charity" and "conditional aid" stance (Liang, W. 2012). Some African countries have welcomed this unique approach which they highlight sharply differs from that of developed countries approach which is generally pegged to forceful political, economic and or policy ultimatums.

### **China, The African Union and a Multi-lateral Approach**

Since the founding of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in the year 2000, China's soft power push in Africa has grown exponentially. In these various forums, multi-billion-dollar relationships are cemented through trade deals, resource swaps and a variety of agreements (Tiezzi Shannon). In the 2018 (FOCAC) summit a wide array of investors, as well as diplomats from not just Africa but the world, assembled in China. As was stated previously china's lack of interference in the domestic affairs of nations that it conducts business with has provided an edge in terms of investment attractiveness. The issue of non-interference has always played a major role when it comes to nations deciding on their partnerships and alliances. China has been actively forging ties outside of official government-to-government channels, which had long been considered unacceptable. Today, however, China actively engages civil society, professional bodies, and the private sector to extend its inroads into Africa and its ability to influence African policymaking at different levels (Tiezzi Shannon).

China's growing role in Africa has largely been welcomed by numerous African heads of state as well as their populous. The African Union (AU) established the China-AU Strategic Dialogue in the year 2008. The objective of this dialogue was to strengthen ties between African states and China. Three years following the establishment of the unique dialogue, the African Union unveiled it's newly built \$200 million headquarters in Addis Ababa built and fully funded by China. At present China's soft power involvement on the African continent is substantial with it not only restricted to state to state relations but rather what one can describe as a multi-level approach with substantial ties with the African Union, regional organizations and individual states (David Dollar 2016). On the commercial level, the Chinese have made sure to involve themselves in day to day activities including smaller scale commerce and trade. There has been resistance as well as inquisitiveness by locals and some African governments across the continent who have become suspicious of the sudden influx of Chinese citizens and their governments, especially when local Chinese businessmen and women involve themselves in the local trading or services that are usually reserved for locals heightening competition for business in an already intense business climate (Liang, W. 2012).

China is well cognizant of this heightened climate and has moved forward to adopt a Soft Power strategy in its commercial and diplomatic relations. This new strategy is meant to allow China's penetration to be one that is accepted instead of being viewed with caution. For this reason, China has generously provided assistance on varying levels that includes low-interest loans, the building of vital infrastructure such as hospitals, schools government facilities, stadiums, power insulations (David Dollar 2016). Many of these projects were previously instituted by Africa's western "partners" who linked the implementation of these projects to political and economic changes that are forced upon individual nations as a prerequisite to any assistance and in some cases the imposing of sanctions, better referred to as the carrot and stick policy.

China has been experiencing mounting success in becoming accepted in many circles in Africa. This success has led to the recognition of China as a quite different power that respects the continent's diverse nature and utilizes its current status of still being a developing country as well. China has tried to make clear through its diplomatic approach that it fully understands the challenges that Africa faces in its development and emphasizes further advocacy in areas such as international trade and negotiations. (Kurlantzick et al., 2006, 1). With a balanced view of the growth in exchange especially in the domain of trade between African nations and China on the bilateral level, a 50 fold increase from the 1980s to 2005 trade figures proves China's soft power policies to be quite fruitful. Furthermore the quintupling between 2000 and 2006 from \$10 billion to \$55 billion and the approach to \$100 billion in 2010 makes for an even more convincing case. China has since overtaken France and the US as Africa's number one business partner (Michel and Michel, 2009, 3).

However, from a realist perspective, many critical voices emphasize that the ostentatious undertakings of the Chinese and their "superficial assistance" and "win-win" acts of philanthropy must be keenly observed (Bolton, J.J. 2018). It is further emphasized by diplomats that in the area of international relations that there is no such thing as a manifestation of true friendship where true love for others exists in earnest; it is merely interest-driven relations where one's eyes are fixed on what one aims to get, using any means and any tactic; even the one who is first to achieve these aims (Rourke, 1991). With China recently becoming Africa's leading partner in the areas of trade, investment, and development, new opportunities have arisen out of this partnership. Apart from bilateral relations with African states, China partners with regional and sub-regional organizations on a growing number of issues that have greatly broadened China's soft power approach. At the height of this flourishing relationship is the partnership between China and the AU in the areas of peace and security.

China's involvement in peace and security initiatives on the continent marks a departure from the country's non-interventionist foreign policy towards more active engagement. To better grasp the policy change, it is useful to situate Beijing's contemporary engagement in Africa from a historical perspective. When one reflects on the past fifty years, the Sino-African partnership has morphed through various stages of political, conceptual, and now economic relations. China was one of Africa's backers during the liberation era that finally led to the decolonization of the continent as well as African nations backing political support for the PRC joining the United Nations (UN), taking over the seat of the ROC from Taiwan, many on both sides like to take a look at yesterday's mutual assistance as yielding fruit and developing in today's ever-growing multi-level partnership. Today's present partnership can be seen as a continuation and strengthening of past relations.

### **The Grand Strategy**

Within the last decade, China has formulated a distinctive form of Soft power in Africa that has powerfully mustered resources to project its soft power to achieve its foreign policy goals. Beijing has repeatedly made it clear that the African continent remains vital to China's continued economic growth and global influence. Nonetheless, China's soft power push in Africa complements its long-term objectives of expanding its position in the world economy and beyond. China's ambition is one that is in line with its mercantilist beliefs that are

grounded in the ideology of state power, economics and their inter-leveraging. These policies display an expanding rational of the Chinese leadership and its pursuit of soft power and influence.

Within the first ten years of the 21st-century sub-Saharan African nations possessed the ten fastest-growing economies (GDP) in the world. With the rise of trade wars, protectionism and tariffs in the second decade of the 21st century's global political-economic arena it is clear that China will surely face difficulties projecting its soft power. Various academics have likened this to an intensification of rivalry between China (a rising power) and other major pre-established powers. Furthermore, it has been likened to China's slowing economic growth and low domestic GDP per capita and corruption. Various scholars also point to the fact that China, as a fairly new major global player must fully establish a political value system and an accompanying economic model that will pose as an alternative to the pre-established dominant US free-market capitalist principles. Many African countries admire China's economic growth but are yet to adopt China's political structure and example. China's soft power is undoubtedly pegged to its domestic attributes. China's soft power and influence will continue to be a projection based on how successfully China can maintain its rapid economic growth and to what level.

The overarching objective of the Chinese approach is to establish itself as a great power. China will have to implore a multi-dimensional approach to achieve this goal. China aims to leverage and multiply its gross domestic product (GDP) for it to raise the standard of living through the nation. The reality is that this cannot be achieved without Africa. To take it a step further China must increase its investments through both its private and public institutions. The "One Belt One Road" initiative has set up a strong foundation that has positioned the fortification of infrastructure, trade, and development links between China, Central Asia, Europe, Middle East and Africa that is pursuing a method that will allow for it to expand its financial reach globally. Africa plays a key role in China achieving these goals. The Chinese government views the continent of Africa as an emerging market with limitless natural resources that the world over is trying to gain access to.

Lastly, China has made a push to modernize and expand not just its economic initiatives but political and diplomatic soft power. The Chinese government has assumed a greater role in global and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, which has allowed for an expansion of Chinese political ideals and a legitimizing of China's political perspective globally. Furthermore, China is expanding its hard power role in the peacekeeping sector, with China's debut in this arena being exercised on the African continent.

