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Opposition in Contemporary Indonesia Post-2019 Presidential Election

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Abstract

The 1998 reform has sparked new hope for the freedom of opinion and expression. The accompanying rhetoric fuels an encouraging situation for the existence of the opposition. This study analyses the dynamics of the opposition in the post-2019 presidential election. This article describes the existence of the opposition, which comprises two political parties at the government level) and three mass organizations at the community level, as well as evaluates several policies. By using the qualitative method, the primary data was gathered through interviews with several opposition figures and secondary data through documents, scientific articles, and media publications related to the agenda and political attitudes of the opposition parties. This study concludes that the drive to stand in opposition to political parties is not composed to single reason. Instead, this article contends that the motivation for standing in opposition is to serve the role of checks and balances

Keywords: Opposition, Democracy, Policy, Checks and Balances

1. Introduction

Post–New Order political life in Indonesia has provided opportunities for the presence of opposition groups. These opportunities have snowballed as a result of popular concern after the fall of Soeharto regime toward freedom of opinion and expression. At the initial phase of the reformation, the opposition was composed of parties who opposed President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), in particular those that had opposed the president before his downfall. Almost all parties served as the opposition except National Awakening Party (PKB) and Love the Nation Democratic Party (PDKB), which supported the government. In the Megawati Administration (2001-2004), almost all parties were part of her cabinet, left PKB and PDKB that played role as opposition.

During the tenure of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), and People’s Conscience Party (Hanura), stood outside the cabinet and operated consistently as opposition. However, according to some experts, although some parties

declared themselves as opposition, the real opposition actually did not occur, replaced by the tendencies of cartel politics (Ambardi, 2009).

After the 2014 Presidential Election, parties that initially part of Prabowo Subianto (Prabowo) coalition, such as Party of Functional Groups (Partai Golkar), PKB, United Development Party (PPP), and National Mandate Party (PAN), eventually joined Joko Widodo (Jokowi) Administration (2014-2019). Only Gerindra and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) acted as opposition. Meanwhile, Democrat Party (PD) did not declare its position as the opposition despite standing outside the government.

In the 2019 Presidential Election, there was a rematch between Jokowi and Prabowo and most of the parties that had contested in the 2014 Presidential Election, indicating a typically similar composition of support. During the campaign, the two camps embraced different perspectives, visions, and missions. These disparities created a strong fanaticism on each side and illuminated an emerging division. In this situation, there is hope for the emergence of opposition forces to serve as critical partners with the government in the function of providing checks and balances. People expects the existence of this opposition would contribute toward the enforcement of democratic conditions, presenting a more aspirational and productive government.

However, not long after the presidential election, Prabowo expressed willingness to join Jokowi's government. This was unexpected considering the previous expectation that the emergence of a stronger opposition seemed to have vanished when Prabowo joined the government. This development certainly had an impact on Gerindra's position, as the party that won the second largest vote in the 2019 election, which could not play an opposition role.

Moreover, the occurrence was compounded with the introduction of Sandiaga Uno (Sandi), the pair of Prabowo in the 2019 presidential election and also one of the leaders of Gerindra, joined the government during the cabinet reshuffle of December 2020. This situation seems reflected a pattern of political life in Indonesia, where those who had been political opponents during the presidential election eventually returned to become part of the government coalition. However, some parties still actually stood as opposition and showed their eagerness to play that role. Not only that, some mass organizations which represents civil society element also emerge as part of important opposition after the 2019 Presidential Election.

In regards to those phenomena this paper will address the reasons behind the commitment of some elements at the state level (political parties) and society level that continue to act as opposition after the 2019 Presidential Election. This article will also discuss motives by evaluating their position on some important issues which indicating the antagonistic attitude towards government policies.

1.1. Literature Review

Study of the opposition in Indonesia has long been conducted, as evidenced through earlier studies conducted by van der Kroef (1977), Uhlin (1998), and Aspinall (2000), which discussed the opposition in Indonesia, especially in the Pre-New Order era and ahead of the Reformation era. Those studies mainly discuss the reasons behind the rise of opposition during that time, indicating the existence of opposition groups at the state and society level. At the state level, two non-government parties, namely PPP and Indonesia Democratic Party (PDI) played opposition role.

The regime's oppression towards society did not recede people or NGO to be critical and voiced their thought. At the society level, the main agenda of the opposition was to criticize the New Order policies, which regarded as filled by collusion, corruption and repression tendencies. Opposition was also aimed to rebuild Indonesia democracy. The scattered opposition consisted of varied groups with different affiliations, characteristics and ideologies background.

