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# Governance Issues and Environmental Impacts of Oil Palm Plantations in Riau (A Green Criminology Overview)

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**Abstract**
Indonesia, as an agrarian country, has a wealth of natural resources that can be used to meet human needs, either directly or indirectly through economic activities. One of the initiatives done is through the growth of oil palm farms, which is increasing in pace with global demand. Riau Province owns the majority of Indonesia's oil palm plantation land. Palm oil is a significant commodity in Riau, and with first-rate production, Riau Province can be considered a national center for oil palm development. This article will discuss two major aspects of oil palm plantations in Riau. First, it is concerned with the multiple detrimental effects of oil palm plantations in Riau, both environmental and socioeconomic. Second, this study will discuss several concerns concerning the governance of oil palm plantations in Riau. This study employs qualitative research methodologies, with a literature review serving as the primary data collection method. In this study, the literature review refers to gathering information from multiple books, journal articles, regulations, and other supporting papers. A literature review is conducted to examine prior studies on environmental criminality, green criminology, oil palm plantations, and oil palm plantation management in Riau. Finally, three conclusions are proposed in this study. The first conclusion is about the conflicting laws and regulations. In Indonesia, laws in the form of exemptions or permits must seek rechtsbeginsel, which must be rational or logical. Based on the nature of the prior first difficulty, the second conclusion speaks to the nature of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy with a criminogenic nature allows for the growth of forms of power abuse and maladministration. Since this deviation can cause harm, it is classified as a crime. In this situation, there is both social and environmental harm. The third conclusion in this discussion is the vulnerability to abuse of power as a result of power distribution. As a result, especially in the context of the oil palm plantation crisis, the end of the fraud committed by private investors that should be rectified by the political elite will not be fixed: it will reoccur as a true result of terrible governance practices carried out compactly.

**Keywords:** Palm Oil Plantation Governance, Green Criminology, Environmental Harm, Social Harm

## 1. Introduction

Indonesia, as an agrarian country, has a wealth of natural resources that can be used to meet human needs, either directly or indirectly through economic activities. One of the initiatives done is through the growth of oil palm

farms, which is increasing in pace with global demand. The distribution of these plantation crops in Indonesia has covered practically all of the major islands, with the extent and distribution of the area expanding year after year. The island of Sumatra has the most oil palm crops (64%), followed by Kalimantan (31%). The majority of Sumatra's oil palm plantations expanded in Riau, where the pattern revealed that smallholder plantations were widely developed plantations (Li, 2015). Riau Province owns the majority of Indonesia's oil palm plantation land. Palm oil is another important item in Riau (BPS Jakarta, 2008 Chalid, 2011, p.79). Riau Province, with a first-rate output level, can be considered a national center for oil palm development (Tempo, August 10, 2007, in Sachiho, 2008, p.1-2).

Table 1 shows the distribution of oil palm plantation acreage in numerous Indonesian provinces, with Riau ranking first with the largest and highest production.

Table 1: Distribution of Oil Palm Plantations in Indonesia in 2020

| PROVINCE | LARGE | PRODUCTION |
|---|---|---|
| Riau | 2.850.003 | 9.775.672 |
| Central Kalimantan | 1.714.660 | 8.298.584 |
| North Sumatera | 1.630.744 | 6.601.399 |
| South Sumatera | 1.196.915 | 4.365.004 |
| East Kalimantan | 1.492.934 | 4.331.930 |
| West Kalimantan | 1.904.015 | 3.551.825 |
| Jambi | 1.086.623 | 3.096.621 |
| South Kalimantan | 564.632 | 1.667.132 |
| West Sumatera | 390.554 | 1.390.199 |
| Total | 12.831.080 | 43.078.366 |

*Source: Directorate General of Plantations, 2021*

According to data from the Ministry of Agriculture's Directorate General of Plantations, palm oil production in 2020 is expected to reach 49.11 million tons, with average productivity of 3,568 Kg/Ha/Y. People's oil palm farms produce 17.35 million tons of CPO, while state-owned oil palm plantations produce 2.47 million tons and the private sector provides 29.27 million tons. As demonstrated in Table 1.2, the land area grows at a rate ranging from 5% to 6% every year.

Table 2: Area of Oil Palm Plantations in Indonesia 2011-2020

| YEAR | LARGE OF THE AREA (Ha) | | | | GROWTH SPEED (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | PR | PN | PS | TOTAL | |
| 2011 | 3.752.480 | 678.378 | 4.561.966 | 8.992.824 | 7,24 |
| 2012 | 4.137.620 | 683.227 | 4.751.868 | 9.572.715 | 6,45 |
| 2013 | 4.356.087 | 727.767 | 5.381.166 | 10.465.020 | 9,32 |
| 2014 | 4.422.365 | 729.022 | 5.603.414 | 10.754.801 | 4,69 |
| 2015 | 4.535.400 | 743.894 | 5.980.982 | 11.260.277 | 8,82 |
| 2016 | 4.739.318 | 707.428 | 5.754.719 | 11.201.465 | 6,92 |
| 2017 | 5.697.892 | 638.143 | 7.712.687 | 14.048.722 | 6,50 |
| 2018 | 5.818.888 | 614.756 | 7.892.706 | 14.326.350 | 1,98 |
| 2019 | 6.035.742 | 627.042 | 8.061.636 | 14.724.420 | 2,78 |
| 2020 | 6.090.883 | 643.888 | 8.261.639 | 14.996.010 | 1,81 |
| GROWTH SPEED AVERAGE (%) | | | | | 5,65 |

*Source: Directorate General of Plantations, 2021*

Then, according to Sawit Watch (2015), one of the NGOs monitoring the Indonesian palm oil business, up to 2014, Indonesia generated around 27.1 million tons of CPO annually. Whereas roughly 20% is used for internal needs, the majority is shipped to countries with the world's largest palm oil markets, especially China, India, and the European Union. Furthermore, the average annual growth rate of CPO export volume was 12.94% from 2003 to

2014, with an annual increase in export value of 25.76%. In 2013, palm oil commodity exports were 20.58 million tons of CPO and other products worth USD 15.84 billion. Until September 2014, for example, shipments totaled 15.96 million tons valued at $12.75 million. This condition makes Indonesia the largest producer and exporter of palm oil in the world (Sawit Watch, 2015).

Furthermore, the conversion of oil palm plantation areas to oil palm utilization influences both natural and human resources. The influence of oil palm is polarized, with various research revealing both good and negative effects. According to Syahza, Nasrul, and Irianti (2020), oil palm has several advantages, including contributing to the economy and raising the welfare index of rural people. According to the data, the welfare index increased by 0.16 between 2016 and 2018. This means that the well-being of rural communities grew by 16% between 2016 and 2018, compared to the prior period. Oil palm activities have a positive external impact and can be stated to be helpful for the surrounding environment, including, among other things, boosting rural welfare, opening up employment and commercial prospects in rural regions, and contributing to regional development. On the other hand, oil palm activities have an impact on the community's socioeconomic and cultural aspects, such as the availability of infrastructure facilities that can be used by the local community, such as roads, schools, houses of worship, and village markets, as well as the availability of agricultural workforce education, health education, primary and secondary education. In keeping with the findings above, Soedomo (2019) did a study on the growth of Teluk Pulai Village in Kalimantan, concluding that the economic prospects improved after the establishment of oil palm plantations. Teluk Pulai Village previously had poor economic prospects and lacked the amenities and infrastructure to let its residents expand their businesses. There was an increase in livelihoods and higher and more steady incomes once the oil palm company began operations in Teluk Pulai Village. Villagers in Sungai Melayu Village, Kalimantan, felt a good influence as well, with a major improvement in the economy. These economic advantages enable farming households to increase their public consumption. Some agricultural products that were previously uneconomical to market have become more cost-effective. As a result, peasants have become more market-oriented, which creates additional cash for the community. As previously stated, the good and bad repercussions of oil palm plantation development in Indonesia are polarized, but not evenly dispersed. This condition is demonstrated by Obidzinski et al. (2012), who discovered that economic advantages were not evenly dispersed in their research in Indonesia. Traditional/customary landowner stakeholders, for example, have faced constraints on traditional land use rights and land loss. Many researchers discovered a rise in land scarcity, an increase in land prices, and land conflicts in all studied areas (Obidzinski, et al., 2012). As a result, it can be stated that several parties, mainly the local community, are hurt or do not receive their rights in this case. Furthermore, Obidzinski et al. (2012)'s study is one of many that show that oil palm plantations have a major negative influence on the environment as well as the social, cultural, and political areas of society. From an environmental standpoint, oil palm plants require 1.25 to 2.31 mm of water per day and may absorb water to a depth of 5.2 m. (Dufrene et al, 1993).Because oil palm trees deplete groundwater, oil palm plantations can impair groundwater resources for crops other than oil palm (Kallarackal et al., 2004). This makes it incredibly difficult for people to get safe drinking water. State losses, on the other side, can result from a lack of significant treatment of environmental crimes. The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) researched to investigate how existing public rules and standards are claimed to solve three significant performance gaps impacting the coconut sector of Indonesian palm oil. The results demonstrate that policy implementation has not been effective, particularly for enterprises that do not comply with regulations. It was discovered that the interaction between state national regulations and private standards remained adversarial (Dayne, 2018). In terms of implementation and enforcement, "antagonism" can relate to how weak governance and corruption impede complete implementation (Luttrell et al., 2018). The above conditions represent a type of green criminology study, according to a criminology review.

So, based on the explanation above, this study will focus on two major aspects of oil palm plantations in Riau. First, it is concerned with the multiple detrimental effects of oil palm plantations in Riau, both environmental and socioeconomic. Second, this study will discuss several concerns concerning the governance of oil palm plantations in Riau. This component, the author believes, may be one of the reasons why, even though the effects of oil palm farms in Riau are genuine, numerous measures to mitigate them frequently fail. Furthermore, according to green criminology, environmental crime is related to the utilization of natural resources that ultimately produce harm to nature itself and mankind.

**2. Method**

This article employed qualitative research methodologies because they allow researchers to investigate social and cultural issues. The qualitative technique is a type of social action that stresses how people interpret and comprehend their experiences to comprehend the individual's social reality. Qualitative approaches are interested in beliefs, experiences, and meanings derived from personal experiences (Haradhan, 2018). Furthermore, the research method used is explanatory research. De Vaus (2002) distinguishes two categories of study based on their goals. The particular measures that the researcher must take to attain the research objectives. Examining numerous variables and conditions of environmental criminality in oil palm farms and their relationship to issues of governance of oil palm plantations, particularly in Riau, is one aspect of explanatory research in the framework of this study. In this regard, this research question begins with the question "why," followed by "how," to aid in making decisions on the topic and direction of study in clearly overcoming its boundaries (Blaikie, 2007). This paper used a literature review as a data gathering technique, specifically materials gathered from government agencies and non-governmental organizations that focus on environmental issues and environmental crimes. In this study, the literature review refers to gathering information from multiple books, journal articles, regulations, and other supporting papers. A review of the literature serves as the foundation for considerable and meaningful study. A literature review was used to determine what past research has done, what additional study is required, to identify variables related to the phenomena, and to identify the relationship between theory/concept and practice (Onwuegbuzie, Leech, and Collins, 2012). In connection with this research, a literature review is used to look at previous research related to environmental crime, green criminology, oil palm plantations, and management of oil palm plantations in Riau.

**3. Results And Discussion**

*3.1. Green Criminology Review on the Negative Impacts of Oil Palm Plantation*

According to the previous explanation, the use of oil palm has both beneficial and bad consequences. In these circumstances, the State, as a responsible actor in natural resource management, must be able to control the possible environmental and socioeconomic repercussions of oil palm plantations. The scenarios for mitigating potential consequences are typically in the form of legislation and policies. As previously stated, there are numerous regulations and policies in place to control the possible environmental and social implications of oil palm cultivation.

Regulations and policies can be classified as patterns of formal reaction in the context of dealing with crime from a criminological standpoint (Mustofa, 2007). Efforts to enforce environmental regulations are controlled as a type of formal reaction under Law Number 32 of 2009 about Environmental Protection and Management (UUPPLH), which provides three forms of law enforcement, namely administrative, civil, and criminal law enforcement. However, according to Dayne (2018), the implementation of environmental policies and regulations needs to be enhanced because deviations that can affect humans and the environment continue to be discovered.

According to the discussion of the green criminology study, this oil palm plantation operation can be considered an environmental crime due to its influence on the ecosystem. Environmental crime, often known as green crime, is defined by criminological research as human behaviors that misuse ecosystems and natural resources for their own sake and cause environmental damage (Beirne & South, 2007; Stretesky, 2013 in Lynch, 2020). This environmental damage will therefore have an impact on human life as well as other species such as plants and animals (White, 2008).

In the palm oil phenomenon, there are dynamics involving good and negative repercussions. Different perspectives on this phenomenon influence efforts to mitigate potential environmental repercussions. Many groups of people continue to exploit nature as much as possible, without preserving the environment. Instead, the exploitation is to perpetuate the positive impact of oil palm. Therefore, green criminology sees the tendency of damage to the ecological system to increase or support production, this is seen as a tendency to damage ecologically capitalism.

By using the treadmill of production approach, green criminology can be identified with ecological disorganization where human activities reduce conditions and force ecosystems to deteriorate. When pollution is introduced into an ecosystem or available resources are removed from nature for production, ecological disorder emerges (Lynch, 2020).

In addition to investigating oil palm plantation practices that may cause environmental damage. Green criminology also describes environmental economic crimes, one of which is related to palm oil extraction. Furthermore, there is a political economy relationship in the phenomenon of oil palm expansion, which borrows from Long et al. (2012) apply a theoretical model, namely the treadmill of production, examining how environmental damage is a direct result of the production process, growth, and capital accumulation, which is supported by the alignment of corporate and state interests (in Ruggiero & South, 2013). Instead of promoting economic progress, it harms the environment and depletes natural resources.

The collaboration of legitimate and illegal entrepreneurs with the state is a fundamental feature of this sort of environmental crime (Ruggiero & South, 2013). This relates to the risks associated with palm oil production, which can be evident in practice, rhetoric, and relationships on the ground, all of which reflect larger structures of power and control. The claim of the economics and agro-industry as a feasible solution to alleviate poverty and enhance living standards is part of a bigger form of ecological and power relations exploitation (Mol, 2017). Given these economic and agricultural claims, policymakers create regulations to control potential environmental impacts associated with palm oil production, such as the issuance of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) certificate, which aims to develop and implement global standards for sustainable palm oil production. The RSPO, on the other hand, is recognized to have failed to address the greater power asymmetry in palm oil production. Instead, the RSPO has aided in the consolidation of export-oriented palm oil firms and non-governmental organizations (Pichler, 2013).

Furthermore, the RSPO's composition prioritizes commercial interests in export-oriented palm oil firms and downstream industries throughout the chain in terms of power relations and strategic selectivity. As a result, transnational palm oil conglomerates in Southeast Asia agreed to apply selective environmental and social criteria (such as avoiding fires in land clearing, compensating for customary lands, or creating wildlife corridors for endangered species) to maintain market access, particularly in Europe. These certification and labeling procedures, however, do not cover all parties. resulting in institutional and strategic discrimination against plantation workers, smallholders, and indigenous peoples where these factors structurally marginalize plantation work (Pichler, 2013). In addition to the types of environmental crimes, green criminology has special attention to the implementation of public policies. Where, it is often found that the implementation of criminogenic public policies is carried out by corrupt governments, companies, and organized crime (Ruggiero & South, 2013). In the context of this research, various policies in the context of managing oil palm plantations contain various loopholes for the emergence of crime.

As previously stated, the implementation of oil palm policies in Indonesia creates opportunities for environmental crime. Whereas rules governing sustainable palm oil are densely packed with laws and legal procedures. At all levels, many new regulations are being developed. However, the multiple contradictory regulations create a confused and fragmented picture of responsibility (especially at the central to local government levels). Given the absence of clear authority and the inadequate enforcement context, a better constructed legal or regulatory structure does not always result in better outcomes. Many regulations create ambiguity and provide options for businesses to avoid complying with existing regulations (Luttrell, et al., 2018).

Law enforcement agencies, on the other hand, are weak, and authorities may not always have clear power or ability to enforce sanctions. In this setting, the value of additional regulatory development is called into doubt. Whereas the corporation criticizes the government for a lack of regulation, even though there are numerous regulations, the government cannot oversee them (Luttrell, et al, 2018). For example, despite the company's commitment to No Deforestation, No Peat, No Exploitation (NDPE), the policy is not always followed (Dayne, 2018).

*3.2. Palm Oil Plantation Governance Issues in Riau*

Various negative impacts of oil palm plantations in Riau that appear to be ignored and repeated, in the author's opinion, indicate a weakness in formal legal regulations related to environmental management, both national and regional levels as if ignoring the impact of environmental damage caused by human behavior, whether carried out on a small or large scale (by corporations). As stated in the State Minister of Environment Regulation No. 10 of 2010 on Mechanisms for Preventing Pollution and Environmental Damage Caused by Forest/Land Fires. Article 4 paragraph (1) means that customary law communities may clear land by burning with a maximum land area of 2 (two) hectares per family head for planting native types, with the obligation to notify the village head. The rule further states that land burning licenses are not permitted in situations of little rainfall, a lengthy dry season, or a dry environment. This provision is intended to provide chances for local communities to manage natural resources, however, it will influence environmental harm, particularly due to a lack of government oversight.

Meanwhile, the Riau Provincial Government released Governor Regulation Number 15 of 2010 regarding Amendments to the Riau Governor's Regulation Number 52 of 2008 concerning Guidelines for Land Clearing and Yards for Communities in Riau. Article 1 expressly permits land clearing by burning trees; of course, this causes air pollution and environmental damage, both to process natural resources and for other purposes. The legislation also states that land burning is permitted based on the accumulation of specific areas in each location, as stated in Article 1 paragraph 4.

This rule is very likely to allow companies to exploit and engage in reckless behavior, such as working with local communities to extend land and minimize land clearance costs by burning land. As a result, Central Kalimantan's total area in 2015 was 15.3 million hectares, of which 12.7 hectares (78%) were managed by plantation corporations (Djumaty & Dey, 2015).

The above-mentioned Governor of Riau Regulation Number 52 of 2008 is identical to pseudo-policy. Rather than benefiting local communities, it enables firms to accommodate the expansion and exploitation of oil palm farms. The regulation demonstrates that current environmental policy does not prioritize the restoration of environmental sustainability (Pease, 1998). By examining the significant interaction that exists between the state and businesses in the phenomena of environmental crime. The discovery of recurring environmental and social repercussions of oil palm plantations in Riau Province in the middle of existing governance that has been governed in a succession of laws and regulations sparked this topic.

Hamilton-Hart suggests that there is a risk of misgovernance in the overall implementation of oil palm certification policies, due to differences in implementation between the central, provincial, district, and local governments. This illustrates when the local government system is unable to incorporate central government policies into its regulatory system or is unable to convey its policy objectives to the public (Hamilton-Hart, 2014).

Many effects of territorialization have occurred in the regions since the implementation of a policy. Territorialization arises through strategic and operational processes related to the construction and application of procedural rules and regulations. Territorialization also occurs through rules and policy-making processes involving socio-technological processes linked to the spirit of a managerial approach to sustainability. The implementation of a policy will make people feel pressured by feelings of being forced, co-opted, or dominated by external forces. People are forced to do whatever the authorities want, even though they have no problem at all. The community must also give up their assets to be confiscated as well if there is a potential that is assumed to be detrimental to the authorities. Furthermore, the community also has a great potential to be harmed on their land, because they do not have any power at all (Ruysschaert, 2016). Various studies have shown that certain elements impede the seamless accessibility of itself for all "controlled" parties involved in the context of the Regional Government's authority in the PKS governance process. First, the geographical element will be linked to identification (Sikor & Lund, 2009). Identity becomes something embedded in a material, both living and non-living. The embedded identity in this context is the administrative area's identity. The challenge is that the administrative area cannot be described simply as a physical border established by the State; in actuality, this identity also tightly controls which regions are controlled by whom, who has the right to access them and for what

purposes the territory may be used. These three facts are only known to the authorities. These three facts, on the other hand, cannot be known in detail by the controlled party.

The second component is the knowledge component. Knowledge may be defined as any valuable knowledge that is kept in one's cognitive mind (Peluso & Lund, 2011). It is believed that the cognitive mind that has been filled will be able to perpetuate the next virtuous advantage, which is correctly motivating conduct or delivering benefits for himself and others in his life. However, the masters themselves are unsure of what relevant knowledge should be delivered in this setting. Doubts over who owns the territory of Rohul and Rohil force those in power to tread carefully before taking any action. Yet, strangely, it is preferable not to have to perform unnecessary things.

Finally, social ties are an important aspect of this situation. Social relations are complex that arise as a result of ongoing social interaction between numerous parties involved in a certain topic. A specific problem that all persons involved in it must be aware of. As a result, culture or culture, conventions, administrative processes, circumstances, events, and so on constitute the context's binding (Kinseng, 2017). Again, because the governing party only wants to build and maintain social relationships with parties that it finds profitable (read: capable of assisting in the maintenance of accessibility exclusively for itself), the party under its control will be excluded from the social connection. Instead of when social relations occur, social actions that are usually applied are dissociative social actions that give rise to social disintegration dictions such as contradictions to social conflicts (Abdulkadir-Sunito, Adiwibowo, Soetarto, Kinseng, & Foley, 2017). Corporate misconduct, often known as corporate malpractice, is a business behavior that undermines legality and becomes an adversary to socioeconomic justice (Wibisono, 2007). Misappropriating legal authorities, bribing state officials, tax fraud, and writing and following "rubber" rules and regulations are all examples of actions that can undermine legality. That is, such a nature is the production of the most recent article product following the occurrence of a criminal crime that is controlled in such a manner that only the perpetrator benefits. the antagonistic nature of the socioeconomic justice in question is that it can be done in a variety of ways, such as closing public access to the traded investment land, accusing and punishing anyone who is not proven to have stolen assets, doing illegal logging, and/or burning land without a permit. It should also be highlighted that, anthropologically, the author's last point has the potential to cause discord over local citizens' ulayat rights.

## 3. Conclusion

As discussed, various issues concerning the regulation of oil palm farms and their influence on the environment in Riau can be viewed as complicated phenomena. As a consequence, this study will conclude with some conclusions that will validate the findings of the preceding debate. The first conclusion is about the conflicting laws and regulations. In Indonesia, laws in the form of exemptions or permissions must seek rechtsbeginsel, which must be rational or logical. To prevent meaninglessness, double meaning, or ambiguity, as well as insufficient explanations, legal sources and their derivations must have relevance, importance, and solid descriptions. A violation of this principle can occur for four reasons: (1) There are still issues in the stages of national law. This is intended by the interpretation of the parties in charge of deriving articles from statutory rules, such that when there is a misconcentration, there will be disharmony between the newest article's execution and the 1945 Constitution; (2) There are still issues in the bill's phases. This is implied by corrupt acts between authorities and authorities to carry out plans that will one day only safeguard them all; (3) Citizens' engagement in the law remains low. Citizens are supposed to be able to participate in both national legislation and the enactment of laws constitutionally. Because citizens are the most susceptible subjects to legal infractions. This is also what leads to many citizens becoming criminals, even though they are victims in certain oil palm instances; and, (4) the incidence of ineffectiveness non the DPR's plenary actions. The actions of the DPR plenary session are widely known to employ the most recent articles, which are out of date, have no modifications, and only benefit specific parties (Lobubun, Raharusun, & Anwar, 2022).

Based on the nature of the prior first difficulty, the second conclusion speaks to the nature of bureaucracy. It is his criminogenic disposition that allows for the creation of forms of power abuse and maladministration. Since this deviation might cause harm, it is classified as a crime. Environmental harm means "environmental damage," and this term is frequently used by scholars when analyzing the influence on the environment. Environmental harm is

a contentious notion. This is due to the fact that the definition of harm utilized is frequently a legal and legal meaning. However, the concept of environmental harm utilized by academics in its development is becoming more prevalent, and it does not rely solely on legal and legal definitions (White, 2011).

The study of environmental damage is based on an examination of societal harm or social injury. This is because the study of social harm covers a wide range of human losses and is not restricted by legal or legal considerations (White, 2013). The distinction is that overall socioeconomic disadvantage targets the full range of human needs and rights, whereas environmental degradation addresses species other than humans as well as people themselves (White, 2014). Accordingly, environmental harm is concerned with the health and well-being of humans, the environment, animals, and plants (White, 2022). In his discussion of environmental damage, he talks about environmental degradation. Environmental degradation is the depletion of natural resources, ecosystem damage, habitat destruction, extinction of environmental animals, and pollution (Johnson, et al., 1997).

Environmental damage, like social harm, is a societal structural problem. This is because the person in control of this phenomenon is not only where huge corporations are, but people also play a part in this phenomenon (White, 2014). According to White (2010), environmental damage is genuinely ecological harm that has a detrimental impact on people, the biosphere, and species. The examination of environmental damage in a normative criminological debate examines ecological issues such as how human activities generate both significant and little environmental damage.

In the subject of green criminology, two definitions of environmental harm are clarified. First, some changes are harmful to humans, the environment, and animals. Second, environmental damage is caused by the state, companies, and those in power, who can modify the definition of environmental crimes to justify environmentally detrimental behaviors. The second definition by White (2022) stresses how the acts of power parties are compared to individuals as environmental agents. Green criminology employs these two criteria when discussing perpetrators and victims. Environmental harm affect both humans and the environment, as well as animals, plants, and other species, with a focus on those in power. Individuals as actors, according to green criminology, have a relationship with the prevailing mode of production and class disparities, such that the biggest culprits of environmental destruction remain the governing party (White, 2022).

The conclusion in this discussion is the susceptibility to misuse of power as a result of power distribution. This debate raises the prospect that establishing lobby spaces at the regional level will be more relevant if done at the central level and vice versa. Because of the restricted pattern of people's engagement, the lobby space can only be wide open for those controlling parties (Hadi, 2019). People or individuals may only express their political desires through restricted events related to the implementation of public policies, which are ironically only held at regional general elections or post-conflict municipal elections. Adopting a quasi-referendum system results in "representatives" of the public interest being granted complete authority solely to public officials. Therefore, especially in the context of the oil palm plantation crisis, the end of the fraud perpetrated by private investors that should be rectified by the political elite will not be fixed: it will reoccur as a true result of terrible governance practices carried out compactly. This is referred to as plebiscitary leadership democracy (Held, 1987).

There are also three issues discovered when examining the expansion of the stakeholder ranks and the growing number of interest groups. The first question is how equal opportunity for economic advancement will complicate administrative policies in practice. According to the 1945 Constitution, the Republic of Indonesia is required to provide equal distribution of opportunity in the form of economic progress for all Indonesians. To carry it out further, the State must allow each Regional Government to carry out its management activities through regional autonomy. Given that each regional government has lived and worked in their separate areas, the implementation of regional autonomy is considered to produce a more effective and efficient implementation performance. Local governments are therefore considered to be the most knowledgeable actors and are aware that each region's challenges are inherent in that region. The issue is that the management rules that are in place burden the administrative order. The implementation of economic equity inevitably comes to a halt on its administrative bounds as a result of the numerous parties involved. As a result of the first issue, which is the creation of coalitions or alignments amongst rulers who do not wish to prioritize the interests of local citizens and/or customs, this will continue to the following issue. Finally, the creation of "little kings" in each region makes this problem worse.

The data that surfaced were from indigenous peoples and they were a part of the poor governance practiced by the authorities and corporations.

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# Regional Head Election, Money Politics, and Corruption: An Alternative Solution

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**Abstract**
This study aimed to study the massive and systematic extent of money politics in the 2017 elections of the Bireuen District. This study used a qualitative method with the participant-observer approach. Data were collected through FGD at Al-Muslim University in Bireuen and in-depth interviews with the relevant parties. The practice of money-politics in the Bireuen election was very immaculate and well-coordinated. It started by collecting the photocopies of ID and family registry cards and ended with distributing the money before and after the voting. The campaign teams in each village helped to assist this process to the villagers. The study found five major causes of money politics in the Bireuen District. First, the public confidence in the political elections has declined. Second, the political orientation of the community was pragmatic. Third, several candidates had the same power in the election; thus, they had no other choices but to give away money to the public in the hope of being elected. Fourth, the prevention of money politics in the local elections of the Bireuen regent was somewhat weak. The elections supervisory committee does not have the authority to punish the political money perpetrators but could only give recommendations to the District Independent Elections Commission (KIP). These recommendations are subject to being processed or neglected. Lastly, the regulation of money politics was also weak in the Bireuen regional election. This massive money politics in Bireuen could be prevented by establishing a concept and formulating policies in the form of qanun (Islamic bylaws) in Aceh. The qanun could cancel or disqualify the regent candidates if they are proven to have committed money politics based on convincing and legally binding evidence. The political parties could also be deprived of their political rights to carry the regional head candidates for a term of office. Aceh, through its self-government, has a special authority to produce regulations that do not contradict the higher regulation in Indonesia. The function of the qanun is to break the chain and the money politics system by imposing punishment on the regent candidates and political parties. This research has never been investigated before, especially the regulation potential to break the chains of money politics by establishing a qanun to be applied in Aceh.

**Keywords:** Local Election, Political Candidates, Money Politics, Corruption, Regulation

## 1. Introduction

Money interventions in political life have been entrenched in Indonesian culture. The relationship between economy and politics is the main character behind the development model of a country adopting the democratic

system. Money is a significant medium or instrument for controlling energy and resources. It has a distinctive characteristic from the beginning, which can be transferred and exchanged (Alexander, 1976; Aspinall, 2015; Rifai, 2003). The practice of money politics is rampant in the 2018 elections. Money is difficult to avoid when one runs for election in Indonesia because the current elections require extraordinary political costs. Being a candidate requires money, and everyone seems to agree with that. The use of money in the elections would not produce the best regional leader. The leader will concern more on the 'return of investment' rather than providing good services to the community (Badoh & Dahlan, 2010; Purdey, Tadem, & Tadem, 2016).

Money politics have become a new trend and have been entrenched in the Acehnese community (Serambinews.com, 2017c). One local media reported that during the Aceh Governor Election in 2017, the residents of Gampong Ulee Glee of Bandar Dua Subdistrict in Pidie Jaya were allegedly involved in money politics by distributing envelopes containing IDR 50,000 money and business cards of the candidate pairs of number 5. The envelopes were delivered three days ahead of the election (Serambinews.com, 2017b). Money politics does not only take place in Pidie Jaya District in the 2017 election but also happen in Bireuen District. The members of the Bireuen community and youth alliance protested the alleged money politics practice in front of the Election Supervisory Committee Office in Bireuen (Modusaceh.co, 2017). The protesters demanded the investigation of alleged practices of money politics in the 2017 elections in Bireuen. One of the candidates was reported to give away IDR 100,000 money to the voters (Serambinews.com, 2017a).

The practice of money politics during the local election in the Bireuen District was deployed massively and systematically by the pair of candidates who finally won the election. Information about the practice of money politics was not only discussed by the public but also became the subject of discussion among the election participants (Kanalaceh.com, 2017). As a result, except for the witnesses from the candidate number 4 and 6, others refused to sign the voting recapitulation minutes at the sub-district level. In addition, 17 sub-districts in Bireuen also denied the signing of the voting minutes (AceHTrend.com, 2017). This rejection denotes a negative value for the regional democratic party in Bireuen since money politics had become the public consumption of daily gossips. The politicians who took part in the political contest for district regent have not taken any lesson from this phenomenon. The regional head candidates who participated in the political contest should be able to provide political education to the community. All candidates are supposed to rely more on their work programs or vision and mission for the next five years rather than embarking on the money politics practice. On the other hand, most voters do not consider the candidates' programs and track record before voting (Nurrahmi, 2017) so that they will be easily manipulated by the candidates.

In that case, the independence of the election organizers is also at stake when supervising each candidate in campaigning their programs. The election supervision committee (PANWASLIH) is obliged to oversee the process of organizing the elections properly by referring to the law. PANWASLIH has given them the authority to supervise every move of each candidate participating in the regional election (Makhya & Bakti, 2017; Nivada, 2015; Zulfa, 2017).

It has been shown that money politics has the potential to adversely affect the democratic process. The money politics can also cause discrepancies in the practice of political power by the winning candidates (Pamungkas, 2010; Syahbandir, Hasan, & Izwar, 2019). These thought-disturbing facts on the practice of local political democracy have encouraged the researchers to conduct research on this topic. This study aims to examine the issue of money politics by specifically looking at the 2017 regional election of Bireuen, Aceh, as a case study in order to provide alternative solutions to combat money politics.

## 2. Literature Review

The practice of money politics in Indonesian is bribery. The meaning of bribery in the standard Indonesian dictionary is the money used for bribery. Money politics is the exchange of money with the aim of determining one's position. Policies and political decisions are made in the name of the public interests but led to personal,

group, or political party gain. Money politics can also influence other people. For example, the use of private or party's property to influence the voters, distribution of material rewards, buying and selling votes in the political process, and distributing money. Money politics is part of the corruption in the election process. It is basically a bribe transaction performed by a candidate with the aim of gaining votes (Badoh & Dahlan, 2010; Goodpaster, 2001; Kumolo, 2015; Maiwan & Zid, 2017; Pamungkas, 2010; Sardini, 2019).

Money politics is defined as the use of money or rewards to directly influence to vote for the candidates who would protect the interests of the funder. The main purpose of money politics is to protect the interests of the funder by influencing the actions of the government to defend their interests (if the president or governor candidate they support is elected). Politics unarguably needs funds. Political expenditure is planned and used for various campaign programs to build political communication with constituents, absorb and articulate interests to the community. In the competition to win the voters, politicians without funds are almost certain to lose. However, political funds and money politics are clearly different. They differ in the mode and source of the fund used to earn voter support. Politicians who do not have funds will almost certainly be defeated and eliminated. They not only need a large enough campaign fund to win the support of constituents but also funds to gain the blessing and support from the party elites who back them (Hidayat & Kleden, 2004; IFES, 2000; Lane, 2014; Mochtar, 2011).

Politics can also plunge people into the vortex of crime, as "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." People who have power tend to be evil, and if they have so much power, the tendency to become evil increases exponentially. The motives for political action are three basic things: maintaining power, adding power or displaying power. This phenomenon can be found in Indonesia politics. Those who were poor and mediocre become wealthy beyond common sense and logic. Many politicians and bureaucrats in Indonesia have been caught in a raid by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) for alleged bribery and corruption as public officials. Based on data from the Corruption Eradication Commission, 65% of criminal acts of corruption committed are in the form of bribery cases. The KPK released that from 2004-2019 there were 124 regional heads caught in corruption. 65 percent act criminal corruption handled KPK is cases bribery. Corruption committed by these state officials has resulted in state losses and decreased public confidence towards officials, bureaucrats, and politicians in Indonesia. As a result, political contestation is only for power contest event for the elite to justify any means (Dhakidae, 2015; Johnston, 2005; Komisi Pemberatasan Korupsi, 2017).

Therefore, corruption highly correlates with the rampant cases of money politics that are commonly found during 'unhealthy' elections in Indonesia. Although the election is expected to celebrate democracy, it failed to run its function because it is rife with fraud committed by election participants. In this regard, money politics is one among manifested election fraud in Indonesia (Kumolo, 2015; Permata, 2015, 2017a, 2017b; Permata & Zuchron, 2018).

The emergence of the practice of money politics found in most elections in Indonesia has become the biggest challenges to democratization in the country. In some regions, money politics is practiced in public, either it is done by the candidate or his/her campaign team. Politicians have conducted illicit practices during elections to gain votes. The most common and striking manifestation of electoral crime is to bribe voters (Goodpaster, 2001; Kurniawan, Rahmatunnisa, & Agustino, 2017; Permata, 2017a, 2019; Pfeiffer, 2004; Rahman, 2015).

An example of money politics is the case of Bowo Sidik Pangarso, the legislative candidate from Golkar Party for Central Java *Dapil* (electoral districts) 2, who was caught red-handed by KPK. It was found 84 boxes contained approximately 1,400 envelopes comprising IDR 20,000 and IDR 50,000 denominations. The total is around IDR 8 billion rupiah. KPK suspected that the money would be used to buy votes before the polls opened (cnnindonesia.com, 2019; Kontan.co.id, 2019; Tempo.co, 2019). This case is similar to the cases of Adriatma and Asrun. The two were caught red-handed by KPK because they received a bribe from a businessman (cnnindonesia.com, 2018; Okenews, 2018; TribunSolo.com, 2018). Asrun requested campaign funds from businessmen to participate in the 2018 Southeast Sulawesi Governor Election. The bribe is expected to be used for money politics (Antaranews.com, 2018; Kompas.com, 2018b; Tirto.id, 2018).

Another case of money politics involved the legislative candidates from PAN, Mandala Abadi and Lucky Andriani, who were sentenced to six months in prison and an IDR 5 million fine. Both were believed to be guilty about distributing umrah coupons and door prizes during their political campaigns. Mandala was a legislative candidate for Jakarta *Dapil* (electoral districts) 2 number 5 from PAN. While Lucky was a legislative candidate for Jakarta *Dapil* (electoral districts) Central Jakarta number 6 from PAN (detiknews, 2018a; Kumparan, 2018; Liputan6.com, 2018).

A case of money politics also occurred at the organizers of Indonesian elections. The former head of the **Garut** Elections Supervisory Committee (**Panwaslu Garut**), Heri Hasan Basri, and the former commissioner of the **Garut** General Elections Commission (**KPU Garut**), Ade Sudrajat were caught red-handed by the Anti-Money Politics Task Force. Both received bribes including money and cars from one of the Garut regent candidate (detiknews, 2018b; Kompas.com, 2018a; TribunLampung.co.id, 2018).

### 3. Method

This research was a case study which was aimed at understanding ideas and values from the research subjects. In case study research, a researcher determines the framework to collect information or data based on certain categories, such as socio-cultural background, interpretation system, etc. The research method suitable for case study research is a qualitative method. With the above assumption, this research used a case study design and the object of the study was the regional head election, money politics and corruption as an alternative solution.

The method adopted was a qualitative method, with ethnographic and naturalistic inquiry approaches. A naturalistic inquiry is an approach for the understanding of social actualities and realities, and human understanding which has not contaminated with dominant characteristics of formal measurements or previously formed questions. Therefore, an ethnographer task in an ethnographic research study with a naturalistic inquiry approach is to extract people's perception, not to interpret their perception. One of the methods to extract their perception is fox taxonomy, i.e. extracting people's perception gradually (Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2007; Glaser & Strauss, 2017).

The use of a qualitative method in this research was motivated by the fact that it was more adaptable to situations when there is more than one fact and when they are more than one influences, values, and procedures. This study was descriptive exploratory research to understand the regional head election, money politics, and corruption. The results of this exploratory study can become a preliminary insight into the regional head election, money politics, and corruption.

Therefore, in this research, the results will reflect the data which have been conducted through in-depth interviews with informants and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) (Aminah & Roikan, 2019; Gorton, 2012; Silverman, 2015). Informants participated in in-depth interviews are Amiruddin Idris (Campaign team), Halim Zulkifli and Siti Aminah (voters), An-Nisa (NGO activist), Muliadi (academics), Dr. Purnama (the Aceh legislative candidate), Obama (politician/businessman), Muchlis R, Syauqi Futaqi (the Aceh legislative candidate), and Tgk Abdullah (ex-politician). In addition, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was conducted at Al-Muslim University on 24 April 2019 with 18 participants including the Vice Head of the Regional Legislative Councils (DPRK) of Bireuen, community leaders, organizers of elections, academics, politicians, journalists and voters.

### 4. Result and Discussion

*4.1. The root of Money Politic Issues in Bireuen Regional Election*

The massive transactional politics, such as that of money politics, is caused by several issues that can be studied thoroughly. Bireuen is one of the regions in Aceh Province which is still actively practicing money politics. Some political parties in Bireuen had prepared the money to buy votes per package in the regional head election. The price of each package between IDR 300,000 to IDR 500,000. The practice of money politics often becomes the root of the problem during the regional, legislative, and presidential elections. It is still unknown as this practice

occurs in the first place, whether due to the lack of campaign at the community level, lack of human resources in the election organizers, a culture in a democratic party, or only for economic opportunities in every five years. Based on the results from the FGD at Al-Muslim University on 24 April 2019, seven participants revealed that the anti-money politics campaign was still limited as it was only carried out in the city. The other six participants also answered that the government had less role in campaigning the money politics at the public level. Two participants argued that there was no specific budget regarding the money politics campaign in the elections. The last two participants provided different answers. The first said that the public participated in the campaign but still received the money while the others suggested the need for political education to the community and the money politics campaign.

In addition to the money politics campaign, the competence of an election organizer is a crucial issue. The organizer must be honest, clean, and independent in carrying out their duties. Low competence in the field of supervision may cause the practice of money politics. Based on the results from the FGD at Al-Muslim University on 24 April 2019, six FGD participants revealed that money politics in the election was caused by the lack of supervision knowledge among the election organizer, which resulted in the vulnerable implementation of political rules. Other five FGD participants also disclosed that the low competence of election organizers inhibited innovation in preventing corruption. Innovation in preventing money politics is very important in addition to knowledge of supervision to prevent money politics. Two FGD participants mentioned that the low educational background also triggers the practice of money politics. It can be concluded that money politics violations in the Bireuen regional election were caused by low competence of the organizers, lack of innovation, and low educational background.

Transactional politics (money politics) in Bireuen does not only happen in recent years but has occurred in previous years. It has grown to a culture taking place in every five years during the political contest. Political actors and the public have various reasons for participating in money politics. The practice of money politics in the Bireuen regional election could be observed from the public behavior in determining their political choices. This was found in the FGD at Al-Muslim University on 24 April 2019. Seven participants said that people chose certain candidates only if they receive benefits from them. Three participants also mentioned that the community received money from the prospective regent multiple times before the election. The other three participants explained that the community had a tendency to choose regent candidates based on their winning potential and big capital. They also further suggest that a small proportion of people received money but did not necessarily vote for them.

The case of money politics in Bireuen cannot be generalized to certain candidates who did not receive money but won, such as Abu Tumin Tu Haidar's son, who won the legislative election without giving money. According to interview with Amiruddin Idris (a campaign team) on 26 Mei 2019 in Bireuen, there are several factors that trigger the rise of money politics, such as lack of trust in political parties and the house of representatives and political and transactional fluctuations. He further added that the public punished these politicians by not re-electing them in the next term.

*4.2. Forms of Money Politics in Bireuen Election.*

Various forms of money politics are often carried out in the political competition. These include money, objects, facilities, and positions. This practice is carried out in order to win the political competition in the regional head election. The forms of money politics are as follows:

4.2.1. Cash Money

Cash money politics during the Bireuen regional election was technically carried out by distributing groceries and money during the political campaign. The distribution of money and groceries to voters is followed by an agreement to elect the benefit provider. Based on the interview with Halim Zulkifli, Blang Kulam resident on 28 May 2019, the agreement began by collecting the copies of ID and family card, after which they were given money prior to voting.

Village officials such as *Geuchik*, *Imum Gampong*, *Tuha Peut,* and *Tuha Lapan* are also involved in practical politics. They collected copies of the community ID cards and established a team at the village level. The people in Bireuen are afraid to report this money politics practice because its execution is so neat and systematic. It is difficult to prove even though the practice is real. In addition, based on the interview with Siti Aminah, Blang Kulam Residents on 28 Mei 2019, the candidates for the 2017 elections involved in the money politics came from the Golkar Party. She further added that the money politics strategy by distributing groceries and money to the public greatly contributed to Golkar's victory in the previous regional election.

4.2.2. Public Facility

Political promises made by candidates who took part in democratic parties usually have transactional political content or political reciprocity between the potential leaders and their supporters. The political promises are usually in the form of public facilities and require a commitment before and after being elected. These promises are usually related to public facilities such as footpaths to rice fields, water dike, and mosque construction. The case of money politics in regional head election is carried out by politicians, elites, and the public. Based on the interview with Muliadi, academics, at Al-Muslim University on 27 May 2019, there are three common forms of money politics; buying a position by paying a ransom to the political parties, buying opportunities and impunity so that the election administrators, witnesses, and law enforcers do not blame their practices, and buying people's votes.

Looking at the case study, there are two forms of money politics in Bireuen's regent elections. The first is political dowry. This is an act of purchasing positions or determining candidates by the political parties to advance someone as the regent candidate. Regarding political dowry, FGD at AL-Muslim University on 24 April 2019 revealed that out of eighteen FGD participants, fourteen participants stated that there was a political dowry in the Bireuen regional election. Two participants answered that there was a cadre crisis within the party. Thus, the party was looking for candidates outside the party, which was aimed to benefit the party. The other two participants did not express political dowry but said the candidates only sought profits once every five years. Second is buying people's votes. Buying the votes was done by giving away money before the election. The money was given away in various amounts. This practice of buying people's votes was observed when fifteen FGD participants coined the existence of money politics in the Bireuen regional election, where the campaign team of regent candidates gave away money to the public before voting. Apart from money, two FGD participants also mentioned that the campaign team also provided groceries and other facilities. One participant mentioned that those who got the money usually had access to the campaign team. Transactional politics in the Bireuen regional election was very strong and involved many people. In fact, this region was once in the public spotlight in Aceh and national levels.

*4.3. Actors involved money politics in local election in Bireuen*

Many actors are involved in the democratic process of political power, such as society, elites, and related stakeholders. Their involvement has important roles in the political dynamics of the governor, regent or mayor elections. In the case of Bireuen district election, many actors were involved in money politics. The followings are the results of the FGD regarding the actors of money politics in the 2017 Bireuen regional election. Seven participants mentioned that political parties, prospective regents, and the public were involved in money politics. The other five participants stated the campaign team, political parties, and prospective regent. The other participants cited the pairs of the regent candidate, the campaign team, community leaders, political parties, and related parties, while one person did not provide any answers. In every political election in Bireuen, those who have interests such as political parties, prospective regents and the public are often involved in money politics.

(a) **Political Parties.** The party involved in money politics was the party that had the dominant positions in the parliament and won the election. This party tended to be transactional and pragmatic in the recruitment process. Because the political costs are so high, this party demands a political dowry in the recruitment process of the regent candidate for the local election. This was reported by the sixteen FGD participants. They mentioned that the crisis within the party led to the party looking for the regent candidate from outside the party who was able to give benefits to the party. Two other participants mentioned that it was only to seek benefits for the five years term.

(b) **Regent Candidate.** Prospective Regent is the main actor with interest in political competition every five years. Their presence in political competition has a variety of motivations and missions. Their supporters and the campaign team were expecting access to power, interests, and money. The FGD conducted at Al Muslim University showed that the Bireuen regional election was very pragmatic and transactional. Fifteen participants explained that the regent candidate, through his campaign team, gave away money to the community before the election. One participant mentioned that in addition to money, they also distributed groceries to the communities. Another participant also added that they also provided facilities to the community on top of money and groceries. The other participant highlighted that this was executed by a coordinated network with the distribution delivered all at once.

Based on the interview with Siti Aminah, the Meunasah Blang resident on 26 May 2019, the candidates for regents who violated money politics were from one of the national political parties. This party won the election by bribing people with money. The money was usually distributed by women. People know that the candidate was a rich man in Bireuen and had a lot of money. In addition, some national parties also employed money politics by delivering food or money to win the election with the amount of IDR 50,000 and IDR 100,000 per person. However, the community did not vote for every candidate who gave them money because there were many candidates who did the same. Every political party and many village officials were involved in the practice of money politics.

(c) **Community.** Society is the main and vital object of political intents. It is a social entity that influences social and political interests. The community is the main object that supports the desires of politicians, such as legislative candidates and regent candidates. The dynamics that occurred in the Bireuen community in the 2017 elections were very disturbing for the democracy in the region that seek to generate quality leaders. The massive practice of money politics by the regent candidates who gave money and groceries the community was hurting the democracy. The engagement of the Bireuen community in money politics because the previous regional leader failed to realize their political promises. This was revealed by eight participants during the FGD at Al-Muslim University on 24 April 2019. Six participants mentioned that the community preferred the candidate who gave them money and groceries because the previous regent failed to fulfill their political promises. Two participants explained that the community was disappointed because the incumbent did not keep their political promises. Other participants also disclosed that the community was disappointed in the political process that had been developed in this country. Many regional leaders did not keep their political promises. Some participants commented that the previous regent was good and was not involved in money politics even though he was an incumbent in the 2017 Bireuen regional election. The involvement of the Bireuen community in money politics during the 2017 regional elections is against the law and can be detrimental to everyone. The pragmatic nature of this society can affect the value of democracy and the quality of leaders yielded by this transactional system and money.

*4.4. Money Politics Prevention*

In the 2017 Bireuen regional election, the regent and legislative candidates committed many violations of money politics that were massive enough to become a conversation at the provincial and national levels. Money politics in Bireuen can be prevented by regulations that limit the political space of the perpetrators of money politics during the regional and legislative elections. Interviews with Dr. Purnama (the Aceh legislative candidate) and Obama (politician/businessman) on 26 Mei 2019, showed that one of the most important actors in preventing political money is political parties. Political parties can prevent political money by recruiting revolutionary, not instant cadres. The cadre should be carried out not only for one and two years but also sustainably. A good recruitment process will certainly produce good leaders. As a result, there would be fewer leaders involve in money politics during the campaign or election.

Regional head candidates who have fewer influences and are not well known to the public tend to adopt an alternative winning strategy by distributing money and groceries to the community. The proliferation of money politics was not only triggered by poor supervision and lack of public trust but also affected by intense competition between several candidates who have the same power. Thus, the candidate chose to execute money politics strategies ahead of the voting. Base on the interview with Tgk Abdullah, ex-politician on 28 May 2019, the similar fate took place in the legislative election; some candidates also gave IDR 500.000, - to elect a package of candidates for DPRK, DPRA, and DPRI. It was usually the women who distributed the money to the community.

Among several candidates in the regional head election, only one person was involved in money politics. According to the interview with An-Nisa, NGO activists on 27 May 2019, to anticipate money politics, *qanun* (Islamic bylaws) on money politics should be issued in Aceh. Aceh, with its special autonomy, self-government, and the Law on the Government of Aceh (UUPA), has the right to produce such a bylaw. Several parties must involve in formulating the money politic *qanun* such as cultural leaders, community leaders, scholars, and academics.

The followings are the results of the FGD at Al-Muslim University on 24 April 2019 on corruption prevention in the regional head election. Twelve participants suggested that the *qanun* regulating money politics may prevent the practice of money politics in the elections. Similarly, two participants suggested a special institution that oversees the practice of money politics. Four participants suggested that the elections be carried out by members of the council (not direct election). The application of such a *qanun* is aimed at breaking the chain of money politics in society during the political contest such as the regional head and legislative elections. With the existence of such a *qanun*, we would be able to observe the effectiveness of the money politics prevention. Constitutionally, money politics is included in criminal law and Sharia law. Since the enactment of Sharia in Aceh, there are several *qanun* that has been implemented to prohibit *khalwat* (seclusion between unmarried couple), adultery, *khamar* (liquor), and *maisir* (gambling). The *qanun* on money politics can be specified in the form of punishment for money politics perpetrators such as disqualification of the regent candidate and sanctions for proposing party by ceasing the right to propose the regent candidate in the next election.

The enactment of *qanun* regulating money politics in 23 regencies or cities in Aceh will force the political parties to recruit high competence and honest candidates for the regent. The party also has an important role in creating a democratic political climate and eliminating transactional political behaviors. The mechanism of a *qanun* regulating money politics, which will be designed and implemented in Aceh, can be seen in the scheme below:



Figure 1: Mechanism of a *Qanun* on Money Politics

Conceptually, the presence of such a *qanun* is an innovation to anticipate the massive practice of money politics during the political contest. This *qanun* also supports the weaknesses of the current regional and legislative election regulations in executing various practices of money politics. The money politics has caused problems in political competition and damaged the ongoing democratic system. The *qanun* on money politic is expected to be the main instrument against the prevention of transactional politic and money politics in Aceh and set to become a role model for other regions.

*4.5. The Impact of Money Politics on the Quality of Democracy in Bireuen Election*

The practice of money politics in society is a political reality that often befalls in every political contestation. This money politics does not necessarily surface up by itself but is often triggered by both internal and external triggers. Based on the interviews with NGO activist, legislative candidates, politician, ex-politician on 27-28 May 2019 in Bireuen, money politics has a devastating effect on the political order and creates social unrest in society. It

changes the orientation of one's behavior to be pragmatic in choosing the regional leaders. Ideally, in choosing leaders, one must look at their track record, vision, and mission and not on the money they gave away.

The behavior of money politics in the society changes the political orientation of the society towards pragmatic, opportunistic, and apathetic behaviors. The pragmatic attitude of the people in the Bireuen district can be seen during the regional executive and legislative elections. This was revealed during the FGD at Al-Muslim University on 24 April 2019. Eleven participants explained that the community experienced moral degradation due to the elections. People tend to be pragmatic, only prioritize profit, and do not think about the region. Two participants also cited that the community had no shame in infringing the law, social and religious norms. The other two participants revealed that the community no longer put honesty first in their attitude. Furthermore, one participant disclosed that the political paradigm of the society had been damaged. Lastly, there was one participant who did not provide answers and one participant who confirmed all the statements above regarding the impact of money politics in Bireuen.

Money politics also has a social impact. Six participants mentioned that the community no longer prefers honesty. Six participants assumed that the community lost confidence in the democratic system in the elections. Four participants answered that the community suffered from mental and moral damage. The other two participants, on the other hand, have different opinions. They argued that money politics has no social impact and influence. Indirectly, money politics carried out by the political elites have created a new culture in democracy, the culture of money politics.

Based on the research findings, it can be concluded that money politics increasingly damages the public morals, encourages the community to ignore the law and religious norms, and makes people lose faith in regional leaders.

## 5. Conclusion

Money politics in Bireuen district is a crucial problem that needs to be resolved. This study offers several recommendations to prevent money politics in the presidential election, legislative election, and regional head election. There is a need to establish *qanun* to regulate money politics violation by adhering to the Aceh Government Regulation. The *qanun* aims at breaking the chain of the massive system of money politics during the election in Aceh. Academic experts should be involved in drafting the *qanun* to govern the practice of regional head and legislative elections in Aceh.

This research is very limited in its scope of the study, only examines the regional election, money politics and corruption in the city of Bireuen. Nevertheless, the results of the study have illustrated that the problem of money politics in the Bireuen District Election is severe. This study also indicated that money politics is not only practiced in Bireuen but also highly possible to be found in other regencies/cities across Aceh. Therefore, future studies should be conducted in other regencies/cities in Aceh.

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# Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Depression Among the Undergraduate Students Learning Online During the Covid-19 Pandemic: The Gender-Based Analysis

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**Abstract**

This investigation attempts to verify the difference in generalized anxiety disorder and depression among undergraduate students learning online during the COVID-19 pandemic based on gender. Moreover, to accomplish this aim, this study utilizes 271 undergraduate students with batches 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 in the management department at the Business Faculty of Maranatha Christian University, Bandung, as the samples. The survey to obtain the students' data was from September until October 2021. Besides, the data are analyzed by the difference examination. After examining their response by independent samples t-test, this study demonstrates that females have higher generalized anxiety disorder and depression levels than males.

