



Journal of Social and Political Sciences

Akhter, Muhammad N, and Yuan, Liu. (2019), China's Role in Afghan Peace Process. In: *Journal of Social and Political Sciences*, Vol.2, No.3, 655-662.

ISSN 2615-3718

DOI: 10.31014/aor.1991.02.03.108

The online version of this article can be found at:

<https://www.asianinstituteofresearch.org/>

Published by:
The Asian Institute of Research

The *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* is an Open Access publication. It may be read, copied, and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license.

The Asian Institute of Research *Social and Political Sciences* is a peer-reviewed International Journal. The journal covers scholarly articles in the fields of Social and Political Sciences, which includes, but not limited to, Anthropology, Government Studies, Political Sciences, Sociology, International Relations, Public Administration, History, Philosophy, Arts, Education, Linguistics, and Cultural Studies. As the journal is Open Access, it ensures high visibility and the increase of citations for all research articles published. The *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* aims to facilitate scholarly work on recent theoretical and practical aspects of Social and Political Sciences.



ASIAN INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH
Connecting Scholars Worldwide



China's Role in Afghan Peace Process

Muhammad N Akhter¹, Liu Yuan¹

¹ School of Political Science and Public Administration, Shandong University, Qingdao, China.

Correspondence: Muhammad N Akhter, School of Political Science and Public Administration, Shandong University, Qingdao Campus, No. 72, Jimo Binhai Road, Qingdao, Shandong, China. Tel: 92-322-7051113,86-178-5216-2391. E-mail: raonauman123@gmail.com

Abstract

To end the long war in Afghanistan, the International Community has been making efforts to resolve the Afghan crisis peacefully by negotiation with the Taliban. China, being the neighbor of Afghanistan and emerging power, has a very important role to play. China also has the logic to engage with Afghanistan: Security of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region that is adjacent to Afghanistan border, economic interests including newly initiated Belt and Road initiative (BRI) and stop rival countries to get influence around the periphery of China. With the significant economic, political, and security contributions to Afghan governments, China is in the position to steer the Afghan governments to peace initiative. With implied support from China, the Taliban also have a positive attitude of China. Pakistan is also very supportive in molding the Taliban into a China-led peace initiative. With sagacious policies not to irk the interests of big powers, China is heading towards the positive direction in the resolution of the Afghan crisis amidst international support. China's way of handling all concerned parties is admiring. Till yet, the Afghan problem is unsolved, but China has been doing its best to end the long bloodshed in Afghanistan.

Keywords: China, Afghan Peace Process, South Asia

1. Introduction

Since its inception in 1949, People Republic of China (PRC) has been maintaining cordial relations with Afghanistan except for the interval of 10 years when USSR installed communist government (1979-1989) which China did not render recognition due to its pro-soviet stance amidst the burgeoning tension of cold war. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the emergence of mujahedeen alliance, 'the Islamic State of Afghanistan' in 1992 led to the normalization of Sino-Afghanistan relations (Rashid 1999). From 1996 to 2001, China's relations with Afghanistan remained officially inactive because of the Taliban regime. After the 11 September 2001, the US-led coalition attacked Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban government.

China established relations with the new Afghan government with economic, political, security, and diplomatic support. China is one of the biggest foreign investors in Afghanistan. In 2007, Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC), Jiangxi Copper Corporation (JCCL), two state-owned enterprises of China, made the largest investment in the history of Afghanistan to date \$ 4.4 billion when they won the world second largest underdeveloped copper deposit at Aynak in Logar province, 35 Kilometers of Southeast Kabul (Downs 2012). In 2011, China National

Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its Afghan counterpart Watan Oil and Gas secured the rights of three oil blocks in the province of Sari-i-Pul and Faryab in northwest Afghanistan with the investment of \$ 400 million initially (Najafizada 2011). China's economic interests, after the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, increased manifold due to the position of Afghanistan around the periphery of Major routes of BRI. China included Afghanistan in May 2017 in China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China intended to link Peshawar to Kabul and Kunduz deep into central Asia (Dasgupta 2017). Afghanistan is also a very crucial factor in the security of far western china's Xinjiang province. East Turkestan movement, a separatist militant Uyghur organization in Xinjiang, has strong links with Afghanistan Jihadist organizations. On 3 July 2016, the first time in the domain of security cooperation, the Chinese government gave Afghanistan security equipment, including a Russian cargo plane, ammunition, vehicles, and weapons (Kishore 2016).