Since 1998 scholars have studied the opposition as a resistance movement, (Törnquist, 2001) the existence and role of parties as opposition in parliament (Admojo, 2016; R. S. P. F. V. R. Putri, 2018; Tuswoyo, 2013), and the prominence of having an opposition in the era of democracy (Noor, 2016).

However, studies examining the opposition in Indonesia have been limited following the 2019 presidential election—in particular, research has yet to combine a discussion of the opposition at both the state and societal levels. Therefore, this study will examine on of the latest opposition situation in Indonesia, with a focus on the period following the 2019 Presidential Election.

1.2. Some Relevant Studies

According to Dahl (1971), the emergence of opposition in politics is an inseparable part of democratic life and is often recognized as a polyarchy. Young (2002) pointed out that Shapiro's study in democratic justice affirmed the significance of emphasizing two important issues related to democracy: participation and anti-subordination. Thus, in democracies, opposition is inevitable.

In general terms, opposition means “opposite” or “something that has a different position towards something else”, which is also interpreted as an opponent or resistance toward something (Rooney, 2001, p. 1020). According to Barnard (1972), political opposition refers to a form of contestation related to or guaranteed in the constitution. Constitutional opposition refers to those who accept the legitimacy of the state and are willing to work within the political structures and processes determined by the constitution. Opposition could be directed against the government, but not to replace it; rather, to influence the attitudes of the government (Norton, 2008).

Thus, the main role of political opposition is to control and balance the course of government or power. The control aspect is more related to the evaluation of government policies. Meanwhile, as a balance of power, the opposition plays a role in providing alternative thoughts or attitudes, thereby preventing government policies from deviating from the national interests. Consequently, standing in opposition is manifested by providing criticism, offering alternative policies, and exerting control over the administration of the government.

In addition, despite standing in different positions with the government, the opposition shall not be perceived as an enemy of the state; rather, it should be seen as merely representing different perspectives by holding basic insights such as the freedom of speech, the rule of law, and the equal protection under the law (Kiiza, 2005). Additionally, the opposition is essentially perceived as a “government-in-the-waiting” (Kiiza, 2005). However, there are times when the opposition penetrates the government to overcome a potential crisis (Fontana, 2009).

Although numerous definitions have been offered, most of the classic definitions of political opposition have been limited to issues of change of power, majority–minority relations, formal political institutions, and formal oversight. These definitions have been unable to address the nature of the development of the opposition.

Several alternative views have surfaced regarding the political context, particularly in the western world, in which it is considered vital to establish a new understanding of opposition (Brack, 2011). This article employs the definition developed by Weinblum and Brack, which refers to opposition as “a disagreement with the government or its policies, the political elite, or the political regime as a whole, expressed in public sphere, by an organized actor through different modes of action” (Brack, 2011).

In keeping with this definition, the opposition includes those who are organized, whether they are political parties or non-political parties, that criticize the government for its positions or policies. This oppositional attitude is exercised both inside and outside the parliament, either in the form of statements, demonstrations, or preferences of different options during parliamentary voting. In addition to political parties, political opposition includes various actors but excludes those who are not organized and those who submit complaints or criticisms outside the public domain (Brack, 2011).

At the state or governmental level, the role of the opposition is performed by the parties in the parliament. At the community level, the role of the opposition is played by a number of parties that have different perspectives than the government and that regularly criticize government policies. In the case of Indonesia, the role of the opposition is at the state level and includes the parties and the community, such as critical mass organizations, both of which criticize government policies and provide feasible alternatives. However, in the context of community opposition, providing alternative policies has been challenging because there are often divisions among the people themselves, which leads to authoritarian forces ultimately persisting (Elanza, 2008).

2. Methods

This study using qualitative research methods to explore primary data through interviews and secondary data through documents, scientific articles, and media publications related to the agenda and political attitudes of the opposition parties. The interviews took place from August to November 2021. The researcher interviews several opposition figures from political party, in particular PKS and PD; and NGO/mass organizations, namely the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), 212 Alumni Brotherhood (PA212), and the Coalition of Saving Indonesia Action (KAMI). These three organizations were selected because of their consistent stance in opposing the Jokowi-Ma'ruf government. The researcher analyses views, criticisms, interpretations, and opinions about the role of the opposition based on the interviews conducted.