### **China- AU; The Future Multi-lateral Approach**

The future of the AU (African Union) and China relations has moved into the domain of strengthening their partnership in areas of specialized skills. The AU is consolidating their comparative advantage. Moreover, this has allowed China to characterize itself as a genuine partner of the continent (without the stigma of a colonial legacy in Africa). With Africa known as one of the world's "last frontiers" as well as a limitless reservoir of the world's most precious resources including human capital, China's is making sure to utilize its position as a major global economic power as well as implementing a hard, soft and "smart" power approach to gain ground in the global scramble for Africa. Those that are rivalling China's scramble for Africa have labelled China "abusers" of soft power (the practice of convincing other actors to follow its footsteps in their economic policies, trade relations, investments, etc.) as a strategy to counter American/Western hegemony and to extend its "Beijing model" of development. (Bolton, J.J. 2018)

A clear example of China assuming major global roles that were only previously held by major western powers is its recent expanded engagement in Africa to include support for peacekeeping operations as was previously highlighted (Liang, W. 2012). This has symbolized the beginning of a profound shift in strategy whereby Beijing is implementing a method of approach that is consistent with major powers, who have long been the nations to

utilize hard power (the practice of using military and/or economic incentives and strength to influence other actors).

With the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in the year 2000, China began to set the stage for implementing and amalgamating China's Africa influence in Africa. Only six years after the establishment of (FOCAC) China outlined four foremost areas of engagement in China-Africa peace and security cooperation which include military cooperation, conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations, judicial and police cooperation as well as non-traditional security cooperation. Furthermore in 2015 President Xi Jinping, announced that China would set aside 100 million USD to the AU to assist in the creation and function of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (n.d.).

China has made clear through its actions that besides financial assistance direct capacity building, technological transfer and technical support there are just a few other ways that China will assist Africa. Furthermore, China has assisted in anti-terrorism operations, anti-piracy operations as well as assisting to better make sure African organizations have what is necessary to respond to security challenges on all levels.

With these steps not just through rhetoric but through placing resources at the disposal of the AU and regional groups, China has shown its encouragement for the growth of Africa's regional and continental peace and security design. Clear evidence of progress in the security sector is displayed through the incorporation of vital bodies such as the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) and regional Peace Support Operations (PSOs), and China's assistance in the financing of AU peacekeeping undertakings in countries such as Sudan and Somalia.

Additionally, China has provided equipment to regional economic communities (RECs), chiefly ECOWAS (Economic Community of Western African States), for the bolstering of a strategic logistics area. China has installed personnel to peacekeeping operations in over a dozen African countries over the last twenty years. Nonetheless, China's growing engagement must be carried out within a pre-established African architecture that the AU can assess to see how best to heighten African peacebuilding policies. There is no doubt that China is utilizing its arrangements with African nations as well as outside partners as an entryway in an attempt to achieve its interests not just on the African continent but globally, being that Africa holds the key for any major power to possess global dominance not only through its limitless invaluable resources but also its untapped human capacity and geographical attributes. In reality, there is no guarantee that Africa's political, security and economic interests will benefit from China's "Beijing model" approach in either the present or the future. What can be certain is that Africa has been provided with a clear alternative to the previously forcefully implemented "western models".

## CONCLUSION

Soft power is continuing to prove to be a formidable tool in the toolbox of Chinese diplomacy, especially in a hi-tech and ever more globalized world. The traditional approaches to China's diplomacy have now been diversified and have allowed for the possibility of objectives to be reached through multiple means not only for China but also for numerous states across the African Continent. Hard power is no longer the condition under which growth and dominance will be determined, but rather a crafty balance of policies that are appealing and who respects and is fair towards the other.

Based on the fact that China has adopted this approach in the initial stage of its opening-up policy under Deng Xiaoping, China seems to have understood the idea of mutual respect between nations quite well and is busy using its soft power throughout the continent dishing out interest-free loans, and supporting African led efforts toward sustainability. The unequivocal and fundamental truth is that numerous African governments are in favour and frankly enthusiastic about the alternative opportunities China has made available. These nations feel

this way with strong reason, especially nations composed of self-respecting individuals who do not like to be screened and constantly compelled to give accounts of their nations political, economic and development orientated transactions to other nations that believe themselves to be moral authorities and whom just recently and in some cases presently work against their interests in an attempt to extend their nation's power, control and subjugation solely for financial profit.

## References

- "Africa's Impressive Growth." 2011. The Economist, January 6, at [www.economist.com](http://www.economist.com).
- Arrey, Sylvester, "Assessing China's Soft Power Diplomacy in Africa in the Context of Post Modern Thinking", at [https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/53562/ssoar-ilshs-2013-10-arrey-Assessing\\_Chinas\\_Soft\\_Power\\_Diplomacy.pdf?sequence=1](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/53562/ssoar-ilshs-2013-10-arrey-Assessing_Chinas_Soft_Power_Diplomacy.pdf?sequence=1)
- Bolton, J. J. (2018). Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R Bolton on the Trump Administration's New Africa Strategy. Retrieved February 29, 2020, from <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-securityadvisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/>
- China's Infrastructure Footprint in Africa - China in Africa - AGE (African Growing Enterprises) File. (n.d.). Retrieved from [https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa\\_file/Manualreport/cia\\_10.html](https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_10.html)
- David Dollar, "China's engagement with Africa: from natural resources to human resources," The Brookings Institution, July 13, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-engagement-with-africa-from-naturalresources-to-human-resources/>.
- Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations, New York, the Guilford Press, 1991.
- Esteva, Gustavo, "Development", in Wolfgang, Dietrich et al. (eds.), Schlüsseltexte der Friedensforschung: Die Kommende Demokratie, Berlin, LIT, 2006.
- Gaye, Adama, China-Africa: the Dragon and the Ostrich, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2006.
- Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, New York, Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1994.
- Kurlantzick, Joshua, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World, New York, Yale University, 2007. 44 Volume 10
- Kurlantzick, Joshua et al., "China's Africa Strategy: A New Approach to Development and Diplomacy?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 12, (1-2) 2006.
- Li Anshan, 2006 "Zhongguo dui Fei zhengci de diaoshi yu zhuanbian" (on the Adjustment and Transformation of China's Africa Policy). West Asia and Africa, vol. 8 pp 11-20.
- Liang, W. (2012). China's Soft Power in Africa: Is Economic Power Sufficient? *Asian Perspective*, 36(4), 667–692. doi: 10.1353/apr.2012.0025
- Martínez-Alier et al., "Sustainable de-growth. Mapping the Context, Criticisms and Future Prospects of an Emergent Paradigm" in Ecological Economics no. 69 (2010) 1741-1747.
- Michel, Serge and Michel Beuret, China Safari: on the Trail of Beijing's Expansion in Africa, New York, Nation Books, 2009.
- Mingjiang, Li, "Soft Power: Nurture not Nature," in Mingjiang, Li (ed.): Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2009.
- Nkrumah, K. (n.d.). Introduction. Retrieved from <https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nkrumah/neo-colonialism/introduction.htm>
- Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft Power. *Foreign Policy*, (80), 153. doi: 10.2307/1148580
- Nye, Joseph Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs Publication, 2004.
- (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/t1195539.htm>
- Projected GDP Ranking. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://statisticstimes.com/economy/projected-world-gdp-ranking.php>
- Rotberg, Robert ed., China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, Washington, D.C., Brooking Institution Press, 2008.
- Rourke, John, International Politics on the World Stage, 3rd edition, Connecticut, Dushkin Publishing Group, 1991.
- Sautman, Barry, "Friends and Interests: China's Distinctive Links with Africa", Working Paper no. 12, Hong Kong, Centre on China's Transnational Relation, 2006.