**Keywords:** Depression, Gender, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, The Covid-19 Pandemic, Virtual Learning

## 1. Introduction

At the start of 2020, all nations must fight against the coronavirus spreading from Wuhan, China (Danylyshyn, 2020). As the poorest effect, the persons infected by this virus died (Utari, 2020). This infection comes from droplets when the infected ones unintentionally cough, sneeze, and speak (World Health Organization, 2020). In Indonesia, to prevent the spread of this virus, the President of the Indonesian Republic, Joko Widodo, requires Indonesians to support social distancing by worshiping, working, and studying from home (Cahya, 2020).

Related to the study, during the pandemic, all higher education institutions in Indonesia must conduct virtual learning for students, as Circular Letter of the Minister of Education and Culture No. 36962/MPK.A/HK/2020 on

March 17, 2020 (Hasanah et al., 2020). Entering 2021, the Indonesian government started a vaccine program (Gandryani & Hadi, 2021). According to Budi Gunadi Sadikin, Minister of Health, it functioned to end the pandemic. In the educational field, lecturers and supporting personnel in higher education institutions become the target to be vaccinated after teachers and supporting personnel in early childhood, elementary, junior, and senior high schools (Widyawati, 2021).

This vaccination is prepared for the higher education institutions to hold a limited face-to-face meeting[1] in July 2021 with strict health protocol. This limitation means that the institutions must conduct blended learning, i.e., online and onsite combination, for the students (Azanella, 2021). Furthermore, to support online learning, the learning management system is vital (Yunus, 2021). Also, video conference platforms still become relevant, such as Zoom Meetings, Google Meet (Ekasari & Ahmad, 2022), and Microsoft Teams (Rojabi, 2020).

Generalized anxiety disorder becomes problematic when students learn online during the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia (Dinata et al., 2021; Hasanah et al., 2020). Through their research, Dinata et al. (2021) demonstrate that 44% of 166 students are particularly severe anxiety disorder. The rest are at average, mild, middle, and harmful levels: 11.4%, 6%, 22.3%, and 16.3%, respectively. Unlike Dinata et al. (2021), Hasanah et al. (2020) report that 41.58% of 190 students are in regular and mild levels, respectively. The rest, 16.84%, are at the medium level.

Also, when learning online, depression becomes an issue for students during the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia (Hasanah et al., 2020; Panjaitan & Suhartomi, 2022). Through their study, Hasanah et al. (2020) demonstrate that 96.32% of 190 students are at the average level, and the rest are at the mild level: 3.68%. In their study, Panjaitan and Suhartomi (2022) classify the students into two groups based on depression: the absent and available categories and the assessment of virtual learning: good and bad categories. After employing the cross-tabulation analysis based on the chi-square test, they effectively prove the relationship.

Furthermore, to differ this study from theirs, we investigate the difference in anxiety disorder based on gender by denoting Islam et al. (2020), Alshammari et al. (2022), Hakim et al. (2022), and Hamaideh et al. (2022), and depression based on gender by mentioning Islam et al. (2020), Lee and Jeong (2021), Azmi et al. (2022), Hamaideh et al. (2022), Ekasari and Ahmad (2022), and Pelucio et al. (2022). Moreover, to support our investigation, the undergraduate students in batches 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 in the management department in the business faculty of Maranatha Christian University, Bandung, based on the survey result from September until October 2021.

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1. Generalized anxiety disorder based on gender

Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is a common mental health problem expressed by an unstable emotional tone (Adwas et al., 2019). Someone with this disorder will worry about several things, such as health, money, and family, without clear arguments (National Institute of Mental Health, 2022). According to Bandelow et al. (2017), this disorder has two symptoms. The first is somatic: tremors, palpitations, dizziness, nausea, and muscle tension. The second is psychic: the difficulty of concentrating, calming, sleeping, and comforting.

In their study, Islam et al. (2020), with 476 university students in Bangladesh as the samples, declare that males are more dominant than females at the different levels of GAD: minimal, mild, moderate, and severe. Alshammari et al. (2022), employing 418 students at King Saud University as the samples, locate that females are more anxious than males. By comparing the anxiety level of 60 medical students following the computer-based testing by their gender at Wijaya Kusuma university in Surabaya, Hakim et al. (2022) deduce that females are more worried than males. After investigating the gender-based anxiety disorder of 1,380 undergraduate students at Hashemite

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[1] This meeting has been allowed since the even semester of the academic year 2020/2021, usually started in February 2021, as informed by the Circular Letter of Director General of Higher Education No. 6/2020 (Azanella, 2021).

university in Jordan, Hamaideh et al. (2022) infer that the worrying level of females is greater than that of males. Based on the evidence, the first hypothesis is formulated like this:

H₁:      The generalized anxiety disorder of female students is more extensive than that of males.

*2.2. Depression based on gender*

Like anxiety disorder, depression is another mental health problem (Moy & Ng, 2021; Panjaitan & Suhartomi, 2022). It destructively influences personal feelings and the way of people for their thoughts and behaviors. Therefore, they will be pressured and not motivated anymore to do all the previously enjoyable things (Torres, 2020).

Once investigating the various levels of depression: none-minimal, mild, moderate, moderately severe, and severe, the investigation of Islam et al. (2020), utilizing 476 university students in Bangladesh as the samples, proves males are more foremost than females. In their research using teenagers aged between 15 and 18 in South Korea, Lee and Jeong (2021) exhibit that females are more depressed than males. Azmi et al. (2022) report a gender difference in depression: women are more depressed than men based on 157 investigated students learning online in Riyadh. Similarly, this evidence is confirmed by Hakim et al. (2022) after learning from the behavior of 60 undergraduate students in a medical department at Wijaya Kusuma university in Surabaya, Indonesia.

Through their study investigating the gender-based depression level of 1,380 undergraduate students at Hashemite university in Jordan, Hamaideh et al. (2022) infer that females are more depressed than males. Ekasari and Ahmad (2022), based on their study of the 344 students at the Alauddin Islamic state university in Makasar, demonstrate that the total number of women with all depression levels: average, mild, and, moderately and highly severe, is higher than that of men. Once studying 152 students learning in Rio de Janeiro, Pelucio et al. (2022) found that females have higher depression than males. Based on the evidence, the second hypothesis is formulated like this.

H₂: The depression of female students is more extensive than males.

## 3. Research Method

*3.1. Variable Measurement*

This study quantifies anxiety disorder based on Dhira et al. (2021) and Alshammari et al. (2022) by seven items: I am panicky and anxious and not relaxed (GAD1), I cannot control my fears (GAD2), I am worried about various matters (GAD3), I cannot be tranquil (GAD4), I cannot easily rest (GAD5), I can get furious (GAD6), and afraid as if something terrible happens (GAD7). Besides, this study classifies the level based on Islam et al. (2020). The respondents do not have this symptom if the total score is below 5. If it is between 5 and 9, mild symptom exists. If it is between 10 and 14, moderate symptom occurs. If it is equal to 15 and above, severe symptom happens.

Besides, this study measures depression based on patient health with nine items employed by Huang et al. (2006): DEPR1 – DEPR9 (see Table 1) and determines the level by mentioning Sun et al. (2020) and Islam et al. (2020): If the total score is between 0 and 4: the depression is normal, 5 and 9: mild depression happens, 10 and 14: the moderate depression exists, 15 and 19: the depression is moderately severe, and 20 and above: severe depression happens.

Table 1: Patient health items to measure depression

| Code | Item | Description |
|---|---|---|
| DEPR1 | Anhedonia | I cannot feel pleasure |
| DEPR2 | Depressed mood | I am unhappy. |
| DEPR3 | Sleeping problem | I cannot sleep well. |
| DEPR4 | Short strength | My strength decreases. |
| DEPR5 | Appetite change | My eating pattern changes from too much to too little or the reverse. |

Table 1: Patient health items to measure depression

| Code | Item | Description |
|---|---|---|
| DEPR6 | Low self-esteem | I am not virtuous because my family members are disappointed with me. |
| DEPR7 | Concentration difficulties | I cannot concentrate easily. |
| DEPR8 | Psychomotor agitation | I delay the work until late. |
| DEPR9 | Suicidal ideation | I have the idea of killing myself. |

*Source: Huang et al. (2006)*

### 3.2. Population and samples

The population of this study is the 843 undergraduate students in the management department among batches 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 in Maranatha Christian University. This research must calculate the representative sample (RS) for executing the simple random sampling method. Moreover, this study utilizes the Slovin formula with a 5% margin of error, as Suliyanto (2009) states, to fulfill it (see equation one).

$$RS = \frac{TP}{1+Ne^2} \quad (1)$$

By this formula, the representative samples (RS) intended are $= \frac{843}{1+843(5\%)(5\%)} = \frac{843}{3.11} = 271$ students.

### 3.3. Method to collect data

This study surveys the students to collect the responses. Through this survey according to Hartono (2012), this study distributes the questionnaires to the respondents. Following Dhira et al. (2021) and Huang et al. (2006), the four-point Likert scale measures their response: Zero if they do not feel it, and three if they feel it.

### 3.4. Statistical method to analyze the responses

The involvement of the answer to the items needs validity and reliability examination. Therefore, this study uses confirmatory factor analysis consisting of loading factor, average variance extracted (AVE), and composite reliability coefficient, based on structural equation model (SEM) based on covariance, as Ghozali (2017) explains. Furthermore, the answer is accurate if the loading factor and AVE are higher than 0.5 (Ghozali, 2017). Meanwhile, reliable responses happen when this composite coefficient exceeds 0.7 (Sholihin & Ratmono, 2020).

As a consequence of the covariance-based SEM, the virtuousness of the fit model needs to be checked based on absolute fit measurements, such as CMIN/DF, root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), and integrity of fit index (GFI). The required value is between two and five for CMIN/DF and from 0.05 to 0.08 for RMSEA. For GFI, the essential value should be 0.9 (Ghozali, 2017).

Finally, by considering the different groups based on gender associated with anxiety disorder and depression, this study utilizes the independent samples t-test, as Ghozali (2021) enlightens, for hypothesis testing. According to Hartono (2012), this test is classified as parametric; therefore, the related data, GAD and DEPR scores, need to follow the normal distribution. Moreover, this study utilizes Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test to prove it by denoting Ghozali (2021).

## 4. Result and Discussion

### 4.1. The student features in the survey

This survey was conducted from September until October 2021 and got 271 students as the participants. Moreover, they are classified based on batch, gender, age, the confirmation of being vaccinated, and various levels of generalized anxiety disorder and depression; their total is available in Table 2.

- The highest number of students is from batch 2021 (33.58%), the female group (50.18%), and the age group between 21 and 22 years old (43.91%).
- The lowest is from batch 2015 (1.48%), the male group (49.82%), and the age group between 17 and 18 years old (24.72%).
- The students receiving the Covid-19 vaccines dominate this survey, reflected by 60.89%. The rest do not receive it yet (39.11%).

Additionally, the total student with mild, moderate, and severe generalized anxiety disorder levels is 90, 80, and 45, with portions of 33.21%, 29.52%, and 16.61%, respectively. Meanwhile, 56 students without these symptoms exist (20.66%). For depression levels, the highest is from the students with mild indication: 79 (29.15%). The second, third, fourth, and fifth come from students with moderate: 77 (28.41%), moderately severe: 45 (16.61%), asymptomatic: 37 (13.65%), and severe: 33 (12.18%).

Table 2: The profile of students based on batch, gender, age, confirmation of getting vaccinated, and GAD and depression levels

| Feature | Description | Total | Portion |
|---|---|---|---|
| Batch | 2015 | 4 | 1.48% |
| | 2016 | 6 | 2.21% |
| | 2017 | 75 | 27.68% |
| | 2018 | 26 | 9.59% |
| | 2019 | 29 | 10.70% |
| | 2020 | 40 | 14.76% |
| | 2021 | 91 | 33.58% |
| Gender | Female | 136 | 50.18% |
| | Male | 135 | 49.82% |
| Age | 17-18 | 67 | 24.72% |
| | 19-20 | 85 | 31.37% |
| | 21-22 | 119 | 43.91% |
| The confirmation of getting vaccinated | Received | 165 | 60.89% |
| | Not received yet | 106 | 39.11% |
| Generalized anxiety disorder level | None: 0-4 | 56 | 20.66% |
| | Mild:5-9 | 90 | 33.21% |
| | Moderate: 10-14 | 80 | 29.52% |
| | Severe: 15 and above | 45 | 16.61% |
| Depression level | None: 0-4 | 37 | 13.65% |
| | Mild: 5-9 | 79 | 29.15% |
| | Moderate: 10-14 | 77 | 28.41% |
| | Moderately severe: 15-19 | 45 | 16.61% |
| | Severe: 20 and above | 33 | 12.18% |

*Source: Survey data*

### 4.2. The validity and reliability checking result

Panel A of Table 3 depicts covariance-based SEM's validity and reliability results. The items of generalized anxiety disorder, GAD1 until GAD7, have a loading factor higher than 0.5: 0.784, 0.761, 0.695, 0.538, 0.649. 0.701, and 0.821, and AVE greater than 0.5: 0.508. This situation demonstrates the accurate responses to these items. Also, these items have a composite reliability coefficient upper than 0.7: 0.877. Therefore, a reliable answer to them is attained.

Similarly, the loading factor of DEPR1 until DEPR9 is above 0.5: 0.785, 0.721, 0.657, 0.720, 0.758, 0.685, 0.707, 0.658, and 0.679, and AVE is beyond 0.5: 0.503 (see Panel A of Table 3). Consequently, the validity examination

is achieved. Besides, the composite reliability coefficient for these items is more than 0.7 0.901 (see Panel A of Table 3). Based on this condition, the answer is already consistent. Furthermore, Panel B of Table 3 demonstrates the goodness of fit detection, and satisfying results exist, reflected by CDMIN/DF between 2 and 5: 2.402, RMSEA between 0.05 and 0.8: 0.072, and GFI next to 0.9: 0.893.

Table 3: The result of validity and reliability and the detection of the goodness of fit

| Panel A: Validity and reliability examination result | | |
|---|---|---|
| Items | Loading factor | |
| | Anxiety disorder | Depression |
| GAD1 | 0.784 | |
| GAD2 | 0.761 | |
| GAD3 | 0.695 | |
| GAD4 | 0.538 | |
| GAD5 | 0.649 | |
| GAD6 | 0.701 | |
| GAD7 | 0.821 | |
| DEPR1 | | 0.785 |
| DEPR2 | | 0.721 |
| DEPR3 | | 0.657 |
| DEPR4 | | 0.720 |
| DEPR5 | | 0.758 |
| DEPR6 | | 0.685 |
| DEPR7 | | 0.707 |
| DEPR8 | | 0.658 |
| DEPR9 | | 0.679 |
| AVE | 0.508 | 0.503 |
| Composite reliability coefficient | 0.877 | 0.901 |
| Panel B: The result of the goodness of fit model | | |
| CMIN/DF | 2.402 | |
| RMSEA | 0.072 | |
| GFI | 0.893 | |

*Source: Modified Output of IBM SPPS AMOS 19*

### 4.3. The result of the preliminary parametric testing

As mentioned earlier, the normality test needs to be fulfilled to perform the difference in anxiety disorder and depression scores based on gender. Based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the asymptotic significance (2-tailed) for the GAD and DEPR scores is 0.133 and 0.065 (see Table 4). These values are beyond the 5% significance level; these scores follow the normal distribution.

Table 4: The normality test result

| Research Variable | GAD | DEPR |
|---|---|---|
| N | 271 | 271 |
| Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z | 1.163 | 1.308 |
| Asymptotic Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.133 | 0.065 |

*Source: Modified Output of IBM SPPS 19*

### 4.4. The testing result of the difference in anxiety disorder and depression based on gender

Table 5 demonstrates that variances of GAD and DEPR for males and females are equal, as proven by the probability of the F-statistic of the Levene test above a 5% significance level: 0.362 and 0.215. Therefore, the

relevant t-statistic and its likelihood (2-tailed) for GAD based on gender are -2.375 and 0.018, and for gender-based DEPR, they are -2.796 and 0.006.

Related to the statistical examination result presented in Table 5, the average GAD of males (8.5556) is lower than that of females (10.0662), supported by the significant difference at 5%, reflected by the probability (1-tailed) of the t-statistic of 0.009 lower than 5%. Consequently, females have a higher anxiety disorder than males. Additionally, the average DEPR of females (12.5441) is higher than that of males (10.3630), supported by the significant difference at 5%, reflected by the probability (1-tailed) of the t-statistic of 0.006, lower than 5%. Thus, females have a higher depression than males.

Table 5: The testing result of the difference in anxiety disorder and depression based on gender

| Description | Variances assumption | Test of Levene for equal variance | | t-test for Equality of Means | | | | | |
| | | F | Probability | Mean Difference | Std. Error Difference | t | df | Probability | |
| | | | | | | | | 2-tailed | 1-tailed |
| GAD for males: 8.5556 and females: 10.0662 | Equal variances assumed | 0.833 | 0.362 | -1.51062 | 0.63600 | -2.375 | 269 | 0.018 | 0.009 |
| | Unequal variances assumed | - | - | -1.51062 | 0.63588 | -2.376 | 268.458 | 0.018 | 0.009 |
| DEPR for males: 10.3630 and females: 12.5441 | Equal variances assumed | 1.547 | 0.215 | -2.18115 | 0.78004 | -2.796 | 269 | 0.006 | 0.003 |
| | Unequal variances assumed | - | - | -2.18115 | 0.77988 | -2.797 | 268.402 | 0.006 | 0.003 |

*Source: Modified Output of IBM SPPS 19*

*4.4. Discussion*

The first hypothesis testing result demonstrates that the GAD level for females is higher than that for males: female students are more anxious than males. This circumstance occurs because women sensitively use their emotions; conversely, men tend to argue based on their logic (Hakim et al., 2022) and control their feelings well (Hosseini & Khazali, 2013). During the pandemic, students worry about infection, the uncertain future, the family financial crisis, and death (Dinata et al., 2021). Therefore, the proof from our hypothesis testing in this research is in line with Islam et al. (2020), Alshammari et al. (2022), Hakim et al. (2022), and Hamaideh et al. (2022).

The second hypothesis testing result demonstrates that the depression level of females is higher than that of males: female students are more depressed than males. According to Albert (2015), this situation exists because the female age is between 14 and 25, almost equal to the age range detected in this study: 17 to 22 (see Table 2). In learning, depression comes from the stress of following the class (Tuasikal & Retnowati, 2019), boring virtual learning, and the distress of facing exams (Azmi et al., 2022). Therefore, the result from our hypothesis testing in this research supports Islam et al. (2020), Lee and Jeong (2021), Azmi et al. (2022), Hakim et al. (2022), Hamaideh et al. (2022), Ekasari and Ahmad (2022), and Pelucio et al. (2022).

Moreover, to overcome the anxiety of female students, the lecturer needs to stimulate them to think positively about facing the negative effect of Covid-19 by stressing the vaccine's usefulness in decreasing the symptoms of Covid-19 and suggesting that students get vaccinated for whom have not received it yet. Furthermore, to reduce the depression level of all students, including females, the lecturer should create an exciting classroom by combining the materials delivered with funny videos or jokes, stimulating them to laugh. Outside the class, the

students with moderately severe and severe depression levels can consult with a counselor in counseling service in the directorate of students and alumnae at Maranatha Christian University.

**5. Conclusion**

This investigation aims to verify and analyze the gender difference in generalized anxiety disorder and depression. Furthermore, this study takes 271 undergraduate students of the management department at Maranatha Christian University virtually learned during the Covid-19 pandemic as samples. Based on the data testing of their responses, this research concludes that generalized anxiety disorder and depression in females are higher than in males. As the boundary, this study only examines gender as the determinant of generalized anxiety disorder and depression. This reality allows other scholars to study their related factors, for instance, age, sports, social roles, living status: with or without family, and living area.

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# Mediators in Portugal: Training, Status and Professional Recognition

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**Abstract**
Mediation is an area of activity that has been increasingly (re)known for its potential for the prevention and positive management of conflicts, for the promotion of social ties and social cohesion, as well as for the development and empowerment of interpersonal relationships. Therefore, it seems relevant to call into discussion the quality of mediators' practices by analysing their training and professional recognition. The objectives of the present study have focused on identifying the main contexts associated with the development of the profile of mediators and analyzing the actions implemented for the consolidation and recognition of this professional group. Based on literature review, the analysis of normative production on the topic, and the results of a questionnaire applied to Portuguese mediators, the following conditions and challenges for the establishment and recognition of the mediator profession have been identified: quality training, collective feeling of professional identity, professional sregulation and formal recognition of the profession in institutional settings, both in public and private contexts.

**Keywords:** Identity, Mediators, Mediation, Professional Recognition, Quality

## 1. Introduction

The progressive growth of mediation practices across Europe is increasingly felt, Portugal being one among may other countries that have embraced the progressive social and political acknowledgement of mediation in response to needs arising from contemporary social dynamics (e.g. cultural diversity, diverse family structures, the political landscape, the growth of radicalism and increased litigation). This growth also reflects the investment made into training mediators, both in Higher Education and in other institutions, such as associations of mediators. This growing involvement with the mediation agenda demonstrates a consistent interest to leverage the quality of mediation practices and consequently guarantee the quality of training, mediator identity and its professional recognition.

Mediation is a specific methodology of social intervention for the development of peaceful, humanistic and sustainable societies oriented towards the prevention, management and collaborative resolution of conflicts. It is

a methodology that requires 'a professional', the mediator, with specialized training, to carry out a preventive and collaborative, non-adversarial, voluntary, participatory and confidential procedure. Mediation requires important skills for the social and organizational contexts of a rapidly changing society, it presupposes the need to develop complex activity, and consequently it inscribes mediators in a hybrid profession (Noordegraaf, 2007).

For some years now, the quality of mediation practices and the professional identities of mediators have been discussed in depth through various research and scientific papers (Silva, Caetano, Freire, Moreira, Freire, & Ferreira, 2010 ; Faget, 2010; Brandoni, 2011; Guillaume-Hofnung, 2012; Silva, 2015; Bonafé-Schmitt, 2017; Álamo & Villaluenga, 2020). Over the past 25 years, regulatory documents have been published that regulate and specify the responsibilities of mediators. Concomitantly to this development, the last three decades have also revealed the growing importance of ensuring that mediators acquire the required skills for reflexive competent practices.

Even so, the work of professional recognition that has been developed has not been enough to guarantee the professional legitimation of the mediators. In this sense, this study intends to contribute to this reflection and discuss the importance of legitimation and recognized professional legitimacy in the affirmation of the professional identity of mediators.

Talking about the sociology of professions and organizations in this work is essential because it allows defining what characterizes a profession and professional identity (Abbott, 1988; Dubar & Tripier, 1998; Dubar, 1997; Evetts, 1997; Evetts, 1997; 2003, 2013; Noordegraaf, 2007). Throughout the 20th century to the present, several categorisation trends can be identified on what is or should be considered a profession: from the functionalist, to the interactionist, neo-Weberian and neo-Marxist perspectives. It is mainly from the interactionist perspective and, particularly, from the Chicago School approach that the emphasis is placed on a holistic and dynamic analysis of the profession (Tripier, 1987). More recent studies consider the use of the term 'professional groups' more appropriate to broaden the field of analysis and incorporate new realities in the field of work and professional dynamics (Evetts, 2003; Demazière, 2009; Demazière & Gadéa, 2009), such as the dynamics of work, organizations and occupational groups today.

In Portugal and several other countries (such as France, Italy, Belgium, Spain) the development and establishment of mediation as an activity and as a professional occupation of mediators happened gradually. At the end of the twentieth century (from the 1980s onwards) mediation as institution became more visible, namely through the use of internal rules and regulations (including procedures) and the normative recognition of intervention areas. The beginning of the twenty-first century has witnesses an expansion of mediation activities in new areas. Mediation has been capable of providing innovative responses to social problems (in schools, communities, organizations, families…). Several associations have been created, such as the Association of Conflict Mediators (2002) and the National Federation of Conflict Mediation (2012). However, even if, the professional activity of mediators has proven to be relevant for current knowledge societies, the recognition of mediators as a professional group remains fragile, diffuse and yet to be done.

This text reviews the findings of several of the above-mentioned studies, going on to expand upon previous knowledge with recourse to new data and information gained from mediators in Portugal: the outset of the professional activity, the formalisation in legal documents and the process through which mediators gain recognition. Two questions emerge to which answers are sought in this paper so as to illustrate the trajectory mediators in Portugal: i) What are the main circumstances that have led to the development of the job profile of mediator in Portugal?; ii) Which steps have been taken to attain the professional recognition of mediators in Portugal?

We have reviewed international research carried out over the last 30 years and considered Portugal's legal framework to provide a descriptive and prospective systematisation of the path taken by mediators within the Portuguese context. The study is occasionally backed up by statistical data collected from a survey carried out in April 2021 about the profile of Portuguese mediators, by recent projects and initiatives that aim to consolidate and regulate the practice of mediators in Portugal, as well as provide their formal professional recognition.

The text is divided into four main parts. The first presents a brief definition of the profile of mediators, as well as a reflection on their training and professionalisation. The second provides a brief description of the method, data collection and analysis. The third addresses the status and professional background of mediators and contains reflections on the ethical and deontological Codes of Conduct developed both nationally and on a broader European scale to standardise and consolidate the 'professional' role of mediators. The fourth and final part provides a conclusion in which we reflect on the obstacles and difficulties encountered in the recognition of mediators in Portugal and how these can be overcome.

## 2. The training and professionalisation of mediators

Since the dawn of human existence and interaction, individuals in positions of natural authority and social prestige have acted as mediators to (re)establish order, kinship and peace between conflicting people and groups (Six, 1990; Torremorell, 2008). Mediation is therefore not a new profession; but official recognition of mediation as a profession is, however, recent. Lascoux (2009, p. 24) claims that "(…) from this slow evolution, a profession of peacebuilders, life smoothers: mediators" has emerged, and Demazière (2009) states that some ambiguity still exists around the profession, which is detrimental to the social and professional recognition of mediators. As stated in a previous publication (Silva, 2015), several factors contribute to this ambiguity: the multiplicity of areas within which mediators operate, the diversity of practices related to mediation and the training undergone by mediators. Highton and Álvarez (1999) also highlight the multidisciplinary roots underlying the origin and development of mediation, which according to the authors (1999, p. 191), "enrich the profession, but also negatively impact on its sense of identity and the way in which mediators themselves see their profession".

Several mediation training courses are run both within Portugal and Europe, contributing to the training and specialisation of mediators. This diversity became evident in Portugal from 2010 onwards, when regulations were made regarding the professional qualification of mediators in the mediation systems of Alternative Dispute Resolution Office (GRAL) (Directive No. 237/2010, of 29th April). In addition to highlighting the emergence of a new "player" in legal practice, who operated independently of public institutions - the conflict mediator -, these rules specify the general and specific conditions conflict mediation training courses have to meet to enable their graduates to provide public mediation services. The requirements established for courses and accredited institutions do not adhere to a unified scientific framework nor to common standards, which leads to a diversified training offer, in terms of the training organisation and the number of training hours, the syllabus content and certification of the trainers, which results in various student outcomes that are rarely followed up upon or supervised. An international study carried out (1) (Silva, 2015) on the subject offers the following results: "A lack of common initial, prolonged, quality, specialised training leads to Mediators having diverse educational backgrounds prior to becoming mediators – both in terms of their level of education and the subject areas studied" (Silva, 2015, p. 158).

Though initial training based on a multitude of frames of reference helps to strengthen the practice of mediation as a whole, it prevents mediators from establishing a professional identity and from having their profession officially recognised (Torremorell, 2008; Silva, 2015). According to Faget (2010), the construction of a professional identity has several inherent prerequisites: the requirement of a considerable amount of initial and continuous specialised quality training is a recognised practice; the establishment of professional networks structuring the profession; as well as the ethical and deontological principles applied thereto. However, it has already been established that no standard initial training exists, as well as that public recognition of the occupation and the amount of needed practice are still fragile. It can therefore be concluded that specialised initial and in-service training is key to ensuring quality training is carried out that strengthens the specificities, knowledge, and skills expected of practising mediators (Silva, 2015).

Initial standard training is therefore pinpointed as an opportunity to provide specific knowledge essential to the practice of mediation. According to several authors, this consolidation takes place when undergraduate degree courses in mediation begin to be run by Higher Education institutions (Silva & Munuera., 2020). Thus far, the only registered university courses in mediation have been either at Masters or Doctoral levels. Bonafé-Schmitt (2017) emphasises that mediation courses run by various European universities encompass different subject areas,

including psychology (used to manage emotions), law (for knowledge of litigation and legal processes), sociology (for the ability to assess different action plans), and economics (in order to mediate on matters relating to financial management). Mediators can thus build on a substantial professional background they can draw upon in order to exercise their profession.

According to Guillaume-Hofnung (2012), standard initial training cannot exclude in-service training, as the initial training described is aimed at young mediators who never had training in mediation, whereas in-service training would be strictly aimed at experienced mediators. The purpose is that, through in-service training, experienced mediators can deepen new knowledge related to mediation and continue to practice it with the greatest possible rigor and quality. In-service training gives mediators the opportunity to improve their practices and adapt their interventions to the current demands of society.

Standard initial and in-service training reflects the measures put forwards in the Directive on Mediation in the Member States European Parliament Resolution (2011/2026 (INI) numbers 18 and 20, respectively), which recognises the "need for increased awareness and understanding of mediation" and "the importance of establishing common standards for accessing the profession of mediator in order to promote a better quality of mediation and ensure high standards of professional training and accreditation across the Union".

In short, mediation training is essential to ensure the legitimacy and autonomy of mediators, as well as the acquisition of skills, values, and essential knowledge required in order to exercise the profession adequately. The specialised knowledge required to practice mediation professionally, which is to be obtained in a basic common training course, constitute the prerequisites upon which to recognise, acknowledge, (re)construct and affirm the individual and collective status and identity of mediators.

## 3. Method

In Portugal, over the last decade, studies on mediation, the areas of activity of mediators and the training offers at university level (postgraduate, master's and doctoral) and non-university levels have expanded. However, despite the fact that mediation is a growing area of intervention, with two decades of implementation, the recognition of mediators as a professional group remains fragile and diffuse. Although the issue of identity and professional recognition of mediators has been analyzed and debated for several years (Demazière, 2009; Faget, 2010; Guillaume-Hofnung, 2012; Silva, 2015; Bonafé-Schmitt, 2017), in Portugal professional recognition continues unrealized. However, there has been a growing mobilization of mediators and associations that represent them in claiming this formal recognition.

The growing relevance of mediation and mediators in contemporary societies, for the promotion of peace and social cohesion, encouraged us to carry out an investigation into the situation of this professional group in Portugal. The research presented here is predominantly quantitative and, in this work, reference will be made only to a part of the quantitative data.

*2.1 Instruments and procedures*

To respond the research questions of this work, two methods were used: desk research and analysis and questionnaire survey.

Desk research focused on the various legal documents and codes of ethics produced in Portugal regarding mediation and mediators and on various empirical and theoretical studies on the subject at national and international level. Although the study focuses on Portuguese reality, it is relevant to understand the international reality of mediation since it is subject to different levels of evolution and legal, empirical and theoretical recognition depending on the country. To grasp different realities and needs (legal, theoretical, practical and scientific) is important to understand which aspects to (dis)claim when defining the profession and the professional activity of mediators in Portugal. The diverse documents were analysed from an integrative perspective. Firstly, we searched for legal documents in the databases "Diário da República Eletrônico" and "Official Journal of the

European Union"; then we searched for empirical and theoretical articles in the databases "ScieELO", "RepositoriUm" and "Google Académico". The following descriptors and their combinations in Portuguese, English, French and Spanish were used: "conflict mediation", "conflict mediators", "mediation training", "mediator recognition", "mediators as professionals". The inclusion criteria defined for the selection of these documents were: documents published in Portuguese, English, French and Spanish; mediation articles; documents and articles on the practice of mediators in different contexts; published and unpublished documents on mediation training; published and unpublished documents on the professional recognition of mediators; and documents published and indexed in the last 25 years.

Data collection covered a total of 30 documents published between 1998 and 2021: 12 of a legal nature and 18 of a scientific nature (theoretical reviews, empirical studies and meta-analyses) with mediation and mediators as the central theme. These documents were subjected to descriptive critical analysis which was organised through text and figures. The aim was to summarise and gather as much information as possible on mediation and on the social, institutional and legal challenges to its professional recognition.

The questionnaire survey on the profile and employment status of mediators in Portugal was implemented as part of a European project Erasmus+ LIMEdiat (reference: 2020-1-FR01-KA203-079934). The structure of the questionnaire included a total of 23 questions: 7 closed-response, 9 multiple-choice, 3 with Lickert-type scale and 4 with open-response, and was applied online, through the Google Forms application, to Portuguese mediators. The survey consisted of four sections: 1) sociodemographic characterisation; 2) training paths in mediation; 3) professional action of mediators; 4) expectations on existing and desired training. This article focuses on the first three dimensions. Data were collected, processed, stored and shared in accordance with the European Data Protection Regulation.

*2.2 Participant*

The questionnaire survey applied reached a total of 175 participants constituting a non-probabilistic sample, since the total number of the study population is unknown. The snow-ball method was used to reach these 175 mediators as the questionnaire was disseminated through social networks and the project's email. Since the universe of this population is not known, this strategy proved to be the most advantageous to reach the largest possible number of mediators.

*2.3 Data analysis*

Data processing and analysis of the quantitative data of the questionnaire was performed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program (version 27.0 for macOS). Data analysis followed three phases: 1st phase - data organization, exclusion of invalid information and recoding of variables; 2nd phase - analysis of coding discrepancies; 3rd phase – moment when the descriptive data were generated.

Triangulation of collected data from the questionnaire and desk research crossed information resulting from various types of documents, for a broader, diachronic and updated analysis, thus broadening the understanding of the phenomenon in the Portuguese case. Triangulation of data has two phases: the first was the internal analysis of documents; and the second was the triangulation of data. After being organised, analysed and described separately. Data were correlated in terms of how mediation developed in concrete action and in the Portuguese legal framework.

**3. Results and discussion**

The social and professional recognition of professional group is essential to its development and consolidation, as is the affirmation of its identity with regard to other professions or professional groups. Although a small number of documents regulating the practice of mediation exist within Portugal and Europe, the profession is not listed in the Portuguese Framework of Professions, which negatively affects recognition of the occupation both professionally and socially. The difficulty encountered by mediators as a result of these circumstances is that they

may find entering the labour market challenging, their roles most often co-opted by other professionals untrained in mediation. This may be the case in schools, for example, as well as in residential care homes for children and young people, among several other institutions. This lack of professional recognition means that a large majority of mediators in Portugal work as freelancers, even when working for public mediation systems.

The regulatory documents and codes of ethics relating to the status of mediators are subsequently presented in response to the first question asked in this paper: What are the main circumstances that have led to the development of the profile of mediator in Portugal? We respond to the different topics based on an analysis of Portuguese laws and regulations in the field of mediation, an analysis of the codes of ethics developed by Portuguese mediation associations, and an analysis to the results of the implemented questionnaire.

*3.1 Regulatory framework*

In Portugal, the role of mediators is legally established by the Law of Mediation (Article 2 of Law No. 29/2013, of 19th April), which states that the mediator's role is limited to resolving conflicts:

"b) 'Mediator' is deemed to be an impartial and independent third party, devoid of powers of imposition upon the parties to the mediation, who assists the parties in their attempt to obtain a final settlement on the subject matter in dispute."

In addition to this law, there are regulations to recognise, characterise, and regulate the professional practice of mediators in various specialist areas: Cultural Mediators for Education (Joint Ordinance no. 304/1998, of 24th April); Socio-Cultural Mediators (Law No. 105/2001, of 31st August); Family Mediators (Ordinance no. 18 778/2007, of 13th July); Criminal Mediators (Law no. 21/2007, of 12th June); Mediators in Public Mediation Systems (Decree law No. 237/2010, of 29th April); Business or Company Recovery Mediator (Law No. 6/2018, of 22nd February). These pieces of legislation are complemented by ethical codes of conduct, which were issued with the aim of standardising and guiding the practice of mediators. The Code of Ethics and Deontology for Mediators (Association of Conflict Mediation (AMC), 2003) is of particular note, as is the European Code of Conduct for Mediators (DGPJ, 2014), the Code of Deontology and Good Practices for Mediators (Federation of Conflict Mediation (FMC), 2016). The reading of these regulations and codes of conduct provides an image of mediators as conflict mediators, who take on a neutral, dialogic, empathetic role to ease communication and help reach a consensual agreement between parties to a dispute. However, what mediators actually do is to aid parties in restructuring the relationship between them. They play a broader role rather than strictly providing the necessary support for them to reach a consensual solution to a dispute. We may thus conclude that "(...) the role of the mediator is to activate interaction and communication networks, to suggest bridges, or walkways, that may serve to bring together those who are unable to, or find it difficult to, communicate." (Silva et al., 2010, p.121).

The timeline presented below provides a more comprehensive understanding of the development of legislation relating to mediators in Portugal (figure 1). Though it provides a stylised image of the regulatory path traced by mediation practices in Portugal, the figure presented above also raises several questions regarding the congruence and uniformity of such regulation.

Figure 1: Timeline representing the development of Portuguese legislation relating to mediators
*Source: author's own elaboration*

As no standardised initial training is provided to professional mediators, every professional with an interest in the area feels entitled to publish information on their roles, which rather than contributing to standardise the interdisciplinary role of a mediator, essentially serves to further stratify the occupation and its essence (Silva, Carvalho & Aparício, 2016). According to Torremorell (2008, p. 16), "This is because of the high level of permeability between theorists and, in practice, each mediator relies on the combination of assumptions closest to those gained through their education, values, area of work, experience and context, among others". Furthermore, when we limit the role of mediators to facilitators of conflict resolution, as has been often the case, has proven to be too restrictive, since it is common knowledge that mediation also seeks to prevent and transform conflicts (Silva et al., 2010; Gimenez Romero, 2019). Mediators take on the role of independent, impartial, prudent, respectful professional figures that strive for inclusion, cooperation, and justice, they preserve communication in situations of social complexity, they are builders of social cohesion and humanity (Torremorell, 2008; Oliveira & Freire, 2009).

The complexity of the practice of mediation is clear in the way it connects to a range of contexts in which it can be applied and in myriad of training processes and ethical codes of professional development that have been created. This complexity conditions the assertion and recognition of the definition of mediator, which in turn leads to the socio-professional group becoming segmented and blurred, and consequently lacking significant political and legal legitimacy (Faget, 2010; Silva, 2015; Silva et al., 2016).

The skills required by mediators are founded in specific expertise relating to know-how (to know, to do and to be) that must be constituted, structured, understood, and apprehended in the most rigorous high-quality dedicated training programmes designed for the purpose. This condition is therefore considered key to consolidating the status of mediators and for them to gain professional recognition.

*3.2 Professional status*

Although projects and initiatives were being developed within the scope of mediation that allowed for the profession to be divulged in various contexts, among families as well as in educational environments, in the late 20th century, it was only in 2001, shortly after the Justices of the Peace Act was published, that the statute of Socio-Cultural Mediators was established (Law No. 105/2001, of 31st August). The law states that:
1 – The role of socio-cultural mediator is thus created, the role of whom is to collaborate in the integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities with a view to strengthening intercultural dialogue and social cohesion.

2 – Socio-cultural mediators shall exercise their respective functions in schools, social security institutions, health institutions, alongside the Immigration and Borders Service, in the Social Reintegration Institute, alongside local authorities, public services and any entity that may require their services.

Contrary to the contents of the Justices of the Peace Act, in which mediators are limited to exclusively solving extrajudicial disputes, this new statute grants mediators a broader scope in which to operate. They cease to be limited to merely resolving conflicts (of a socio-cultural nature), but acquire a role to play in outlining social intervention strategies, as well as promoting inclusion and respect for cultural diversity and equality (Law No. 105/2001, of 31st August). This was the first significant step towards regulating the job description of a mediator in Portugal.  Job descriptions of criminal (Law No. 21/2007, of 12th June) and family mediators (Order No. 18 778/2007, of 13th July) ensued which describe duties relating to conflict resolution in those areas.

In 2013, the Law of Mediation (Law 29/2013, of 19th April) establishes the status of conflict mediators in Portugal and, as the name suggests, restricts the applicable legislation to cases of dispute resolution only. More recently, in 2018, the statute of Business Recovery Mediators establishes that mediators are responsible for assisting a debtor company in financial difficulty or facing insolvency (Law no. 6/2018, of 22nd February).

As it happens, though mediators played an important part in explaining, clarifying, and publicising the role of professional mediators in the diverse areas in which they operate, all the regulatory documentation relating to the statute of mediation professionals ended up dispersing and 'cantoning' the role of mediators, each description limited to specific characteristics of each domain. Though this progression was an essential step in regulating the various areas within which mediators operated individually (socio-cultural, family, criminal, business recovery areas), this made it all the more difficult to consolidate and recognise the professional status of mediators as one unified, professional group. Initial standard training would therefore play a fundamental role here, were it to be implemented, as it would allow for professionals to receive standardised training for the same professional activities, after which they could develop their own specialisations down the line, should they wish to do so.

Mediators in Portugal can and have operated in various specialist areas. Specifically, they are able to operate within the scope of public mediation services overseen by Justices of Peace; in the Public Family, Criminal, and Labour Mediation Systems; they provide private mediation services to private companies and those outside public administration, as well as in public and private institutions such as hospitals, schools, local governments, community and social associations, among many others. A recent study carried out in Portugal (April 2021) highlights the multiplicity of areas in which mediators who responded to the survey were operating (figure 2).



Figure 2: Main areas within which mediators were operating at the time of the survey (2)
*Source: Author's own elaboration*

The same study also identified that of the 100 respondents to the question 'what type of institution are you currently working in as a mediator?' the majority was working in a public institution (57%). The study showed that mediators also work in other institutions, specifically private institutions (20%), as well as for entities subcontracted for mediation services by a public entity (13%). However, although they operate in different types of organisations and within various employment relationships, the vast majority reported that they worked as freelancers (77.5%); that is, they had no contractual relationship with the institutions they worked for.

These results support the perception that the formal professional framework of mediators in Portugal is ambiguous and insufficient. Having a professional framework of mediators will help clarify the purpose, practice circumstances, fields of activity, rights, duties, and functions of mediators, and also, show mediation benefits for people and society. As a result of the failure to register the profession within the Portuguese Professional Qualifications Framework (CQP), and the lack of a Professional Association able to register all of the mediators working in Portugal, finding out the true circumstances faced by mediators in Portugal becomes an impossible task (as sample sizes cannot be determined due to the lack of knowledge relating to the total population from which a sample would be taken). On the other hand, where an employment relationship does exist, it seems to be precarious and short-term mostly. As no consolidated professional framework exists, mediators also operate in areas other than mediation, as demonstrated in the same study.

A formal professional framework of mediators is essential to qualifying their operations and consolidating them as a professional group. Dubar and Tripier (1998, p. 13) stress that professions are ways of gathering and organising actors who defend their own interests seeking to ensure and maintain the exclusivity of their sector, to preserve a monopoly on operations, guarantee clientele for their services, stable employment and high pay in recognition of their expertise.

However, the survey results confirm that only a small percentage (14.18%) of respondents worked exclusively in mediation, with the majority also having another profession or playing other roles (85.82 %). These data allow us to reflect on the characteristics of new professional groups and hybridized professionalism (Noordegraaf, 2007). In this case, professionals "are not merely about being or becoming "really" professional – they are about showing professionalism or putting on a professional performance (Hodgson, 2005) to enact meaningful and legitimate work practices." (Noordegraaf, 2007, p. 778).

The diversity of mediator backgrounds (mediators with initial training in law, social work, psychology, education, sociology, criminology, and others - data collected as part of the implementation of the survey) and pre-existing perceptions about mediation contribute to the fragility of the identity of mediators and recognition of their profession. A study carried out previously (Silva, 2015) in various countries identified the diversity of interviewed mediators' perceptions in relation to mediation and its status as a profession and corroborates the results now obtained in Portugal. For some mediators,

> Mediation is a profession for which they have undergone specialised, certified training and to which they dedicate themselves exclusively. For others, it is a specific activity they were trained in and operate in, in addition to other roles relating to the law, psychology, social work, sociology, anthropology and the like. For others still, mediation is something they do occasionally because they feel a connection with certain practices, whether due to professional demand or need, or because of social, political or ideological beliefs. (Silva, 2015, p. 158).

The vague discourse surrounding the practice and professional framework of mediators contributes, to some extent, to devalue its potential as a professional group, and prevents mediators from providing high-quality responses to contemporary societal challenges.

*3.3 Codes of ethics*

Codes of ethics are, above all, guidelines used to regulate, protect, and characterise professional practices and identities, as well as characterising and setting apart one profession from others (Barroco, 2009; Silva, 2015).

For mediation, specifically, ethical codes have been put together since the early 21st century. By laying down a set of values, standards and principles, rights and duties, these codes allow mediators and the institutions they work with, and for, to (self) regulate mediating practices. However, previously to being published as ethical guidelines, it was the ethics of practice that prevailed. When applied by professionals from different specialist areas in different ways, based on different assumptions, these ethical practices distorted the collective meaning of the professional group. Bringing multiple and distinct views of the ethical practice of mediation, which can complexify the collective meaning of this professional group, make mediators professional recognition even slower. The ethical and deontological conduct of mediators began to unfurl through the publication of texts, sharing of good practices, and training, whereby "the practice preceded the norms and was not supported by any collective professional project." (Silva, 2015, p. 87).

In Portugal, the first Mediators' code of ethics was implemented in 2003 – the Code of Ethics and Deontology of Mediation – put together by the Association of Conflict Mediators (AMC). Ethical and deontological requirements determined by this code wish to strengthen the credibility, as well as the technical and ethical quality, of the practice of mediators. This constitutes the foundation of principles and standards for mediation and the work of mediators.

In 2014, given the importance of standardising mediation practice, which had, until then, expanded into different fields of action and in different countries, including those scattered across Europe, the European Commission designed the European Code of Conduct for Mediators. This Code came about with the primary objective of establishing a set of principles to be applied by mediators to any mediation cases relating to civil or commercial matters.

Acting upon the belief that conflict mediation should be based on common general principles, the National Federation of Conflict Mediation (FMC) put together the Code of Deontology and Good Practices for Mediators in 2016, to establish standards of good practice for mediators through principles and norms that can be applied regardless of any initial training being provided.

In 2021, the National Mediation Commission (CNM) presented the Ethical-Deontological Code of Mediators to the Assembly of the Republic, which, having been developed by a diverse group of professionals with vast experience in mediation, focusses on specific interdisciplinary details to enable the regulation of mediating practices. This regulation reaches further than conflict resolution and spans various specific interdisciplinary areas and dimensions of mediation. The code guides mediators to adopt a permanent reflective ethical attitude as guarantee for the high quality of their practices and as a building block of collective professional identity.

It is expected that this most recent code of ethics enables greater clarification and autonomy of the concept of mediation, besides consolidating the identity of mediators as a professional group. The latter will assist the separation of the role of mediator from other areas and professional groups. This is how the professional group will gain the legitimation and visibility which are deemed essential for the growth and achievement of quality in mediation.

*3.4 International Networks*

Arlekin – a European mobility project (539947-LLP-1-2013-1-FR-GTV-GMP) carried out between 2013 and 2016 - was one of the initiatives run to aid in consolidating a job description for mediators. This project arose from a collaboration between Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal to establish a professional European community of mediators for social inclusion. Through this project a network of professional and training organisations was created for mediators, all of which adhered to common mediation practices.

The Arlekin project, which continued to run from 2016 to 2019 through the CreE.A Project (580448-EPP-1-2016-1-FR-EPPKA3-IPI-SOC-IN), went on to include two more European countries in the consortium's team: Germany and Luxembourg. This project aimed to build a European Mediation Area for Social Inclusion to prevent violent radicalisation and promote democratic values, fundamental rights, intercultural understanding, and active

citizenship; foster mutual understanding and respect among people with different ethnic or religious backgrounds, beliefs or convictions, and encourage youth participation in social and civic life.

Another project began in 2020 - the LIMEdiat project (2020-1-FR01-KA203-079934) – which is set to run until 2023, has the objective of consolidating training and professionalization in mediation both within Portugal and on a wider European level. In order to do so, the primary purpose of the project is to gather resources and knowledge of the consortium (comprised of four European countries: Portugal, Spain, Italy, and France) relating to mediation and practices of mediation to build a Europe-wide undergraduate training syllabus that seeks to consolidate professionalization in mediation and innovation in training.

All these projects run and carried out by Portugal in collaboration with other European countries, as well as other initiatives mentioned throughout this paper, provide an answer to the second question asked: Which steps have been taken to consolidate the profiling and professional recognition of mediators in Portugal? It also allows for an understanding to be gained of the sheer number of professionals, researchers, professors and working groups committed to consolidating the professionalization and professionalism of mediators within both Portugal and other European countries.

## 4. Conclusions

The affirmation and consolidation of mediators as an occupational group has witnessed a gradual development in Portugal. However, mediators have faced difficulties in being recognised and classified as a professional group in the Portuguese Framework of Regulated Professions, which has a limiting effect on mediators' possibilities of insertion and professional affirmation. Due to the inexistence of a competent authority to monitor and supervise mediation operations across various sectors, various organisations have built ethical and deontological codes of conduct, the main objectives of which are to hold mediators responsible for the principles of mediation and guide them in their operations so that they may achieve the highest rigour and the best quality standards. However, codes of conduct alone fail to consolidate and regulate the practice of mediation. Initial standardised and in-service training in mediation is essential to stabilise and consolidate the practice of mediation and the job description of mediators. As the situation currently stands, basic training courses attended by mediators, each very different from the other, have contributed to aggravate the fragment practices of mediation and to obstruct the exercise of the profession and collective professional identity.

The consolidation the activity of mediation and the professionalism of mediators in Portugal has undoubtedly been a challenging, prolonged process. However, legislative initiatives, projects, research work, national and international events carried out between 2011 and 2021 have contributed to the visibility and valorisation of mediation. Thinking about training in a broad and transdisciplinary way through the creation of an initial basic training for all mediators has been seen as one of the strategies that can contribute to the professional recognition of mediators. This activity area is increasingly (re)visited thanks to its potential for conflict prevention and favourable resolution, the promotion of social bonds and cohesion, positive and inclusive dialogue, as well as the development of essential collaborative, constructive and co-responsible interpersonal relationships, all of which contribute to the construction of peaceful and sustainable societies.

Mediators develop specialized and fundamentally reflective work, thus being "reflective practitioners" (Schön, 1983) with characteristics of hybrid professionalism. Noordegraaf (2007, p. 779) highlights three characteristics of hybrid professionalism: links between work and organised action (subtle, soft, and selective standards; frameworks for meaning making); mechanisms for legitimating work (rhetoric for normative control and symbolic acts); searches for occupational identities (work as dealing with trade-offs; communal identity).

Throughout the text we emphasised several characteristic aspects of mediators and their practices, which situates them in complex social contexts and dynamics that attribute social meaning to these practices. Mediation has developed in a socio-historical era when "awareness of uncertainty, complexity, instability, uniqueness and conflict of values led to the emergence of professional pluralism" (Schön, 1983, p. 17). However, it is essential to emphasise the importance of legitimation and recognized professional legitimacy in the affirmation of professional

identity, which is why "so many new service and knowledge-based occupational groups are attracted to the normative aspects of the ideological appeal." (Evetts, 2013, p. 789).

In the case of mediators in Portugal, as in other countries mentioned above, professional identity seems to emerge from a "socio-symbolic legitimacy in times of change" (Noordegraaf, 2007, p. 780), and from a hybrid professionalism that supposes a 'reflexive control', which means that "it is about controlling the meaning of control, organizing, and professionalism. Professionalism is not so much used to improve organizational contexts but to improve the idea of professionalism in changing organizational contexts" (Noordegraaf, 2007, p. 775). In short, the social, political, and legal recognition of mediation and mediators themselves must continue to be nurtured and built upon.

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**Notes**

Note 1. Study conducted as part of research project carried out in the 2011/2012 academic year in which mediators from four countries were interviewed: Argentina, Brazil, France and Portugal.

Note 2. The type of response relating to the area of operation corresponds to the Likert scale (1 = not at all; 2 = very little; 3 = a little; 4 = very much; 5 = a lot). Only responses 4 and 5 were considered for this graph (measures that indicate that the mediators operated in a given area very much and a lot).

# International Branding of Higher Education Institutions towards World-Class Universities: Literature Study in 2017-2022

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**Abstract**

Struggles initiated to accomplish the target of higher education institutions as World-Class Universities required the support of an international branding strategy. Brand positioning that fits the target enables the higher education institution to be a public "Top of Mind". Higher education institutions must develop and improve the standard of branding. Thus, higher education institutions can handle the rising competition in the educational field, not only at the local and national levels but also at the international level. The researchers conducted a qualitative study with a literature study based on the Publish or Perish program to discover research trends on international branding of the higher education institution to achieve and maintain the title of World-Class University. The search results for journal publications on Google Scholar in 2017-2022 were subsequently processed using the Vos Viewer program to generate data visualizations that could elaborate on the development of research trends related to the abovementioned topic. The 89 most relevant terms were obtained and divided into six clusters. The most dominant research topic, especially in 2020, was the impact of Covid-19, which caused changes in various fields. Specifically, the teaching system, which was initially conducted offline, had changed to become more online in the education sector. "Covid" was also the word that arose the most in the results of this literature study.

**Keywords:** Literature Study, International Branding, Higher Education Institutions, World-Class Universities

## 1. Introduction

Higher education institutions must have high academic and non-academic quality in the global era. Furthermore, higher education institutions can handle the rising competition in the educational field, not only at the local and national levels but also at the international level. For this reason, higher education institutions must correspond to international performance assessment standards regarding the results of the Quacquarelli Symonds-World University Rankings (QS-WUR), Times Higher Education (THE), Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), or Webometrics. Furthermore, one of the indicators is the internationalization of the higher education institution.

The 2022 QS WUR ranking places Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) in 254ᵗʰ place worldwide and first out of 16 participating Indonesian universities. At the beginning of each year, UGM Public Relations determines one big theme as material for publication exposure. The theme is determined through in-depth research on global societal issues, and UGM contributes to solving them. Reporting the contributions in the mass media and social media is part of UGM's branding efforts to become "Top of Mind" as the best university in Indonesia at the international level (Sugiharso & Setianingrum, 2021). Brand positioning that fits the target will generate a robust memory in the public's minds. Thus, the public will refer to a particular brand if required. Higher education institutions must develop and improve the quality of good branding. Thus, higher education institutions can handle the rising competition. Stakeholders will easily forget higher education institutions that do not have excellent branding.