3. Result

3.1. Opposition at the State Level

3.1.1. The Prominent Actors

The opposition in Indonesia is currently formed by PKS and PD, which supported the Prabowo-Sandi pair during the 2019 presidential election. PKS, an Islamic party founded by *dakwah* (preaching) activists, is a continuation of Justice Party (PK) established on 20 April 1998. After the 2014 presidential election (which was won by Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla), PKS demonstrated consistency by preferring to become the opposition. Along with Gerindra and PD, PKS was not part of the Jokowi-Kalla cabinet. As the notable opposition parties, both PKS and Gerindra voiced critical views toward the government. In the 2019 Presidential Election, PKS again took the initiative in supporting Prabowo, this time by partnering with Sandi. In subsequent years, PKS has remained as the opposition.

PD was declared in 2003, initiated by General Yudhoyono. In the 2019 presidential election and was the last party to express support for Prabowo-Sandi. After the Constitutional Court officially rejected the lawsuit for the 2019 presidential election dispute that Prabowo-Sandi supporters had filed, PD stated that it was open to the possibility of a closer move with the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin side should an offer to join the government arise (Ihsanuddin, 2019). However, in its development, this party has been increasingly perceived as an icon of opposition.

3.1.2. The Underlying Reasons

The PKS opposition stance was rooted in the Prabowo-Sandi loss in the 2014 presidential election. PKS attempted to maintain consistency in its position as the party who did not support Jokowi as the president. According to PKS, each political party supporting Prabowo should play a role as the opposition, which means standing outside the government. Moreover, the main aim to be opposition is to conduct the checks and balances function (Sera 2021). PKS believes that having control over the government is the main reason to be opposition "Interview with Mardani Ali Sera."

Moreover, exercising the option to become opposition represents a form of commitment to upholding democracy. According to PKS, this is very important for Indonesia. Authoritarian government had historically been incompatible with the expectations of Indonesian people, as exemplified during the era of Guided Democracy (1959–1966) and New Order (1966–1998) (Sera, 2021). Hence serving as an opposition, according to PKS, is also

related to faithful efforts in serving the people's interest through the implementation of checks and balances government, ensuring the president functions in accordance with the constitution and people interest (Iman, 2020).

However, the ideal opposition according to PKS does not solely criticize and act contrarily from the government, but also offers rational alternative ideas (Iman, 2020). In this role, the opposition will support government policies that have a positive impact on the people but will also criticize and demand revision if the policies deviate from the interests of the greater Indonesian people. Thus, PKS expects that the government will conduct its function as an executive, while PKS, as part of the legislature, conducts its function as a controller (Wijanarko, 2015).

PD has also positioned itself outside the government since the first term of President Jokowi's administration. This role was based on the belief there must be a party that embraces opposition role as a conduit for the aspirations of the people. In addition, this party has undertaken an oppositional stance with the aim of ensuring that checks and balances offset President Jokowi's government, which is perceived as important and healthy for democracy (CNN Indonesia, 2021).

For PD conducting control towards government is very essential in our democracy. This is to ensure that the government holds correct policies that could offer massive benefits for people and no one left behind (Putra, 2021). According to PD the opposition is intended to perform its role as a supervisor and counterweight to the Joko Widodo government (Putra, 2021). However, despite the PD preference to be in opposition, it does not necessarily need to be at odds with the government. According to Putra (2021), PD will criticize any government policies and attitudes that are less beneficial to the Indonesian people.

3.1.3. Political Position Arguments on Government Policies

The opposition's stance was apparent when PKS and PD rejected or criticized several government policies. This refusal was due to several reasons, as will be further discussed. In some cases, the opposition simply exhibited strong resistance to various government arguments. However, the criticism was also intended to correct or demonstrate dissatisfaction with the approved policies. This article uses three important cases, that became public discussions, as examples of the opposition attitude of these parties towards government policies.

3.1.3.1. "Restructuring" the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)

One government policy that has been in the public spotlight and is opposed by anti-corruption activists and the opposition is to approve the revision of the KPK Law, which was enacted by DPR. The law was officially promulgated by itself for 30 days after it was ratified by DPR (CNN Indonesia, 2019b). For the government, this policy aims to further encourage the effectiveness of the KPK's performance, sustaining this institution as more in line with the interests of the government rather than becoming an independent institution that has the potential to conflict with the national interests (Erwanti, 2019).

