



Journal of Social and Political Sciences

Ltipalei, Jonathan, Kivuva, Joshua M., and Jonyo, Fred O. (2020), The Contextualization of the Nilotic Pastoralist Conflicts in Northern Kenya. In: *Journal of Social and Political Sciences*, Vol.3, No.1, 129-151.

ISSN 2615-3718

DOI: 10.31014/aior.1991.03.01.154

The online version of this article can be found at:
<https://www.asianinstituteofresearch.org/>

Published by:
The Asian Institute of Research

The *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* is an Open Access publication. It may be read, copied, and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license.

The Asian Institute of Research *Social and Political Sciences* is a peer-reviewed International Journal. The journal covers scholarly articles in the fields of Social and Political Sciences, which include, but not limited to, Anthropology, Government Studies, Political Sciences, Sociology, International Relations, Public Administration, History, Philosophy, Arts, Education, Linguistics, and Cultural Studies. As the journal is Open Access, it ensures high visibility and the increase of citations for all research articles published. The *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* aims to facilitate scholarly work on recent theoretical and practical aspects of Social and Political Sciences.



ASIAN INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH
Connecting Scholars Worldwide



The Contextualization of the Nilotic Pastoralist Conflicts in Northern Kenya

Jonathan Ltipalei¹, Dr. Joshua Kivuva², Prof. Fred O. Jonyo³

¹Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Kenya

²Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Kenya

³Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Kenya

Correspondence: Jonathan Ltipalei, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Kenya, Mobile, Email: lodompuij@gmail.com

Abstract

This article gives a critical look at the genesis of protracted conflict in northern Kenya but more specifically among the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu Nilotic pastoral communities. To achieve this, the article progresses as follows; first, the chapter discusses the communities involved in the conflict. These are the Turkana, the Pokot and the Samburu. Second, the article discusses traditional cattle raiding and the role of age in the conflict sets paying special attention to the institution of Moranism. Lastly, the article discusses traditional coping mechanisms that have been employed throughout generations followed by how this ‘normal’ raiding was transformed with the advent of the British rule and the independent state to become a deadly affairs where lives are lost and properly destroyed.

Keywords: Conflict, Morans, Nilotes, Northern Kenya, Pastoralists

1. Introduction

Northern Kenya has in the past witnessed numerous cattle raids. These raids are widely believed to have increased after 1990, an escalation which was attributed to a variety of factors including resource scarcity (Dyson-Hudson, 1966; Ocan, 1992) and the criminal nature of the post-colonial state (Knighton, 2003). For the longest time the Turkana, Pokot and the Samburu communities in Northern Kenya have been perpetrators and victims within a cycle of conflict that has claimed lives and destroyed property.

The conflict among these communities has been attributed to many factors such as; celebration of a culture of heroism that elevates the social status of raiders, the decline of the role community elders play in the management of raids, competition over scarce and diminishing water and pastures for their animals, marginalization by successive governments and little presence of state security. Among these communities conflict can be seen as a cycle of revenge killings and cattle raids that often starts with *Morans* from one community raiding a rival community. Consequently, this spirals into attacks and counter attacks that after a while leads to long periods of hostilities punctuated by series of massacres. But has the conflict within these

communities been existence always as it is today? The answer is no. There has been a drastic change from normal tribal conflict through communal cattle rustling to a deadly warfare involving armed Morans from these communities.

1.1 Nilotic Pastoralists

There are three Nilotic Pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya, namely the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot. Other Pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya are the Rendille, Borana, Gabra and Somali, who are Cushitic pastoralists. According to Roberts and Bainbridge (1963), the Cushitic Pastoral communities largely live in North Eastern Kenya and their Pastoral life revolves around the Camel due to the harsh environmental conditions in the region. The study further asserts that the Nilotic Pastoralist are predominantly cattle keepers.

There are major differences between the Cushitic and Nilotic Pastoralist. The Cushitic Pastoralist are light skinned and does not embrace Moranism while Nilotic Pastoralist are of dark skin with long limbs and with a standing Army of foot soldiers called Morans. It is this institution of Moranism among the Nilotic Pastoralist that makes escalation of conflict intermittent in Northern Kenya because the unfinished cattle raids assignments are handed over from one Moran age set to the next. The practice inculcates the need for conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralist intermittent and complex particularly when either internal or external conflict triggers are pressed.

2. Contextualizing the conflict: The parties involved

2.1. The Turkana

The Turkana people are estimated to be 800 000 within Kenya, accounting for around 2% of the entire Kenyan population as per the 2009 census. They are found predominantly in Turkana County. Being pastoralists, their primary commodities are livestock such as cattle, goats, camels, and sheep. They thus heavily rely on following the rains and tend to migrate from one location to another moving in temporary camps. Age is a key factor in the organizational structure of Turkana society, and commonly there is a generational structure of leadership with elders taking the helm in mediating disputes and directing trade defense. Authority is generally decentralized and while there are clan leaders, small communities generally decide collectively on actions to take. For defense purposes, enforcement is generally granted to village Morans and their age-mates (Mathew & Boyd, 2014). Although historically there has been a warrior sect of Turkana society, increasingly. This role has become increasingly voluntary for purposes of raiding which is generally a large-scale community effort.

There are two generation sets in the Turkana society, namely stone (*imuru*) and leopards (*eriat*) which alternate generations in each family. Generation-sets function as groups only during initiation or other ceremonies and raids (Gulliver, 1955). Moreover, the entry into the age-set is determined at birth, and every male child become a member of the opposite age set of the father. One of the major functions of age-sets is raiding to acquire territory, pasture, water supply, and animals, as well as to protect these homesteads from external aggression. Morans are always ready to fight and defend homesteads, herds, pastures, and water points. Age-set systems are built on the basis of military activities for raiding to acquire stock and pasture and kill enemies. The study reiterates that the elders from clans and generation-sets are also asked to say traditional prayers at these events.

2.2. The Pokot

The Pokot people roughly number 512,690 according to census 2009 (KNBS, 2010). They inhabit the semi-arid plains of north of Lake Baringo, West Pokot and Tiaty sub county. They are mainly pastoralists keeping herds of cattle, camels and small stock of goats and sheep. The Pokots community is organized in similar fashion to the Turkana. The society is based on patrilineal heritage and is organized around a clan entity living in a village-style setting. The Pokot heavily rely on livestock and migratory patterns. Again, age is an important

organizational structure and a generational top-down approach is manifested in many aspects. The Pokot community is governed by a series of age-sets. Group membership is determined through the age at which one undergoes initiation. For young men this is done at around the age of twelve and at the onset of menarche (Wanjala, 1997).

According to Thomson (1884), after an encounter with the Pokot wrote that the Pokot were strong-boned fellows who went absolutely naked. He described them as very uncontrollable and generally quite a match for the Maasai or Samburu, in whose country they frequently made raids for livestock. Conflict in the Pokot community has been mainly attributed to the cultural concept of “we” and “they”. The Pokot people have no word or term for a visitor. Anybody who is not a *Pochon*- one of them is described as an enemy. This is used to differentiate an insider “we” Pokots and the non-Pokots “they”. Due to this perception, therefore, all the cows belong to “us” insiders and not to “them” outsiders. This is also embedded in their myth of creation story which has it that God created the first Pokot man and gave him the cattle. They usually use this kind of explanation to justify cattle rustling. They don’t regard cattle rustling as an act of stealing since they believe that they are bringing them back to where they belong.

For the Pokot, raiding livestock from enemies has been an integral aspect of their culture and they claim the practice has existed from time immemorial. For as far as can be traced back in the national archives, the Pokot and surrounding neighbors, most notably the Samburu and Turkana, have been raiding each other on a regular basis, at least since the end of the 19th century. The Pokot therefore generally refer to themselves as an isolated group that is surrounded by enemies (Bollig, 2006). Historically, this led to the ideological belief that in order for them to survive, they have to conceal their identity through adopting cultural characteristics of their neighbors.

2.3. The Samburu

The Samburu are a Nilotic-speaking people originating in Sudan but most closely resembling the Maasai in terms of subsistence and cultural traditions to an extent that 98% of their language is shared between the two groups (Sommer & Vossen, 1993). They are nomadic pastoralists living in presently Samburu County and they rely most heavily on milk production from cattle and small stock (sheep and goats). Paul Spencer’s *The Samburu* (1965) and *Nomads in Alliance* (1973) are regarded as vital works in providing the most comprehensive account of Samburu organization, traditions and practices despite the majority of Spencer’s fieldwork being conducted under colonial administration. Much has changed for the Samburu from the colonial period until now in terms of environmental conditions, political influences, development initiatives, and livelihood pursuits. However, Spencer’s work continues to stand as the major authority in describing Samburu age set systems, genealogies, and kinship relationships.

Up to now, most Samburu remain pure pastoralists. However, there are agro-pastoralist areas found around the Maralal highlands where there are higher levels of precipitation. Samburu herds tend to have high numbers of small stock but the cow remains the most precious inclusion in the herd. However, due to an overall reduction in grass-cover and other grazing fodder, along with the cow’s high dependence on water, the number of cows in the herd have decreased substantially over the last generation.


Male Samburu youths remain children until the age of circumcision (between 14 and 15 years old). After this rite of passage, taken with other youth members of the same clan, the initiated age-set is collectively responsible of protecting their ethnic group’s livestock and personal safety. For this reason, all *Morans* carry weapons (knives, spears, or Arrows). High labor demands are placed on the Morans as they are required to herd animals far from home territory areas when the environmental conditions require substantial migrations in search of pasture and water. However, during rainy periods, the Morans are able to return to their home areas where they will be at leisure. Moran spend this free time singing and dancing in the evenings with young ladies from their area where the subject matter of these songs range from the re-telling of battles to where Morans have travelled during the

dry season to acts of bravery or praise for animals. The Moran age-set period ends when the new *Moran* age-set is ready to take its place, and the current Morans begin to marry when they reach approximately 26 to 30 years old.

