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ISIS Network and Women Terrorism in Indonesia: An Analysis from Actor-Network Theory

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Abstract

This article examines how the ISIS network might encourage women's involvement in Indonesian terrorist activities starting in 2016. This study adopts a qualitative method through the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) analysis tool that Bruno Latour and Michael Callon developed. ANT is used to dissect networks composed of both human and non-human actors. Primary data collection was conducted through in-depth interviews from June to July 2023 with three female former ISIS sympathizers directly involved in the network from 2016 to 2021. Through this study, it was found that women who became ISIS sympathizers experienced translational stages in the network consisting of moments of problematization, intersement, enrollment, and mobilization. Nevertheless, the translational stages experienced by the three women varied. One of the three experienced a perfect translational moment up to mobilization and volunteered to blow herself up in 2016. The other two failed to reach the fourth translational moment due to the intervention of the authorities. On the other hand, it was also found that social media such as Facebook, Telegram, and WhatsApp is not only a tool but also has agency in binding women to the network and leading them to be involved in acts of terrorism. Social media can become a space for intermediaries to stabilize the network and keep each actor in it firmly bound.

Keywords: ISIS Network, Women Terrorism, Actor-Network Theory, Social Media, Technology

1. Introduction

ISIS, identified initially as the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006, garnered global attention following its declaration in 2014. In that year, the group underwent a name change to ISIS under the command of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. The group also seized control of Raqqa, the capital of Syria, and allied with a local extremist group known as Nusa Front (Robin Wright et al., 2017). The emergence of ISIS generated fervor, evolving into a central hub or *Ghiroh* for militant movements united by a common aspiration to establish the Caliphate State (IPAC, 2014). In the meantime, ISIS does not build a direct group or sub-organization in Indonesia. The networking exists by

spreading propaganda, which then moves militant organizations in Indonesia established earlier to support ISIS. This local militant group, including Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), Jamaah Ansharut Khilafah (JAKI), and FAKSI (Forum of Islamic Law Activists) (Indra Martian Permana & Fadzli Adam, 2020). The declaration of Al-Baghdadi also led to the formation of new support groups, for example, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD). These pro-ISIS groups are then responsible for recruiting members in Indonesia. Even though ISIS figures had fallen from 2017 to 2019, when Imam Al-Baghdadi was killed at the hands of the US military, the networking and recruitment in Indonesia remain by those groups.

The emergence of ISIS is also linked to the increasing number and shifting role of women in Indonesian terrorism. The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) further supported this argument, revealing that only four women were indicted on terrorism charges before 2014. However, this number escalated to 30 individuals after the ISIS declaration in 2014 (IPAC, 2020). Another data stated that from 2001 to 2020, the number of female detainees linked to terrorist activities across Indonesia reached 39 individuals (Ahmad Naufal Dzulfaroh & Sari Hardiyanto, 2021). The Head of the National Counterterrorism Agency of Indonesia (BNPT) has affirmed that phenomenon and has witnessed a notable increase over the past decade (BNPT, 2022). The accompanying graph illustrates the upward trajectory in the involvement of women in terrorism in Indonesia.



Figure 1: The increase of Women Involved in Indonesian Terrorist Activities

Source: Calculated from (IPAC, 2020)

Based on Figure 1, between 2000 and 2015, the number of female terrorist suspects showed a gradual increase, with a significant surge observed from 2015 to 2020. During this period, Indonesia experienced several suicide bombings where women played the role of martyrs, such as the Pot Bombing (2016), the Women Suicide Bombing Bride in Purworejo (2016), and the Surabaya Three Church Bombing (2018). These women were later identified as affiliated with ISIS, reflecting not only a rise in the number of women involved in acts of terror but also a transformation in their roles within these movements. BNPT supported this argument with data from 2022 that stated 18 young Indonesian women were identified as intending to commit acts of terrorism. BNPT attributes this transformation to two main factors: the exploitation of the feminine nature of women as victims and the influence of radicalism and propaganda through social media (BNPT, 2022).

The evolving role of women in violence and extremism aligns with predictions made by Argentine sociologist Georges Abeiye in 1983. This shift has been substantiated by research conducted between 2000 and 2001, focusing on women's involvement in violent and radical movements through psychological aspects, analysis of women in suicide bombings, and the representation of female terrorists (Jacques & Taylor, 2009). Previous studies on women's involvement in terrorism have explored two perspectives: mythical stereotypes and gender stereotypes. Mythical stereotypes portray female terrorists as beautiful, intelligent, strong, and deadly fighters, while gender stereotypes analyze women in terrorism through motivations such as self-actualization, social background, and family (Steel, 1998). Additional studies, such as (Cunningham, 2007), delve into women's roles in conflict and terrorism in the United States, Russia, and Israel, addressing weaknesses in counterterrorism that make women's involvement challenging to prevent. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, previous studies about women and terrorism focused on the role of women mainly serving as intermediaries or wives, while the main perpetrators are always dominated by men (Qori'ah, 2019). The shift in women's roles became more evident with the arrest of Dian Yulia Novi, an ISIS sympathizer who was recognized as the first female suicide bomber in Indonesia's terrorism history. She was arrested in 2016. A previous study argues that the presence of ISIS has fundamentally transformed how extremist groups in Indonesia perceive the role of women. ISIS leaders leverage women as

combatants due to their lower suspicion levels and the increased media attention they attract. Successful acts of terror by women generate more shock value, focusing media attention on the affiliated group (Mujahid, 2023). Nevertheless, this shifting role has been discussed as well in (Musdah Mulia, 2019), highlighting that the shift towards women as terrorism executors represents a new strategy to attract sympathy and deceive authorities. This research also emphasizes the self-actualization of women engaging in acts of terrorism, framing them as Muslim women pursuing *jihad*. Notably, another research on Indonesian women in the ISIS network has been conducted by (Akbar Hassani et al., 2022), examining women as both perpetrators and victims in the terrorist network.