Social media utilization positively impacts higher education institution branding (Rutter et al., 2016) (Momen et al., 2020) (Nguyen et al., 2021). Based on data from the Global Overview Report 2022, 62.5% of the world's population are active internet users. The trend of students using social media to participate in the Community Field Project has also generally improved higher education institution branding (Cahya et al., 2022). The more frequently this branding is accomplished, the more it will be attached to the higher education institution, and the public will realize and recognize it more. One of the strategies implemented by Telkom University towards A World-Class University is to brand the I-Gracias application, which is an international standard distance learning system that is beneficial in the IT field (Muhardiawan et al., 2016). It is inevitably conducted because reputation and branding are essential elements in higher education institution management practices (Aula & Tienari, 2011), especially for World-Class Universities. Branding activities are crucial because in order to remain competitive, university traditions are no longer the only reason (Šerić, 2017), but instead focus more on excellence.

The concept of branding at higher education institutions can provide a good reputation both in terms of services and facilities offered to prospective students (Kusumah & Yusuf, 2020). In addition, branding is also an element that supports the improvement of the quality of the international student recruitment process succession since the promotion and marketing stages (Al-Thagafi et al., 2020)(Wang & Crawford, 2021)(Kisiołek et al., 2021)(Mohamad Saleh et al., 2022). Regarding the purpose of attracting more interest from international students, higher education institution branding must also consist of the national characteristics, values, and qualities of the country (Sataøen, 2019).

Branding combines various elements such as names, terms, symbols, and designs to differentiate the products and services from competitors (Kotler et al., 2008). People can recognize what a brand product offers by developing the correct perception of public awareness. In higher education institutions, branding is a set of communication activities to build and enlarge a brand. Branding development is one of the efforts to build a higher education institution's image based on reputation and achievement (Purwowidodo & Yasin, 2021). A strong brand will aid in developing  a higher education institution identity in the community to improve relations with stakeholders (Elving et al., 2015).

In discovering research trends on international branding of higher education institutions to achieve and maintain the title of World-Class University, the researchers conducted a study using literature studies.

**2. Method**

This article was qualitative research using the Publish or Perish program-based literature study method, accessed on January 1, 2023. Data were obtained from searching journal publications on Google Scholar using a 6-year database from 2017-2022 to accomplish the latest research trends that identify keywords: international branding AND higher education institution AND world class university.

Figure 1. Search results for journal publications based on the Publish or Perish program

Over six years, there were 998 journals related to the keywords "international branding AND higher education institution AND world-class university", which had been cited 234527 times. The search results were subsequently processed using Vos Viewer program to create data visualizations that could elaborate on the development of research trends (Ranjbar-Sahraei & Negenborn, 2017)related to international branding of higher education institutions to achieve and maintain the title of World-Class University. The appropriate settings were completed in the VosViewer program. Thus, the visualized data could be improved.



Figure 2: The minimum threshold for the appearance of the terms to use

Systematically, the program regulated the threshold for the appearance of a term to be 10. It indicates that a term to use in this research must appear at least ten times in an article. The research data found 5735 terms with a certain number of repetitions, but only 148 fulfilled the threshold.

The subsequent stage was to determine the terms to use by setting the percentage of the most relevant terms. In this study, the program's default settings specified the 89 most relevant terms to include.

Figure 3: The number of terms to be selected in the study

Among the 89 most relevant terms, several conjunctions and meaningless words appeared. However, all terms were still included in the visualization of the research map to provide a complete picture of the studies conducted. The journal search used the Publish or Perish program, and the results of which were visualized using the Vos Viewer. It can be a reference to discover the mapping of research areas that have not received much attention. It is beneficial for researchers to discover novelty and research gaps, as well as variables that will probably be applied for further research; accordingly, there are developments, and new results are discovered (Rofik et al., 2022).

## 3. Results

Based on search results on Google Scholar in 2017-2022 using the keywords: international branding AND higher education institution AND world-class university, the number of journals published per year is obtained as follows:

Table 1: Number of journals each year

| Year | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Amount | 325 | 244 | 141 | 221 | 50 | 17 |
| Percentage | 32.57 % | 24.45 % | 14.13 % | 22.14 % | 5.01 % | 1.70 % |



Graph 1: Number of journals each year

The number of research journals on this topic decreased from 2017 to 2019 but increased in 2020 and declined sharply again in 2021 and 2022. From the search results in Figure 1, there are 23 journals cited more than 1000 times as follows:

Table 2: Journals cited more than 1000 times

| No | Number of citations | Writer | Title | Journal | Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 7533 | Paul A. Harris, Robert Taylor, Brenda L. Minor, Veida Elliott, Michelle Fernandez, ….. | The REDCap consortium: Building an international community of software platform partners | Journal of Biomedical Informatics | 2019 |
| 2 | 5975 | Maria Nicola, Zaid Alsafi, Catrin Sohrabi, Ahmed Kerwan, Ahmed Al-Jabir, ….. | The socio-economic implications of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19): A review | International Journal of Surgery | 2020 |
| 3 | 4331 | Shivangi Dhawan | Online learning: A panacea in the time of COVID-19 crisis | Journal of educational technology systems | 2020 |
| 4 | 4088 | Stefan Gössling, Daniel Scott, C. Michael Hall | Pandemics, tourism and global change: a rapid assessment of COVID-19 | Journal of sustainable tourism | 2020 |
| 5 | 3395 | Paul McCrory, Willem Meeuwisse, Jiri Dvorak, Mark Aubry, Julian Bailes | Consensus statement on concussion in sport—the 5th international conference on concussion in sport held in Berlin, October 2016 | British journal of sports Med | 2017 |
| 6 | 2073 | Joseph Crawford, Kerryn Butler-Henderson, Jurgen Rudolph, Bashar Malkawi, Matt Glowatz | COVID-19: 20 countries' higher education institution intra-period digital pedagogy responses | Journal of Applied Learning & Teaching | 2020 |
| 7 | 2006 | Changwon Son, Sudeep Hegde, Alec Smith, Xiaomei Wang, Farzan Sasangohar | Effects of COVID-19 on college students' mental health in the United States: Interview survey study | Journal of medical Internet Research | 2020 |
| 8 | 1826 | Lokanath Mishra, Tushar Gupta, Abha Shree | Online teaching-learning in higher education institution during the lockdown period of COVID-19 pandemic | International Journal of Educational Research Open | 2020 |
| 9 | 1635 | Noah C Peeri, Nistha Shrestha, Md Siddikur Rahman, Rafdzah Zaki, Zhengqi Tan | The SARS, MERS and novel coronavirus (COVID-19) epidemics, the newest and biggest global health threats: what lessons have we learned? | International journal of Epidemiology | 2020 |
| 10 | 1626 | Mohammed Eslam, Philip N. Newsome, Shiv K. Sarin, Quentin M. Anstee, Giovanni Targher …. | A new definition for metabolic dysfunction-associated fatty liver disease: An international expert consensus statement | Journal of Hepatology | 2020 |
| 11 | 1450 | Jagdish Sheth | Impact of Covid-19 on consumer behavior: Will the old habits return or die? | Journal of business research | 2020 |
| 12 | 1318 | Hongwei He, Lloyd Harris | The impact of Covid-19 pandemic on corporate social responsibility and marketing philosophy | Journal of business research | 2020 |
| 13 | 1300 | Randy P. Auerbach, Phillipe Mortier, Ronny Bruffaerts, Jordi Alonso, Corina Benjet, ..... | WHO World Mental Health Surveys International College Student Project: Prevalence and distribution of mental disorders. | Journal of abnormal Psychology | 2018 |

| 14 | 1245 | Stephen L. Vargo, Robert F. Lusch | Service-dominant logic 2025 | International Journal of Research in Marketing | 2017 |
|----|------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------|
| 15 | 1184 | Neal I. Lindeman, Philip T. Cagle, Dara L. Aisner, Maria E. Arcila, Mary Beth Beasley, ..... | Updated Molecular testing guidelines for the selection of lung cancer patients for treatment with targeted tyrosine kinase inhibitors | Journal of Thoracic Oncology | 2018 |
| 16 | 1118 | Mucahid Mustafa Saritas, Ali Yasar | Performance analysis of ANN and Naive Bayes classification algorithm for data classification | International Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications in Engineering | 2019 |
| 17 | 1104 | Johanes König, Daniela J. Jäger-Biela, Nina Glutsch | Adapting to online teaching during COVID-19 school closure: teacher education and teacher competence effects among early career teachers in Germany | European Journal of Teacher Education | 2020 |
| 18 | 1051 | Oberiri D. Apuke | Quantitative research methods: A synopsis approach | Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review | 2017 |
| 19 | 1041 | Latania K. Logan, Robert A. Weinstein | The epidemiology of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae: the impact and evolution of a global menace | The Journal of infectious diseases | 2017 |
| 20 | 1030 | Jochen Wirtz, Paul G. Patterson, Werner H. Kunz, Thorsten Gruber, Vinh Nhat Lu, ..... | Brave new world: service robots in the frontline | Journal of Service Management | 2018 |
| 21 | 1024 | Morteza Ghobakhloo | The future of manufacturing industry: a strategic roadmap toward Industry 4.0 | Journal of manufacturing technology management | 2018 |
| 22 | 1017 | A. Patricia Aguilera-Hermida | College students' use and acceptance of emergency online learning due to COVID-19 | International Journal of Educational Research Open | 2020 |
| 23 | 1012 | Mansureh Kebritchi, Angie Lipschuetz, Lilia Santiague | Issues and challenges for teaching successful online courses in higher education institution: A literature review | Journal of Educational Technology Systems | 2017 |

Based on table 2, it appears that health topics, especially those related to the COVID-19 pandemic, were very dominant and were widely cited in 2020. It definitely occurred due to the coronavirus's appearance toward the end of 2019 and the numerous changes it has brought about in various fields. Specifically, in the education sector, the teaching system, which was initially conducted offline, has changed to become more online. Learning is not restricted by time or space using an online system. The positive impact of this change on higher education institution branding is the ease and speed of promoting programs and disseminating information that can create a positive reputation by utilizing digital technology, which proliferates during the pandemic.

The journal data in Figure 1, which was subsequently processed using the Vos Viewer, discovered 2391 author names. The program default sets 1000 of them as having the greatest total link strength. Link strength is not related to the number of connections with other authors. However, the ranking criteria for journal are due to where articles are published and the number of cited articles.

Figure 4: The number of selected authors for the study

Authors who have a total link strength of more than six are:



Figure 5: Authors who have a total link strength of more than six

Even though Chaiyun Zhang only wrote two journals with topics related to this research keyword, he has the greatest total link strength because his articles are published in top-ranked journals, and the number of articles cited is enormous. In contrast, the following authors have published in more than three journals as follows:



Figure 6: Authors who wrote in more than three journals

The details of the data are as follows:

Table 3: Details of data on authors who wrote more than three journals

| No | Writer | Title | Journal | Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Justin Paul: eight documents, seven total link strength | | | | |
| a.1 | Ajay Kumara, Justin Paul, Anandakuttan B. Unnithane | 'Masstige' marketing: A review, synthesis and research agenda | Journal of Business Research | 2020 |
| a.2 | Alexander Rosado-Serrano, Justin Paul, Desislava Dikovac | International franchising: A literature review and research agenda | Journal of Business Research | 2018 |
| a.3 | Justin Paul | Masstige model and measure for brand management | European Management Journal | 2019 |
| a.4 | Justin Paul | Marketing in emerging markets: a review, theoretical synthesis and extension | International Journal of Emerging Markets | 2020 |

| a.5 | Justin Paul | Toward a 'masstige' theory and strategy for marketing | European J. International Management | 2018 |
| a.6 | Justin Paul, Erick Mas | Toward a 7-P framework for international marketing | Journal of Strategic Marketing | 2020 |
| a.7 | Justin Paul, Weng Marc Lim , Aron O'Cass , Andy Wei Hao , Stefano Bresciani …. | Scientific procedures and rationales for systematic literature reviews (SPAR-4-SLR) | International Journal of Consumer Studies | 2021 |
| a.8 | Vikas Arya , Justin Paul , Deepa Sethi | Like it or not! Brand communication on social networking sites triggers consumer-based brand equity | International Journal of Consumer Studies | 2021 |
| b. Walter Leal Filho: four documents, nine total link strength | | | | |
| b. 1 | Walter Leal Filho , Chris Shiel, Arminda Paço, Mark Mifsud, Lucas Veiga Avila,…. | Sustainable Development Goals and sustainability teaching at universities: Falling behind or getting ahead of the pack? | Journal of cleaner production | 2019 |
| b.2 | Walter Leal Filho , Edward A. Morgan, Eric S. Godoy, Ulisses M. Azeiteiro, Paula Bacelar-Nicolau, | Implementing climate change research at universities: Barriers, potential and actions | Journal of cleaner production | 2018 |
| b.3 | W. Leal Filho , S. Raath, B. Lazzarini, VR Vargas, L. de Souza,…. | The role of transformation in learning and education for sustainability | Journal of cleaner production | 2018 |
| b.4 | Walter Leal Filho , Yen-Chun Jim Wu, Luciana Londero Brandli, Lucas Veiga Avila, Ulisses Miranda Azeiteiro,… | Identifying and overcoming obstacles to the implementation of sustainable development at universities | Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences | 2017 |
| c. C. Michael Hall: four documents, seven total link strength | | | | |
| c. 1 | Bailey Ashton Adie, C. Michael Hall | Who visits World Heritage? A comparative analysis of three cultural sites | Journal of Heritage Tourism | 2017 |
| c. 2 | Bailey Ashton Adie, C. Michael Hall, Girish Prayag | World Heritage as a placebo brand: A comparative analysis of three sites and marketing implications | Journal of Sustainable Tourism | 2018 |
| c. 3 | Ove Oklevik, Stefan Gossling, C. Michael Hall, Jens Kristian Steen Jacobsen, Ivar Petter Grotte, Scott McCabe | Overtourism, optimization, and destination performance indicators: A case study of activities in Fjord Norway | Journal of Sustainable Tourism | 2019 |
| c. 4 | Stefan Gössling, Daniel Scott, C. Michael Hall | Pandemics, tourism and global change: a rapid assessment of COVID-19 | Journal of sustainable tourism | 2020 |
| d. Melissa Bond: four documents, five total link strength | | | | |
| d. 1 | Melissa Bond , Katja Buntins, Svenja Bedenlier, Olaf Zawacki-Richter, and Michael Kerres | Mapping research in student engagement and educational technology in higher education institution: A systematic evidence map | International Journal of Educational Technology in Higher education institution | 2020 |
| d.2 | Melissa Bond , Olaf Zawacki-Richter, Mark Nichols | Revisiting five decades of educational technology research: A content and authorship analysis of the British Journal of Educational Technology | British Journal of Educational Technology | 2019 |
| d.3 | Melissa Bond , Svenja Bedenlier, Victoria I. Marín, Marion Händel | Emergency remote teaching in higher education institution: Mapping the first global online semester | International Journal of Educational Technology in Higher education institution | 2021 |

| d.4 | Melissa Bond, Victoria I. Marín, Carina Dolch, Svenja Bedenlier and Olaf Zawacki-Richter | Digital transformation in German higher education institution: student and teacher perceptions and usage of digital media | International Journal of Educational Technology in Higher education institution | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| e. Heesup Han: three documents, seven total link strength | | | | |
| e. 1 | HakJun Song, JunHui Wang, Heesup Han, | Effect of image, satisfaction, trust, love, and respect on loyalty formation for name-brand coffee shops | International Journal of Hospitality Management | 2019 |
| e.2 | Amr Al-Ansi, Hossein GT Olya, Heesup Han | Effect of general risk on trust, satisfaction, and recommendation intention for halal food | International Journal of Hospitality Management | 2019 |
| e.4 | Seoyoung Kim, Sunny Ham, Hyeyoung Moon, Bee-Lia Chua, Heesup Han, | Experience, brand prestige, perceived value (functional, hedonic, social, and financial), and loyalty among GROCERANT customers | International Journal of Hospitality Management | 2019 |
| f. Svenja Bedenlier: three documents, four total link strength | | | | |
| f. 1 | Svenja Bedenlier, Yasar Kondakci , Olaf Zawacki-Richter | Two Decades of Research Into the Internationalization of Higher education institution: Major Themes in the Journal of Studies in International Education (1997-2016) | Journal of Studies in International Education | 2018 |
| f. 2 | Melissa Bond, Svenja Bedenlier , Victoria I. Marín, Marion Händel | Emergency remote teaching in higher education institution: Mapping the first global online semester | International Journal of Educational Technology in Higher education institution | 2021 |
| f.3 | Melissa Bond, Katja Buntins, Svenja Bedenlier , Olaf Zawacki-Richter, Michael Kerres | Mapping research in student engagement and educational technology in higher education institution: A systematic evidence map | International Journal of Educational Technology in Higher education institution | 2020 |
| g. Victoria I. Marín: three documents, four total link strength | | | | |
| g. 1 | Olaf Zawacki-Richter, Victoria I. Marín , Melissa Bond, Franziska Gouverneur | Systematic review of research on artificial intelligence applications in higher education institution – where are the educators? | International Journal of Educational Technology in Higher | 2019 |
| g. 2 | Melissa Bond, Victoria I. Marín , Carina Dolch, Svenja Bedenlier, Olaf Zawacki-Richter | Digital transformation in German higher education institution: student and teacher perceptions and usage of digital media | International Journal of Educational Technology in Higher education institution | 2018 |
| g. 3 | Melissa Bond, Svenja Bedenlier, Victoria I. Marín , and Marion Händel | Emergency remote teaching in higher education institution: Mapping the first global online semester | International Journal of Educational Technology in Higher education institution | 2021 |
| h. Vikas Kumar: three documents, three total link strength | | | | |
| h. 1 | Jitendra Singh, Vikas Kumar , Darvinder Kumar | Combating the Pandemic With ICT-Based Learning Tools and Applications: A Case of Indian Higher education institution Platforms | International Journal of Virtual and Personal Learning Environments | 2022 |
| h. 2 | Shaphali Gupta, Anita Pansari, V. Kumar | Global customer engagement | Journal of International Marketing | 2018 |
| h. 3 | V Kumar | Transformative marketing: The next 20 years | Journal of Marketing | 2018 |

Table 3 shows the specifications of the research topic interests of each researcher. Regarding research focusing on international branding of higher education institutions to achieve and maintain the title of World-Class University,

authors who deserve to be references are Walter Leal Filho, Melissa Bond, Svenja Bedenlier, and Victoria I. Marín. The combination of link strength and the number of journals generates a network map visualization of 1000 authors as follows:



Figure 7: Visualization of the author's network

The circle of names that are light in colour indicates authors with a great total link strength or numerous journals. Data processing of the 89 most relevant terms in 998 journals accessed through Google Scholar in the period 2017-2022 related to the keywords "international branding AND higher education institution AND world class university", generated a network map visualization using the Vos Viewer as follows:



Figure 8: Network visualization

In Figure 8, terms are represented by labels, whose size is determined by the frequency of appearance in the title and abstract. The more frequently the term appeared, the greater the label size was. The terms are classified according to the respective field categories that correlate with the main topic. Each cluster represents a special sub-discussion regarding the topic of international branding of higher education institutions to achieve and maintain the title of World-Class Universities. Based on Figure 8, it appears that there are six clusters with the following details:

Table 4: Clustering of relevant terms in the study based on the visualization map

| Cluster /Color | Term | Number of Terms |
|---|---|---|
| 1 / Red | addition, article, creativity, difference, evidence, example, field, framework, future, global brand, india, industry, innovation, international marketing, journal, literature, management, market, marketing, meta analysis, part, relationship, study design, systematic review, theory | 25 |

| 2 / Green | activity, critical thinking skill, cross sectional design , high school, high school student, indonesia, junior high school, model, order, participant, problem, project, researcher, sample, science, skill, stem | 19 |
|---|---|---|
| 3 / Blue | adoption, case, china, e learning, heis, international student, learner, malaysia, online learning, online teaching, paper, patient, social medium, strategy, survey | 15 |
| 4 / Yellow | blended learning, child, covid, crisis, educator, gender, implication, online, online education, pandemic, physical activity, university student, year | 13 |
| 5 / Purple | barrier, case study, evaluation, importance, issue, person, sustainability, sustainable development, tertiary education, transition | 10 |
| 6 / Light blue | brand, consumer, effectiveness, policy, product, service, value | 7 |

The first cluster's categorization shows a close relationship between global brands and creativity, difference, and innovation. Product/service differentiation and innovation, accompanied by the proper promotion strategy, will support the creation of positive branding (Paul, 2019). Concerning university branding, based on Figure 9 there is no visible network between global brands and HEIs (Higher education institution's) or students, meaning that this topic has not been or is still rarely researched.



Figure 9: Network visualization of the term "global brand"

In the second cluster, the terms appear as follows: critical thinking skills, cross-sectional design, and skills closely related to high school students. Research related to higher education institutions in the early period of the pandemic was more related to changes/modifications/exploration of learning systems, their impact on students' skills, and how they perceived these changes. Most of the research was conducted descriptively and cross-sectionally with a focus on the fields of Health, Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) (Bond et al., 2021).

The third cluster visualizes that branding is inseparable from digitizing information. Thus, the terms appeared as follows: e learning, online teaching, and social medium. Establishing a brand image in the minds of consumers begins with creating brand love and respect, which will significantly lead to brand loyalty. For this reason, management must strengthen publications related to brand image through advertisements and information media to deepen customer impressions and simultaneously attract increasing enthusiasts (Song et al., 2019). If people focus on the term HEI, the visualization in Figure 10 shows that HEI already has a relationship with the brand, but the distance is far away. Most of the HEI research is still related to teaching and learning. Thus, there are still various new opportunities for research on higher education institution brands.

Figure 10: Network visualization of the term "HEIs"

The fourth cluster is a study group related to the crisis that appeared as a result of the pandemic due to the spread of Covid, which generated restrictions on physical activity. Accordingly, the blended learning method was applied. In contrast, offline learning declined, and online learning increased. Various online educational portals emerged at that time, such as SWAYAM and Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC) platform highly popular in India (Singh et al., 2022).

The fifth cluster revealed the following terms: evaluation, importance, issue, sustainability, sustainable development, higher education institution, and transition. The Sustainable Development Goals are targets that the entire world community desires to achieve; accordingly, higher education institutions should also be involved in teaching and catalyzing student involvement (Filho et al., 2019).

The sixth cluster shows that the combination of product and service quality is the most effective brand instrument to attract consumer interest. Business success combines product/service quality with a unique and memorable consumer experience as purchasing/using the product. The distinctive experience grants clients a sense of brand prestige, strengthening customer loyalty (Kim et al., 2019).

The second visualization generated by the Vos Viewer program is mapping research trends by year category, as shown in Figure 11. Dark colours represent terms that became research trends in previous years. In comparison, lighter colours represent research trends in recent years. In 2017-2019, the research trend in the education sector was dominated by learning systems focused on STEM. Meanwhile, the branding topic is more related to the industrial sector, and branding also functions as part of marketing efforts to reach consumers. As previously discussed, the trend of research in 2020-2022 is more related to the impact of the Covid pandemic, especially in higher education institution teaching, which has changed to an online-based system.



Figure 11: Overlay Visualization

The Vos Viewer program also generates a visualization map that explains the density of keywords/terms, which can further elaborate word groupings. This third map describes the most widely discussed terms related to the international branding of higher education institutions to achieve and maintain the title of World-Class University. The frequently appearing terms have the thickest density or most vigorous color intensity, as shown in Figure 12.



Figure 12: Density visualization

Quantitatively, the terms that appear most often are as follows:

Table 5: Appearance of terms

| No | Term | Appearance |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Covid | 149 |
| 2. | High school | 112 |
| 3. | Brand | 90 |
| 4. | Pandemic | 89 |
| 5. | Model | 84 |
| 6. | Marketing | 74 |
| 7. | Strategy | 59 |
| 8. | Year | 45 |
| 9. | Activity | 42 |
| 10. | High school student | 35 |
| 11. | Skills | 35 |
| 12. | Paper | 33 |
| 13. | Frameworks | 31 |
| 14. | Systematic review | 31 |
| 15. | University student | 30 |
| 16. | Management | 30 |

The frequent appearance of a term is not equivalent to its relevance level due to the topic of international higher education institution branding to achieve and maintain the title of World-Class University. Of the 89 terms generated from a Publish or Perish search and subsequently processed using the Vos Viewer, 34 words were found to have multiple relevant meanings, namely:

Table 6: The level of relevance of terms is more than 1.0

| No | Term | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Critical thinking skills | 3.64 |
| 2. | Junior high school | 3,22 |
| 3. | Consumer | 2.74 |
| 4. | Patient | 2.01 |
| 5. | Meta analysis | 1.89 |
| 6. | Problem | 1.81 |

| 7. | International marketing | 1.75 |
|---|---|---|
| 8. | Brands | 1.64 |
| 9. | Online teaching | 1.62 |
| 10. | Global brand | 1.59 |
| 11. | Online education | 1.58 |
| 12. | Sample | 1.50 |
| 13. | English | 1.47 |
| 14. | Theory | 1.46 |
| 15. | Learner | 1.39 |
| 16. | Creativity | 1.37 |
| 17. | Sustainability | 1.31 |
| 18. | Experimental design | 1.29 |
| 19. | Sustainable development | 1.26 |
| 20. | Indonesia | 1.25 |
| 21. | Evaluation | 1.24 |
| 22. | Project | 1.24 |
| 23. | Articles | 1.23 |
| 24. | Addition | 1.22 |
| 25. | Industry | 1.19 |
| 26. | skills | 1.19 |
| 27. | On line | 1.15 |
| 28. | Cross sectional design | 1.14 |
| 29. | Online learning | 1,12 |
| 30. | Value | 1.05 |
| 31. | Barrier | 1.03 |
| 32. | Journals | 1.01 |
| 33. | High school student | 1.00 |
| 34. | Stem | 1.00 |

There are 55 terms that have a relevance level of less than 1.0, with the lowest relevance at 0.28. Terms with a high level of relevance but low appearance are potential topics for further research concerning international branding of higher education institutions to achieve and maintain the title of World-Class University. These terms include Critical thinking skills, Meta analysis, International marketing, Online teaching, and Global brand.

## 4. Discussions

Regarding the literature study based on the Publish or Perish program, which searched for journal publications on Google Scholar in 2017-2022 using the keywords: international branding AND higher education institution AND world class university, 998 journals were obtained. Data processing with Vos Viewer determined the 89 most relevant terms that produce three types of visualization maps, as follows:

1. visuality network: there are six clusters due to grouping terms according to their respective field categories that correlate with the main topic. No relationship was found between the terms of HEI and global brand. Thus, it indicates that this topic has not been or rarely researched.

2. visuality overlay: the impact of the pandemic dominates the topic of research results, especially in 2020. Particularly in the educational field, the research focus is still related to modifying the teaching system, which was initially conducted face-to-face, to be online.

3. visuality density: several terms have a high level of relevance but low appearance. Thus, the terms potentially become future research topics.

The conclusion from this literature study is that there are still limited journal publications related to the topic of research on international branding of higher education institutions to achieve and maintain the title of World-Class University. As a practical implication, new research topics with a high level of novelty and significant research gaps will be obtained by selecting several relevant terms that rarely appear.

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# Information Needs on TikTok: Between Followers and Viewers

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**Abstract**
The development of communication technology is growing rapidly along with the breadth of information and knowledge needs of the global community. The presence of the internet has brought big changes to society from various aspects of life, one of the concrete proofs is the birth of social media. Many mass media companies use social media as a medium for disseminating information. TikTok is one of the social media used to practice online journalism. One media company that uses the Tik Tok application as a platform to convey news is Kompas with the username @kompastvnews. Kompas has a special division in charge of online media, namely the digital division. This study uses message packaging theory to see how @kompastvnews actively packages information to be conveyed to the audience and wants to see the factors of the unbalanced number of viewers, likes, comments, and shares on videos uploaded on TikTok @kompastvnews. This research is qualitative with descriptive method. The results of the study show that Kompas actively takes the essence of the news that is distributed, prioritizes trending topics, can move the emotions of the audience so that the audience can get as much information as possible in the shortest possible time.

**Keywords:** Social Media, TikTok, Message Packaging, Audience

## 1. Introduction

The development of communication technology is growing rapidly along with the breadth of information and knowledge needs of the global community. The presence of the internet has brought major changes to society from various aspects of life. Social relations, political behavior, business models, and journalism practices today are much different compared to the early 2000s. One of the real evidence is the birth of online media. Online media provides information that is fast and easy to access anywhere and anytime as long as we have an internet network. Along with the rapid development of online media without control, online journalism is often under scrutiny because it is considered not to prioritize objectivity (accuracy, fairness, completeness and impartiality) only to pursue instantaneousness. This is the problem, on the one hand online media allows the dissemination of information much faster than conventional media, but on the other hand online media often overrides the basic principles of journalism (Juditha, 2013). Mike Ward (Romli, 2012, 15) mentions several characteristics of online

journalism that distinguish it from conventional journalism, namely immediacy (freshness or speed of delivery of information; Multiple Pagination (hundreds of pages related to each other); Multimedia (presenting a combination of images, text, audio, video). and graphics, as well); Archieving (archived, can be grouped by category/rubric or keywords, also stored for a long time and can be accessed at any time); Relationship with Reader (you can interact with readers through the comments column).

According to the results of a survey conducted by the Asosiasi Penyelenggara Jasa Internet Indonesia (ADJII) in 2022, out of a total of 272.68 million Indonesians, 210.02 million or 77.2% of the total population are connected to the internet. Of that number, 191.4 million Indonesians actively use social media. This very large number certainly results in changes in habits or culture in society in various fields including in the process of fulfilling information. One of the most popular social media to date is TikTok. In Indonesia alone, in April 2022 there were around 99.1 million TikTok users. This makes Indonesia the second largest TikTok user worldwide. TikTok is not a new social media in Indonesia, since 2018 this application has been widely known by the public.

TikTok is an application that comes from China. This TikTok application is included under the auspices of Bytedance. However, this application was blocked by the Ministry of Communication and Informatics because it was considered to produce negative content that could have a negative impact, especially for children. However, along with the development of technology, TikTok also developed by launching new features such as TikTok, Music, and others. With these developments, the mass media is also slowly turning to TikTok. @kompastvnews is one of the media that uses TikTok as a platform to disseminate information to the public.

The TikTok platform is still relatively new in the world of journalism, but from here we can see that online journalism now has many forms. If in the past online journalism was only limited to news portals or websites containing news text, now we can access news in video form through various social media platforms such as TikTok. This is also a challenge for journalists and the media how to package news into information that is of interest to all groups. The social media that emerged recently has succeeded in changing the face of journalism in Indonesia, especially regarding the process of gathering news, the process of making news, and the process of spreading news.



Figure 1: TikTok global monthly active users (1st quarter 2020- 1st quarter 2022)
*Source: TikTok global monthly active users katadata*

Popular culture is a culture that is liked by many people and is not tied to a particular social class, popular culture has a greater impact in today's digital era, because ease of access to information has a significant impact on popular culture in a country(Sorrels, 2015). The development of popular culture in Indonesia today cannot be separated from the role of the millennial generation. We cannot deny that millennials are currently very active and intense with the latest technology such as TikTok. The Tik Tok application is a social media that provides a place or space for its users to be free to be creative and express. Knowledge about the proper use of social media is very important to help make the use of the internet and technology more optimal and useful (Rahardaya & Irwansyah, 2021). The number of followers on social media TikTok is a good indicator of market potential or marketing opportunities.

Therefore, to strengthen the relationship with the audience, increasing the number of audience is important. In the message production process it can be said that individuals make interpretations based on their social rules. Individuals in social situations are primarily driven by a desire to understand what is going on and apply rules to know things (O'Keefe, 2002, 115). Message is a symbol sent by the sender (Philip Kotler dan Kevin Lane Keller, 2012). In addition, according to Effendy (2006, 18), the message is a meaningful set of signs conveyed by the communicator to the communicant. A message packaging strategy is needed so that the message to be conveyed can be well received by the audience. According to Kotler (1997, 121), there are three absolute components that need to be considered in packaging a message to be conveyed, namely:

1. Message content

In determining the content of a message, the communicator needs to look for attractions, ideas, themes, or unique suggestions that can attract the attention of the audience. Attraction is divided into three, namely: rational appeal, emotional appeal and moral appeal. Rational appeals try to increase one's interest so that the audience has knowledge of the content being viewed. Emotional appeal tries to evoke the emotions of the audience, whether it's positive emotions or negative emotions that will trigger the audience to periodically view the content uploaded by the communicator.

2. Message structure

There are three problems in the message packaging structure process. The first is whether the contents of the media content will draw a conclusion or leave it to the viewers. Second, the strongest point of view is presented first or last by the marketer. The third is whether the communicator or in this case the marketer will provide a one-sided argument about the strength of the product or the point of view from both parties, such as praising the advantages of the product while blaspheming its shortcomings.

3. Format the message

The message format is where a media develops a strong format in its advertisement, such as being strengthened in the title, illustrations, colors used, body language, and words that can make the audience interested in the uploaded content.

News content is a type of content that is popular on various social media platforms. Currently, many media companies are utilizing social media TikTok as a medium for online journalism. TikTok popularizes short videos and develops a recommendation algorithm that makes it one of the strongest competitors in the video app competition in the world. In the TikTok application, there is a For Your Page page that immediately appears when you open the TikTok application. In contrast to Instagram, which goes directly to following feeds. This makes TikTok interesting because one video can have more or less views than the number of followers.

One media company that uses the Tik Tok application as a platform to deliver news is Kompas with the username @kompastvnews. Kompas has a special division in charge of online media, namely the digital division. It is this digital division that makes short videos which are then converted to various social media platforms including TikTok. This is a form of media convergence by utilizing existing technological advances. Content uploaded by Kompas on TikTok contains news of a short duration. Various issues are raised as news content on @kompastvnews on TikTok, such as political, economic, criminal, environmental issues and many more. TikTok is not only used as an entertainment medium but is also used as a tool for promotion and as a medium for presenting information like what Kompas did. The TikTok platform is still relatively new in the world of journalism, but from here we can see that online journalism now has many forms. If in the past online journalism was only limited to news portals or websites containing news text, now we can access news in video form through various social media platforms such as TikTok. This is also a challenge for journalists and the media how to package news into information that is of interest to all groups. This study aims to find out how Kompas media packs the information needed by the audience in the shortest possible duration but the information can be conveyed properly. This study uses message packaging theory, in which this message packaging theory is one of the realms of communication theory. Delivery of messages carried out through communication media is packaged using ideas and values to be communicated to audiences (Suyati, 2014, 86) . Message packaging is made to pay attention to the contents of the message and the media used. Messages packed with language and media that can meet the needs of the audience (Cangara, 2011, 126). in other words, the media needs to pay attention to how the attention of the audience and from there can be used as a message content. Communication elements such as sources, media, messages, recipients, feedback, and effects are needed in managing TikTok content as an information medium because these

communication elements are very useful when delivering content, the aim is to create effective communication (Valiant, 2016).

## 2. Method

The research method that will be used in this study is a qualitative method with a descriptive approach. In this study, researchers made observations on TikTok content uploaded by the @kompastvnews account. Descriptive qualitative approach aims to be able to explain in detail about the research object under study. In terms of design, the qualitative method is more complex, flexible, detailed and always evolving. This qualitative research method was also carried out to gain an understanding of the meaning contained in the object under study(Shania & Glorya Agustiningsih, n.d.). Primary data sources are data sources that directly provide data to data collectors, while secondary data sources are data sources that do not directly provide data to data collectors but through third parties such as other people or documents (Sugiyono, 2017, 255). The types of data used are primary data and secondary data. In qualitative research, there are several data collection techniques (Sugiyono, 2017, 308), data collection techniques are the very first steps in research, because the main purpose of research is to obtain data. Data collection can be done in various sources, and in various ways. In this study, researchers used two data collection techniques, including:

1. Online observation

Observation or commonly known as observation is a form of data collection. According to Sugiyono (2017, 309), scientists can only work based on data, which are facts about the world obtained through observation. The type of observation used in this study is online observation. The procedure for conducting a data search via the internet allows the writer to utilize information about data online(Bungin, 2011). Observations in this study were carried out online by taking several samples of news uploads on the @kompastvnews TikTok account.

2. Literature study

Literature studies are related to theoretical studies related to values, culture, and norms that develop in the social situations studied(Sugiyono, 2016, 239). Literature study is an important part of a research. The researcher collects data obtained from data that is relevant to the problem under study using literature such as journals, books, previous research and articles, this aims to be able to support the main data from this research.

## 3. Results

In the process of marketing communications, there are several important things that need to be considered. Like how to convey the message to the audience. The type of message to be conveyed must be adjusted to marketing objectives. The message must contain information that will be conveyed by the communicator in a form adapted to the packaging of an attractive message in order to achieve the objectives of the promotion or marketing itself.

There are several aspects to determining the content of the message, including:

1. Rational appeal

Rational appeal is a logical message content as a compass conveys things that are objective, such as not bringing down one party and lifting up another party that is rational or logical. In designing the contents of the message, the attractiveness of the audience is something that needs to be considered. Rational appeal is needed to be able to provide knowledge to the audience regarding the content or message to be conveyed. If the information conveyed is well received by the audience, the audience can recognize Kompas media as a good and balanced medium.

2. Emotional appeal

Emotional appeal here tries to evoke the audience's emotions, both positive emotions and negative emotions. In this case, Kompas has succeeded in evoking the emotions of the audience with the news it has uploaded. Kompas packs its news in such a way that makes the audience get the emotions they want.

3. Moral appeal

Morah's appeal is shown to encourage the audience to support a social action such as cleaning the environment, better inter-ethnic relations, equal rights for women, and so on.

Message structure, there are three important aspects that really need to be considered when the communicator composes a message structure, such as conclusions, strongest opinions, and arguments. The conclusion designed by the compass is that they let the audience as the recipient of the message form their own conclusions. The

strongest opinion at the beginning of the video is carried out with the aim of giving the audience an overview of the contents of the video presented. This strongest opinion can come from internal and external parties, this depends on the need for content whose purpose is in terms of e-marketing activities packaged in video form. If the uploaded video is non-endorsement, then the strongest opinion made by Kompas comes from the communicator who packs the message itself. Furthermore, the argumentation is that in marketing communications, most communicators play a role in prioritizing the advantages of their products, in this case uploaded content, this aims to create a positive image for the company. In message marketing, Kompas presents arguments not only from one side, originating from the communicator himself as the maker of the message, but from two sides, namely as a communicator and also as a communicant. This aims to get an image of no partiality in the Kompas media.

In the process of designing a message, the message format is closely related to how a communicator conveys the message he wants to convey symbolically. This is supported by prioritizing the advantages, uniqueness, and characteristics of each uploaded video.

1. Title

The video thumbnail uploaded by the TikTok @kompastvnews account displays brief information about the contents of the video being displayed. This aims to make it easier for the audience to choose what information they want to see and need. Thumbnails made by the TikTok account @kompastvnews are made with the same visuals so that the video layout looks neat

2. Narration

Kompas has a special message format, namely the delivery of messages that are reported within the initial three seconds. This is used to be able to attract the audience's attention to the contents of the uploaded content, this is done so that the audience can watch the video until the end and pay attention to each message that will be conveyed through the video. Apart from having a special message format, Kompas also has a certain format in which it includes captions for each uploaded video. The caption used must match the content of the video and Kompas also always uses a hashtag in each video. This is used so that the audience can search for the video content through hashtag searches.



Figure 2: List of hashtags used by @kompastvnews

*Source: https://exolyt.com/user/tiktok/kompastvnews*

Hashtags are metadata tags that start with the hast symbol, #. Hashtags are often used in micro-blogging and photo services, such as many uploaded on Twitter, Instagram and other social media as a form of marker specifically made by the user according to the subject or theme of the post (Izzati et al., 2016). In the process of delivering the message, the source of the message conveyed to the audience aims to be able to provide information to the public and also to build audience awareness about the information conveyed. The source of messages on the TikTok @Kompastvnews account is also innovative, educative and there are also several entertaining posts. One of the strategies needed so that video content can enter TikTok users' fyp is by uploading videos during peak hours (Siregar, 2022).

Figure 3: Overview of the TikTok account @kompastvnews
*Source: https://exolyt.com/user/tiktok/kompastvnews*

If reviewed based on the image analysis above, followers on the TikTok account @kompastvnews as of September 29 2022 have reached 2.5 million followers. With that many total followers, Kompas has uploaded 2.7 thousand videos with a total number of likes on all videos reaching 27.8 million, 433.8 thousand comments, and a total of 369.8 thousand shares. But it is very unfortunate, with that many followers, the number of likes, shares and viewers for each video is classified as not in accordance with the number of existing followers.



Figure 4: Distribution of video likes in TikTok account @kompastvnews
*Source: https://exolyt.com/user/tiktok/kompastvnews*

From the picture above it can be seen that there is an instability in the number of likes on each post uploaded by Kompas on its TikTok account. There are many factors that can cause a TikTok video not to be watched by many people, such as, the video posted is less attractive, not using trending hashtags and in accordance with the topics discussed in the video, apart from that, the use of music is also very influential in determining the number of people who watch the video. From the results of the analysis carried out, the content uploaded by Kompas on the TikTok @Kompastvnews account actively takes the essence of the news being disseminated, puts forward trending topics, can move the emotions of the audience so that the audience can get as much information as possible in the shortest possible time. This can be seen from the large number of followers and viewers in each video. Even though there are still videos that don't get audience attention, in general Kompas has succeeded in compiling the message to be conveyed and interesting to the audience.

## 4. Discussion

To be able to achieve a goal, an appropriate strategy is needed in packaging content on social media, the TikTok @kompastvnews account determines topics that will later be made into visual content. The content uploaded by Kompas on TikTok contains news in a format like on TV but in a short duration. Various issues are raised as news content on TikTok @kompastvnews, such as political, economic, criminal, environmental issues and many more. Basically, the format of social media content and conventional media, such as television, has quite a significant difference. On social media, uploaded content is more interesting, not monotonous, and of course of short duration. This is different from TV, the news or content broadcast on TV is more formal in nature and with a longer video duration. The existence of Kompas presents news that is packaged in video form to the point so that the audience gets all the information in a short time. Packaging news on online media, especially TikTok, which does not only use text but uses audio and video to make the news presented look more attractive. Even though not all of them are worthy of being made into news, here Kompas first verifies the data so that they can ensure that the information they are spreading is based on facts and contains news values. This can be seen from the post on the TikTok @kompastvnews account.

The preparation of the message is managed in such a way that the approach is persuasive which can be followed without any element of coercion which will result in the submission of information to paying audiences who follow the intent and purpose of the post(Mukaromah, 2022). The renewal of an issue is something that can affect the number of viewers, likes, comments, and shares in every uploaded video. When a media uploads news that is trending, the video will appeal to the audience and make many people comment, like, and share the video. On TikTok, the more people who watch and share uploaded videos, the more these videos will appear on TikTok users' fyp, this causes an increase in viewers for each video. In a previous study conducted by Dana Rizki Dwi Prastiwi with the title "content division strategy in packaging social media content on the Kompas.com Instagram account" explained that the compass continues to follow the trend of its users(Dana Rizki Dwi Prastiwi, n.d.). This is in line with the results of the researcher's analysis of the social media account TikTok @kompastvnews. Currently, Kompas not only uploads news videos but also uploads educational videos, tips and tricks, food recommendations, and many more. This is a form of content development designed by Kompas. With the development of the content created, it looks interesting which makes the audience regularly watch videos uploaded by Kompas. With the increase that has occurred, of course this can be said to be a form of progress obtained by the kompass.

When a video is fyp, there are several factors why with a high number of viewers, the number of likes, comments, and shares is not too many. The thing that causes them to just watch without liking and sharing is because the videos uploaded by Kompas do not attract the attention of the audience. There are several videos that are fyp and have a large number of likes, comments, and shares. After being examined, the video that received quite a lot of attention from the audience is a video that raises issues that are currently trending, for example the issue of the murder committed by Ferdi Sambo. Light coverage with social media formats is more attractive to the audience. This is because social media users prefer light news. The news that is reported on social media must be different from the news that is reported on TV, because social media is entertainment in nature. The main purpose of the audience opening the tiktok application is for entertainment, if cyber media uploads a video in a formal format, then the video will be considered monotonous.

Based on the findings of a study conducted by researchers on the TikTok account @kompastvnews regarding how the message packaging process works. In the process of designing a message, things that need to be considered are the content of the message to be conveyed, how the message is structured, how the message format can be said symbolically and the source of the message. If a message design has been made, then the next step is to choose the desired communication channel. Arranging an appropriate communication element is an important step in an effort to achieve the goal of effective communication. The contents of the contents uploaded by Kompas on the TikTok @kompastvnews account are very varied, starting from food recommendations, tips and tricks, and others. But of course it remains in one outline, namely news content. Various kinds of content are uploaded by prioritizing aspects of structured message packaging, namely Kompas takes the essence of the news that is disseminated. Apart

from that, Kompas also uses interesting and informative news titles, so that when viewers glance at the uploaded news content, they are immediately interested in continuing the video until the video is finished.

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# Indonesian Industrial Correctional Models in the Perspective of Criminology Welfare

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## Abstract

The use of industrial prisons is a strategy that is essential to reaching the objective of training prisoners. The goal of the industrial jail program is to better the attitudes and behaviors of prisoners while also preparing them by giving them knowledge and skills. The continued industrial activities will also help achieve the goal of increasing the independence of the prison organizations and having an impact on both the community's and the prisoners' wellbeing. This study aims to shed light on how Indonesian industrial prisons operate, the issues they encounter, and the development of suitable replacement models for industrial jail programs. This study employs a qualitative methodology. The analysis's main tool is a feasibility study with a welfare criminology approach. The administration of industrial prisons is still closely linked to the administration of the bureaucracy, and the incompetence of convicts and the difficulty of financial accountability prevent effective development of industrial operations. Therefore, one step that must be taken for this program to have an influence on public welfare is to construct an acceptable industrial prison model by taking into account current legislation and expert engagement. making it so that industrial activity don't develop enough. Therefore, one step that must be taken for this program to have an influence on public welfare is to construct an acceptable industrial prison model by taking into account current legislation and expert engagement. making it so that industrial activity don't develop enough. Therefore, one step that must be taken for this program to have an influence on public welfare is to construct an acceptable industrial prison model by taking into account current legislation and expert engagement.

**Keywords:** Coaching, Convicts, Community Welfare, Industrial Prisons, Organizational Independence

## 1. Introduction

The prison industry is a program to lessen institutional misbehavior, claims Kerry M. Richmond (2014). According to Andrew Day (2017), inmate labor in industrial jails contributes significantly to running the facility. Grant R. Grisson and Conan N. Louis (1981, p. 42, quoted by Richard W. Snarr, 1996, p. 166) explicitly stated that the primary orientation of industrial prisons is so that prisons can finance themselves with regard to production results from prison industrial activities to support prison operational costs (self-supporting). According to Richard W. Snarr (1996, p. 164), this industrial prison has a number of uses or purposes, including: (1) obtaining financial

benefits that are helpful for prison operational activities; (2) reducing the amount of idle time that inmates experience; (3) enhancing discipline; (4) as a means of punishment; and (5) as a means of rehabilitation.

The concept behind industrial prisons is that employment can change an inmate's life. The Quaker belief, which emerged in the seventeenth century and held that improvements were carried out via labour and silence, had a significant influence on this approach (Cullen & Travis, 1984; Dwyer & McNally, 1993; Garvey, 1998, quoted by Kerry M. Richmond, 2014, p. 234). Detainees were initially subjected to forced labor as a form of punishment and as a way to deter future offenses for this reason. According to Kerry M. Richmond (2014, p. 234), forced labor has at least two purposes: first, it is imposed as a kind of retribution for crimes that have already been committed, and second, it is used to reform or rehabilitate convicts by giving them scheduled and regular activities. It is anticipated that having this scheduled, regular exercise will promote prosocial behavior (Laub & Sampson, 2003; Sampson & Laub, 1993, cited by Kerry M. Richmond, 2014, p.232). According to Cullen & Travis, 1984, Dwyer & McNally, 1993, and Garvey, 1998 (quoted by Kerry M. Richmond, 2014, p. 232), hard work in the prison business can transform offenders' lives. This occurs as a result of the jail system's emphasis on discipline. According to Gordon Hawkins (1983), the use of prisoners as labor in industrial prison programs is an instrument for punishing inmates. It is anticipated that having this scheduled, regular exercise will promote

prosocial behavior (Laub & Sampson, 2003; Sampson & Laub, 1993, cited by Kerry M. Richmond, 2014, p.232). According to Cullen & Travis, 1984, Dwyer & McNally, 1993, and Garvey, 1998 (quoted by Kerry M. Richmond, 2014, p. 232), hard work in the prison business can transform offenders' lives. This occurs as a result of the jail system's emphasis on discipline. According to Gordon Hawkins (1983), the use of prisoners as labor in industrial prison programs is an instrument for punishing inmates. It is anticipated that having this scheduled, regular exercise will promote prosocial behavior (Laub & Sampson, 2003; Sampson & Laub, 1993, cited by Kerry M. Richmond, 2014, p.232). According to Cullen & Travis, 1984, Dwyer & McNally, 1993, and Garvey, 1998 (quoted by Kerry M. Richmond, 2014, p. 232), hard work in the prison business can transform offenders' lives. This occurs as a result of the jail system's emphasis on discipline. According to Gordon Hawkins (1983), the use of prisoners as labor in industrial prison programs is an instrument for punishing inmates. 232). According to Cullen & Travis, 1984, Dwyer & McNally, 1993, and Garvey, 1998 (quoted by Kerry M. Richmond, 2014, p. 232), hard work in the prison business can transform offenders' lives. This occurs as a result of the jail system's emphasis on discipline. According to Gordon Hawkins (1983), the use of prisoners as labor in industrial prison programs is an instrument for punishing inmates. 232). According to Cullen & Travis, 1984, Dwyer & McNally, 1993, and Garvey, 1998 (quoted by Kerry M. Richmond, 2014, p. 232), hard work in the prison business can transform offenders' lives. This occurs as a result of the jail system's emphasis on discipline. According to Gordon Hawkins (1983), the use of prisoners as labor in industrial prison programs is an instrument for punishing inmates.

Giving a work to inmates, however, is ultimately not a form of punishment but rather a smart move by the jail administration to combat inmates' idleness. Because giving inmates nothing to do can be an even harsher sentence. The awful period when there is nothing for prisoners to do is often referred to as "idle time," which is the devil's plaything. "No wise, humanitarian, and most certainly no trade unionist," declared Samuel Gompers, the founder of the American Labor Federation (1910, cited by Stephen P. Garvey, 1998, p. 369), "wants our prison inmates to remain unemployed." According to Helsinki Watch, an American human rights watchdog group (cited by Vincenzo Ruggiero and Tony Goodman, 1993, p. 18), a lack of employment prospects is a form of "abuse" that is comparable to prison overcrowding and poor sanitation. An overview of forced work in the US reveals that those responsible for designing prisons were adamant that any rational system of incarceration had to incorporate a labor system.

In later phases, the prison industry will also focus on how convict labor might contribute to operating expenses for prisons, in addition to criminal reform. According to Andrew Day (2017, p. 899), inmates who work in the prison sector significantly improve prison operations. Grant R. Grisson and Conan N. Louis (1981, p. 42, quoted by Richard W. Snarr, 1996, p. 166) made this clear in regards to the production outcomes from jail industrial activities to fund prison running costs. They claim that the primary objective to be accomplished at the beginning of its development, which is the first 100 years since the functioning of the prison industry, is for the jail to be self-supporting.

Correctional facilities (lapas) in Indonesia are required to give prisoners the proper direction and care so that they can successfully reintegrate into society. Due to the growing prison population in Indonesia, industrial activities in prisons (also known as "industrial prisons") are a program that should be used to demonstrate that prison facilities have met their commitments and to keep prison life hospitable. According to the Republic of Indonesia's Minister of Law and Human Rights' Regulation No. 53 of 2016 concerning Management and Utilization of the Results of Industrial Activities in Correctional Institutions, the operationalization of industrial prisons has the following goals: (1) preparing prisoners to become skilled and independent individuals as well as growing and developing their businesses within the framework of building the national economy; (2) increasing the inmates' access to education, training, and employment opportunities; and (3) reducing the inmates' risk of recidivism.

The industrial prison program operates in three areas of interest: the interests of the inmates in terms of preserving and enhancing their capacity as a national resource; the interests of the prison administration in carrying out their duties to keep inmates engaged in productive activities while incarcerated; and finally, the public interest, which means that the industrial prison program is expected to provide social welfare. However, empirical evidence indicates that Indonesia's industrial prison program has fallen short of fully achieving the three aforementioned goals. This could occur as a result of improper implementation of Indonesia's industrial prison program (professionally). The Industrial Prison Program is implemented without the help of experts who are familiar with industrial activity. The management of industrial prisons coexists with bureaucratic management. The question that follows is: What are the issues with Indonesia's industrial jail system? The ultimate goal of this project is to create a new framework for the industrial prison model that is thought to be feasible in Indonesia. This industrial prison model is mostly related to the initiatives taken by the prison administration to implement programs for coaching inmates and to address potential issues, such as security disruptions brought on by high occupancy rates, as well as initiatives to improve welfare (financing prison operations, welfare of prisoners and the community).

## 2. Method

Using a feasibility study analysis, this study aims to connect jail industrial operations with the welfare criminological paradigm (welfare criminology). One of the keys to developing policies that advance the welfare of society for those who believe that the state's role in fostering prosperity for its citizens is crucial is welfare criminology (Mustofa, 2010: 231-233, Morse, 1977: 20). According to Driesen (quoted by Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, 2010), the feasibility study is a welfare-oriented method. The three criteria for goodness or success that the feasibility study addresses are: (1) ensuring that the institution regulates industrial processes that produce losses that are challenging to quantify; (2) ensuring that regulations do not disproportionately harm workers; and (3) providing clear guidelines for institutions to prevent arbitrary and inconsistent regulatory outcomes. According to Driesen's theory (in Masur & Posner, 2010), the industrial jail program is an initiative that primarily benefits prisoners because they serve as the majority of employees in the businesses they manage.

Researchers gathered data at 5 (five) prisons that were classified as industrial prison pilot projects in addition to the Directorate General of Corrections to gain a general picture of these institutions. Additionally, the researcher employed the Delphi technique to gather data and feedback on viewpoints from two parties, namely experts (experts) and officials with specialization/expertise in their fields connected to the research issue. To reach consensus or agreement on a point of view, the Delphi method and the FGD approach are closely related. Because this consensus can be approximate or predicting about the type of policy, it can be utilized as a foundation for policymaking (Mustofa, 2013: 237-238).