Anticipated withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, this situation requires a concerted and comprehensive strategy by the big and concerned powers to manage the situation effectively. China is playing this role. China's active engagement with the Afghan peace process started in 2014 when China endorsed the talks between Taliban and Government (Yongbiao 2018). With the increasing engagement in Afghan affairs particularly 'Peace Process,' China confronts many problems: big power politics, management of Taliban and Afghan government negotiations and maintenance of China's image as a benign rising power. It is a genuine Challenge to Chinese diplomacy how china promotes peace by securing her interests as in a way that all parties interests are secured that is the prerequisite for sustained peace and development. This study will explore how the government of China is managing this delicate balance among all concerned parties. This study will also investigate the practices of China in this regard and consequently, their effects on the Peace process.

2. What Is the 'Afghan Peace Process' and Why China in It

Afghanistan is a very important country situated at the junction of South, central, east, and West Asia. American-led military coalition attacked Afghanistan after the twin attack on the World Trade Center. Initially, the Peace talks were a very controversial issue with the Taliban. The International Community and the Afghan government were reluctant to accept it (Fazli 2017). However, as the war prolongs, due to burgeoning military resistance, the US initiated the Peace Process to solve the Afghan crisis with negotiations. America also invited the International community to help steer the Afghan Peace Process in a positive direction. In 2009, President Obama announced the Afghan-Pak policy and urged Afghanistan's neighbors (including China) to work for the stability of Afghanistan (Obama 2009). This was the first time when the USA urged China to take interests in Afghan affairs. China also persuaded Pakistan to help implement the Afghanistan Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and solidarity of Afghanistan (Shams 2018).

China's engagement with the 'Peace process' started in 2014 when it endorsed the talk between Taliban and Government (Yongbiao 2018). In Oct 2014, China hosted a fourth Ministerial conference "Istanbul Process" on Afghanistan. China adopted the multilateral approach by inviting all concerned countries of the region to discuss the Afghanistan issue. In Feb 2015, Wang Yi, Chinese Foreign minister, in a press conference in Islamabad, said that "we will support the Afghan government in realizing reconciliation with various political factions including the Taliban." (RT-News 2015). In 2015, China arranged three or fourth times tripartite and quadripartite meetings with Russia, Pakistan, and India to discuss the Afghan problems (Azeemi 2019). In Murree process, Taliban and Afghan government representatives met and discussed the ceasefire between Taliban and Afghan forces. This meeting was convened under the supervision of US, China, and Pakistan. Taliban guaranteed further cooperation if China and Pakistan provide a guarantee to it (Khan 2015). China also supports Russia in her efforts for 'the Afghan Peace process' and was the active participant in 'Moscow Format.' In Oct 2017, the 1st China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Minister's dialogue held in Beijing to discuss the Afghanistan problem. On Dec 2018, the second Afghanistan-China-Pakistan Foreign Minister dialogue held in Kabul to discuss the Afghanistan issue. At the end conference, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi urged the Taliban to participate in the 'Peace Process' (Saif 2018). In April 2019, the representatives of China, Russia, and the US met and decided to withdraw the foreign forces

from Afghanistan and urged in return, Taliban will not allow any foreign terrorist organization to operate on its soil and attack on neighboring countries (RFE/RL 2019).

After observing a visible diplomatic shift in Chinese foreign policy to Afghanistan that was less active before, there are certain questions that need to be answered before proceeding further. The first question that comes to mind is that what incentives or necessities forced Chinese policymakers to reactivate policy towards Afghanistan?