- Snow, Phiillip. 1995. "China and Africa: Consensus and Camouflage." In Thomas Robinson and David Shambaug, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 283-321
- Tandon, Yash, *Development and Globalization: Daring to Think Differently*, Cape Town, Pambazuka Press, 2009. [20] *The Bible, The Holy Bible, New King James Version 2000*, Chicago, The Bible League, 2007.
- The Role of Chinas Financial Institutions - China in Africa - AGE (African Growing Enterprises) File. (n.d.). Retrieved from [https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa\\_file/Manualreport/cia\\_11.html](https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_11.html)
- Tiezzi Shannon, "FOCAC 2018: Rebranding China in Africa." *The Diplomat*, 2018
- UNFPA, *UNFPA State of World Population 2011: People and Possibilities in a World of 7 Billion*, UNFPA, 2011.
- Warner, J. (2015). Complements or Competitors? The African Standby Force, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, and the Future of Rapid Reaction Forces in Africa. *African Security*, 8(1), 56–73. doi: 10.1080/19392206.2015.998543
- Zartman, William and Jeffery Rubin, "The Study of Power and the Practice of Negotiation", in Zartman, William and Jeffery Rubin (eds.), *Power and Negotiation*, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2000.



# The Paradigm Shift - India's Journey of Corporative Act to Producer Company Act; How Sustainable the Farmers' Producer Organization Model Has Been So Far?

Rehana Noor<sup>1,3</sup>, Kalyanasundaram M.<sup>2</sup>, Nazma Sultana Lily<sup>3</sup>, Mohammad Rubel Mia<sup>1,3</sup>, Shanthi Venkatesh K.<sup>2</sup>,  
Anisur Rahman<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> NOREC, Oslo, Norway

<sup>2</sup> DHAN Foundation, Tamil Nadu, India

<sup>3</sup> WAVE Foundation, Dhaka, Bangladesh

Correspondence: Rehana Noor, NOREC- Participant, International Young Professional Exchange Programme, WAVE Foundation, House # 3/11, Lalmatia Delight, Satmasjid Road, Dhaka 1207, Bangladesh, Email: nishanoor11@gmail.com

## Abstract

Over the years, in India, plethora of approaches has been taken to organize farmers, especially smallholder farmers, in order to enhance their farm profitability. The concept of 'Cooperative' was one of the options available for the producers to get organized themselves as an active player in the supply-chain by value addition and business ownership. However, the cooperative system in the country had several shortcomings. Hence, a new legal entity, "Producer Companies" was introduced by the amendment of Companies Act 1956 during 2002. This Farmer Producer Organization (FPO) model under the new company act 2002 is a hybrid between a private limited company and a corporative society. Most of the producer companies are start-ups and promoted by NGOs. The robust governance and management of this model in India and promotion of this concept may bring prosperity among smallholder farmers. However, the best practices followed by the successful producer companies across the country in awareness creation, capacity building, promotional efforts and operational management etc. are not well documented and disseminated. This paper examines the experience of five unique set of FPOs running legally and successfully for three years from Tamil Nadu of India. The selected FPOs were NABARD and SFAC promoted. Based on the findings on the challenges faced in formulation of FPOs; the intervention for further up scaling was identified to make this a sustainable model in future.

**Keywords:** Indian Experience, Implicative Strategies, Producer Companies, Smallholder Farmers

## Introduction

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Agricultural cooperative was the most common farmers' Producer Organization (PO) which emerged in Europe and other developed countries. Cooperatives are an association or corporation established for

the purpose of providing services on a nonprofit basis to its shareholders or members who own and control it and voluntarily stand for common economic, social and cultural needs. Cooperatives are required to register under particular legislations. In UK, many cooperatives are registered under the industrial and provident societies acts but many also have registered under company acts. In the US most cooperatives are registered as limited liability companies. The European Cooperative Statute provides the legal framework for cooperatives in Europe. Generally, in developed countries cooperatives were independent, farmer-controlled and financed self-help organizations whereas in developing countries cooperatives were largely government funded. In the aim of mobilizing and improvement of rural livelihood, colonial governments developed cooperatives (Davis, 1990; FAO 2001). Following a similar top-down approach, the developing countries enact the cooperative law which tied the cooperatives with central and state governmental distribution and output marketing system and especially in case of African countries like Tanzania, Ghana and Zambia integrated cooperatives into political administration structures Bardhan & Pranab 2005 and Hardesty et al., 2004)

Many small-scale farmers get economic benefits in working together at cooperative level; however, the state run cooperative system has largely spilled in many developing countries. It is found in research that If members of the cooperatives are provided necessary resources such as training, quality inputs (seed, fertilizers, pesticides) etc., then cooperatives flourish in the market and able to adopt sustainable pro-poor development strategies. On top of that, cooperatives help building rural empowerment among their producers by improving their bargaining power, exploiting the impact of the middlemen in the supply chain and ultimately leverage decision making skill at local, national, sub-regional and international environment (Venkatesan P. et al., 2017; Mercoiret, 2006; Gideon et al., 2007).

### **Transformation of the corporative to Company Act**

In India, it is found by the survey of National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) that 40% of the farmers want to leave agriculture because of the low product price (Murray, 2009). There is a very limited scope of value addition in the produce due to low productivity resulting for lack of knowledge on production technology, access to credit, input, market and most importantly the reluctant attitude of the farmers towards any new innovation. Middlemen exploitation in the supply chain limits the product price in the market realized by the primary producers. Naturally, Farmers expect prosperity in pace with the economic growth of the nation. The concept of cooperatives is a potential way for the farmers to organize themselves to get a strong position in the value chain and business ownership. Producer cooperatives are the aggregations of producers which provide service in terms of knowledge, agro-advisory, supply of credit, input, procurement, processing, marketing and distribution etc. These organizations uphold the political voice of shareholders, reduce the input, transaction and transport costs, provide platform for sharing information, coordination of common activities and involve in decision making with collective action. They are registered under the State Cooperatives Societies Act and expected to work on giving access to risk-bearing capital, product diversification, fixing market standards and economic resilience at grass-root level.

Many researches revealed that cooperative system in India have been influenced by political interference, corruption, apathy, poor marketing strategy, capital shortage, bureaucratic lethargy and stagnation. Pitfalls in the cooperative act have been criticized for their failure (Singh, 2008; Venkattakumar R. et al., 2012 and Tusshar et al., 2016). Unfortunately, the concept of NGOs too could not overcome certain factors like preferred share premium, limited rights of members on internal control mechanism, privilege for the large holders, functioning like closely-held companies, risk of becoming investor-oriented company, off-market purchases to meet contract terms, leasing of delivery rights by members and dependence on non-producer member equity and non-member business (Singh, 2008). Amidst such deficiencies and inadequacies in cooperative system, there was an attempt during 2002 to strengthen the cooperative movement with the amendment (in Section 581) of Companies Act 1956 as a response to the Report of the Committee under the Chairmanship of Professor Dr. Yoginder K Alagh.

Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Government of India introduced the Bill for amendment by introducing part IX A and thereby paved the way for incorporation of Producer Companies (Alagh, 2007; Gupta, 2007; Singh, 2008; Shubhangi 2016, Mahajon 2015; and NRRA, 2009).