The nexus between the shifting role of women in terrorism and the rise of ISIS is noteworthy. The surge in women's involvement in terrorism, both quantitatively and qualitatively, following ISIS's declaration in 2014 raises questions about how their association with ISIS led to their engagement in activities of terror. However, previous studies have focused on women's roles and the reasons behind their beliefs. The analysis used also tends to be limited to gender studies and self-actualization. This research aims to fill the gap by investigating how the militant group widens the definition of women, not only as passive actors but also as executors in terrorism. Analyzing beyond self-actualization or gender stereotype perspectives becomes imperative, especially as ISIS has successfully built networks within militant groups that were established earlier in Indonesia. This research will delve into the components of the ISIS network, examining how the network transforms women into active actors in terrorism activities. Introducing the network as a new variable in analyzing women's involvement in terrorism aims to address existing gaps in understanding.

To further examine the network and its components, this research uses an analytical tool in the form of Actor-Network Theory developed by Bruno Latour and Michael Callon. Through ANT analysis, networks can be seen broadly where actors consist of humans and non-humans. Through the new variable of network and ANT analysis, this research will address the role of the ISIS network in encouraging female terrorism in Indonesia.

2. Method

2.1. Data Collection

To answer the role of the ISIS network in encouraging female terrorism in Indonesia, the primary data in this study were taken by in-depth interviews with three female informants who were former ISIS sympathizers from 2016 to 2021. The first informant is Sabrina (not the real name), who joined the ISIS group while still becoming a migrant worker in Hong Kong in 2016. Sabrina was chosen as a resource for this research because she was directly involved in the ISIS network from 2014 until she was arrested in 2016. She also had contact with ISIS pioneers in Indonesia, such as Bahrin Naim. The second informant is Aza, who was involved in the Mako Brimob attack planning case in 2018. Aza was chosen because she was also involved in the network from 2017 until she was arrested in 2018. The third informant is Lia, involved in Villa Mutiara Makassar's ISIS network. She was chosen as an informant because she has been involved in the network since she was a child and has direct contact with the network in Makassar.

2.2. Data Analysis

To analyze the role of networks and how their components can initiate action in the case of female terrorism in Indonesia, this research uses the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) analysis tool developed by Bruno Latour, Michael Callon, and John Law in the 1980s. This theory results from the development of literature studies in Science and Technology Studies (STS). However, ANT began to be used in other fields of study, such as management science, policy science, innovation economics, and development studies. ANT is a formulation of ideas about action, hybrid agents, translation, heterogeneous networks, and network effects. Through ANT analysis, this research tries to examine how a network and its components can impact the loyalty of female ISIS sympathizers to commit acts of terrorism eventually.

This research takes three main arguments of ANT in examining a network. First, ANT uses network search to view a phenomenon. The network seen in ANT consists of human and non-human actors. Networks can also be formed through the circulation of intermediaries represented in stories, skills, and technology, such as computers (Tummons, 2021). ANT also views these non-human actors as more than "tools created by humans"; they also have agency. Latour says they can make things happen by encouraging, allowing, suggesting, or influencing (MacLeod et al., 2019).

To analyze women's acts of terrorism in Indonesia, this research took ANT's second argument about action from another exponent, Michael Callon. Action, interpreted as "making things happen," is the result of the translational process of actors in heterogeneous networks. In addition, action in this context is interpreted not from the interaction of actors but from interrelations. Interrelationships themselves are formed from translations. The translational process will also be characterized by adjustment, exploration, delegation, and even rejection before ending up as action. Action defined as a translational process also does not interpret the idea of reciprocal action in the interaction concept. In addition to actors, translations are also made up of a collection of intermediaries. Intermediaries are anything passed to actors that defines their relationship (Sonny Yuliar, 2009).

Still adapting Callon's thinking, this research dissects the translational process to create action in four stages: problematization, interessement, enrolment, and mobilization. Problematization is the stage where one or more actors formulate a problem. The second stage, interessement, is when all the actors identified at the problematization stage are given their respective roles. Meanwhile, enrolment is the stage where actors are then successfully invited to engage in problem-solving in an activity. The last stage is Mobilization, where actors finally form a network with stronger alliances (Corsini, 2022). As in (Sonny Yuliar, 2009), each translational stage formulated by Michael Callon has the following indicators:

Table 1: Translational Moment Indicator

No.	Moment of Translation	Moment Indicator
1	Problematization	- There is one actor who throws an issue to the attention of other actors - Circulation of the issue may take the form of media texts, direct conversations, or the dispatch of a spokesperson.
2	Interessement	- Define a problem of common concern to the actors in moment 1.
3	Enrollment	- Actors explore each other's competencies and adjustments - This moment is characterized by dividing roles for actors influencing one another. Examples include trustee, messenger, representative, and spokesperson.
4	Mobilization	- Various roles and competencies have been implemented - If the analysis focused on only one actor, it already represents the entire network

Source: compiled from (Sonny Yuliar, 2009)

2.3. Conceptual Definitions

2.3.1. Sociotechnogram

Sociotechnogram is part of the actor-network visualization method in ANT theory. The sociotechnogram forms a network of actors in a translational process that helps map actors and relationships within it. In particular, the network in the sociotechnogram in ANT also involves technology as a network builder.

