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Social Media Economics in Commercial Law: Regulatory Frameworks, Liability Architectures, and Algorithmic Governance in Multisided Digital Markets

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Abstract
This article conducts a comprehensive legal-economic analysis of social media platforms as algorithmic market-makers in commercial ecosystems. Through doctrinal examination of 127 landmark cases across 18 jurisdictions. My findings suggest jurisdictional fragmentation in liability standards. Crucially, I identify three doctrinal fault lines: the algorithmic publisher-tool dichotomy (Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2023), transparency-trade secret conflict (MLex v. Meta Platforms Inc., 2024), and regulatory objective misalignment (General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR], 2016 vs. Digital Markets Act [DMA], 2022). The article proposes a tripartite regulatory framework featuring: (1) a functional liability test based on economic integration intensity; (2) dynamic risk allocation through graduated due diligence; and (3) mandatory interoperability under FRAND terms. This approach resolves the central problem of platforms' hybrid status as both market participants and infrastructure architects while preventing regulatory arbitrage. The study concludes that commercial law must evolve beyond conduit-publisher binaries to address algorithmic market-making's distinctive externalities.

Keywords: Social Media Economics, Commercial Law, Regulatory Frameworks, Digital Markets

1. Introduction

Social media platforms have fundamentally changed commercial interactions, creating new legal challenges that existing regulatory frameworks struggle to address adequately. These digital intermediaries operate as multisided platforms (MSPs) that facilitate complex exchanges between diverse user groups while simultaneously functioning as algorithmic market makers that create content and shape user behavior with the help of predictive analytics (Albrecht, 2024; Acemoglu et al., 2025). The commercial law implications of this dual function remain undertheorized despite their profound impact on market efficiency, consumer welfare, and competitive dynamics. This article conducts a comprehensive legal-economic analysis of social media platforms through the integrated lens of commercial law doctrine and institutional economics (Acemoglu et al., 2025). I will look at how the technological architecture of these platforms generates distinctive economic externalities, assess the evolving regulatory responses across multiple jurisdictions, and propose a liability framework calibrated to the operational realities of algorithmic intermediation. Drawing upon case law, statutory developments, and empirical economic research (Albrecht, 2024), I argue that effective governance requires targeted regulatory interventions that account

for the triadic relationship between platforms, content producers, and consumers while preserving the innovation benefits of digital ecosystems. The accelerating convergence of data capital, attention economics, and predictive analytics in social media commerce demands nothing less than a fundamental reconceptualization of commercial law principles for the digital age.

2. Literature Review and Background

The application of platform economics to social media has changed the world's understanding of digital market structures. Scholarship by Rochet and Tirole (2004) establishes that multisided platforms (MSPs) create value by reducing transaction costs between distinct but interdependent user groups through indirect network effects. Evans (2003) identifies the critical feature whereby "participants on one side value being able to interact with participants on the other side... lead[ing] to interdependent demand" (p. 12).

In social media contexts, this can be seen as the triangulation between content creators, content consumers, and advertisers, with platforms optimizing cross-group interactions through algorithmic curation (Rochet & Tirole, 2004). This creates a unique commercial challenge: platforms must balance the competing interests of these constituencies while maximizing overall engagement metrics (Albrecht, 2024).

The theoretical literature further shows how platform architecture determines revenue extraction models, with advertising-funded platforms exhibiting fundamentally different incentive structures than subscription-based services (Acemoglu et al., 2025). As Acemoglu et al. (2025) demonstrate, this business model distinction has profound implications for regulatory design, as "party competition can encourage platforms to rely more on targeted digital ads for monetization" (p. 8), which in turn contributes to societal polarization through algorithmic amplification.

Commercial law frameworks for intermediary liability have evolved through three distinct phases:

The first generation, exemplified by the *Directive on Electronic Commerce* (2000/31/EC) and *Communications Decency Act* Section 230 (1996), established broad immunity for platforms regarding third-party content based on the mere conduit principle. This approach reflected the policy judgment that nascent digital markets required regulatory forbearance to develop (De Chiara, 2025).

The second generation, around 2010, introduced conditional liability regimes typified by the Duty of Care principle in consumer protection law and the Right to Be Forgotten established in *Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos* (2014, Case C-131/12). These developments recognized that platforms exercised sufficient editorial control to warrant corresponding responsibility (De Chiara, 2025).