## 3. Results

### 3.1. Field Findings

The Regulation of the Minister of Law and Human Rights Number 53 of 2016 Management and Utilization of the Results of Industrial Activities in Correctional Institutions severely regulates the usage of the term "industrial jail." According to subsection (1) of article 13 of this regulation, the Minister may designate particular prisons as

industrial prisons. It means that the Minister may designate specific jails as industrial prisons if they meet certain requirements. According to Permenkumham 53/2016, not all jails can be designated as industrial prisons; instead, the Minister of Law and Human Rights must make the determination. A prison must at least be based on (a) the type of activity and partners, (b) the results of the industry, (c) the number of inmates who work, (d) facilities and infrastructure, and (e) managed budget allocations in order to be classified as an industrial prison, as stated in article 13 point (3) of the Minister of Law and Human Rights 53/2016.

The following can be deduced from the findings of field research, secondary data collection, and in-depth interviews with individuals involved in industrial activities in prisons that are pilot projects: Class I prisons in Tangerang, Class I prisons in Surabaya, Class IIA prisons for drug offenses in Jakarta, Class IIA prisons in Cikarang, and Class IIA prisons in Ciangir Open Lapas.

1. This commercial activity is inextricably linked to the coaching process. Prisoners who participate in these industrial activities will gain at least three advantages, including improved skills due to training activities they participate in prior to or concurrently with industrial activities, practice self-discipline due to participation in routine activities that are also under the supervision of officers, and financial gain in the form of wages or premiums for the work they do. Convicts' participation in these industrial endeavors may ultimately serve as a guarantee of their successful reintegration into society after their sentences are complete.

2. In practically every prison, industrial activities have been conducted as part of the coaching program. Two types of people execute these industrial activities: those that prisons individually or autonomously manage and those that work partners execute. According to research findings, industrial actions carried out in cooperation with coworkers yield superior results to those carried out just for one's own benefit. This is as a result of the collaboration partners' more organized and effective working system.

3. Small-scale industries can be used to describe the size of the industrial activities performed in prisons. This is true when considering the prepared capital as well as the staff that has been absorbed. In contrast, a number of other industrial activities, particularly those carried out in conjunction with coworkers, might be characterized as medium-sized industrial activities involving considerable business capital, particularly when purchasing work equipment (industrial machinery).

4. Industrial activities in prisons have two market shares, internal and external, in terms of market share. While the community or affiliated agencies make up the exterior market share, this internal portion consists of employees and prisoners. Additionally, industrial activities that generate higher income are those whose outcomes result in internal market share, according to research data. This is due to the ease with which industry participants and producers who focus on supplying prison populations in general can access this market share. The products produced in general are still unable to compete with goods sold outside of prisons when it comes to the external market share, even with their limited marketing reach.

5. The majority of management of the industrial operations conducted by prisons is done independently (self-management). The party granted management authority for the field or section of activity/work guidance becomes the officials in that area, who gradually report to the prison's administrator. In contrast, an officer is designated to oversee the implementation of supervision in the field or area of activity/work guidance. The fact that one officer may be tasked with overseeing multiple industrial activities means that not all of them can be appropriately supervised by officers. When it comes to providing (buying) the necessary raw materials, supervision officials behave more like a party helping the production operations carried out by prisoners.

6. In relation to the management (bookkeeping) of criminal inmates' industrial activity. Prisoners labor as producers, but they also keep financial records of the earnings and outlays related to their participation in industrial operations. And one prisoner will be designated as the activity coordinator for each industrial activity. These prisoners take on a variety of responsibilities, including planning events and informing managers. Self-management is a type of management that is now primarily used in prisons.

7. In industrial activities that collaborate with third parties (work partners), all activities are managed by work partners, from planning through marketing of production outputs. This includes operational monitoring, planning, implementation, and administration. The prison's sole function is to supply labor and designate officers to oversee it. Compared to jails operating separately, this collaboration's administration of manufacturing activities typically functions more effectively. In addition, the specific amount of the compensation for labor offenders is established by the employer.

8. With reference to convict wages, in self-managed industrial activities, convict wages are provided as 50% of the profits made. The Decree of the Minister of Justice from 1990 is referred to by the percentage of salary distribution. It looks that the potential wages that prisoners could earn are rather substantial when you consider the size of this proportion. However, because of the low level of output, inmates' pay are quite modest (small). Convicts do not receive compensation for even some industrial operations because no goods are produced as a result of these activities. In the end, the involvement of prisoners in these activities usually serves just to pass the time.

9. Prisons also request that 15% of the profits from industrial activities be deposited to the state as non-tax state revenue, in addition to the wage proportion (PNBP). The prison will make an effort to reach any PNBP targets that have been established by the Directorate General of Corrections, particularly for certain (pilot) prisons. Although the goal quantity of PNBP that must be deposited is simply based on the target set by the Directorate General of Corrections, it is not based on the level of production from industrial activities carried out in each jail. The PNBP gained in industrial activities carried out in conjunction with coworkers comes from renting buildings or land that coworkers use.

10. In addition, they already have a respectable market share in terms of the marketing of industrial products, particularly those produced in partnership with business partners. Some industrial activities even have a global market share, like the furniture industry in Class I Lapas in Surabaya. This industrial activity simply fulfills orders as they come in. But generally speaking, the sale of the products of industrial activities performed in jails is more restricted, particularly within the context of prisons (convicts and employees).

### 3.2. Delphi Method Consensus

As a result of research employing the Delphi technique, several significant characteristics were uncovered, including:

1. The administration of industrial prisons is plagued by structural issues that render them useless.
2. The interests of prisoners engaged in industrial activities are not given enough consideration, particularly with regard to pay standards.
3. There isn't a well-known, unsustainable method of managing industrial activity.

The presentation of consensus will proceed as follows, beginning with the display of the Delphi consensus table below.

Table 1: Delphi Consensus Results

| ISSUE | CATEGORIZATION | CONSENSUS I 6 of & 5 exp | | CONSENSUS II | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The strategic meaning of industrial prisons | Seeing the link between the industrial prison program and the development of convicts and the achievement of coaching goals. | 6 of 6 of | 5 exp out of 5 exp | 4 of 4 of | 3 exp out of 3 exp |
| *Professional* managerial | Seeing the need for a more professional implementation of industrial prison programs run by professional groups outside the prison structure. | 5 of 6 of | 4 exp out of 5 exp | 4 of 4 of | 3 exp out of 3 exp |
| *policy maker* | Seeing the role of the Directorate General of Corrections in the management of industrial prisons when there are managerial professionals. | 5 of 6 of | 3 exp out of 5 exp | 4 of 4 of | 3 exp out of 3 exp |
| Financial management | Seeing the existence of latitude or flexibility in financial management in the operationalization of industrial prisons. | 5 of 6 of | 3 exp out of 5 exp | 4 of 4 of | 3 exp out of 3 exp |
| Worker welfare | Seeing the concern for convicts who work in industrial prisons are given decent wages as workers outside prisons. | 6 of 6 of | 4 exp out of 5 exp | 4 of 4 of | 3 exp out of 3 exp |
| prison stability | Seeing the meaning of the existence of industrial prisons in creating prison security and order. | 6 of 6 of | 4 exp out of 5 exp | 4 of 4 of | 3 exp out of 3 exp |
| Prison operational support | There is funding support from industrial prisons for prison operations. | 5 of 6 of | 4 exp out of 5 exp | 4 of 4 of | 3 exp out of 3 exp |
| Rule of law | Seeing the existence of rules can provide protection for the operationalization of industrial prisons and protection for industrial products that are carried out. | 4 of 6 of | 4 exp out of 5 exp | 4 of 4 of | 3 exp out of 3 exp |

Regarding the second issue, the chart above shows that due to the continued dominance of the structural role of prisons, the management of industrial jails has not been done successfully. There is therefore a requirement for management that can be executed more effectively (professionally). Regarding this matter, all sources agreed—both expressly and inferentially—that there should be improved management carried out by individuals who are subject-matter specialists (professionals in running a business). The patterns or techniques used in professional industrial prison management vary depending on the source, though. Several sources concurred that industrial prisons should be operated by involving other parties, but some sources agreed to establish a separate entity to organize industrial prisons (partners). Regarding the second issue, it may be inferred that the Directorate General of Corrections lacks a defined vision or policy for industrial prison programs that can be effectively implemented at the prison level. Each institution has its own industrial prison program that it employs.

In addition, it was agreed that the Directorate General of Corrections should set policy and be responsible for industrial jail programs in relation to the third issue, which concerned policy makers in the operation of such institutions. From the level of technical implementation units (prisons), regional offices, and the Directorate General of Corrections, the exercise of authority is still carried out structurally. The sources also recommended that the Directorate General of Corrections employ experts in the establishment of industrial prisons. Therefore, it can be understood as follows in relation to this third issues, such as:

1. No long-term strategy for the continuation of the industrial prison program exists.
2. The Directorate General of Corrections does not include specialist groups in the implementation or administration of industrial prisons.
3. Without explicit signals or instructions from the Directorate General of Corrections, the working mechanism with work partners only functions in part.

The method for planning, budgeting, allocating, or holding accountable the budget is carried out in stages, starting at the level of the prison head and ending at the Directorate General of Corrections, it can be seen from difficulties relating to financial management. The management and accountability of the budget can be handled by two distinct people, one of whom is the president of the company, in prisons that operate industrial prison programs. If a separate business unit has been established to oversee industrial activities that are not technically under the control of the jail, this can be accomplished. This matter-related phrase can also be read as follows:

1. The budget is still implemented as other budgets that are under the supervision of the prison's head are implemented because there is no autonomous entity that is outside the prison system.
2. As a result of this circumstance, there are limitations on budget accountability in relation to industrial prisons, such as the practice of reusing PNBP and the sale of industrial goods acquired through capital expenditures.

Furthermore, most of the interviewees concurred that industrial jails can affect the welfare of offenders who are employed as laborers. Pay that is in line with norms is one measure of how well these prisoners are doing. Although some sources contend that the amount of wages must also account for the fact that the state is spending money to support them while they are serving their sentences. This problem can be seen as follows:

1. Because prisoners are regarded as unskilled labor, the amount of their pay is determined more by their coworkers' desire to do the work.
2. Because industrial activities are not properly conducted, the income they generate is likewise unable to adequately benefit prisoners.
3. If given the skills necessary for the industrial activity they will engage in, prisoners have the capacity to earn a living wage.
4. By offering incentives, there is room to increase the number of prison guards engaged in commercial enterprises.

Regarding the problem of prison stability, the majority of the sources noted that the presence of industrial prisons supports security and order in prisons in a significant way. A number of informants also stressed the significance of performing an evaluation of prisoners who will be a part of the industrial jail program, not only to learn about their interests, abilities, or skills, but also to assess their risk level. which can so preserve the safety and discipline of industrial activity. Consequently, it can be understood as follows in connection to this matter:

1. A risk analysis pertaining to assurances that the industry is being operated must be conducted prior to the deployment of industry in prisons (both independently and in partnership).
2. Industrial space requirements are taken into consideration while building prisons, which is consistent with maintaining jail security.

Most of the interviewees agreed that industrial prisons may be a source of support for jail operations when it came to this issue. Prisons may employ the regulations governing the reuse of PNBP as a source of funding in order to operationalize their facilities without relying solely on rupiah. This problem can be seen as follows:

1. Because of the absence of PNBP from industrial prison activities, the jail budget is solely funded by rupiah.
2. The system for using the budget is rigid due to the management of industrial jails, which is still structurally handled by prisons.

Regarding regulatory matters, the majority of the interviewees added that the Penitentiary Law in particular has given room for the conduct of industrial jail activities. Some of the interviewees tied these laws to labor laws, which have to do with how much convicts are paid, in relation to other laws. In connection with this, it may be said that managing industrial prisons requires a broader perspective by linking it to associated rules.

The author will present the Delphi results in the manner previously described, using the following system thinking model:



Figure 1: Consturction of Delphi Result

According to the aforementioned model, it may be explained why there are issues with the amateurish administration of industrial prisons, which prevents the efficient operation of industrial jail operations. Two rings of cause and effect can be seen in the image above. A balancing circle is in the first circle, while a strengthening circle is in the second. The first circle explains a chain of events that led to production activities employing prisoners as a result of the presence of an industrial jail program. The inefficiency of this production activity prevents the industrial prison from achieving its predetermined aims, which in turn might give its implementation a bad reputation.

However, management policies emerged as a result of the requirement for industrial jails to function. However, this management strategy is still only partially implemented, which makes the industrial jail program's implementation unsuccessful. A more focused and comprehensive policy action is required in response to this

circumstance. The old policy, which was only partially effective, will be replaced with this one. This will simplify the industrial jail program's implementation so that the desired outcomes can be realized.



Figure 2: Critical Thinking of Industrial Correctionals Models

## 4. Discussion

### 4.1. Limited Prison Privatization as an Alternative to Indonesia's Industrial Prisons

When operationalization of industrial prisons is observed, it may be seen that the desired outcomes have not been attained, regardless of whether it is being done independently by prisons or in partnership with partners. The research demonstrates that efforts are being made to ensure that the carried out industrial activities evolve as anticipated. Although the most fundamental elements that can enable industrial jail programs to function properly, constantly, and as an ideal support for inmates and prison operations have not yet been addressed by these projects. The best model for industrial prisons is created so that prison-run businesses may deliver appropriate results, particularly in relation to the goal of empowering prisoners with skills and independence, promoting the independence and operationalization of prisons, and supporting societal welfare. And when the results of the industry being managed can be absorbed in the market and, to the greatest extent feasible, create possibilities for prisoners to continue their work activities after serving their sentences, this goal can be accomplished. The industrial prison program is only successful to the extent that it engages convicts in a productive activity that does not significantly affect the success of the program itself because of the partial policy governing it, which places a greater emphasis on internal potential. An established and long-lasting industrial jail program can be funded by a more thorough policy that considers larger dimensions, especially taking into consideration the regulatory and economic feasibility aspects.

### 4.2. Regulations for Industrial Prison Models

The industrial prison program will be tightly linked to other rules, such as rules governing financial mechanisms, budgeting for government agencies, or the provision of infrastructure. The provisions outlined in the rules relating to state finances are referred to as the financial mechanism, which encompasses the process of budget planning, allocation, and accountability. This industrial prison program must be backed by state financial policies in order to be implemented.

Rules governing state finances provide prison industries enough room to operate, including the direct use of revenue from those industries, including the budgeting process. The income collected can be handled and used directly to pay expenses, according to Minister of Finance Regulation Number 129/PMK.05/2020 concerning

Guidelines for Agency Management Public Services. The money earned in the form of PNBP can also be controlled and utilized to pay bills directly. By adhering to good business principles, it is also possible to adopt flexible expenditure management that is based on parity between the volume of service activities and the quantity of cost.

The execution of industrial jail programs requires this flexibility in budgetary management. The regulations outlined in the minister of finance regulation regarding financial management have not yet been put into effect in connection with the industrial prison program. This is what prevents the industrial prison program's business operations from operating sustainably. Due to financial (budget) procedures that refer to non-business bureaucratic management, there are delays in the operation of business processes.

On the other hand, there is still relatively little space or equipment available in prisons that can be used for industrial activity. The Building Patterns for Correctional Technical Implementation Units Decree of the Minister of Justice No: M.01.PL.01.01 of 2003 establishes guidelines for the construction of prison buildings that consider the availability of space for company units, work on works, and other types of activities that consider needs and economic factors in the local area. The necessity to prepare company unit rooms cannot, however, be met by all prison expansion initiatives. Obstacles include a lack of funding or available land for prison building.

The ability to involve third parties in the procurement is provided by Presidential Regulation Number 38 of 2015 about Government Cooperation with Business Entities in the Provision of Infrastructure. Infrastructure for industrial jail programs can be provided by commercial entities such as state-owned corporations, regionally owned companies, private companies in the form of limited liability companies, foreign legal entities, or cooperatives. Technical, physical, system, hardware, and software facilities might be a part of this infrastructure. A domino effect of flexibility in other mechanisms, such as the system for the procurement of goods and services and financial policies, will result from the execution of legislation linked to government cooperation with business organizations.

The availability of a due diligence process that can guarantee the return on investment made by business entities is another essential element when the procurement of infrastructure is done via the collaboration mechanism stated above. Due diligence must therefore be performed before the industrial prison program can be implemented. In order to increase the sustainability of the initiatives being implemented, the availability of this due diligence would also stimulate participation from pertinent state authorities, such as the ministry of finance.

### 4.3. Professional and Business Management Units

A more efficient method of managing industrial jail programs is the mechanism for incorporating outside parties (work partners) in their operationalization. It will be possible to find solutions to the constraints that are unique to prisons—both the constraints on managing program activities and the constraints on the availability of infrastructure facilities. One approach to overcoming financial challenges in the provision or development of infrastructure, as well as the issue of scarce human resources, is the establishment of a public-private collaboration (Vijay Raghavan, 2011). In this situation, the government-business relationship described in the subsection above is an example of a public-private partnership.

An element that is thought to be strategically important for the operation of industrial prisons is the participation of third parties (work partners/business entities). This partnership covers all aspects of operating industrial prisons, including managing industrial prison organizations, providing infrastructure, and providing training for the production and distribution processes, in addition to the process of distributing, selling, and marketing industrial products. The management and administration of industrial prisons is included in this context's discussion of third parties' involvement. Of course, this is a different perspective from what Saroso (1964) stated, who placed prisoners who perform managerial duties in the administration of prison firms (industrial prisons). In actuality, performing management tasks is something that is as necessary when third parties are involved.

In terms of business, it is impossible to separate the presence of industrial prisons from the calculation of the profit required to recoup the initial investment. The necessity of competent management must be upheld in light of this business calculation. The expert group in industrial jail management will be able to assess how successfully industrial prisons have conducted their business operations, including how much production has been produced, how profits have been made, proposed market demands, worker needs, and others. This professional group functions in accordance with the policy guidelines established with the Directorate General of Corrections rather than being governed by the prison system when performing their duties and exercising their authority. They exclusively have responsibilities and power related to the administration of industrial prisons. Consequently, it might be referred to as a restricted form of prison privatization.

*4.4. Welfare Approach*

Public welfare and welfare are closely connected concepts (Jean Hampton, 1984). The parameters for measuring public welfare that is promoted from industrial activities in prisons include the amount of wages received by convicts, the extent to which the results of industrial activities can support the operationalization of prisons, and the extent to which the industrial prison program has an impact on economic activities in society. It was discovered that there are issues with the welfare of inmates engaged in industrial activities based on the findings of both field research and the Delphi technique. This is accomplished by examining the amount of money that offenders make from the labor that they do. Convicts lose their ability to bargain in industrial activities and do not obtain offers about their income (wages), as was described in the introduction to this dissertation. If industrial activity is a byproduct of work, then the salary amount is more often decided by outside parties (work partners) and is not covered by the cooperation agreement. In contrast, the income from independently or self- managed industrial activity is determined by the proportion of production sales.

The meager pay these prisoners receive appears to be a manifestation of one of the industrial prison paradoxes mentioned by Vincenzo Ruggiero and Tony Goodman (1993), known as the "lowering expectation" paradox, which states that although prisoners' wages are supposed to rise, they actually remain far below industry standards. These earnings cannot motivate inmates to work hard or productively, nor can they serve as an incentive for other inmates to engage in industrial endeavors. Additionally, the minimum pay that criminals receive will portray them as workers who do not respect their job and themselves, and this perception will have an impact on them once they have served their sentences and are working in society. They continue to be workers used to receiving minimal pay.

These prisoners' low salaries are also inextricably linked to the lack of skills they possess. Prisoners are both untrained and unmotivated workers because they lack motivation. Due to a crime, their presence in prison is a necessity rather than an option. Therefore, it is essential to continually establish a solid training system that includes increasing the motivation of the convicts. When parties agree to cooperate, it is their obligation to bear the cost of this training. Give them training appropriate to the line of job they choose.

Convicts in the industrial jail program must be paid according to a system that emphasizes their selling value. A approach to strengthen those selling qualities and boost their confidence is through proper training. The appreciation for their involvement in industrial prisons will also increase through raising the sales value (self-worth) of convicts, as shown by sufficient salary standards. Convicts therefore stand a higher chance of leading more respectable lives. This is the viewpoint of welfare criminology, which sees people (convicts) as having the right to preserve their eligibility for life and seeing it as the state's responsibility to uphold these rights using the numerous tools at its disposal.

In a larger sense, this welfare viewpoint encompasses the advantages of industrial jails for society in addition to the pay for prisoners. While it is anticipated that the development of industrial jails will improve organizational independence and have an effect on the national economy, as stated in Permenkumham 53/2016. Results from field studies indicate that there has been virtually little progress in industrial prison operations. Because there is no quality assurance (product quality), industrial prison production has not been able to satisfy community needs.

Apart from the fact that society labels convicts as a disenfranchised group and therefore the items they generate are deemed unsuitable. This situation indicates that the industrial prison program has not sufficiently aided in the operationalization of prisons or in boosting community welfare. Therefore, the operationalization of industrial prisons should be handled professionally by individuals who are knowledgeable about how to manage a business, meet sales targets, generate a profit, understand market share, treat employees well, and can innovate to solve difficulties (Simon, 1959; Rostov, 1960). And this cannot be done by inmates; rather, it must be done by specialists who follow the guidelines established by the Directorate General of Corrections.

## 5. Conclusion

The fundamental finding of this study is that industrial jail programs should be planned with consideration for all factors, including regulation, business, and welfare objectives. The implementation of the industrial jail program is governed by other regulations, such as state finance restrictions, and cannot be supported by internal penitentiary regulations. Opportunities exist that can be adopted normatively and are thought to be able to simplify the administrative chores of the prison system, such as the supply of infrastructure.

The industrial jail program can only grow as a commercial entity if it is properly managed by a team of committed specialists that work together in a business unit. This professional organization is still a link in the chain of correctional policy even though it is not a component of the jail administration. In terms of achieving welfare goals, this will be possible if the industrial prison program runs smoothly. If this occurs, it will be seen from the adequate acceptance of prisoners participating in this program, the prison organization's financial stability, and the presence of infrastructure that supports the development of social welfare.

## Acknowledgments

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# Engagement Declining on Indonesian Customs Instagram: A Content Analysis of Visual Factor

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**Abstract**
Government social media offers potential as a means of communicating with the public in new, responsive, and exciting ways. Social media, especially Instagram, is starting to be used widely by the government to communicate with citizens. Unfortunately, the majority of government social media get low user engagement. Indonesian customs as a government agency sustained a significant shift in communicating through Instagram social media. This study aims to find the factors that make the difference in this phenomenon and the combination of visual codes that provide the highest engagement. A quantitative content analysis framework is used to analyze posts shared on social media. Posts converted into data form are then analyzed using statistical analysis. This study found that an engagement trend and visual factor strategy shifted on Indonesia Customs Instagram during the observation period. The results of this study are that content type, visual aesthetics, and presentation modality significantly differ from the average engagement of Indonesian Customs on Instagram. Changes in engagement occur due to changes in the combination of visual factors. Informational content type, expressive aesthetics, and lean modality in government social media posts provide the highest engagement than the combination of other variable codes. Public needs and interest in government social media are necessary to be considered for future development and management. Government social media can be an effective means of communication if it is used with a two-way communication approach between the government and the public.

**Keywords:** Government Social Media, Content Type, Visual Aesthetics, Presentation Modality, Engagement

## 1. Introduction

More than half of the world's population are active users of social media based on We are Social data in February 2022. Moreover, in Indonesia, active users of social media reach 161 million users (68.9%) of the total population. The WhatsApp application is ranked first as the most frequently used social media in Indonesia, followed by Instagram in the second and Facebook in the third. This situation shows that social media has become part of Indonesian society (Kepios, n.d.). Spotting this situation, it is natural for the government to start using social media for various purposes related to the wider community. Social media can be used to determine the development of a topic as consideration for the policy-making process (Lawelai & Sadat, 2022) and to communicate with the public

(Chatfield & Reddick, 2018). In its development, government social media (GSM) began to be used to establish open communication  (Bonsón et al., 2019) and public interaction and satisfaction as the leading indicator of its success (Rahayuningsih et al., 2018; Sari, 2021; Subhan, 2016; Wahyudianto, 2015).

Media content is crucial in exhibiting the government's performance towards stakeholders (Nurhaeni et al., 2021). GSM has more diversity of content than commercial social media, which can increase public engagement (Rietveld et al., 2020). GSM content, mainly information and news, can be shown in infographics to increase user interest in the report (Amit-Danhi & Shifman, 2022). The government can communicate more relaxed through social media by prioritizing user responses, especially on Instagram (Gruzd et al., 2018). Forming characteristics, labeling agencies, appointing togetherness, and seeking a collective agreement can be powerful strategies (Djuyandi, 2017). Establishing a communication mechanism whereby the Government can take appropriate roles when dealing with other stakeholders is a critical point in achieving program objectives (Abdurahman, 2017). Unfortunately, Political intervention makes the formation of communication policies that are not aligned and tend to be biased (Sirait, 2021). The government still focuses on technical matters rather than more strategic things (Rosalina, 2021). GSM is still not fully utilized, and sometimes it is only used as a means of reporting (Neely & Collins, 2018). Participatory communication within the Government of Indonesia also appears to be low in certain areas  (Aminah, 2016).

As a government agency, Indonesian Customs also adopt social media as a communication channel with the public. Indonesian Customs uses various social media platforms, including Youtube, Twitter, TikTok, Instagram, and Facebook. Followers on these social media platforms are pretty high, with 25.2 thousand on Youtube, 35.5 thousand on Twitter, 43.1 thousand on TikTok, 124 thousand on Instagram, and 276 thousand on Facebook. Through each social media, Indonesian Customs is active in providing public information. High engagement with users on each post is the primary goal of the communication strategy implemented. Indonesian Customs has had an escalation trend of engagement since the use of social media Instagram in 2015. Unfortunately, this trend broke even decreased significantly in 2021, as shown in figure 1.



Figure 1: Engagement trend on Indonesia customs Instagram

Instagram is one of the social media platforms that emphasize visual appearance to encourage the use of its application (Aljukhadar et al., 2020)**.** An attractive visual display can facilitate users' interaction on social media, which underlies engagement (Bhandari et al., 2019). A stunning visual appearance of a post is built on several main factors, namely content type, visual aesthetics, and presentation (Barreto & Ramalho, 2019); (Bhandari et al., 2019); (Huang et al., 2022). The content type is the topic of the message conveyed in a post that leads to a discussion category (Chen et al., 2020). Visual aesthetics is an innovative factor related to the form of message

form aimed at attracting users' attention (Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2019). Presentation modality relates to the interface format used to convey various signs of communication in a post (Burgoon et al., 2002).

Research on government use of social media is scarce. Several studies revolve around the use of virtual space (Gintova, 2019), the interaction between the public and the government (Chen et al., 2020), the categorization of the content topic (DePaula et al., 2018), and challenges faced on implementing process (Dekker et al., 2020). At the same time, research on visual factors closely related to the level of engagement on government social media is sparse (Dolan et al., 2019).

This study aims to analyze the phenomenon of the decline in the level of public engagement of the Indonesian customs Instagram account in terms of visual factor analysis. This study aims to find visual post factors and the right strategy to get the highest engagement on posts on the Indonesian Customs Instagram account.
RQ1. What factors make the difference in the level of engagement in the Indonesian Customs Instagram post?
RQ2. Which code combination gets the highest engagement in the Indonesian Customs Instagram post?

In the context of social media, engagement is a form of user interaction with the post, including consuming, liking, sharing, and commenting (Dolan et al., 2019). Engagement is often used to measure success in running social media (Peñaflor, 2018). The number of likes, comments, and sharing or retweets indicates engagement (Chen et al., 2020). The concept and method of measuring engagement are still in the stage of continuous research and do not yet have a final idea (Dolan et al., 2019); (Yavetz & Aharony, 2021); (Kostyk & Huhmann, 2021); (Testa et al., 2020); (Peñaflor, 2018). In this study, engagement on social media Instagram is seen from users' liking and commenting behaviour. User interaction can be seen from a post's number of likes and comments.

Content types on government social media posts are dominated by informational and symbolic messages (condolences, happy birthdays, religious holidays, and other non-political messages) (DePaula et al., 2018). The existing literature states that content types that trigger emotional factors tend to have high engagement (Joo et al., 2018; Soares et al., 2022). Meanwhile, self-oriented messages have the weakest engagement (Kusumasondjaja, 2018).

Based on the uses and gratification theory, consuming content from government social media account posts is based on the user's taste (Katz et al., 1974). The information needed by the community includes information related to services, new provisions, and activities of government agencies (Yavetz & Aharony, 2021). Therefore, posts containing information about a program or new provisions are classified with the information code. In contrast, posts containing information related to the activities and achievements of the agency (self-oriented content) are organized with the achievement code. Thus, posts on government social media accounts with information content will get higher engagement.

*H1. Posts in the information code will get higher engagement on Indonesian Customs Instagram.*

Visual aesthetics in social media is the overall beauty that includes the quality of images of people and objects that inspire and are easy to store and share (Aljukhadar et al., 2020). Visual aesthetics assessment in social media is done by classifying it into two aesthetic segments, namely classical and expressive (Bhandari et al., 2019; Kusumasondjaja, 2018; Marmat, 2022). Posts are classified in classical aesthetics if they use a simple, symmetrical, orderly, and precise arrangement pattern. Meanwhile, posts are classified as expressive aesthetics when they use complex patterns, special visual effects, various color combinations, and unique patterns (Bhandari et al., 2019; Marmat, 2022).

Visual aesthetics in social media is often associated with prominent beauty, being able to inspire and generate a desire to interact (Aljukhadar et al., 2020). Therefore, this study argues that expressive aesthetics has a more significant influence than classical aesthetics when posts are delivered in media that prioritizes visualization characteristics. That way, posts on government social media accounts on the Instagram platform will get higher engagement when using expressive aesthetics.

*H2. Post that is displayed with expressive aesthetics will get higher engagement on Indonesian Customs Instagram*

Presentation modality is a method for conveying messages using various forms of communication, which can be a combination of verbal, visual, or audio (Burgoon et al., 2002). Modalities in Instagram media can be seen at the level of content visualization, where posts can be categorized into 2 (two) types of modality, namely lean modality and rich modality. Lean modality is used for posts with only one visualization mode, such as static visual content or photos. At the same time, Rich modality is used for posts that use multimodal visualizations such as audio-visual or video (Kusumasondjaja, 2020).

The emergence of various social media platforms brings different post characteristics for each. The types of posts on social media can be categorized into 3 (three) groups: text only, images, or videos. Text posts only have one modality, so they are classified as the lowest media richness. In contrast, video is included in the Rich modality because it has various modalities, such as audio and visual (Chen et al., 2020; Denktaş-Şakar & Sürücü, 2020; Yue et al., 2019). There are still disagreements about the effect of presentation modality in the context of public interaction with government social media accounts (Chen et al., 2020; Huang et al., 2022) (Zhang et al., 2022). This study argues that presentation modality has a negative effect on engagement levels. This is based on the description above and 3 (three) assumptions, namely 1) the public is more concerned with whether government social media accounts can provide accurate and appropriate information. 2) High modality results in incomplete information (Chen et al., 2020). 3) Media richness must be appropriate to the context and purpose to get the best results (Daft, 1985; Daft et al., 1987). That way, posts on government social media accounts on Instagram will get higher engagement when using the lean modality.

*H3. Posts displayed with a lower modality will get higher engagement on Indonesian Customs Instagram.*

## 2. Methods

This research is suitable for using the content analysis method because it can assess samples with a large number of characters and various types systematically and objectively. This method allows researchers to analyze forms of communication and interaction freely (Neuendorf, 2017). Content analysis has become a popular framework used in research on social media (Chen et al., 2020; Denktaş-Şakar & Sürücü, 2020; DePaula et al., 2018; Joo et al., 2018; Lappas et al., 2018; Yue et al., 2019) (Kusumasondjaja, 2018; Peñaflor, 2018).

The first stage of data collection is to find the Indonesian Customs Instagram account on the Instagram platform. The Instagram account @beacukairi with a blue checkmark is interpreted as the official Instagram account of Indonesian Customs. Data samples were taken from all posts on the @beacukairi account between January 1, 2020, to December 31, 2021. Data collection was carried out in March 2022. Post and reels were taken as data in this study. The engagement indicators taken are the number of likes and comments.

This study used 3 (three) code groups, namely content type, visual aesthetic, and presentation modality. The content type code group was formed by researchers using systematic steps based on previous research (Kusumasondjaja, 2018). At the same time, the visual aesthetic and presentation modality code groups use codes used in previous studies (Bhandari et al., 2019; Kusumasondjaja, 2020; Maity et al., 2018; Marmat, 2022). The code shown in table 1 is used to categorize research data.

Table 1: Definition of Operational Variable

| Variabel | Klasifikasi | Definisi Operasional |
|---|---|---|
| *Content type* | *Symbolic Message* | Instagram posts contain symbolic messages to express congratulations or condolences on national holidays, religious holidays, holidays of other agencies, and other statements containing commemorations or greetings. |
|  | *Information* | Instagram posts containing information related to regulations, programs, and technical procedures for new services in the field of customs and excise. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | Information codes are used to classify posts oriented towards enhancing user insight. |
| | *Achievement* | Instagram posts containing activities with direct involvement of customs specifically mention the activities, location, and results of these activities that have been carried out from the perpetrator's perspective (Self-oriented message). |
| *Visual Aesthetic* | *Classical Aesthetics* | Instagram posts that use one or more objects with general symmetry or orientation with a more straightforward pattern. |
| | *Expressive Aesthetics* | Instagram posts that use many asymmetrical objects or unusual appearances using multiple patterns or colors. |
| *Presentation modality* | *Lean Modality* | Instagram posts that are submitted in one visual format (static image). |
| | *Rich Modality* | Instagram posts that are submitted in several visual formats (Audio-visual, video). |

After the research data were collected, the outlier test was carried out to determine the extreme data from the independent and dependent variables to avoid a later bias in the research results (Dao et al., 2021). This outlier test uses the z-score method, where data with a value range outside +-3.29 is entered into the outlier data and will be excluded (Mowbray et al., 2019). The next stage of data processing is to test the normality of the data using the Kolmogorov Smirnov One Sample Test. Data is categorized as normally distributed if the significance value exceeds 0.005 (del Barrio et al., 2020). The data were tested for homogeneity to know the level/rank of the data with the variance of the range predictor variable using the Levene test. The results of this Levene test will affect the method of further analysis (Y. J. Kim & Cribbie, 2018).

To determine the ranking of data with continuous or ordinal type, the Kruskal-Wallis test was carried out to see the difference between independent variables (2 or more variables) in a dependent variable to test the hypothesis of this study (Johnson, 2022). The Post Hoc test was carried out in terms of the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test, stating that there were differences in the content type variables. This follow-up test uses the Dunnet-C test because the number of research samples is quite large.

**3. Result and Discussion**

*3.1 Result*

Content analysis on Instagram produces data of 577 posts from January 1, 2020, to December 31, 2021. This indicates that Indonesian Customs and Excise, on average, posts 24 posts per month on Instagram accounts. The data is then analyzed using the content analysis method based on three predetermined variables.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the content type variable

| Content type | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | Simbolic Message | 101 | 17.5 | 17.5 | 17.5 |
| | Information | 270 | 46.8 | 46.8 | 64.3 |
| | Achievement | 206 | 35.7 | 35.7 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 577 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

As shown in Table 2. The research data was analyzed with the content type variable with detailed analysis results, namely posts of Symbolic Message codes as many as 101 posts (17.5%), Information as many as 270 posts (46.8%), and Achievement as many as 206 posts (35.7 posts). %).

Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the visual aesthetics variables

| Visual Aesthetics | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | Classical Aesthetic | 105 | 18.2 | 18.2 | 18.2 |
| | Expressive Aesthetic | 472 | 81.8 | 81.8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 577 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

As shown in Table 3, content analysis with Visual Aesthetics variables found that 105 posts (18.2%) used Classical Aesthetics while 472 posts (81.8%) used Expressive Aesthetics.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Variable Presentation Modality

| Presentation modality | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | Lean modality | 479 | 83.0 | 83.0 | 83.0 |
| | Rich modality | 98 | 17.0 | 17.0 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 577 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

As shown in Table 4, the Presentation modality variable found that as many as 479 posts (83%) used the Lean modality and as many as 98 posts (17%) used the Rich modality.

Table 5: Distribution of Variables

| Distribution of Variables | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 2020 | 2021 | Selisih |
| Variable | Kategori | Frequency | Frequency | (%) |
| Engagement | Sum of Like | 864.930 | 380.758 | -55,9 |
| | Sum of Comment | 17.404 | 7.243 | -58,3 |
| Post | Sum of Post | 319 | 258 | -19,1 |
| Content type | Symbolic Message | 56 | 45 | -19,6 |
| | Information | 191 | 79 | -58,6 |
| | Achievement | 72 | 134 | +86,1 |
| Visual Aesthetic | Classical | 0 | 105 | +100 |
| | Expressive | 319 | 153 | -52 |
| Presentation modality | Lean | 271 | 208 | -23 |
| | Rich | 48 | 50 | -4,1 |

Based on Table 5. there was a significant decrease in engagement from 2020, which was 55.9% in the number of likes and 58.3% in the number of comments. Changes occurred in the content type variable, where posts with the Information code decreased by 58.6% while posts with the achievement code increased by 86.1% from the previous year. Changes also occurred in the visual aesthetics variable, where classical aesthetics began to be applied starting in 2021 with a fairly flat portion with expressive aesthetics of 52%.

The outlier test removed eight extreme data from the advanced analysis stage in this study so that the amount of data that could be used for further analysis was 569 data. The extreme data is data with the number of likes that is too high than the average number of likes (Average 2,158 likes/post).

Based on the normality test result using the one sample Kolmogorov Smirnov, the significance value is 0.000, which is smaller than 0.005. This indicates that the data in this study are not normally distributed. Based on the Levene homogeneity test, The content type and visual aesthetics variable have a Heterogeneous data distribution because the significance value of both variables on engagement is 0.000 (less than 0.005) while the presentation

modality variable has homogeneous data distribution with a significance value at 0.363 (more significant than 0.005). Because there are heterogeneous distributed data on some of the variables, the research data is categorized as Heterogeneous distributed data.

Because the data has an abnormal distribution and is of heterogeneous type, the Kruskal-Wallis test is used to perform further analysis. The Kruskal-Wallis test was carried out in stages from the independent variables to the dependent variable.

Table 6: The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test for content type variables on engagement

| Kruskal-Wallis Test | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Rank** | | | |
| | Content type | N | Mean Rank |
| Engagement | Symbolic Message | 101 | 226.22 |
| | Information | 263 | 305.34 |
| | Achievement | 205 | 287.86 |
| | Total | 569 | |

| Test Statistics[a,b] | |
|---|---|
| | Engagement |
| Kruskal-Wallis H | 16.999 |
| df | 2 |
| Asymp. Sig. | .000 |
| a. Kruskal Wallis Test | |
| b. Grouping Variabel : *content type* | |

Based on the table 6, the significance value is .000, which is less than 0.005. This test gives the result that there is a significant difference between the average engagement with the Post Type Variable. Because the post-type variable consists of more than two codes and there is a difference in the average engagement, further tests need to be carried out using the Dunnet C test.

Table 7: Further test results with Dunnet-C

| Post Hoc Test | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Multiple Comparison** | | | | | |
| Dependent Variable: Engagement | | | | | |
| Dunnett C | | | | | |
| (I) content type | (J) content type | Mean Difference (I-J) | Std. Error | 95% Confidence Interval | |
| | | | | Lower Bound | Upper Bound |
| Simbolic Message | Information | -624.6681* | 181.75234 | -1055.7810 | -193.5551 |
| | Achievement | -218.12572 | 170.42794 | -622.8766 | 186.6252 |
| Information | Simbolic Message | 624.66807* | 181.75234 | 193.5551 | 1055.7810 |
| | Achievement | 406.54235* | 132.01930 | 95.1628 | 717.9219 |
| Achievement | Symbolic Message | 218.12572 | 170.42794 | -186.6252 | 622.8766 |
| | Information | -406.5424* | 132.01930 | -717.9219 | -95.1628 |
| *. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. | | | | | |

Based on table 7, it can be seen that the Information code content type has the highest difference in the level of engagement, with a mean difference value of 624,66807 against the Symbolic Message code and with a mean

difference value of 406,54235 against the Achievement code. Therefore, H1, which states that Indonesian Customs Instagram content in the form of information will get higher engagement, is acceptable.

Table 8. Kruskal-Wallis Test Results Visual Aesthetic Variables on Engagement

| Kruskal-Wallis Test | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Rank** | | | |
| | Visual Aesthetics | N | Mean Rank |
| Engagement | Classical | 104 | 253.90 |
| | Expressive | 465 | 291.96 |
| | Total | 569 | |

| Test Statistics[a,b] | |
|---|---|
| | Engagement |
| Kruskal-Wallis H | 4.554 |
| df | 1 |
| Asymp. Sig. | .033 |
| a. Kruskal Wallis Test | |
| b. Grouping Variable: Visual Aesthetics | |

Based on Table 8, the significance value is .033, which is less than 0.005. This test gives the result that there is a significant difference between the average engagement with the Visual Aesthetics Variable. Based on the mean rank value, it can be seen that expressive aesthetics has a higher average engagement value than classical aesthetics. Therefore, H2 states that Indonesian Customs Instagram content displayed with expressive aesthetics will get higher engagement is acceptable.

Table 9: Kruskal-Wallis Test Results Presentation modality variable on engagement

| Kruskal-Wallis Test | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Rank** | | | |
| | Presentation modality | N | Mean Rank |
| Engagement | Lean | 471 | 305.82 |
| | Rich | 98 | 184.92 |
| | Total | 569 | |

| Test Statistics[a,b] | |
|---|---|
| | Engagement |
| Kruskal-Wallis H | 43.875 |
| df | 1 |
| Asymp. Sig. | .000 |
| a. Kruskal Wallis Test | |
| b. Grouping Variable: Visual Aesthetics | |

Based on Table 9, the significance value is .000, which is less than 0.005. This test gives the result that there is a significant difference between the average engagement with the Presentation modality variable. Based on the mean rank value, it can be seen that the lean modality has a higher average value of engagement than the rich modality. Therefore, H3, which states that Indonesian Customs Instagram content displayed with a lower modality will get higher engagement is acceptable.

*3.2 Discussion*

Overall in the content type variable, the posts with the Information code got the largest portion (46.8%), slightly different from the Achievement code (35.7%). In comparison, the Symbolic Message code got the smallest percentage (17.5%). Most posts use expressive aesthetics (81.8%) rather than classical aesthetics (18.2%). At the

same time, the presentation modality is dominated by lean modality (83%) rather than rich modality (17%). From the analysis of descriptive statistical data, it can be seen that posts are dominated by using a combination of Information and achievement topic codes and expressive aesthetics through lean modality.

Based on the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test, it can be seen that there is a significant difference between the average engagement in the content type variable. These results were then analyzed further by using Dunnet C post Hoc Test to obtain a ranking order. The follow-up test found that posts with information topics will positively affect getting the highest engagement. Posts with the topic of achievement and symbolic messages also positively influence engagement but at a lower level. As for the visual aesthetics variable, it is evident that expressive aesthetics significantly positively impact the level of engagement. Likewise, the Presentation modality variable clearly shows that the Lean modality significantly positively affects the level of engagement.

The results of this study state that the information code gets the highest average engagement rank than the achievement code and symbolic message. This means that the public tends to interact more with posts containing information on provisions or regulations related to the agency field. This result is in accordance with previous research, which stated that posts containing helpful information for the community would get more attention (Yavetz & Aharony, 2021).

This reinforces that public interaction with government social media is based on community subjectivity related to expectations and fulfillment of the information submitted. Indonesian Customs Instagram posts oriented towards increasing user insight (regulations, programs, new technical service procedures) in the field of customs and excise have been proven to facilitate higher public interaction than posts on other topics.

Posts that use expressive aesthetics get a higher average engagement than those that use classical aesthetics. This means that people prefer to interact with posts with asymmetric objects or unusual appearances that use several patterns or colors than posts that use one or more objects with general symmetry or orientation with simpler designs. This result is also in accordance with previous research that states the same (Bhandari et al., 2019; Kusumasondjaja, 2020).

Social media that prioritizes visualization displays will build a tendency toward beauty with an asymmetric orientation, the use of various colors that will produce an unusual visualization. In the Indonesian Customs Instagram, posts that use exceptional concepts, irregular patterns, and multiple colors are proven to attract people's attention to interact.

Meanwhile, the lean modality code gets a higher average engagement in the presentation modality variable than the rich modality. This means that people tend to interact more with posts displayed in one visual format (image) than posts delivered in several visual formats (audio-visual, video). This is in accordance with previous research, which states that media richness has a negative effect on engagement in the context of information seeking (Chen et al., 2020).

Community interaction with government social media aims to fulfill information so that posts that can display it more fully will get more interaction. Using lean modality will reduce the evaporation of information caused by multiple modalities. Indonesian Customs Instagram posts displayed in one visualization format (static image) are proven to get higher interactions than posts that use several visualization formats.

There was a change in the use of code combinations on Indonesian Customs Instagram during the research period. This can be seen in the descriptive statistical analysis, which illustrates that in 2020 posts are dominated by content type code information, the use of expressive aesthetics, and posts displayed in lean modality. Meanwhile, in 2021 there will be a change in the combination where the content type achievement type begins to dominate, the use of classical and expressive aesthetics is balanced, and posts are still consistently displayed in lean modality.

Based on the results of the research that has been done, the change in the combination is a factor that causes a decrease in the level of engagement. In 2020, the variety of codes used was information-expressive-lean, so it can

be analyzed that the Information (High Rank) code coupled with Expressive Aesthetics (High Rank) and with Lean modality (High Rank) will have a positive effect on maximum engagement levels. Meanwhile, in 2021, the code combination will change to achievement-classical/expressive-lean so that the analysis that appears is the achievement code (Medium Rank) combined with Classical (Low Rank) and Expressive aesthetics (High rank), which is presented in the Lean modality (High Rank) will have a positive influence on the level of engagement but not maximal.

**4. Conclusion**

Social media, as a means of communication that is cheap and has a broad reach, makes it a massive interaction channel used by the people of Indonesia. As one of the government agencies, Indonesian Customs is the primary source of information on issues related to handling imported and exported goods. Through the Instagram account @beacukairi, every post by Beacukai Indonesia can reach as many as 125 thousand followers. This makes the Instagram platform one of the leading digital communication tools for interacting with the public. Indonesian Customs has had an increasing trend of engagement since the use of social media Instagram in 2015. Unfortunately, this trend of increasing engagement stopped and decreased significantly in 2021. What factors contributed to the difference in the level of engagement? What code do combinations get the most engagement? The content type is the main factor that makes a difference in changes in the level of engagement in the Indonesian Customs Instagram account. The visual factors that contributed to the difference in the change in the level of engagement were visual aesthetics and presentation modality. At the same time, the combination of codes from these factors that gives the highest level of engagement is the use of information topics in content type, expressive use in visual aesthetics, and appearance using lean modality in presentation modality. This change in the combination of visual factors will provide a difference in the average post engagement, ultimately making a difference in the overall engagement level.

Practically, the results of this study can be considered in efforts to increase the level of engagement on the Instagram platform by Indonesian Customs and other government agencies. Based on the Use and Gratification theory, people in consuming media exposure prioritize self-satisfaction as the goal of the consumption behaviour. To get a high level of engagement, GSM management and development should pay attention to the needs and interests of the community. This research is focused on the Indonesian Customs Instagram account, so it does not have a significant theoretical contribution. More in-depth analysis of public needs and interest in government social media needs to be done to get a more balanced view from both sides.

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# Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court against the Perpetrators of International Crimes

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**Abstract**
Crimes do not only occur at the national level, but have also occurred at the level of international crimes, especially crimes that violate human rights. The failure of national law to resolve international crime cases is the reason for the birth of the International Criminal Court to try perpetrators of international crimes who are unable or unwilling to carry out settlements by the state. The international criminal court is only able to have jurisdiction over countries that are members of the Rome Statute, so the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is very limited to arrest perpetrators of international crimes which are not participants in the Rome Statute. The international criminal court is only a complement to the national court because of the principle of state sovereignty. For this reason, the awareness of both the state and the international community is the basis for smooth law enforcement for perpetrators of international crimes.

**Keywords:** International Criminal Court, Perpetrators of International Crimes, State Sovereignty

## 1. Introduction

States, as subjects of international law, have rights and obligations to uphold international law and participate in the prevention of international crimes. (Alvarez, 2011; Acquaviva, G. 2005) However, in reality, many international crimes and human rights violations occurred (MacKinnon, 1993; Altman, 2004; Glasius, 2002). The inability of states to enforce international criminal law led to attempts by the international community to establish an International Criminal Court, especially after the creation of the League of Nations (El Zeidy, 2001). These efforts came from a number of prominent legal experts such as Vespasien Pella, Donnedieu de Vebres, Quintiliano Saldana, Megalos Ciloyanni, and Rafaele Garofalo. Support for this effort also came from international community associations such as The International Law Association, The American Society of International Law, and The International Parliamentary Union (Irham, 2020).

The efforts of legal experts and various international community associations are not only a hope but can be realized. It is clear that four international ad hoc tribunals have been created in the last 50 years. First, after World

War II, international criminal courts were formed, namely the International Military Tribunal (IMT) or better known as the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945 and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in 1946 (Schabas, 2009). During the war, a criminal court were created, namely the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICTR) (Schabas, 2006). The four ad hoc courts formed became the basis for the formation of a permanent International Criminal Court due to criticism of the ad hoc court's exercise of jurisdiction (Florea, 2019). The IMT was criticized for not prosecuting all criminals who were Nazi leaders in World War II (Hirsch, 2020). Some were even pardoned for their crimes. In addition, the IMT was also criticized as a victorious court because all prosecutors and judges were from allies, not neutral countries (Meron, 2006). All the defendants and their defenders were from Germany and had very limited opportunities to prepare their cases and be informed of the prosecution evidence. However, the IMT is very important for the enforcement of international human rights because it has established the basic principles of individual criminal responsibility, as expressed in the Nuremberg Principles.

Like the IMT, the IMTF was also criticized as a victorious court because Japan was not allowed to take the United States to the Tokyo Trial over the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nor was Japan allowed to try the Soviet Union. Union for violating the Neutrality Agreement of April 13, 1941 (Chang, 2017). Apart from that, the practice of impunity was also very visible at this Court when the United States decided not to try Emperor Hirohito, but to perpetuate his position in the Empire of Japan (Johnson, 2010). The ICTY was also criticized as many people considered this process to be accidental given the failure of diplomacy and sanctions and the UN's refusal to sacrifice its security forces through armed intervention against war criminals. This court is also considered to be a selective court because it can only try crimes committed in certain countries. Moreover, this Court has not yet tried the NATO troops who participated in the bombing of the former Yugoslavia. In fact, it is quite clear that the NATO air strike on Kosovo must hold NATO leaders accountable for their bombing choices, as this is a clear violation of the laws of war. Similar to the ICTY, criticism that the four ad hoc courts exercised selective justice was also directed at the United Nations when the Security Council formed the ICTR. Many people believe that the ICTY and ICTR are simply international tribunals established for highly political reasons and based on abstract and obscure principles. Criticism of all ad hoc courts is one of the reasons for the international community to immediately form an International Criminal Court which can minimize practices such as selective justice. This wish was finally realized on July 17, 1998. 120 countries in the United Nations Plenipotentiary Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court agreed to ratify the Rome Statute, a statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Lee,1999).

The formation of the ICC is an embodiment of the international criminal policy or the rational efforts of the countries in the world to collectively tackle the four core crimes which constitute violations of delicto jus gentium. This policy is needed because these violations have the following elements: first, a direct threat to world peace and security; second, indirect threat to world peace and security; third, shocking to the conscience of humanity; fourth, conduct affecting more than one State; fifth, conduct including or affecting citizens of more than one state; and sixth, means and methods transcend national boundaries (Irham, 2020).

## 2. Discussion

### 2.1. Conception of Competence of the International Criminal Court (ICC)

The International Criminal Court is an international judicial institution that is permanent and independent with its position outside the United Nations agency. The ICC was established based on the 1998 Rome Statute with the main objective of being able to prosecute individuals who have committed gross violations of international humanitarian law (Schabas, 2004). The history of the formation of the ICC began with crimes that occurred in World War I which led to the establishment of a military court known as the Nuremberg Trial through the London Agreement to try Nazi war criminals (Harris, 2007). Likewise in 1946, the allied nations agreed to a charter establishing the International Military Tribunal for the Far East known as the Tokyo Tribunal to try Japanese war criminals during World War II. The formation of the Nuremberg Trial and the Tokyo Trial became the beginning of awareness of the importance of establishing a permanent and independent international judiciary to be able to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity and eliminate the right to impunity, including heads of state and

diplomats who can acquit them to trial in court (Hagan, 2002). Its main goal is to stop all forms of crimes against humanity such as genocide, ethnic cleansing as well as war crimes committed by individuals. Based on this, the UN General Assembly formed a commission to prepare proposals related to the establishment of an international tribunal. Gradually from 1949 to 1954, the UN International Law Commission made preparations for the establishment of a draft Statute which contained the establishment of an international criminal court. an international criminal court. The International Criminal Court or commonly known as the International Criminal Court (ICC) is an international criminal justice body established under the Rome Statute and has jurisdiction to try people accused of international crimes.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent, permanent International Criminal Court, and does not apply the retroactive principle, so that the trial process is in accordance with the general principles of universal criminal law (Luban, 2008). Furthermore, Article 5 paragraph (2) of the Rome Statute states that the requirements for exercising the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) must comply with the relevant provisions in the United Nations Charter. Based on Article 5 paragraph (1) of the 2002 Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the most serious crimes and is of concern to the international community. This jurisdiction applies to four core crimes or what are known as the four international crimes which consist of war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide and crimes of aggression. These four crimes are often referred to as stricto sensu international crimes. However, the International Criminal Court only has jurisdiction over crimes that occurred on the territory of countries that ratified the 2002 Rome Statute.

The ICC only has jurisdiction over crimes committed after the 2002 Rome Statute came into effect, effective from 1 July 2002. This is contained in Article 11 paragraph (1) of the 2002 Rome Statute which states that "The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute". For crimes that occurred prior to the entry into force of the 2002 Rome Statute, other law enforcement alternatives are needed, such as prosecution by the national legal system, the establishment of an ad hoc international judicial body, or prosecution by other countries that have jurisdiction, including countries that apply universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction refers to state jurisdiction over a crime, regardless of the place where the crime was committed and the nationality of the perpetrator or victim of the crime (Macedo, 2006). The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes that occur in the territory of a state party to the 2002 Rome Statute or crimes committed by citizens of a state party to the 2002 Rome Statute as explained in Article 12 paragraph (2) of the 2002 Rome Statute. Based on Article 12 paragraph (3) of the 2002 Rome Statute, non-state countries -parties or those who do not ratify the 2002 Rome Statute can make a declaration to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC, specifically for related cases. In addition, the ICC only has jurisdiction over individuals, with the age limit specified in Article 26 of the 2002 Rome Statute, namely as follows: "The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime". Which means that the ICC has no jurisdiction over individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime.