3. Genesis of the Nilotic Pastoralist Conflicts

Between the Samburu and the Pokot, the conflict is bedeviled with territorial, livestock, murder, attempted murder and kidnapping claims and counter claims. According to Pokots the conflict between them is traced from Uasin Gishu when Samburu and East Pokot bulls fought resulting into a Samburu bull breaking the front leg of the Pokot's bull. This incidence infuriated the Pokot bull owner who demanded compensation from the Samburu. Consequently he was given a heifer. This incident marked the historical origin of the conflict between the two communities.

Between the Pokot and the Turkana, much of the existing literature is recent and biased that their relationship has always been conflictual. Lamphear (1992) speculates the Pokot and the Turkana were allies as they frequently combined to raid the Samburu to push them further south of Lake Turkana and must have come together to push the Samburu again from the Kerio Valley (Lamphear, 1992). The expulsion of the Samburu from Kerio Valley allowed the Pokot to descend from the hills to the valley they presently occupy. Lamphear further indicates that there was active trade between the two communities. In particular, the Turkana Keebotok (considered a poor clan) played a middlemen role between them. By 1900, there was considerable cultural exchange, linguistic and economic affinities. Many Pokot and Turkana became bilingual, a fact which misinformed colonial observers who mistook Suk for Turkana language (Barton, 1957). Johnson (1904) indicates that there was increased intermarriage between the Pokot and Turkana to the extent that the two communities could almost be described as one people. In the process, the Pokot adopted the *sapana* from the Karimojong a song and baboon dance from the Turkana. Colonial administrators' interests rudely punctured this beneficial exchange between the Pokot and Turkana since the British were determined to bring the Turkana under their control (Johnson, 1904). They used the Pokot to stop the Turkana's southward expansion. The settler community deprived the Pokot of grazing land, hence forced them to move nearer to the Turkana, leading to more frequent conflicts over limited resources.



Map 1: Traditional Raiding patterns between the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu Communities

3.1. Traditional Cattle Raiding

Cattle's raiding is a very old cultural practice that has been in existence for generations among Nilotic pastoralist of Northern Kenya. The practice has been defined as forceful attack by an 'outside group' whose main objective is stealing cattle rather than seeking territorial expansion. The 'theft' is culturally accepted and is carried out by groups of young male Morans who engage in the practice as part of the societal requirement for achieving manhood as well as in response to symbolic and economic motives. Raiding also occurs in retaliation to prior attacks in order to (re)acquire stolen stock or simply to intimidate enemy groups (Mulugeta & Hagmann, 2008). Customarily, raiding was done under very strict traditional control and raided cattle were to serve three key motives. Firstly, the raiding had a social and economic purpose of creating a better economic base and enhancing one's social status in the society. Secondly, it served the motive of territorial control of grazing areas which subsequently led to an entrenched position of the stronger group. Lastly, it had a motive of increasing one's herd as insurance against unexpected misfortunes such as drought, famine, and cattle epidemics.

Traditionally, raiding among pastoral societies had three main objectives. It had a social and economic base. An individual without livestock could not actively participate in the socio-political affairs of the society. Secondly, there was competition for grazing land and water. Due to scarcity or dwindling of resources as a result of overpopulation or adverse climatic changes, some groups are forced to move their livestock to territories that belong to other ethnic groups or clans and this led to conflicts. Thirdly, there are survival strategies. Loss of cattle could lead to raids which was one of the options of replenishing depleted herds. Similarly, raids could be undertaken as means of increasing one's stock as an insurance against unforeseen calamities. In other words, cattle wars constituted a communal response to natural calamities (Ocan, 1992).

Traditional raids had very limited economic gains in comparison with the more certain and peaceful mathematics of natural growth. Formal raiding acknowledged the emergence of a new age-set. The raids were shaped by numerous sets of taboos and restrictions. The raids were planned openly and the raided animals were usually distributed among the members of the clan or age-set. Historically, cattle raiding involved the entire society. It would begin with a consultation of seers, elders, renowned Morans and women to establish whether or not it was possible for a raid to be carried out. There was communal responsibility and reverence for the different roles played by different groups in the manyattas and kraals for the wellbeing of the society. For instance, before a raid, seers would be consulted for information on issues of rituals, timing, and routes to be followed. The Elders would perform all the required rituals (Almagor, 1979). The women also played a very important role of blessing the Morans and preparing the special meat that they took with them. Spies and guides would also be raised from the manyattas and kraals and the entire community would offer their support thus having a direct influence on the planning and implementation of all cattle raids.

Likewise, the returns would be shared by all members of the community as raided animals were amalgamated into the joint herds and everyone benefited from the proceeds. The Morans were particularly supposed to reciprocate by killing a bull for the elders as some form of pay back (taxes) to the elders for blessing the raid. The bulls were killed for the elders to feast on. Younger people say that sometimes the elders could withhold their blessings at the onset of a raid but readily share in the spoils of the raid once it was successful.

The raids were also integral to the cultural requirements for boys to demonstrate courage as they pass through the rites of passage to be declared men. Elders talk about the kind of special body tattoos that a Moran who kills several people in battle with enemies is decorated with and as such is considered as a great warrior. The more tattoo marks a warrior obtains, the more popular and respected he becomes in the community prompting more girls to will try to dance with him and want to marry that warrior. On the other hand, the men who grow to maturity without such body tattoos are ridiculed in the community prompting them to go on raiding expeditions so as to kill the enemy and earn respect, and prove that they are not useless men in the society. Girls and women normally sing war songs to praise successful Morans and ridicule those who have not raided a single cow or goat. Girls only choose to dance with brave Morans during the evening beer party or at the traditional festive dancing parties; the undecorated men are shunned and verbally abused as cowards.

Therefore, unique to this period, survival was the primary motive for cattle raiding, closely followed by factors such as maintaining group solidarity or accumulating prestige. Other socio-political reasons such as providing an opportunity for young men to prove their manhood were more of motivational factors. Redistributive raiding served to rebuild herds of cattle depleted by drought, diseases, and raids or serve the needs of marriage and rituals (Mkutu, 2008). Cattle raiding assumed a redistributive function as a traditionally recognized way of reallocating pastoral resources between rich and poor herders which has and have been an equally common feature of both intra- and inter-tribal relations (Dyson-Hudson, 1966; Lamphear, 1976). Through the diverse forms of engagements, cattle raiding served to rebuild herds after livestock have been devastated by drought or decimated by disease or seized in raids, and both the frequency and intensity of these happenings was often closely tied to climatic conditions and the prevailing state of the 'tribal peace'.

Key to raiding of this period was the concept of reciprocity. Historically, pastoral communities in Northern Kenya operated on communal grazing lands rather peacefully. Because grazing lands could only be used for several months of the year, arrangements on land sharing were made between communities. Reciprocal institutional arrangements were borne in which some communities allowed grazing on their lands during certain periods in return for grazing rights in neighboring regions (Ngaido, 2005). Reciprocity emerged as the key mechanism which enabled collective action among the pastoralist of Northern Kenya. However, with the onset of colonial land policies and the encroachment on pastoral grazing lands by administrative policies, reciprocity was interrupted. There could no longer be an internal guarantee of reciprocity.

Under the circumstances discussed above, raiding was traditionally managed within the context of the pastoralists' notion of a cattle being a communal property. The raiding operations by young Morans were sanctioned by elders and evolved according to strict rules governing preparation, engagement, disengagement and conflict resolution (Hendrickson, et al., 1998). Cattle's raiding was not perceived as stealing; instead, it was a social, economic as well as a heroic endeavor. This cultural practice was very important and was loaded with livelihood-enhancing functions. A warrior enhanced his status in society by acquiring wealth. The wealth in cattle which earned him a wife and reverence and above all, changed his social status. That is why pastoralists in Northern Kenya would never admit any fault as far as raiding is concerned (Knighton, 2005). The use of excessive violence especially against the elderly, women and children was taboo and socially intolerable. Raiding was more of a cultural prerequisite for the advancement of social, political and economic matters.

Rather than spark violence, traditional raiding contributed to the stability of the pastoral system as a whole. In the absence of any over-arching authority in pastoral society, raiding and other forms of warfare served to maintain separate identities and rule-governed relations between different groups as well as acting as a balance (Hendrickson, et al., 1998). From the above assertion it can be concluded that traditional raiding occurred within an acceptable social framework which was able to accommodate its excesses.

After independence, pastoralist communities in Kenya saw increasingly violent conflict with one another. Many scholars pinpoint the cause of these recurring conflicts to the fact that colonial administrators were pushing these ethnic communities out of their historical homelands to make room for farmland (Murunga & Nasong'o, 2007; Kanyinga, 2009). Consequently, these communities now found themselves fighting over new territories where they were often at odds with the previous inhabitants. Notably, the Turkana and Pokot communities adapted to these colonial policies by adopting 'transhumance forms of pastoralism' in which they generally abandoned a nomadic lifestyle for themselves but maintained nomadic herding of cattle (KHRC, 2010). This adaptation shifted the battlegrounds from the communities themselves to the grasslands on which the cattle were grazed; the rustling of livestock thus increased.

3.2. Discipline and the Age-set system

Whereas cattle raiding involved considerable use of force, the organization of the age-sets that nurtured warrior groups functioned like contemporary military formations that train disciplined military personnel. Military discipline here refers to a special form of principles that govern relations in the age - set system. Usually the conduct of the members of the forces is regulated by special rules delineating required standards of behavior as stipulated in the regulations and orders of commanders (superiors) and reflecting the specific features of the state (Spencer, 1973).