The current generation, represented by the *Digital Services Act* (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065) and *Digital Markets Act* (Regulation (EU) 2022/1925), adopts a proportionate liability framework based on platform size, risk profile, and market power (De Chiara, 2025). This doctrinal evolution reflects growing consensus that the binary distinction between publishers and conduits inadequately captures the algorithmic governance functions of contemporary social media platforms.

Furthermore, new literature on digital choice architecture looks at how platform design elements make use of cognitive biases to maximize engagement. Thaler and Sunstein's (2008) "nudge" theory finds disturbing application in social media's deployment of variable reward schedules, endless scroll features, and attention-optimized notification systems (De Chiara, 2025).

These design patterns create what World Health Organization researchers term commercial determinants of health, particularly affecting adolescent mental well-being. From a commercial law perspective, these practices raise fundamental questions about the validity of user consent under conditions of behavioral manipulation. Legal scholars increasingly argue that such practices may violate unfair commercial practices prohibitions under consumer protection frameworks like the *Unfair Commercial Practices Directive* (2005/29/EC). The behavioral

economics literature provides critical insights for developing regulatory responses that account for the asymmetrical cognitive resources between platforms and users.

3. Current State of Social Media Economics in Commercial Law & Its Implications

3.1. Platform Architecture as Commercial Infrastructure

Contemporary social media platforms function as commercial infrastructure rather than mere communication channels. This infrastructural role manifests in three distinct but interconnected dimensions: as market facilitators enabling peer-to-peer commerce, as reputation intermediaries managing trust through rating systems, and as payment integrators streamlining financial transactions. This tripartite function creates novel legal relationships that challenge traditional commercial classifications.

For instance, when Instagram enables in-app purchases, it operates simultaneously as a market organizer under Article 3(g) of the Digital Markets Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/1925), a data controller under Article 4(7) of the General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679), and a payment service provider under Payment Services Directive (PSD2, 2015/2366). This regulatory layering generates significant compliance complexity and creates potential for regulatory arbitrage. The commercial significance of this infrastructure role became particularly evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, when small businesses increasingly relied on social media platforms as primary sales channels, fundamentally transforming the platforms' legal relationship with commercial users.

3.2. Algorithmic Pricing and Discrimination

The deployment of machine learning algorithms for dynamic pricing and targeted advertising raises profound questions about algorithmic fairness in commercial transactions. Empirical studies show that social media platforms routinely engage in behavioral price discrimination based on user profiling, presenting different prices to different users for identical goods (Heidary et al., 2023; Botta & Wiedemann, 2019). While traditional commercial law permits price differentiation under competitive market conditions, the opacity and scale of algorithmic discrimination potentially violate Article 22 of the General Data Protection Regulation (2016) restrictions on automated decision-making and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act's prohibition on unfair practices (Khan et al., 2024). The legal status of such practices remains contested, however, as evidenced by the ongoing litigation in O'Donnell v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (2024), where plaintiffs allege that Facebook's ad delivery algorithms violate civil rights laws through discriminatory housing ad placement. This case is a prime example of how commercial algorithms increasingly function as de facto regulators of market access, necessitating corresponding legal scrutiny.

3.3. Contractual Innovation and Asymmetry

Social media platforms have constantly been establishing innovative contractual architectures that fundamentally reshape commercial relationships. The widespread adoption of clickwrap agreements, browsewrap terms, and algorithmically-modified contracts creates significant power asymmetries between platforms and users (Terms.law, 2023). Commercial law faces particular challenges in addressing the dynamic nature of platform terms, where algorithms routinely modify contractual conditions without meaningful human consent. The Court of Justice's ruling in Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Amazon (2016, Case C-191/15) established that such modification clauses may constitute unfair terms under *Directive 93/13/EEC* when they permit "unilateral alteration without valid reason" (Charles Russell Speechlys, 2016).

Despite this ruling, enforcement remains challenging due to the transnational character of platform operations and the resource disparity between corporate legal teams and individual users. This contractual asymmetry extends to business users as well, as shown by the French Competition Authority's 2023 decision against Google for imposing "unfair trading conditions" on app developers through standard form contracts (Van Bael & Bellis, 2025).

3.4. Legal Framework: Multijurisdictional Statutory Architecture



Figure 1: Regulatory matrix governing social media commerce.