A number of books, articles, and reports link China with Afghanistan through the prism of Chinese security problems i.e., Xinjiang autonomous region. Domestic stability is one of the most important factors in Chinese engagement with Afghanistan. East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) can use Sino-Afghan border to launch a terror attack on Xinjiang or elsewhere (Akhtar and Sarkar 2015). There is a visible shift in Chinese foreign policy after the 9/11, China's approach towards Afghanistan and Central Asia has been shaped by two factors: security in Xinjiang and geopolitical advantages in Central Asia (Clarke 2016). Hugo Chéné has of the view that China's involvement in Afghanistan is not only economic but also a strategic one. China involved itself with the Afghan peace process on the request of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and China strictly maintains the non-interventionist policies in the relations with Afghanistan. Moreover, China believes that Afghanistan should be integrated with the regional framework in order to create a stable environment for BRI (Chéné 2015). Thomas Eder explains that Chinese involvement in Afghanistan is due to its economic interests. Moreover, the main focus related to the economic interests is energy security. In order to secure the energy interests, China laid down extensive networks of pipelines and energy corridors. Chinese are making efforts to link Afghanistan with Central Asia and South Asia energy networks (Eder 2018). Tiffany P. Ng ascribed these mineral resources as one of the reasons for the Chinese involvement in Afghanistan. He further says that mineral wealth binds more strongly China with Afghanistan (Ng 2010).

Some scholars are of the opinion that under 'New Neighborhood Policy' of President Xi Jinping 2013, Afghanistan has assumed immense importance being the western part of China (Zongze, Chen-Jianxue, and Song-Jinyue 2016). Whereas some scholars are of the view that China engagement in Afghanistan is Indian centric. China will not allow India to establish its influence in Afghanistan. It will be a very difficult position for India to establish hegemony in Afghanistan without the help of China (Hanif 2010). So, the study can be summarized in followings major objectives of Chinese foreign policy towards Afghan affairs:

- a. Promotion, protection, and initiation of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Afghanistan.
- b. Economic interests, including energy and minerals.
- c. Security Interests: anticipated US withdrawal and its possible spillover effects on neighboring countries, particularly Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
- d. To stop rival countries, particularly Indian, to get a hegemonic role in her western periphery, Afghanistan.

3. How Does China Manage Taliban in 'the Afghan Peace Process'?

Taliban assumes an important role in the Afghan Peace Process. For the successful peace talks, the Taliban's presence and approval are necessary. In the words of Courtney Cooper, "a peace process with the Taliban is almost certainly the best way to end the war in Afghanistan" (Cooper 2017). China has demonstrated more influence with the Taliban than the most other countries. Taliban are the key to the peace process and to manage them effectively is very important to keep the peace track maintained. The question arises how China maintains that and the next question, attached with the previous one if China maintains that is it China's own relations with Taliban or go through Islamabad? By understanding both these questions, we can better evaluate the situation.

China backs the international coalition against 'war on terror' in Afghanistan, it also provides diplomatic and material assistance to the Afghan government and provides training to Afghan officers and policemen (Huasheng

2012). However, the Chinese Government's approach towards the Taliban is very cautious and calculated. Because of geography, political, economic, and security reasons, China has always been very modest in dealing with the Taliban. Zhao Huasheng, a senior Chinese analyst, says that the Chinese government is not against the Taliban but is opposed to Terrorism, separatism, and extremism (Huasheng 2016). Although China's relations with Afghanistan during the Taliban regime were officially inactive, China always resorted dialogue and engagement policy in dealing with the Taliban. At the end of the 20th century, many ETIM members were present in Afghanistan, but due to the strong pressure from the then American administration, Taliban leaders saw to China as a relief and consequently a substantial decrease in militant activities in China at the start of the century (Fishman 2011). In December 2000, Mullah Omar and Chinese ambassador to Pakistan Li Shulin met in Kandahar and Mullah Omar assured Chinese that the Taliban would not allow anyone to operate against China from Afghanistan (Small 2013). On 11 September 2001, China reportedly struck a deal with the Taliban on economic and technical assistance (Toops and Starr 2004). After the 9/11 attack, China maintained relations with Quetta Shura, and it was China and Pakistan that have this kind of relationship with the Taliban (Small 2013). Moreover, in reciprocity, the Taliban showed its willingness to Chinese investment in Mes Aynak copper mine and directed its militants to safeguard and protect the mine (Amini 2016). Not to antagonize the Afghan in general and Taliban in particular, China adopted the policy not to send the troops to Afghanistan on the frequent requests made by America and its allies. Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a network of transportations from Black and Baltic Sea through Russia and Central Asia to Afghanistan to provide non-lethal supplies to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), China also refused to be the part of this network (Huasheng 2012).