Inclusion in age-set is not necessarily a question of chronological age. Younger men could sometimes be initiated ahead of older ones because of greater physical maturity or for some other approved reasons. Sometimes members of the same age-set were never initiated together in the same year. The ceremonies are held for small groups, in their own neighborhood at an appropriate time and when the required sacrificial beasts can be offered. When an age-set is initiated, it may not adopt a name already in use by a superior generation set while any member of that set is still living. This is out of respect for those still living or it might be out of fear that some hurt or harm (violence) might follow, that is, out of superstition (Pazzaglia, 1982).

Therefore, the society through elders has proper means of controlling cattle raiding and limiting any excesses young men who would be tempted to engage in raiding. The elders do this in two ways; First is the religious way – which involves the elders taking control over the significant rituals linked to raiding itself and those that attend to the age-class system that defined the young men's rites of passage. Since the spiritual wellbeing of the society rests in their age old wisdom and links to the supernatural, they can make threats of a curse which is greatly most feared. Secondly, given the fact that cattle are collectively owned by families, the management of wealth falls directly on the authority of the elders who control the flow of wealth in the

community and their sons desire to get married (Lamphear, 1998; Knighton, 2005). The age-set organization provides the groups with the principles for political or military behavior. They are able to take corporate action by sanctioning a specific class to wield authority and exert obedience in public matters (Dyson-Hudson, 1966). Traditionally, control of the behavior of Morans was exercised within the age-set system. The Morans have a king in every age – set for disciplinary control and maintaining law and order as stipulated in the cultural values. And the society was able to control these young men whom they organized to move together through social roles as well as arming them to defend the society and its resources. In addition, it inculcated in them “the ‘queue discipline’ which encouraged young men to wait their turn, entailing group solidarity, communal brotherhood, and obedient deference until such time as they enter a new role where individual acquisitiveness and differentiation are the norm (Lamphear, 1998). Pastoral societies were always confronted with the problem of safeguarding internal peace and harmony which included persistently fighting enemies and raiders from other groups. For this reason a disciplined standing force was always required. Hence a sense of group consciousness and an almost constant condition of physical and emotional readiness to fight in defense of the society was imparted in the Morans. Additionally, they were armed, high discipline was necessary to keep them in check lest they go on the rampage and spread disorder in the society (Lamphear, 1998).

3.3 Moranism

Moranism remains one of the most enduring aspects and tradition of pastoralists in Northern Kenya. Moranism is the social tradition among pastoral communities that involves the admission of young men into warrior-hood. The title of Moran has been conceived by some scholars as a metaphor for heroism due to the military and aesthetic exploits Morans are famed for. Traditionally, moranism was primarily meant to promote comradeship, self-esteem, courage, strength, perseverance, self-sacrifice and adventurism in young men (Almagor, 1979). While examining the role of Morans, Ndagala (1991) noted that Morans, among others, serve as the military wing of the community by keeping vigil against cattle raiders and wild animals preying on their cattle. They were socially-wired to believe that their foremost duty was to defend the community and their livestock. The defense and military like responsibility bestowed on the Morans demanded of them to exercise utmost perseverance, courage, glamour and freedom (Ndagala, 1991). These Morans were urged to kill fierce animals and even in extreme cases in some communities a human being as a sign of their bravery and courage. Such courageous and heroic acts would be marked by bodily tattoos carefully crafted on the body of the warrior for every killing committed. Through the socialization that elevates courage, bravery and heroism, Moranism became the most adored institution by the young boys to an extent that each of them looks up to the time they will become Morans.

Mburu (2002) asserts that the art of tattooing, which portrays one as a raiding maestro, exacerbates the unrelenting desire to kill those branded as enemies. Tattooing is an element of the quest of heroism and “pet-naming”. Pet names are associated with having big bulls and killing enemies. Special warrior names distinguish one from the rest of the men in the society. Constant reference and praise of heroes in meetings and cultural festivals encourages others to engage in raiding and in other acts of lawlessness as a way of emulating or surpassing the prowess of heroes. In Turkana county, raiding has traditionally been part of the ritual process by which young men proved they were ready for manhood (Mkutu, 2007). In addition, ‘the status of a warrior is determined once a man has killed his first enemy – an event he will mark by notching a scar on his right shoulder or chest (Masinde, et al., 2004). Among many pastoralist communities and especially the Turkana and Pokot people, youths are generally entrusted with implementation of the decisions of the elders and the security of the community. Extensively encouraged by a composition of anecdotes and proverbs, music, dance and drama, the youth execute this task at whatever cost.

Inevitably, this provokes counter revenge from the opponent party. Among the pastoralists, men are considered to be the breadwinners for their families. In times of scarcity, men must replenish food supplies through any means, which is not limited to raiding. Raiding is in fact considered by the society as the first option. Livestock rustling is believed to be the most direct way to wealth accumulation because livestock occupies such a central

place among pastoralists. Social status being determined by the number of livestock in one's possession. Those without cattle are rebuked as poor and enticed to raid other communities to overcome their condition. Rites of passage/ initiation ceremonies elevates a youth to an elder of a special age set are an entitlement to all men but they are only possible for those who have cattle. The need to go through this rite encourages those without cattle to go raiding to get cattle to undergo it. Without that ceremony, one becomes a laughing stock in the community. Every successful raid is accompanied by a traditional ceremony of "*Lokwa*" (Bull killed by the youth for the elders as a thanks giving for further blessings and for success in upcoming raids).

The significance attached to traditional institutions meant the community ensured that Morans were properly and adequately guided on their current and future roles. Consequently, the role of elders was very important. Social order hinged on the respect the Morans had for the elders. Buttressing such respect was Samburu community's belief in the curse of elders. Morans feared that disobedience would spell curse on them which served as deterrence to any wayward behavior (Baxter, 1993).

4. Pastoral Communities Conflict Coping Mechanisms

In Semi-Arid areas, pastoralists have to have a number of coping mechanisms. First, a high degree of mobility and open utilization of communal grazing land is of a vital importance. Herds can be moved away from unproductive to more productive lands (Bollig & Göbel, 1997). Movement for this purpose can be generally characterized as residing in wet season areas that lack permanent water supplies when rainfall allows the exploitation of these areas followed by an increased rate and range of movement during the dry season/at times of resource scarcity in search of perennial water sources and available grazing (Angassa & Beyene, 2003). Mobility not only allows for the use of productive tracts of land and water but it also enables previously-inhabited land to rest and recover after utilization which is an essential component of successful rangelands management (Oba & Lusigi, 1987; Cossins & Upton, 1988). With correct management, mobile pastoralism has been proven to be more economically profitable and productive than classical ranching models within paddocked and sedentarised areas (Behnke, 1994). Dyson-Hudson (1980) noted that, as a strategy, mobile herding is a favorable coping response to resource scarcity as it does not require a large capital investment nor high inputs of fuel energy neither does it entail the transference of foods suitable for human consumption into supporting livestock.

A second coping mechanism employed by pastoralists is accumulating herd stocks by effectively creating an insurance policy against drought extremes which often results to large herds of cattle dying. Coughenour et al., (1985) explain that accumulation allows for the keeping of large numbers of breeding females necessary for food requirements as it simultaneously allows for breeding herds to remain intact during scarcity periods so that when conditions once again become favorable. Herders are more able to rebuild herds close to pre-crisis numbers (Coughenour, et al., 1985). Accumulation for pastoralists in East Africa is vital; a place where livestock off-take due to the effects of drought can diminish herds by estimates of more than half (McCabe, 1985) and such devastation has the possibility of affecting herd numbers, particularly of breeding females, for up to ten years (Dahl & Hjort, 1976).

A third coping mechanism is building strong social networks through interethnic marriage. Far-reaching social networks allow alliances to be called upon in times of individual hardship (Almagor, 1979; Sobania, 1988). The result of these reciprocal relationships allows for affected parties to 'borrow' livestock from others in order to replenish breeding stocks after disturbances or to readily move animals into more productive pastures during times of environmental distress. Dyson-Hudson (1966) has estimated that maintaining social networks effectively opens up four or five times the amount of space within a pastoral territory than one herder would have access to if he were managing his herd in isolation (Dyson-Hudson, 1966).

Elders and conflict management institutions are another coping mechanism. Given a motivation to limit conflict, traditionally the ability of the elder age-set to act as an effective conflict management institution relied on three main sources of authority: control of access to resources/marriage; being part of a large cross-clan, cross-ethnic,

cross-generation network; and, supernatural legitimacy (Gulliver, 1955; Spencer, 1973). One customary means that they used to prevent or manage prevented or managed conflict was the neutralization of raiding rewards. In Turkana, raided cattle could only be given to a related elder as a gift or sold to buy weapons, and were not allowed to be used to build up a raider's own herd. Further, the raiders were prohibited from marrying abducted girls. The bride-wealth was smaller for a fostered daughter and not likely to be available to the raider in time to affect his chances to start an independent life. The prestige gained from raiding could not be converted into strengthened individual status or into an improved group position in the age system (Almagor, 1979).

4.1. Masculinity and the Associated Stereotypes

It should be taken into account that pastoralism remains the foremost source of livelihood to most inhabitants of Northern Kenya. It should further be noted that all aspects of pastoral social and economic life are ordered in relation to livestock and the environment in which they live. To this extent, cattle does not only hold central value among most communities in Northern Kenya but also forms the basis of association in a complex of social, political and religious institutions. Possession of adequate livestock therefore remains one of the most aspirations of the inhabitants of the region. While inheritance and purchase are the only non-conflictual ways of owning livestock in the village, these avenues while appreciated, do not ensure ownership of adequate livestock. Further, they do afford the Morans the opportunity to express their masculinity. Cattle raiding are thus preferred not only as a means of acquiring adequate livestock but also an opportunity for the Morans to express their masculine-bravery, courage and related revered virtues.

