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The Total War Strategy: Challenges in Facing Traitor of the Nation: A Historical Approach During the Indonesian War of Independence

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Abstract

The Indonesian state implements a total defense system, meaning that it involves all the people and all national resources, national facilities and infrastructure, as well as the entire territory of the country as one defense unit. This system demands awareness of the rights and obligations of every citizen to defend the state as a manifestation of its totality. Efforts to raise awareness of defending the state for every citizen are a formidable challenge, recorded in Indonesian history as inseparable from attempts to betray the nation's struggle. Based on this phenomenon, the writer is moved to reveal several historical events during the war for independence in 1945-1949 which recorded the existence of certain people and groups who became traitors to the nation. The discussion in this article uses a qualitative research method using a historical approach, in which the preparation procedure goes through four stages, namely: heuristics, criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The data analysis used is historical analysis, with an emphasis on sharpness in interpreting historical facts. From the analysis conducted, it can be proven that during the war for independence in 1945-1949, the implementation of the total war strategy, which should have received the support of all the people, actually faced quite a tough challenge. This challenge was caused by the existence of certain people and groups who defected to side with the Netherlands, either by joining forces formed by the Netherlands or as spies for the Netherlands. Of course, this is very contrary to the values of state defense that must be possessed by every citizen.

Keywords: Total War, Traitor, Spies, State Defense

1. Introduction

In essence, national defense is all universal defense efforts universal, where awareness of the rights and obligations of citizens and belief in their strength is the basis for their implementation. It is said to be universal, because its implementation involves all citizens, utilizing all national resources and the entire territory of the

state in national defense efforts. The history of thinking about the concept of universal war in Indonesia was born during the independence war in 1945-1949, this is inseparable from T.B. Simatupang and A.H. Nasution, who gave his points and discussed together with General Soedirman to produce a new strategy and outlined in the Strategy Order Number 1. In the Strategy Order, he decided to return to guerrillas, abandon linear defense methods and form guerrilla groups that decentralized (Soetanto, 2006).

Guerrilla warfare is a war that is carried out clandestine, full of speed, sabotage, and usually in small groups but very focused and effective. To be able to implement effective guerrilla tactics requires the ability to control the territory and get the support of the people, both in terms of logistical support and information about the whereabouts of the enemy. The confidentiality factor is the key to the success of guerrilla tactics and it is greatly influenced by popular support (Prabowo, 2009). It was these guerrilla tactics that gave birth to a formulation of the concept of Indonesian state defense, namely the Total War, in which the support and involvement of all Indonesian people became the main foundation in its implementation. Based on historical records, it must be admitted that the support provided by all the people has not been fully realized.

During the independence war in 1945-1949, history has recorded several incidents of betrayal of the nation's struggle by certain people and groups from some of the Indonesian nation who wanted to gain personal or group benefits by sacrificing the interests of the nation or often referred to as "stooges- Netherlands henchmen." Betrayal of the nation's struggle was carried out either by joining forces with the Netherlands formation or as spies for the Netherlands. This is of course very contrary to the values of state defense that should be embedded in every Indonesian citizen.

The period of the war for independence in 1945-1949 was chosen in this discussion because at that time Indonesia had declared its independence as a sovereign nation. Thus, it has clearly defined the boundaries of the parties loyal to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and the parties who betrayed Indonesian independence. From this historical experience, it may become a meaningful lesson in developing a future Total War Strategy. For the Armed Forces, the history of the struggle for independence also contained materials for developing theories on the problem of tactics and organization. Therefore we must try to record the history of the struggle for independence as completely and honestly as possible (Simatupang, 1981).

2. Method

The method used in the preparation of this article is qualitative research using a historical approach. This research is descriptive which seeks to provide a specific description of a situation, mechanism, and process based on elementary information which in turn will produce an explanation of the phenomenon under study (Neuman, 1994). The analysis in this research was carried out by studying the documents. In the document study, the data collection used was historical data tracing. Historical data related to the independence war in 1945-1949 were collected and carried out historical analysis using a qualitative approach. The data that has been collected is processed into relevant data or as criticism. The process of criticism explains whether the source is valid, according to time and place, can be trusted, and so on. Furthermore, the interpretation of the data is carried out to be processed into facts accompanied by objective interpretations, without any tendency or interest. The final step is a presentation in written form, namely historiography (Bungin, 2007).

3. *Devide et Impera* Part II

The Allied victory in World War II on August 15, 1945, resulted in the Allies having the right to Japanese rule in various colonies including Indonesia. With the enactment of the Civil Affairs Agreement, on 23 August 1945, the British together with the Netherlands troops landed in Sabang, Aceh. Furthermore, on September 15, 1945, the British army as the allied representative arrived in Jakarta accompanied by the Netherlands representative to the allies, Dr. Charles van der Plas. The presence of allied troops was also accompanied by NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) led by Dr. Hubertus J van Mook, to open negotiations based on Queen Wilhelmina's radio broadcast speech in 1942 (conception of state), which stated that a commonwealth would be formed led by

the Queen of the Netherlands with members including the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies (Iqbal, 2010).