This provision liberated the cooperative from the formidable process of working under the Registrar of Cooperatives, but the ICA cooperative principles remained the foundation of the design of the producer company with the same five organizing principles—(i) voluntary and open membership; (ii) equal voting right independent of shareholding; (iii) elected board from amongst members; (iv) limited return on share capital; and (v) distribution of surplus on patronage basis. This new legal facility was widely expected to unleash a new wave of farmers' cooperative enterprises, but this time under the more business-friendly amended Companies Act of 1956. Since then, more than 2000 producer companies have been established at various parts of the country covering a wider range of commodities which appear like old wine in a new bottle (NRRA, 2009 and Tushar et al., 2016). To avoid the same problems occurring in the cooperative sector, the producer-company legislation contains some major changes such as limited government control, prohibition for the state representative to be part of the organization and its managerial body. Producer companies are formed only among primary producers who are small and marginal farmers of any region. The minimum members shall be ten, or two institutional members such as self-help groups (SHGs), cooperatives, or any other formal farmer organization. The members must buy one share value which ranging from 50 to 200 Indian rupees. The company act allows the suspension of minimum capital stock of 100000 Indian rupees since it is difficult for the small farmers to raise such high levels of capital stock. Instead, the liability of the members is limited to the amount they have spent on shares. Hence, farmers do not risk losing their land or any other assets should the company go bankrupt. Shares cannot be publicly listed and traded; they are only transferable among members. This ensures that successful producer companies do not risk takeover by other companies or TNCs (interview with the Agricultural Finance Corporation, (AOFC, in 2010 and Anika et al., 2012).

The producer company concept is aimed to combine the efficiency of a legacy with the spirit' of traditional cooperatives. Producer companies aim to integrate the farmers into modern supply networks by minimizing transaction and coordination costs, while benefiting from economies of scale. They are run and owned by farmers, financially facilitated by the government and overseen by professionals. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine the potency of the farmer producer organization and their company model as a bottom-up approach for smallholder farmers' participation in emerging markets and its sustainability.

### **Literature review of different producer companies**

The Indian Organic Farmers Producer Company Ltd (IOFPCL), the first farmers' producer company in India is in Aluva (Kerala), producing organic products. Vanilla India Producer Company Ltd (VANILCO) has been promoted by Indian Farmers Movement (INFARM) of Kerala, a charitable society with over one lakh farmer members to cater to the long-term needs and interests of the vanilla farmers. Vanilla India Producer Company Ltd (VANILCO) has been promoted by Indian Farmers Movement (INFARM) of Kerala, a charitable society with over one lakh farmer members to cater to the long-term needs and interests of the vanilla farmers. ESAF Swasraya Producer Company Limited (ESPCL) for handicrafts, herbal and agriculture products and food, dairy and meat. Ten watershed development groups of Amreli District formed a producer company "Dhari Krushak Vikas Producer Company Ltd" at Dhari, Amreli, Gujarat under the guidance of Development Support Centre (DSC), Ahmedabad for the food grains and oilseeds. Government of India, through Spices Board under the Ministry of Commerce has promoted two producer companies, the Coinonya Farm Producers Company Ltd for turmeric and Karbi Farm Producers Company Ltd for Ginger and Chilly in Karbi Anlong district of Assam for promoting organic cultivation, processing and export. Agricons Agro Producers Company Ltd, Raipur, Chhattisgarh was incorporated in 2005. Rangusta a producer company that promotes the products of artisans, weavers and craftsmen, was registered in 2004 and has been extending services in Rajasthan, Assam and

Uttarakhand to bridge the gap between the artisans and the customer and to provide such artisans the sustainable rural livelihood options (Anonymous, 2007 and Murray, 2009). Masuta Producer Company Ltd is promoted by PRADHAN, an NGO as an independent rural enterprise suitable for women and landless and marginal farmers who had limited dignified job opportunities, low wage rates (Venkattakumar R. et al., 2012 and Kumar, 2007). The Junnar Taluka Farmers' Producer Organization and Producer Company To put an end to the exploitation of middlemen, Mr. Shriram Gadhve, the leader of the Farmer Producer Organization (FPO) movement in Narayangaon, took up the onus on himself to save his fellow men from this crisis. Gadhve spread word about the FPO movement, initiated by the Vegetable Growers Association of India (VGAI) and the Small Farmers Agribusiness Consortium (SFAC) and convinced all the tomato growers in Narayangaon to join the movement. Today, Narayangaon is the largest open tomato auction market in the country. This market attracts traders from all over the country who carry back the produce to different parts of the country such as Ahmedabad, Surat, Baroda, Kota, Indore, Jabalpur, Jhansi, Lucknow, Agra, Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Chennai, Pune and Mumbai and so on (Preeti et al., 2015). Several POs have been funded (and continued to be funded) through NABARD under the Umbrella Program for Natural Resources Management (UPNRM) – bilaterally funded by KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau)/GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) and NABARD and also Nabard Financial Services (Nabfins), a subsidiary of NABARD. For example, under PODF,6 The Nachalur Farmers' Producer Company was formed by a group of 100 farmers from 30 villages in Tamil Nadu in June 2012. Within six months' time, they were able to sell 300 tonnes of fertiliser at prices higher than before. Similarly, Devbhumi Natural Products Producer Company (DNPPCL), with support from Appropriate Technology India (ATI) became one of the first few all-women POs to scale up their operations in sericulture, organic honey and spices, and eco-tourism. Some of the POs supported under UPNRM are more farm-based, and involve agricultural produce that has a variety of uses. For example, Sambandh (Odisha) supports tribals collecting medicinal plants, Women's Mutually Aided Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society (MASUTA, Andhra Pradesh) received loan support to build capacities for improving their tasar silk yarn production business. There are several other organisations in Tamil Nadu, Jharkhand, and Karnataka that have been supported under the aegis of UPNRM (Venkatesh Tagat et al., 2016).

### **Production**

The major goal of producer companies is to link smallholders to market channel. Therefore, they predominantly work on the downstream end of the production system. The benefits of the entire concept, however, can be seen both on the supply and demand side of the market. Generally, smallholder farmers are unable to directly interact with large-scale customers. The Producer companies have been able to reduce the influence of the middlemen in the market. Therefore, farmers are getting the profit as because the money which had been paid to the middlemen before now this has been shared with the farmers directly. Moreover, farmers are now have the access to the market standards and price information which later on helping them in their production planning and methods. Producer companies are undertaking different strategies and programs to uplift farmers' production methods. Among plethora of initiatives take by the producer company some are like timely inputs (seeds, fertilizer, pesticides) supply, training on new production technology, finance credit facilitation (Anika et al., 2012).