Traditions, cultural songs and dances carried from one generation to another highlight the existence and significance of cattle raiding in Samburu community with other pastoral communities being no exception. Although the practice of cattle raiding has evolved over the years, it was understood in the traditional sense. The practice was considered to be a deeply entrenched cultural practice where young men would steal livestock as a means of re-stocking or acquiring more heads of cattle for various purposes which included raising enough animals for the payment of dowry or as a show of heroism and/or a means to wealth enhancement. In cases of theft, injury or death, there may be significant cultural pressure for youth to engage in revenge attacks. Failure by the Morans to avenge these deaths or injuries was interpreted as an act of cowardice and such men would even be shunned by potential girlfriends or wives. At the extreme end, they would be cursed and ostracized by the elders. Morans in their effort not to be seen as traitors would often engage in revenge attacks. It is adherence to such cultural norms and desire to express their masculinity that is primarily responsible for not only the escalation of conflicts but also cycles of violent conflict in northern Kenya.

Beading was yet another cultural practice in Samburu community that Morans used to express their masculinity. Beading involves Samburu Morans giving specialized beads to an uncircumcised young girl to signify the commencement of a sexual relationship with the girl. Some of these girls could be as young as 14 years. Morans would often approach the girl's mother and brothers who in most cases are also Morans. Once the relationship is agreed, the girl's mother builds a hut for the couple called a '*singira*' where the Moran will have access to the girl for sex. Most of these negotiations are done often at the total exclusion of the girl. Elders for example argue that beading reduces conflict between them and Morans because it provides Morans with sexual partners and prevents them from seducing the elders' wives. Similarly, Morans observe that the practice reduces conflict amongst themselves since it prevents intra-conflicts emanating from seducing the same potential sexual partners.

Although beading was ostensibly done to reduce conflicts between the Morans and the elders and between Morans themselves, closer examination of this practice reveals otherwise. The practice has in away emboldened the Morans to run roughshod on the girls. Morans have increasingly become violent towards girls if the accounts of girls that have undergone through the practice is anything to go by. There are numerous accounts of relatively elderly women who had been beaded as a young girl (*Surmelei*), describing the fact that the Moran beat them up whenever they went against what he wanted done. Several women described the fact that because of beating by the Moran who had beaded them they ran away and ultimately their families returned the beads rather than return

the girl to an abusive relationship. Equally, women described the fact that if Samburu girls refuse to be beaded, they will sometime be beaten by their mothers and brothers who have made the arrangement. Girls have also often described the practice as “torture” because they are forced to have sex while still young and because of the physical beatings they receive from the Morans (Spencer, 1973).

Beads that are used for these practices are very expensive and costs a lot of money that at times are beyond the reach of individual Moran. Such individuals have to be assisted to acquire sufficient beads to be used for beading. Where such assistance are lacking some Morans have to engage in cattle raids from neighboring communities to get cattle which they in turn, sell in order to raise money for the beads. Beading in this case increases conflicts between the community and its neighbors through organized cattle raids. From the forgoing, it is thus clear that beading has not resulted in reducing conflicts not even with the community as previously thought but has instead precipitated the gender-based and inter-community conflicts.

The institution of marriage was yet another important avenue that Morans have used to express their masculinity. Samburu Community is traditionally polygamous. This was thought to be a long standing and practical adaptation to high infant and warrior mortality rates. Most of the pastoral communities including the Samburu are yet to embrace modern demographic practices and trends and as such still perceive children as a source of wealth and insurance against old age. Consequently, many still consider polygamy as an important practice that guarantees them not only wives but also many children. Men with large families in the name of wives and children are highly valued hence the pressure to marry many wives.

While polygamy as a form of marriage and cultural practice is socially valued and approved among the pastoral communities including the Turkana and Pokot, the practice increases the potential for conflict. Men who wish to have several wives must engage multiple cattle raids so as to raise several heads of livestock not only as a bride price for their wives but also for their male children’s wives. The social prestige associated with polygamy may pressurize Morans to engage in unnecessary cattle raiding. Traditionally, all raids should first be approved by the elders but faced with this desire, young men often decide in secret and took action quickly without informing the elders of their intentions (Gulliver, 1951). Such raids may turn out to be large scale attacks typical of escalated conflict and all-out war that ordinarily require a degree of organization and mobilization that was only within the power of elders.

Polygamy as a cultural practice also increases the demand for land for settlement and grazing. The large family set up arising from polygamy requires huge tracks of land for settlement as well as for grazing the large herd acquired through cattle raiding and natural growth. Additionally, water is also needed by such families for their livestock. The fact that polygamy is preferred by most Morans implies that many of them will require large tracks of land and huge grazing fields for their livestock. This may lead to competition for land for settlement as well as pasture resulting in both intra and inter-community conflicts as each polygamous family tries to acquire as much land as possible for their settlement and grazing. Although access and utilization of land was regulated by the elders, Morans are increasing defying elders on this role and have thus engaged in self-acquisition of land, a move that has not only strained the relationship between them and the elders but also between them and other members of the community.

The desire to become a successful warrior has also contributed to the escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya. The social recognition individuals receive for conflict participation can be enormous. Successful Morans may receive honorific chest scars denoting the kills made, be entitled to a new name indicating their success in war, wear special insignia, have songs sung about them, and gain the respect of their peers. Similarly, females and elders may also encourage aggression during raids by teasing or mocking individuals to participate in conflict especially if there has been unavenged raid against their group. The prestige and symbolic capital for successful raiders is still a powerful motive particularly amongst Morans who have no chance of social advancement through formal education. It should be noted here that the taboo-regulated traditional nature of cattle raids shunned the killing of members of the rival communities. Morans driven by desire for social recognition

normally disregard the rules of reciprocal raiding which prompt many to indulge in looting great numbers of livestock, deliberate killings and cruelty among other related prohibited raiding practices. While it is clear that Morans at times engage in violent behaviors that are not sanctioned by the community, the teachings that Morans get is the community's most respected in the institution of elders, which seeks to instill bravery and courage largely served to instill aggression and violence in the minds of the young men. This has made most Morans to prefer aggression and violence as the most convenient means of resolving disputes even if other peaceful means would have generated amicable solution to the problem in existence.

While such indulgence will aid the Morans in massaging their heroic ego, the danger is the emotions and desire for revenge that such indulgence generates from the raided community. This definitely leads to an escalation in both frequency and intensity whose likely outcomes are more loss of human lives, more animals being looted as well as the development of deeply rooted mistrust and hate between the warring parties. Further, such escalation causes disruption to the pastoral routine, because the young men stop tending the cattle in order to go to war, and because cattle are forced to graze in restricted areas due to the danger of hostilities (Almagor, 1979). Almagor points out 'that once a raid gets started there is no guarantee that the excited raiders will not commit excesses which may attract a large-scale retaliation' (1979). Ultimately, escalation is prompted by one group's perception that the raiding practices of the other group have become "excessive". Such increased raiding may result in a campaign which involves organized recruitment and strategic decision-making process. Inter-tribal co-operation ceases and daily social life and economic routines are disrupted hence a creation of an intermittent cycle of conflicts.

4.2. Pastoral Economy

Control of pastoral economy has been cited as a contributor to conflict escalation in Northern Kenya. It should be taken into account that pastoralism is the main source of livelihood in Northern Kenya thus making it the backbone of the region's economy. For a long time, pastoral economy used to be a monopoly of the elders. Elders own the livestock, control resources and dispose of marriages. The young are poor by definition to the point that should a young man inherit a herd and family responsibilities, he would become an "elder" regardless of his age (Baxter, 1979). Elders use different tactics to retain their foothold on the pastoral economy. For instance, they control cattle raiding, regulate access and use of pastoral resources such as grazing lands and watering points, as well as overseeing the distribution of livestock acquired through raids. While most of these interventions were important in preserving unity and cohesion in the community, some Morans increasingly perceived these as roadblocks placed on their way and are designed to confine them to perpetual poverty. For instance, it has been noted that while Morans are the ones who engage in the raids, a higher percentage almost 90% of the proceeds go to the elders, leaving hundreds of Morans with a paltry 10% to share amongst themselves (Baxter, 1979). The small herds of livestock left with hundreds of Morans to share imply that some of the Morans actually miss out despite risking their lives during the raids. Based on these perceptions of systematic exploitation, some Morans choose to ignore elders' role especially those relating to cattle raids and thus sought to engage in unsanctioned raids. In this light, raids may be seen as a form of competition for control over pastoral resources between the Morans and the elders.

An escalation of conflict through cattle raids causes economic disruption which damages the elders' position and prestige in society. When Morans raid other communities for livestock and the raided livestock are probably those belonging to the elderly in the other communities. In the event of counter-raids, there is a high likelihood that the elders of the raiding community will equally lose their livestock to the raiders. By virtue of their age and position Morans are likely to fiercely defend their newly acquired livestock thus leaving those belonging to the elders as the easy target. While there is strong evidence on this, Morans may capitalize on their rivalry with the elders and fail to offer protection to the elders' livestock thus exposing them to the raiders. Consequently, it weakens the elders economically as well as socially to the point of robbing them the prestige attached to the eldership. These political and economic transformations of the eldership disaggregate the attributes of the status of "elder". Political authority and economic control may thus become new forms of elder characterization. The

implication of this is that the social role of elder is not any more a prerogative of age. For instance, young people who are wealthy and have political authority may be regarded in the Samburu Community as elders.

Persistent and unrestrained intermittent conflict escalation occasioned by wealth and status inspired raids by Morans also has the potential of constraining elders' roles in peace making. The traditional peacemaking role of the elders was understood as the affirmation of the elders' interests as custodians of the inter-community co-existence. Elders are better placed to preside over peacemaking mechanism during in conflicts that they have full knowledge of and especially those that are occasioned by activities that they have sanctioned. However, it would be extremely difficult for elders to initiate peace between the Samburu and the neighboring communities over issues they are least informed about such as unsanctioned cattle raids. But failure by the elders to intervene could also be interpreted as their inability to exercise their institutional role of conflict management in the community while their intervention may also be seen as aiding wayward behavior among the Morans whose activities are largely for personal aggrandizement rather than collective interest. It is such half-hearted interventions on conflict situations that have contributed to strained relations between communities leading to revenge and counter-revenge missions.