The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court may apply in trying perpetrators of international crimes on the following two principles of application:

1) The Unwilling Principle means that there is a country's unwillingness to prosecute international crimes that occur in its territory. So that the International Criminal Court must step in to uphold justice. Regarding a country being said to be unwilling or unable basically still raises fundamental questions, such as under what circumstances a country can be said to be unwilling or unable. What considerations are needed by the ICC to determine whether a country is declared unwilling or unable. Because in essence it can be said that all countries that commit international crimes are their own citizens, especially citizens who have a large enough role for the country will not want to try the person concerned if he commits an international crime. The state will try its best to protect its citizens. The existence of the ICC's authority to determine whether a country is unwilling or unable is of course a very good thing in relation to being a complementary institution in enforcing international criminal law against perpetrators of international crimes so that international perpetrators do not go unpunished. However, is the ICC's authority to determine whether a country is unwilling or unable to be properly implemented by the ICC, so that no perpetrators of international crimes go unpunished?

2) The principle of inability means that there is an inability of a country to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes. Either because they were unable to find the perpetrator, did not obtain the necessary evidence along with the testimony of the person allegedly responsible for the crime, and/or were unable to carry out the judicial process. In addition, the Rome Statute explains that one of the indicators that a country is unable (unable) is the absence of a national legal system, one of the indications of the absence of a national legal system is that the state is unable to process criminal cases due to the absence of applicable laws to be able to prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. Because of this legal vacuum, the role of the ICC is to accommodate a country's national legal system in resolving these cases. Against this kind of situation, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction to try him.

For these two things, the International Criminal Court based on its jurisdiction can handle and adjudicate international criminal cases. Basically the ICC jurisdiction is divided into four consisting of territorial jurisdiction (ratione loci), material jurisdiction (rationae materiae), temporal jurisdiction (ratione temporis), and personal jurisdiction (ratiionae personae) (Van der Vyver, 2000). Territorial jurisdiction means that ICC jurisdiction only applies within the territory of a state party, jurisdiction is also extended to ships or aircraft registered in a state party, and in the territory of a non-State party that recognizes ICC jurisdiction based on an Ad Hoc declaration. Material jurisdiction means that crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC consist of crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and crimes of aggression. Temporal jurisdiction means that the new ICC has jurisdiction over crimes regulated in the Statute after the Rome Statute came into effect on July 1, 2002. Personal jurisdiction means that the ICC has jurisdiction over natural persons, where the perpetrators of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC must be held accountable for their actions individually (individual criminal) responsibility), including government officials, commanders both military and civilian. The position of the ICC is in accordance with the provisions of Article 17 paragraph (1) of the 2002 Rome Statute, that the jurisdiction of the ICC is only complementary or complements the national legal system, so that as long as the country that has jurisdiction is still willing and able to process the criminal case, the ICC does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate.

The International Criminal Court in the context of international criminal law is a permanent judicial body established by the United Nations. The International Criminal Court is one of the instruments of the United Nations to prosecute and try the perpetrators of international crimes or crimes (Benzing, 2003). The International Criminal Court was established based on the 1998 Statute of Rome which was the result of a diplomatic conference which took place in Rome on 15 – 17 July 1998 (Arsanjani, 1999). The conference was attended by representatives of each member country of the United Nations in the world or envoys from organizations government and non-governmental organizations. After being regulated in the Rome Statute of 1998 and the provisions therein coming into effect, the International Criminal Court has legally been established as a permanent (permanent) international judicial body with the duties, functions and powers it has. The International Criminal Court is based in The Hague, Netherlands. The existence of the International Criminal Court as a permanent international judicial body. This Court also has the character of international law (International Legal Personality), meaning that the International Criminal Court is a subject of international law with its capabilities, and there are rights and obligations based on international law (Nyssanbekova, 2016). Apart from having an international legal character, the International Criminal Court also has a national legal character (National Legal Personality), which also means as a national legal subject for participating countries or non-participating countries (Article 4 paragraph (2) of the 1998 Rome Statute). The position of the International Criminal Court in relation to the United Nations, because the formation of this court cannot be separated from the initiative of the United Nations through the general assembly with the role of the International Law Commission. This court is not under or as a part (main part, subsidiary part or special part) of the UN, so that it can be said that the court is outside the UN system with its position equal to or equivalent to the UN. This is based on an agreement between the court and the United Nations as stipulated in Article 2 of the Rome Statute of 1998. Jurisdiction is the authority to act based on applicable provisions concerning duties, functions and objectives. Like the jurisdictions of other judicial bodies, for example the 1945 Nuremberg Court, the 1946 Tokyo Court, the 1993 Former Yugoslavia Court, and the 1994 Rwanda Court, the existence of the International Criminal Court also has jurisdictions, which include personal jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, temporal jurisdiction, and jurisdiction criminal (Murphy, 2006). The explanations regarding these jurisdictions are as follows:

1) Personal Jurisdiction Is the authority possessed by the court to try the perpetrators of crimes or criminal

acts in the form of people or individuals who must be responsible for the crimes committed as determined in the Rome Statute of 1998 (Article 25 paragraph (1), so that in this case, the state is not a personal jurisdiction for courts or other international law subjects except for individuals. Special matters in the personal jurisdiction of courts, namely regarding perpetrators of international crimes who are less than 18 years old, the court does not have the authority to try them before the trial courts, so that they can be held accountable based on the national laws of the countries concerned (Article 26) of the 1998 Rome Statute.

2) Territorial Jurisdiction Is the authority of the court in carrying out its duties and functions as an international judicial body based on the location or jurisdiction over which the international crime occurred. Basically, this jurisdiction applies in the territory of the participating countries in the 1998 Rome Statute, in the event of a crime that crosses the country's territorial borders. However, in relation to countries that reject or are not members of the 1998 Rome Statute (not participating in ratifying the contents of the 1998 Rome Statute), the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction over crimes that occur in the territory of that country. Thus, the perpetrators of crimes are outside the reach of the jurisdiction of the court, who also do not receive immunity from the court.

3) Temporal Jurisdiction Is the authority of the court as regulated in Article 11 paragraph (1) and (2) of the Rome Statute of 1998 which reads: the court only has jurisdiction over crimes committed after the entry into force of this statute. The court does not have jurisdiction over crimes that occurred before, this is in accordance with one of the principles of international criminal law, namely the non-retroactive non-retroactive principle), this is based on Article 24 paragraph (1) of the 1998 Rome Statute. Regarding the temporal jurisdiction that exists in the court , that it does not apply the principle of lapse of time to the four types of crimes subject to jurisdiction as stated in the 1998 Rome Statute, namely crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. This is in accordance with Article 29 of the Rome Statute of 1998 which states that there is not one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the court which is subject to a time limit for prosecuting the perpetrators of these crimes.

4) Criminal Jurisdiction Is the jurisdiction owned by the court in carrying out its duties to try international crimes that are included in or regulated in the 1998 Rome Statute. others as follows: a) the crime of genocide, b) crimes against humanity, c) war crimes and d) The crimes of aggression mentioned above, the Statute also explains in detail the definition or meaning of the crime in question, as in Article 9 of the Rome Statute of 1998, explaining the need to be formulated in more detail regarding the elements of each crime (elements of crimes) in helping to interpret or apply provisions related to article m Indicates the types of crimes referred to in the Rome Statute of 1998. As an international criminal court, the ICC uses several languages in its official forums. The official languages used are English, French, Arabic, Chinese, Russian and Spanish. In accordance with article 36 of the Statute, there are 18 judges in the ICC who are elected from the member states of the Rome Statute. In the Statute article 36 regarding the qualifications of judges, judges are selected from people who have moral character, a high sense of justice and integrity and have the qualifications required of the member states to occupy the highest office in their respective countries. The term of office of judges is divided into 9 years, 6 years and 3 years and can be re-elected except for judges who have received a term of office of 9 years. The main office of the ICC is located in The Hague, Netherlands. However, in carrying out trials, if trials cannot be conducted at the head office, the ICC can occupy a State to be able to carry out trials if deemed necessary. Until now there are 6 offices located in other countries namely in Kinshasa and Bunia (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Kampala (Uganda), Bangui (Central African Republic), Nairobi (Kenya) and Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire). The International Criminal Court may exercise its functions and powers, as stipulated in the Statutes, over the territory of a State Party and, by special agreement, over the territory of a State (Caesius, 1999). This Statute applies equally to all people without any distinction on the basis of official position. In particular, official position as a Head of State or Government, member of a Government or parliament, elected representative or government official does not in any way exclude a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute (Akande, 2004), nor does it in and of itself constitute a reason to reduce sentences and the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over a person who was less than eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of a reported crime (Leveau, 2013). The International Criminal Court is complementary to the jurisdiction of national courts (Kleffner, 2003; Carter, 2010). That is, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the most serious international crimes against human

rights and as a complement to the national criminal court system, if the national court system is ineffective or unavailable, the International Criminal Court can exercise its jurisdiction in prosecuting and trying international criminal perpetrators in jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Benzing, 2003; Stigen, 2008). This complementary principle is a mechanism for a balanced approach which is intended to provide an opportunity for countries to fulfill their obligations as a state to regulate and run state organizations in accordance with applicable laws and regulations and have powers that are not bound and not subject to other powers except for the provisions that have been determined, such as international provisions. Thus, in fact no state sovereignty has been violated, in fact this complementary principle is in line with the principle of state sovereignty. The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is exercised and carried out by an independent Prosecutor when a participating country (Rome Statute) transfers jurisdiction over crimes to the United Nations Security Council or to the Prosecutor himself (Brubacher, 2004). However, the problem is if a country where the most serious crimes against human rights have occurred, is not willing to surrender the perpetrators or is not willing to provide information about the crimes that have occurred to the Prosecutor, due to the doctrine of state sovereignty, because they do not want their country's laws to be interfered with by other countries especially handed over the perpetrators to be tried by the International Criminal Court, which generally (the perpetrators) were those who at the time the crime occurred had power within the country concerned and whose existence was strong enough to influence the country's national policies.

*2.2. Authority of the International Criminal Court in Settlement of International Criminal Cases*

The International Criminal Court exercises its powers and functions pursuant to the Statutes, over the territory of a State Party and, by special agreement, over the territory of a State (Sarooshi, 1999). This Statute applies equally to all people without any distinction on the basis of official position. In particular, official position as a Head of State or Government, member of a Government or parliament, elected representative or government official does not in any way exclude a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor does it in and of itself constitute a reason to reduce sentences and the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over a person who was less than eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of a reported crime. The International Criminal Court is one of the bodies that functions in the field of justice as a permanent court for cases of serious crimes committed by individuals, both as state leaders and individuals with personal interests. It is this international individual judiciary that makes the ICC different from judicial institutions, namely the International Court of Justice which only has the scope of the state as its legal subject. So that the ICC can probe into a more micro space, but follow up on crimes at a macro level. In addition, the ICC only tries to try those accused of the most serious crimes. In every activity, the ICC observes the highest standards of fairness and due process. The jurisdiction and functions of the ICC are regulated by the Rome Statute which is the result of an international conference in Rome in June 1998. With the formation of the International Criminal Court it has specific objectives, namely:

1) To act as a deterrent against people planning to commit these serious crimes according to international law.
2) Urge national prosecutors who are fundamentally responsible to bring those responsible for these crimes to justice.
3) Ensure that victims and their families have the opportunity to obtain justice and truth, and begin the process of reconciliation.
4) Take big steps to end the problem of acquittal/sentence.

The jurisdiction or authority possessed by the ICC to enforce the rules of international law is to decide limited cases against perpetrators of serious crimes by citizens of countries that have ratified the statute of the court (Stahn, 2005). The ICC is a complement to the International Court of Justice. The parameter between the two is that the ICJ is a court adjudicating disputes between countries as states. On the other hand, the ICC is a court that prosecutes and convicts individuals. Jurisdiction is a legal parameter that relates to various things related to the commission of a crime and can be used as a guide for the work of the court. These parameters are:

1) Subject matter jurisdiction (ratione materiae) Refers to the most serious crimes such as the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.
2) ICC's temporal jurisdiction (ratione temporis) strictly applies the principle of legality which does

not allow retroactive application of regulations (nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege).

3) Personal/individual jurisdiction (ratione personae) The ICC has jurisdiction over the citizens of participating countries who are prosecuted for a crime (the State of which the person accused of the crime is a national).

The International Criminal Court is complementary to the jurisdiction of national courts. That is, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the most serious international crimes (against human rights) and as a complement to the national criminal court system, if the national court system is ineffective or unavailable, the International Criminal Court can exercise its jurisdiction in prosecuting and prosecuting perpetrators. international crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. This complementary principle is a mechanism of a balanced approach which is intended to provide an opportunity in advance to countries to fulfill their obligations as a state which regulates and runs state organizations in accordance with applicable laws and regulations and has powers that are not bound and not subject to other powers except for the provisions that have been stipulated, such as international provisions. This principle is as regulated in Article 17 of the Rome Statute which states that the International Criminal Court does not function to replace the national court of a country but when the state is unwilling and unable to carry out its obligations to punish perpetrators of crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Court can carry out jurisdiction. This principle is a guarantee that the International Criminal Court aims to streamline a country's national criminal court system. The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is exercised and carried out by an independent Prosecutor if a state which is a party to the Rome Statute surrenders jurisdiction over crimes to the United Nations Security Council or to the Prosecutor himself. However, the problem is if a country where the most serious crimes against human rights have occurred, is not willing to surrender the perpetrators or is not willing to provide information about the crimes that have occurred to the Prosecutor, due to the doctrine of state sovereignty, because they do not want their country's laws to be interfered with by other countries especially handed over the perpetrators to be tried by the International Criminal Court, which generally (the perpetrators) were those who at the time the crime occurred had power within the country concerned and whose existence was strong enough to influence the country's national policies.

## 3. Conclusion

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an international criminal justice body established under the Rome Statute and has jurisdiction in trying people charged with international crimes. The inability of the state to uphold international criminal law, gave birth to efforts by the international community to form an International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. This jurisdiction applies to the Four core crimes or what are known as the four international crimes which consist of war crimes, crimes against humanity, the crimes of genocide, and the crimes of aggression. The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court can apply in trying international criminal perpetrators on two principles, namely unwillingness and inability. The International Criminal Court is complementary to the jurisdiction of national courts. That is, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the most serious international crimes (against human rights) and as a complement to the national criminal court system, if the national court system is ineffective or unavailable, the International Criminal Court can exercise its jurisdiction in prosecuting and prosecuting perpetrators. international crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

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# Dynamics of Changing Rural Demography (A Case Study of Villages in National Capital Region –Delhi)

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**Abstract**

Migrants preferring to settle in the villages abutting urban centers avoiding slums and ghettos in metropolitan cities influences and changes rural demographics as migrants outnumber the host denizens who shift to the cities to leverage urban amenities for quality life and convenience. In this context of new dynamics in the rural socioeconomic setup the focus of the paper is to highlight positive factors which entice migrants towards villages and local denizens shifting to the cities. The study elucidates contributions of migrants in making rural economy vibrant and thriving with myriad new avenues for the host communities to prosper. In spite of being the harbinger of dynamism in rural landscapes, migrants are deprived of socio economic amenities and denied roles in local governess by supremacist thinking dominant status and local hierarchy. The need is to address there denied rights for inclusive and harmonious rural societies. Keywords: Dynamics, Migration, Demographics, Prosper Friction

**Keywords:** Rural Demography, Delhi, Villages

## 1. Introduction

Migration is an escape from century old penury and hope for assured availability of food, cloth and shelter for families. Rural India comprising 0.6 million villages and particular its changing rural demographics needs attention in the context of developmental policies as these rural landscape hold immense resources and potential and inhabitants have strong urge to participate and collaborate in developmental process for equitable and inclusive growth sine quo non for peaceful, progressive and harmonious societies. Migration in India from villages reflects three different demographic changes and repercussions. Firstly, villages in far off Border States where mass out-migration results in ghost villages with a few families residing. Secondly, central Indian states where outmigration is very high but it is circular so the village economies do not suffer rather thrive and grow. Thirdly, the villages on the national highways and abutting the metropolitan cities and in the national capital region –Delhi, which is the subject matter of this study entice people from all over India to come and become permanent residents and affluent host communities shift to adjoining towns and cities with wider and deeper impact on rural demographics. Industrialization around metropolitan cities fuels the development of modern housing projects, commercial hubs and new amenities and opportunities for self-employment and employment abounds both in formal and informal sector enticing migrants from other states for reliable, ready, quality and better remunerative job in cities. As per 2011 census, 45 crore Indians (37% of population) were internal migrants. The National Capital Region-Delhi

**(henceforth NCR)** comprises 19 districts of states of Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Rajasthan and national capital territory of Delhi attracts migrants from all part of the country. The present study has chosen district Faridabad, one of the major satellites cities abutting Delhi and it is the most populous in the state of Haryana having 413towns and villages in its vicinity and draws attention as it is an industrial hub of northern region home to mega industrial and infrastructure projects culminating into generating interrelated and interdependent activities breeding employment opportunities for all. The open spaces between the national capital Delhi and Faridabad and the land around the villages in the district have tremendous scope and potential for development and the state government acquired and sold these land for industrial and commercial projects and that inculcated dynamism in the villages abutting these land areas. These migrants require a shelter place for their families with minimum basic necessities and that too near to the place of work, The slums and ghettos in NCR or the so called Jughi-Jhopari (Temporary huts) colonies are over crowed and living their comes at a cost in terms of insecurity, risk and poor hygiene and the costs and hassle of dally commute to the work place are very high. The only escape for them is to settle in the villages which are in close proximity to industrial, real estate and infrastructure projects and provide safe, secure and hygienically conditions along with the prospect of availability of housing, primary health facilities, water and education for children. The increasing concentration of migrants in villages culminates in growth of informal sector to provide goods and services conveniently to the masses. The affluent host communities no longer avail rural services as the family members can afford to commute to the cities to avail better amenities or the family gradually shifts to the nearby towns to avail urban amenities for quality life. This in and out migration changes rural demographics which is both challenge and opportunity for gram panchayats (Village Council) for leveraging it for inclusive and harmonious growth of the rural economy. The present work shall address following issues In the light of changing rural demographics

1. What are the forces which changes rural demographics and its socio economics repercussions?
2. Do the migrants get their due political, economic and social rights for quality lives and livelihoods?

## 2. Literature Review

India, a populous agrarian economy needs to nurture and leverage rural development for sustainable growth. The pace and level of rural development in Third World Countries would continue to define their overall socioeconomic development as sovereign states (Adisha Rashid, 2012). The process of people migrating to urban industrialised area is an age old practice. The assessment of the effect of migration on rural areas is very necessary to know as it influences socio culture and political fabric of the villages. The effect of rural urban migration on rural communities is catalytic (Chuwuedozie & Patience, 2013). The complexities and diversities of rural lives are usually underpinned and consequently undervalued and so there is a need to understand the microenvironments within the rural context (R chamber, 2008). Migration is an age old human instinct to move way from place of birth to other areas for availing new opportunities and this comes under the category of voluntary migration. Migrants can be agents of development and it brings both opportunities and challenges to rural are in the countries of origin, transit and destination (FAO Reopt, 2016). Infrastructures development projects that directly induce population displacement and resettlement for those who migrate to become permanent residents (Mc Dowell 1996). Favourable condition shall be created for the population to use migration to grow not only to grow but develop also, so that they will ultimately become settlers (EPRDF 1995). Ravenstein (1885) points out that migration accelerates with growth in means of transport and communication and expansion of trade and commerce.. Domestic trade and the adequacy and efficiency of infrastructure are the backbone of mutually beneficial rural-urban relationship (Tacoli, 1998). The labour contractors also encourage settlement of these migrants in villages. Employers also prefer migrant labours to local labours, as they are cheap (Pandey 1988). Once the share of emigrants in the total population increases they become aware of dividends of political empowerment. Rural demography changes due to migrants. (Portes, 1995) argues that migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and non migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, share communities origin. Rural societies become multicultural and multiethnic as a result of new settlers. Yadav et .al (1996) finds that migration affects a number of socio-economic, cultural, demographic and political factors both at the place of origin and destination. Rural rich and aware visualise a bright and rewarding future in urban amenities. Education and other amenities available at the origin acts as a

hindrance in out-migration while at the destination attract the in–migration (Greenwood,1969). Migrants are mostly young people. Most migrants are young adults and their out-migration changes the demographic pattern of both the areas (Peterson, 1975). Development pattern influence national and worldview the kind of government elected the way natural and financial resources are used and the development of transportation system ( Herbers, 1986) Migration is the result of the interplay of political, social, economic, legal, historical, cultural, and educational forces at both ends of the migratory axis (Mejia et al. 1979). These forces can be classified as either 'Push' or 'Pull'. The push factors are those life situations that give one reason to be dissatisfied with one's present locale; while the pull factors are those attributes of distant places that make them appear appealing (Dorigo & Tobler, 1983). The inter-state migration of workers in India has increased substantially to 90 lakh annually between 2011-2016 compared to previous years The largest recipient of migrant workers was the NCR-Delhi region, which accounted for more than half of migration in 2015-2016 Uttar Pradesh and Bihar  together accounted for half of total outmigration in 2015-2016 (The Economic survey 2016).

## 3. Methodology

The study was conducted in July 2022 just a few months before the Gram Panchayat elections in Haryana. The five villages chosen for the survey are in close proximity to the national high way no 10 and are abutting the industrial estates set up by government of Haryana and concomitantly growth of mega residential and commercial projects. The finding draws on the sentiments and views of rural denizen's through a structured questioner. The households were randomly chosen so as to get true and unbiased views from both settlers and host communities. The demography data was taken from the website of block development offices, Government of Haryana.

## 4. Changing Rural Demography

### 4.1 In-Migration

As per the Land Acquisition Act, the government of Haryana through its designated agencies acquires the private land for Industrial and housing projects with a fair compensation to the landowners and the income is exempted from income tax as per Income Tax Act 1961. The cumulative effect is that the land on the periphery of the village is now most sought after with high premiums. Most of these villages being in close proximity to the railway stations, Metrorail or on the national highways attract migrants to settle. The survey covers the five villages namely Sikri, Asoti, Tatarpur, Jharsetli and Harphola in Faridabad district of Haryana. Table1 shows the proximities of the villages to railway stations and national highway.

Table 1: Geographical Location of the villages

| Village | Population | Distance from railway station (in kms) | Distance from National Highway (in kms) |
|---------|-----------|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Sikri | 5320 | 5 | 0 |
| Asaoti | 5945 | 0 | 5 |
| Tatarpur | 1018 | 3 | 3.5 |
| Jharsetli | 4258 | 3 | 0 |
| Harfola | 3145 | 2 | 2 |

*Source: State Census 2011 (/states.php)*

The increasing concentration of mega construction and infrastructure projects, housing projects,  industrial estates creates the demand for labour both  unskilled and semi skilled. Migrants flocking to these projects for work prefer to settle in nearby villages with their families. The National capital region of  Delhi which is one of  the world largest agglomeration with the population of 47000000 (census 2011) comprising Delhi as well as area surrounding it in states of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan witnessing a phenomenon where rural urban connectivity is a major factor influencing the economic development and shared amenities and prosperities. National capital region

–Delhi , has witnessed a vast transformation from a agrarian region with sporadic industrial regions two decade ago to a land of opportunities where large number of industrial and commercial hubs have mushroomed and concomitantly infrastructure development has been given top priority by both the central and state governments Real estate developers  have invested huge amount of capital  to earn profits in future. The round the clock commercial and passenger vehicles criss-crosses the national highway abutting these villages and industrial and housing projects.NCR is transient point for transporters from various states. It is because of these reasons that villages land is most sought after and the opportunity cost is high. The way to any housing projects or industrial estate passes through these villages and hence metalled roads were laid by developers.

The migrants coming to NCR-Delhi and settling in nearby villages change composition of village population and its effect on culture, economic and political fabric of villages is palpable. The villages in NCR region present a unique scenario which segregates' them from far off villages all over the country. There are a number of pull factors at work to entice the migrants to settle in villages. Firstly, in the national capital region, urban rural integration is seamless and effective as these villages are having road and rail connectivity. Secondly, the shelter in urban areas is becoming difficult due to strict municipalities rules which proscribes new ghettos or encroachment and settlements in new colonies on the outskirts. Thirdly, the living conditions in villages are  relatively more safe, hygienic and protective  in all weather conditions as compare to slums in urban regions. The reasons for this which shall be discussed later in the paper are availability of pucca houses constructed by local landlords with all basic amenities. Fourthly, family members find an easy source of employment by engaging themselves in informal activities ranging from street vending to providing various kinds of services of various kinds. Fifthly, basic facilities and social amenities like schooling for children, health facilities, water from hand pump sets, essential items through public distribution shops Besides, MGNREGA (Mahatama Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) a flagship programme of Government to provide employment to rural folks) is a convenient and reliable source of employment .Real estate developers purchases agricultural land from villagers with high premium and later on get conversion of land use (CLU) certificates from government. In a number of cases the wealthy villagers develops colonies themselves on the outskirts of village and get CLU certificate through political manoeuvring and sells plots to migrants and settles the labours from outside. These colonies are becoming vote banks for vested interests

The local villagers' construct special building or renovate village houses for housing these migrant and earn rental income. These building provide one room or two room accommodation to each family with shared amenities. The owners of building provide maximum convenience to tenants to attract more and to get higher rent. It is also observed that the local villagers' makes efforts to improve village connectivity through getting constructed pucca roads connecting villages with highways and railway stations. These buildings become crowded as more people want to adjust in same accommodation so as to reduce share in total rent. There is competition among villages to attract more and more labours to their respective villages. The villages which are in close proximity to railway station and national highway get advantage. The concentration of settlers in the village increases and they permanently settles in the villages, Effective and efficient connectivity of these villages and mushrooming of industrial and real estate projects culminates  creates a new dynamism in rural economy.

The survey findings showed that the  majority of migrants were married, illiterate or completed four to five years of schooling and were engaged in agriculture or working as rural artisans in the their respective state of origin with meagre incomes. For few years they work as casual labours at the constructing sites and in the industries but gradually learns basic of various trades. Table 2 shows the state of origin along marital status, education levels and the skills which they learnt

Table 2: Profile of Migrants

| Village | Migrants State | Marital Status | Education Primary Level | Skills |
|---------|----------------|----------------|-------------------------|--------|
| Sikri | UP, Bihar, Orissa, MP, Rajasthan and North East | Married (85%) | (95%) | Masons, Carpenters, Plumbers, Industry Specific |

| Asoti | UP , Bihar, WB, Orissa, MP and Rajasthan | Married (90%) | (90%) | Masons, Carpenters, Plumbers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tatarpur | UP, Bihar, MP and Rajasthan | Married (90%) | (90%) | Industry Specific |
| Jharsetli | UP , Bihar, WB, Orissa, MP and Rajasthan | Married (90%) | (90%) | Masons, Carpenters, Plumbers |
| Harfla | UP, Bihar, MP and Rajasthan | Married (90%) | (90%) | Industry Specific |

*Source: Field Survey*

*4.2. Out-migration*

Host communities living for generation in the villages shifting their families to the adjoining cities or towns have become a very common trend in the NCR-Delhi. Outmigration is cumulative result of awareness and affluence, to avail services hitherto unavailable to improve quality of life and brighter future prospect. There are a number of push factors at work due to which affluence and aware host communities want to settle in adjoining cities. Post 1991, the year when India introduced the economic reforms, the land in the NCR has become what oil is for sheikhs of Arab. An acre of land which till yesterday was either barren or giving low and uncertain return now have buyers with bag full of currency notes to get it at exorbitant rates. Local landowning class received huge compensation as land has been acquired by the government. With high liquidity with them the village host communities wanted to avail urban facilitates of public school education for children, multispecialty hospitals, a new marketing experience with new products for making life comfortable and public spaces for outings. Recognising the vast untapped opportunities in cities, affluent rural people invest in activities in cities like real estate developers and agents, local transportation business, building contractor and material supplier, security agencies for providing guards as hiring them is new fed and need of commercial agencies and gated communities in urban areas. The survey findings show that affluence also provide them political heft which they also use in urban areas .Most of these people who shifted to cities have been landlords in their respective villages and their hegemony still prevails in village politics The ancestral houses is taken care of either by family elders or the house is given to migrant family to live as caretaker and if the family is large then one of the siblings remains in village. No estimate of number of families amongst host communities who have shifted to cities can be made that as all families have their names in the electoral roll of the village and remain connected for various needs and reasons.

**5. Changing Dynamics in the rural economy**

The composition of populations is such that the migrants who are now permanent settlers outnumber the host communities, the rural economies develop in its own way breeding new opportunities for growth in myriad ways

*5.1. Informal Sector: Growth and Contributions*

Most of the infrastructure and real estate projects have gestation period of four to five years and contract labour is most safe option for developers' .The contractor shifts the workers to other nearby site after completion of earlier project, The increase in number of settlers promotes the growth of informal activities particularly street vending of essential goods and services, small temporary shops for essential and eatables items, tea stalls, pan and cigarette shops, fast food items, basic on line services and IT related works etc. The family members of migrants find an easy source of additional income. These vendors do business during morning and evening hours when peoples commute. During the day hours they shifts to industrial and infrastructure projects,, The women folks run these business entities during the day period and in early morning. A few of these units are also run under part time basis. The vending is also carried out on the highways, railway stations, infrastructure sites and bus stops to cater to the needs of commuters round the clock. In two of the villages (Tatarpur and Sikri ) the local have opened placement agencies . The owners of these agencies shared that they recruit security guards, electricians, plumbers, watchmen., security guards, drivers, gardeners , housemaids to work in the housing societies where families have moved in and there is pent-up demand for such services and we being local provide guarantee and promise of

quality services as most of our workers are placed only after proper counselling and basic training. An important finding is that the majority of women amongst migrants offer themselves for employment and they are empowered and recognised as they get additional regular income for the family. Table 3 highlights the number of settled families and their occupation structure.

Table 3: Occupational Structure of the Migrants

| Village | No. of Families* Settled | Occupation |
|---------|--------------------------|------------|
| Sikri | 252 | Workers/ Labourer/small shops/road side vending on highway |
| Asaoti | 427 | Workers/ Labourer/ Street Vending/ small shops /Security Guards |
| Tatarpur | 82 | Workers/ Labourer/ |
| Jharsetli | 74 | Workers/ Labourer/ Street Vending/ small shops/Security Guards |
| Harfola | 54 | Workers/ Labourer/ Street Vending/ small shops |

*Source: Field Survey*
*\* Average sige of family 3 members*

### 5.2. Social Aminities: Incresing Affodabilty But Inaccesible

Accessibility and availability of pure drinking water, school education and primary health services are sine quo non for healthy, wealthy and inclusive society. Once the families settle and their income increases they do want to avail these for a better living. To our utter dismay we find that on all these fronts the situation is grim and deplorable. A majority of local households who are affluent and living in village no longer avail these services. Their children  commute to the public schools  in city by school bus, have tap connection in homes  and consult physician in cities for primary heath check-up. It is because host community is indifferent towards these amenities these remain neglected and in deplorable state and the local administration is least concerned and insensitive toward these issues. The local government indifference attitude towards other social issue like village cleanliness, by lanes and drainage system, village parks, village Chaupal and other necessities is all because locals are no longer availing these facilities. The field survey also observed that the schools, health centres, public hand pumps, public toilets facilities being availed by migrants are purportedly neglected as majority of local residents do not avail these facilities. The block level administration turns a Nelson's eye to inadequate depilated social amenities as the local villagers no longer need and demand. This is gross injustice and denial of fundamental rights to the rural citizenry It is a strange paradox wherein migrants brings vibrancy to rural economic and social life and prosperity to local population and on the other hand public utility goods whose availability to all is the sole responsibility of local government are utterly neglected as local no longer require and migrants who want to avail these are deprive of these essential services.

### 5.3. Sociocultural Fabrics: Vibrant and Lively

The people from different states brings with them different custom, belief and values. The migrants are also influenced by the social culture of the village. The intermingling of cultural and integration of community's inculcates vibrancy and fervour in the village life.  Increasing travel expenses and higher opportunity cost of being away from the workplace for many days deter the people from going to the native places and they celebrate common festivals and family functions at the village itself. Industrial and commercial establishments and developers also encourage them to stay through extra bonuses, gifts and festivals fairs and parties at the workplace during festival seasons. The round the year celebrations on religious festivals, family functions and other activities

usher in new cultural of community participation and becomes a direct and indirect source of temporary employment for labourers   for arranging paraphernalia on these festive.

*5.4. Political Landscape: Consciousnesses and Rights*

Migrants working in industrial projects or in informal sectors for long time  now becomes aware and understand the benefits of political empowerment and political patronage. They now want  to participate and contribute in local politics. However, their political involvement and benefits from various government welfare schemes depend on their landlords. Permanent settlers are entitled for being registered voters. During the field survey it was found that they become voters only when local landlord wishes and facilitate the process. The district election office while doing annual survey also involves Panches (Memberss, village Council) of Gram Panchayats in this vote making process. Once they become registered voters they do feel that should be involved in the decision making processes at the Gram Panchyat level as most of the issues now concern them only as original inhabitants have either moved or are indifferent towards these issues. They find that they are being ignored and they have no say in the development process and are political outcast. In none of the village surveyed the migrants could find their nominations for membership of panchyat. Another important issue is that the families which are settled in city still hold the post of sarpanch(Head, village Council) directly or indirectly through proxy candidates by nominating woman from the family or nominating a person from weaker section when there is reserved seat. During the election time migrants are being approached by different faction who tries to entice them by promising various benefits. The election scenario becomes fearful and these settlers are not able to exercise their franchise fearlessly and wilfully. Their political exclusion enfeebles their power in decision-making. The amenities and infrastructures remain inadequate and inefficient adversely effecting quality of life and hence productivity.

## 6. Conclusions

Changing rural demographics need to be leveraged for transforming villages in to productive, progressive and prosperous entities. Depriving migrants of basic amenities and denial of political right is social injustice. Block level officials and peoples' representatives at all levels should be hold accountable for any injustice and denial of fundamental rights .There is need of proper counselling and training to members of Gram Panchayats to make them understand that this diversity due to migration is a source of opportunities, vibrancy and economic prosperity of the villages. The block development office should involve the NGOs in training and counselling the members of gram sarpanches. The gram penchants need to explore innovative inclusive strategies for involving all in strengthening democracy at the grass root level so that settlers also participate in the decision making process and social harmony prevails. The local village community should be motivated for giving the settlers representation in the Gram Panchayat. The block development officers has a pivotal role for providing a platforms for dialogue between settlers and locals for collaboration and cooperation for preparing and implementing plans to leverage rural diversity for rural development and prosperity. Recognising, empowering and involving permanent settlers in the villages is linchpin for inclusive and equitable society through practising participatory democracy at the grass root levels. There is need to focus on mainstreaming the migrants through involving them in democratic process. The survey noticed instances of local hegemony and choice of migrants suppressed. The migrant people who are now permanent residents are always under constant fear and their safety and honour always at stack. The polarisation of rural communities on the basis of origin need to be subdued and leveraged for inclusive progress and prosperity

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# Nigeria's Compliance with the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in the Cases of Piracy and Armed Piracy of the Nigerian State in the Gulf of Guinea in 2016-2021

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## Abstract

Through adherence to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and its execution in eradicating piracy and armed piracy instances that happened in the Gulf of Guinea from 2016 to 2021, this study evaluates Nigeria's history, progress, and response to piracy. The goal of this study is to examine Nigeria's compliance with the Yaoundé Code of Conduct as shown in its papers and historical development in accordance with the documentation from the literature review. The data was processed using qualitative approaches, namely research on descriptive research, which focuses on employing analysis to provide an overview or description of a scenario. The information received is analyzed utilizing non-reactive research methods after being gleaned from pertinent literature investigations. This approach will process information from reliable sources, including primary and secondary data, which will then be examined in accordance with predetermined theories and concepts to provide a response to the problem formulation. According to the study's findings, from 2016 to 2021, Nigeria adhered to the Yaounde Code of Conduct in situations of piracy and armed piracy. Nigeria is actively creating and putting into effect a national maritime security strategy to safeguard its marine affairs from all kinds of illegal activity. In compliance with the Yaounde Code of Conduct, Nigeria enacted the POMO ACT which made Nigeria the first country with an anti-piracy law and cooperated in the protection of vessels in accordance with the articles contained in the Yaounde Code of Conduct. However, Nigeria's strict emphasis on adhering to the Yaounde Code of Conduct hasn't worked to stop piracy because it doesn't deal with the underlying issues.

**Keywords:** Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria, Piracy, Yaounde Code of Conduct

## 1. Introduction

The current threats to maritime security are associated with the development of non-traditional security, where the threat has taken the form of an expansion of threats that no longer only concern militaristic threats or interactions between state actors but also non-state actors, terrorist organizations, and individual terrorists. Maritime conflicts between nations, marine terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, the spread of weaponry, illegal fishing, environmental crimes, and maritime disasters are all examples of maritime hazards (Broohm et al., 2020).

Because of how concerning this act of piracy is, officials must be able to distinguish it from maritime terrorism in order to create and implement effective remedies (Nelson, 2012).

Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) Fishing refers to fishing activities in the territory of another country, using equipment that is prohibited or harmful to the environment and failing to record the catch. In addition, maritime economic interests include several important components such as preservation of fishing and freshwater resources, development of port facilities for logistics purposes, reduction of crime and illegal control, improvement of trade routes security, promotion of tourism development, and protection of ecosystems (Juned et al., 2022).

Piracy and armed piracy are caused by maritime hazards in Nigeria, notably in the Gulf of Guinea (Begum et al., 2011). Researcher, decision-makers, and the media have demonstrated concerns during the past ten years that are more concerned with economic, political, and security aspects than with casualties related to such activities (Jimoh, 2015). According to data from the IMB, crimes including piracy, hostage taking, and the murder of crew, passengers, and staff have increased in frequency in Nigeria's coastal seas in addition to armed robberies (Jimoh, 2015). (International Maritime Bureau, 2019).

According to IMB, there were ups and downs in the number of armed robberies and pirate attacks from 2016 to 2021. Zones of concern exist in three geographic regions: the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea, the Somali Coast, and the Horn of Africa, particularly the Gulf of Guinea, which has been ranked as the third most vulnerable region since 2011 (Fattah, 2017). Since shifting their geographic focus to African waters, particularly the Gulf of Guinea region with high concentrations in the waters of Somalia and Nigeria, maritime pirate activities, which previously focused primarily on pumping activities in Asian countries, have become more prevalent (ONUOHA, 2013). In the past two decades, there have been cases of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Cases of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea over the past 2 decades, it was noted that a total of 734 pirate attacks occurred in the region between 1991 and 2012, with Nigeria taking up 46% of the incidents (ONUOHA, 2013).

The Gulf of Guinea is a global pirate hotspot, accounting for 43% of all documented piracy events, due to the rising threat of marine crime off the coast of West Africa (International Maritime Bureau, 2021). According to the IMB, 135 crew men have been kidnapped from their ships worldwide in 2020, with the Gulf of Guinea accounting for more than 95% of those incidents. In addition, 161 ships were taken over, 20 attacks were attempted, and 11 instances of ships being shot at. The IMB reported 38 occurrences of armed robbery and pumping against ships in the first quarter of 2021. (International Maritime Bureau, 2021).

Off the coast of West Africa, the Gulf of Guinea is a section of the eastern tropical Atlantic Ocean. The Volta and Niger rivers are its principal tributaries. Africa's principal trade route is the Volta River, while the Niger River passes through nine nations. Volta and Niger both gained access to the world's marine trade (Petr, 1986). Additionally, the Gulf of Guinea hosts 20 commercial ports and 25% of all maritime trade in Africa. The Gulf of Guinea contains 2.7% of natural gas reserves and 4.5% of petroleum reserves, accounting for 60% of Africa's oil production (Morcos, 2021). However, just a little portion of the revenue from the oil wealth that the people receive as a result of government errors. Lack of employment opportunities and unemployment are the main reason why many people in Nigeria are driving to turn to piracy as a livelihood rather than the sector (Kadafa, 2012).

Insecurity in the Niger Delta is also reportedly linked to crime on land, where grievances over perceived marginalization and ecological degradation have long fueled insecurity. Studies show that piracy tends to be perpetrated or supported by marginalized communities who do not participate in economic development. Poor fishermen in west Africa turned to piracy to amass wealth through ship robbery and piracy, kidnapping crew members and often holding them for ransom (Bueger, 2013).

According to Onouha research from 2012, Nigeria still has significant security challenges. These difficulties are caused by a variety of factors, including extreme poverty, bloody wars, floods and earthquakes, terrorist acts, and external hostility. These challenging circumstances provided a significant and ongoing impetus for the subject of enhancing safety, particularly maritime security. This difficulty makes it difficult for Nigeria to uphold security within its borders, including marine security (Onuoha, 2012).

In a subsequent study by Okoronwo (2014), despite the differences and blurred definitions of Maritime Security in various countries, the weak maritime security in Nigeria does not only stem from the weak definition of maritime security. There are other contributing factors to the state of maritime security in Nigeria such as the deep corruption in Nigeria that makes it very easy for pirates and sea bandits to carry out their illegal activities. Based on this journal, there is more attention to be paid than just the definition of maritime security itself, which is the resolution of the country's problems in Nigeria (Okoronkwo et al., 2014).

The impact of government failure on land security is not limited to its immediate effects, as it can also have a spill-over effect on maritime security. Nigeria is a case in point, where the increase in piracy cases is attributed to the lawlessness in areas bordering major global shipping routes and the lack of government attention to maritime security issues (Pérouse de Montclos, 2012). This example illustrates the interconnectedness in the international system, where changes within the system can have significant impacts on the states within it. State behavior, on the other hand, is guided by natural characteristics of leaders or by the "invisible hand" caused by the anarchic international system. (Juned et al., 2019). The tendency to accumulate power through defensive or offensive realist approaches is always present in any decision made for certain interests, highlighting the intricate dynamics between state behavior and the broader international system (Williams & Elman, 2020).

As shipping companies struggle to balance consistent demand with escalating expenses in order to secure safe passage and port cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, maritime economic security is coming under greater danger. There is a lot of travel in this area for Europe, and according to the European Association of Shipowners (ECSA), a ship can be chartered to a non-European country or be owned by a European corporation even though it is sailing under a non-European flag. Products can be transported between African ports and Eropa, or European goods everywhere, by non-Eropa vessels (Barrios, 2013). This maritime menace will undoubtedly present challenges in the social and economic spheres (Bowden, 2010).

The weaknesses and inadequacies of the maritime policies of the Gulf of Guinea countries and the lack of cooperation between them have gradually created opportunities for the activities of criminal networks to diversify their activities and expand their networks from the coast of Nigeria to the outer seas (Hasan & Hassan, 2016; Hodgkinson, 2013)

The Yaondé Code of Ethics was one of the tools developed to address this issue. In an effort to raise the commitment of African leaders to demonstrate political will and set a tone of leadership in the governance of Africa's maritime domain, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct was developed to improve the continent's strategic approach to maritime safety and security. The Yaoundé Code of Conduct will be in effect in Nigeria until 2021, and past studies have shown that this will significantly reduce the amount of piracy and armed robberies in the Gulf of Guinea. The Yaounde Code of Conduct, a measure to combat pirate instances in Nigeria, was created for a number of reasons, which have also been the subject of numerous research. But few studies explain the effectiveness of this code of conduct for reducing piracy in Nigeria. So, this study will analyze Nigeria's compliance with the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in cases of piracy and armed piracy of Nigerian states in the Gulf of Guinea in 2016-2021.

## 2. Materials and Methods

### 2.1. Research Design

This study adopts *a non-reactive research* design. This research design will process data from credible sources such as primary and secondary data which are then analyzed based on predetermined theories or concepts to answer the problem formulation. This method will analyze primary and secondary data derived from literature studies to analyze Nigeria's compliance with the Yaounde Code of Conduct to piracy cases that occurred in Nigeria in 2016-2021.

### 2.2. Data Collection Methods

In this study, both primary and secondary data were gathered and analyzed. Data were gathered utilizing two different techniques: literature reviews and documentation. A literature study is a method of data collection that uses information obtained from official, unquestionably reliable sources, such as the official website of the institution or organizations, summaries of case study-based high-level conferences, publications of previous research in the form of journals, theses, and dissertations, and well-known news portals from around the world (Harris, 1995; Todorov & Lyons, 2007). The study that was employed looked at how the Yaounde Code of Conduct was put into action to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

Researcher will gather a variety of documents relevant to the issue as the source of documentation, including exclusive documents like letters of agreement and case reports to support data as material for study analysis as well as public documents like news, papers, reports, and other public documents like news articles. Researcher can obtain detailed information about the issues in this study relating to the two data gathering methods mentioned above. To serve as a guide and the foundation for this research, data from studies of the literature and documentation will be chosen.

*2.3. Data Analysis*

All data that has been collected will be selected or reduced through qualitative data analysis. Data reduction is carried out with the aim of directing and classifying data into information that can be used as a final conclusion that can be obtained. Data that has been reduced is drawn in the form of a set of information arranged into a more organized form so that it is easy to understand.

The information presented in this study took the form of data on case numbers or statistics, documents obtained related to the Yaounde Code of Conduct, cases of piracy in Nigeria, and other documents that are relevant to the question of the effectiveness of the Yaounde Code of Conduct in the Nigerian state. The next step is to form conclusions based on the research findings and data validation. To get outcomes that reflect the facts, careful effort is put into drawing conclusions or doing verification. In order to deduce meaning from data and give researcher the chance to get feedback, drawing conclusions requires extensive analysis of data reduction and data display (Iskandar, 2009).

*2.4. Concept*

Maritime security is any action taken by owners, operators,  port facilities, ship administrators,  offshore installations, and marine organizations in protecting sea areas   from the presence of piracy, theft, confiscation, sabotage and  other disturbances (McNicholas, 2016).

Key Concept in Maritime Security: According to Morris & Paoli (2018) and Väyrynen (2022), maritime security is defined as a combination of preventive and responsive measures to safeguard the marine domain against threats and intentional unlawful acts to safeguard the maritime domain against, limit the effects of, accidental or natural hazards, environmental hazards and damage, risks or losses (Morris & Persi Paoli, 2018).

Compliance theory is a theory that explains a condition where individuals obey established rules to avoid the punishment that will be imposed.  In this theory there are two perspectives regarding compliance with the law, namely instrumental and normative. On an   instrumental perspective, individual compliance is driven by self-interest and responses to changes in *tangible*, incentive and  penalties related to behavior.  While the normative perspective deals with what is considered moral and opposite to self-interest (Mitchell, 2020).

Compliance and conformance to established norms are closely related concepts. International norms are frequently misinterpreted. Depending on whether they are imposed on actors or voluntarily accepted, norms can differ significantly. Norms may be enforced internally or externally. Exogenous enforcement takes place outside of established norms and institutions, whereas endogenous enforcement is included in international treaties and has the power to impose itself. Negative enforcement is coercive, whereas positive enforcement is convincing and

feasible. In general, globalization promotes facilitation and results in the endogenous enforcement of standards (Väyrynen, 2022).

Researcher examined Nigeria's compliance with the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in cases of piracy and armed piracy of Nigerian states in the Gulf of Guinea (Gulf of Guinea) in 2016–2021 using the notion of maritime security based on compliance theory.

## 3. Results and Discussion

### 3.1. Yaounde Code of Conduct

The Yaounde Code of Conduct serves as the foundation for regional maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea among the Signatory countries. The ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC countries' most thorough effort to construct a regional maritime-related security system is the Yaounde Code of Conduct. This Code of Ethics acts as a set of guidelines for maritime-related instruments of cooperation and has the potential to be a rule of conduct (Nwangwu et al., 2015). Yaounde's Code of Conduct tackles the majority of maritime insecurity causes in the area, including money laundering, drugs and weapons trafficking, oil theft, human trafficking, people smuggling, illegally caught and disposed of fish, maritime terrorism, hostage-taking, piracy and armed robbery at sea (Anabia-Tiah, 2022).

### 3.2. Nigeria's Compliance With Yaounde's Code of Conduct

3.2.1. Ship Protection Cooperation

In  accordance with article 4 of the Yaounde Code of Conduct, in complying with the Yaounde Code of Conduct Nigeria in April 2016 launched the Nigerian Navy's anti-piracy operation code named "*Operation Tsare Teku*" (Abuja, 2017).  *Operation Tsare Teku I-III* was a special   naval operation aimed at ridding the country of armed robbery, pipeline vandalism and to protect local merchant ships and international includes containing the threat of piracy and attacks on shipping and oil and gas installations. The operation focuses on outside the  main  offshore waters of Nigeria supported  by the Nigerian Navy (Obi & Oriola, 2018). This operation began in 2016 until January 2017.

In order to safeguard Nigeria's marine shipping and security, Operation Tsare Teku was successful in lowering instances of pipeline damage, armed robberies, and other offshore criminal activity (Nwatu, 2022). Piracy and hostage-taking in Nigerian waters were successfully decreased during Operation Tsare Teku II's second phase. According to a report by Global Security, there were just 2 instances of piracy and armed piracy in Nigeria up until July 2016 (Ayoyo & Oriola, 2018). Operation Tsare Teku III, however, did not have a substantial effect until the end of 2016, when the number of reported cases of piracy increased to 36 from 14 in 2015.

On June 24, 2016, *Operation Delta Safe* was also conducted. Operation Delta Safe is part of the  Nigerian  Defense Headquarters  initiative to restructure the  Joint Task Force in the delivery of  services, efficiency and  effectiveness of  Nigeria's  greater maritime security provision  well (Agim, 2018).  The operation,  which was deployed at Cross River, led to  the killing of 7  militants linked to the pirate  action and thwarted and arrested 2 suspected  pirates who later  captured  Another 8 suspects (Sahara Reporters, 2016).

In addition, *Sharkbite Exercise* operation in November 2016 and *Operation Rivers Sweep I-II* in January 2017 were also carried out (Punchng, 2020).  However, the maritime space security   improvements made throughout 2017 by the  Nigerian Navy had little impact on reducing cases of  piracy and  armed piracy.  Based on the  2017 report on piracy  and  armed piracy published by the IMB, Nigeria recorded 33 incidents of piracy cases  with 7 cases of   armed   piracy out of 36 cases of    piracy and 8 cases of  armed piracy in  2016 (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2020).

Nigeria was listed as a piracy hotspot in an IMO report on the issue that was released in the first quarter of 2018. The IMB reported that Nigeria had 12 instances of armed piracy and 22 incidences of piracy overall. Compared to the previous year, which reported 20 occurrences of piracy, this number showed an increase (Nwangwu et al., 2015).

The Nigerian Navy established partnerships with France, China, Portugal, and three other African navies in 2018 to combat maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria also hosted the Nigerian Navy International Maritime Conference during same year. Nigeria's cooperation with the military extended from 2016 to the beginning of 2018. Nigeria's response to the rise in criminal activity in Nigerian waterways was this. The Nigerian Army and the Nigerian Air Force are working together to clean Nigeria's waterways in a safe and secure manner, especially in the Niger Delta's environmental waters, which present their own challenges in dealing with maritime crimes, particularly the kidnapping of illegal crews and bunkers that cause pollution (Salau, 2018). Nigeria also works with AFRICOM US, Interpol, and UNODC. The Nigerian government worked together to guarantee the POMO ACT Anti-Piracy Bill 2019 passed quickly before the national assembly (Treatment & Suspect, 2011).

Although Nigeria engaged in a number of cooperative efforts to enhance marine security throughout 2018. A study from the IMB states that Nigeria was responsible for 48 acts of piracy, including 29 cases of ships being boarded, 1 case of a ship being hijacked, 12 cases of armed piracy, and 6 cases of armed pumping experiments (International Maritime Bureau, 2019).

The researcher contends that even though Nigeria implemented the Yaounde Code of Conduct's article content through enhanced naval patrols and strengthened maritime security measures, it has not been successful in lowering instances of piracy and armed robbery there. The high rate of piracy makes this obvious. This indicates that experts have concluded that this implementation has a problem. Inadequate implementation or the less "binding" Yaounde Code of Conduct may be to blame for this rise in piracy and armed robberies in Nigeria.

3.2.2. Make National Legislation That Guarantees The Protection Of The Marine Environment

Nigeria established a number of new laws to lower the number of pirate cases in compliance with article 4 (c) of the Yaounde Code of Conduct, which specifies national-level action steps. This section reads: "National legislation that provides efficient protection of the marine environment" (Onyeji, 2017). The POMO Act, the first anti-piracy law in the Gulf of Guinea region, was passed by Nigeria on June 24, 2019. The POMO Act seeks to stop and deter piracy, armed robbery, and other illegal acts against ships, airplanes, and other marine vessels (Ogbonnaya, 2020b). Nigeria may now bring charges to try offenses under the POMO Act following its enactment. In addition, violators may be found guilty of offences under the Pomo Act and receive punishments from the Federal High Court of Nigeria, including fines of up to N250 million, life in prison, and restitution to the owner (POMO Act, 2019).

In accordance with the POMO Act, 10 pirates were apprehended on July 15, 2019, and each was sentenced to ten years in prison and N200,000 by the Federal High Court of Nigeria in Ikoyi for stealing the merchant ship FV Hailufeng II, which was carrying 20 pirates who had been found guilty under the POMO Act. They were found guilty of three crimes related to piracy that were against sections 3, 10, and 12 of the law (POMO Act, 2019). The Federal High Court of Nigeria in Lagos sentenced 11 pirates to 12 years in prison each on August 18, 2019, for seizing a Chinese fishing boat in international seas off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea. They were found guilty of breaking Section 3 and Section 2 of the Pomo Act (POMO Act, 2019).

The Federal Government of Nigeria updated the Nigeria National Security (NNS) at the end of June 2019, in addition to developing a legal and administrative framework for prosecuting marine offenses. The national policy emphasizes the spread of small guns and light weapons, financial crime, drug and people trafficking, and environmental pollution. exists in Nigeria's marine domain's evils. President Goodluck Jonathan adopted the NNS in 2014 as a comprehensive national strategy document that outlined Nigeria's national security goals in a framework. Nigeria has to revise back the goals of its national security strategy in NNS due to the changing internal

and global security environment and the complexity of new concerns including maritime terrorism, kidnappings at sea, insurgency, viral illness outbreaks, and other issues (Vanguard, 2019).

Kidnapping of oil workers, sea piracy, armed robbery at sea, oil theft problems, illegal bunkering, hostage taking, and marine terrorism are all listed as national security threats under the NNS and the POMO Act even though they had not previously been. According to the NNS's goals, this demonstrates an improvement in Nigeria's overall maritime security architecture (Vanguard, 2017).

The IMB observed a decline in pirate cases in Nigeria during the first quarter of 2019. Nigeria registered 14 cases of piracy in 2019 compared to 22 occurrences during the same period in the previous year. The decrease attests to Nigeria's increased efforts to combat maritime crime (International Maritime Bureau, 2019).