### **Governance**

We found different governance structures in different FPOs while collecting the research data and also in the literature review. In particular, in the dairy companies which are under the promotional program of National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) incorporated some design features to enhance patronage cohesiveness, governance effectiveness, and operating effectiveness of these new businesses. Take for example their by-laws governing the relationship between members and the MPC (Milk producer companies):

(i) The MPC does business only with registered members; members without business with the cooperative have to surrender their membership. (ii) New members can join, but only during specific windows in each year, by paying admission fee of Rs 100 and buying five shares with a book value of Rs. 100 each. Only those members can vote who have supplied at least 500 kg of milk and supplied milk for at least 200 days during the year. (iii) Members have to maintain a 3:1 flush-to-lean ratio of milk supply, that is, to be able to supply 300 liters to the MPC during flush months, a member should have supplied 100 liters during lean months. (iv) After their first year of membership, members have to ramp up their equity capital in proportion to (at present Re 1/kg of milk supplied) their business with the MPC during the previous year. Returns to members too are similarly tied to patronage and equity shares. (v) Voting members are divided into patronage classes A, B and C; each class sends to the board elected members in proportion to its share in the FPCs business. (vi) The face value of the equity share is to be revalued periodically; new members can join by buying shares at a re-valued price (net worth/no of shares). (vii) Old members can exit the MPC and retire their equity capital at today's valuation. (viii) Up to 1/5th of the directors on board can be co-opted experts. Together, these provisions tweak three ICA principles. First, membership is open and voluntary but "conditions apply." Second, board is elected by one member-one-vote rule, but vote comes only with threshold-level of patronage. Moreover, A-class vote is weightier than a C-class vote. The more business you do with the cooperative, the greater your say in its decision-making. Finally, buying a share is not just a token admission fee, it is buying or selling a piece in the cooperative's accumulated net-worth in a manner that protects the senior rights of early members who are now incentivized to supply capital (Anika et al., 2012 and Tushar et al., 2016).

On the other hand, one of the FPO among our field research, Illupur Producer Company limited, maintain several parameters for the eligibility being a board of directors, as a part of their governance management such as, 12 meetings, considering one meeting in each month and the year round so; should be conducted and interested participant shall attend at least 11 meetings of their own group and 3 other meetings from other groups and participate in the knowledge exchange, conflict management and credit transaction related works; Credit line should be very clear by themselves and also their individual groups and At least 1 lakh business transaction yearly.

The contestant themselves shall declare themselves as interested nominee for the selection process of the board of directors and then FPO will cross all these parameters and declare either these participants are eligible or not. If there is more than one participant for each vacant post then FPO will consider the person who successfully and substantially contributes than other competitors. FPO motivates their active members though offering premium prices at least 10-20% known as patronage bonus. However, they discourage dividend system as these have to done from the share capital of the members.

Managerial skill is one of the key capacities need for the farmer organizations and is generally difficult to find such capabilities among the smallholder farmers (Barham & Chitemi, 2009; Bie'nabe & Sautier, 2005). Therefore, according to the producer company legislation, a professional manager, designated as chief executive officer, is being appointed by the board of directors. Every producer company must have a minimum of five but not more than fifteen directors. The members of this board of directors are appointed from within the participating farming communities. The directors are a group of members of the village community and are, in consequence, deeply embedded within local social structures. This kind of recruitment practice and representation ensures leadership acceptance from within the community and is a crucial point in successful farmer organizations (Wilson, 2009). According to the legislation, the board of directors' post is completely voluntary, but the chief executive officer is entitled for the salary. However, fieldwork evidence suggests that the recruitment of qualified managers to run this kind of management set up and maintenance of their salaries due to financial limitations remain as a major problem for most Indian producer companies. In most cases, when a professional in the company just started to adapted in such kind of managerial environment they either aspire for more remuneration or switch the company for better opportunities.

## Marketing and employment opportunity

Average market price each year has a strong influence into the producer company and prices fluctuate within the company for this. However, the marketing strategy taken by FPO, which is selling their products in bulk amount with pre-agreed prices, performs a significant positive impact for actors on both sides of the market, especially farmers. Very often, at the peak harvest time, supplies of the perishable goods become available on the market; this affects the price mechanism and often results in extremely low prices levels and negative incomes for farmers. For this reason, sustaining the livelihood of the farming household and making investments for the new season become difficult. To avoid this market situation, a FPO named Vasundhara Agri-Horti Producer Company (VAPCOL)'s efforts to generate pre-agreed contracts for large quantities of perishable produce help farmers to plan their economic situation for longer periods. And thus, producer companies like VAPCOL can have positive effects not only among the farming community, but also on the demand side of the market. Transaction costs for procurement become less while buyers deal with a single representative of producer. In addition, buyers will get an agreed volume of produce at prearranged prices and times. This makes this form of business transaction relatively calculable for buyers; otherwise, they would have to search market places to secure and satisfy their demand. Therefore, the long-term goal of VAPCOL is to intensify and create more links between participating families and corporate buyers. The producer-company concept brings a new platform for the farmers to obtain their liberty and to improve their position of power within the production and marketing system. Producer companies can successfully collaborate with larger organizations of retailing and processing industries by giving them the increasing flexibility requirements. In the medium to long term, this form of producer organization might allow farmers to move into a higher level of value-chain relationship with corporate large-scale buyer organizations (Anika et al., 2012).

## Methodology

The Secondary data were collected from the literature review of the Farmer Producer Organizations and the primary data were collected from the intensive field survey at Tamil Nadu, India from April to December 2019 at five different FPOs. In a short period of three years, all these five Farmers Producers' Organizations (FPOs) have achieved scale in terms of membership, business turnover, market position, and have built up internally generated equity capital (Table 1).

## Results and discussion

Table 1: Growth of Farmer Producer Companies in the Year of 2018-2019

Parameter	FPO 1	FPO 2	FPO 3	FPO 4	FPO 5
No of farmers	1028	47	1092	1005	1000
Women members	695	24	922	460	390
Smallholders as % of total members	98.83	95	96	98	98
Paid-up share Capital (Rs. million)	2	.47	1	1	1
Business turnover 2018-2020 (Rs million)	5.65	No turn over	1.38	10.04	23

**FPO 1.** Kottampatti Farmers' Producer Company limited, Facilitating Organisation: DHAN Foundation and NABARD funded

**FPO 2.** Klaiyarkovil Farmers' Producer Company limited, Facilitating Organisation: DHAN Foundation and NABARD funded

**FPO 3.** T. Kallaupatti Farmers' Producer Company limited, Facilitating Organisation: DHAN Foundation and NABARD funded

**FPO 4.** Illupur Farmers' Producer Company limited Facilitating Organisation: DHAN Foundation and SFAC funded

**FPO 5.** Pudukkottai Farmers' Producer Company limited Facilitating Organisation: DHAN Foundation and SFAC funded

### **Challenges Faced by FPO**

Finance is the major challenge for FPO because of dependency on the government and other supporting organizations in terms of funds and services. To run their smooth operations producer company, need a huge amount of working capital for procurement, value addition, and marketing as well as extending credit, loan and advances. Banks refuse to lend the companies due to lack of guarantees since these companies only have their equity share of the primary producer, neither any physical nor the tangible assets. The main concern from the banks end is what manner the company will be able to raise the margin money required to mobilize the loan (Murray, 2009; NRAA 2009 and ITIGI et al. 2012). Moreover, it also suffers from tax on income (30.2%) unlike corporative, which can show income under tax free heads. Unavailability of skilled professionals has been the core bottleneck due to gap in entrepreneurial and technical aspect. Therefore, capacity building of all stakeholders including grass root level coordinator of the producer company is extremely needed. Registration process is very cumbersome, arduous and time taking. Hence, simplifying the registration procedure of the producer companies shall be given the utmost priority (DSC, 2007). The Producer Companies encounter into troubles in getting agricultural produce marketing committee (APMC) licenses for processing and trading as because of the existing licensees of the traditional cooperatives in many places. According to DSC (2007), the present fertilizer licensing policy, the "Principal Certificate" can only be given to the cooperatives and no provisions have been made so far by-laws to provide such licenses to producer companies. Producer company provisions are not in tune with the general framework for companies with limited liability in terms of restrictions of transfer of shares and thus the denial of exit opportunity, absence of competitive market for cooperative control and the very existing platform for infeasibility of imposing corporate Government regime. A weak position in terms of competing with the existing market, negotiating prices was found due to dependency for marketing on a few select buyers, rather than alternative parallel channel to market and attitude of offering low prices by the retailers.