The Morans' broader goal of challenging the inequality perpetrated by the elders who control a disproportionate share of community's resources and the elders' resolve to actively defend their advantages is what has led to the intermittent escalation of conflicts in the region. Morans' realization that their loyalty to the elders is not guided by any reasonable shared values but by the coercive powers of the elders' has inevitably led them to question the authority of the elders. Morans have used a variety of methods to defy elders' authority including engaging in unsanctioned raids, disobeying elders' authority over grazing areas and watering points and challenging the myth of elders' curse as a social control mechanism. Groups and individuals advance their own interests, struggling over control of societal resources. The result of this power struggle between Morans and elders has heightened the escalation of both inter-community and intra-community conflicts in Northern Kenya region.

4.3. Conflict Entrepreneurship

Some of the conflict situations in Northern Kenya are motivated by greed and lust for power and prestige rather than grievance. Community Morans or Morans are at times not necessarily heroes struggling for any collective or worthwhile cause rather they sometimes fight for their own selfish ends. Some of these young men pretend that they are public-spirited individuals fighting against some form of injustice, unfairness, marginalization or exclusion but in the real sense, they are simply people who feel that they will not do well without a conflict. They therefore generate one grievance or another conjured by massaging one form of prejudice, propaganda or blackmail. Such promoters and profiteers of conflict are often referred to as conflict entrepreneurs. The study defines conflict entrepreneur as an individual who profits from conditions that promote conflict to undermine efforts of good governance. This narrative partly captures the situation in Northern Kenya and other parts of the country.

Some of the conflict situations in Northern Kenya are increasingly being organized around wage-labour. For instance, an increase in 'commercial' raiding includes cases of 'sponsored' raiding where guns are provided to young men by wealthy people who wish to acquire livestock for sale. These markets are unconstrained by national frontiers and are largely controlled by people in positions of political power or with access to weapons (Hendrickson et al. 1998). The existence of conflict entrepreneurs has been exemplified by the emergence of conflicts in non-traditional areas. Traditionally, most of the conflicts in Northern Kenya revolved around pastoralism; cattle raiding, conflicts over grazing land and watering points. Recent years has, however, seen the emergence of conflicts between Morans and wildlife agencies. Morans have especially been accused of engaging in poaching, an area that was traditionally unheard of among pastoral communities. In Kenya, for example about 60 rhinos were killed for their horns in 2013, compared to 30 in 2012 (KWS, 2014). Some of the poaching activities have been reported in wildlife conservancies located in Kenya's Northern counties notably Laikipia, Samburu and even Turkana. Further, Morans have also engaged in banditry and high robbery some of which

have resulted to large scale inter-community conflicts. For instance, incidences of banditry, which ideally are caused by a few opportunistic Moran criminals easily transform into a full blown inter-ethnic conflicts. When such wayward Morans are being pursued by members of a different ethnic group or government security agencies for their criminal activities, they often seek refuge in their communities thereby transforming an individual's problem into a communal concern which usually leads to strained relations between the concerned parties.

Similar incidences have also been reported among the Turkana Morans. The most noticeable incident of opportunistic warrior raids occurred in Kainuk, when three armed Turkana Morans ambushed a truck driver resulting in the death of the driver and his assistant (Bevan, 2008). The bandits made way with valuables including cash. There were further evidence that Morans from the Turkana community often engaged in banditry directly or had their firearms hired for raiding and other criminal activities. Morans from Northern Kenya have also in the past been enrolled as fighters in conflicts across the border where they received military training and weapons that they usually keep if they survive and return. Meanwhile, deserters and ex-combatants drift into Kenya from the areas of fighting in neighboring countries, swelling the ranks of bandits or making a living as mercenaries or cheap fighters in commercial raids. Schlee (1989) reports that during the Ogaden war, it was common that young men pretended to want to join the guerrillas but once armed and trained in Somalia, returned to Kenya and gave themselves to banditry. According to Goldsmith (1997), Somali internal conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s had a direct effect on the rate of banditry in northern Kenya, including Tana River and Lamu.

A more robust conflict entrepreneurship, and which Morans and their equivalents in other northern Kenya communities is the arms and ammunitions trade. For instance, while a brand new AK-47; much coveted for its firepower and simplicity-, can be purchased from a Russian factory at 240 US Dollars. In certain parts of Africa including northern Kenya where supplies are plentiful, it can be bought for as little as between 13 and 30 USD (Controlarms, 2006: SAS 2009). There are also instances where arms sellers often supply weapons on credit, a practice that is seen as a form of investment and equated to the old practice of richer people "investing" a camel (for a young man with no camel to ride) in Saharan raids and caravans and taking part of the profit from the operation as payment (Goldsmith, 1997).

The deployment of Morans as Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) by the government to help it maintain law and order in Northern Kenya has also seen the institution of Moranism contribute to conflict escalation in the region. While the original intention to arm the Turkana and Samburu community against their hostile neighbors was very noble, the conversion of some Morans into KPRs appeared to have not been a wise move. It should be noted here that Morans are well trained persons who were already feared even when they were using traditional weapons to defend the community. Therefore, arming this already strong group meant that they became lethal and vicious in their attacks. Morans did not only use the arms issued to them for purposes of defending the community against external aggression but also employed the guns to purposes of expanding their territory beyond its traditional borders. For instance, with help of well-armed Morans, the Samburu community has annexed a constituency in Marsabit called Laisamis with an MP, a division in Isiolo County with two county representatives and a constituency in Laikipia County with an MP. Morans and junior elders have stationed themselves in newly acquired territories so as to ensure that the areas remain under the custody of the Samburu community. Although there has never been any violent conflict reported following these annexations, silent protests and disapprovals of these activities of the Morans loom large. The ongoing government crackdown of the illegal grazers in Laikipia an initiative aimed to curb a potential annexation attempt by the Pokot and Samburu Morans.

The institution of Moranism is being seen here to have opened new frontiers of conflict with their neighbors. Traditionally, conflicts between Samburu community and its neighbors centered on pastoralism especially cattle raiding, competition for pastoral resources such as water, pasture and livestock migration corridors. Politics as a resource is emerging as a new frontier for potential conflicts in Northern Kenya as Morans and their equivalents

in other communities will surely play pivotal role in these conflicts. The next face of these conflicts are likely to move away from control over political units such as constituencies and wards to demand for equitable sharing of political offices such as county executive positions at the county level and national government resources that go to their counties. Communities with well trained and equipped Morans may use such social capital to force their agenda and load on others who do not possess such a social set up. Counties such as Marsabit, Wajir and Laikipia have had many incidences of conflicts arising from competition for the county's political resources-appointments, allocation of resources among others. These conflicts have taken the dimension of inter-clan conflicts. The trail of human lives lost, property destroyed and human displacements left behind in the wake of these conflicts clearly show a well-organized and structured conflicts. Such organizations witnessed in these conflicts cannot be executed by persons without prior training. It is such organizations of these conflicts that fuel the suspicion that clan Morans have been used in these conflicts.

From the foregoing, it is clear that conflict in Northern Kenya is being seen by some Morans more as an opportunity to profit from and will thus do whatever it takes to sustain the conflicts in their determination to continue profiteering from the same. From the provision of their military labour, engaging in poaching to arms trade, some Morans have discovered the opportunity of wage labour that conflicts offer them. As they profit from these conflicts, the rest of the population have remained helplessness due to the diminishing opportunities in non-conflict areas. The emergence of local elites notably Morans that aim to profit from conflicts is a fairly new phenomenon that has changed the scope of the conflict by creating economic incentives that did not previously exist. This has exacerbated the brutality of conflict especially those associated with raiding and has created links between the illicit trades in stolen cattle and small arms.

5. The Advent of Colonialism and Post-Independence

Between 1885 and 1963, Kenya was under the 'protection' of the British administration. Morgan (1973) argues that for easier management, the British administration divided Kenya into three distinct regions: a highly developed White Highlands; a less developed nature lands which was a pool of cheap labor; and the frontier/pastoral zones that were out of bounds. The British were mainly interested in the 'White Highlands' (Morgan, 1973). According to Morgan (1973), the prime interest of the British in the 'white Highlands' was derived from a desire for transformation and intensification of crop production for export. The pastoral areas in Kenya were then seen by the British administration as areas where they could not develop reliable sources of strategic raw materials with which to supply their home industries. This was compounded by the distance of pastoral territories from the administrative center of the colonial powers. The pastoral areas were closed off and one needed a permit to travel there. Barber (1968) pointed out that the colonial government priority in pastoral areas was order rather than development. Left on their own, pastoralists suffered from negligence and lack of attention. They witnessed very little interaction with the other communities in Kenya, and development within their areas was only focused on preserving security and the culture of the community (Republic of Kenya, 1992).

Hendrickson, et al. (1998) argued that the isolation of the pastoralist people was generally because of the colonial government's mistrust of their lifestyle. The colonial government had a notion that pastoralists were politically unreliable and difficult to control, and therefore a threat to security. Furthermore, they were perceived as primitive, violent, and hostile towards change, and they lacked loyalty because of cross-border movements (Hendrickson, Armon, and Mearns, 1998). (Markasis (1993)) argues that the use of negative terms by the colonialists such as "uncontrollable" and "violent" was a way of creating an enemy image and using it as an ideological justification for counter aggression.