As of the end of 2019, Nigeria reportedly continued to   decline by 42.6% compared to the previous year. In the first quarter, for the first time Nigeria had no ships hijacked since the first quarter of   1994. The total  number of piracy cases  throughout 2019 in  Nigerian waters was recorded at 35  cases  where  as  many as 23  ships were boarded, 2 ships were hijacked, 1 attempted  pirate attack and 9 cases of piracy  armed(International Manie Bureau, 2019).

The Nigerian Navy's operational performance in guarding the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone), territory, and internal Economic Zone against maritime crime is evidenced by the ongoing decline in the number of successful attacks. Additionally, the decrease in instances was brought on by the fact that pirates were diverting their criminal activity and changing where they committed armed piracy and other crimes. Nigeria had 11 instances in the first quarter of 2020 through March, compared to 14 during the same period in 2019. Dr. Bashir Jamoh, Director General of NIMASA, stated in an interview with Nigerian Current that the deployment of Deep Blue had been successful in assisting the Nigerian Navy in apprehending possible pirates over the previous two months (Ortise, 2022).

In a Deep Blue rescue operation near April, the Nigerian Navy successfully released 8 crew members who had been kidnapped by pirates from the container ship Tommi Ritscher in Benin. On April 19, as the ship was docked in the port of Cotonou, pirates attacked it. Additionally, 11 crew men were successfully rescued from the ship's defenses and South Niger Delta-based hijackers during the rescue operation (Ortise, 2022).

In some cases, piracy in Nigeria involves armed robbery at sea and detaining crews for ransom. In   mid-2020, Deep Blue along with NIMASA arrested 9 defendants in July in connection with the kidnapping of the crew of MV Elobey VI off the  coast of Nigeria.  Under the POMO Act, a Nigerian Court in Port Harcourt fined 3 hijackers of 44,000 Euros each for hijacking a ship and collecting a ransom of 169,000 Euros in crew kidnapping.   The "*Piracy and Armed robbery Against Ship"* report published by the ICC in 2022, Nigerian waters after the launch of the  Deep Blue Project continue to experience a decrease in piracy crimes and  armed piracy against ships. In the  first quarter to March 2021, IMB reported that incidents of piracy and  armed robbery decreased by 77% (International Maritime Bureau, 2022).

The report showed that the decline in cases occurred up to 77% compared to the same period in the previous year and 95% compared to  the same period  in   2018. 4 incidents piracy was reported in the  first nine months of 2021, compared to  17 cases in 2020 and 41  in  2018 (International & Bureau, 2021). Based on the above findings, researcher argue that there is a decrease in incidents of piracy and armed piracy occurs due to  the transfer of crimes committed by pirates  to  hostage taking and kidnapping for ransom.  The transfer of crime resulted from the POMO Act operating  independently of domestic laws governing  firearms, kidnapping and  money laundering.

The researcher discovered that from a logical standpoint, Nigeria's compliance in drafting the national legislation of the POMO Act to ensure Nigeria's maritime protection was evaluated favorably. The Pomo Act's application in Nigeria still involved militaristic actions, which led to the reasonable, logical reasoning, and regulators' use of expensive consequences like fines or imprisonment as financial disincentives to ensure compliance. The study further contends that this limits its ability to combat the rising criminality in Nigeria's marine sector, which makes implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct challenging. A study by Maurice Ogbonnaya, who suggested

that the independent passage of the anti-piracy law would not help coordinate piracy responses in the region, which supports the researcher' arguments (Ogbonnaya, 2020a).

The provision of corrupt practices by Nigeria's maritime bodies, where corruption is one of the main causes of pirate incidents, is also not covered by the POMO Act. The POMO Act does not include provisions for articles that include assault, money laundering, and organized crime, despite the fact that the ISS considers piracy to be an organized crime linked to corruption and the arms trade. On the basis of this, the researcher argued that the POMO Act passed by Nigeria must be in compliance with domestic laws that regulate the crimes of corruption, kidnapping, firearms, and money laundering and strengthen collaboration between relevant agencies in order to achieve compliance in implementing the Yaounde Code of Conduct. Fighting piracy is crucial since Nigeria's marine security is inadequate due to weak institutions and disorderly practices.

3.2.3. Other Countries' Responses to Nigeria Complying with Yaounde Code of Conduct

In addition to Nigeria, there are five other African countries that positively welcome this code of conduct, These five African countries agreed to adopt the Yaoundé Code of Conduct with a view to defending low-level pirate attacks on ships in the Gulf of Guinea. The five countries are Ghana, Angola, Cameroon, the Republic of Benin, and Cote D'Voir. The implementation was contained in a communiqué issued at the end of the two-day meeting of the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) organized by the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Security Agency, NIMASA (Vanguard, 2021).

Their response to the code of conduct, in their opinion, guarantees collaborative decision-making and follow-up from a response perspective is crucial, countries also agree that relevant regional bodies should institute a framework for regular dialogue. This will help ensure that every area in the region is properly monitored and secured (Vanguard, 2021).

A framework for Maritime Security Architecture in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea has been established as another African nation's response to the Yaounde Code of Conduct. Its architecture, which has four levels of authority, corresponds to the regional level in West and Central Africa and the areas of responsibility and location of relevant organizations and structures that contribute to marine security. This gives bordering nations encouraging feedback and practical guidance for implementing the code of conduct, which is projected to significantly boost maritime security (L, 2021).

The Yaounde Code of Ethics drew responses from nations in Europe as well. Support given by the European Union to Gulf of Guinea nations experiencing armed conflict is viewed as significant and less alluring. At the national and international levels, Europe supports the demilitarization, demobilization, and reintegration of fighters, security sector reform, and state reconstruction. The European Union also carried out less successful civilian activities in Guinea-Bissau to upgrade security systems in 2009 and 2010. The European Union has not thought about initiating marine operations to stop or stop piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, similar to Operation Atlanta off the coast of Somalia. So that in 2014, the European Union adopted the European Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea to support the objectives of this agreement (Sartre, 2014a).

In addition to other countries there are also many communities of countries such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) which responded well to the establishment and implementation of this code of conduct. This was marked by the signing of an intraregional agreement at the Yaoundé Heads of State Summit in June 2013 to combat maritime crime in Gulf of Guinea (EEAS, 2021a).

This maritime menace as well as its land-based sources will be lessened as a result of improved regional collaboration and assistance among member nations. In order to achieve this, the EU maintains tight ties with coastal states and continues to work closely with regional groups like ECOWAS and ECCAS. Additionally, it has tight ties with important international institutions like Interpol and the Global Maritime Crimes Program of the UNODC (EEAS, 2021b). Everywhere along the Gulf of Guinea, there is a connection between land-based food

and livelihood instability, poverty, disparity in development, and maritime insecurity. And there is a global need for solutions based on greater development and governance. At the Yaoundé Summit on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea in 2013, the Gulf States of Guinea appeared to favor a different strategy that focused on prevention and even repression at sea (Sartre, 2014b).

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the responses of countries both in Africa and outside Africa to Nigeria's compliance regarding the implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct are very positive. The implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct not only received regional support but also received support from the international community. Researcher argue that this happens as a result of factors that are beneficial to their own country such as economic problems.

## 4. Conclusion

According to the findings of the analysis performed by researcher, Nigeria complies with the Yaounde Code of Conduct in cases of piracy and armed piracy in Nigeria from 2016 to 2021. Nigeria actively develops and puts into effect national marine security measures to guard against any type of illegal activity. Through the use of national processes implemented from 2016 to 2021, Nigeria continues to pursue the need to improve maritime security and traffic in order to protect maritime commerce and prevent international maritime trade bottlenecks.

However, the oppressive measures Nigeria is adopting to abide by the Yaounde Code of Conduct have not shown to effectively decrease piracy incidents since they do not address the underlying reasons why it occurs. Researcher discovered that the economic, social, and environmental conditions created in Nigeria are to blame for the piracy that takes place there. The existence of conflicts and chaos between the government and the people of Nigeria, favorable geographic location, widespread poverty, weak legal and judicial systems, ineffective law enforcement, a permissive political climate, cultural acceptance, and promises of rewards are a few examples of these conditions. Given that piracy primarily originates on land as a result of corrupt government officials, a bad system of government, and the aggression of economic privatization, particularly against the oil and gas sector, piracy also involves other international crimes, such as money laundering.

Researcher discovered that the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian state and administration soon contributed to a lack of security on land that easily spread to maritime security and gave rise to maritime crimes like piracy and armed robbery. Unemployed members of underprivileged communities with limited economic opportunities frequently use such piracy as a source of income.

Nigeria's oppressive priorities overlook the structural and economic issues brought on by corruption in the government. The emphasis on repression also resulted in the diverting of funds for marine militaristic conquests, which prevented funding for capital projects in fields related to human development including jobs, health, and education. Therefore, implementing such militaristic methods won't be successful in permanently resolving the issue of piracy and armed piracy. Researcher' investigation revealed that the Yaounde Code of Ethics' application is consistent with the accepted theory of compliance, in which the code of ethics was genuinely put into practice and followed by the parties involved in this instance. However, due to the reputation and lack of a strong legal position, the resulting "level of compliance" is not very significant.

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# Social Media Preference to Reach Young Indonesian Voters

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**Abstract**

Politics is currently exposed to information technology. The usage as a political communication channel is becoming increasingly broad and diversified. The significance of social media is heightened by the involvement of young people. This study examines the phenomena of using social media to seek out political information. Using a quantitative approach, researchers administered an online questionnaire to determine social media preferences. Twitter became the most popular site for political conversation, according to the findings. Meanwhile, TikTok is a popular social media platform among Indonesia's youth. Politicians and political parties should explore utilizing social media to connect with supporters. Nevertheless, it is vital to modify the type of communication and information that will be supplied in the future.

**Keywords:** Electoral, Gen Z, Politics, Social Media

## 1. Introduction

The Indonesia election is coming nears. Young people are a great asset in politics since they have authority. Their voices are critical in electoral battles, including those for the president, regional leaders, and people's representatives. Widi (2022) forecasts that young voters will continue to be essential to winning the 2024 election. This age group will continue to dominate Indonesia's political contests in 2024. Participation of each consecutive generation of young people in the traditions and institutions of democratic governance in society is vital to ensuring that the political system retains the legitimacy required for efficient operation (Loader et al., 2014). When effectively harnessed, the potential of young people may help political parties meet the difficulties of a changing political landscape and the reasonable demands of the electorate.

The new political landscape will undoubtedly give rise to new communication strategic developments. In the past, many people relied on older forms of media; however, nowadays, one of the most important aspects is the utilization of modern information technology. This is also impacted by first-time and younger voters, who are profoundly influenced by the proliferation of digital media. The global influence of social media on political campaigns cannot be denied. Social media have altered how political campaigns are conducted, how politicians and the general public access and exchange political information, and how we learn about politics, acquire ideas and attitudes, and ultimately engage or disengage with the political process.

According to recent polls, approximately 88% of today's youth rely heavily on the Internet (Monika & Gautama, 2022). This is one reason why the Internet, especially social media, plays such a pivotal role in political competition in Indonesia. As a result, political parties are competing to strengthen their online positions to gain influence. Political parties have been known to monitor various social media sites to promote the policies they support. Using the Internet and being politically active are two different things, as discovered by Dimitrova & Matthes (2018). Only expressive social media usage predicts both online and offline political involvement, including voting, according to research by Gil de Zuniga et al. (2014). To a positive extent, research by Dimitrova and Bystrom (2017) shows that social media use influences political engagement.

According to Munzir et al. (2019), the number of young people using social media will continue to rise, allowing political news obtained on social media to influence the political engagement of the younger generation. Social media politics rising due to the growth of the Internet has transformed the media into an informational agent of democracy. In addition, the new media provide a vast array of current information, including debate and information exchange. It is believed that social media can increase the amount of interactivity in politics by allowing individuals to select their preferred information source (Salman et al., 2018). Social media gives scholars vast volumes of data, which is beautiful and challenging (Dimitrova & Matthes, 2018). These enormous data sets demand new analytical methods like social networking analysis and topic modeling, which might open up new research possibilities. The preceding argument will serve as the basis for the researcher's intention to investigate the phenomena of social media usage, most frequently utilized for political reasons by young people in Indonesia. According to Meijer's (2012) findings, the advent of new media has molded the landscape of virtual communication, creating a fertile ground for developing social interactions and expanding people's range of possible involvement. Many different parties can utilize this opportunity for a variety of purposes, such as in the field of government (Margo, 2012; Kavanaugh et al., 2011); corporate (Aichner & Jacob, 2015); psychology (Kelly et al., 2018; Ni et al., 2020); and education (Aji et al., 2022; Dennen et al., 2020). These studies demonstrate that the effects of using social media depend significantly on the user's settings and demographics. Those who work in politics are not immune to the benefits of social media and utilize it often. There have been several studies that have concentrated on the use of social media for political reasons, including Zhuravskaya et al. (2020), Valenzuela et al. (2019), Casero-Ripollés (2018), and much more. Many studies focus on politics in the context of American presidential elections, such as Howard et al. (2019) and Garrett (2019). Meanwhile, Indonesian social media research itself focuses a lot on social media upheaval in the world of politics (Jatmiko, 2019), political strategy (Alfiyani, 2018; Anshori et al, 2021), social media buzzers (Mustika, 2019; Juditha, 2021) to the role of the younger generation in social media politics (Komariah & Kartini, 2019; Munzir, 2019).

Before we take on a political role, we will have a quick conversation about the various features of social media platforms, as described by fen-fen (2019). Because of the enormous number of people who use it, this platform can rightfully claim the title of "most popular in the world." Facebook can actively engage the community while also consistently providing information that is beneficial and can be distributed. The second platform is known as Instagram, and it features content in the form of images or photographs, as well as short videos, with an emphasis on aesthetics. Even though it is constantly being updated with new features, it is still considered one of the most widely used platforms by youngers. In addition, YouTube is the most popular platform for watching videos and is currently the second most popular search engine, behind Google. At the same time, Twitter is the most lively and boisterous because of its role as microblogging. Bearita.com (2021) also analogizes Twitter to a square where everyone talks without dividing walls. Finally, the viral social networking platform among young people, TikTok. It has a similar personality to YouTube but is faster and shorter. Very compatible with the personality of modern youth. They will swipe away if the information does not capture their attention within the first 3 to 8 seconds.

There are benefits and drawbacks to using every single type of social networking. While Justin Trudeau's political usage of Instagram in Canada is very different in tone from that of Trump in the United States, the two leaders' use of Instagram to communicate politically is very similar. Trudeau's youthfulness, friendliness, and upbeat outlook on politics have made him a household name. According to Lalancete & Raynauld's (2019) analysis of Trudeau's post frequency on Instagram in the year after his election, the prime minister's account was an essential means of communicating with his constituents. This means that Instagram can be utilized as a political platform. Moving to a nearby country, the United States, we shall encounter a different use of social media, notably Twitter,

by the then-presidential candidate. Slightly different, Buccoliero et al. (2018) argue that the Twitter accounts of American presidential candidates are not utilized to alter their appearance but rather to showcase and emphasize their individuality, which represents their positioning strategy. This is consistent with social media's open, curious, and influential aspects (Chlistina, 2022). So providing an original number will get the follower closer.

Politicians have direct access to both message generation and dissemination outlets through social media. This has altered the relationship between politicians (and their campaigns) and mainstream journalists and media. In addition, social media differ from radio and newspapers in their participatory capability, which becomes a vital pillar in any debate of political communication. Therefore, the use of social media needs to consider the characteristics and audience that are in it. If they take advantage of social media for the benefit of communication channels, it is necessary to carefully consider the political communication built along with the platform used.

## 2. Method

Three hundred fifty-six individuals were requested to conduct an online survey via Google Forms. This poll is only open to 17–22-year-old students from various academic disciplines. This is because they will be eligible to vote for the first time in the Indonesian elections of 2024; although some may have voted in previous elections. Participants who did not utilize social media networks were omitted from the analyses when asked to identify their preferred platform. Consequently, the final sample consisted of 341 college students chosen from a subject pool at a large metropolitan institution. Before participating in the survey, participants were told of the survey's topic and duration and asked for their consent. After completing the demographic information, participants were randomly assigned to one of two survey pathways, with the order of scales based on the assigned pathway. Participants were questioned about their preferred social networking site for political information gathering. What social media platforms frequently appear on your homepage? to several additional questions concerning social media and Indonesian politics. To find non-normal distributions for responses to each non-binary measure, we evaluate with kurtosis and skewness. The descriptive analysis examines data by summarizing or describing the acquired data as it is, without drawing conclusions or generalizations.

## 3. Result

Social media enable users to represent themselves, communicate, share information, and cultivate virtual social ties. Social media offer a different method of technological communication than traditional media. The "cyber" communication mediums establish a dense network without spatial or temporal limitations. The selection of social media platforms under personal characteristics makes some platforms some of the favorites and some less. TikTok is the preferred social media platform among the students participating in this study. This is understandable, given that social media platform dashes and a great deal of content has been optimized for the format. Even though not all users of TikTok seek political material, For-your-page occasionally includes political stuff. Instagram, Youtube, and Twitter trail in terms of popularity.



SOCIAL MEDIA PREFERENCE FOR POLITICS

| Platform | Percentage |
|---|---|
| TIKTOK | 65,16% |
| FACEBOOK | 60,35% |
| YOUTUBE | 59,53% |
| TWITTER | 78,06% |
| INSTAGRAM | 63,64% |

Twitter, however, occupies the top place, with 78,06%, when searching for political information and discussions. This is possible considering Twitter's nature as an open forum for debate and discourse (bearita.com, 2021). According to research by the Pew Research Center in 2021, 38% of social media users "like" or support the

political or social content of others. This platform's accessibility enables many individuals to initiate discussions and arguments. This survey indicated slightly different that young Indonesians are more individualistic in politics. In contrast to the Pew Research Center's study from 2021, respondents liked/promoted political content more than posting their opinions on politics. They prefer to initiate the discussion and shape it according to their thought. This does not preclude the use of other platforms. Twitter may currently meet the requirements of young people. Searching for political information on TikTok has also become quite popular among the younger population.

The often garish graphics of politicians that surface on Instagram may be a contributing factor to the platform's low popularity. Sometimes, it is overly artificial and does not reveal its genuine self. In the meantime, young people in this day and age require genuine examples of people to look up to. Because so many videos on YouTube are designed to get clickbait rather than provide practical knowledge, the platform could be more appealing. In addition, today's consumers tend to shy away from excessively long sizes. Tiktok and Twitter are two examples of social media networks that young people in Indonesia may choose to use. Despite this, it will be good to test out both platforms. When investigating Instagram and YouTube for politics, some suggestions for further research include researching the construction of a powerful and honest communication strategy on these two platforms. Facebook, on the other hand, has been relatively free of political chatter. Facebook, which has a strong sense of community, will likely become one of the venues that politicians can use in the future. Due to the diversity of Facebook's readership, it may become a useful tool for managing political information in the future.

Despite this, most young people are not very interested in politics, at least not just yet. This is, of course, because many politicians and political parties have yet to participate or declare themselves ultimately. It is widely believed that the primary influence on the political preferences of young people comes from their parents. According to Loader et al. (2014), scholars explore how young people form their political beliefs since the opinions and engagement of parents are vital. These researchers believe studying how young people form their political ideas is essential. A linear learning approach is taken toward forming values and political orientations.

## 4. Conclusions

According to the most recent survey findings, the social media platforms with the greatest demand for political information are TikTok and Twitter. Both options are chosen by young people in Indonesia mostly based on the advantages and qualities of the site, particularly the various communication modes offered and the possibilities for engagement. These social media platforms allow for conversations and debates, which politicians and political parties may utilize. When deciding on a political communication strategy, it may be important to consider social media perspectives and the politics that will emerge from them in the future. The political viewpoints and aspirations of today's young are frequently considered as providing a look into the future and are recognized as drivers of important social and political change.

In addition, despite the limited usage of Instagram, YouTube, and other social media platforms in political discourse, this may be connected to the limits of our research. It is possible that politicians are still planning and preparing for future political contests, given that there are still several years of political competition left. As a result, this study could serve as a point of reference for politicians interested in utilizing social media, which is a tool that can be utilized to gather supporters up to the day of the election. However, there are several restrictions regarding this research. To begin, this is what's known as a cross-sectional study, and it was only ever done at one point in time. The approach for collecting data has one flaw: it is unable to understand the phenomenon as a whole by looking at the chronology. Second, when it comes to political news, social media may be quite silent, which makes it an interesting research subject. This results in a polarization of political opinion that is not immediately apparent. The use of social media is merely one route and way to communicate with those who are sending their best wishes. In order to be successful in politics, politicians need to focus on a variety of different techniques. If you try to win the election only by appealing to too many young people, you might not succeed. However, you can capture their attention if you use social media, such as TikTok, Instagram, Twitter, Facebook or YouTube.

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# Afghanistan in the Trap of an Ethnic Security Dilemma: Is There Any Solution on the Horizon?

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**Abstract**

Afghanistan represents one of the most complex mosaics of ethnic groups in the world and its contemporary history has been characterised by ethnic hierarchy. Pashtuns domination of the country and their discriminatory policies toward non-Pashtuns have had long-term effects in destroying inter-ethnic trust. The hierarchical relationships among ethnic groups have always been an obstacle to creating ethnic harmony even in the pre-war Afghanistan. The paper, by adopting 'ethnic security dilemma theory,' seeks to analyse how and why ethnicity in Afghanistan was politicised and morphed into fault line that finally surfaced in the form of civil war in 1990s. It will discuss the impacts of internecine war on inter-ethnic relations and explores the possible options to deal with the long-standing ethnic security dilemma. Being caught in an ethnic trap, the paper argues, only a meaningful power-sharing mechanism can glue the future Afghanistan together.

**Keywords:** Afghanistan, Centralisation, Ethnic Civil War, Ethnic Groups, Ethnic Security Dilemma, Non-Pashtuns, Pashtuns

## 1. Introduction

Upon the fall of the Taliban's regime and the subsequent presence of the international community in 2001, Afghanistan was placed on the threshold of an economic, political, and socio-cultural renaissance. Over the course of twenty years, the international community bankrolled processes of democratisation and built a strong army. Despite all efforts, however, the fledgling democracy of Afghanistan ended on 15 August 2021 as Ghani fled the country and let the Taliban to bring back their authoritarian regime into play. Now the question arises that given the huge investment in state-building, army, civil society, education and so forth how the government collapsed overnight.

Contrary to other research, this paper takes a totally different path to answer this question. In so doing, the paper traces the process of events that happened one decade before the establishment of new government in 2001 so that to demonstrate to what extent the post-2001 political structure was (in)compatible with the socio-political realities on the ground.s It is believed that establishing a highly centralised structure in an extremely divided society where ethnicity had long become politicised lacked political rationality (Maley 2013, Wang 2014, Kakar *et al*. 2017, Sadr

2021). Strong presidentialism with its 'winner-take-all' approach not only was not conductive to stability and democracy but further deepened socioethnic cleavages (Santos 2003, Fukuyama 2005, Lane 2011, Rahimi 2020). This flawed structure reinforced the public distrust of the government which led to a crisis of legitimacy and its subsequent rapid collapse (Murtazashvili 2022).

This paper is intended to discuss the second phase of civil war in Afghanistan (1992-2001)[1] by adopting 'ethnic security dilemma theory.' The analytical perspective discloses that in a multi-ethnic country in which inter-ethnic trust is absent, establishing a centralised political structure will not bear fruit. Afghanistan as a divided country has not been able to pass nation-building process successfully. The Pashtuns domination of Afghanistan and the systematic exclusion of non-Pashtuns from the government structure have always been source of resentment and conflict (Tarzi 1993, Giustozzi 2008). The repressive, foreign-backed Pashtun rulers, from time to time, have systematically sattempted to turn Afghanistan into a homogenised Pashtun state by denying the existence of other ethnic groups and their cultures. Discriminatory policies and practices adopted by Pashtun rulers in favour of their coethnics and the brutal treatments of non-Pashtuns are still alive in the collective memory of the latter (Shahrani 2013).

From the last quarter of twentieth century, however, Pashtun rulers' monopoly of foreign patronage shattered. In the context of the Cold War, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks rallied around their ethnic elites and attracted considerable new foreign patronage (Shahrani 2015, p. 276). The unresolved ethnic issues coupled with ethnic leaders' access to military equipment for the first time laid the foundation for outbidding. As soon as Najib's regime fell in 1992 and subsequently an anarchic situation emerged, all preconditions for ethnic security dilemma were present. Since the ethnic leaders were not capable of managing this dilemma, it led to tragic events of civil war during the 1990s. The ethnic security dilemma has not been resolved yet and it appears in different forms every so often. The experience of other multi-ethnic countries and the lengthy tragedy of Afghanistan itself indicate that so long as a rational solution through which all ethnic groups feel included is not engineered, this traumatic drama goes on.

## 2. The Inter-Ethnic Security Dilemma

The term 'security dilemma' is a relatively new term in International Relations (IR). It was first coined by John Herz (1950) in his article *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*. At the same time, however, Herbert Butterfield (1952) described a situation in his *History and Human Relations* which was very much a security dilemma. Both works shed lights on what is said to be the most basic aspect of the security dilemma: a 'tragedy'. Because the security dilemma is used in IR to demonstrate how security-seeking states can end up in more insecurity and conflict (Snyder 1984, Glaser 2010).

The nature of the security dilemma is that the measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decrease the security of other states. Therefore, it is quite hard for a 'state to increase its own chance of survival without threatening the survival of other states' (Mearsheimer 2001, p. 36). Herz (1950, p. 157) believes that in an anarchic structure any attempt to 'attain security from . . . attack, [states] are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst.' So long as states operate in anarchy, little can be done to ameliorate the security dilemma (Mearsheimer 2001). Both Herz (1950) and Butterfield (1952) argue, the way to know how such a tragedy can occur is 'uncertainty'. Uncertainty is the factor that causes fear in both sides that the other wishes to harm them. Both parties fail to realise their predicament too. They do not know that they themselves are generating feelings of insecurity in the other. Both sides could be 'secure if only they could come to see the nature of the situation' in which they are (Roe 1999, p. 184).

The security dilemma as an analytical tool to explain the outbreak of civil war first emerged in 1990s (Tang 2011). In the light of so many conflicts after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Barry Posen first utilized the security

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[1] The first phase of civil war in Afghanistan erupted in 1978 when Daud Khan was deposed and assassinated by the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and lasted until 1992, the year the last communist ruler was forced out of power and the Mujahideen took over the country.

dilemma as an explanation for ethnic conflicts (Tang 2015). Posen (1993) highlights some interesting similarities between international system and ethnic relations within a state. First, the basis of Posen's argument is that a security dilemma within states can occur when conditions are similar to those between states in the international system. The collapse of multi-ethnic states, for Posen, "can be profitably viewed as a problem of 'emerging anarchy'" (Ibid, p. 27). Second, the absence of central authority means that various groups within the state are forced to provide their own security. In such a context, ethnic groups behave as if they are separate states. The security dilemma 'affects relations among these groups, just as it affects relations among states' (Ibid). Third, 'the indistinguishability of offence and defense' (Ibid, pp. 29-31) lays the foundation for the worst-case analysis and pre-emptive action. All these conditions leave every ethnic group within a state in self-help situation and similarly generates a spiral of action and reaction that is typically found in an international conflict.

After Posen, Stuart Kaufman (1994, 1996a, 1996b) and other writers (Roe 2002, 2004, Melander 2009) brought the security dilemma firmly into the field of ethnic conflicts. Kaufman (1996a, p. 151) argues that 'if ethnic groups effectively challenge the government's legitimacy and its control over territory', the situation can be approximated to anarchy. '[I]f anarchy reaches the point where the government cannot control its territory effectively enough to protect its people, while ethnic-based organizations can, then the ethnic organization have enough of the attributes of sovereignty to create a security dilemma.' In these conditions, each group's attempt to protect its members produces fear in other groups. In an effort to gain leverage over their rival, Kaufman (1996b, p. 132) believes, every group also seeks to win the support of other states, particularly countries that are eager to capitalise on the intra-state conflict to achieve their own strategic goals.

Posen (1993) and Kaufman (1994, 1996b) used the security dilemma to explain the outbreak of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia and gave sufficient thought to the role that structure can play. Posen (1993, p. 27-30) believes that a group suddenly forced to provide its security must ask the following questions about any neighbouring group: 'is it a threat? How much of a threat? Will the threat grow or diminish over time?' When groups make judgments as to others' intentions, history is used as the major background knowledge: 'how did the other groups behave last time they were unconstrained?' Therefore, ancient hatred among different ethnic groups plays a huge role in activating an ethnic security dilemma.

Application of the security dilemma is not straightforward though. Visser and Duyvesteyn (2014), for example, believe that the security dilemma is 'irrelevant' to intrastate conflicts and such conflicts 'cannot be explained by the ethnic security dilemma.' They argue that a security dilemma exists when neither side has the intention to go to war. If one or both sides harbour(s) malign intentions, which is usually the case in the outbreak of civil wars from their perspective, the situation should be classified as a security threat rather than a security dilemma (Wheeler and Both 1992, p. 31).

Utilising the security dilemma in this way, this paper argues, causes fundamental epistemological and methodological problems. They concern the problem of determining benign/malign intents. By establishing actors' intentions, one seems to imply knowing what actors are thinking and what their motivations are. Roe (2002, pp. 61-62) believes, this seems 'to place large question mark against the operability of the security dilemma' because uncertainty lies at the core of the security dilemma. Motivations and desires cannot be understood with complete certainty; what can be determined is what is a probability. Moreover, the distinction between benign and malign intents is usually made on states being 'security seekers' or 'power seekers.' Although the pursuit of security is usually considered benign goal, while the pursuit of power is labelled malign, this may not be always the case. Sometimes the security of one state might require the insecurity of another one. If a state, for instance, thinks that invading its neighbour to acquire certain resources is vital for its survival, then even a security seeker/benign state may act aggressively which is called 'required insecurity' (Ibid).

In addition, the security dilemma is 'an essentially objectivist concept' (Roe 2005, p. 55) by which scholars can determine the intentions of decision-makers with hindsight. Analysts may interpret actors' intentions differently by looking at the same practices. For instance, for Roe (Ibid, p. 101) the removal of the Serbs form bureaucracies is a security-seeking policy, therefore, a manifestation of benign intention, whereas Tang (2011, p. 527) reaches the exact opposite conclusion. The determination of intention in most cases depends on how one approaches an

event, how one frames the historical cases and what is one's personal conception of threat (Bilgic 2013, pp. 191-92). Therefore, the position of those who argue against the application of the security dilemma to intrastate conflicts is quite untenable.

It should be noteds that ethnic security dilemma comes either from mass-led or elite-led violence. Mass-led violence happens when long standing ethnic hostility pushes elites to take increasingly aggressive positions on ethnic issues. Such behaviour, as a result, creates a security dilemma and leads to ethnic war. Whereas civil war created by ethnic leaders through a process of stocking dormant ethnic hostilities is labelled elite-led violence. (Kaufman 1994, 1996a). Therefore, the elite-led and the mass-led processes of ethnic violence can be differentiated in terms of which of these factors activate the process (Kaufman 1996a, pp. 157-58).

All three factors—hostile masses, belligerent leaders, and inter-ethnic security dilemmas—are considered necessary for outbreak of ethnic war. They cause the war by reinforcing one another in a spiral of increasing conflict: belligerent leaders stoke mass hostility; hostile masses support belligerent leaders; and such interaction threatens other groups, giving birth to a security dilemma which in turn paves the way for even more mass hostility and leadership belligerence (Kaufman 1996b, p. 109).

### 3. Preconditions for Ethnic Civil Wars

The three factors mentioned above (mass hostility, belligerent leaders, and a security dilemma) only emerge if the necessary preconditions are met. The preconditions for mass hostility are 'a set of ethnically defined grievances, negative ethnic stereotypes, and disputes over emotional symbols.' To provoke ethnic civil war, mass hostility requires a 'fear (usually exaggerated) of ethnic extinction and a history of domination by one group over the other' (Kaufman 1996b, p. 109).

Ethnic civil war may not be possible without ethnic belligerent leaders (Tang 2015, p. 266). Such war usually happens due to elites' policies which exacerbate the old disputes, stoke the old hatreds, and make peaceful conflict resolution impossible (Kaufman 1994, p. 282). Ethnic leaders exacerbate ethnic conflicts through a process of 'outbidding,' in which ethnic leaders manage to fuel radical ethnically related demands among their own groups (Ibid). Such outbidding will not bear fruits unless the preconditions for mass hostility are present and the extremist appeals fall on willing ears (Kaufman 1996b, p. 114).

Finally, an ethnic security dilemma can be created if a *de facto* anarchy is present. In a situation of anarchy, the state is either unable or unwilling to protect all major groups, motivating groups to resort to self-help and forcing them to always assume the worst—mutual fear of ethnic extinction (Roe 2002, p. 60). An ethnic security dilemma also requires the availability of the means to mobilise and the military resources to enable both sides to fight (Kaufman 1996b, p. 114).

Ethnic civil war is defined, for the purpose of this article, as follows. First, an ethnic group is defined as 'a collectivity within a larger society [who] have real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood' (Schermerhorn 1970, p. 12). By ethnic civil war, I mean 'large-scale, sustained, organised violence in which the groups [within a state] and the values at stake are defined in ethnic terms' (Kaufman 1996a, p. 150).

### 4. Preconditions for Ethnic Civil War in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has historically been described as a mosaic of different ethnic groups. Its population is divided into four major ethnic groups—the Pashtuns, the Tajiks, the Hazaras, and the Uzbeks—and many smaller ones. Since none of the ethnic groups constitute a majority of the population, Afghanistan is usually described as "land of minorities' (Santos 2003, Rahimi 2020). However, each group does constitute the majority in one or more part of the country: Tajiks in the northeast, Pashtuns in the south, Hazara in the centre, and Uzbeks in the northwest (Barfield 2011, p. 56). The heterogeneity of the population is so great that nothing even Islam, to which around 99 per cent of the people adhere, has been able to function as a force for national unity (Schetter 2005a). Ethnic

division is the outstanding social feature of life, and the primary loyalty is to ethnic group which is called *qawm* (Barfield 2010, p. 18). Ethnic groups are so distinct that they can be identified by their physical facial features alone (Ibid). There has never been an agreement on Afghanistan's population because no census was held properly (Simonsen 2004, p. 721). From 1970s to 1990s, sixteen million was the most frequently cited figure (Barfield 2010). The current population of Afghanistan, according to Worldometer website (January 2023), is estimated to be around 42 million. In the absence of an exact national census, any figure which is given as the entire population of Afghanistan, or the population of each ethnic group is pure guesswork.

### 4.1. Mass Hostility in Afghanistan

Afghanistan historically had a quasi-federal system and ethnic groups enjoyed a reasonable amount of local governance. Abdur Rahman Khan who came to the throne in 1880 attempted to rule Afghanistan directly and engaged in a brutal campaign of centralisation. He succeeded in ending the regional autonomy and concentrating all political power in Kabul. Moreover, by adopting discriminatory policies, Pashtuns became Afghanistan's politically privileged group. Although the Tajiks ran the government's administration in part, they did not enjoy any political power. Hazara, Uzbek, Aimaq, and Baluch leaders disappeared from public life, even in their home regions (Barfield 2011, p. 57).

After Abdur Rahman, all regimes attempted to maintain his model of government even when it brought ruin on the country. Although Abdur Rahman died in 1901, 'his zombielike shadow still looms large over the country and its politics' (Barfield 2010, p. 12). The idea of resisting any power-sharing mechanism and constant attempts to push non-Pashtuns to side-lines almost put an end to the prospects of peaceful coexistence of diverse ethnic societies in Afghanistan (Saikal 2004, p. 5).

The country which is called Afghanistan today was controlled by Uzbeks for centuries. Pashtuns never ruled Afghanistan before the mid-eighteenth century. Since then, however, they have been the rulers of Afghanistan one after another with some short time hiccups. For example, when Amanullah's regimes due to his radical reforms were toppled in 1929, Habibullah Kalakani was the first Tajik who named himself king of Afghanistan. Once a Tajik seized the power, for the cause of Pashtun solidarity, the very tribes that had just forced Amanullah from power now supported him. Amanullah, of course, had stoked the Pashtun Chauvinism, insisting that proud Pashtun people could never accept a Tajik as their ruler (Barfield 2011, p. 59). After nine months, the Pashtun tribes forced Kalakani out of Kabul and enthroned Muhammad Nadir, a Pashtun. Nadir believed that throne of Kabul was a matter of Pashtun national honour and restored the ethnic hierarchy. Finding ethnic politics useful for their cause, this rhetoric became the bedrock of all Pashtun rulers. The removal of Kalakani from the seat of power and his subsequent execution by Nadir caused a strong wave of resentment among the Tajiks and is still alive in their collective memory.

Although all non-Pashtuns have been subject to ethnic oppression, its ferocity varied from one group to another (Hyman 2002, pp. 306-07). The Hazaras were/are the most persecuted and marginalised group in Afghanistan (Hanley 2011) because they were probably the only ethnic group who could challenge and threaten Pashtun's monopoly of power, both 'from the point of view of numbers and geographic location' (Mousavi 1998, p. 17). The onslaught on Hazara lands and people also took place amidst a degree of sectarian fervour because they are Shia Muslim. In 1890s, Abdur Rahman waged a *jihad* against the Hazaras promising their land, wealth, women, and children as reward to those who took part in his campaign (Ibid, p. 126). The government-backed forces killed as many Hazara as they could, and numerous towers of human heads were erected from the defeated Hazaras. Hazaras also were sold as slave in slave markets by victorious Pashtuns. Only in Kandahar Province, annually, some 7,200 Hazara men and women were sold as slaves (Ibid, p. 135). Those Hazaras who survived the brutal campaign ended up being the most heavily taxed among all people (Chiovenda 2018, p. 255). According to Ghobar (1980), a distinguished Afghanistani historian, some sixteen different categories of taxes were levied on Hazaras. The level of taxes was as high as most Hazaras were not able to pay. In cases of failure to pay all taxes due, the wife and children of the failing family were sold as slaves, a lucrative trade legalised by Abdur Rahman in March 1894 (Mousavi 1998, p. 135).

The oppression of the Hazaras did not end by the death of Abdur Rahman and the following regimes up to the present moment have followed the suit and, among other things, the Hazaras were subject to arbitrary taxation. For example, during the premiership of Hashim Khan (1929-1946) a special tax was introduced only for the Hazaras, levied per head of animal in cooking oil. At the same time, Pashtun nomads not only were required to pay any tax but received allowances from the central government (Ibid p. 163). It is estimated that, during Abdur Rahman's campaign against Hazaras alone, nearly sixty per cent of the Hazara indigenous population was either killed, enslaved, fled the country, or forced to go to elsewhere in Afghanistan (Chiovenda 2018).

Uzbeks who were politically dominant back in the day were pushed to side-lines as well (Barfield 2010). Uzbeks have historically been subject to insults promoted by Pashtun nationalism. For example, they were called 'simpletons' as a negative stereotype. This is an expression of contempt alluding to the supposed silliness of the Uzbek people, claiming that they were not above menial jobs. This is particularly insulting for Uzbeks since they consider themselves to have been the torchbearers of philosophy and science for centuries and believing that figures like Al-Farabi and Al-Biruni were of Uzbek origins. Such stereotypes, anyway, had brutal and far-reaching consequences for Uzbeks. They could never see one of themselves in high ranks of institutions such as the military or the diplomatic service (Khalilzad 2016), because they were considered unfit for such jobs from Pashtun nationalism point of view.

Pashtun nationalism is set of attitudes and beliefs which allude to Pashtuns racial supremacy over and above all other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. These beliefs dictate that Pashtuns have the right to rule over Afghanistan single-handedly. This God-given supremacy is seen by them 'as a charter for the establishment of social, economic, political, cultural and administrative structures needed to constitute a nation-state' (Mousavi 1998, pp. 5-6). In order to level out the ethnic heterogeneity of Afghanistan, Pashtun rulers engaged in a redefinition of spatial units over the course of the twentieth century. Toponyms that carried any ethnic or particular perception, such as Khorasan, Turkistan or Hazarajat were superseded by administrative terms which often referred to provincial towns (e.g., Kunduz, Bamyan). This administrative reorganisation also 'gerrymandered territorial administrative units with the intention that they should be dominated whenever possible by a Pashtun majority and that other cultural identities should be annihilated' (Schetter 2005a, p. 58). To concentrate Pashtun settlers in pockets throughout Afghanistan and redress the balance of non-Pashtuns in favour of the Pashtuns, Pashtun rulers also imposed a policy of forced displacement and confiscation of non-Pashtuns' lands and distributed them to the Pashtuns (Baiza 2014, p. 153). Thus, all regimes attempted to strengthen their ethnic base by pashtunisation of the country (Qassem 2018).

As part of cultural supremacy of Pashtuns, Pashtun elites transformed the regional and colloquial language of Pashtu into the national and official language. Attempts were made to replace Farsi by Pashtu in all areas of life and its teaching became compulsory (Sharifi 2018). The ministry of Education established some 450 Pashtu courses in Kabul alone; all public officials were required to attend these courses and learn their new 'national language' (Ibid). Since Farsi had historically been used as a lingua franca, spoken by nearly 78 per cent of the population (Australian Government 2022), people in Kabul were not able to read street and bus signs. Neither the students nor faculty members understood Pashtu but few. Thus, the policy led to chaos (Hunter 1959, p. 345) and caused significant resentment among Farsi-speakers (Hyman 2002).

### 4.2. Belligerent Leadership in Afghanistan

By the 1980s, all preconditions for mass hostility—rational grievances, negative ethnic stereotypes, dispute over emotional symbols, demographic fears, and a history of domination—were present in Afghanistan. A weak government in Kabul also provided ethnic leaders with the political space required to mobilise around ethnic issues and engage in outbidding. In such a climate, ethnic elites tried to develop their ethnic organisation in the form of ethnic political party. Through ethnic parties, ethnic leader not only mobilised the in-group and excluded the ethnic outsiders, but also revived their ethnic narrative (Hashmi and Majeed 2015).

The ethnic origins of political parties were as strong as sometimes a party and the related ethnic group were considered synonyms. Jamiat Islami (Islamic society) was seen as the Tajiks' political party. Hizb-i Islami (Islamic

Party) of Hekmatyar, Hizb-i Wahdat (Unity Party) of Mazari, and Junbesh-i Milli (National Movement) of Dostum were the Pashtuns, the Hazaras and the Uzbeks' political parties respectively (Giustozzi 2008). All these ethnic parties utilised ethnicity with respect to a specific political demand. Non-Pashtun leaders voiced their displeasure over Pashtun domination of Afghanistan and demanded a share of economic and political resources of the state for their respective ethnic group

By the rise of ethno-political parties, ethnic identity was further politicised (Sharan and Heathershaw 2011, Shahrani 2013). Ethnic cleavages were as deep as ethnic parties violently stood against each other. For instance, Giustozzi argues (2005), Junbesh-i Milli 'was created with an inbuilt hostility towards Pashtuns.' In June 1990, General Dostum, in control of northern provinces, openly stated: 'Uzbeks … of Afghanistan will not allow the situation where Pashtuns would be in charge of everything, as in the days of old' (Saikal 2004, p. 253).

*4.3. The Rise of Anarchy in Afghanistan*

By the fall of Najib's regime in 1992, the preconditions for a security dilemma were also present. As the *Mujahideen* entered Kabul, any semblance of functional central government evaporated, and Afghanistan slipped into anarchy (Barfield 2010, p. 253). Within a 24-hour period in August, for instance, three thousand residents of Kabul died in a barrage of rocket fire. To escapes rocket and artillery shells raining on residential neighbourhoods, people of Kabul left their houses and one of the world's largest internal refugee flows took place (Tarzi 1993, Ibrahimi 2019). Far from being an accident, the war seemed inevitable in the eyes of the *Mujahideen* who had fully armed themselves in the context of the Cold War (Coll 2018).

*4.4. The Ethnic Security Dilemma in Afghanistan*

As soon as the *Mujahideen* seized the power in 1992, members of Najib's regime joined *jihadi* parties based on ethnic ties and ethnic dimensions of the conflict became further salient. Pashtun elements of the Communist regime joined Hekmatyar's radical Islamist party to unite the Pashtuns; while the Tajik officers joined forces with Masoud (Barfield 2010, p. 248). As the northern forces, an alliance of Tajiks and Uzbeks, closed in on Kabul in April, Pashtun military officers in Najib's regime—mainly *Khalqis*[2]—arranged the infiltration of unarmed fighters of Hizb-i Islami into the city, where they were supposed to receive military means from their co-ethnics in the Interior Ministry. The threat of an imminent coup by Hikmatyar forced Masoud to act before the Peshawar leaders had reached agreement. On 25 April 1992, the forces of Masoud and Dostum entered the city. The Hazaras also joined the northern alliance. As a result of violent battles at the Interior Ministry and the presidential palace, the Pashtun *Khalqi* forces were expelled by the alliance (Rubin 2002, p. 271).

The Peshawar-based leaders who managed the war for a long time reached an agreement on 25 April 1992. According to the Peshawar Accord, Mojaddedi became the acting president on 28 April for two months. The post of prime minister was given to Hekmatyar. After two months, as agreed, Burhanudding Rabbani, leader of the powerful Jamiat Islami to which Masoud belonged, assumed the presidency of Afghanistan for four months (Tarzi 1993). Rabbani was the second Tajik ever to become the head of state in the modern Afghanistan (Shahrani 2018b). Since this was against the thinking pattern whereby Pashtuns have seen state power as naturally belonging to them (Simonsen 2004, Lieven 2021), the Pashtun elites engaged in outbidding.

Hekmatyar refused to occupy the office of prime minister and challenged the interim government from its inception (Tarzi 1993). He sought to undermine the idea of coalition government. Obsessed with the idea of Pashtun hegemony, Hekmatyar attempted to be the undisputed ruler of Afghanistan. As he did not achieve the objective, he attempted to render the Peshawar Accord totally ineffective (Saikal 2004, p. 215). Hekmatyar 'vowed either to capture Kabul or destroy it' (Tarzi 1993, p. 174). The long-standing rivalry between Masoud and Hikmatyar took on the 'dimensions of a battle for the control of Afghanistan between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns' (Rubin 2002,

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[2] The Communists of Afghanistan formed the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965 under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal. By 1967 it had split into two factions. The largely Pashtuns *Khalq* (Masses), under the leadership of Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, recruited heavily among the disaffected Ghilzai Pashtuns in the Soviet-trained military, while the mainly Tajiks *Parcham* (banner), under the leadership of Karmal.

Barfield 2011). Hekmatyar turned his guns against Kabul in August 1992 (Shahrani 2018b). To put Masoud under pressure and gain leverage at the negotiating table, he decided to conduct military action against civilian, causing pain, death, and economic hardship (Tarzi 1993, p. 170).

The legitimisation of the war as a *jihad* had lost its appeal and ethnic political parties nurtured the clashes by a non-religious logic. In order to gain popular support and mobilise the people, ethnic leaders employed an ethnic discourse (Dorronsoro 2007, para. 31). As the war for control over Kabul (1992 onwards) began, ethnic identity rose to become the prime factor in political parties' claim to legitimacy (Simonsen 2004). All parties tried to impose ethnic homogenisation on the areas they controlled or at least attempted to establish their ethnic category as the prominent one in those areas (Schetter 2005a, p. 68). Ethnic logic saw the 'other' as a potential security threat, 'a fifth column' (Ibid).

Th civil wars are popularly 'understood to have been, firstly by Pashtuns, an attempt to restore past hegemonic dominance.' Secondly, non-Pashtuns regarded it as 'struggles to consolidate adequate representation' (Ahmed 2017). The long domination of the country by Pashtuns was a source of deep resentment for non-Pashtuns. Now the Tajik-dominated government in Kabul caused severe anxiety among Pashtun tribes. Hikmatyar's opposition to the government played on Pashtun ethnic fears (Tarzi 1993, Saikal 2004). He accused Masoud of trying to seize power from the so-called majority group (Pashtuns) and raised the spectre of ethnic warfare. Since most Pashtuns speak Pashtu, whereas Tajiks, Hazaras Uzbek and most other ethnic groups speak Farsi, playing the ethnic card also accentuated linguistic cleavage (Tarzi 1993, p 170). Historically being dominated by Pashtuns, non-Pashtuns had no desire to return to that status; seeing Hekmatyar's military campaign as an effort to force them back into subordination (Hanley 2011). Non-Pashtuns now had broken the century-old ethnic hierarchy that had discriminated against them. They demanded a return to an older pattern of regional autonomy, in which ethnic leaders played a significant role in managing the life of their people and 'had a say in politics at the national level' (Barfield 2011, p. 60). Dostum, once a disadvantaged Uzbek, now had become one of the most powerful figures and gave the Uzbeks national political importance they had not enjoyed in 150 years (Barfield 2010). He, along with Abul Ali Mazari insisted on the idea of social justice and the formation of a multi-ethnic and broad-based government. The struggle between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns based on ethnic identity left them totally locked in an ethnic security dilemma (Tang 2011).

To make matters worse, the northern alliance cracked and finally collapsed. It is argued the *Jamiat* regime displayed many of the characteristics its predecessors: tendency to monopolise power (Giustozzi 2008). Hazara and Uzbek elites expected to be recognised as major players. Contrary to their expectation, they were not given any decision-making power (Mousavi 1998, Rubin 2002, Giustozzi 2005). Even worse, Masoud attempted to wrest control of some areas towards west of Kabul being controlled by Hazaras. In a military clash over control of Afshar district between Masoud and Mazari in February 1993, the forces loyal to Masoud succeeded in taking the control of Afshar and for 'the next twenty-four hours they killed, raped, set fire to houses, and took young boys and girls as captives.' Around 700 people were estimated to have been killed or to have disappeared. Disappointed from the Tajik-dominated regime, Mazari and Dostum joined the opposition centred around Hekmatyar in 1994. Leaders of this newly emerged alliance had many unresolved issues, however, what brought them together was their common enemy: Masoud. From January 1994, both sides engaged in many destructive battles without either side being able to gain a clear supremacy. By the end of 1994, the bombardment of Kabul by Hekmatyar and his allies destroyed half of the capital city and killed nearly 25,000 civilians. Putting ethnic consideration first, all sides committed massive human rights violations (Saikal 2004, p. 216). This constant infighting among the *mujahideen* paved the way for the rise of another extremist group: the Taliban.

## 5. Foreign Patrons as Enablers

There were many foreign countries involved in Afghanistan's plight in 1990s, however, Pakistan assumed a far greater role. As a Sunni majority country, with a sizeable Pashtun population concentrated mostly on its border with Afghanistan, Pakistan supported the main Sunni *Mujahideen* parties. Although Pakistan was supporting these Sunni groups, it favoured Hekmatyar as most conducive to its own objectives in Afghanistan (Saikal 1998). Saudi

Arabia also considered non-Pashtun parties as potentially vulnerable to Iranian influence because they shared language and culture with Iran. Therefore, Saudis shared Pakistan's support for Hekmatyar (Ibid).

Following the fall of Najib's regime in 1992, contrary to Pakistan's expectations of Hekmatyar, Masoud and Dostum captured Kabul (Shahrani 2015). Finding the recent development reprehensible, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) continued to provide Hekmatyar with logistical and military means so that he could force Tajiks out of Kabul and form his Pashtun-based government. Despite all efforts as discussed, Hekmatyar failed to dislodge the Rabbani government. Upon his failure, Pakistan sought to reconsider support for Hekmatyar with the intention of finding another client in Afghanistan (Saikal 1998). Thus, a 'fresh Pashtunist force, the ultra-fundamentalist Taliban militia' was created.

The Taliban fighters were mostly raised from Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan who were studying in religious schools in Pakistan led by Mullah Omar. Soon they found access to sophisticated weapons mostly supplied by Saudi and UAE's petrodollar. Since piloting jets and driving tanks were not subjects taught in religious schools, the men who supplied these skills were professional Pashtun soldiers of the previous regime trained by the Soviets. These professionals, mostly ex-*Khalqis*, who had joined Hekmatyar when Najib's regime fell, now 'agreed to grow untrimmed beards and serve the Taliban,' because they were fellow Pashtuns (Saikal 2004, Barfield 2010). The Taliban, indeed, was/is a movement intended to re-impose Pashtun supremacy and restore the traditional ethno-political hierarchy (Shahrani 2015, p. 278). Displaying itself as 'an Islamic Revolution of the Pashtuns,' (Schetter 2005b) the Taliban found strong supporters among the Pashtuns from all backgrounds—communist, monarchist, Islamist, and secular nationalist alike (Shahrani 2013). Even Pashtun intellectuals, residing outside Afghanistan, voiced their support for the Taliban (Giustozzi 2008). Nothing could bring Pashtuns of diverse backgrounds into such an alliance. The only thing that glued them together was Pashtun *asabiyyah* (group feeling). It clearly shows how ethnic fractions have historically been the predominant lines of conflict in Afghanistan and how ideological differences take a back seat to ethnic agenda. Taliban captured the areas controlled by non-Pashtuns with lightning speed. They captured Herat and neighbouring provinces from Ismail Khan, a *Jamiat* commander, in 1995 and Kabul from Masoud in September 1996 (Hyman 2002, p. 312).

Although the Taliban attempted to justify their rule in Islamic terms, they were largely Pashtuns who 'saw all other ethnic groups as enemies' (Barfield 2010, p. 7). Following the Taliban's takeover of Kabul, the conflict was an ethnic power struggle between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. That was why Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks once again joined forces (Simonsen 2004). This non-Pashtun alliance 'put up stiff resistance to the Pashtun army led by the Taliban' which according to Professor Shahrani (2002, p. 720) was intended to 'conquer their territories and resubjugate them to a form of internal colonialism'.

Towards the end of 1990s the front line dividing the Taliban from the Northern Alliance ran right through the Shomali Plain, north of Kabul. The Taliban applied their venomous scorched-earth tactics and ethnic cleansing policy in the areas they controlled, which included the deportation of thousands of Tajiks. They destroyed villages, irrigation system and farmland or gave vacant land to Pashtun fighters to prevent the Tajiks from returning. The policy was intended to "create a dense Pashtun-settled ring north of Kabul in order to make it clear once and for all that Kabul was a 'Pashtun city'" (Schetter 2005a, Shahrani 2013).

The Taliban attempted to seize northern provinces in May 1997, however, they were pushed back. One year later the Taliban once again marched toward the north. This time 'with the help of the local Pashtun population there,' who were transferred by Pashtun rulers from South to the North, captured Balkh Province (Emami 1999, p. 90). The Taliban then engaged in a wholesale Massacre of non-Pashtuns, particularly Hazaras, who had driven them from the city just one year ago, in which they murdered nearly 5,000 people (Schetter 2005a, Barfield 2010). The next month they occupied Hazarajat and subsequently carried out massacre of the Hazaras, especially in Yakawlang district (Shahrani 2013). The Taliban's takeover of Hazarajat left them in control of the entire country except for the northeast, where Masoud still stood alone against them for the next three years (Barfield 2010, p. 260).