### **Critical Analysis**

According to Singh (2015), a core issue is the logic of founding a Farmer Producer Company (FPC) which should ideally arise from a new way of doing business by the smallholder farmers integrating new technology, product development, and innovative promotional and marketing strategy. Yet, a majority of registered FPCs among more than 2,000, have struggled to grow and become viable. Size may not be the only or even a major indicator of success, however, survival as a viable, self-sustained, member-controlled producer organization is. A study of recent reviews and evaluations of producer companies has identified all manner of problems facing those (Tushar et al., 2016).

India's small farmers are resource poor and risk averse; but the idea of farmers Producer Organizations (FPO) is not only for pooling of produce but is also for pooling members' capital. If FPOs promise attractive returns to investment and enjoy trust of their members, there is no reason why farmers would not provide them capital. Is the experience with promoting producer companies any different from earlier experience with promoting traditional cooperatives? In my view, as of till now, it is not. Like the old-world conventional cooperatives, most

FPOs too are sheep in wolf's clothing. Their promotional process provides little evidence of design thinking for "transforming existing conditions into preferred ones." The discourse on the future of FPOs is not about how they can mobilize energy for growth from within but about how to garner resources and concessions from governments and external agencies. Had this not been the case, we would not hear promoting NGOs bemoaning lack of capital, capability, and facilitation as key constraints facing FPOs. Had they thought about the growth trajectory of FPOs at the time of formation, it would have been hard to ignore these as future challenges that needed preparation from the beginning. The flaw lies not in FPCs, but in the thinking and process of promoting them (Tushar et al., 2016 and ITIGI et al., 2012).

Financial institutions may offer some anomalous approaches to the producer companies to grow and being capable themselves to create a strong and resilient market position. Hence, financial organizations like bank can arrange loan facilities, where they can consider the yearly business turn over and reputation of the companies and the principles, services with which such companies operate, as the tangible assets not merely the physical assets. Guarantees and undertakings from the promoter institutions and purchase orders and the agreements pertaining to business may have to be relied upon by the financial organizations to extend credit facilities (Murray, 2009 and Venkattakumar R. et al., 2012).

### **Suggestions**

Farmers Producer Organizations (FPO) can overcome their financial challenges by undertaking some measures such as dealership with public and private companies and work as commission agents on behalf of those companies to purchase bulk amount of inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides) for their members; direct contract for procurement of the members' produce with private and public companies; backward linkage dealership and taking advantage of government schemes which provide loan against pledging warehouse receipts ( ITIGI Prabhakar et al., 2012).

To make FPOs resilience and fittest for the competitive market system some unconventional approaches could be taken like strong linkages and knowledge sharing among FPOs, academician, researchers, policymakers, market players; conducting policy dialogue by the farming lobby embed lessons learnt by FPOs, especially on the establishment of the small farming as a viable business (Gideon et al.2007).

More importantly, Selection process of the governing body and transparency in financial management and not but the least good feasibility study shall be maintained carefully to get the most benefit from the Farmers' Producer Organizations.

### **Conclusion**

The success of Farmers Producer organizations depends on more or less the same factor as such of the cooperatives which is the liability of the farmers towards company. The integrity and quality of the leadership, its acceptance within the community, as well as the market competence are the most crucial factors for a successful producer company. FPO has to be economically viable for their members by providing them appropriate knowledge on production technology so that ultimately, they can maintain strong forward and backward market linkages. One thing for sure is need to keep in mind is to set a benchmark of support whether it could be financial or capacity building that is handled by the NGOs or government subsidies; as because the end goal of the Producer company is to be empowered by their smallholder farmers to lead a viable business within their community. Ironically, this cannot be achieved only by the smallholders' individual initiatives alone. Furthermore, the fact that, to date, the concept of producer companies has captured so little attention except financing in capacity building, even in India needs to be addressed. This suggests that there is little belief on the government's side in this concept as an alternative to the privatization of agriculture as designed by the WTO.

However, producer companies' aim shall be building up a potential partnership with cooperate buyers since farming has always been considered as a risky enterprise for the natural processes underlying it. Producer companies integrate the legacy of farmers' knowledge, are locally embedded, they empower smallholder farmers while giving them the opportunity to deal with contemporary market actors and to enter high-value markets within the community. Henceforth, they can involve the farmer members', governing body and promoting NGOs, extensively in the supply chain which can make this model sustainable in terms of environmental, socio economic resilience in future.

**Acknowledgments:** The authors are thankful for the financial support from the Norwegian Agency for Exchange Cooperation (NOREC), an executive body under the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Previous to 2018, known as FK Norway). This research work was funded by the NOREC through the WAVE-FK International Young Professional Exchange Programme.

## References

- Venkatesan P. and B.S. Sonatakki (2017): A Powerful New Dawn- Farmer Producer Organization Advances in Economics and Business Management (AEBM).
- Venkattakumar R. and B.S. Sonatakki (2012): Producer Companies in India-Experiences and Implications, Indian Research Journal of Extension Education Special Issue (Volume I), January 2012.
- Shubhangi Salokhe (2016): Farmers producer Organization for effective linkage of small producers with market, International Journal of Applied research 2016; 2(10): 142-146.
- Preeti Sawairam (2015): Case study of farmer producer organization in Maharashtra in the era of globalization, IBMRD's Journal of Management and Research. Volume 4, Issue 2, September 2015, Print ISSN : 2277-7830, Online ISSN: 2348- 5922.
- Venkatesh Tagat and Anirudh Tagat (2016): The potential of Farmer Producer Organizations in India, SSRN electronic Journal, DOI.10.2139/ssrn.2972488.
- Anika Trebbin and Markus Hassler (2012): Farmers' Producer Companies in India: A new concept for collective action, Environment and Planning A 2012, volume 44, pages 411-427, doi:10.1068/a44143.
- ITIGI Probhakar, B.L. manjunatha, M.L. Nithyashree and Dipika Hajong (2012): Farmers Producer Company- An Innovative Farmers' Institution, Environment and Ecology 30 (2): 427-430, April-June 2012.
- Tushaar Shah (2016): Farmer Producer companies-Fermenting New wine for new bottles, Economic and political weekly (EPW), VOL LI NO 8.
- Singh & Sukhpal (2008): "Producer Companies as New Generation Cooperatives," Economic & Political Weekly, 17 May.
- Singh, Sukhpal and Tarunvir Singh (2013): Producer Companies in India: A Study of Organization and Performance, publication No 246, Centre for Management in Agriculture, Indian Institute Management, Ahmedabad, [http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/users/webrequest/files/cmareports/14Producer\\_Company\\_Final.pdf](http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/users/webrequest/files/cmareports/14Producer_Company_Final.pdf).
- Singh, Sriram (2015): "Promotion of Milk Producer Companies: Experience of NDS," Presentation in Workshop on Producer Companies organised by National Dairy Development Board, Anand, Gujarat, 8 October.
- Alagh K Yoginder. 2007. On Producer Companies. PRADHAN'S Workshop on Producer Companies.
- DSC. 2007. Development Support Centres's Experience. Dhari Krushak Vikas Producer Company Ltd. PRADHAN'S Workshop on Producer Companies.
- Murray E.V. 2009. Producer Company Model- Current Status and Future Outlook: Oppurtunities for Bank Finance. Knowledge Bank. College Agricultural Banking. Pune, Maharashtra, India. Pp 13.
- NRAA (2009): "Perspectives and Problems of Primary Producer Companies-Case Study of Indian Organic Farmers Producer Company Ltd, Kochi, Kerala"; National Rainfed Area Authority (NRAA), New Delhi, India. Pp 18.
- Gupta Arvind. 2007. A Critical Appraisal of the Provisions of Producer Company. PRADHAN'S Workshop on Producer Companies.
- Kumar Anish. 2007. Promoting Poor Centric Producer Organizations: Learning, Oppurtunities and Challenges. PRADHAN'S Workshop on Producer Companies.
- Mahajan V. (2015): "Farmer Producer Companies: Need for Capital and Capacity to Capture Value