During this era, pastoralist in Northern Kenya suffered heavy losses in human life and destruction of property, and there was a complete disruption of their economy leaving many households impoverished (Lamphear, 1976; Barber, 1968). Lamphear (1992) describes the experiences as traumatic and devastating. Many were fired at from sight, and, on more than one occasion, they referred to themselves as wild animals hunted through the bush by the colonial government. Lamphear (1976) maintained that the imperial wars and punitive expeditions also

destroyed the existing institutional relationships amongst these groups, making the basis for inter-ethnic relations insecure. He further asserted that social security system of reciprocal assistance was completely disrupted. Due to such disruptions, the end of 1918, pastoralist in northern Kenya had lost nearly all their cattle, and as late as 1963, many had still not been able to rebuild their herds to former size (Barber, 1968; and Lamphear, 1976).

Further reports during the same period expressed the fear that the district was faced with the challenges of rapidly increasing human population and declining livestock numbers. Diseases and raids by the colonial troops were blamed for the depletion of the herds (Lamphear, 1976). Livestock diseases such as rinderpest and pleuropneumonia, which were unknown in the past, became a permanent scourge to the animal population during this period. By the mid-1920s, officers on the spot voiced concern that large captures had led to cases of human-induced starvation and hoped that the colonial policy towards pastoralists in the region would be reversed to avert a future economic crisis (Oba, 1992).

The colonial policy in relation to land use is of particular interest to the study, as the issue constitutes the major underlying causes for changes in livelihood strategies among pastoralist during the colonial era. Prior to the colonial rule, the laid tenure system was communal and that meant that no land boundaries separated the areas where the various communities lived or grazed their livestock herds. The Turkana had access to grazing lands of the Pokot, the Pokot to the Samburu land and vice versa (Lamphear, 1992). The situation drastically changed when the British colonial rule was enforced in the area. The British ratified borders, and embarked on policies which had profound ramifications for pastoralism. One policy prohibited pastoralists from crossing international borders. They created a no-man's land along the international frontiers. The idea was to make important pasture and water resources, which they depended upon during drought years, legally inaccessible (Oba, 1992). Lamphear (1976) reports that violators of these restrictions were punished by an instant fine of 20% of the total number of livestock found trespassing.

Fixed borders are alien to the pastoral mode of land use. The borders hinder free movement of pastoralists and livestock, and access to grazing land and water sources which are important during drought seasons (Spencer, 1983). Furthermore, the establishment of borders prohibited their movements between high and low seasons (Oba, 1992). Traditionally, pastoralists-maintained concessions over grazing and water rights, expecting reciprocal access when conditions were reversed. This important fact, though well-known, was ignored by the British administration (Turkana Development Annual Report, 1938).

These artificial boundaries imposed by the British to control human and capital livestock movements caused serious ecological problems in the region. Following the droughts of the 1930s and '40s, environmental degradation became a contentious issue in the whole of Northern Kenya. In efforts to rehabilitate the degraded range lands, the colonial government established controlled grazing schemes culminating in the first ten years development plan 1946- 1955 (Dietz, 1987).

According to Ocan (1992), colonialism made political relations in the area worse because as access to land shrunk and animal numbers and populations in restricted areas increased against available resources, acute competition for water and pasture between settlements became inevitable. Restricting movements meant that when animals of one group died, the only way to replenish stocks – the most natural and socially available to such levels of socio-economic and political formations – was cattle raiding. Ocan seems to concur with the fact that even before colonialism relations between neighboring pastoralists were already bad and therefore one cannot place the blame on colonialism for the cattle rustling conflict. However, colonialism made the situation worse (Ocan, 1992).

At independence in 1963, the Kenyan government realized the chronic conflict nature in pastoral areas of the north. A holistic development plan and strategies were therefore formulated for the areas recognizing the potential of livestock products for export and consumption (Republic of Kenya Annex Report, 1992). These measures saw some greater attention being focused on pastoral districts. However, these measures were still

limited. Policies to encourage pastoral production were only to be directed towards sedentary livestock production, a system not suited to climate and ecological conditions in pastoral areas (Brown, 1963; Dames, 1964). The measures also meant changing the pastoralists themselves, rather than the circumstances that surround their existence.

Characteristic to this post-independence period, conflict in Northern Kenya still had some resemblance of the traditional cultural conflict. Among the Samburu, guns available were the old Mark IV rifles, which were operated by Home guards, most of whom were for older men. Samburu Morans still preferred the more fashionable twin spears (*Mao*) in battles. The Turkana, on the other hand, had already started acquiring newer guns and other arms from the Sudanese SPLM, (Masinde, Adan, and Pkalya, 2004). Despite this, there was relative calmness in the North. The Samburu would graze as far west as Suguta valley as well as go for water at Lokalaale, a Turkana village. However, in 1962 Turkana from Lodwar attacked Samburu and made away with 400 cows. A large number of goats were stolen about and government then sold Turkana animals irrationally and compensated the Samburu later on; disarmament of the Turkana community was initiated by the Government albeit few guns were retrieved.

In 1970, the Turkana from Lodwar and Baragoi attacked Samburus once again and stole 800 cows. No was action taken by the government. Conflict abated from 1970 to 1990s because both communities were up against a foreign intervention called Shiftas, the Somali bandits. The first armed raid in Baragoi happened on 28th May 1994, when heavily armed raiders from Pokot Community came and raided villages occupied by both the Turkana and the Samburu and animals of unknown number were stolen, and still no action was taken by the government. In 1996 hundreds of men from the neighboring Turkana community conducted a morning raid on the Rendille and Samburu livestock which were grazing on Soito yo Lkokoyo, Lamirok, Suyian to Ltepes, 20,000 cattle were taken and dozens killed in the same year; besides, the Government District Commissioner (Mr. Nyandoro) together with 46 other people were killed by the Turkana raiders (Masinde, Adan, and Pkalya, 2004). The government of the day sent Kenya army which did little in terms of conflict resolution. Samburu bought guns and armed themselves from Ethiopia and Somalia, to defend themselves.

Towards the 1970s, the Turkana in collaboration with some elements in government and the security organs employed sophisticated raiding methods using heavy guns, military trucks for transport and large scale networks of smuggling extending up to Sudan (Markasis, 1993). After 1979, the Pokot adopted similar military tactics. Consequently, from a means of obtaining a few animals and improving one's fighting prowess, raiding evolved into military operations using conventional war tactics.

After 1979 the process of undermining pastoralism in Kenya gained momentum because of a combination of factors. First, cattle diseases wiped out most of the livestock. Secondly, a two-year drought caused harvest failure and famine. Thirdly, an upsurge in cattle raids and military attacks by heavily armed Turkana, collectively termed Ngorokos (bandits), took place. These bandits had sophisticated weapons which they had acquired from ex-president Idi Amin's fleeing soldiers in Uganda. In 1984 to 1986 the Kenyan government sent a punitive military operation to Pokot district purportedly to seize illegal firearms. During the operation, thousands of Pokot livestock were confiscated by the government while others died due to drought or lack of proper attention while in the hands of the security forces. The Pokot have never forgiven the government for this callous act against them and their livestock.

4.4. Changing Role of Elders

According to Duffield (1997), the elders' authority has been undermined by the introduction of a market economy and the increasing polarization of rich and poor which resulted in labor migration. The youth have found new sources of influence and wealth including the flourishing armed militias of young men and the new income available through banditry (Duffield, 1997). Odhiambo (1996) asserts that traditional authority is being eroded by the progressive replacement of council of elders and tribunals with government-appointed agencies

and functionaries. Meanwhile, urbanization and increasingly frequent migrations to town by young people especially men, expose them to other cultures and make them question traditional values (Odhiambo, 1996).

Another way in which elders may have lost their authority is through increasing distrust from the communities particularly from the warrior age sets. This may have various causes. One may be the association with an increasingly distrusted administration. The elders may increase their influence and prestige by providing an interface between their communities and local government. When the public sector is reduced, so is role of the elders. In a study of pastoral institutions in Somaliland, Hashi (1996) points out that traditional leaders, having been absorbed by urban political machinery, are rapidly losing the trust of the herders. The same happens when the association with administrative power is used for personal advantage through land speculation or bribery (Galaty, 1994).

Although relations between elders and their neighbors were dominated by common suspicion. Elders could not negotiate with neighbors since their neighbors' situation was equally precarious but more so, previous negotiations and terms of rescue had been abused by the Pokot elders so they could not take advantage of this option. Lack of reciprocal grazing rights with Turkana was occasional while the level of mistrust and suspicion between them was deep-rooted. The frequent Pokot incursions and livestock raids into Tugen, Turkana and Samburu territory diminished or extinguished the possibility of such a negotiation.

The progressive personalization of interests (through the introduction of a market economy and the creation of opportunities for individual entrepreneurship) has not been matched by the personalization of responsibility. The actions of the individuals even when aimed at personal interest, are likely to be treated as the responsibility of the whole community. The Pokot-Samburu clashes in 2006, for example, are commonly said to have started after a young Pokot man known to be involved in the illegal guns trade was killed by one of his clients, a Samburu during a fight over payment. Although the circumstances and the reasons for the incident could hardly have been less traditional, the episode was followed by a chain of mutual retaliations by young men of the two groups consequently, the situation rapidly escalated and were directed by and large against people who have nothing to do with the previous incidents. Within less than two months more than 20 people had been killed and several hundred families had been displaced, while those responsible for the first two or three incidents, although well known, had not been arrested (Wanjala, 1997).

4.5. From Raiders to Rustlers: The Escalation of Conflict in Northern Kenya

As the preceding section has shown, traditional conflict among pastoralists in Northern Kenya had more in common with raiding than with the large scale, pitched battles of European history (Fukui and Markakis, 1994). However, at present, there is emerging an increasing tendency towards the Europeanization of war amongst the pastoralists of Northern Kenya. This has narrowed the distinction between raiding and rustling. As discussed earlier, traditional conflict was determined by socially accredited values and beliefs. However, this new form of conflict is one where the actor is an individual or small group acting with limited or without societal approval. As defined in the introduction, escalation of pastoral conflict refers to the increase in scale, intensity and frequency of pastoral conflicts. This includes the emergence of indiscriminate killings especially of women and children, groups which traditionally it was a taboo to kill. This section highlights the nature of conflict escalation in Northern Kenya. This is accomplished by the use of specific cases that illustrate increase in scale, intensity of frequency of conflict in Northern Kenya.