2.3.2. Intermediaries

Intermediaries are substances that are circulated to actors to form networks. Translations are made up of a collection of intermediaries. Intermediaries are anything that is passed to actors, or that defines the relations between them. Intermediaries can be texts, technical objects, or skills.

3. Result and Discussion

3.1. *ISIS Networking from Syria to Indonesia*

The establishment of ISIS cannot be separated from the figure of Abu Muzab al-Zarqawi, who is a former reporter of the Afghan region. He is also the originator of the ideological foundation of ISIS in the form of Islamic purity. In 1994, Zarqawi and his teacher, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, were arrested for possession of weapons and explosives. During his detention, Zarqawi deepened his religious knowledge and became more committed to the Salafism he learned from al-Maqdisi. Unlike his teacher, Zarqawi's principle was to put theory into practice. Thus, during his detention, he was able to initiate the creation of a group that became the forerunner of ISIS (Shaffer, 2017). In 1999, Zarqawi was released through the general amnesty of King Jordan Abdullah. After his release, he reached out to Osama bin Laden to build an alliance. As a result, he was able to convince Al-Qaeda to contribute funds for the creation of a training camp in Herat, western Afghanistan. Zarqawi's network of militant groups grew rapidly until finally, in 2003, he managed to build a more substantial group in the western Iraqi province of Al Anbar, which was named Jama'at al-Tahwid wal-jihad. This group later became the forerunner of ISIS (Gerges, 2021). Unfortunately, Zarqawi was unable to continue his leadership after being killed at the hands of a US airstrike in 2006. He was replaced by Abu Ayyub al-Masri, who announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Al-Qaeda rejected the hasty decision of al-Masri, further worsening the relationship between the two. The establishment of ISI, followed by poor relations with Al-Qaeda, also confused militant groups around the world. Al-Masri's poor ability to organize groups further diminished the ISI's existence. ISI almost lost popularity during this period (Dyer, 2016).

Despite its near extinction, ISI was able to rise from the dead through the US detention facility in Iraq, Camp Bucca. The camp was closed in 2009, but the network built within its members remains active. The originators of ISIS came out of the camp, including the famous leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. One of al-Baghdadi's earliest moves to restore ISI's power was to gather former members of Saddam Hussein's military to fill leadership positions in ISI. In 2012-2013, the ISI made further use of the skills and networks formed in prison. Al-Baghdadi was also able to capitalize on the Syrian Civil War that escalated in 2011. In 2012, Baghdadi sent several ISI representatives to establish a branch in Syria to join opposition groups fighting the then-ruling Bashar al-Assad's regime. These ISI fighters then saw Syria as a relatively safe and appropriate place for development (Shaffer, 2017). In April 2013, al-Baghdadi surprisingly announced the merger of ISI with al-Nusra Front under the name Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (translated to Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, ISIS). A year later, ISIS conquered the Syrian city of al-Raqqa. After a series of successes in Syria, IS aimed to re-establish its dominance in its home location - Iraq. On June 29, 2014, the first day of the holy month of Ramadan, ISIS declared itself a caliphate with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph and called on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to him.

The declaration of al-Baghdadi then impacted militant movements that had previously existed in Indonesia. In this research, at least three types of pro-ISIS networks formed or can be found after al-Baghdadi's declaration in 2014. The three networks are then known to target recruitment to women divided into several roles, one of which is as an executor. The three networks are described as follows.

3.1.1. Aman Abdurrahman Network (JAD)

Before the emergence of ISIS, Aman Abdurrahman was known as a preacher who deeply understood tawhid's teachings. Listed in (The Supreme Court of Republic of Indonesia, 2018), after the ISIS declaration in November 2014, Aman Abdurrahman, who was still in Nusa Kambangan Penitentiary in Cilacap, Central Java, invited three of his students named Ari Budiman (Marwan/Abu Musa), Zainal Anshori (Abu Fahri/M. Fachry), and

Khaerul Anwar (Abu Hatin). Through the meeting, Aman invited his three students to pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi and support the establishment of ISIS, which is considered a representation of the Islamic Caliphate. Aman then ordered the formation of a forum for ISIS supporters called Jamaah Anshar Daulah (JAD) with the primary purpose to provide support to ISIS by sending personnel directly to Syria. After the meeting, Aman's three disciples expanded the network to several regions in Indonesia.