However, for some the revision of the KPK Law had become an entry point for weakening the KPK by disrupting its independence. This policy would make KPK lost its independency, since it became part of the government's institution. Not long after this policy stipulated, the weakening of the KPK became even more substantial after President Jokowi was silent when 57 KPK officials were dismissed because they were accused failed to comply with the Nationalism Insight Test (TWK) (Prasetya, 2021). Many people regarded it as the continuation of the declining independence of KPK.

The TWK was seen as an attempt to dismiss figures who had been critical and outspoken toward the KPK leadership, and also as an effort to "tame" rather than to enforce the KPK's role (Guritno, 2021). According Usman Hamid, the Coordinator of Amnesty International Indonesia there is human rights violations potential and nuances of discrimination in this process, considering that the dismissal applies to figures with highly credible record of performance with different perspectives from the leaders (Kawilarang, 2021).

In relation to this policy, PKS voiced disagreement (Sera, 2021). PKS believed that KPK should stay as an independent body. According to Sera, since the complexity and damaging impact of corruption for the nation, Indonesia needs for a corruption-eradication commission that strong, and independent from any intervention, including the government (Sera, 2021). The KPK's work has also started to shape the cautious attitude of public officials and is reflected in high levels of public trust in the KPK.

The dismissal of the 57 KPK officials through the TWK was considered by PKS as a further effort to weaken the KPK. Moreover, PKS rejected this outcome as based not on objective standards because many of the officials who did not pass the TWK were officials with strong backgrounds and records of achievements (Sera, 2021).

Similar to PKS, PD believed that the revision of the KPK Law should not be the entry point for weakening the position and performance of this body (Setiawan, 2019). PD stated that the party did not expect the KPK to become an uncontrolled institution, but also believed that it should be strengthened not weakened (CNN Indonesia, 2019a).

Regarding the use of the TWK that later resulted in the officials' dismissal, PD expressed its disappointment and perception that it was an unprofessional mistake. The party believed that the TWK should not be used as the basis for dismissing officials. The Chairman of PD, Agus H. Yudhoyono, stated that TWK results should only be implemented to determine a person's character or personality, not as a measure for candidacy to become a KPK official (Dirhantoro, 2021).

3.1.3.2. Omnibus Law Case

In the 2020, government stipulated a set of regulation that consisted of several regulations, including the Job Creation Act (*Undang Undang Cipta Kerja*), popularly known as UU Omnibus Law. The government considered the ratification of the Omnibus Law, which consist of thousands of verses, as necessary to create a conducive climate for economic investment in Indonesia that will help it achieve economic growth targets, job creation, and other economic goals. (Asmara, 2020). However, this policy was rejected by several elements of the society, including the labour organizations. They believed that this policy would bring many disadvantages for them, including uncertainty in terms of the continuation of having job.

As opposition parties, PKS and PD had consistently objected to the ratification of the law. According to PKS, this law had a potential to violating the interests of the Indonesian people and the sovereignty of the nation, since it will provide a lot of concession for the investors rather than labours. For this reason PKS believed that this policy is a pro-elite, not pro-people (Sera, 2021).

In addition, PKS believed that ideally many of the contents of the bill should be carefully considered. However, PKS noted that process of stipulating this law has been rushed and was not inclusive of all parties. PKS argued that access to the discussion of this law was limited, allowing minimal public participation in offering input, corrections, and improvements (Prima, 2020). This haste and lack of public participation finally became evident. In November 2021, the Constitutional Court stated that the Omnibus Law had violated the law or was unconstitutional, one of which was due to the above two reasons (Rastika, 2021).

PD also objected to the ratification of the Omnibus Law. According to PD not only that this policy has no urgency, but also it has a potential to change numerous laws, which would result in a regulatory vacuum, since it would suspend many previous regulations. (Sani, 2020). Moreover for PD, it was substantively not pro-labour policy, since it only provided advantages to big entrepreneurs and ignored a sense of justice (Sani, 2020).

Moreover, similar to PKS, for PD discussion mechanism of this bill was flawed. PD agreed that simplifying permission stages to make business easier to hold is important, but it needs a proper time to stipulate. There are a lot of drafts of chapters on the bill that really need to be intensely discussed, to ensure that this regulation is in line with the people's interests. For PD the attitude of the government to limited the policy making process in relation to this bill was not appropriate and could not be accountable for in the legislative point of view" (Putra, 2021).