- Added," Hyderabad: BASIX Social Enterprise Group.
- AOFC India, 2009, "Association of Farmer Companies India", <http://www.aofcindia.org>
- Bie-nabe E, Sautier D, 2005, "The role of small scale producer's organizations in addressing market access", in Beyond Agriculture: Making Markets Work for the Poor Eds F R Almond, S D Hainsworth, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/CropPostHarvest/CPHPIntro.pdf>, pp 69 – 89
- Barham J, Chitemi C, 2009, "Collective action initiatives to improve marketing performance: lessons from farmer groups in Tanzania" Food Policy 34 53 - 59
- Wilson G, 2009, "The spatiality of multifunctional agriculture: a human geography perspective" Geoforum 40 269 - 280
- Bardhan & Pranab (2005), Scarcity, Conflicts and Cooperation: Essays in the Political and Institutional Economics of Development, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
- Davis, Junior (1990). Agricultural development and food policy in Zambia within the context of state policy and economic stagnation: a review with regard to government agricultural marketing and incentive structures. Thesis (M.Sc.Econ.) - University of Wales (Swansea), 1990.
- (FAO) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, (2001) Improving performance and governance in Kenyan agricultural cooperatives through mobilising member equity capital – advantages of a deferred member payment scheme.
- Hardesty, S.D. and Vikas D. Salgia (2004) "Comparative Financial Performance of agricultural Cooperatives and Investor-Owned Firms." working paper. University of California, Center for Cooperatives 2004 18 p. Electronic location [http://www.cooperatives.ucdavis.edu/reports/report\\_pdf/comp\\_per\\_pop.pdf](http://www.cooperatives.ucdavis.edu/reports/report_pdf/comp_per_pop.pdf)
- Mercoiret, M., and Mfou'ou (2006) Rural producer organizations, empowerment of farmers and results of collective action – introductory note. World Development Report (2008) Rural producer organizations for pro-poor sustainable agricultural development, Paris Workshop 30-31st October 2006.



# Interpreting the Assam Revolts of 1893-94: A Retrospective Discourse With Special Reference to its Unsuccessful Factor

Dr. Kamal Chandra Pathak<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Sonapur College, Kamrup Metro, Assam, India. Email: k.c.pathak68@gmail.com

## Abstract

Anger emanates from hunger and hunger gives birth revolution. The peasants of Assam resorted to the path of violence against the Colonial Government in the close of the 19th century but their attempts met with failure. This paper is an honest attempt through which some of the major factors that precipitated the fiasco of the upheavals of 1893-94 are addressed.

**Keywords:** Assam Revolts, Retrospective Discourse, Unsuccessful Factors

## Key-words with glossary:

Augmentation, *mandal* (a village surveyor), *maujadar* (in charge of mauza) *mels* (assembly), *raij-mels* (people's assembly), *Marwaris* (people from Marwar), *tahsildar* (in charge of tahsil), jealous gossiping, crest-fallen, disgruntle, inapt-handling,

The peasants, who constitute the largest single segment of mankind, play a special role in shaping our destinies. Unfortunately, these sections sometime resorts to violence as and when their minimum interests are not met, rather seek to impose additional burden on them. Anger emanates from hunger and hunger gives birth to revolution. The pages of history are filled with their revolutions break-out in different countries in different times. Similarly, a series of protest did burst out in the districts of Kamrup and Darrang of Assam in 1893 and 1894 mainly against the revenue augmentation of the Colonial Government. Revenue hike in 1892, settlement of infertile land in the name of indigenous people, survey of 1893 and abolition of surrender of land, rude and harsh behavior of M.C.Bordoloi, the Extra-Assistant Commissioner of Barpeta sub-division and his reluctance of peasants request for remission of revenue, assault on the *mandal* and *maujadar* on the 21st January, 1894 at Lachima, rapacious and avaricious nature of *mandal* and *maujadar*, banning of *raijmels* by R.B.McCabe, the Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup – all these factors are solely responsible for the outbreaks of 1893-94. In addition to that, revenue, tea plantation and planters' exploitation, Government's apathy towards agricultural development and fight against natural calamities, migration, money economy and problem of adjustment with the new economy, decline and ruin of indigenous industries, rural indebtedness, red-tappism of the colonial bureaucrats, slow and imbecile education scenario, declaration of grant of lease system, role of the Christian missionary, injustice in the land, exaction of the *Marwaris* and the local traders- these also made local people ignited and irritated. The furious peasants of Kamrup and Darrang, therefore, did gird waist-band on their loins

against the local white government in the close of the 19th century. Notwithstanding having their defensive capability, they fail toto against the government in 1894.

Behind the success and failure of each and every outbreak, there are some factors that work. The outbreaks of 1893-94 were also not exception to that. From study, some general as well as peculiar factors come to surface that contributed immensely for the crest-fallen and downfall of the outbreaks of 1893-94. Let's review these factors which precipitated their tragic fall at the hands of the Colonial Government.

Apply of obsolete and conventional weapons as against the modern and sophisticated weapons was the main reason of the defeat of the peasants of Kamrup and Darrang. The peasants of Rangia, Lachima and Patharughat applied traditional weapons i.e. spears, bows arrows as against the modern weapons of the British. Their weapons could not be compared with that of the British. The peasants sought to vanquish the mighty British with their bamboo pop guns. The peasants of Patharughat failed as they fought pitched battle with the help of their fish-spears, branches of trees, bamboo sticks and clods of earth. They applied these as missiles on the colonial gunmen. While the armed men of the colonial power fought with their belligerent dresses and shoes, the peasants fought with scanty wearing, barefooted and bare-handed.

Underestimation of the power and number of the British was the main reason that led to the hasty defeat of the peasants of Kamrup and Darrang. Seizure of license guns was one of the causes of their quick defeat. People of Kamrup could have applied their guns had their guns not been seized by the Government. All license guns in Rangia, Nalbari, Barama and Bajali tahsils- the storm centers were seized following the order of R.B.McCabe, the Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup. Lack of unity and worth organizers among the local leaders and absence of proper leadership precipitated their haste defeat. Compared to their military skill, efficiency, decision making and adroitness; the local leaders were proved to be inferior to the colonial leaders. They have no any planned and long-termed scheme at their hands. Lack of common cause and parochial interest among them precipitated their catastrophe as and while the course of revolutions developed. They failed out and out to show the peasants the right way to fight. They could have gained something from the government by pursuing the conciliatory and moderate way. Idea of compromise did not develop in their mind and most of the time the revolts became conflagrable owing to their inapt-handling.