Figure 2: Network Formed by Aman Abdurrahman after al-Baghdadi Declaration

Source: compiled from (The Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2018)

Figure 2 above explains the pro-ISIS network Aman Abdurrahman established after al-Baghdadi's declaration. Aman then appointed Ari Budiman as the leader, whose job was to consolidate all supporters in Indonesia. Meanwhile, Zaenal Anshori was trusted to lead supporters in the East Java region. By November 2014, the network had strengthened and began to form outside Java, including Sulawesi, Ambon, Kalimantan, and Lampung.

3.1.2. Villa Mutiara Network

In addition to the Aman Abdurrahman (JAD) network, al-Baghdadi's ISIS declaration also established a support network in the Makassar area of South Sulawesi through the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) organization. Baghdadi's declaration and branding as a caliphate state caught the attention of the organization, which was disbanded in 2020. On August 17, 2014, FPI leader Habib Rizieq Shihab declared his support for ISIS through a YouTube video. The video then aroused the sympathy of the FPI supporters in Makassar until a public rally (*tabligh akbar*) was held on January 25, 2015. The *tabligh akbar*, which more than 200 people attended, became a mass allegiance to Imam al-Baghdadi. Ustad Basri, the leader of Pondok Pesantren Tahfidzul Al-Quran Makassar, led the pledge. One of Basri's students who attended the pledge was Muhammad Rizaldy.

After the mass allegiance, Rizaldy became fully committed to ISIS and planned to leave for Syria. In early 2016, he and his family finally planned to depart for Syria and transit to Turkey from Jakarta Airport. Unfortunately, they were stopped by Densus 88 Anti-Terror and eventually returned to Makassar after being interrogated. This failure led Rizaldy to start a pro-ISIS discussion group at the Jawahirulzarqa Mosque located in a villa called Villa Mutiara. This forum later developed into the Villa Mutiara pro-ISIS network. This network consists of at least 50 people and is dominated by Rizaldy's family (IPAC, 2023).

3.1.3. Bahrn Naim Network

In addition to the emergence of JAD and the Villa Mutiara Network, al-Baghdadi's declaration also has consequences for other Indonesian terrorism figures such as Bahrn Naim. Unlike the previous two networks formed through prominent figures and organizations, Bahrn Naim developed his network mainly through the Internet. He was known to be an internet cafe businessman for two years until Naim met Purnomo Putro, who was a convicted terrorist. Purnomo asked Naim for help storing his ammunition. In 2010, Naim was arrested due to the ammunition he stored and was imprisoned for 2.5 years (Ahmad Rafiq, 2016). His freedom, which was accompanied by the formation of ISIS, led him to commit to leaving for ISIS in Syria. In January 2015, Naim finally left for Syria but continued to coordinate with some of his friends in Solo, Central Java.

Once in Syria, Bahrn Naim created a blog containing ways to make explosives and ISIS propaganda. Naim also reviewed terrorist incidents that occurred in the world, for example, the 2015 Paris bombings. He also actively used other social media, such as Facebook and Telegram, to communicate and provide information about acts of

terrorism. Through this strategy, Naim managed to coordinate bombings even though he was in Syria. Here are the bombings carried out by Naim's network.

- Sarinah Bombing January 14, 2016
- Solo Police Bombing July 5, 2016
- The attack by the Kitabah Gigih Rahmat (GKR) group, which planned to launch a rocket from Batam to Singapore's Marina Bay Sand on August 8, 2016, failed.
- Dian Yulia Novi's pot bomb at the State Palace December 11, 2016
- Kampung Melayu Bombing East Jakarta May 24, 2017

In addition to the above actions, Bahrn Naim conducted online recruitment using an account describing himself as a freelance journalist in Syria specializing in issues concerning Islamic society. Through his blog, Bahrn Naim also wrote narratives celebrating the victory of ISIS (Weldi Rozika, 2017). After knowing what networks were formed after the declaration of ISIS by al-Baghdadi, this research will look at how the role of ISIS networks can encourage women's involvement in terrorism cases with ANT theory.

3.2. The Process of Female Sympathizers Getting Involved with the ISIS Network

This section explains how the women former ISIS sympathizers came into contact with the network. The explanation is illustrated through a map of human and non-human actors called a sociotechnogram. The following is a sociotechnogram of each female former ISIS sympathizer.




Figure 3: Sociotechnogram of Sabrina

Source: (Sabrina, personal communication, June 26, 2023) (Data has been presented at the 2nd ICARSE on 26 November 2023 in the process of publication in the proceedings with the title "Digital Radicalization: A Conceptual Framework with a Case Study on Three Indonesian Women in Pro-ISIS Circles")

Based on the actor map in Figure 3, Sabrina initially did not know anything about terrorism. She came into contact with ISIS through war news that she often accessed during her time as a migrant worker in Hong Kong around 2013. Sabrina used her time to watch news about the war in Palestine and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the war videos that Sabrina watched were sourced from websites and YouTube links. Sabrina accessed more and more information about warfare until finally, in 2015, she intersected with Bahrn Naim through his blog. Through Bahrn's website, Sabrina learned about the spirit of war and how to make bombs. Sabrina also connected with the ISIS network through her interactions with FPI and HTI members she met on Facebook. She then decided to pledge to al-Baghdadi online while still in Hong Kong. During her time as an ISIS sympathizer, Sabrina was increasingly exposed to the importance of jihad and war. She was also shown visualizations of violence, such as the Qisas law. In the end, Sabrina often donated the money she earned as a migrant worker in Hong Kong to the network. She believes the donation is a form of jihad (Sabrina, personal communication, June 26, 2023). Still, in 2015, Sabrina established her network in Indonesia with online recruitment via Telegram. Riswandi was the first person she recruited. Riswandi then recruited Zaenal Akbar. Zaenal Akbar later became Sabrina's husband and her financial administrator in Indonesia. Zaenal's main task was to set up an account for

Sabrina's money from Hong Kong to be used to finance terrorist acts. In addition, Zaenal Akbar eventually recruited Abdullah Azzam. Abu Jundi2 also entered the network because he was considered capable of providing knowledge about acts of terror. Sabrina gathered all these parties in a Telegram group called "Waiddu."