3.1.3.3. The Arrest of M. Rizieq Shihab and the Disbandment of FPI

After returning to Indonesia in 2020, M. Rizieq Shihab, one of the prominent opposition figures, was entangled in the case of mass gatherings in Petamburan (Jakarta) and Megamendung (Bogor). Shihab was accused of violating Law No. 6/2018 on Health Quarantine. On December 10, 2020, the police officially named Shihab as a suspect in triggering the mass gathering (Dharmastuti, 2021). After being detained for months (Detik.com, 2021), Shihab was also found guilty of spreading false news regarding the results of the swab test at Ummi Hospital.

Shihab was later sentenced to four years in prison. Moreover, on December 30, 2020 the government dissolved the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) organization, led by Shihab, without a proper trial. Parties that joined Jokowi Government did not make any critical statements for this, and in fact eagerly supported this policy.

PKS firmly opposed the detention of Shihab and the disbandment of FPI. According to PKS, the legal treatment was discriminatory and unfair. Although Shihab was entangled in a mass gathering case, other parties had been allowed to go free, as exemplified by the cases of the Governor of East Java, Khofifah Indar Parawangsa (Kurniati, 2021), or the Mayor of Bekasi, Rahmat Effendi (Kurniawan, 2021). According to PKS, Shihab should have been treated fairly and equally to the others, and therefore should not have received the sentence that was imposed (Sera, 2021).

In the relation to FPI disbandment, PKS perceived it as a violation of the presumption of innocence. This also indicated that there was a violation of the spirit of the rule of law because it is the court—not the government—that holds the right to dissolve a large organization like FPI. In the FPI case, the court had not yet ruled when the government disbanded the organization instead of allowing the case to be processed in court. To PKS, this significantly endangered democracy and law enforcement efforts in Indonesia (Sera, 2021).

Regarding the arrest of Shihab, PD gave a statement reminding listeners that the legal process should not be intimidating to anyone and that the principle of the presumption of innocence should be maintained. The public should not underestimate the potential for intimidation and should not ignore the presumption of innocence in the Shihab case (Akhmad, 2020). PD indicated that Shihab's case has a strong relation to the violation of civil liberties and law enforcement. Based on the constitution, no one could be treated unfairly. It is in this context that the Shihab controversy lies (Putra, 2021).

In the case of the FPI disbandment, PD's official stance was as an opponent, maintaining that the dissolution violated the constitution and the essence of a democratic state. The rule of law does not justify the disbandment in such a way; moreover, the existence of FPI itself is a consequence of democracy. Rachland Nashidik, the Chairman of the PD Advisory Council, stated that the government's move to dissolve and ban FPI significantly endangered constitutional rights. He firmly pointed out that PD had excluded the government's method of "sacking the FPI" on the grounds of democracy and human rights (Sucipto, 2021).

3.2. *Opposition at the Society Level*

3.2.1. The Prominent Organizations

Opposition at the society level is represented by many groups. This paper has selected the three most important opposition organizations, in particular at the commencement of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf government, namely KAMI, FPI, and PA212. These three organizations were selected because of their consistent stance in opposing the Jokowi-Ma'ruf government.

KAMI is an organization formed in Jakarta and declared on August 18, 2020. The founders and the member figures of KAMI have a record of being critical figures or at least as having distance from the government, including Gatot Nurmantyo, Din Syamsuddin, Rocky Gerung, Refly Harun, Chusnul Maryah, Syahganda Nainggolan, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, and Adhi Massardhie (Wardah, 2020). One of KAMI's main activities is responding to several government policies. Not long after the declaration, several KAMI activists were imprisoned, including

Jumhur Hidayat, Syahganda Nainggolan, and Anton Permana (Wardah, 2020). They were accused of being part of the party that was responsible for the rampant demonstrations in various regions, especially the demonstrations related to the Omnibus Law.

FPI established on August 18, 1998 in Tangerang, Banten. FPI has been widely acknowledged as an Islamic group that performs street actions, which are often accompanied by violence and lead to public unrest. For FPI, these actions serve as a form of moral responsibility for the existence of disobedience that has not been completely maintained by law enforcement elements. Shihab, a preacher who is the leader of FPI, has political concerns and has not hesitated to criticize various government policies. Regarding FPI's tough stance, people believes that FPI and Shihab are icons of the opposition to the Jokowi leadership (Rosyid, 2019). During the 2019 presidential election campaign, FPI supported Prabowo and remained consistent in standing as Jokowi's political opponent after the presidential election.