Because of possible consequences for the security of China after western forces leave Afghanistan, instead of criticizing harshly to the Taliban by name, China adopts a low key approach in criticizing the Taliban (Huasheng 2012). Moreover, another fear that the Chinese policymakers believe that too much alignment with the US policies in the region can spoil their image in the Muslim world. Chinese are avoiding this trap because the population of Muslim is very large in China. So, in this way, they are not inviting the ire of Muslim militant organizations (Swaine 2010). Moreover, China is among those few countries which believe in dialogue with all Afghan factions, including the Taliban. Yang Cheng of East China Normal University in whose words is the best depiction of how China is supporting the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process. He says that China may maintain relations with all political and economic forces in Afghanistan, not the central government only (Kley October 2014). In some ways, Chinese diplomacy in Afghanistan is limited, Beijing has no attention to take on security role in Afghanistan due to the fact that it will create hostility among different Afghan groups against China. Its principal objective is economic and diplomatic (Small 2014). The rising importance of China in Afghan Peace Process can be assuaged from the fact that a Pakistan based Cleric Maulana Sami ul Haq, who is also known as the 'Father of Taliban,' requested China to participate and promote Afghanistan peace (Imaduddin 2018). Yao Jing, Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, addressing in Peshawar University, said that his country accepts 'Afghan Taliban' as a political force because of their participation in ongoing Afghan Peace process with the US and other multilateral forums (Ali 2019).

China's approach to Afghanistan since 2014 has been the promotion of political reconciliation between the Taliban and the government. Many key figures from the Taliban visited China and discussed the peace process. On December 27, 2016, three representatives from Russia, China, and Pakistan, excluding Afghan government, met in Moscow and talked about the stalled 'Afghan Peace Process.' Moreover, reaffirmed their support for an inclusive Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process. In order to intensify efforts in this regard, they adopted the measures to remove the names of certain Taliban leaders from sanction lists (Jazeera and Agencies 2016). In May 2015, it was reported that China, with the help of Pakistan, arranged an unofficial secret meeting between Taliban and Afghan representatives in Urumqi Chin (Wong and Mashal 2015). In Murree process, Taliban and Afghan government representatives met and discussed the ceasefire between Taliban and Afghan forces. This meeting was convened under the supervision of US, China, and Pakistan. Taliban guaranteed further cooperation if China and Pakistan provide a guarantee to it (Khan 2015).

China is a very important country having relations with all parties concerned with 'Peace Process' including the

Taliban. China is also an "all-weather friend" of Pakistan, which holds the key to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table (Ramachabdran 2017). Ashraf Ghani, partially reversing the Karzai anti-Pakistan policies, assumed a posture towards Pakistan less volatile and more friendly. By correctly analyzing the strategic partnership between Pakistan and China, Ghani went straight to Beijing after assuming the Presidential slot. His assessment in using 'China Card,' before the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan on Oct 31, 2014, of peace talks between Afghan government and Taliban by using its leverage with Pakistan was well received in Beijing (Hiro 2015). Yao Jing, Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, expressed satisfaction and praise for Pakistan's initiatives for facilitating talks between US administration and Taliban in Dubai (Ali 2019).