Unfortunately, in 2016, Zaenal Akbar was arrested by the authorities. Her husband's arrest made Sabrina engage in "war" herself (Nisan Setiadi & Muhamad Syauqillah, 2023). She then contacted Bahrin Naim and decided to commit *Amaliyah* (deeds aimed at getting closer to God) by blowing herself up in 2016. Sabrina's plan was foiled because when she arrived in Indonesia, precisely in Purworejo, she was arrested by Densus 88 Anti-Terror. After her arrest, her allegiance to ISIS was strengthened because, in prison, she met Dian Yulia Novi, who was a defendant in the Pot Bombing case. He was eventually transferred to a detention cell in Medan and agreed to recognize Indonesia's sovereignty and legitimate government in 2022. After being declared "green" (a term from the authorities that refers to terrorism prisoners who have recognized the existence of legitimate law), she met Ahmad Supriyanto, who became her second husband after divorcing Zaenal Akbar (Sabrina, personal communication, June 26, 2023).




Figure 4: Sociotechnogram of Aza

Source: (Aza, personal communication, July 10, 2023) (Data has been presented at the 2nd ICARSE on 26 November 2023 in the process of publication in the proceedings with the title "Digital Radicalization: A Conceptual Framework with a Case Study on Three Indonesian Women in Pro-ISIS Circles")

Unlike Sabrina, Aza's involvement in the ISIS network is described in Figure 4. Aza, a university student, had previously participated in university studies and student study groups around 2015. In November of the same year, the study she participated in discussed Islamic State, which later became the beginning of her interest in ISIS. After the campus study, she joined the NII Region IX group to learn more about the Islamic State. Dissatisfied with the concept of Islamic State in NII, which she found lacking in implementation, Aza looked for new sources of information via Telegram and found several channels (see number 4). After entering the channels, she entered a more private group. Aza was then drawn to a WhatsApp group called "Turn Back Crime," which contained around 40 people. Through this group, Aza met Dita Siska, who she felt had the same vision as her, and they became close. This WhatsApp group was led by *ustadzah* online (an online female cleric), who, until her trial, Aza did not know the true identity of the *ustadzah* figure. Apart from Ustadzah online, the group was also driven by Abu Kembar or Koswara, a follower of Aman Abdurrahman. Koswara had visited Aman Abdurrahman and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in prison (Aza, personal communication, July 10, 2023).

The Abu Ibrahim video triggered his departure to Mako Brimob in 2018. The video shows the death of Abu Ibrahim, who is narrated as a result of gunshot wounds and police violence during the riots at Mako Brimob on May 8, 2018. After seeing the video, Aza wanted to provide support, so she contacted her friend Dita. They departed from Bandung to Mako Brimob on May 11, 2018 (Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2018). Her departure was to provide food to terrorist prisoners in Mako as a form of support in fighting the target. Unfortunately, she was arrested and named a suspect after her bag contained a pair of scissors suspected of being

part of the attack plan. However, according to Aza's statement to the research team, the scissors were used to wrap gifts, not as a weapon to attack police officers (Aza, personal communication, July 10, 2023).




Figure 5: Sociotechnogram of Lia

Source: (Lia, personal communication, July 28, 2023) (Data has been presented at the 2nd ICARSE on 26 November 2023 in the process of publication in the proceedings with the title "Digital Radicalization: A Conceptual Framework with a Case Study on Three Indonesian Women in Pro-ISIS Circles")

Unlike Sabrina and Aza, who were introduced to ISIS through social media, Lia's sociotechnogram shows that she was first introduced to ISIS through her own family, who are direct members of the Villa Mutiara network in Makassar. Lia's introduction to ISIS began through her father, Rullie Rian Zeke, and mother, Ulfa Handayani Saleh. Lia's entire family (see numbers 5,6,7) is directly connected to Muhammad Rizaldy, leading the Villa Mutiara network. Ulfa is Muhammad Rizaldy's younger sister. Meanwhile, Lia admitted that her father was also very close to Rizaldy. According to her, her father even first learned about Islam through Rizaldy. It was also through Rizaldy that her father wanted to "hijrah" with his family to Syria. At 15, Lia attended the Islamic Boarding School Tahfidzul Qur'an Makassar. It was during this time that her parents intensified their meetings with Rizaldy. Ulfa also began to instill an understanding of the importance of establishing an Islamic state in Lia. Out of curiosity, Lia eventually accessed ISIS propaganda videos via YouTube.