The 212 Alumni Brotherhood (PA212) was established in Jakarta on December 2, 2016. This organization is a collection of alumni who attended the mass action and who come from various Islamic religious backgrounds, as a response to Governor Ahok's statement in Kepulauan Seribu, which has been considered harassment of the Muslims. The core element of PA212 was the former member of the National Movement to Guard the *Fatwa* of the Indonesian Ulama Council (GNPFMUI), led by figures such as Bahtiar Nasir, Shihab, Yusuf M. Martak, Zaitun Rasmin, and Haikal Hassan. In 2019 Presidential Election, PA212 was Prabowo-Sandi proponent. Several PA212 figures have ideological tendencies that are critical toward Jokowi and his supporters.

3.2.2. The Underlying Reasons

As an opposition figure, KAMI believes that during the Jokowi administration numerous problems emerged. These problems ranged from the weakening of the implementation of *Pancasila* ideology, social justice, and state sovereignty to environmental issues. In response to these problems, this coalition was formed to save Indonesia (Muflih, 2020). Therefore, KAMI declared eight demands to President Jokowi, to be resolved immediately due to their urgency¹.

According to Chusnul Mariyah (2021), one of KAMI's founders, although KAMI does not aim to overthrow the government, it has never been reluctant to be labelled as the opposition. With the eight demands and offer of an alternative agenda, KAMI substantially acts as the opposition. Some people argue that KAMI's emergence is relevant given the reduction of opposition in parliament, which is limited to executing the role of checks and balances. KAMI's presence is thus perceived as unique because it dares to take a stand against the authorities (Rasi, 2020).

The main reason FPI became an opposition movement was because of the results of the IV Ulama Congress, which did not recognize the results of the 2019 Presidential Election because it was considered to be fraudulent. Moreover, FPI regarded President Jokowi as a president who has a less concern for the Muslim aspirations. It is indicated by some treatments towards Islamic preacher, teacher or activists who were treated inappropriately, including experiencing criminalization and persecution (Alatas, 2021).

Similar to the FPI, the result of IV Ulama Congress was the main foundation of PA212's opposition. PA212 could not support the government based on the results of the alleged fraud. PA212 hence preferred to be the opposite party to the government and refused to conduct post-election reconciliation. Bamukmin, one of the main leaders of PA212 asserted that "the election was a fraud and created many victims. For these reasons it is impossible for us to do reconciliation" (KumparanNews, 2020).

¹ The eight demands cover the following issues: (1) Consistently implementing the 1945 Constitution; (2) Seriously dealing with COVID-19; (3) Responsibility for the emergence of economic recession; (4) Revising legal products that are not in accordance with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution; (5) Operating against corruption; (6) Not providing opportunities for the rise of communism, anti-Pancasila ideology, or separatism, and stopping the stigmatization of religious groups as intolerant, radical, and extremist; (7) Maintaining the Pancasila ideology; and (8) Carrying out the Presidential Oath seriously.

3.2.3. Political Position Arguments on Several Government Policies

After the 2019 election and the commencement of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin administration, there were several prominent cases that were highlighted by various parties, including critical circles at the community level. Among them included the case of the establishment of the Omnibus Law and the implementation of the 2020 Regional Head Elections. Both cases are regarded as national cases that have received high-profile criticism from the opposition at the government and community levels.

3.2.3.1. Omnibus Law Case

Despite Omnibus Law being believed by the government and its supports would provide advantages, including simplifying regulations for doing business activities in Indonesia, many people regarded this policy as a problematic both in terms of substance and the ratification process. Based on these two issues, they firmly rejected the Omnibus Law. This refusal exemplifies the firmness of the opposition toward the government's policy.

For KAMI, the Omnibus Law would raise the potential for creating opportunities for free competition between foreign companies and national or local companies. Free competition would further create inequality and would not be profitable for national companies considering that most national or local companies are weak compared to international enterprises. In this context, For KAMI this bill reflected the government's weak commitment to protecting state sovereignty and labour rights by providing provided broad opportunities for foreign entities to open businesses in Indonesia (KumparanNews, 2020).

One of the main consequences, according to KAMI, this law might harm the interests of workers or laborers as it opens opportunity for foreign labours to get jobs in Indonesia. If this occurs, it would be detrimental to local workers. For this reason, KAMI rejection to this law was based on the rationale that this regulation would potentially deteriorate national sovereignty, increase social gap among people, and deteriorate the bargaining position of the laborers"(CNN Indonesia, 2020a).