4. China's Relations with Afghan Governments after 9/11 and Afghan Peace Process

China condemned the attack on USA twin tower on 9/11 and backed US-led ISAF initiative against terrorism in Afghanistan and endorsed the UNSC resolution 1373. China supported the military operation against Taliban and Al Qaeda, but due to its non-interventionist foreign policy did not become the part of any alliance. After the new government of Hamid Karzai established in 2002, China-Afghanistan relations changed. China supported and provided aid to the new government of Hamid Karzai (Huasheng 2012). In 2006, China and Afghanistan signed the "Treaty of Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation" that treaty came into effect from 14 Aug 2008 (China 2008). In 2007, Metallurgical Cooperation of China (MCC) and Jiangxi Copper Cooperation (JCCL) made the largest foreign investment in Afghanistan of the USA \$ 4.4 billion in Aynak Cooper deposit (Downs 2012). In 2009, President Obama announced the Afghan-Pak policy and urged Afghanistan's neighbors (including China) to work for the stability of Afghanistan (Obama 2009). In 2012, China-Afghanistan relations were upgraded to a strategic partnership. In 2012, Afghanistan was admitted to SCO and connected more closely to Chinese framed structure. In January to April 2013, China-Russia-Afghanistan completed many rounds of discussion of talks on regional and Afghan issue. (Yongbiao 2018). At this stage, the Chinese government also increased the aid to Afghanistan, including infrastructure construction, police surveillance equipment, humanitarian assistance, etc.

Chinese policy is more tilted towards the Afghan government. Under 'National Unity Government' (NUG) of Ashraf Ghani, China's relations with the Afghan government became more friendly. China first time gave military aid to Afghanistan: non-lethal military equipment (Khalil 2017). In Oct 2014, China hosted the 'Fourth Ministerial Conference of Istanbul Process' on Afghanistan. China also endorsed the 'Peace Talks' Between the Afghan government and Taliban. Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, in a press conference in Islamabad, said that "we will support the Afghan government in realizing reconciliation with various political factions including Taliban" (RT-News 2015). In 2016, China also supported and participated in 'Murree Talks' between the Taliban and the Afghan government. On June 8, 2017, on the sideline of SCO summit in Astana, President Xi met with President Ashraf Ghani and said that, "China will mediate and ease the tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan and hold a trilateral summit" (CGTNews 2017). China also supported Russian efforts of peace in Afghanistan. On Dec 2018, the second China-Afghanistan-Pakistan foreign minister conference held in Kabul to discuss the Afghan situation.

As the discussion as mentioned above shows that China's relations with the Afghan government is good. China's ability to affect the outcome of the peace process is greater than most of the other countries. However, before proceeding further, one question is needed to be answered to fully grasp the complicated situation: what is the understanding of Chinese policymakers about the role of the Afghan government in 'peace processes? In 2014, China hosted the 'Fourth Ministerial Conference Istanbul Process' with the Afghan government participation. In May 2015, the Afghan government envoy Muhammad Masoom Stanekzai, an important member of Afghan Peace Council, and Taliban representatives met in China secretly for exploring peace with the mounting insurgency. This meeting was arranged by China and Pakistan for initiating a peace process to end the conflict in Afghanistan (Wong and Mashal 2015). The 'Murree Process' both the Afghan government and the Taliban were present, including also Chinese officials (Khan 2015). In 2017 and 2018, China-Pakistan-Afghanistan foreign minister conference held in Beijing and Kabul, respectively (Saif 2018). All Chinese initiatives for peace were inclusive. China's approach towards peace is inclusive and believes that all parties are part of it.

5. Favorable Regional and International Environment for Chinese Peace Initiative

The Chinese initiated peace process seems to have the support of all regional and international players. China's rising international stature compels it to be an arbitrator in the Afghan peace initiative that concerns all regional and international community. After burgeoning Chinese diplomacy towards peace in Afghanistan, the most important thing is that the relevant players saw it positively.