The situation encountered by the allies and the Netherlands was beyond their expectations because Indonesia had declared its independence, even though this was not recognized by the Netherlands. The desire of the Netherlands to return to occupy Indonesia had an impact on the revival of the spirit of the Indonesian nation's struggle to be able to defend its independence. Resistance and fighting took place in several regions in the country to oppose and oppose the presence of allied forces and NICA, such as the Bojong Kokosan battle led by Lt. Col. Eddie Sukardi, the November 10 incident in Surabaya led by Colonel Sungkono, the Medan Area battle led by Colonel Achmad Tahir, Palagan Ambarawa led by Colonel Soedirman, etc.

Facing this situation, the Netherlands tried to re-implement their strategy during the colonial period, namely divide et impera to be able to divide the unity of Indonesia. The politics of divide et impera were considered an outdated strategy in the colonial era, but this strategy was still used by the Netherlands to be able to continue their rule in Indonesia. Machiavelli ([1521] 2003) in his book *Art of War* describes this strategy as a strategy carried out by war leaders to weaken the concentration of enemy resistance, "A Captain ought, among all the other actions of his, endeavor with every art to divide the forces of the enemy, either by making him suspicious of his men in whom he trusted, or by giving him cause that he has to separate his forces, and, because of this, become weaker." The quote illustrates that this strategy is used to be able to seize power and maintain power by dividing the resistance of large groups into small groups so that they are easy to subdue, and preventing the possibility of these small groups from being able to reunite. The goal of using this strategy is to be able to divide while maintaining its condition or even be able to expand the division in opposing groups.

The efforts made by the Netherlands to re-implement the divide et impera at that time had succeeded in dividing Indonesia into states, namely: the State of East Indonesia (now Papua), the State of East Sumatera, the State of Madura, the State of Pasundan, the State of South Sumatera, and the State of Java. East (Putra, 2014). Of course, this is a big question, how could the Netherlands be able to carry out the divide et impera strategy after Indonesian independence? This question is answered if we look at the fact that the Netherlands was able to regroup native parties which during the colonial era provided support to the Netherlands.

Before the outbreak of World War II, many educated natives preferred to become colonial employees of the Netherlands Indies. They felt a more settled life by becoming employees of the Netherlands Indies colonial, with guaranteed regular income, facilities, and positions that were considered higher. The choice to take up arms against the Netherlands colonial government would certainly pose a big risk to their lives. Another group was indigenous people who were members of the colonial military who were members of the Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger (KNIL). Apart from that, there were also private parties who were pro-colonial, who usually worked for companies or became traders. The private sector often became the eyes and ears of the Netherlands intelligence called the Nederlands Force Intelligence Service (NEFIS). There were reasons for their economic, power and, religious background so that they sided with the Netherlands colonialists. Their existence had a big role in extending the Netherlands colonization of the country for hundreds of years. After Indonesian independence, many of them remained loyal to the Kingdom of the Netherlands by assisting the Netherlands efforts to re-occupy Indonesia.

4. The Members of the Netherlands troops are Indigenous

To face resistance from the Indonesian army, the Netherlands again formed special units and units to strengthen their troops, some of whose members also came from natives. The Netherlands formed the Infantry Battalion V (5e Bataljon Infanterie) or known as the "Andjng NICA Battalion," on December 2, 1945, in Bandung, when a period of conflict and social chaos had occurred since the Japanese surrender to the allies (Saleh, 2000). This battalion was known for its courage and cruelty in counter-guerrilla operations and was involved in Military Aggression I and Military Aggression II. Members of this Battalion consisted of former Dutch and Indo prisoners of war and internees, as well as indigenous people who registered, mainly from Ambon, Manado,

Timor, Java, and Sunda. This battalion was nicknamed "Andjing NICA" because they used the badge "barking dog" as the identity of the battalion's emblem, something the Indonesian nationalists did not know coincidentally as a kind of insult to those who supported the Netherlands (Oostindie, 2016). The Andjing NICA Battalion is part of Brigade V, which has the duty and responsibility to protect the Bandung area and its surroundings from various activities of Indonesian independence fighters who they consider to be terrorists.

Apart from the NICA Andjing Battalion, the Netherlands also formed 1e Parachutisten Compagnie (1e Para Cie). It was a paratrooper unit formed on the suggestion of Lieutenant PE Van Beek at the end of 1945. On March 1, 1946, starting with the formation of the School voor Opleiding van Parachutisten (SOP), then on May 1, 1947 on the orders of Lieutenant General Spoor, stood 1e Parachutisten Compagnie (1e Para Cie) led by Captain Sisselaar. The 1e Para Cie troops were dominated by soldiers from Europe, but there were also indigenous soldiers from the Ambon Tribe who were prominent among the paratroopers. To support its military operations, the Netherlands also formed a special force, namely the Depot Speciale Troepen (DST). The DST unit was formed on the advice of Captain W.J. Schepens on 15 July 1946 in Jakarta, initially, the members of the DST were taken from volunteers. In January 1948, the DST was renamed the Korps Speciale Troepen (KST) led by Captain Westerling, with his trademark green beret. In the early stages, this troop educated around 1,250 soldiers consisting of Dutch War Volunteers (OVW'ers), Indo-European soldiers, and indigenous soldiers.