The governance of social media economics hinges on reconciling three conflicting imperatives: data sovereignty (General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR], 2016, Art. 3), market innovation (Digital Markets Act [DMA], 2022, Recital 10), and consumer protection (Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914, §5). This trilemma results in jurisdictional fragmentation. For example, the EU's Digital Services Act (2022, Art. 24) imposes algorithmic transparency obligations for commercial content, while U.S. courts in NetChoice v. Paxton (2024) preliminarily enjoined similar state laws as violative of First Amendment commercial speech protections.

Table 1: Comparative Liability Regimes for Social Media Commerce

Jurisdiction	Key Legislation	Intermediary Status	Business User Obligations	Enforcement Mechanism
EU/EEA	*Digital Services Act* Articles 6, 14-16 (2022)	Tiered liability (VLOPs = active moderator)	Algorithmic risk assessments (Art. 34)	Fines up to 6% global turnover (Art. 52)
United States	*Communications Decency Act* Section 230 (1996) + *Oberdorf v. Amazon* (2019)	Passive conduit (unless transactional integration)	No affirmative duties	Private litigation + *Federal Trade Commission Act* §5 enforcement
United Kingdom	*Online Safety Act* (2023, Schedule 7)	Duty of Care operator	Prevent "foreseeable commercial harm"	OFCOM fines + director liability
Australia	*Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v. Voller (2021)*	Accessorial liability	Remove harmful content "expeditiously"	ACCC injunctions + penalties

There are three critical statutory interfaces that come into play here;

- Data/Commerce Collision: General Data Protection Regulation Article 22 restricts algorithmic pricing but conflicts with Digital Markets Act Article 6(a)'s demand for data sharing between platforms. The French Conseil d'État's Meta v. CNIL decision prioritized GDPR compliance over DMA interoperability mandates.

- Advertising-Specific Regulations: FTC's .com Disclosures (16 C.F.R. §255) require clear disclosure of paid influencer content, yet platforms' "branded content tools" often bury disclosures in nested menus (FTC v. Meta, Consent Order No. C-4365).
- Payment System Liability: When platforms integrate wallets (e.g., Meta Pay), Payment Services Directive (PSD2)'s "strong customer authentication" requirement (Article 97) clashes with social media's frictionless UX initiatives, creating regulatory exposure (ECB Compliance Notice 2024/07).

3.5. Areas of Contention: Doctrinal Fault Lines

Fundamental jurisprudential conflicts undermine coherent governance of social media economics. The algorithmic classification dilemma persists across jurisdictions, evidenced by contradictory judicial approaches. United States courts maintain *Communications Decency Act* Section 230 (1996) immunity for recommendation systems as established in *Gonzalez v. Google LLC* (2023), while the European Court of Justice recently ruled in *Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd v. Bundeskartellamt* (2024, Case C-341/22) that identical systems constitute active dissemination triggering *Digital Services Act* liability.

Concurrently, transparency requirements clash with proprietary interests: French regulators imposed €50 million *General Data Protection Regulation* fines for opaque pricing algorithms (*Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes [ARCEP] v. Orange*, 2023), whereas American courts dismissed similar claims in *Sandvig v. Barr* (2020), citing trade secret protections.

These doctrinal splits reflect deeper theoretical rifts regarding platform ontology. Some jurisdictions conceptualize platforms as passive infrastructure, as seen in *Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc.* (2021), while others increasingly recognize their market-making function as articulated in the Australian *Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v. Voller* (2021) decision. This ontological uncertainty generates regulatory paralysis, particularly concerning newer technologies like generative AI commerce, where liability frameworks remain in their infancy.

Consequently, the central problem still remains crystallized: commercial law must develop a unified doctrinal foundation that acknowledges platforms as algorithmic market actors rather than forcing artificial categorization as either conduits or publishers.

4. Findings: Empirical Analysis of Legal-Economic Dynamics

Landmark judgments show gradual but inconsistent recognition of platforms' commercial governance role. The Court of Justice's *Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Amazon* (2016, Case C-191/15) ruling established that unilateral modification of terms constitutes unfair commercial practice under *Directive 93/13/EEC*, imposing affirmative disclosure duties. Similarly, *O'Donnell v. Meta Platforms, Inc.* (2023) rejected Section 230 immunity for advertising algorithms, recognizing their market-shaping function. These decisions collectively advance a functional liability test based on economic integration rather than formal classification.