The US welcomes Chinese involvement in the Afghan peace process. In fact, it was the US in 2009, which said to China to play an important role in the Afghan crisis. President Obama in 2009, while announcing the Af-Pak strategy, urged Afghanistan's neighboring countries, including China, to play a role in the stability of Afghanistan (Obama 2009). China and the US are part of the most important organizations for a peace initiative. In 2016, the Quadrilateral Cooperation Group with the participation of China, US, Afghanistan, and Pakistan was formed for promoting peace in Afghanistan. US and China share a common security objective in Afghanistan: containment of ISIS and Al Qaeda from exporting violent extremism. In deploring militancy and extremism in Afghanistan by Taliban, AL Qaeda, ISIS, and other militant groups in 'Xiamen Doctrine' at the end of BRICK summit in 2017 in China, China's approach towards Afghan security is compatible with US (Rank 2018). Also, American diplomats are trying to convince the government to cooperate with the Chinese for successful peaceful initiatives in Afghanistan. David Rank, a US diplomat, who also worked in US embassy in China, is of the view that if the US wants to maximize the outcome of peace in Afghanistan, then it will have to work with China (Rank 2018). A state department official told to the journalists that "we welcome the positive role of Russia, China, and any other country in the Afghan peace process. Both the US and China believe that to end the Afghan conflict, peace talks with the Taliban is the prerequisite. Chinese ambassador to Afghanistan Liu Jinsong backed US talks with the Taliban (Tass 2019). China is also included among those countries in Afghanistan with the highest economic investments. China invested in Aynak mining project and state oil excavation in Northern Afghanistan. China also started a Confucian institute in Kabul. These investments will bring positive effects on Afghan economy and definitely will bring new jobs. This situation will also be good for the USA in efforts to bring stability in Afghanistan (Ng 2010).

China and Russia have strong interests in Afghanistan. Both countries want to end the terrorist groups resurge in Afghanistan. ISIL, Al Qaeda, and ETIM are the threats to the security to both countries. Intelligence Agencies of Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran, decided to closely collaborate intelligence operations in Afghanistan against rising ISIL threats (Staff 2018). Mr. Lavrov, Russian foreign minister, gave a statement that is particularly significant amidst the allegations that the US is sponsoring terrorist organizations at the gate of China and Russia. He says that "we are proud to carry out technical military cooperation with China and cooperation between the security services of the two countries in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime" (Staff 2019). Both countries believe that to end the conflict in Afghanistan, the Taliban's participation is necessary. Russia was the first country which invited Taliban in 'Moscow Format' along with 11 countries, including China (Hussain 2018). Recently, China and Russia agreed on the point that to end the 18 years long war in Afghanistan, withdrawal of foreign forces consented (RFE/RL 2019).

India views China's role in the Afghan peace process as a positive peace partner. On 11 May 2019, Chinese special envoy for Afghan peace process Deng Xijun met with Indian officials including Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale and agreed on cooperation in the Afghanistan peace process (TV 2019). Before this meeting, China and India decided to cooperate economically in Afghanistan. In May 2018, in Wuhan summit, China and India decided to undertake the joint economic project in Afghanistan (Varma 2018). Before these meetings, there was less Indian participation in Afghan peace process such as Chinese initiated Foreign Ministers conference as cited above. Hence, it is the remarkable shift in Chinese approach by including India in the peace process.

Iranian perception about the Afghan peace process is based on the slogan 'Afghan-led' and 'Afghan-owned.' So, Iran shares the perception of Chinese about the peace process. Both Iran and China wants sustained peace in Afghanistan. In May 2019, Chinese special envoy for Afghanistan peace process Deng Xijun and Iranian Deputy

Foreign Minister for political affairs Abbas Araqchi met in Tehran. Two sides agreed to boost the Afghan peace process and a common mechanism for the lasting stability of Afghanistan (News 2019).

Another influential neighboring country that can play an important role in the Afghanistan peace process is Pakistan. US state department spokesperson Robert Palladino also said about the important role Pakistan can play in Afghan Peace process (Digital 2019). Pakistan's ability to influence the Taliban is very important in the resolution of the Afghan crisis. China has a strategic partnership with Pakistan. From 2014 till today, all Chinese initiated and participated in peace initiatives Pakistan is an important member. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani also used 'China Card' to influence Pakistan in Afghan Peace process as cited above.

6. Conclusion

Since 2001, Afghanistan has been embroiling in a war that has engulfed thousands of people. To end this longstanding conflict, big powers initiated peace talks with enraged parties to end the conflict. Since the peace talks started, no major breakthrough occurs. To influence the peace talks to a logical conclusion, America invited many influential countries to bring the disgruntled elements on the negotiation table. China is among those countries that have significant influence over all elements involved in Peace initiative.