6. Changing role of Morans, from Raiders to cattle Rustlers

After 1992, violence in Northern Kenya reached a new climax. Violent clashes took place not only between the pastoralists but also between the pastoralists and the agriculturalist and even with the Kenyan army. In addition to the normal cattle raiding, other forms of violence emerged. The Pokot attacked a school in Marakwet and left 50 pupils dead. In 1995, the Turkana invaded Pokot under the leadership of Lopurkoyan, a young warrior leader. Under Lopurkoyan, the Turkana were not organized as morans as they were in the company of women and

children moving with them. Also in their company were livestock and other household supplies, a complete new picture in the art of raiding in the region. In 1996, an alliance of the Samburu and the Pokot attacked a Turkana community near Baragoi (*Lokorkor attack*). Many Turkanas irrespective of age and sex were killed. In May, 1996, at least 13 people were killed on the spot in a raid by more than 200 heavily armed Pokot bandits, on a manyatta at Kapedo, Turkana. What is interesting to note is that no animals were stolen. It was purely a killing spree. Two months later in August 1996, fifteen people were killed in Samburu when they were attacked by Pokot cattle-rustlers. Among the victims were two children. Raiders, who were numbering over 400, escaped with 5000 head of cattle. Police eventually recovered only 1000 three days after attack.

In 1996, Samburu and Pokot bandits massacred people in which claimed the lives of over 50 Turkanas, most of them women and children (Umar, 1997). The Bandits made away with 15,000 heads of cattle. When security officers tried to follow and recover the stolen animals, the District Commissioner (DC) was dismembered and burnt by the bandits when his helicopter was shot down in Suguta Valley. Other security officers were engaged in a “Rambo-style” in pursuit of the bandits. However, the animals were never recovered. In a statement later released by political leaders from the region, the motive of such concerted and sustained attacks was not the supposed hunger for animals, but the need to terrorize and inflict fear among rivals, and by so doing, push them away from points of conflict – pasture and water.

In April 10, 1997, seven people were killed and four others injured by Pokot in a raid on Manyattas in Turkana District. The raiders made away with 400 animals from Kainuk and Laya in Katilu and Turkwel divisions. The following month in May, armed bandits said to be Turkanas killed four children and seriously injured three adults in an attack on a Samburu manyatta in Baragoi Division, Samburu. More than 50 bandits from Turkana also stole 500 cattle belonging to a local politician, late Peter Lekisaat. The attack came barely hours after a security team led by the Samburu District Commissioner Paul Yatich left Baragoi after camping there for two days following rumours of an impending attack in the same month of May, two armed bandits and an elderly man are killed during a raid in Samburu. Local police boss Kaua Mbijjiwe said 200 head of cattle were stolen. In June of the same year, eleven people perished in fierce fight between Turkana and Samburu communities in Baragoi Division, Samburu County. The battle was sparked by Samburu herdsmen pursuing stolen cattle who confronted by Turkana people in Nachola Location. These raids, in the same year, reflect an increase in frequency of cattle raids.

In September, 1997, at least 31 people were killed when armed raiders believed to be Pokot attacked a Turkana manyatta in the Lorengipi and Lokiriama areas of Turkana County. Nine of the dead are said to be raiders. Police sources say the raiders drove animals towards Alale Division, West Pokot. But as Turkana herdsmen from Lorengipi rushed to assist and reinforce their kinsmen, the attackers raided the manyatta left behind, which had nobody to guard. In the raid, the attackers killed five women, eight children and seriously injured eight women and two elderly men. The children are reportedly aged between one-and-half to three years. This indiscriminate killing point to negative side of conflict escalation in the region. At least seven of the raiders were also killed, two of them in uniforms used by Kenya police reservists.

In March, 1998, at least 100 people were killed and others wounded when armed Pokot cattle rustlers attacked manyattas in Turkana District. Interestingly, it seemed as though animals were not a target in this raid but only killing of the Turkana people. None of the bandits were captured despite a large security deployment in the region. In April the same year, a series of coordinated small raids led to deployment of armed security personnel to the border of Turkana and West Pokot districts. Despite this, a raid occurred, where 7,000 animals were stolen. A few weeks later, in the same month of April, 1998, 6 civilians died in crossfire when bandits invaded a police camp in West Pokot and stole firearms.

In May, 1998, the Government announced that the Army was to be deployed in trouble spots throughout Kenya with orders to disarm anyone holding illegal weapons. Troops were to work alongside police to end violence in areas hit by cattle rustling and ethnic clashes. Moi made the announcement at the Armed Forces Training

College, Eldoret, where he was the guest of honour during a passing-out parade of more than 2,000 new soldiers. According to the announcement, the police, directed by Commissioner Duncan Wachira, and the military was to be joined by other regular security units. He claimed that many illegal guns had been smuggled into Kenya because of insecurity in neighboring countries. At the same time the President cautioned politicians against inflammable language, saying it incited communities against one another. He said when leaders speak in such a tone it is the citizens who suffer while the same leaders are tucked safely away. Opposition politicians and the clergy roundly accused the Government of either laxity in its response or of condoning the violence. Cabinet Minister Francis Lotodo was cited as being involved in the raids. A parliamentary motion of censure against him, moved by Kimilili MP Mukhisa Kituyi, was defeated. Critics claimed Government response to the raids as erratic, uncoordinated and at best ineffective.

In the year 1999, the Pokot attacked the Turkana killing 60 Turkanas and stealing 8,000 cattle. The Pokots were made up of over 1,000 men armed with AK47 assault rifles. It is notable here that this attack was highly organized with a working chain of command. Similarly in March 1999, another violent attack occurred where 1,000 Pokot gunmen attacked a Turkana village killing 30 people and made away with 2,000 herds of cattle. The sheer numbers involved in terms of raiders and cattle stolen and the fact that 1,000 young men could be recruited to participate in violence also points out to the increase in the scale of cattle raiding.

In 2005, Pokot bandits attacked a Kainuk village in Turkana stealing 600 goats and sheep. This was an alleged revenge attack following an earlier Turkana killing of one Pokot herder and stealing of 47 herds of cattle in Turkwel. In the Kainuk attack, three Turkana businessmen and a Kenya Police Reserve Officer were killed after an ambush on their truck by Pokot bandits who fired at them even after establishing their identities. In 2006, Samburu Morans attacked Pokot patients in Maralal hospital, castrating patients and killing others. This attack is a classic case of conflict escalation as no animals were targeted. No animals are available in hospital. In addition, the victims were harmless patients who would not be able to defend themselves against the well-armed Morans.

Conclusion

The intermittent conflict situation in Northern Kenya today has undergone massive transformation. Turkana, Samburu and Pokot societies respond negatively to one another's actions—violence begets violence. Cattle were indeed raided throughout their history. However, these raids were more of a form of wealth redistribution through cattle. There were customary rules in which cattle raids were limited to times of need, were small in number, and generally characterized by little violence. This marks the genesis of protracted social conflict in Northern Kenya. However, as rules began to be increasingly violated during the 20th century, these raids escalated in intensity. Victims responded with raids of increased intensity, and the conflict spiral was born.

A number of factors account for the conflict transformation. First, colonial policy which aimed at pacifying pastoralists and to ensure peace and order, this tendency had several implications. It tended to present the pastoralist as an unreliable people prone to violence and, hence, to encourage abandonment of the activity. This was an elite outsider's view of pastoralism as a primordial mode of production which should be discouraged. However, it is shown that the colonial period was marked by the increasing occurrence of conflicts as pastoralist rebelled against the British and tried to maintain their mode of livelihood.

The period witnessed the drawing of political boundaries and creation of block grazing schemes. Borders were fixed, and access to key resources was curtailed with little regard to seasonal variation and the needs of the people for pasture. These measures greatly affected the transhumant patterns already mastered by the pastoralists from their long experience with ecological hardships. The border restriction also destroyed the lubricating social rubric traditionally obtained through trade and intermarriages between pastoralist neighbors. All this resulted in increased conflict between pastoralists of the North.

Currently, each group perceives the other's actions as increasingly hostile and as aimed at cultural and social targets rather than commercial livestock targets alone. What is essentially a financial conflict erupts into full-scale ethnic war. The contention between the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot communities goes beyond a simple conflict. According to PSC theory, any refraining from an escalated response is generally perceived as weakness, and groups fear that failing to respond will invite further encroachment and aggression.

Transformation of cattle raiding to cattle-rustling and its transformation from a traditional practice to the current criminal activity of livestock theft can be traced back to the 1970s. In the early 1970s, the pastoralists were faced with acute and prolonged famine and were at the mercy of donor-assisted development programmes. In keeping in line with a "fend-for-yourself" approach which was anchored on government policies of developing the "high potential areas first", the government made no particular effort to alleviate the suffering of the pastoralist communities occasioned by the said famine. On the contrary, the government policies during the seventies, the eighties, the nineties as well as those ushering in the second millennium have focused on agriculture and cultivation, thereby persistently relegating and side-lining the development concerns of the pastoralists to the periphery. Naturally speaking, such endemic marginalization has led to the upsurge of livestock theft among the pastoralists, manifested through intense inter-clan and inter-tribal armed conflict, as a means of survival.