In addition, KAMI criticized the procedure for enacting this law for not involving sufficient public participation (CNN Indonesia, 2020a). Whereas the law consists of roughly 80 regulations and around 1,200 articles, it only took 167 days to finalize (C. A. Putri, 2020). The criticism of minimal public participation also views the enactment as violating the rules of policymaking that require broad public participation.

FPI regarded the Omnibus Law as potentially harming local laborers. The main concern of FPI was that the laborers' bargaining position weakened before the big companies, which eventually made them easy to be fired. In addition, FPI believed this law does not protect national industries; instead, it had the potential to strengthen the domination of foreign entrepreneurs. In addition, the process of enacting the law was quite brief and reflected the elite's interest in the process (Detik.com, 2020).

PA212 also criticized the Omnibus Law, believing that the process of constructing this law was elitist because it did not allow for wide participation during its discussion. In addition, the substance of the Omnibus Law was detrimental to Indonesian laborers because the law provides a significant opportunity for the entry of foreign workers.

Therefore, along with FPI, GNPF *Ulama*, and HRS Center, PA212 advocated for the Omnibus Law to be annulled (JPPN, 2020). PA212 also supported the actions of workers and students in performing strikes and demonstrations (WE Online, 2020). In fact, they actively undertook the part in demonstration against the Omnibus Law (Firmansyah, 2020). Their demands included supporting the people's action against the Omnibus Law, immediately withdrawing the Omnibus Law, demanding Jokowi's resignation, and demanding that parties supporting the Omnibus Law dissolve themselves (Detik.com, 2020).

3.2.3.2. The 2020 Simultaneous Local Election Implementation

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government forced a simultaneous local election (Pilkada) in several districts. For the government, the implementation of the 2020 Pilkada served as a constitutional right of the people to determine the course of government. The government also believed that the establishment of a definitive government through local elections would maintain the preservation of people's economic life.

However, for the opposition groups, the implementation of the 2020 Pilkada would generate numerous problems. According to KAMI, the 2020 Pilkada was an elitist, since it was not in line with the people's aspiration. Several influential mass organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and MUI rejected it (Helmi, 2020). Also, based on numerous surveys, the public generally did not view the implementation of the 2020 Pilkada as something urgent. In this regard, Din Syamsuddin, Head of KAMI who also former the Chairperson of Muhammadiyah (the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia) the implementation of the 2020 Pilkada was coercive (Wibowo, 2020), and even represented a form of "constitutional dictatorship" (Harjanto, 2020).

Moreover, KAMI was also concerned that the implementation of the regional election would endanger the safety of the public because it will be performed in 14 electoral areas where COVID-19 cases are categorized as red zones (Dwianto, 2020). COVID-19 cases could widely spread due to the low level of discipline in public health protocols during the campaign, which lasted for 71 days. With this situation, the policy for implementing the 2020 Pilkada essentially went against the essence of the constitution and violates the government's assurance to protect all citizens, especially from the dangers of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Similar to KAMI, the implementing the 2020 Pilkada for FPI was not an urgent matter because the community does not consider it so. According to FPI, the most important agenda for the people is overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, FPI insisted that saving people's lives be the government's top priority compared to political and economic issues (Budiman, 2020). FPI stressed the 2020 Pilkada was forced to be implemented during the pandemic due to the politicians' ambitions to win the electoral contestation. It is inconsistent with the government policy itself related to imposition of restrictions on community activities (Alatas, 2021).

PA212 believed that the 2020 Pilkada would potentially harm the community, and it characterized the agenda as the "Death Pilkada." According to the Deputy Secretary General of the PA212, Novel Bamukmin, the COVID-19 pandemic had wreaked havoc and threatened the lives of the Indonesian people. Therefore, the government's main task was to prevent the pandemic from further endangering all citizens and ensuring their safety. However, this guarantee of safety tends to be disregarded by the government, which continues to impose the 2020 Pilkada (Suryarandika, 2020).

With these considerations, FPI and PA212 called on the public to boycott and ask for a delay in implementing the 2020 Pilkada. They asked the public not to be involved in the entire series or process of the 2020 deadly elections and call for a postponement and stop the entire series/stages of the 2020 deadly elections that are taking place (CNN Indonesia, 2020b). It is apparent that the opposition's attitude among the public is based on the argument that there is no urgency in implementing the 2020 Pilkada when the COVID-19 still become a serious threat for the people.