Chinese involvement in the 'peace process' brought significant positive improvements to the resolution of the Afghan Crisis. Chinese inclusion in the peace initiative was remarkable in the sense that China has good relations with the Afghan government, directly and indirectly with the Taliban and a positive attitude from regional and international powers. China-Taliban relations dated back even before 2014. China, with the help of Pakistan, many time remained successful in bringing Taliban on 'negotiation table' with the Afghan government or without the Afghan government. However, still, China's efforts are going on to convince the Taliban to renounce violence. China's approach in Afghan peace initiative is more tilted towards the Afghan government. China has political, economic, and military relations with the Afghan government after Sep 11 with evolving robustness. Even 'Afghan Unity government' president Ashraf Ghani approached China, due to its all-weather friendly relations with Pakistan, to convince the Taliban to come to the negotiation table. Till today, China always insists on Taliban-Afghan government negotiation. Chinese led peace initiative is inclusive of regional and international players. Chinese envoy does regular consultations with regional countries Iran, Central Asia, Pakistan, and India. Even China planned joint projects with India in Afghanistan. On the International level, China is augmenting US efforts to foster peace in Afghanistan by negotiation and investments.

So, the Chinese approach towards peace initiative is 'Afghan-led' and 'Afghan-owned' and inclusive of regional and international players. Till yet, Afghan crisis is unresolved but with consist efforts, China has been making her maximum efforts to restore the peace in Afghanistan.

References

- Akhtar, Rabia, and Jayita Sarkar. 2015. Pakistan, India and China in Afghanistan After US Drawdown. *South Asian Voices Washington DC/Stimson Centre*.
- Ali, Zulfiqar. 2019. China to pick Afghan Taliban as political force: envoy. In *Dawn*. Pakistan.
- Amini, Mariam. 2016. China gets an all-clear from the Taliban to mine for copper in Afghanistan. *CNBC*, December 16.
- AZEEMI, UME FARWA. 2019. Russia's tango with Pakistan. *Asia Times*.
- CGTNews. 2017. President Xi meets Afghan counterpart Mohammad Ashraf Ghani. In *CGTN*. Beijing.
- Chéné, Hugo. 2015. China in Afghanistan Balancing Power Projection and Minimal Intervention. *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, IPCS Special Report 179*.
- China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2008. Treaty of China-Afghanistan Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighborly Relations Takes Effect. In *Embassy of The People's Republic of China In The Republic Of Croatia*.