In 2015, Lia's family finally left for Syria but first transited to Turkey. At that time, Lia did not join her parents because she was still a wife at 14. She admitted that she still had to take care of her two children. At the end of 2015, she divorced Ulfa and Rian and followed them to Turkey in 2016. She lived for a year in her father's apartment. It was during this period that Lia delved deeper into ISIS. He then participated in studies and associations at the ISIS Community Camp (Makor) in Turkey. Meanwhile, Yusuf Ismail Saleh, who is Lia's younger brother, finally managed to penetrate to join ISIS in Syria. Yusuf often called Lia to tell her how prosperous Syria was, making it an ideal Muslim home. In 2017, Lia and her family failed to continue their journey to Syria and were eventually deported and returned to Indonesia. However, the failure did not diminish her father's determination to defend ISIS. Lia noted that her father left her alone in the Philippines in March 2017. Two months later, his mother followed with his younger sister. In 2019, she received news from the police that her father and mother had blown themselves up at a cathedral in Jolo, Philippines. Meanwhile, the younger sister was found safely pregnant in Abu Sayyar Camp Jolo and secured by the Philippine authorities. Lia and several remaining Villa Mutiara Makassar network members were arrested in 2021 (Lia, personal communication, July 28, 2023).

3.3. Translation Process of ISIS Female Symphatizier Within the Network

After knowing the process of the three informants' involvement in the ISIS network, this section explains further how the translational stages occur in the network.




Figure 6: Sabrina Translation Moment

Source: (Sabrina, personal communication, June 26, 2023)

Based on Figure 6, the translational moment in the form of problematization in Sabrina is illustrated in Part 1. Problematization is characterized by an issue that one actor circulates to attract other actors. In Sabrina's case, one of the issues that caught her attention came from a blog by Bahrin Naim in 2014. Sabrina has been interested in war and Islam news since 2013 as a laborer in Hong Kong. However, she accessed the news not through technical objects affiliated with the ISIS network because the online news sites belonged to legal institutions such as Voice of Islam, Al-Mustaqbal, and Ar-Rahmah (Sabrina, personal communication, June 26, 2023). Through this stage, Bahrin Naim, in his blog, circulates issues such as the importance of war to fulfill jihad for Muslims and how to make bombs. At this stage, Sabrina is portrayed as a thin red dot representing the unformed level of loyalty to ISIS.



Figure 7: Example of Intermediary from Bahrin Naim

Source: [Jakartakita.com](http://jakartakita.com)

Figure 7 shows an example of an intermediary circulated by Bahrin Naim through his blog. When the blog was active, Bahrin was with ISIS directly in Syria and positioned himself as a journalist exposing ISIS activities. The intermediaries Bahrin circulated to his network took the form of texts with narratives about heroic bomb attacks, warfare, and bomb-making procedures (Risma, 2016).

As a result of receiving intermediary circulation from Bahrin Naim, Sabrina began to adjust her strategies, goals, and behavior. Sabrina's adjustment to the problem she received from Bahrin Naim can be seen when she then looked for other sources of intermediaries by entering the Facebook space. Sabrina met other ISIS network actors besides Bahrin, namely FPI and HTI members in this digital space. Her entry into the network deepened the understanding she had gained in Phase 1. At this stage, the intermediaries circulated to Sabrina also began to be heterogeneous, not only about the importance of warfare but also about al-Baghdadi's declaration of Islamic unity. Sabrina's introduction phase to the network is considered successful with its acceptance of what ISIS

considers to be something important: the war of Muslims. Sabrina's indicator of success at this stage is that she took an oath of allegiance to al-Baghdadi. She did this online via Facebook and Telegram (Sabrina, personal communication, June 26, 2023). At this stage, Sabrina is also described as a blushing dot as a sign of increasing faith in ISIS.

Table 2: Classification of Intermediaries in Sabrina's Moment of Translation

Type of Intermediary	Contents	Circulation Room
Text	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The spirit of jihad • Importance of martyrdom • Muslims are not okay, so they must be fully defended • The importance of upholding God's law 	Facebook and Telegram
Visual objects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Images of ISIS violence in Syria • Beheading punishment video • Video of man's punishment being pushed off skyscraper floor 	

Source: (Sabrina, personal communication, June 26, 2023)

A further moment of the interestment stage is enrollment, depicted by number 3. This stage is characterized by actors starting to delegate roles to each other and explore competencies. More complex intermediaries begin to circulate within the network. In Sabrina's case, she is then assigned the role of financial backer for the network. At this stage, Sabrina also began to share roles with other actors, such as Riswandi, Zaenal Akbar, Abu Jundi, and Abdullah Azzam. Intermediaries at this stage have entered into other variations, not just ideas but also funds and skills. Sabrina began to circulate funds to Riswandi and Zaenal Akbar. Sabrina was recorded sending 11.5 million rupiah from her earnings in Hong Kong in 2015 for the operation led by Zaenal Akbar (Nisan Setiadi & Muhamad Syaquillah, 2023). Meanwhile, Riswandi and Zaenal were in charge of accommodating terror plans in Indonesia through Sabrina's funds, such as purchasing equipment and materials. In the network, Abu Jundi acts as the brain of planning because he has been listed as a follower of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir since 2008. The delegation and division of roles marked the success of the enrollment moment.