4. Discussion

Research result Indicates that despite political reconciliation after the 2019 general election, there are various groups that claim to be in the opposition. As mentioned before the meaning of the opposition in this article is related to those who have a disagreement with the government or its policies, the political elite, or the political regime as a whole, expressed in public sphere, by an organized actor through different modes of action (Brack, 2011). Indonesia current situation, opposition groups still consists of those who are organized, whether they are political parties or non-political parties, that conducting activities to criticize attitudes, perspectives, or policies of the government.

These opposition groups are generally the former supporters of Prabowo's presidential candidacy, a figure who is symbolized as an alternative to Jokowi. However, this impression faded when Prabowo amalgamated with the

Jokowi government. Moreover, the opposition groups generally have a record of being the opposition long before the 2019 Presidential Election and remained after that election was implemented.

The determination to become an opposition is based on motives related to democratic ideals. What remains, especially for the opposition at the state level, is the desire to conduct the checks and balance role. For the opposition at the community level, distrust of the 2019 election results has become one of the main reasons for taking a stand as an opposition. Apart from that, the current government raises numerous basic problems that harm the interests or aspirations of the people.

The ideological backgrounds of these oppositions are diverse. Some are based on religious values, especially Islam (PKS, FPI, and PA212). Others are based on nationalism, such as PD, which sometimes also claims to be a nationalist-religious party. Meanwhile, KAMI is an organization founded by prominent figures and supported by groups with varying ideologies and aspirations. From an ideological background, this researcher concludes that the post-2019 election opposition is not monolithic. Ideological motives are also not dominant, although it is inarguable that PKS, FPI, and PA212 are representatives of groups with ideological views.

Contrary to the assumptions of some parties, authenticity forms the basis for opposition that is based on practical rather than ideological interests. The reason for the rejection of the Omnibus Law, for example, is due more to the potential harm it could bring to the labour group. Meanwhile, the objection toward the implementation of the Pilkada is more due to the threats to citizens' health and lives. In addition, the implementation of the Pilkada is likely to be postponed considering that the citizens themselves do not see the urgency of its implementation.

This study also demonstrates that the opposition is not always composed of one voice. They may be synergistic or cooperative in some cases, but in other cases, they are not. The Omnibus Law case truly unites the opposition at the state and societal levels because they share a similar view. On the other hand, in the case of the 2020 Pilkada, the opposition at the state and societal levels was divided. The opposition at the state level approved its implementation, while the opposition at the community level rejected the policy.

In the case of the 2020 Pilkada, parties have a strong interest in participating due to the possibility of obtaining political interests. The desire to obtain the position of regional head serves as the basic consideration that distinguishes the opposition at the state and community levels. This indicates that there is a gap between the two levels of opposition. The existence of this diversity confirms the view that differences are feasible within the different opposition groups, which are generally driven by their respective interests.

Although the existence of the opposition remains visible after the 2019 Presidential Election, the continuity of the opposition at the community level remains vulnerable, as demonstrated by the government's discriminatory treatment toward the opposition groups. The case of Shihab's arrest proves the vulnerability of opposition groups at the community level due to the state's treatment, depending on the perhaps capricious attitude of the regime.

5. Conclusion

This discussion above illuminates the reasons that PKS and PD have become the opposition. One of the obvious motives lies in the expectation that the essence of democracy will be enforced and executed. In addition, the two parties believe that several government policies have violated the spirit of democracy and human rights, mainly regarding public participation and equality before the law. Although these two parties support some government policies, in the cases above, both have objected for various reasons. This further emphasizes that PKS and PD are committed to standing as the loyal opposition to Jokowi's government.

On the other hand, there is a mixture of motives for becoming the opposition at the society level. The first motive stems from the implementation of the 2019 Presidential Election that is considered to have been flawed, thereby creating interest in taking a position opposite the elected government. The second motive involves the capability of the government, especially Jokowi's administration, which is perceived as incompetent. For KAMI, the second

factor is considered the most important concern, which is in contrast with FPI and PA212, both of which emphasize the first factor as the main consideration.

Meanwhile, their attitude toward government policies is generally based on reasonable reasons. The opposition groups believe that there was a problem with the process and substance of the Omnibus Law. For the 2020 Pilkada, the oppositions believe that there was no urgency and that its implementation created the potential for danger because it was performed during the COVID-19 pandemic. The presence of oppositions, with the complexities indicates that critical groups in Indonesia are not perished after Prabowo decided to join the government.

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