R.B.McCabe, the Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup became successful in winning some of the leaders to his side. Probably, he won them by fulfilling their parochial interest. Moreover, by appointing the rebel leaders as constables at the disturbed areas, the power of the rebels was weakened. Thus, the shrewd and astute British created division among the leaders.

Most of the time, it was found that the leaders of the *mels* had no control upon their people. For example, Kan Goswami appealed to the people not to give high revenue to the *tahsildar* of Rangia. Though initially, his appeal was welcome, but finally his appeal was dashed to the ground by Rudra Sarma of Septi. In addition to that, the leaders of Patharughat wanted to pay revenue of the Government. It means that somebody wanted to pay revenue defying the order of their leaders. It proves they had no control over their own people.

The people of Assam at that time groaned under economic hardship. Probably because of this, they could not fight a decisive battle against the administration as economy has a great role to play in the revolt.

Strong espionage system also helped the government in curbing the tide of the revolt. The administration could know about the rebel leaders and their *mels* through their spies. Some native also informed the government about the rebels and their whereabouts. As a result, their secrecy leaked. Unfortunate is that native betrayed native only for coins and invited ultimately their own defeat.

Rumour, false propaganda from the side of the government also brought success to the government. On the other hand, the innocent peasants they did not resort to such policy.

The strong British intelligence and quick and timely decision of the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police brought easy victory for the government. The government could collect secret information of the rebels and their sitting of the *mels* through their intelligence at a regular basis and took quick and haste decision on it which brought failure of the peasants. If sometime the number of troops sent to quell and disperse the *mels* was found short, immediately additional troops was sent again on the basis of the report of the intelligence. For instance, the situation of Lachima became tense following the assault on the *mandal* and *maujadar* on the 21st January, 1894. But timely arrival of R.B. McCabe, the Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup at Lachima on the 24th January, 1894 saved the situation from being conflagrated. The quick and prompt decision of J.D. Anderson, the Deputy Commissioner of Darrang to open fire on the mob who continued to approach towards him inspite of his order to leave the place resulted scores of them lay dead and wounded along the Mangaldoi road. His that moment decision brought government victory on one hand and defeat of the peasants of Patharughat on the other.

The uprisings of 1893-94 were confined at the two districts only. Moreover, entire Darrang and Kamrup districts especially South-Kamrup was not influenced by them. The revolt was highly localized and restricted to some areas. Many areas remained undisturbed. So, the administration found no problem to curb and quell them. Sporadic outbursts helped the government to quell the uprisings of the peasants instantly.

The uprisings failed to embrace all sections of the society. Had all sections irrespective to high and low, rich and poor, government and non-government employees stretched-out their helping hands to the peasants and fought sincerely for them, probably there was scope of lasting the revolts for more time. Many did not help the peasants in spite of having sympathy due to losing their jobs. For example, Sonaram Talukdar, a school teacher had been discharged from job due to his taking part in the *raij-mels*. Even his primary school of Byaskuchi was also banned. This however, created scare in the minds of people and therefore, they remained silent.

Some sections supported the peasants but they did not stretch-out their helping hands to them. For instance, some Barua of Jayantipur told Kan Goswami, Rahmat Khalipha, Abhay Choudhury that he would not go openly against the government. Moreover, the incident of Lachima and Patharughat failed to stir the imagination of the elite minds.

In addition to that, though all peasants fought together but their social and economic disparity created division among them. The rich and well-to-do peasants how much sincerely they did fight with the poor peasants, that is under suspicion.

Some of the leaders they did not join openly against the British in spite of having their grievances against the government. These disgruntled men were waiting for a chance to wreak vengeance on the government. The uprisings of 1893-94 gave opportunity to this sections who wasting no time began to instigate the peasants to move forward. The peasants, they could not ignore their leaders' command as they were the source of credit in the villages. They appeared as saviours but they were the first to retreat. According to Saikia, 'in the face of government repression, the peasantry stood their ground, made sacrifices but the leaders betrayed them and disappeared. Their proxy resistance broke down.'

Ever-preparedness and ever-readiness also brought victory to the British government. They were ever ready to face any type of situation. The rebels, on the other hand, whatever they did, they did that secretly. Ever-preparedness and ever-readiness was not found in them.

The Colonial Government always resorted to well-equipped strategy and manoeuvre. But the peasant mode of protest was obsolete and outdated. Defamation, nameless sabotage, tales, jealous gossiping, rumours, character assassination and nicknames-these were probably the symbolic resistance of the peasants against the government. Foot dragging, house burning, hypocrisy, petty thief – these were probably resorted by the peasants which evaporated in front of the gun-fire of the government. The language of the British protest was guns and brains. But the peasants of Kamrup and Darrang fought with passions and emotions. Their main weapons were their bombastic words. The leaders instigated the mob not to scare of the colonial guns. Emboldened by this, the mob jumped onto the fire like moth and brought their tragic ruin.

To bring all under one roof, the leaders of the *mels* resorted to some psychological strategy i.e. blessing and cursing. But how much and what way their strategy acted, it cannot be said. Had the *mels* adopted some practical and well equipped strategy to unite their men, probably they could have won. Their utopian, traditional, obsolete and superstitious strategy brought their failure.

Awkward position of the peasants might also be responsible for making the condition of the peasants unstable and fragile. The ryots were in between two fires. If they supported the government, they were socially ostracized and if supported the society, their properties were seized. They therefore, felt unstable, insecure and nervous which precipitated their fiasco.

Putting ban on the *mels* on January 10, 1893 by R.B.McCabe, the Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup gave birth crest-fallen in the minds of the peasants. The ban disheartened and dejected their minds. They probably began to think that if the government could put ban on the *mels*, it was too easy for the administration to quell them personally. So, ultimately it resulted in their degradation.

From our observation, it can be said that there was not a single factor that brought defeat of the peasants in the uprisings of 1893-94; there were a series of factors which precipitated their fiasco. Notwithstanding their decisive confrontation against the Colonial Government, they failed. Use of traditional weapons as against the modern weapons of the government, lack of unity among the local leaders, underestimation of the power and division among the peasant leaders by the government, weak control of leaders upon their people, economic hardship, strong espionage system of the government, false propaganda spread from the side of the government, strong and prompt decision of the government, sporadic outbursts, leaders failure to embrace all sections of the society, retreat of some of the leaders at the peak time of outbreaks, cool and meticulous decision of the administration, obsolete and outdated strategy of the local leaders – all these immensely contributed for the failure of the revolts of 1893-94.

## References

- Amalendu Guha, *Planter Raj to Swaraj (1826-1947)*, Tulika Books, New Delhi, 2006, PP.43 to 45  
S.L.Barua, *A Comprehensive History of Assam*, Munshiram Manoharlal Pvt Ltd., New Delhi, 2005, P.504  
Late Mayaram Kakati's 'Asamiya Terasa Sanat Rangia' in P. Kalita's ( Ed) *Rangia Raj-mel*, Rangia, 2005, PP.5,14 ( Assamese book)  
Bhabananda Deka's 'Britishar Biruddhe Asamot Pratham Gana Andolan' in A.Das & H.Sarma's *Sarukshetri Raj-mel Sata-barshiki Smritigrantha*, Baniakuchi, 1994, P.96 (Assamese book)  
Rajen Saikia's *Social and Economic History of Assam (1853-1921)*, Manohar, New Delhi, 2001, PP.107 to 109