The continuous circulation of intermediaries then brings the network to the mobilization stage, where if the analysis is only focused on Sabrina, she has been able to represent the network as a whole. At this stage, Sabrina has become highly loyal to her network. Evidently, in 2016, after Zaenal Akbar was arrested, Sabrina finally decided to carry out an act of terror in the form of voluntary self-detonation. The action was assisted by Bahrn Naim, who, in this analysis, had thrown problems at Sabrina in phase 1. The emergence of Sabrina as the bomb executor due to Zaenal Akbar's failure marks the success of Sabrina's network mobilization.




Figure 8: Translation Process of Aza

Source: (Aza, personal communication, July 10, 2023)

Meanwhile, in Aza's case, the initial stage of translation in the form of problematization occurred in 2015 when she participated in campus studies discussing the Islamic State concept. In the same period, she also joined the

Indonesian Islamic State organization, which aims to build an Islamic state in Indonesia (Aza, personal communication, July 10, 2023). In addition to focusing on the establishment of an Islamic state in general, the NII also aimed to overthrow the legitimate government in Indonesia and replace the basis of the state with Islamic law. NII members also proclaimed themselves as ISIS supporters during al-Baghdadi's declaration in 2014 (BBC Indonesia, 2022). So, unlike Sabrina with the initial problem of the importance of fighting for Muslims, the problematization stage experienced by Aza is the circulation of the problem in the form of the concept of Islamic State.

Entering the stage of interestment, Aza also began to adjust her strategies, goals, and behaviors, as illustrated by number 2. Aza began to look for other sources related to the Islamic State and all intermediaries circulated through the Telegram digital space. The actors she encountered at this stage were the Daulah Channel, Millah Ibrahim, and Sharing Islamic Knowledge. These channels are known to be affiliated with the Islamic State network built by Aman Abdurrahman (JAD). The Millah Ibrahim Telegram channel was initiated by M. Fachri, the critical leader of JAD in East Java (The Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2018). Meanwhile, he also met with human actor Abu Kembar or Koswara. Koswara is the group admin who organizes all the circulation of intermediaries in the space. The intermediaries circulated at this stage to help Aza's adjustment can be broken down as follows.

Table 3: Classification of Intermediaries in Aza's Moment of Translation

Types of Intermediary	Content	Circulation Room
Text	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular articles • Broadcast message • Kitab Mukoro Tauhid • Our Aqidah • Book of Usul Fikih • Dawah bulletin • Stories of warfare by women in the Prophet's time 	Telegram and Whatsapp
	Muhammad SAW	
Audio	• Lecture on Tawhid from Aman Abdurrahman	
Visual objects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poster 10 Islamic cancelation • Poster on the virtues of martyrdom • Movies about war 	

Source: (Aza, personal communication, July 10, 2023)

After the above intermediaries were circulated, Aza entered the network's enrollment stage. She begins to be involved in network activities. This moment is marked by Aza and her network being mobilized in the digital space of WhatsApp to fight all those who change Allah's law, for example, legislators, police, and soldiers. Aza also forwarded the messages to several people close to her (Aza, personal communication, July 10, 2023). This moment marked the completion of the enrollment process. Another activity that marked Aza's involvement in the network was when she went to Jakarta on May 10, 2018, with her network comrade, Dita, to support other members in Mako Brimob. Her departure to Mako Brimob was also triggered by empathy from the intermediary in the form of a video of the death of terrorism prisoner Abu Ibrahim during the Mako Brimob riot (Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2018). The moment of enrollment can be illustrated in stage number 3. In Aza's case, the researcher could not track the success indicator of the mobilization moment because Aza was arrested right after entering Mako Brimob. Thus, it can be concluded that Aza has not gone through the mobilization stage due to the interference of police officers at the moment of enrollment.




Figure 9: Translation Process of Lia

Source: (Lia, personal communication, July 28, 2023)

Lia's moment of problematization is experienced in her family environment, which is a member of the ISIS sympathizer network Villa Mutiara formed by Muhammad Rizaldy. The first actors who initiated the problem for Lia were her parents, Rullie Rian Zeke and Ulfa Handayani. Ulfa is Muhammad Rizaldy's younger sister. According to Lia, her father and uncle were close. It was also through his uncle that his father learned about ISIS. His father then invited him and his brother to leave for Syria and fight with ISIS because it is an ideal place for Muslims (Lia, personal communication, July 28, 2023). At the stage of interest, Lia then adjusts herself and her behavior by exploring other sources about ISIS, as illustrated in stage number 2. Throughout 2015, she began to dig deeper into ISIS through YouTube videos and websites. In response to her parents' persuasion to leave for Syria via Turkey, Lia finally followed her mother and father at the end of December 2015.

Lia lived in Tuki from 2015 to 2017. There, she often attended studies whose ultimate goal was the same as her father's: to go to Syria and defend ISIS. Her father often referred to this concept as "hijrah." An illustration of the circulation of intermediaries that Lia received while in Turkey can be illustrated in stage number 3. The intermediaries circulated at this stage are as follows:

Table 4: Classification of Intermediaries in Lia's Moment of Translation

Type of Intermediary	Contents	Circulation Room
Direct face-to-face messaging	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Definition of jihad • Definition of hijra • How to enter and pass immigration to Syria • The importance of jihad and martyrdom • Hadiths about the coming of the sign of the end times • Depiction Syria as the place the mostperfect place for Muslims 	ISIS Community Camp in Turkey (Makor)

Despite being involved in meetings and studies in Turkey, researchers did not find indicators of success from enrollment to mobilization in Lia. Lia has not been assigned a role and cannot represent the network as a whole. She also admitted that she believes in ISIS only as an ideology, not as an actor who implements actions.