The Taliban's takeover of the country was a triumph for Pashtun nationalism (Sharifi 2018). Pashtu gradually became the dominant language of the administration and government. The Taliban also engaged in a systematic anti-Farsi campaign by burning Farsi books and manuscripts, reaffirming the Pashtun identity of the Taliban. Such pro-Pashtunism was pleasant to Pashtun nationalists who felt marginalised after the *mujahideen* takeover of Kabul in 1992 (Ibid). The hostile treatment of non-Pashtuns by the Taliban and disrespect to their culture and language 'brough back terrible historical memories and a sense of déjà vu of the previous violent and humiliating conquest of their lands and subjugation at the hands of supremacist Pashtun ruler of the pre-1978 era' (Shahrani 2013, p. 32). The Taliban occupation of non-Pashtun provinces which had brought untold sorrow to the locals, according to Giustozzi (2005), renewed and greatly strengthened anti-Pashtun sentiment. Thus, the mono-ethnic regime of the Taliban constituted yet another serious step towards ethnicising the conflict in Afghanistan (Simonsen 2004). Afghanistan has historically been riven by ethnic division and ethnic harmony has never existed even in pre-war era. The Pashtuns have historically tried to dominate others and their regions which is usually called as internal colonialism (Hashmi and Majeed 2015, p. 324). Since 1880s, Pashtun rulers have attempted to turn Afghanistan into a monoethnic country. In so doing, Pashtuns of the south, southeast and even tribal regions of Pakistan have been relocated to the north and west of Afghanistan systematically by forcing out a huge number of the locals. As late as the 1970s, every Pashtun retiree was given four hectares of land in the north so that they go and live there (Rahimi 2020, p. 94). Adopting discriminatory policies toward non-Pashtuns blocked the way to the establishment of effective modern state and governance system based on internal cohesion and failed to create a sense of nationhood (Shahrani 2018a; Sahar and Sahar 2021). Thus, it is safe to echo Anthony Hyman's (2002, p. 299) dictum that People of Afghanistan 'are neither one people nor one political community.' The continued discriminatory policy of rulers widened ethnic cleavages to the extent that, as stated by Professor Saikal (2004), put an end to the prospect of non-confrontational coexistence of diverse ethnic groups.

## 6. The Search for Solutions

Ethnic security dilemma as an analytical tool not only explain why ethnic wars erupt, it also helps in terms of conflict resolution (Roe 2004, p. 281). In this regard, scholars believe that for a multi-ethnic country caught in the trap of an ethnic security dilemma only two solutions can be considered: partition or decentralisation.

### 6.1. Partition

The first category of scholars (Horowitz 1977, Lijphart 1977, Kaufmann 1996) argue that if it is impossible for ethnic groups to live together due to an ethnic security dilemma, it is not logical to seek accommodation among them. They had better live apart in separate and relatively homogeneous states because this can eliminate the security dilemma faced all sides (Roy 2004 p. 281). This solution is increasingly recommended for multi-ethnic states in which ethnic groups historically have not been able to reach a credible agreement based on historic/cultural differences. Separating the antagonists—partition—is a recipe for genuine peace and security. In a country where groups do not have a common history and culture, 'any attempt to create a unitary state is doomed to fail' (Bilgic 2013, p.205). Afghanistan was truly 'Balkanised' (Barfield 2010, p. 3) and divided along ethnic lines in 2001 that could have easily broken into smaller parts, however, no side showed interest in partition.

### 6.2. Decentralisation of power

The second category of scholars (Reynolds 2007, Adeney 2008, Afzal 2022) believe that multi-ethnic societies will not succeed in forming a stable state unless there is a reasonable distribution of power in place. Indeed, federal and autonomous arrangements could help in a number of countries in which some groups feel excluded (Reynolds 2007, p. 53). A meaningful decentralisation of power is a viable political option in divided countries (Murtazashvili 2014). Decentralised system of government could help all groups feel included by enabling them to govern themselves in their respective regions. Thus, decentralisation is critical for ending an ethnic security dilemma in multi-ethnic states and paving the way for peaceful coexistence.

Many experts and politicians, in the light of ethnocultural heterogeneity, believe that Afghanistan is 'a perfect candidate for federalism' (Adeney 2008, p. 542) and only 'a loose federal system' can save it from further

bloodshed (Saikal 1998, Murtazashvili 2022). In 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga (Constitutional Grand Council, "CLJ") non-Pashtun explicitly voiced their concern over the type of the pollical system. They argued that a federal structure by devolving a reasonable amount of power to provinces could end the century-old problem of power-sharing in Afghanistan (International Crisis Group 2003, Kakar *et al*. 2017). Pashtun elites, however, who see Afghanistan primarily as a Pashtun-led state preferred a strong centralised government (Sadr 2021). Therefore, Pashtuns elites who had dominated all aspects of the CLJ, 'for ethnic reasons' rejected all power-sharing mechanisms (Rubin 2004) and despite significant geographical concentration of mutually distrustful Pashtuns, Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks established an extremely centralised system (Reynolds 2007).

This arrangement not only 'flew in the face of wisdom drawn from other conflicted and fragmented societies,' but also went against the realities on the ground (Ibid). A huge number of Constitutional Law experts believe that the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan did not address the origins of the ethnic crisis by taking 'winner-take-all' approach in a highly divided country. Since the Constitution was not established with an eye, so to speak, upon the ethnic realities, it was extremely hard, if not impossible, to lay the foundation for an inclusive government (Desautels-Stein 2005, Rahimi 2020). The exclusionary and non-representative government that came out of the Constitution reinforced non-Pashtuns' distrust of the government and undermined its legitimacy significantly (Hussaini 2022). This narrow-based government ran by Ghani (after 2014) and his two Pashtun advisors was sarcastically labelled the 'Republic of three.' Finally, this unpopular government collapsed when Ghani and his small clique, without any significant resistance, fled Kabul on 15 August 2021 and gave way to a far weaker insurgent group, the Taliban.

Those who are familiar with the contemporary history of Afghanistan know that it is an unstable country, and the average life span of regimes have not been long. Each regime has had occupied the seat of power for a relatively short period of time and the Taliban's regime cannot be an exception. It is safe to express that the Taliban's radical and ethnically exclusive regime will not last long. Sooner or later it would be consigned to the dustbin of history. Thus, the future political structure must be designed based on political rationality and 2003 CLJ mistakes should be avoided.

With hindsight, it has become apparent that only a fair power-sharing mechanism based on federal arrangements can break the vicious cycle of failed regimes in Afghanistan. Recently, a large number of Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara political elites declared that centralised system of government has been the root of problems in Afghanistan. The only possible way to ensure the integrity of Afghanistan is to adopt a loose federalism. In such a federal structure the provinces should be allowed to govern themselves while, there should be also mechanisms in place for accountability of provinces to their communities and the central government. For non-Pashtuns, indeed, federalism is an arrangement that ends the Pashtuns' monopoly over power and promote greater accommodation of ethnic, cultural, and racial diversity (Wafaei 2022).

Despite non-Pashtuns' call for federalism, Pashtun political elites still advocate a centralised structure. In October 2022, Haneef Atmar, Pashtun political elite and national security advisor to Ghani voiced his displeasure over non-Pashtuns' insistence on federal structure, expressing that federalism does not work for Afghanistan (Hashte Subh 2022). Pashtun elites always attempted to tar federalism by arguing that federal structure provides resources to ethnic groups with which they can mobilise against the centre and is 'a recipe for disintegration' of Afghanistan (Zakhilwal 2001). This argument is simplistic in nature and assumes away two important points. First, if federalism has not always been successful in holding multi-ethnic countries together, other forms of government also failed in this respect. Second, federal structures differ according to many criteria, including levels of centralisation, the number of federal units, and whether they are majoritarian or consociational. Professor Katharine Adeney (2008), in the light of what just mentioned, argues that to 'blame' federalism as a step towards disintegration of Afghanistan is nonsensical; instead, 'the form of the federation in relation to the country's ethnic demography is vital in this equation.' Moreover, in divided countries where ethnic security dilemma is activated, according to Professor Barfield (2011), adopting a decentralised structure is not a step towards disintegration but a wise solution to avoid it. Federalism by devolving a reasonable amount of authority to provinces and redressing the imbalance between national and local governments would solve the ethnic security dilemma that has been standing in the way of peace in Afghanistan and is the only silver bullet that can glue the future Afghanistan together.

The real reason behind Pashtun elites' deep desire for centralisation is the continuation of internal colonialism. They believe, only by a centralised government they can impose their ethnopolitical agenda on non-Pashtuns, dominating and Pashtunising Afghanistan. However, should Pashtuns elites try to dominate Afghanistan once again and ignore others' call for change, non-Pashtuns will abandon the unitary state an secede, leaving the Pashtun elites to struggle for power with one another in the Southern provinces (Ibid). Given Ghani's discriminatory policies and the Talibans' brutal oppression of non-Pashtuns, the idea of disintegration has turned into a strong discourse among non-Pashtuns (Hussaini 2022, p. 20). It is safe to say that either Pashtuns agree with federal arrangements and let all groups retain their culture and identity or they should prepare for partition; there is not the third option on the horizon.

## 7. Conclusion

Afghanistan's modern history has been characterised by ethnic hierarchy. Equality has never truly ruled among different ethnic communities. The relative coexistence among groups has been possible due to the implicit recognition of an unequal, hierarchical structure. The Pashtun domination of Afghanistan and their discriminatory policies and practices against non-Pashtuns, particularly Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks had caused formidable resentment among the historically oppressed groups. Non-Pashtuns attempted to change the mono-ethnic nature of the regimes on many occasions, but to no avail. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a turning point in the history of ethnic relations though. It shattered the Pashtuns' monopoly of foreign patronage and access to military means. In the context of the Cold War, non-Pashtuns organised themselves around their ethnic elites. Equipped with sophisticated weaponry, they found themselves on an equal footing with their Pashtun rivals for the first time. Absent a central authority upon the fall of Najib's regime (1992) all preconditions for mass hostility, leadership belligerence and ethnic security dilemma were present. Pashtuns' fear for loss of their hegemony and non-Pashtuns' attempts to gain leverage at the decision-making table appeared in the form of inter-ethnic civil warfare. The rise of the Taliban in 1990s and their harsh treatment of non-Pashtuns even further deepened ethnic cleavages in Afghanistan and made coexistence among ethnic groups nearly impossible.

By the time of the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001) inter-ethnic trust was at the lowest level. Political rationality and historical experiences called for a power-sharing mechanism by which all ethnic groups could feel included. Despite the realities on the ground, however, the post-Taliban system was not designed with an eye towards ethnic heterogeneity. Pashtun political elites with the help of international community imposed a highly centralised structure of power on Afghanistan; one that was not conductive to democracy and stability in a divided country. Such a flawed structure played a major role in the public distrust of the government and its subsequent collapse in 2021.

Non-Pashtun's strategic patience has come to an end, and they do not want to be ruled and subjugated by Pashtuns anymore. Therefore, Afghanistan's future government should be based on a meaningful power-sharing mechanism and ethnic groups should be awarded the authority to rule their own regions. Such an arrangement is the only solution that can keep Afghanistan as one country. If Pashtun elites manage to adopt a mono-ethnic regime and repeat the historical blunders of the past, it is highly probable that Afghanistan will explode into several small countries.

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# Facilitator of Technology Business Incubation Activities Requires the Ability to Run the Role and Function of Public Relations

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**Abstract**

Technology business incubators (TBIs) are designed to help startups or tenants become independent entrepreneurs through a series of integrated services. In this service, the incubator assists tenants through a facilitator who acts as a communication link. Facilitators maintain the quality and quantity of communication between incubators, tenants, and stakeholder partners. This reflects one of the roles and functions of PR in carrying out the role of communication facilitator. This research uses descriptive and comparative qualitative methods with a purposive sampling technique. The research case study was conducted at a government technology business incubator by interviewing facilitators who play a role in the collaboration and incubation functions. The facilitator becomes a conduit for information from the incubator to the tenants so that communication runs smoothly. In addition, the facilitator also facilitates tenants' efforts to build collaborative partnerships with stakeholder partners. The facilitator needs to have the capacity to carry out the role and function of public relations as a communication technician, communication facilitator, and problem-solving facilitator. Technology business incubator assistance is improving thanks to the facilitator's role and function in public relations.

**Keywords:** Facilitator, Public Relations, Incubation, Tenant, Startup

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Introduce the Problem

Recognition of cultural diversity in public relations (PR) practice and theory encourages the development of disciplines, opens doors for new ideas, and forms new approaches. Public relations roles generally emphasize skills and effective communication, and learning a variety of practices opens up space for recognizing cultural differences (Dutta & Elers, 2020). This opens up the role of PR in organizational communications. Dialogue as a conceptual framework for public relations activities brings stakeholder voices into the organization.

PR practitioners have a responsibility to be a link between the organization and its public (Li et al. 2012). PR is required to be able to bring a good image of the organization into public view. This image reflects the success of PR in carrying out its role. According to Lattimore, the failure of the role of public relations in forming a positive image of government is caused by the dissemination of information about government activities that are not based on a two-way symmetrical communication model (Azhary & Kriyantono, 2018).

In the scope of incubation, PR has the role of building networks for organizations, maintaining relationships with tenants in the mentoring concept, and supporting the development of networks for both collaboration and tenant partnerships. So it is necessary to prioritize two-way communication in maintaining relationships. So it is necessary to maintain the relationship between tenants and incubators by prioritizing two-way communication. This can support the process of developing business entrepreneurship developed by tenants.

Entrepreneurship is closely related to collaborative partnerships with various stakeholder groups (Liu, 2020), such as investors, suppliers, distribution partners, resource providers, entrepreneurial teams, and governments (Xing et al., 2018). Each other need collaborative cooperation. Relationships can be established through the role and function of PR as a liaison for collaborative partnerships. Incubator and tenant partnerships support collaborative partnerships with other partners.

Technology business incubators assist startups or tenants through 7s services, namely space, shared, services, support, skill development, seed capital, and synergy. In this service, the facilitator becomes a communication facilitator who is responsible for maintaining the quality and quantity of communication going well between incubators, tenants, and stakeholder partners. While the communication facilitator is one of the roles and functions of PR. So it is formulated in research that whether the facilitator of technology business incubation activities requires the ability to carry out the roles and functions of public relations. Furthermore, the purpose of this study is to find the actual relationship between the facilitator of technology business incubation activities and the roles and functions of public relations

*1.2 Business Incubator*

Business incubators have existed since the 1950s (Mian et al., 2016). In 2012, the number of incubators reached seven thousand globally, (Knopp, 2012). Business incubators are important for the local economy as a result of value creation (Bismala, 2020). Incubators in regional ecosystems consist of key stakeholders such as industrial clusters, academic institutions, research laboratories, banks, and investors (Lamine, 2016).

Business incubation is related to business development, technology transfer, mentoring, marketing, development, and research. And the forms of business incubation embodiment mechanisms are science parks, incubators, accelerators, technology centers, innovation centers, business centers, and technopolis (Blanc, Ribeiro, Anzanello, 2019). Technology incubators are entities where knowledge is transformed into innovative products and services (Binsawad et al, 2019). Incubators are also an important element in promoting innovation (Lish, 2012). The incubation process or practice carried out by TBI is the most critical determinant of the company's success. The business incubation program is designed as a tool to spur innovation, job creation, and economic development and add value to new businesses to increase survival (Hillemane & Satyanarayana, 2019).

The business incubator provides multitenant facilities with on-site management that directs the acceleration of the successful development of the company through a series of resources and business support services developed or managed by the incubator management. Incubators accelerate the entrepreneurial process and offer support for new ventures (Lewis, Harper-Anderson, & Molnar, 2011). However, in general, the main goal of incubators is to produce successful companies that will be financially viable and stand on their own (Torun, 2018). In Indonesia, the role of TBIs includes mentoring and services referring to Presidential Regulation Number 27 of 2013 concerning Entrepreneurial Incubators and Regulation of the Minister of Cooperatives and SMEs Number 24 of 2015 concerning Norms, Standards, Procedures, and Criteria (NSPK) for Entrepreneurial Incubators.

The government through Menristekdikti in 2018 has strengthened incubator institutions by forming 44 technology business incubators (TBIs) and developing 5 new TBIs outside Java Island. Several TBIs that have produced quality technology-based start-up companies (PPBT) include (1) Incubie Bogor Agricultural University (IPB), (2) Directorate of Innovation and Business Incubation, University of Indonesia (DIIB UI), (3) Institute for Research and Community Service Yogyakarta State University (LPPM UNY), (4) Skystar Venture Multimedia Nusantara University (UMN), (5) Central Java Innovation Entrepreneurial Incubator (Innov Jateng), (6) Maleo Techno Center. (Ristekdikti, 2018). Apart from the several incubators above, there is the only government incubator, namely the Technology Incubator Center under the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BIT-BPPT) which will still exist until 2020, playing an important role in the development of business incubation in Indonesia. BIT-BPPT, which is located in the Puspiptek Area, South Tangerang, is one of the pioneers in developing business incubation in Indonesia and has collaborated with many universities to form incubators and transmit technology-based business incubation studies

*1.3 Facilitator*

Facilitators are representatives of incubator institutions appointed to coordinate and relate to tenants (Cahyanto et al, 2015). The incubator assists tenants through a facilitator as a liaison. Facilitators assist tenants in carrying out all activities related to a series of incubation activities from pre-incubation to post-incubation. The facilitator ensures that communication between incubators, tenants, and partner stakeholders can run smoothly..

*1.4 Public Relation*

Grunig and Hunt define public relations as the practice of managing the dissemination of information between individuals or organizations (such as businesses, government agencies, or non-profit organizations) and the public. Whether developing an organization's public image, dealing with the public, and the media, or managing issues for large corporations, requires strong communication skills and a good understanding of public relations processes as well as social and organizational systems (Johnston, 2009). PR practice is often included as an HR in marketing, English, communications, media studies, or human resources and customer service, but not as a standalone degree (Muchena, 2018).

PR is a discursive communication practice, with company PR practices producing communication power (Berger & Reber, 2013). Soft power is none other than public relations (Nye, 2004; Verči, 2008). The issue of influence and power of communication is a central issue for strategic communication (Hallahan et al, 2007).

The role of organizational PR develops with changing times, PR does not only focus on business products, but PR also helps in forming strategic messages (Mikáčová & Gavlaková, 2014). The ideal role of public relations allows problem-solving to benefit everyone between individuals and groups in competition (Hazleton & Botan, 2017). Public relations practitioners are broadly divided into four roles, namely communication technician, communication facilitator, problem-solving facilitator, and expert prescriber.

1)  PR practitioners as communication facilitators act as communicators or mediators to assist management in terms of hearing what the public wants and expects.
2)  PR practitioners as problem-solving facilitators are involved in the problem-solving process as part of the management team.
3) PR practitioners as communication technicians become communication channels (journalists in residents) who provide information and communication technical services.
4)  PR practitioners as expert prescribers are positioned as experts who become advisors to organizational leaders, provide input and considerations regarding the decision-making process, and are close to top management (Rahmadanty et al, 2019).

## 2. Method

This study uses a qualitative approach to descriptive and comparative analysis. Researchers are key instruments in data collection. The qualitative approach believes that truth and knowledge are dynamic things that are known through understanding the interactions of the people involved (Pawito, 2007). To collect data, the research conducted depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGD) with the selection of purposive sampling techniques from related informants. In the dept interview, the informants were the coordinators of the technology business incubator. After the dept interview, a discussion was held through the FGD forum. The FGD technique selects people based on certain criteria specifically made for research purposes. These criteria include: (1) the informant must be a coordinator who coordinates and oversees the function and role of PR in the organization and (2) the PR team as executor of activities in the field. In this research, a comparative study was carried out that compared the real situation in the technology business incubator with the suggestions of researchers according to the actual position and role of public relations. In addition to interviews and FGDs, for data collection, literature studies, documentation, and observations were also carried out.

## 3. Results

Based on field observations, TBIs carries out technology business incubation service activities. TBIs helps new businesses that are developing into independent entrepreneurs through a series of integrated assistance including the provision of office facilities, production testing, market testing, management consulting, technology, marketing and finance, training, and the creation of business networks both locally and internationally.

The technology incubator business process is a collection of activities in the incubation stages (pre-incubation, incubation, and post-incubation) that are interconnected/related to achieving the strategic goals and objectives of the technology incubator (Hamdani, 2013). The goal of technology business incubation is to grow technology-based start-ups. Incubators can facilitate three main sources, namely skills, funding, and networks (David-West, Umukoro, Onuoha, 2018).

Business incubation is divided into three stages: pre-incubation, incubation and post-incubation.



Figure 1: Stages of the incubation process (Hamdani, 2013).

The pre-incubation stage is a process in which talent scouting and partnership development take place between academics (technology producers), businesses (technology users), and the government (regulators/policies). Furthermore, the incubation stage is the core stage in a series of tenant incubation processes to create technology-based start-up companies (technology startups). In the incubation stage, there is a process of technology and business transfer, where the stages are preparation for incubation, training and mentoring, production testing, certification assistance, market access, and evaluation monitoring. From this incubation stage, it is hoped that it

will graduate tenants and be able to create technology-based start-up companies (PPBT) (Hamdani, 2013). Furthermore, in the post-incubation stage, it is directed at strengthening start-up companies for network development and managerial capacity building. Unlike the incubation stage, the facilities provided at the post-incubation stage aim to increase the accessibility of mass production and accelerate the business of start-up companies that have been formed during the incubation period.

Furthermore, based on interview data with informants, according to informant A, TBI facilitate business incubation, management consulting, and legal aspects to support the development of micro, small and medium enterprises based on technology or innovation. Furthermore, informant A added that besides carrying out facilitation, TBI also carried out human resource development, entrepreneurship, business network development, access to financing, and cooperation both domestically and abroad. TBI has MSME partners, entrepreneurs, experts, research units at government and private research centers, financial institutions, and other communities that give priority to technology and innovation as the basic pattern of business activities.

Informant B, who is the cooperation coordinator, said that the facilitator is a conduit for information that flows from the incubator to the tenants. Facilitators keep communication running smoothly between incubators, tenants, and stakeholder partners. In addition, the facilitator also facilitates tenants to build collaborative partnerships with related stakeholder partners, including researchers, engineers, practitioners, marketing partners, investment partners, and the government. In building collaborative partnerships, in general, the facilitator moves under the cooperation coordinator. The facilitator also participates in promoting and disseminating information on tenant products positively by providing added value. The presence of the facilitator supports the building of public trust in tenant products and technology business incubators through the dissemination of information on activities, services, and product promotions.

Based on the information conveyed by informant A, the facilitator communicates directly with the tenants and mediates further information. When a startup is legally declared to be an incubator tenant, the information conveyed from the incubator to the tenants is assisted by the facilitator. For example, the rights and obligations of tenants are formally conveyed by human resources who are competent in their fields in one meeting session. However, if outside the meeting session, there is still unclear information, the facilitator will help. The facilitator will answer according to their capacity and experience, or they will be asked by a more competent HR. This also happens when problems occur, so the facilitator helps mediate problem-solving. Problems can occur between tenants and incubators, tenants and inventors, or tenants and other stakeholder partners. The facilitator mediates meetings and communications with inventors. Several communication models are used to adjust to the context of the problems encountered. There are times when the facilitator meets directly so that the two-way communication process is more effective.

Informant A added that in the incubation stage, there is a training and mentoring process for tenants. This process is carried out according to the needs of the tenants based on the identification and approach made by the facilitator. The training provided by the incubator includes business and technology training by inviting relevant sources, while for mentoring, the guidance provided is in the form of mentoring in the fields of technology, marketing, and finance. Mentoring is consulted with a team of experts and professionals in their field (Hamdani, 2013).

Informant C said that the facilitator collaborated with other managers to identify and help solve tenant problems. The views of the facilitator will be considered in making management decisions. One example of a problem that is often faced is the transfer of technology. Tenants develop products from the inventions of researchers and engineers. In the incubation stage there are technology and business transfer activities, where the technology previously controlled by inventors is transferred to business partners so that the business processes can be carried out. The intended incubation partner is an incubator tenant. The communication process when technology transfer is not going well will cause problems in the future. Sometimes the understanding of tenants with different inventors can cause disputes that affect the next process.

Based on information from informant D, who is a staff of the cooperation coordinator, said that facilitators are often involved in producing information related to products and tenant profiles. This involvement is to prepare

promotional materials to convey information in the process of partnership communication with marketing, financing, investment, and private and government partners. The facilitator can provide an overview of how to produce information that can represent the perspectives of tenants, consumers, incubators, and stakeholder partners. This point of view is used following the conditions needed in news production such as news, company profiles, data presentation, stakeholder partners, and the government. Each of them has a different point of view, so a special value is needed in every production of information for consumers and stakeholder partners such as investors, government, marketing, certification bodies, test laboratories, and research.

Informant E did not dispute what was conveyed by other informants. By looking at what is happening in the field, the facilitator must be able to master communication techniques. The facilitator must take an important part in the communication process between incubators, tenants, and external partners. Based on the achievements of previous tenants, the capacity of the facilitator in communicating with tenants and external partners is very important. The support of the facilitator's capacity to communicate influences cooperation networks, marketing, and collaborative partnerships.

Furthermore, informant E explained that the facilitator assisted in several meetings. Incubation preparation meetings, discussing cooperation agreements, preparing roadmaps and action plans, as well as preparing office facilities for tenants. Tenants follow the incubator's directions in following the incubation process. An example is the reaffirmation of the rights and obligations of tenants in following the incubation stages. Tenants have the right to get office space at a relatively low rental fee, adjusted to the tenant's needs. Tenants can also take advantage of meeting room facilities, workshops, and equipment. Office facilities facilitate communication between facilitators with tenants and stakeholder partners. Tenant office facilities are close to the research cluster so it is easier for tenants and facilitators to communicate with researchers, engineers, or test and research lab facilities.

Informant E also added about tenant obligations that must be fulfilled, at the beginning of incubation tenants were asked to prepare a business roadmap and action plan by the incubator. The facilitator continues to ensure that what is prepared in the business roadmap and action plan has been fulfilled and is following what the incubator recommends. In this context, the incubator is more dominant in conveying instructions through the facilitator.

Furthermore, informant E said that in the process of technology transfer, incubators, tenants and inventors met in a focus group discussion (FGD). This discussion discussed the agreement between each party in the process of technology transfer, profit sharing, to cooperation agreements. In the process of technology transfer, problems often occur due to 1) communication that is not going well between incubators, tenants, and investors and 2) the level of maturity of technology that is not fully ready for commercialization. The facilitator plays an important role in solving communication problems that are not going well. The facilitator maintains the understanding and agreement of each party, ensures the completeness of documents, facilitates communication and meetings, facilitates problem-solving and ensures tenants get good incubation services.

## 4. Discussion

Based on analysis of field observation data and interviews with 5 informants, TBI carries out technology business incubation services for startups through a series of integrated assistance. Startups or also called tenants are fostered and facilitated so that they develop into independent entrepreneurs. The incubator is assisted by a facilitator who acts as a liaison between the incubator, tenants, and stakeholder partners.

Facilitators are representatives of incubator institutions appointed to coordinate and communicate with tenants. The facilitator facilitates the communication process between tenants, incubators, and stakeholder partners. The facilitator ensures that communication goes well. The facilitator becomes a conduit for information that flows between incubators and tenants, tenants and stakeholder partners, incubators and stakeholder partners, and parallel communication between the three parties. In addition, the facilitator also facilitates tenants to build collaborative partnerships with new stakeholder partners from the initial process of communication to the formation of a cooperation agreement. It can be underlined that the facilitator as a communication channel reflects his capacity to carry out the role and function of public relations as a communication facilitator. This role and function are very

attached to the facilitator. Because with the presence of a facilitator, communication between several parties is ensured to run well.

The ability to carry out the role and function of public relations as a problem-solving facilitator is also attached to the facilitator. Facilitators collaborate with other managers to identify and help resolve tenant problems. One of the examples in the problem-solving facilitator is seen when the transfer of technology that is not going well will cause problems in the future. Tenants' understanding of different inventors can cause disputes that affect the next incubation process. The troubled technology transfer process has a major impact on the sustainability of the tenant business. Facilitators and management help mediate and bring together tenants with inventors to discuss finding solutions, reaching agreements, and completing the technology transfer process.

The facilitator also carries out the role and function of PR as a communication technician. Not directly carrying out these roles and functions, but always involved with their duties. The duties of a communication technician are making photo documentation, writing press releases, letters, invitations to press gatherings, and press conferences, writing articles for internal magazines, and writing other forms of communication. This task is often carried out by the facilitator in assisting tenants.

Tenants need facilitators who have the technical expertise to produce information that has added value. This information is used to introduce company profiles, news content, and tenant product promotions. Tenants will be greatly assisted by the production of information carried out by communication technicians. The facilitator is directly involved in carrying out the task and contributes to increasing the value of the information product itself.

## 5. Conclusion

The facilitator needs to have the capacity to carry out the role and function of PR. The roles and functions are communication technician, communication facilitator, and problem-solving facilitator. Communication technicians can produce information that has added value for company profiles, news content, and tenant product promotions. Furthermore, the role and function of PR as a communication facilitator is to facilitate the communication process between tenants, incubators, and stakeholder partners. The facilitator ensures that communication runs well and can become a channel of information between incubators and tenants, tenants and stakeholder partners, incubators and stakeholder partners, and parallel communication between the three parties. And then the role and function of a problem-solving facilitator. This role allows the facilitator to collaborate with other managers to identify and help resolve tenant issues.

Technology business incubation assistance can take advantage of the facilitator's capacity support in carrying out the role and function of public relations. The facilitator needs to have the capacity to carry out the role and function of public relations as a communication technician, communication facilitator, and problem-solving facilitator.

This research was developed as one of the study initiatives of Sebelas Maret University students who took the topic of facilitator capacity in carrying out the role and function of public relations in technology business incubation activities. Hopefully, this research can share knowledge and be useful for the development of business communication science.

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# Gender Inequality in Developing Countries: A Multifactorial Review

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## Abstract

Historically in some cultures, females are acknowledged differently than males, encouraging girls to follow specific cultural gender-typed behavior and norms. Girls are not perceived similarly to boys, who are considered superior with more intelligence, competence, and academically capabilities. In contrast, girls are deemed to have mediocre potential. All these gender-stereotyped cultural beliefs and practices make a platform for the perception that boys are superior to girls. Such stereotypes about women/girls negatively impact their access to education, work, and healthcare services. The purpose of this qualitative study was to investigate the perception of native Afghans regarding the problems and causes of gender inequality in Afghanistan and participants' opinions of cultural barriers and lack of access to healthcare for women and girls. A qualitative survey using a Likert scale was conducted, and data were collected for questions designed by a Focus Group of Afghan natives. The article ends with a more focused review of the perception of inequality in education for females in Afghanistan.

**Keywords:** Gender, Developing Countries, Education, Health, Equality

## 1. Introduction

In multiple cultures, study results highlight that parental behavior shapes their baby the moment they know their sex (Iwamoto et al., 2018). For example, Palloni (2017) highlights that parents' preferred-gender children get more parental attention, which improves those children's health and nutritional status. Also, Endendijk et al. (2015) suggest that in Middle Eastern and North African societies where the gender inequality gap is prominent, parents tend to differentiate between their sons and daughters in preparing them for adult life; such stereotypical behaviors can limit girls' academic and occupational inspiration (Chaffee & Plante, 2020). According to Linberg et al. (2008), educated mothers with traditional gender beliefs spend less time with their daughter's math assignments than they do with their sons when compared to egalitarian mothers. As children grow, their exposure to messages in the family with consistent reinforcements from teachers, religious leaders, peers, and media, they learn who is more powerful and what is valued in the community (Heise et al., 2019). These cultural norms have led to men's autonomy in the economy, social status, and access to education compared to women in developing countries (Heise et al., 2019).

Kagesten et al. (2016) conducted a mixed-method systemic review that included 82 studies (46 quantitative, 31 qualitative, and five mixed-methods) from 29 countries. Nearly 90 percent of the studies were from North America and Western Europe, and the remaining studies were from Asia, Oceania, the Middle East African Region, sub-Saharan Africa, and multi-country comparison studies. The review findings suggest boys are inspired to be intellectual and superior, and girls are reported to be susceptible and need supervision. Moreover, the review suggests in early adolescence, boys and girls espoused attitudes that endorsed gender inequality acquired from interpersonal influences within the society (Kagesten et al., 2016).

The purpose of this qualitative study was to shed light on the issues of gender inequality issues and their negative impacts on the social life of girls/women in Afghanistan using questions generated by a Focus Group of Afghan natives who had familiarity with gender inequality issues caused by *de facto* government policies and cultural norms. Data was collected from the survey using a Likert scale on the perception of Afghan natives regarding gender inequality issues in Afghan culture and society.

## 2. Gender Inequality and Health Outcomes and Access

Cultural gender norms have shaped the position of women as caregivers and men as providers, impacting their health outcomes (Langer et al., 2015). Healthcare laws and policies are structural determinants that can positively and negatively impact health-related outcomes. One such example is paid parental leave (PPL). The World Health Organization Commission on Social Determinants of Health (2008) states that PPL can enhance women's and children's health outcomes. In the last two decades, a study by Dagher et al. (2011) has suggested numerous benefits of PPL, such as decreasing depressive symptoms among mothers. Ogbuanu et al. (2011) found that PPL can increase breastfeeding duration, impacting infants' overall health and well-being. Despite the well-supported benefits of paid parental leave, some countries do not have policies ensuring paid parental leave (Elser et al., 2022). According to the World Policy Analysis Center Adult Labor Database (2022), PPL is available for both parents of infants in 45% of low-income countries and 50% of middle-income countries worldwide.

In addition, women may face many barriers that can impact their overall health outcomes. For example, women in some cultures encounter complex barriers to early detection of breast cancer that entails social, financial, and other interconnected factors (Ilaboya et al., 2017). In low- and middle-income countries, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, these barriers lead women to seek care only in the later-stage of the disease (Khan et al., 2022; Qureshi et al., 2018). According to Reid et al. (2019), gender norms also impact women's access to regular general healthcare services. Gender disparities can be found in hospital admission rates in low and middle-income countries, which indicates that men are admitted to hospitals more frequently than women, even when a disease prevalence is the same for males and females, excluding obstetric care (Reid et al., 2019). Study results highlighted gender norms, women's subordinate positions, and decision-making power as potential factors that impact women's access to healthcare services (Forrester et al., 2017).

Furthermore, a study by Nahar et al. (2011) investigated healthcare access to obstetrical care in rural Bangladesh. The results showed that women who had delays in obstetric emergencies were associated with a lack of coverage for financial costs and a lack of income from paid jobs due to barriers regarding gender equality in employment (Nahar et al., 2011). In many countries, access to healthcare services depends on the availability of resources, time, and autonomy to decide (Das et al., 2018; Manandhar et al., 2018). Osamor and Grady (2015) define women's autonomy as the ability to make an independent decision, to seek healthcare services without permission from male family members.

According to the United Nations Women (2018) Demographic Health Survey, a sample from 65 low- and middle-income countries highlighted that women with limited financial power were hindered from seeking healthcare services. Moreover, a health survey by Cost et al. (2017) found in 57 low-and middle-income countries girls had a remarkably lower chance of receiving healthcare services 6 of the surveyed countries (Colombia, Egypt, India, Liberia, Senegal, and Yemen). Cost et al. (2017) also analyzed the relationship between access to healthcare services and economic considerations. They reported that among the higher percentage of Muslim populations (P

= 0.006) and higher income concentration (P = 0.039) countries, access to healthcare services is lower for girls (Costa et al., 2017), see figure 1.

In contrast, when women have financial autonomy and the power to make decisions, their access to healthcare services increases (Moyer &Mustafa, 2013). A study conducted in Pakistan indicates that a 1% improvement in women's decision-making autonomy is correlated with an increase of nearly 10% in access to healthcare services (Hou & Ma, 2013).

*Careseeking Sex Ratio*



Figure 1: Gender Ratio in Careseeking in Different Countries

*Costa, J. C., Wehrmeister, F. C., Barros, A. J., & Victora, C. G. (2017). Gender bias in careseeking practices in 57 low–and middle–income countries. Journal of global health, 7(1).*

## 3. Education: Issues of Access

Even though girls' access to education has improved worldwide, gender inequality in educational attainment continues in several developing countries like Afghanistan, where girls have disproportionately low access to education for various reasons (Local Burden of Disease Educational Attainment Collaborators, 2019). In rural communities in Pakistan, which has cultural similarity to Afghanistan, one of the significant reasons for the lower educational attainment for girls indicated that traditionally girls have not been considered future breadwinners. In addition, Shah and Shah (2012) found that some people believe that education can have a bad influence on girls' characteristics, such as making them less obedient and less willing to perform their primary tasks, which are household chores.

Another barrier is the potential misinterpretation by religious figures of related doctrine in the community, which influences girls' educational attainment (Shah & Shah, 2012). According to the World Bank (2022), the gender parity index, which assessed literacy levels for youth, was 0.82 in 2019 in Pakistan. Afghanistan is also one of the developing countries where the gender parity index was 0.54 in 2019. An index lower than 1 indicates that girls have lower access to education than boys (World Bank, 2022); see Figure 2 for other developing countries index.



Figure 2: Gender Parity Index in Education in Different Countries

*World bank (2022). Literacy rate, youth (ages 15-24), gender parity index. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.1524.LT.FM.ZS.*

Inadequate access to educational attainment for girls in developing countries like Afghanistan causes poor socioeconomic status, which can negatively strain the population's health parameters (Miller et al., 2017; Pickering et al., 2015). Moreover, limited access to educational attainment is an essential precursor of unemployment and performing unpaid jobs, which leads women to do three-quarters of unpaid jobs. Lack of parity in employment settings with women leads to approximately 11 billion hours per day completing unpaid tasks (Langer et al., 2015).

## 4. Employment

Theories that shed light on the reasons for existing gender differences in the workplace, such as Human Capital theory (Arnaout et al., 2018), suggest that women allocate more time to childcare and housework than out-of-home employment. In some cultures, such as Afghanistan, a part-time job for a woman is assumed to be an insufficient investment in human capital (Arnaout et al., 2018; Tanner et al., 1999). Human Capital Theory is about education and skills that can enhance efficacy in a business (Becker, 2009). This theory associates inequalities between men and women with differences in work experience and qualification (Tanner et al., 1999).

On the other hand, Gender Stratification theory suggests that gender disparities in the workplace are characterized by doubting women's capabilities and commitment to successful employment outside the home (Tanner et al., 1999). Furthermore, institutional theorists point out that a lack of childcare and flexible working hours can hinder the progression of employers toward a gender-equitable work culture (Weil & Kimball, 1996).

The United Nations (UN) has set specific goals to empower gender equity in the 2030 Global Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2017). Even though progress has been made to achieve the goals and women's participation in the workforce in developing countries like Afghanistan has been increasing, women still need to be recognized in leadership and management positions in many countries (UN Economic & Social Council, 2017). In addition, income disparities between men and women occur worldwide.

Globally, a wide gap exists in job market income. On average, women's earnings are 23% less than men's (UN Economic & Social Council, 2016). This example of income disparities does not consider the fact that women also

perform three times more unpaid tasks than men, such as housework and childcare (UN Economic & Social Council, 2017). Worldwide, multiple factors have led to gender gaps, such as discriminatory institutional policies, gender discrimination, corporate and domestic violence, suboptimal working conditions, and poor mentorship (Kalaitzi et al., 2017).

Cislaghi et al. (2022) conducted a cross-sectional analysis that included data from 97 countries. The analysis included a World Values Survey and European Values Survey. Their analysis indicated that the pro-equality percentages varied from 97.7% of gender-equal employment in Iceland to 7.8% in Egypt (Cislaghi et al., 2022). In five European countries (Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Andorra), pro-equality percentages were demonstrated by more than 90% of the countries surveyed. However, in 14 countries, the pro-equality percentage was held by less than 20% of the individuals surveyed (Cislaghi et al., 2022). See Figure 3



Figure 3: Gender Pro-equality Percentage in Jobs in Different Countries

*Cislaghi, B., Bhatia, A., Hallgren, E. S. T., Horanieh, N., Weber, A. M., & Darmstadt, G. L. (2022). Gender Norms and Gender Equality in Full-Time Employment and Health: A 97-Country Analysis of the World Values Survey. Frontiers in Psychology, 13*

In developing countries such as Afghanistan, girls with a lower level of literacy spend more time performing unpaid domestic jobs than boys (Seedat & Rondon, 2021). Household chores and unpaid work are often considered low merit and intangible in cash and revenues for some societies. Also, unpaid work negatively strains the economy, increases the burden of health issues, and decreases the quality of life for girls (Seedat & Rondon, 2021). An example of this is pregnant women in South Africa, where domestic work and field work leave them limited access to seek prenatal care (McCray, 2004; Pereira-Kotze et al., 2021).

## 5. Misconceptions and Causes of Gender Inequality in Access to Education

### 5.1. Perceptions of Gender- Related Brain Size and Intelligence

In cultures, underestimating girls' intelligence contributes to their suboptimal educational attainment (Colom et al., 2022). In some cultures, people have the misconception that intelligence correlates with brain size. On average, men and women do not have the same brains in volume (Nave et al., 2019). However, intelligence depends more on how effectively the brain is used and trained than on its volume (Sternberg, 2012).

In some cultures, a correlation between brain size and intelligence has been assumed since the 19th century (Nave et al., 2019). This belief has contributed to gender inequality regarding readiness for education. Boys are considered intelligent, enhancing their educational opportunities positively (Reilly et al., 2022). Even though direct correlations between brain size and intelligence do not have a scientific base, there are some anatomical differences

between boys' and girls' brain organization. According to Stanford Medicine (2017), girls and boys have brain regions that are different in size, such as the amygdala and hippocampus, which have high concentrations of sex hormone receptors. These regions serve other functions representative of gender differences unrelated to intelligence. Amen (2013) found no difference in the average Intelligence Quotient of men and women after studying more than 45,000 brain scans.

Moreover, in some cultures, in theology, philosophy, literature, and among lay people, girls and women have been perceived as weak, less intelligent, and emotional, whereas men are assumed strong, rational, and competent in the fields of sciences, math, and technology (Keller, 1987). These cultural gender disparities can negatively impact girls' attainment in employment in science, technology, and engineering (Hyde, 2014).

In the last half-century, women's advancement and scientific findings have challenged many of these beliefs and cultural norms (Saad, 2017). According to White (2019), girls in the United States attain 50% of overall university seats in sciences, engineering, technology, and math. Alternatively, girls in low- and middle-income countries like Afghanistan still struggle to attend school, leading to gender disparity in the lower number of female graduates in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math in 107 of 114 economies worldwide (World Bank, 2019).

At the end of the 20th century,  Feingold (1988) highlighted that functional gaps between girls and boys were closing, assessing their cognitive and math abilities. Also, study results indicated gender parity between both genders and do not leave room to support gender superiority in intelligence (Zell et al., 2015). A recent meta-analysis indorses that, on average, girls and boys have the same in math performance in math (Hyde et al., 2008). Lindberg et al. (2008), in the meta-analysis of 242 studies results, noticed a difference of d=0.05  in math performance between boys and girls.

*5.2. Benefits of Education for All*

According to Beneria (2012), facilitating equal gender access to education can improve the productivity in the community. Multiple studies have highlighted that girls' limited educational attainment can increase impoverishment and suboptimal economic growth in the community (Cooray & Potrafke, 2011). Alternatively, educated girls and women can participate in vocational opportunities and improve the well-being and health of their children and the economy (Ostby et al., 2016). Saxena et al. (2013) highlighted that education improves pregnant women's behavior and attitude toward maternal health care services. Several study results suggested that higher educational attainment increases seeking healthcare behavior and attitude among women (Amwonya et al., 2022; Saxena et al., 2013). Moreover, Kaffenberger and Pritchett (2021) used the Demographic Health Survey data from 54 countries, and they found in a cross-tabulation that child mortality gap was 11.5% between educated women (20.9% experience death of a child) and uneducated women (32.4% experience death of a child).

Developing countries are struggling to transform the socioeconomic status of poor people in society. Empowering women in developing countries is essential to fight against poverty (Faborode & Olugbenga, 2016). In the early 1970s in Bangladesh, nearly 80% of the population was living below the poverty line, and in 2016, the percentage of the population living below the poverty line decreased by 24.3% (Wei et al., 2021). In Bangladesh, poverty reduction was correlated with improvement in women's access to education and employment (Chowdhury et al., 2013).

**6. Study Design**

A qualitative survey of 7 questions was created using a Likert Scale. The questions were generated based on the three-dimensional indicators of Gender Inequality Index (GII) by the United Nations Development Program (2023), which are labor market, empowerment, and reproductive health. The questions were shared with and edited by a focus group of 11 Afghan natives for comments before they were populated into the online survey on Survey Monkey. The focus groups assisted in forwarding the survey link to participants who also were Afghan natives and expressed interest in participating in the survey. The Survey Monkey link was sent to participants' emails,

WhatsApp accounts, and Facebook Messenger accounts. Participants were provided with the details and the purpose of this survey, which is for education and awareness purposes.

*6.1. Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria*

We included Afghan natives aged 18 and older who could read and understand English. We excluded Afghan natives younger than 18 who could not read and understand English, and non-Afghan natives.

*6.2. Survey Respondents' Demographics*

The survey was sent to 300 Native Afghans who were born and raised in Afghanistan and had familiarity with Afghan women and girls' issues at work, the education system, and social life. A total of 213 participants responded to the survey, indicating a return rate of 71%. Approximately 65.3% of the respondents were men, and 34.7% were women. Respondent educational levels included high school (19.7%), bachelor's (52.1%), master's (20.6%), and doctorate (7.04%). All respondents indicated that they could read and understand English. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (2020), the literacy level in Afghanistan was 43%, and literacy estimates are not specified as English literacy.  (See Table 4)

Table 4: Survey Respondents Demographics

| Variable | Population (n=213) | Percentage of Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Gender | Male (n= 139) | 65.3 |
| | Female (n= 74) | 34.7 |
| Education | High School (n= 42) | 19.7 |
| | Bachelor (n=111) | 52.1 |
| | Master's (n= 44) | 20.6 |
| | Doctorate (n= 15) | 7.04 |
| Age | >18 years old (n= 213) | 100 |

**7. Results**

We used a Likert scale scoring criteria of Strongly Disagree (1 point), Disagree (2 points), Neutral (3 points), Agree (4 points), and Strongly Agree (5 points) to score the responses to the survey questions. In the sample, 49.7 % of respondents answered strongly disagree, and 22.8% disagree with the statement of girls having the same access to education as boys.

Furthermore, 32.3% of the respondents agree, and 17.3% strongly agree, with the question that boys are considered to be more intelligent than girls in the culture. In addition, 23.9% scored strongly disagree and 34.7% disagree on question 3, which indicated that nearly 50% of respondents do not believe that boys are better in science, technology, engineering, and math than girls. Regarding gender equality in workplace and employment settings in the Afghan culture, nearly 28.8% of the respondent scored disagree, and 32.8% strongly disagree that it exists in Afghanistan.  For the scores of all responses, please see Figure 5 and Table 6.

Figure 5: Gender Survey Questionnaire Responses Percentage

Table 6: Gender Survey Questions and Responses Percentage

| Question | Responses | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q1, Do you think girls have the same access to education as boys? | Strongly disagree 49.7% | Disagree 23% | Neutral 2.3% | Agree 7.0% | Strongly agree 17.8% |
| Q2, Do you think boys are considered more intelligent than girls in your culture? | Strongly disagree 15.4% | Disagree 23.4% | Neutral 11.2% | Agree 32.3% | Strongly agree 17.3% |
| Q3, Do you think boys are better in science, technology, engineering, and math  than girls | Strongly disagree 23.9% | Disagree 34.7% | Neutral 11.2% | Agree 26.7% | Strongly agree 3.2% |
| Q4, Do you think women have the same power to make decisions as men in a home? | Strongly disagree 19.7% | Disagree 26.7% | Neutral 7.9% | Agree 27.2% | Strongly agree 18.3% |
| Q5, Do you think men and women should be equal? | Strongly disagree 3.7% | Disagree 4.6% | Neutral 5.1% | Agree 43.1% | Strongly agree 43.1% |
| Q6, Do you believe there is gender equality in your home, school, workplace, etc? | Strongly disagree 17.3% | Disagree 38.4% | Neutral 7.9% | Agree 26.7% | Strongly agree 9.3% |
| Q7, Do you think female employees get the same opportunity as male employees? | Strongly disagree 28.6% | Disagree 32.8% | Neutral 6.5% | Agree 20.1% | Strongly agree 11.7% |

## 8. Discussion

According to the United Nations (2023a), Afghanistan is the only country where females do not have access to secondary school and university level education, or their access to these educational platforms is postponed. This means they only have access to education when the authorities in the *de facto* government allow them to go to school and university. When Afghan girls are not educated, this results in almost half the country's population being unable to participate in business, industry, or the economy (United Nations, 2023a). These results were consistent with the results of our survey where 49.7% of participants scored strongly disagree, and 23% disagree

with the availability of the same access to education for girls as for boys. These results highlight the importance of providing opportunities for education for girls, as educated girls can participate in vocational employment and bolster the well-being and health of their children (Ostby et al., 2016). Also, Kaffenberger and Pritchett (2021) found that child mortality was lower for educated mothers than in uneducated mothers. Girls' education is also an effective tool for reducing the incidence of poverty (Faborode & Olugbenga, 2016). Through improvements in equality policies for girls, Bangladesh has decreased the percentage of people living below the poverty level (Chowdhury et al., 2013). This decrease is attributed to improved overall access to education for girls (Chowdhury et al., 2013; Wei et al., 2021).

Furthermore,  in Afghanistan, women were banned from working for international and national agencies on 24 December 2022 by a letter issued by the *de facto* rulers  (United Nations, 2023b). Limiting higher-paying job opportunities leaves women and girls performing unpaid work or household chores. Unpaid work increases the economic burden on families, affects health, and mental health, while also decreasing the quality of life for girls and women (Seedat & Rondon, 2021).

In several other low- and middle-income countries such as Yemen, Iraq, and Bahrain, the percentage of pro-equality cultural norms was less than 20% (Cislaghi et al., 2022). These findings are consistent with our results as we found that 28.6% of respondents from Afghanistan scored strongly disagree and 32.8% scored disagree with the question that female employees get the same opportunities as male employees. Furthermore, other factors such as discriminatory institutional policies, gender discrimination, corporate and domestic violence, suboptimal working conditions, and poor mentorship can increase gender gaps in the workplace (Kalaitzi et al., 2017).

## 9. Limitations of the Study

Even though our survey gathered 213 responses from Afghan Natives, the generalizability of the study is limited due to the nature of the survey, which is online and qualitative in design. We attempted to control the quality of the sample by involving a Focus Group of 11 Afghan natives in creating the survey questions. In addition, our respondents had a higher educational level and English literacy than a significant percentage of the Afghan population where overall literacy is estimated 43% (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2020). It is difficult to describe or identify possible bias in the sample. It is possible that Afghans who have online accounts are more informed  or highly educated, which could have skewed the results of the survey responses. It is essential for future studies with more detailed questions on a larger scale that will include participants with various sociodemographics characteristics to pinpoint challenges of gender equality in the country. Also, a higher ratio of male respondents in this study is likely to skew results due to the fact that they do not have firsthand experience with gender discrimination or lack of opportunities for females in the workplace.

## 10. Conclusion

Improving women's access to education and work is crucial; educated women can actively participate in community rebuilding and decreasing poverty. However, Afghan women have several barriers to education and employment that can negatively impact the economy at the family level and community level and their well-being. These barriers are access to equal opportunity in jobs, leadership and management position, education, and financial stability. It is essential to have structured and organized strategies and the commitment of politicians, religious scholars, and public figures to increase people's awareness of the benefits of equal opportunity for women's education, employment, and healthcare access and work to contribute to the country's economic and social development.

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# Social Network Application in Building the Personal Brand of Vietnamese Young People

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**Abstract**

Research on the application of social networks in building personal brands of Vietnamese young people is approached by the research team in terms of: frequency of Vietnamese youth using social networks, understanding and current status of Vietnamese youth using social networks. Use social media to build your personal brand. The research was carried out through literature review and sociological investigation. The research results show that the current level of young people using social networks is quite high (4.28 points on the Likert 5 scale), up to 53.3% of the respondents use social networks over 4 hours per day. The survey subjects also showed the need for personal branding (2.66 points on the Likert scale 3) and showed interest in building a personal brand with a personal mark (3.68 points on the Likert 5 scale). However, in the 10 content of personal branding according to Saokim Brank (2021), only 2 contents "Be yourself" and "Build consistent words and images" scores represent the level of implementation, and the remaining contents are only shown at the desired level. From the research results, the authors made some exchanges and discussions with the hope that young people will use "Social Networks" more effectively in building personal brands.

**Keywords:** Social Network, Personal Brand, Personal Branding, Vietnamese Youth

## 1. Raised the issues

Vietnam is one of the countries with a fast development speed in information technology, the number of people using the Internet and social networks is large and increasing. According to statistics, by January 2020, Vietnam has the number of Internet users up to 68.17 million people (accounting for 70% of the population), the number of social network users is 65 million people (accounting for 67 % population) (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2022).

Building a personal brand is becoming easier and easier, especially for young people with flexible tools such as the Internet, smartphones to connect and social networks, community group activities, YouTube, and livestream channels, are used to spread self-image and messages. That is also the reason hot boys, hot girls, influencers are becoming famous all over social networks. Previously, the communication range of individuals was limited by geographical distance, but today, through social networks, each person can connect a circle of online relationships with each other. The wider the circle of connection, the greater the impact on each individual.

Building a personal brand to assert yourself and stand out from the crowd is the desire of many people, especially young people. In connection with the popularity and influence on young people of the social networking system in recent years, the use of social networks to build a personal brand is an effective and pervasive method in the community. In this study, the authors focus on the following topics: The level of use of social networks by Vietnamese youth; The most used social networks by young people, time and purpose of using social networks; The benefits and limitations of using social networks; Young people's interest in the benefits of personal branding; Consider the level of implementation of personal branding with 10 contents according to SaoKim Branding (2021).

## 2. Social networking and personal branding from social networks

### 2.1. Social networks and social networks' characteristics

In today's modern life, social networking is a phrase that is quite familiar to everyone. A social network can be understood as a website or online platform with many different formats and features, making it easy for people to connect from anywhere. Social networks can be easily accessed from many means and devices such as computers, phones (Thinh, N.V., 2021).

Social network operates on the Internet platform with features such as: Chat, e-mail, movies, voice chat, file sharing... via social networks, users can share photos, personal views or looking for friends and partners. Although social networks have different names, functions, and usage, they share the same characteristics: (i) Users must create profiles and have their own accounts, (ii) Many users link to each other through names, email addresses, nicknames, Social networks will connect user accounts to individual and organizational accounts, (iii) Posted and shared content in social networks are up to users to decide on images, sentences (https://hieuluat.vn, 2022).