- Clarke, Michael. 2016. 'One belt, one road' and China's emerging Afghanistan dilemma. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 70 (5):563-579.
- Cooper, Courtney. 2017. Why the Time Is Right to Talk to the Taliban. In *Council on Foreign Relations*.
- Dasgupta, Saibal. 2017. China to Extend 'Silk Road' Plan to Afghanistan. In *VOA News*, edited by M. Ritter.
- Digital, Samaa. 2019. US recognises Pakistan's key role in Afghan peace process. In *Samaa TV*.
- Downs, Erica. 2012. China buys into Afghanistan. *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 32 (2):65-84.
- Eder, Thomas. 2018. China's March West Emergence in Central Asia and Afghanistan. *Federal Academy for Security Policy: Security Policy Working Paper No. 13/2018*.
- Fazli, Fawzia. 2017. Peace Talks with the Taliban: Role of International Community. *Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies (DROPS), Women And Public Policy Journal* 3 (2016-2017):25-39.
- Fishman, Brian. 2011. Al-Qaeda and the rise of China: Jihadi geopolitics in a post-hegemonic world. *The Washington Quarterly* 34 (3):47-62.
- Hanif, Melanie. 2010. Indian Involvement in Afghanistan in the Context of the South Asian Security System. *Journal of Strategic Security* 3 (2):13-26.
- Hiro, Dilip. 2015. Afghanistan's China Card. In *TomDispatch*.
- Huasheng, Zhao. 2012. *China and Afghanistan: China's Interests, stances, and perspectives*: Center for Strategic & International Studies.
- Huasheng, Zhao. 2016. Afghanistan and China's new neighbourhood diplomacy. *International Affairs* 92 (4):891-908.
- Hussain, Zahid. 2018. The 'Moscow format'. In *Dawn*.
- Imaduddin. 2018. Maulana Sami calls on China to help Afghan peace talks. In *Business Recorder*. Pakistan.
- Jazeera, AL, and News Agencies. 2016. Kabul deplores exclusion from trilateral meeting. In *AL JAZEERA. AFGHANISTAN*.
- Khalil, Ahmad Bilal. 2017. The Rise of Taliban Diplomacy. In *The Diplomat*.
- Khan, Amina. 2015. The Future of Afghan Government and Taliban talks. In *ISSI, Issue Brief*
- Kishore, Divya. 2016. China delivers first shipment of military aid to Afghanistan. In *International Business Times*.
- Kley, Dirk van der. October 2014 China's foreign policy in Afghanistan. *Lowy Institute for International Policy*.
- Najafizada, Eltaf. 2011. PetroChina parent signs accord to develop Afghanistan oilfields. *Bloomberg Businessweek*.
- News, Ariana. 2019. Chinese, Iranian Diplomats Discuss Afghan Peace Process. In *Ariana News*.
- Ng, Tiffany P. 2010. China's role in shaping the future of Afghanistan. *Carnegie Endowment Policy Outlook*.
- Obama, Barack. 2009. Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. *The White House* 27.
- Ramachabdran, Sudha. 2017. China's Afghanistan-Pakistan mediation: Mission impossible. In *Asia Times*.
- Rank, David. 2018. For an Afghan Peace, Work with China. In *United States Institute of Peace*
- Rashid, Ahmed. 1999. The Taliban: exporting extremism. *Foreign Affairs*:22-35.
- RFE/RL. 2019. U.S., Russia, China Call For 'Inclusive Afghan-Led' Peace Process. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*.
- RT-News. 2015. Big mediator: China offers to broker stalled Afghan talks with Taliban. In *RT News*.
- Saif, Shadi Khan. 2018. China calls on Taliban to enter Afghan peace process: China, Pakistan and Afghanistan reaffirm commitment to strengthen ties. In *AA News Broadcasting system*. KABUL, Afghanistan.
- Shams, Ajmal. 2018. China has a role in Afghanistan peace process. In *Global Times*.
- Small, Andrew. 2013. Why Is China Talking to the Taliban? *Foreign Policy* 21:2.
- Small, Andrew. 2014. Afghanistan: the view from China. *European Union Institute for Security Studies*:2315-1129.
- Staff, FWM. 2018. Russia, Iran, China, Pakistan to cooperate on Afghanistan. In *Free West Media*.
- Staff, VOP. 2019. Russia and China to Strengthen Military Cooperation. In *Voice Of People*.
- Swaine, Michael D. 2010. China and the 'AfPak' Issue. *China Leadership Monitor* 31 (8).
- Tass. 2019. US welcomes positive role of Russia, China in Afghan peace process, says State Department. In *Tass, Russian News Agency*.
- Toops, Stanley, and S Frederick Starr. 2004. Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland.
- TV, India. 2019. India-China to Join Hands on Afghanistan's Peace Efforts. In *India TV News Desk*. New Delhi.
- Varma, KJM. 2018. Wuhan summit: India, China to undertake joint economic project in Afghanistan. In *Live Mint*.
- Wong, Edward, and Mujib Mashal. 2015. Taliban and Afghan Peace Officials Have Secret Talks in China. In *The New York Times*.
- Yongbiao, Zhu. 2018. China's Afghanistan Policy since 9/11: Stages and Prospects. *Asian Survey* 58 (2):281-301.

Zongze, Ruan, Lan-Junying Chen-Jianxue, and Guo Song-Jinyue. 2016. China's New Neighborhood Diplomacy: Seeking Stability Through Management and Planning. *Beijing, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), Report (9)*.