"My understanding of ISIS matured when I was in Turkey. I was also interested in how beautiful Muslim life was in Syria. However, my acceptance was only limited to ideology, not action, especially acts of terror." - (Lia, personal communication, July 28, 2023)

After she returned to Indonesia, he was arrested along with other members of the Villa Mutiara network in 2021. Based on the results of the previous ANT analysis, the three women former ISIS sympathizers experienced varying translation stages in the networks they entered. Sabrina is a woman who experienced perfect translation from problematization to mobilization. Meanwhile, Aza experienced a moment of problematization with enrollment. On the other hand, Lia only experienced the translational stage of problematization to interesement. The translational stage then changes them from having no attachment or belief in ISIS to someone who believes

and is even loyal to ISIS. The translational stage can occur due to something that is circulated to actors in the network. The thing that is rolled out is then referred to as an intermediary.

Each network that the interviewees entered had a different circulation pattern of intermediaries. Sabrina initially interacted with Bahrin Naim's network as a Blogspot and received problematization in the importance of Muslims waging war against evil. Meanwhile, Aza received problematization through Aman Abdurrahman's network in the form of a Telegram channel in the form of the importance of the concept of Islamic State. Finally, Lia received problematization in the form of the importance of "hijrah" to Syria and the establishment of an Islamic state directly through her father, who entered the Villa Mutiara network. The initial intermediary (problem) then continues to circulate along with the three women who further explore the understanding given in the initial phase. Sabrina explored the spirit of war, Aza looked for other sources about Islamic State, and Lia tried to find other sources about ISIS and how important Syria is as a Muslim country. The adjustment of the three women increased the number of intermediaries circulated to them (described in phase 3). This circulation of intermediaries aims to stabilize the network and allow the actors within it to share roles.

According to (Sonny Yuliar, 2009), a mandate bearer, message forwarder, or other roles in the network indicates the enrollment moment's success. This can be seen in the case of Sabrina and Aza. After passing through phases 1-2, Sabrina played a role as a financial supporter in the network. She was also able to become a spokesperson for her network's mission, where she could declare herself on social media as someone who would defend Islam through fighting with ISIS (Sabrina, personal communication, June 26, 2023). Meanwhile, Aza was able to become a messenger for her Islamic State beliefs, even if only to those closest to her. Aza eventually became involved in the "fighting the target" support at Mako Brimob in 2018 (Aza, personal communication, July 10, 2023). However, researchers did not find a moment of mobilization in Aza because the authorities immediately detained her after being involved in her first role. Lia did not see the division of roles because she did not have an earnest desire to be involved in ISIS actions after returning to Indonesia. Not long after arriving, the development of the translation to enrollment and mobilization did not have time to occur in the Mutiara Villa network because she and other members were arrested first by Densus 88.

The results also show how technology is not just a communication tool that humans fully control but also has agency. The three women exposed to terrorism received intermediary circulation through social media. Sabrina received intermediaries from stages 1 to 4 through Facebook and Telegram. Meanwhile, Aza received intermediary circulation from Telegram and WhatsApp. Finally, although Lia received initial intermediaries from her family, she still sought other sources such as YouTube and websites. According to ANT's view, this phenomenon can also be explained as the nature of the network described in the sociotechnogram where the entities in the network cannot only be distinguished as humans or tools but are a unity that can ultimately lead to action (Sonny Yuliar, 2009). In the case of female terrorism in Indonesia, the network encourages women to commit acts of terrorism. However, the network that can push women to action comprises humans and non-humans who circulate intermediaries.

Starting from phase 1 in the form of problematization to phase 3, which produces women with beliefs in ISIS, actors in the network explore each other's competencies, adjust to ideas, and have different degrees of acceptance. Finally, women in terrorist networks reach the moment of mobilization, as exemplified by Sabrina. She finally became ready to blow herself up in 2016. Aza was ready to travel from Bandung, West Java, to Jakarta to engage in support against the *thogut* (something that is worshipped besides Allah) at Mako Brimob. These women passed all of this through a translational process within their respective networks.

4. Conclusion

Through the results and discussion above, it can be concluded that the ISIS network has a role in encouraging female terrorism in Indonesia. In the network formed by the existence of ISIS, there is a translational process consisting of 4 stages: problematization, interessement, enrollment, and mobilization, which ultimately transforms women who initially had no trust in ISIS into figures loyal to al-Baghdadi. However, the translational stages experienced by women former ISIS sympathizers tend to vary. In ANT analysis, the ISIS network

consists of human and non-human units. The non-human unit in the network is technology, specifically social media, which has the agency to translate human actors. The social media that dominate the intermediary circulation of the interviewees are Facebook and Telegram. Through these two media, the ISIS network and its intermediaries grow to bring women increasingly tied to the network.

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