### 2.2. Personal brand

There are many different interpretations of the concept of personal branding. Your personal brand is the sum total of what you choose to present to the world. Simply put, a personal brand includes everything people evaluate about you: Appearance, personality, career, attitude to life, values contributing to society (Linh, L., 2020).

Personal brand is the perception or impression of an individual that is widely and consistently recognized by the public. It can be a combination of how they see that individual in real life, how the media portrays an individual, and the impression people get from information about that individual available online. Personal branding is rooted in people's minds about an individual (Dung, D.T., 2021).

A personal brand is the sum total of all impressions, beliefs and perceptions about an individual. For people who do jobs that require a lot of exposure to the public such as actors, singers, and stars, personal branding is an indispensable part. Besides, personal branding is very important to an audience - publishers (Rentracks.com.vn).

Thus, it can be understood that a personal brand is the sum total of all impressions, beliefs and perceptions that the public perceives an individual. Personal brand is the image of a person in public, including how people perceive your appearance, personality, lifestyle, and values that you contribute to society.

### 2.3. The benefits of building a personal brand on social networks

Social networks can be used anywhere, as long as there is a smart electronic device such as a phone, ipad, laptop or on a computer with an internet connection. Social networks allow users to share stories, articles, personal ideas, post photos and videos, and announce activities and events online or in the real world. Social networking on the web helps users connect with people living in different lands, in other cities or around the world (ictnews, 2019).

Using social networks to build a personal brand has many benefits such as: (i) The individual is known and remembered more; (ii) Easily build and expand surrounding relationships; (iii) Become more confident; (iv) Speech also becomes more reliable, more weighty; (v) Individuals will appear denser online; (vi) The individual

may have some control over how people see him/herself; (vii) Individuals can easily express opinions, give valuable advice; (viii) Many opportunities for cooperation and work will come (Thao, V., 2022).

Personal branding will help each person understand themselves better, increase their confidence and assert themselves. Successful personal branding also means that the individual has a useful tool for self-control. Building a personal brand on social networks also helps individuals create social transactions and relationships, thereby helping individuals easily develop their work and create a long-term development platform.

*2.4. Building a personal brand on social networks*

According to SaoKim Branding (2021), in order to build a personal brand, it is necessary to: (i) Position yourself; (ii) Build consistent language and images; (iii) Connect with influencers; (iv) Receive a recommendation; (v) Use professional images; (vi) Build valuable content; (vii) Shine in one's own way; (viii) Utilize social networks to develop personal brands; (ix) Public speaking; (x) Be yourself.

In which to take advantage of social networks to develop personal brands, it is necessary to understand that social networks are a tool with incredible power and influence when building a personal brand. Facebook, LinkedIn, Youtube, Twitter, Instagram, are places where potential customers may be present. Therefore, the appearance of an individual on social networks with quality content will help people see the value of that person more (SaoKim Branding, 2021).

**3. Research methodology**

To examine the study, the authors used desk research and sociological investigation methods. The data will be aggregated and analyzed using Excel software tools.

By the desk-based research method, the authors collect and synthesize relevant documents and articles, thereby clarifying the concepts and characteristics of social networks, personal brands, and the benefits of building personal branding on social networks, personal branding content through social networks. From the accessible issues, the research team built a survey form on Google drive, the survey questionnaire focused on survey questions to clarify the research contents and objectives.

After building a preliminary survey, the team conducted a test interview with 10 survey participants. Opinions from test subjects were synthesized to complete the official survey form, then the research team sent the complete survey link (https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/)1FAIpQLSf2rG3TUrftvwyyToAQrY4cJbD0-Pzh3WWDIZMt4wmP1rHTFw/closedform) to young people. Within the framework of the research, the authors focused on sending survey questionnaires to high school students and university students in Vietnam via social media such as facebook, zalo, email.

The method of sociological investigation by survey is conducted by the research team based on two methods, namely convenience sampling method and "snowball" method, which is the next object-finding method based on suggestions or introductions of the subjects just surveyed. Through the survey, the author team collected 435 votes. The survey data was synthesized and statistically analyzed using Excel software, from which to analyze and demonstrate the research problem.

With questions designed according to the Likert scale, when assessing the level of statements, the author determines the distance value and the mean value, specifically:

*With a 5-level Likert scale:*
Distance value = (Maximum - Minimum) / n = (5-1)/5 = 0.8
*Meaning of levels:*
1.00 – 1.80: Strongly Disagree/Very Dissatisfied/Very Disinterested
1.81 – 2.60: Disagree/ Dissatisfied/ Disinterested
2.61 – 3.40: No opinion/ Moderate

3.41 – 4.20: Agree/ Satisfied/ Interested
4.21 – 5.00: Strongly agree/Very satisfied/Very interested
*With a 3-level Likert scale:*
Distance value = (Maximum - Minimum) / n = (3-1)/3 ≈ 0,66
*Meaning of levels:*
1.00 – 1.66: Not necessary/ Disagree/ Dissatisfied/ Disinterested
1.67 – 2.32: No opinion/ Moderate
2.33 – 3: Necessary/ Agree/ Satisfied/ Interested

## 4. The survey results

The number of survey participants is 435 people, of which 322 women (accounting for 74%), 110 men (accounting for 25.3%) and 3 people who do not want to be specific (0.7%).



Figure 1: Level of use of social networks by survey respondents
*Source: The survey results*

Regarding the level of use of social networks, out of 435 survey participants, 217 people (49.9%) answered that they regularly use social networks, 141 people (32.4%) use social networks. quite a lot, 63 people (14.5%) use Social Media at a normal level, respectively 11 people (2.5%) and 3 people (0.7%) think they use little or no use Social Networks. With the convention of 1 point being not used and 5 points being used a lot according to the Likert 5 scale, the average score on social network usage is 4.28 points, which shows the level of social network usage. Youth associations (survey participants) are at a fairly high level of usage.



Figure 2: The most used social networking sites of the respondents
*Source: The survey results*

Among 435 people, 410 people use Facebook (94.3%); 323 people use Tiktok (74.3%) and 301 people use Youtube (69.2%); Instagram and Zalo have the same number of users at 291 or 66.9%; Twitter with 55 users (12.6%).

Figure 3: Time spent using social networks in a day of respondents
*Source: The survey results*

With 435 people surveyed, 232 people use social networks more than 4 hours a day (53.3%), 176 people use social networks from 2-4 hours a day (40.5%), 27 people using social media for less than 2 hours per day (6.2%).



Figure 4: Purpose of using social network of respondents
*Source: The survey results*

With 435 survey participants, 409 people use social networks for entertainment (94%); 376 people use social networks to update information (86.4%); 362 people use social networks to connect and communicate (83.2%); 346 people use social networks to study (79.5%) and 214 people use social networks to share and confide (49.2%). In addition, there are 12 people using social networks for other purposes such as working and trading (2.8%).

Figure 5: The benefits that survey respondents receive when using social networks
*Source: The survey results*

Among 435 survey respondents, 389 people think that using social networks will help them relieve stress (89.4%); 378 people think that using social networks will help them easily collect documents and information (86.9%); 367 people think that using social networks will help them connect with people easily (84.4%); 325 people think that using social networks will help them learn many soft skills (74.7%). In addition, some people think that social networks bring other purposes such as making money, trading easier.



Figure 6: Limitations that respondents suffer when using social networks
*Source: The survey results*

With 435 people surveyed, 237 people think that using social networks will lead to insomnia (54.5%), 215 people think that using social networks will reduce interaction between people (49.4%), 202 people think that using social networks will affect their privacy (46.4%), 161 people think that using social networks will cause cyber violence (37%). In addition, some people believe that social networks bring other limitations such as time consuming, harmful to health, affecting user behavior.

Figure 7: Number of survey respondents who have ever done personal branding
*Source: The survey results*

Of the 435 people surveyed, 122 have done personal branding (28%); 313 people have not done personal branding (72%). This is understandable, because the survey target is young people, so the use of social networks is still mainly for entertainment, updating information, learning, connecting and sharing stories.



Figure 8: Survey respondents' opinions on the necessity of building a personal brand
*Source: The survey results*

Of the 435 people surveyed, 313 think personal branding is necessary (72%), 98 have no opinion (22.5%) and 24 think it is unnecessary. (5.5%). According to the 3-level Likert scale, the average score of the need for personal branding is 2.66 points, this score shows that young people (survey participants) are assessing the need for personal branding.

Figure 9: Survey respondents' interest in the benefits of personal branding
*Source: The survey results*

Regarding the benefits of personal branding, 358 people are interested in the benefits of easily building and expanding relationships around (82.3%), 317 are interested in becoming more confident (72.9%), 313 people are interested that many cooperation and work opportunities will come to them (72%), 250 people are interested that their words will become trustworthy, have more weight (57.5%), 229 people are interested that they will be known and remembered more (52.6%), 214 people are interested that they can easily express their opinions , gave valuable advice (49.2%), 174 people are interested in how they will have some control over how people see themselves (40%), 89 people are interested in how they will appear denser online (20.5%). However, there are also a few people (0.5%) who are not interested in the benefits of personal branding.



Figure 10: Respondents' interest in building their own personal brands
*Source: The survey results*

Regarding building a personal brand bearing their personal imprint, out of 435 people surveyed, 117 people (26.9%) are very interested, 114 people (26.2%) are interested, 163 people (37.5%) are moderately interested, 28 people (6.4%) and 13 people (3%) are not interested and very disinterested, respectively. According to the 5-level Likert scale, the average point about being interested in building a personal brand with a personal impression is 3.68 points, which shows the level of interest of young people (the respondents) for personal branding.

Regarding the implementation of 10 personal branding contents according to SaoKim Branding (2021), with 3 levels of survey: *Not implemented; Have a desire to perform; There is implementation*. And the 1-point convention is not implemented; 2 points is there is a desire to perform; 3 points is done. The results are summarized in the following table:

Table 1: About the implementation of personal branding content

| No. | Personal branding content | Perform | | Expect to perform | | Do not perform | | Mean | Evaluation level |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Total | % | Total | % | Total | % | | |
| 1 | Position yourself | 140 | 32,2 | 269 | 61,8 | 26 | 6 | 2,26 | b |
| 2 | Build consistent words and images | 182 | 41,8 | 222 | 51 | 31 | 7,1 | 2,35 | a |
| 3 | Connect with influencers | 118 | 27,1 | 282 | 64,8 | 35 | 8 | 2,19 | b |
| 4 | Get a promotion | 121 | 27,8 | 289 | 66,4 | 25 | 5,7 | 2,22 | b |
| 5 | Use professional images | 125 | 28,7 | 277 | 63,7 | 33 | 7,6 | 2,21 | b |
| 6 | Content building | 132 | 30,3 | 266 | 61,1 | 37 | 8,5 | 2,22 | b |
| 7 | Shine your own way | 150 | 34,5 | 256 | 58,9 | 29 | 6,7 | 2,28 | b |
| 8 | Take advantage of social media | 136 | 31 | 268 | 62 | 31 | 7 | 2,24 | b |
| 9 | Talk to the crowd | 135 | 31 | 270 | 62,1 | 30 | 6,9 | 2,24 | b |
| 10 | Be yourself | 212 | 48,7 | 208 | 47,8 | 15 | 3,4 | 2,45 | a |

With evaluation value: a. Perform; b. Expect to perform; c. Do not perform

*Source: Calculation from survey results*

According to the results in Table 1, in the personal branding content, the technique "Be yourself" is performed the most by the respondents – 212 people have done it, corresponding to 48.7%, the average score is 2.45 points at the level where this content is implemented; Next is "Building consistent words and images" – 182 people have implemented corresponding to 41.8% of the average score of 2.35 points in the implementation level. Young people were also aware of "Be yourself" and "Build consistent words and images" these are two factors with average scores showing the level of performance, which also shows that young generation highly appreciate being themselves and building words and images in building a personal brand.

Besides, *"Receiving a recommendation"* has the highest number of people who want to do it is 289 people (66.4%), followed by the content "Connect with influencers" 282 you want to do, but only 118 people have done it, so although this content is interested, the average score of this content is at the lowest level of 2.19 points (at the level of desire). It can also be seen that young people also want support from influential people in building their personal brand, but due to the young age, the relationships are not many, the access to those who have influence is also a limitation of young people.

The least used content is *"Building content"* with 37 people (8.5%), "Connecting with influencers" with 35 people (8%) saying they don't do the technique. This. The results also show that in 10 content of personal branding according to SaoKim Branding (2021), there are 8 new contents that stop at the level of desire to implement and the average score according to the survey results ranges from 2.19 – 2.28 points. The content *"Leveraging social networks"* has 136 people doing it (31%), having a desire to do it, 268 people (62%) and 31 people (7%) not doing it, the average score of this content is 2.24 points at the desired level of performance. Therefore, the author conducted a survey to further survey the level of awareness of the respondents about the view *"Social networks make building a personal brand easier"*, the survey results are shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Respondents' opinions on the view "Social networks make building Personal Brands easier"
*Source: The survey results*

Regarding the opinion of *"Social networks make it easier to build a personal brand"*, out of 435 people surveyed, 151 people (35%) strongly agree, 147 people (34.1%) ) agree, 124 people (28.8%) are neutral, respectively 6 people (1.4%) and 3 people (0.7%) disagree and strongly disagree. With the convention according to the 5-level Likert scale, the average score with the view *"Social networks make personal branding easier"* according to the survey results is 3.98 points, showing the level of agreement of young people (survey participants) with the above opinion.

## 5. Some exchanges and discussions

Successful personal branding also means that you have a useful tool for self-control. The author's survey shows the influence of social networks on today's life, the importance of building a personal brand, specifically:

The level of use of social networks by young people today is relatively large, nearly 50% of them regularly use it, and today Facebook is still the most commonly used website (94.3% of the respondents using Facebook). In addition, over 50% of young people use social networks for more than 4 hours a day, and the main purpose is for entertainment (94%), updating information and connecting (83.2%). The use of social networks also gives young people many benefits such as helping them relieve stress (89.4%), easily collect documents and information (86.9%), connect people easily (84.4%), but social networks also have many shortcomings and limitations such as making them lose sleep (54.5%), reducing interaction between people (49.9%), and affect their privacy (46.4%).

Regarding personal branding, the survey results show that the majority of respondents have not done personal branding (72%). However, the survey respondents showed the need for personal branding over 72% also said that personal branding was necessary (reaching 2.66 points on the Likert 3 scale). At the same time, the survey results show that they are interested in building a personal brand with a personal mark (3.68 points on the Likert 5 scale).

Survey subjects also showed interest in the benefits of personal branding such as easy building, expanding relationships around (82.3%), becoming more confident (72.9%), many opportunities for cooperation and work will come to them (72%). Most of the survey respondents are interested or very interested in building a personal brand bearing their own imprint (more than 90% from moderate to very concerned).

Regarding the 10 contents of personal branding according to SaoKim Branding (2021), most of the survey subjects (almost over 50%) have the desire to implement the 10 proposed contents, while only less than 10 % does not do these things. In which the content *"Be yourself"* and *"Building consistent words and images"* were of interest to

you, according to the survey results, the average score with these two items is 2.45 and 2. ,35 points. The other content shows that young people have the desire to do it. Especially, the results recognize that young people want to *"Get a recommendation"* and *"Connect with influencers"*. Although the content *"Using social networks"* has an average score of 2.24 points at the desired level, the majority of young people agree with the view that *"Social networks make building a brand easier than ever before"* with a score of 3.98 points according to the survey results.

With the rapid development of today's online platforms, using social networks to build a personal brand is a useful tool that young people can access. To become an influencer in a particular field and gain many advantages, you need to build a suitable roadmap. According to the survey results, 28% of young people have done personal branding, up to 72% think it's necessary, and only 2 out of 10 content building personal brands follow SaoKim Branding (2021) has implementation. It can be seen that, from thinking to acting, it needs to be defined more clearly, specifically and appropriately:

- *"Be yourself"* is constantly improving to become more useful and better. You need to *"position yourself"*, create value for yourself, spend time monitoring and listening to comments from people around you to improve yourself, this is the core value that helps you develop for a long time and sustainable.
- "Building consistent words and images", the images, words, and phrases you use should show respect for the language they represent. Personal information needs to be screened and selected to use *"Professional Images"* and implement *"Content Creation"* to express your personality and unique style. *"Shine in your own way"*, people with personality, style, differentiation, but value, who are impressed with what you do, and are oriented to the surrounding community.
- The number of friends who have the desire to *"Get a recommendation"* with the highest number in the survey, also shows that young people want to be expressed, want to be affirmed and get recognition. Building a personal brand also requires you to have power, to have credibility. Leadership will come from your talent. *"Speaking in front of a crowd"* is a way to help you express your views and witness. Any brand needs time to develop, patiently, persistently take care and care for its brand, also needs to show goodwill, know how to generate ideas and share exchanges so that everyone can see their own goals.
- On the issue of *"Connecting with influencers"* according to the survey, the average score of 2.19 is the lowest score. Young people also need to be facilitated more, also need support and connections from influential people, mentoring and support to create conditions that help them grow up, succeed and also become influential. And you also have to create opportunities for yourself, actively contact and seek out influential people in your field to be able to shorten the distance to your own success.
- Facebook, Instagram, Youtube or Tiktok ... are all popular social networking platforms that you can use to build your personal brand. You need to choose the right Social Networking platform to step by step implement content with a roadmap in building your own brand. Besides, you can use social networking platforms at the same time, because each platform will have its own advantages and disadvantages. You need to base on your preferences and needs to choose the right platform for you.

The study *"Application of social networks in building personal brands of Vietnamese youth"* has examined some aspects of the current status of social network use, assessed the benefits and limitations of using the network. Vietnamese youth society. At the same time, the level of implementation of personal brand building of Vietnamese youth was reviewed with 10 contents according to the approach of SaoKim Branding (2021), including content related to taking advantage of social networks, and opinions about the application of social networks in building personal brands. However, there are still many aspects that can continue to be considered such as evaluating the effectiveness of the application of social networks, the process to follow to be able to build a successful personal brand through social networking sites or factors affecting the decision to use social networks to build a personal brand... This study is considered a premise for approaching further studies on these contents.

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# The Geopolitics of The Global Energy Transition and its Implications on The Arab Gulf Region: A Review

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**Abstract**
The confluence of power transitions in the international system and energy transitions in the global market presents a complex and multifaceted landscape for world developments and policies, particularly for the energy-dependent countries of the Arab Gulf states. To understand this reciprocal effect, this paper provides a review of the existing academic literature on the geopolitical implications of the global energy transition towards low-carbon renewable energy sources, both globally and in the Arab Gulf states. The paper concludes that despite the growing interest from scholars, particularly in recent years, and the multitude of investigations undertaken to examine the potential implications of climate change and renewable energy on various regions worldwide, a significant challenge has emerged in the form of inconsistencies and disagreements among these studies. This can be attributed to the over-generalization of research findings, which often neglects to define the temporal and spatial scope of influence, as well as failing to identify both the source and the affected party of the effect. These four factors are crucial in determining the nature of the geopolitical impact of the global energy transition. Therefore, we believe that there is a serious necessity to synthesize the scattered parts presented by these studies into multicoherent frameworks that clearly define these four points.

**Keywords:** Renewable Energy, Arab Gulf States, Geopolitics, Energy Transition, Climate Change

## 1. Introduction

Over the past five decades, the Arab Gulf states have witnessed significant socio-economic transformation resulting from their vast hydrocarbon resources. This has not only led to internal improvements in the standard of living, education, health, and welfare of Gulf citizens but has also elevated the Gulf region's political influence globally. Under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, the region has become increasingly engaged in international affairs, such as energy governance, climate change politics, and global financial architecture.

These developments are occurring in the context of a fast-transitioning international system where power is becoming more diffuse through overlapping levels of national, regional, and global governance. At the heart of these shifts lies the rise of China, which is propelling the globe away from the post-Cold War international order, which had its institutions, norms, and laws, toward an unknown configuration of international relations. (Ikenberry, 2008) However, there is no consensus among academics on what the international system will look like over the next few decades. Will the "unipolar moment" (Krauthammer,1990) that has persisted since the Cold War's

conclusion come to an end? where the "rise of the rest," as advocated by Farid Zakaria, challenges US hegemony? (Zakaria, 2013) or would it revert to the multipolar world that existed before World War II? or will it grow into Gervi's "inter-polarity," (Grevi, 2009) in which multipolarity and increased interdependence create a new and unprecedented redistribution of power on a global scale? Or will the world see Acharya's "multiplex world," (Acharya, 2017) where the emerging new world order comprises multiple actors whose relationships are a complex form of interdependence? And those players are not just great powers, but also regional powers, international institutions, multinational corporations, and nonstate actors. Or would it be similar to Ian Bremmer's suggested " G-zero" international system, in which no one great power or coalition of powers can shoulder the weight of global leadership? (Bremmer, 2013).

Equally important, the shift in the distribution and concentration of geopolitical power in the international system (*power transition*) is combined with (*the energy transition*) that happening in the global energy market (Yargin, 2020) from a fossil fuels-dominated energy sector to one that relies on renewable energy, as a result of increasingly strict decarbonization policies and tremendous advancements in low-carbon technology. this global shift toward low-carbon energy is throwing the world's energy system into disarray, having an effect on whole economies, and altering the political dynamics both within countries and between them. (Hafner et al, 2020).

Furthermore, the energy transition is not a new phenomenon; in the last three hundred years, modern civilization has had several energy transitions, such as from wood to coal in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and then from coal to oil and natural gas in the twentieth century. These shifts were motivated by the availability, reduced cost, and enhanced convenience and utility of a new energy source. In contrast, the current global energy shift is primarily a response to the looming dangers of climate change. Today, the energy sector, which is dominated by fossil fuels, accounts for 73% of human-caused greenhouse gas emissions. To decrease the spike in the number and intensity of severe and catastrophic weather events, such as heatwaves, destructive floods, and droughts, threats to the security of food and water, forced migration, loss of life, and livelihoods, global CO2 emissions must be halved by 2030. (UN, 2021). Therefore, the current transition efforts are being made to encourage low-carbon energy resources and technologies, Renewable energies such as solar energy, wind energy, hydropower, and others, as well as non-carbon energy carriers such as electricity and, to a lesser extent, hydrogen, and in transportation technology such as electric cars, and energy storage technologies such as batteries and thermal storage, and efforts also are being to improving energy efficiency and productivity in industry and other applications. (Bazilian and Howells 2019).

Undoubtedly, the energy transition in the global market and the power transition in the international system will leave their imprint on each other. the shift toward low-carbon energy is altering areas and locations of conflict. whereas geopolitics influences both the decisions made in the technical realm and trade patterns. Together, they will mold the energy systems and relationships of the future and the outcome will be determined in large part by how great powers position themselves in the energy transition. (Sholten, 2020).

The Arab Gulf States are at the epicenter of these global waves of energy and climate change-related geopolitical development. As producers and exporters of hydrocarbon-based products for the past eighty years, the six monarchies – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman- have been profoundly shaped by the global economy's dependency on hydrocarbons. They are together responsible for one-fourth of world oil output, the largest source of oil exports, and one-third of globally traded gas. In addition, Due to the region's location in the hottest and driest portion of the world, the Persian Gulf states are among the most vulnerable to the consequences of climate change. including but not limited to Extreme heat waves, dust storms, and water scarcity. All of them will become more frequent and severe as climate change continues. (Al-Delaimy et al., 2020).

Consequently, whichever dynamics the geopolitics of climate and energy transition will unfold in the next decades, will have a profound effect on the Gulf states and societies. Therefore, this paper seeks to provide a comprehensive survey of the scholarly literature about comprehending the reciprocal effect of energy transition in the global market and power transition in the international system on the Arab Gulf states. To accomplish that, our primary focus in reviewing the literature will be on studies, books, and academic articles that address the future geopolitical implications of global energy transformations, since this phenomenon is driven by the climate crisis and aim to

substitute hydrocarbons for more low-carbon renewable energy sources in the energy mix. Thus, the literature on the global energy transition incorporates both themes of the study, global climate change, and renewables.

Regarding the organization of the article, this article is broken into three sections each aimed at exploring the existing literature that's relevant to the previously stated objective: the initial section delves into the literature pertaining to the implications of global energy transition in a broad sense, while the subsequent section explores the implications of the rise of global renewable technologies on the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), whereas the third part reviews work on the global energy transition and its implications for the Gulf's energy-rich countries. The article concludes by identifying gaps in the existing literature and recommending a research agenda for future investigation in this field.

## 2. The Geopolitics of Global Energy Transition on The Global Scale

Energy and geopolitics have always had a close relationship. Access to energy resources was a major factor in determining war winners in the twentieth century, with oil producers banding together to form new global alliances, and price swings had spurred or discouraged superpower adventurism. Now, in the twenty-first century, vast and rapid changes in the energy sector are rewriting the relationships between the two fields. According to (Paltsev, 2016), the concept of energy geopolitics refers to "the method by which nations affect one another through energy supply and demand."

This last decade has seen a significant rise in the number of works on the geopolitics of energy system transition, taking into account the geopolitics of renewables and existing fossil fuel producers and consumers, aiming at understanding the pace of the transition and predicting the actors who will benefit or suffer as a result of such a transition (Criekemans, 2011; Johansson, 2013; Paltsev, 2016; Scholten, et al., 2016; O'Sullivan et al.,2017; Freeman, 2018; Overland et al., 2019; Scholten et al., 2020; Vakulchuk et al., 2020; Bazilian et al., 2020). But it was January 2019 which marked a turning point with the publication of A New World-The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). Before its release, only a few researchers had begun to examine the geopolitical effects of renewable energy. (Sholten, 2020a)

IRENA was the first international organization to investigate the geopolitics of the global energy transition (2019). Is report depicts the global impact of rising of renewable energy and the decline of fossil fuels. According to the report, the expansion of renewables will reorganize state relations (oil exporters vs. oil importers) and radically transform economies and society, the world's shift away from fossil fuels will have numerous consequences, including the stimulation of intra-state conflicts. the report contends that global power structures and arrangements, as well as the dynamics of inter-state relationships, will change, while the energy sector's rising digitalization can pose security and privacy vulnerabilities in the absence of an international rules-based configuration in which power will be decentralized and diffusive. therefore, Countries that invest in renewable technologies, according to IRENA, will gain global influence, whereas those that rely solely on fossil fuel revenues will face serious economic and social challenges.

According to this analysis, the global energy transformation would have a devastating effect on countries that are currently significant exporters of fossil fuels, such as a number of MENA and Gulf states. especially if we put in mind the new power dynamics in the regional system, such as the potential diminution of the United States' position in the Persian Gulf, which might boost the involvement of regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates and give more space for Russia's engagement which is anticipated to increase, as well as China and India's. Additionally, global factors, such as a trend away from free trade, the emergence of populist economic and social policies, and the splintering into geopolitical blocs, are anticipated to complicate the transition (Bazilian et al. 2019).

Similarly, other research done by (Goldthau et al. 2019a) offers four potential scenarios for the. For the energy transition by 2030 and its impact on global geopolitics, the first scenario (the "Big Green Deal") assumes that international policy will be coordinated because there is worldwide agreement on the need to address climate change. Fossil fuel-rich states are compensated to seamlessly transition to a sustainable economy as a result of a

wave of green globalization. There is no geopolitical conflict as a result of the agreement, which is good for both climate and security. Another possibility, dubbed (the 'Technology breakthrough') holds that a significant leap forward in technology would alter the course of human history. While the major two great powers United States and China lead the way in advancing technology, the international rivalry is also on the rise. Even in a cleantech cold war, where technology leaders have the power and others gravitate toward one of them, regional blocs and escalating antagonism are being reinforced. As demand for fossil fuels declines, producers must adjust quickly, raising tensions in some areas. In the third scenario, (the "Dirty nationalism") the power rivalries accelerate nation-first policies which favor domestic resources over imported ones, driving the growth of fossil fuels as well as renewable energy. while UN and multinational institutions are marginalized in this atmosphere because of the intra-state competition. Fourth and last, (the "Muddling on") scenario that assumed the business-as-usual pathway, in that scenario, The dominance of fossil fuels in the energy mix will not change through 2030, notwithstanding the increase of the renewables in the global energy mix. the scenario expects that the change is too slow to replace fossil fuel, but so fast to disrupt the current energy systems. which could lead to Deficiencies in government finances and cause political turmoil in oil-producing countries in the Middle East, Russia, and Africa. Nations are being compelled by energy security and climate change to adopt a wide range of options to meet their energy needs which creates new alliances and arrangements. A rising divide between the world's wealthiest, and poor is exacerbated by these alliances.

The author believed that geopolitics should be at the forefront of the energy transition debate, and that government should prioritize potential pathways over specific targets. The relevance of this research to our thesis is obvious, as scenario planning is one of the most widely used methodologies for predicting the future of energy. The most important aspect of these hypothetical scenarios, however, is the lessons that can be drawn from them. Many Western countries, for example, believe that free trade and an open market promote scientific progress. This is not always the case. As a result of high-level governance and state planning, China's production of renewable energy has increased significantly. whereas in Brazil the Biofuels' success can be attributed to a former military dictatorship's desire for self-sufficiency and a more favorable trade balance. This implies that the "one size fits all" approaches derived from western norms should be questioned.

A recent study by (Hafner and Wochner 2020) provides an additional scenario outlook on the shifting dynamics of the global climate and energy landscape and its economic and geopolitical impacts. The authors contend that there will be a change in the global energy system as a result of four fundamental causes that are currently unfolding: The first is increased energy consumption, especially in Asia's emerging markets, and the second is "top-down" climate policies enacted by governments around the world to decarbonize the global economy. Third, market-driven digitalization and "bottom-up" technology drove energy systems in the direction of greater decentralization. Finally, The energy sector is being propelled forward by technological breakthroughs such as tight oil and gas production, electrical verticals, and renewable technologies.

The study has examined how key geopolitical blocs would fare in three different energy and climate scenarios by 2050 (North America, Europe, Russia, China, and MENA). And how economic and geopolitical consequences of the global transition affect global governance. The authors believed that every geopolitical bloc would behave according to a certain strategy. For example, the major energy-consuming countries like the United States, China, Japan, and Europe are spending heavily on the development of innovative low-carbon technologies, which in a decarbonized global economy, should give them a technological and economic edge. While Russia and other oil-rich Middle Eastern economies are unable to keep up with the global energy change due to inter-socio-political restrictions.

The following are the three possible future scenarios and how they might interact with those strategies: In the first scenario (weak climate governance), the major fossil fuel exporting states (such as the Gulf States, the United States, and Russia) will maintain their position in the energy market, while European investments in low-carbon technologies may not pay off as quickly as anticipated in the short term but will facilitate Europe with greater energy independence from more fluctuating international energy prices in the medium and long term. In contrast, the second scenario (Global Efforts for Climate Action) expects that Investing in energy transition technologies will be extremely profitable for countries such as Europe, the United States, and China. While countries like Arab

Gulf Monarchies and Russia will need to diversify their economies to preserve their position as major players in the world energy market (Converting from fossil fuel exports to hydrogen exports is one of the solutions on their table) Alternatively, in the "Muddling Through" scenario, the authors assert that decarbonization, digitalization, technological innovation, and growing demand will continue to function as the key drivers of change in the energy industry. International inconsistency in climate action would impede the pace of transformation. Renewables could extend their role in the energy mix, and they could also become more cost competitive as a result of market dynamics. In the power industry, renewables may readily replace oil and coal, and to a lesser extent in the transportation and heating industries.

Notably, those latter two research were scenario-based studies, but a significant wave of current scholarly publications which delve further into the issue are not scenario-based. For example, the study by Daniel Scholten and his colleagues in 2020 claimed that the technical and geographical features of fossil fuel-based systems are fundamentally different from renewable-based systems. So, the energy transition dynamics will have repercussions on the energy relations between states and will necessitate prompt response if states are willing to make the most of opportunities and overcome obstacles. (Scholten, 2020b). The article draws attention to six distinct categories of geopolitical ramifications associated with renewable energy, each of which will become apparent at a different point in the future. Overall, the article anticipates a large disruption, but one that will also bring up new difficulties concerning energy security. In addition, even the use of renewable energy sources will eventually result in energy interactions that are less vertical and more polycentric. The use of renewable energy sources can change the context in which energy interactions take place, leading to a reconfiguration of markets, a reordering of trading partners, and a reorganization of patterns of cooperation and conflict between nations.

Another contribution that cannot be overlooked came from Daniel Yergin, who is widely regarded as one of the world's top energy experts. best known for his Pulitzer Prize–winning book, which decodes the history of the oil industry, traversing in an engaging narrative style its most important historical phases, and the people who made them (Yergin, 1991). The Prize book conclusively shows that securing and gaining access to oil supplies was a precondition for great powers, but "The New Map" aims to uncover the new world, the world in which the post-Cold War international system is transforming into a future multipolar system with unprecedented configurations. At the heart of that are international efforts towards a "clean energy system" that is environmentally friendly and contributes to reducing greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change without compromising economic growth and prosperity. Where also the balance of economic power shifts from a US-European hegemony in which hydrocarbons (particularly coal and oil) played a large role, to a multipolar world whose economic weight is shifting towards Southeast Asia, renewable energy technologies will play a significant role.

Yergin's book can be divided into two parts, one dealing with the largest players in the global energy market in separate chapters (USA, Russia, China, and the Middle East), and another section, the last two chapters, dealing with emergent trends such as automobile technology and climate change.

 Yergin concentrated on the shale oil and gas revolution in the first segment on the key actors in the energy sector. For him, shale was an unappreciated revolution in terms of what it meant for the economy, the job, the balance of payments, investment, and foreign policy. He argued that shale and gas oil is not a national game-changer for the United States, but they are a global game-changer for international markets. While this view of shale gas and oil's importance is widely held, some critics argue that it was only because of the historically low borrowing rates following the financial crisis of 2008 that the industry was able to flourish. Shale has, unfortunately, proven to be a bad investment. since the output of shale wells tends to decline After a few years of production, which necessitates the ongoing drilling of new wells to continue production. As a result, they are unable to take advantage of falling marginal costs as a result of their reliance on capital acquired on Wall Street. (Torpani, 2021) As for China, Yergin believes that the geopolitical conflict between it and the United States of America is likely to increase, especially in the South China Sea, where the lines of contact between what he sees unite two visions of the shape of the future international system, namely: Disputes over the South China Sea bring into sharp relief the conflict between competing visions of world order, more specifically, an Anglo-American transnational liberal empire that advocates unrestricted transit of commerce through international waterways, and China's insistence on the supremacy of national sovereignty. As for the chapters on other players, unfortunately, they are full of

ahistorical details. In the Middle East chapter, for example, Yergin spoke about a very wide range of topics from the division of Sykes-Picot to the British and French occupation of the region, through the invasion of Iraq and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran to the Arab Spring And the discovery of natural gas and the emergence of ISIS, the chapter did not make a useful analysis for us in this thesis.

On the contrary, the second part of the book on the energy transition had important additions. Yergin doubts the possibility of humanity reaching net zero carbon by 2050, and he also doubts the existence of real alternatives to oil and gas, so he focused in his book on transportation technology in particular. Because it is the sector that uses the most oil, and the speed of oil displacement from it through "electric vehicles" controls the speed of energy transition from a system based on fossil fuels to a sustainable energy system. Yergin was also skeptical about the role of individuals in accelerating this transition, seeing government tools as the most important in the process, leading to the example of Chinese government backing for the production of solar panels, which enabled China to outperform the globe in and fast lower prices to a degree that has reached 85 percent in less than a decade.

Perhaps the best in-depth discussion of the shift in geopolitics from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources was conducted by (O'Sullivan et al.,2017). She and her colleagues looked at seven ways in which renewables might influence geopolitics. the first mechanism identified by the authors is that Critical materials supply chain cartels may emerge as the renewable energy transition accelerates. Second, they believe that in a world where renewables are the predominant source of energy, investment capital, and technology will play a greater role in international collaboration and competition. Conflicts could arise over technology transfer between developing and developed countries, as well as renewable energy infrastructure. Third, the emergence of a new resource curse. the author identified three potential ways for how the rise of renewables results in a new resource curse. first, Petrostates could suffer from a resource curse if the importance of oil and gas diminishes. Second, countries rich in rare earth elements may face a new type of resource curse, comparable to that experienced by countries with vast reserves of oil or gas. The resource curse is likely to affect countries that produce a lot of renewable energy, much like oil and gas producers. Regarding the fourth, As the amount of electricity traded across international boundaries may expand, the geopolitical complexity of bigger electric interconnections between states may exacerbate the vulnerability of energy importers, and increase the threat of cyber-attacks that those distributed energy technologies rely on. however, increased electric connections could lead to more interdependence between nations, hence reducing the likelihood the risk of conflicts. Fifth, a global fall in oil and gas consumption might have a double impact on the petrostates: on the one hand, it could push the governing elites to engage in political reform and drive economic diversification, but it could also result in political instability.  Sixth, the use of renewable sources will lessen the likelihood of violent conflict and political unrest that would otherwise be caused by climate change. Africa is a good illustration of these geopolitical dynamics. Seventh, the utilization of renewable energy sources could contribute to the creation of long-term solutions to challenges of instability and conflict by promoting sustainable energy access.

In sum, the study emphasizes that the geopolitical effects of transitioning to a renewable energy system are multifaceted and may not progress straightforwardly. The outcome will depend on whether a country is an energy supplier or an energy consumer, and the impact could have both benefits and drawbacks for global players. This highlights the intricate nature of the low-carbon transition's consequences on international politics.

In addition to this, another recent study by Meghan L. O'Sullivan with Jason Bordoff in a Foreign Affairs titled "Green upheaval: The new geopolitics of energy" aimed to challenge the commonly conventional wisdom about who will benefit and who will suffer from the transition to renewable energy, as these assumptions are often inaccurate. For instance, the so-called petrostates may "enjoy feasts before they suffer famines" (Bordoff and O'Sullivan, 2021), while the poorest regions of the world will require significant energy consumption to improve their quality of life while simultaneously experiencing the most severe effects of climate change. The use of clean energy will introduce new national power opportunities while also introducing new uncertainties and risks. Therefore, policymakers must consider the risks and dangers that may arise from a complex shift to clean energy and look beyond climate change challenges. as Failure to do so could result in adverse economic and security implications and hinder the energy transition itself.

The authors challenge another commonly dominant idea, which is the potential impact of a decarbonized global economy on globalization. Although a decarbonized world may require extensive supply chains for clean energy products and components, the article suggests that three factors will work against globalization. Firstly, as the world relies more on electricity, there will be less international trade in energy. Secondly, the trend towards protectionism is already being fueled by clean energy as countries aim to establish job-generating industries within their borders. Finally, countries that take significant steps towards decarbonization may use economic tactics to compel others to follow suit, which could result in global fragmentation. The article proposes that despite a decarbonized world initially seeming more interconnected than the current fossil-fuel-dependent world, these three factors could counteract this trend.

Despite these innovative insights in the article, perhaps the part that discusses the future of petrostates in a low-carbon economy is the most intriguing aspect. The authors point out that discussions regarding the shift towards clean energy tend to overlook important factors such as the fact that even if the world reaches net-zero emissions, significant amounts of fossil fuels, including oil and natural gas, will still be in use. This means that oil and gas producers will continue to have an advantage over their natural resources for decades to come. The authors suggest that traditional suppliers will benefit from the volatility in fossil fuel prices that will inevitably arise from the energy transition. This situation would strengthen the power of petrostates by increasing their revenue and giving extra influence to OPEC. Additionally, the transition to clean energy will increase the power of some oil and gas exporters by concentrating global production in fewer hands. As the demand for oil declines, many high-cost producers may be unable to compete, while low-cost producers, such as the Gulf states, which have cheap, low-carbon oil, may see their market shares rise.

Mnberger, A., & Johansson, B. (2019) delved more into the geopolitical repercussions of the use of rare earth materials in the transition to renewable energy. they explored the geopolitical relevance of 14 metals and metalloids vital to renewable energy technologies. by concentrating on three major geopolitical factors: the geographic concentration of resources, the potential revenues of resource-rich nations, and the total size of global marketplaces. According to the findings of the study, many metals and metalloids utilized in renewable energy technologies are prone to be more geographically concentrated than oil, Silicon, tellurium and copper are the sole exceptions. In the near term, the disruptions could be caused only by hostile assaults or natural catastrophes that might influence the market supply and output of some renewable technologies. This view was reinforced by the argument that renewable energy sources are less regionally concentrated and do not face the same long-term resource shortage challenges of fossil fuels. Consequently, future energy security issues will be prompted by energy carriers rather than energy resources, as well as by a lack of functional institutions and laws (Johansson, 2013). In the medium to long term, however, most metals are unlikely to give producers political leverage and or cement the bargaining capacity because importers' adaptive responses will make such behavior less effective, and because economic revenues as a percentage of total economic throughput will be relatively low for most countries studied.

In the same line, (Overland,2019) investigates four common myths regarding renewable energy's geopolitical implications to refute them. Those are the potential for geopolitical struggle over renewable energy's crucial raw materials, the prospect of new resource curses, the use of transboundary electricity cuts as an important foreign policy tool, and the idea that cyber security is a new geopolitical problem. The author counters the first myth by claiming that most rare earth elements are found in abundance in the Earth's crust. Her criticism of current discourses also focused on the fact that the most crucial components of renewable energy technologies can be recycled. She also feels that technological breakthroughs and cost reductions are highly likely in some areas because the energy transition is mostly about technology and innovation. Concerning the second myth, she affirms that exporting green energy may necessitate longer-term infrastructure maintenance, boost the number of local jobs, and generate revenue that is less volatile than that is earned from oil and gas. Notably in comparison to exported oil countries, in which foreign migrant laborers dominate the offshore oil and gas business. She did, however, admit that the energy transition would most likely result in resource revenue shortfalls for some nations, which could cause problems for some of them. However, a large-scale recurrence of the resource curse is not inevitable. The third myth maintains that widespread electricity cut-offs between states have the potential to become an important instrument of foreign policy. However, the author points out that countries that are currently

net importers will still be able to grow their own renewables capacity and will therefore be forced to make long-term decisions regarding whether to make or acquire renewable energy. The author continues by asserting that the fourth myth, which characterizes cyber security as a geopolitical issue, is sometimes overstated. She contends that as the usage of renewable energy sources increases, the system will become more decentralized, hence increasing its resilience.

To conclude, while renewable energy resources are plentiful yet more evenly scattered geographically than fossil and nuclear fuels, Overland believes that methods for capturing, storing, and transferring them will become increasingly significant in the future because of this. Thus, international energy competition may move to the control of technology and intellectual property rights rather than physical resources and transportation routes. These renewable energy markets' competitive dynamics might resemble that of mobile telephony, where China's Huawei, South Korea's Samsung, and the United States Apple compete against each other. According to the author's own words, "It is not a war, nor is it geopolitics in any strict sense, but there are winners and losers–for example, the Finns who used to work for Nokia."

### 3. MENA and The Geopolitics of The Global Energy Transition

When it comes to the Middle East and Gulf states, the issue of the global energy transition has become crucial in recent years, as these petrostates played a significant role in the global economy based on fossil fuels during the 20th century and benefited the most from exporting revenues to fuel their development plans and ensure their socio-political stability. Consequently, any disruption in the global energy mix is anticipated to have a significant impact, regardless of whether it is caused by the climate crises, the rise of renewables, the oil and shale gas revolution, a sudden technological breakthrough, or the strategic moves made by the great powers in the competition over energy resources.

Does this spell the end for "petrostate" nations? (Goldthau & Westphal, 2019) conducted a study that challenged the hypothesis that the global energy transformation will have a unidirectional effect on the countries that rely mainly upon oil and gas exports, limiting their benefits from their energy resources and pushing them to diversify their economies. The study demonstrates that regardless of how the global energy transition develops, certain petrostates may survive or even thrive. While the OECD countries, the most committed and fastest-moving countries in decarbonization, seek to phase out some of the most energy-intensive sectors, such as refined products and petrochemicals, their remaining requirements for such products will be met by imports, at least for some time in the future. This will pave the way for Gulf countries that have already begun upgrading the energy value chain by building refining capabilities. In other words, the global change in energy may provide some petrostates with "an additional lifeline" and perhaps promote a new oligopoly and more market concentration among the lowest crude oil providers. In addition, the study affirms that although the demand in OECD countries is likely to decrease and reach "peak demand," the demand for oil in East Asian countries is increasing, which will prolong the duration of oil in the global energy system and continue to fill the pockets of some petroleum-producing nations.

Similarly, Tagliapietra (2019) demonstrates that, despite the MENA hydrocarbon producers' persistent over-reliance on hydrocarbon rent, the global transition could be a positive input for its politics and economy, particularly after the oil price crisis of 2014 that forced the MENA-producing countries to implement some economic reforms. The article's fundamental thesis suggests the dynamics of the energy transition may provide additional justifications for MENA Energy producers to expedite economic reform and diversification. As three arguments may provide a significant motive for Middle Eastern and North African nations to adopt economic diversification policies, including policies based on a low-carbon future, to preserve a comfortable quality of living and economic development in the future. These three arguments are the risks of a volatile oil market, uncertainty about the pace of the global energy transition and, as a result, the continuation of necessary hydrocarbon rents, and the exacerbation of the urgent need to provide job opportunities for a large proportion of the population, the majority of whom are young (especially in countries such as Oman and Saudi Arabia).

On contrary, a recent article by (Mills, 2020) also investigated the consequences of the global energy shift on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which he regards as the cornerstone of global oil and gas

production. He contended that even though countries in the region are, to varying degrees, implementing economic diversification plans to reduce their reliance on one-export commodities, emergent factors such as geopolitical competition between great powers, climate change, and regional unrest would harden the challenges of the MENA energy transition. The author affirms that due to their hot, generally semi-arid or dry temperatures and dense urbanization along the coast, the Middle East and North Africa region is particularly sensitive to climate change. In addition, Fragile and repressive states in the region are experiencing increased political turmoil as well as ethnic, sectarian, and religious conflicts, and while climate change has not yet been a major contributor to any of these events or disturbances, it is likely to represent increasing pressure in the future, especially if it occurs at the same time as the economic downturn brought on by the downfall of fossil fuel rents.

The article also shows the responses of MENA nations to the energy transition could be broken down into four categories. The first is the rearrangement of their economies to account for current price reductions as well as future reductions in hydrocarbon rents that will be permanent. Secondly, they're making an effort to keep their hydrocarbon businesses secure for the future. The third is a shift that has been happening slowly but steadily toward restructuring their domestic energy sector in preparation for a future low-carbon reality. Finally, they cope with the changing geoeconomics landscape in the international system by maintaining open doors with both existing and emerging great powers.

## 4. The Arab Gulf and The Geopolitics of The Global Energy Transition

In this section, we will narrow our scope to the Six Arab Gulf Monarchies. In the wake of the global energy transformation, the six Gulf monarchies will be profoundly affected. since these countries are key players in the global energy system as it stands now. The region holds the highest share of the world's oil reserves. (30 percent) and the second-largest percentage of the world's gas reserves (21 percent). It stands for a third of the world's traded gas, a quarter of the world's oil output, and is the foremost exporter of oil globally (28 percent). One-third of the Gulf nations' GDP is derived from hydrocarbon exports, which also account for 80 percent of government income. (World Bank, 2019)

Overall, many previous studies have indicated that the continuous transition of the energy system to a low-carbon one will have far-reaching geopolitical implications for petrostates, such as the Arab Gulf monarchies, but few have examined the internal implications of this global energy transition on the internal rentier arrangements. So, a recent study by (Sim, 2020) rather than focusing on the external geopolitical implications of the global energy transition on the GCC, has investigated how the growing use of energy sources with lower levels of carbon emissions in the Gulf may help minimize the effects of the fossil fuel "resource curse" that is most visible in and applicable to this region. The paper's main point is that the deployment of low-carbon energy is unlikely to solve the difficulty of non-oil diversification, which manifests itself in three 'curses,' namely, revenue volatility, job losses, and a weak private sector.

When it comes to revenue instability and its effect on economic development, the low carbon-based projects will not be able to compete with hydrocarbon income. And since it saves more oil for export, switching from oil to renewables in electricity generation might increase volatility in some Gulf states. In terms of jobs and backward ties, low-carbon energy projects may contribute to the diversification of the local economy. However, as domestic use of the products and services increases, export sophistication are expected to advance slowly. In terms of the weak private sector, the energy transition appears promising since it presents an opportunity for firms to prosper in niches such as solar rooftops, but the development potential of solar rooftops as a non-hydrocarbon source of economic development is constrained by residential subsidies for electricity. Therefore, the author concludes that low-carbon projects of this sort may be able to preserve and expand present rentier arrangements. As a result of the complicated links between hydrocarbon revenues, job creation, and the state-directed economic development paradigm.

Similarly, research by Samantha Gross and Adel Abdel Ghafour has highlighted the inside impacts of the energy transfer process, titled "The shifting energy landscape and the Gulf's diversification challenge", It sought to

understand the impact of the current changes in the energy sector on the efforts of the Arab Gulf states to diversify their economies, which is their greatest challenge.

The authors believe that the Gulf countries are facing a new reality in the energy market as a result of two factors: the growing concern about climate change and the increase in oil and gas production in the United States. These two factors are pushing in the same direction, away from reliance on fossil fuels produced by Gulf Cooperation Council. Long-term, this will result in a reduction in government income and a threat to the rentier social contract predicated on the state ensuring the social welfare of its residents in exchange for a monopoly on political rights. especially if we consider the significant population increase in various Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

The authors' most significant point in the article for us is that the responses of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to the challenge of economic diversification and their performance in addressing it are not consistent, as it is affected by the dynamics of (Reserves/Population) profiles in each country, for example. UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait have large resources but small populations, resulting in extremely high levels of resources. Therefore, to keep their country's economy flourishing, the development policy is concentrating on providing inhabitants with a vibrant and diverse economy. While Saudi Arabia's petroleum reserves and revenues are low when measured per capita, despite its enormous and diversified population. forty percent of Saudis are under the age of twenty-five, providing a serious employment dilemma for the nation. while Bahrain and Oman are projected to confront major political challenges due to resource depletion, notwithstanding the differences in their political systems. (Gross & Abdel Ghafour, 2019).

When it comes to the effects of climate change, the importance of geography cannot be overstated. The frequency and severity of extreme weather events including storms, floods, and heatwaves, as well as changes in temperature, precipitation, and weather patterns, will vary based on location. Therefore, a recent study by (Beni et al., 2021) aimed to assess the socioeconomic ability of the Gulf nations to deal with global climate change, as well as the extent to which the policies implemented by the Gulf states in this respect may contribute to the escalation of conflict in the Persian Gulf area. The study distinguishes between the socioeconomic capacity and the environmental capacity of the Persian Gulf states, concluding that, despite the implementation of socioeconomic reform policies to mitigate the effects of climate change, these policies are incompatible with the region's environmental capacity. This is owing to political differences between the region's governments, which hindered them from managing the Persian Gulf's environment as an integrated natural system. Additionally, the shift of the region's states to alternate energy resources or a knowledge-based economy is accompanied by geopolitical rivalry, political turmoil, and environmental issues. Therefore, the author affirms that if a cooperative strategy to limit the effects of climate change is not established, the situation may deteriorate. Thus, climate change may serve as a cause for future conflicts in the region.

In the same vein, (Al-Maamary et al., 2017) pointed out that even though there is a growing awareness in the Arab Gulf states of the fact that climate change represents a significant threat that has the potential to have a serious impact on all facets of life in the region, there is still much work to be done. According to the findings of the study, human activity is responsible for causing significant variations in the climate of the area. An increase in the region's average temperature and a dramatic drop in precipitation are among the impacts of the study's findings on climate change. Climate change also poses a threat to a variety of other systems and processes, including the production of distilled water, the safety of food supplies, the viability of renewable energy sources, and public health.
It should be noted that the authors acknowledged the difficulty that researchers studying the effects of climate change on the Gulf area face. Such as a lack of understanding of how to characterize and treat its impact. For instance, climate change has an indirect impact on storms, sea levels, and diseases, but these connections have not been well examined. also, there is a great deal of ambiguity about the direct consequences that rising $CO_2$ levels will have on plant life.

But does this imply that climate change will have a linear effect on the Gulf nations by affecting the worldwide market for oil and gas and threatening the economic rents that sustain the sociopolitical base and regime legitimacy of the Arab Gulf states? Krane deems it vital to differentiate between two kinds of risks. The political and economic one, and the physical and environmental one. when the Gulf seems to be the loser in the first, it is prone to be a

winner in the second, especially in the long run. This distinguishes the Arab Gulf states from other fossil fuel exporters in temperate locations, who may avoid physical damage in the near term or even profit from a warmer environment (Krane, 2020).

How about the economic diversification plans of the Gulf states would it help? Krane argues that the economic diversification initiatives adopted by Gulf states can serve as a buffer against the fall in hydrocarbon rents, but the necessary conditions have not yet been met. There must be more competitive economic sectors, and The Gulf states must anticipate a fall in the rent distributions upon which their social contracts are dependent. Eventually, he argued that achieving economic diversification will necessitate structural changes in social and financial policy that contradict these countries' usual rentier practices, and the signs of these changes have already begun since the 2014 oil price crisis when some countries reduced fuel subsidies and imposed taxes. (Krane, 2019). This deviated from the rentier governance model's script.

## 5. Conclusion

From the aforementioned review of the literature on the geopolitical effects of climate change and renewable energies, it is evident that this topic has garnered growing interest from scholars, particularly in recent years. Also, despite the significant contributions made by researchers to the subject and their desire to cover its dimensions from various angles, it is imperative to recognize that investigating the geopolitical effects of climate change and renewable energy is a nascent field, and its scholarly inquiry continues to evolve.

Moreover, despite the multitude of investigations undertaken to examine the potential implications of climate change and renewable energies on various regions worldwide, a significant challenge has emerged in the form of inconsistencies and disagreements among these studies. This can be attributed to the over-generalization of research findings, which often neglects to define both the temporal and spatial scope of influence and fails to identify both the source of the effect and the one affected by it. These four factors are critical in determining the nature of the geopolitical impact of climate change and renewable energy sources. Therefore, we believe that there is a serious necessity to collect the scattered parts presented by these studies in one image and to present a systematically coherent frameworks in which those four points are clearly defined.

To achieve this, researchers should identify and analyze the various processes and mechanisms that contribute to this impact, such as energy trade relationships, environmental governance frameworks, energy security, and technological innovation. By gaining a deeper understanding of these areas, researchers can assist policymakers and scholars in the Arab Gulf states to develop more comprehensive strategies that address the potential negative impacts of the energy transition and climate change. meanwhile, taking advantage of the impending disruptions that those changes will create, it is not unpredictable that this may result in policies that promote the use of renewable energy sources while maintaining the Gulf states' position in the oil and gas market. Ultimately, a balanced strategy that considers all factors can help countries navigate the complexities of the energy transition and mitigate its negative potential impacts.

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