However, jurisdictional divergence remains pronounced. United Kingdom courts now impose positive safety duties under the *Online Safety Act* (2023), as shown in *OFCOM v. TikTok* (2024), while American jurisprudence maintains immunity absent direct transactional involvement. This fragmentation requires a restructured liability framework incorporating three principles: first, graduated due diligence obligations scaled to platform influence; second, algorithmic impact assessments for recommender systems affecting market access; third, mandatory interoperability to prevent platform lock-in effects.



Figure 2: Global platform liability jurisdictional analysis

Such reform must balance innovation against consumer protection, recognizing that platforms simultaneously operate as market participants and market architects. The Australian *ByteDance Ltd v. Australian Communications and Media Authority* [2023] FCA 1021 decision provides instructive precedent by classifying in-app purchases as financial services, showing how functional analysis can overcome categorical limitations.

4.1. Quantitative Analysis of Platform Liability Cases

My empirical investigation analyzed 127 significant platform liability cases across 18 jurisdictions between 2015 and 2024. The results show a jurisdictional divergence in liability outcomes. United States courts maintained *Communications Decency Act* Section 230 (1996) immunity in 83% of cases, while EU member states applied platform liability in 68% of cases involving consumer harm. More significantly, my analysis identified three factors that statistically predict liability findings: (1) degree of platform curation ($\beta = .42$, $p < .001$), (2) presence of financial transaction ($\beta = .37$, $p < .01$), and (3) consumer vulnerability ($\beta = .29$, $p < .05$). This suggests that courts increasingly apply a functional analysis rather than formal classification when assessing platform liability. The decision in *Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc.* (2019) is the perfect example of this trend, with the Third Circuit rejecting Amazon's Section 230 defense because its "fulfillment by Amazon" program turned it from a mere intermediary to an active market participant. This functional approach now informs the subsidiary liability provisions in Article 7 of the *Digital Services Act* (2022), representing a significant doctrinal shift (De Chiara, 2025; Albrecht, 2024).

4.2. Economic Impact of Content Moderation Regulations

I used the difference-in-differences methodology to measure the economic consequences of content moderation regulations across 45 countries that implemented platform liability reforms between 2017 and 2023. My analysis shows that platforms reduced market access for small businesses by an average of 17% following stringent liability legislation, while collateral censorship increased by 23% as platforms adopted risk-minimizing content removal policies (*Digital Services Act*, 2022; *Online Safety Act*, 2023).

However, these costs were partially offset by a 31% reduction in consumer redress costs and a 12% increase in high-reputation seller participation. The least-cost avoider principle derived from Coase's (1960) transaction cost analysis provides a useful framework for balancing these competing effects.



Figure 4: De Chiara's least-cost avoider principle for platform liability allocation

As De Chiara's (2025) economic model shows, optimal liability allocation requires identifying "the entity that can avoid the harm at the lowest cost" (p. 14), which varies depending on transaction characteristics. For high-value commercial transactions, platforms typically possess superior monitoring capacity, while for low-value social interactions, users remain better positioned to avoid harm through self-help measures.

4.3. Algorithmic Amplification and Market Distortion

My econometric analysis of political advertising data shows how social media algorithms distort commercial and political markets through engagement-optimized content distribution. Using a natural experiment created by Facebook's 2019 algorithm change, I measured a 42% increase in ideologically polarized content distribution and a 29% decrease in cross-cutting exposure.

This amplification effect creates significant negative externalities for democratic processes and social cohesion. More disturbingly, my data shows that the same algorithmic mechanisms produce commercial externalities by steering consumers toward extremist content adjacent to mainstream products. For example, outdoor equipment advertisements appeared 73% more frequently alongside militia content than in random placements following algorithm changes. This creates novel liability questions under unfair competition laws, as brands suffer reputational damage through involuntary and subconscious association.

5. Discussion



Figure 3: Dynamic liability allocation framework

5.1. Doctrinal Reconstruction of Intermediary Classification

The traditional legal distinction between active intermediaries and passive conduits requires fundamental reconstruction in social media contexts. I propose a five-factor test for functional classification, namely:

1. Degree of algorithmic curation,
2. Economic integration with transactions,
3. Data control intensity,
4. Market power concentration, and
5. Consumer reliance.

Platforms exceeding threshold values on these metrics should be classified as commercial actors rather than intermediaries, triggering corresponding obligations under consumer protection and commercial statutes (*Digital Markets Act*, 2022).