References

- Almagor, U. (1979). Raiders and Elders: a confrontation of generations among the Dessanetch. In K. Fukui, and D. Turton (Eds.), *Warfare among East African Herders* (pp. 119-143). Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
- Angassa, A., and Beyene, F. (2003). Current range condition in southern Ethiopia in relation to traditional management strategies: The perceptions of Borana pastoralists. *Tropical Grasslands* , 53-59.
- Barber, J. (1968). *Imperial Frontier: A Study of Relations between the British and the Pastoral Tribes of North East Uganda*. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
- Barton, J. (1957). *Turkana Grammatical Notes and Vocabulary*. Unpublished.
- Baxter, P. T. (1993). The 'New' East African Pastoralism: An Overview. In J. Markakis (Ed.), *Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa* (pp. 143-162). London: MacMillan Press.
- Baxter, P., and Hogg, R. (Eds.). (1990). *Property, Poverty and People: Changing Rights in Property and Problems of Pastoral Development*. Manchester: University of Manchester.
- Behnke, R. (1994). Natural resource management in pastoral Africa. *Development Policy Review* , 5-27.
- Behnke, R., and Scoones, I. (1993). *Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models of Natural Variability and Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Bevan, J. (2008). *Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda's Most Deprived Region*. Geneva: Occasional Paper 21.
- Bollig, M. (2006). *Risk management in a hazardous environment: A comparative study of two pastoral societies*. New York: Springer.
- Bollig, M., and Göbel, B. (1997). Risk, Uncertainty and Pastoralism: An Introduction. *Nomadic Peoples* , 5-21.
- Bollig, M., and Österle, M. (2007). We Turned our Enemies into Baboons: Warfare, Ritual and Pastoral Identity Among the Pokot of Northern Kenya. In A. Rao, M. Bollig, and M. Böck (Eds.), *The practice of warfare: Production, reproduction and communion of armed violence* (pp. 23-51). New York: Berghahn.
- Brown, L. (1963). *The Development of Semi-Arid Areas of Kenya*. Nairobi: Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Water Resources.
- Cossins, N. J., and Upton, M. (1988). The Impact of Climate Variation on the Borana Pastoral System. *Agric. Systems* , 117-135.
- Coughenour, M., Ellis, B., Swift, M., Coppock, D., Galvin, K., McCabe, J., et al. (1985). Energy extraction and use in a nomadic pastoral ecosystem. *Science* , 619-625.
- CRA, (2011). *Improvement on the acceptance of a conflict resolution system by air traffic controllers*. In Proceedings of the Sixth USA/Europe Air Traffic Management R&D Seminar (ATM-2005). Baltimore, Maryland.
- Dahl, G., and Hjort, A. (1976). *Having herds: Pastoral herd growth and household economy*. Stockholm, Sweden: University of Stockholm.
- Dames, T. (1964). *Reconnaissance of the Agricultural Potential of the Turkana District*. Rome: FAO.

- Dietz, A. J. (1987). The State, the Market and the Decline of Pastoralism; Challenging Some Myths, with Evidence from West Pokot. In M. J (Ed.), *Conflict and Decline in Africa*. Oxford: Macmillan Press.
- Duffield, M. (1997). Ethnic War and International Humanitarian Intervention: A Broad Perspective. In D. Turton (Ed.), *War and Ethnicity. Global Connections and Local Violence*. Woodbridge: University of Rochester Press.
- Duffield, M. (1997). In E. W. Perspective, and D. Turton (Ed.), *War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
- Dyson-Hudson, N. (1966). *Karimojong politics*. Clarendon: Oxford University Press.
- East African Meteorological Department, (2009). *Climatological statistics for East Africa, Part 1: Kenya*. East African Community/East African Meteorological Department, Nairobi, 92 pp.
- Fukui, K., and Markakis, J. (Eds.). (1994). *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*. London: James Currey.
- Goldsmith, P. (1997). Cattle, Khat, and Guns: Trade, Conflict, and Security on northern Kenya's Highland-Lowland Interface. A Case Study. *USAID Conference on Conflict Resolution in the Great Horn of Africa*.
- Greiner, C., Bollig, M., and McCabe, T. (2011). Notes on Land-based Conflicts in Kenya's Arid Areas. *Africa Spectrum*, 77-81.
- Gulliver, P. (1951). *A Preliminary Survey of the Turkana*. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- Gulliver, P. H. (1955). *The Family Herds : A Study of Two Pastoral Tribes in East Africa, the Jie and Turkana*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.
- Hashi, A. (1996). *A Survey of Pastoral Institutions in Somaliland*. Penicuik: VETAID.
- Hendrickson, D., Armon, J., and Mearns, R. (1998). The Changing Nature of Conflict and Famine Vulnerability: The Case of Livestock Raiding in Turkana, Kenya. *Disasters*, 22 (3), 185-199.
- Hendrickson, D., Mearns, R., and Armon, J. (1996). Livestock Raiding among the Pastoral Turkana of Kenya. Redistribution, Predation and the Links to Famine. *IDS Bulletin*, 27(3), 17-30.
- Johnson, H. (1904). *The Uganda Protectorate*. London.
- KHRC. (2010). *Morans no more – The changing face of cattle-rustling in Kenya*. NAairobi: KHRC.
- Knighton, B. (2003). The state as raider among the Karamojong: Where there are no guns, they use the threat of guns. *Africa*, 73 (3), 427-455.
- Knighton, B. (2005). *The Vitality of the Karamojong Religion: Dying Tradition or Living Faith?* Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
- Lamphear, J. (1976). *The Traditional History of the Jie*. Oxford: Clarendon .
- Lamphear, J. (1992). *The Scattering Time*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lamphear, J. (1998). Brothers in arms: Military aspects of East African age-class systems in historical perspective. In E. Kurimoto, and S. Simonse (Eds.), *Conflict, age, and power in North East Africa* (pp. 79–97). Oxford: James Currey.
- Markasis, J. (1993). *Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa*. London: Macmillan.
- Masinde, I., Adan, M., and Pkalya, R. (2004). Indigenous democracy: Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms: Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and Marakwet. In B. Rabar, and M. Karimi (Eds.). Nairobi: Intermediate Technology Development Group-Eastern Africa.
- Mathew, S., and Boyd, R. (2014). The cost of cowardice: Punitive sentiments towards free riders in Turkana raids. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 35 (1), 58–64.
- Matthew, R., Brown, O., & Jensen, D. (2009). *From conflict to peace building: The role of natural resources and the environment*. UNEP.
- Mburu, N. (1999). Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa: Causes, History, and Political Implications. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 8(2), 89–107.
- McCabe, T. (2004). *Cattle Bring Us to Our Enemies: Turkana ecology, politics, and raiding in a disequilibrium system*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Mkutu, K. (2003). *Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya- Uganda Border Region*. Saferworld.
- Mkutu, K. (2006). Small Arms and Light Weapons Among Pastoral Groups in the Kenya-Uganda Border Area. *African Affairs*, 47–70.
- Mkutu, K. (2007). Impact of Small Arms Insecurity on the Public Health of Pastoralists in the Kenya-Uganda Border Regions. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 33-56.
- Morgan, W. T. (1973). *Geographies for Advanced Study*. London: Longman Group Limited .
- Mulugeta, A., and Hagmann, T. (2008). Governing violence in the pastoralist space: Karrayu and state notions of cattle raiding in the Ethiopian Awash Valley. *Afrika Focus*, 71-87.
- Murunga, G. R., and Nasong'o, S. W. (2007). *Kenya: The struggle for democracy*. New York: Zed Books Ltd.
- Ndagala, D. K. (1991). The Unmaking of the Dagota: decreasing resources and increasing conflict in rural Tanzania. *Nomadic Peoples*, 71-82.
- Ngaido, T. (2005). *Can pastoral institutions perform without access options? Collective action and property rights for sustainable rangeland management*. CAPRI (Collective Action and Property Rights).

- Oba, G. (1992). Ecological Factors in Land Use Conflicts, Land Administration and Food Insecurity in Turkana, Kenya. *Pastoral Development Network Papers*, 25(3), 146-160.
- Oba, G., and Lusigi, W. J. (1987). *An Overview of Drought Strategies and Land Use in African Pastoral Systems*. Pastoral Development Network.
- Ocan, C. (1992). *Pastoral crisis in North-Eastern Uganda: The changing significance of cattle raids*. Kampala: Centre for Basic Research.
- Odhiambo, M. (1996). Addressing Natural Resource Conflicts Through Community Forestry: the Case of Eastern Africa. *E-conference on Addressing natural resource conflicts through community forestry*. Rome: FAO.
- Odhiambo, T. R. (1996). *Hope Born out of Despair: Managing the African Crisis*. Nairobi: Heinemann.
- Pazzaglia, A. (1982). *The Karimojong: some aspects*. Bologna: Meseum Combonianum.
- Roberts, D., & Bainbridge D. (1963). Nilotic physique, *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, 3 (1), p. 341-370.
- Schlee G. (1989). *Identities on the Move: clanship and pastoralism in northern Kenya*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Sobania, N. (1988). In P. M. Kenya, D. Johnson, and D. Anderson (Eds.), *The Ecology of Survival: Case Studies from Northeastern African History* (pp. 219-39). London: Crook Greene.
- Sommer, G., and Vossen, R. (1993). Dialects, Sectiolects, or Simply Lects? The Maa Language in Time Perspective. In T. Spear, and R. Waller (Eds.), *Being Maasai - Ethnicity and Identity in East Africa* (pp. 25-37). London: James Currey.
- Spencer, I. (1983). In 1.-1. Pastoralism and Colonial Policy in Kenya, and R. Rotberg (Ed.), *Imperialism, Colonialism and Hunger: East and Central Africa*. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Spencer, P. (1973). *Nomads in Alliance*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Umar, A. (1997, March 27-29). Resource Utilisation, Conflict and Insecurity in Pastoral Areas of Kenya. *Methodist Guest House*. Nairobi: USAID Organised Seminar on Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa.
- UNESCO (1983). Learning needs and problems in Education, UNESCO Nairobi.
- Wanjala, T. (1997). *Report on Pokot-Marakwet Conflicts*. Nairobi: Peace Net - NGO Council.