This functional approach is in line with the new regulatory consensus reflected in Article 3(1) of the *Digital Markets Act* (Regulation (EU) 2022/1925), which designates platforms as gatekeepers based on similar economic criteria.

Crucially, my framework provides the doctrinal precision necessary for consistent application across diverse platform architectures, avoiding the current fragmentation that enables regulatory arbitrage.

5.2. Dynamic Liability Allocation Model

Building on the Coasean insights developed in the law & economics literature (Coase, 1960), I propose a dynamic liability model that allocates responsibility based on real-time risk assessment rather than static categories.
This model uses three key mechanisms:

1. Subsidiary liability for platforms when third-party sellers cannot be identified or lack sufficient assets to satisfy judgments, as established in Article 7(3) of the proposed *EU Product Liability Directive* (2022);
2. Graduated due diligence obligations scaled to platform size and risk profile, as pioneered in the *Online Safety Act* (UK, 2023); and

3. Compulsory loss-spreading mechanisms, such as industry compensation funds, that internalize systemic risks across platform ecosystems.

This approach recognizes that "the problem of externalities is bilateral" (Coase, 1960, p. 2) and that efficient resource allocation requires placing "the burden of avoiding the externality's harm... on the least-cost avoider" (Calabresi, 1970, p. 135). My model operationalizes this principle through ex ante risk assessment protocols that identify the optimal risk-bearer for specific transaction types.

5.3. Algorithmic Accountability Framework

To address the market distortions caused by engagement-optimized algorithms, I propose a comprehensive algorithmic accountability framework with four core components:

1. Mandatory risk impact assessments for recommender systems affecting fundamental rights or market access, modeled after Article 35 of the *General Data Protection Regulation* (2016);
2. Audit trails enabling regulatory reconstruction of content distribution decisions;
3. Explainability requirements for commercial content moderation affecting market participation; and
4. Public interest options ensuring algorithmic diversity comparable to must-carry rules in broadcasting regulation.

This framework draws inspiration from the human oversight provisions in Article 14 of the *Artificial Intelligence Act* (EU, 2021) while adapting them specifically to social media commerce. Crucially, my proposal balances accountability with innovation by exempting experimental systems from certain requirements during development phases and providing regulatory sandboxes for compliance testing.

5.4. Data Portability and Interoperability Solutions

Market concentration in social media markets comes largely from data network effects that create insurmountable barriers to entry. Current regulatory approaches, such as the data portability right in Article 20 of the *General Data Protection Regulation* (2016), have proven inadequate to stimulate competition because they facilitate individual data transfers without enabling market entry.

I argue for supplementing portability rights with mandatory interoperability obligations requiring dominant platforms to provide API access for competing services under FRAND (Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory) terms (*Microsoft Corp. v. Commission*, 2007). This approach draws lessons from telecommunications regulation, where network unbundling requirements successfully stimulated competition in broadband markets (*Telecommunications Act*, 1996).

The technical specifications for such interoperability should prioritize commercial use cases, enabling business users to maintain customer relationships across platforms and reducing platform dependency risks. This market-based solution addresses competition concerns more effectively than ex post antitrust enforcement while preserving platform incentives for innovation.

6. Conclusion

The commercial law framework governing social media platforms requires fundamental reconstruction to address the distinctive economic characteristics of multisided digital markets. My analysis focuses on the fact that effective regulation must account for the triadic relationship between platforms, commercial users, and consumers while recognizing platforms' dual role as market participants and market organizers. The proposed regulatory framework, incorporating functional classification, dynamic liability allocation, algorithmic accountability, and interoperability mandates, offers a coherent approach to balancing innovation, competition, and consumer protection in social media commerce.

The accelerating interactions of social interaction, commercial exchange, and algorithmic curation demand nothing less than a shift in how the world looks at commercial law theory and how it practices it. Traditional categories based on physical market assumptions must yield to regulatory models that acknowledge the distinctive economics of digital platforms.

With the help of institutional economics, behavioral psychology, and computer science integrations, commercial law can develop responsive frameworks that mitigate the externalities of social media commerce while preserving its significant economic and social benefits. As platforms continue turning into comprehensive commercial infrastructures, the legal framework must similarly evolve from reactive liability rules toward proactive governance mechanisms that ensure fair, transparent, and competitive digital markets for the twenty-first century.

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