The Netherlands effort to recruit and mobilize natives was also carried out by forming the Hare Majesteit's Ongeregelde Troepen (HMOT), The Queen's Non-organic Forces. This troop was formed by Lieutenant Koert Bavinck, intelligence officer of Battalion 3-9-Regiment Infanterie. The majority of HMOT members are former members of Laskar Rakyat Djakarta Raya (LRDR), which is the largest Laskar group in the East Jakarta area (Karawang-Bekasi). The LRDR has a political line that is opposite to the Indonesian government, this is the reason the Indonesian Republic Army on April 17, 1947, carried out an attack that disintegrated the LRDR's power. As many as three hundred frustrated Panji-led LRDR members were recruited by the Netherlands into a troop unit which was later named HMOT (Elands, Gils, & Schoenmaker, 1996). The existence of the champions in the Netherlands troops was also involved in Military Aggression I, they were not only as guides but also fought like professional soldiers. The existence of HMOT also contributed significantly to the seizure of the Karawang and Cikampek areas by the Netherlands on 23 July 1947 (Cribb, 2010).

5. Netherlands Spy Agency

The revolutionary period or the era of the Indonesian independence war in 1945-1949 was a period full of chaos, according to Ricklefs (1991) that "academic investigations of the Revolution attempted to obtain a kind of structure regarding an essentially chaotic period." This period of chaos made things uncertain. Information circulating in the community about social and political conditions in Indonesia is confusing. In this period it is difficult to be able to ascertain the difference between friend and foe, it is almost imperceptible. This is due to the development of slander and the issue of spies between one party and another. The situation was increasingly confusing with a lot of news and information flow about the Indonesian situation with no clear source of news, which made the atmosphere tense. The party considered to have played a major role in creating this situation and worsening the situation during the Indonesian revolution was Netherlands intelligence.

The Netherlands recruited indigenous people to become spy agents, as part of an intelligence operation carried out by the NEFIS-Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (De Moor, 2015). This strategy allowed anyone to become a potential Netherlands accomplice or spy. The boundaries between friend or foe became unclear because the Netherlands also used Indonesians to support their efforts to re-occupy Indonesia. This situation also made it easy for anyone to accuse or be accused of being a Netherlands spy. The natives who became Netherlands spies were known as "NICA agents," even though they were employed by NEFIS because NICA was not a military organization, but a temporary transitional form of civilian government. To be able to carry out the recruitment of spies, NEFIS often used a provocation strategy to play against fellow children of the nation, with this strategy many indigenous people later became Netherlands spies (Tantri, 1960).

By using native agents, it was easier for the Netherlands to enter the Republic's territory and observe their movements closely. Spy agents who were informants from the indigenous civilian population were also frequently tasked with obtaining information about the Republic's military strength. These spy agents in their daily lives dress like ordinary people, such as farmers or traders in the market, they sometimes even wear uniforms of warriors or Laskar when carrying out a mission (Nordholt, 1997). These informants are willing to do the work because NEFIS offers a reward in the form of money, food, sarongs, or clothes (NEFIS / CMI Archives). Very difficult conditions and the shadow of poverty and hunger made many of them willing to take the job, even at the risk of risking their lives.

The existence of this spy agency also almost caused a guerrilla war led by General Soedirman to experience failure and destruction. When the night before leaving Dasun, a mysterious man suspected of being a Netherlands spy asked Sudirman's whereabouts. Responding to this, when they heard the news that the Netherlands had arrived at Pagung, Sudirman's troops decided to look for another safer place. To outwit the Netherlands spy, a plan was made to distract him. One of the Young Marine Lieutenants, Heru Kesser who looks like Soedirman, is dressed to resemble Soedirman. He was also stretched using a stretcher that Soedirman used. The fake Sudirman on a stretcher headed to the new post (southwest of Kediri) accompanied by Soepardjo Rustam. Meanwhile, the original Soedirman was carried towards Parang Village. After walking for several hours in the opposite direction, they were then able to catch up with Soedirman's group, who were no longer stretched. This diversion plan was successful so that Soedirman could continue his guerilla (Tjokropranolo, 1993). Soedirman was fortunate to have loyal friends and soldiers and received the support of the people who were sympathetic to his struggle, they worked together to make a stretcher to go down a road that was not easy to reach with his increasingly severe illness (Asura, 2015).

Another incident that showed the existence of treason by the Netherlands spy agency was also proven by the arrest of the guerrillas "Pangeran Papak's Army." The Papak Pengeran Troops are part of the Siliwangi Division troops that remain in West Java, not following the move to Central Java. This strategy led to continued resistance against the Netherlands in West Java, such as the ambush and attacks on Netherlands military posts in the Karawang, Purwakarta, and Garut areas. The actions taken by Pangeran Papak's troops were quite disturbing for the Netherlands because there were former Japanese soldiers who joined in the guerrilla and fought to defend Indonesia, namely: Yang Chil Sung (Komarudin), Hasegawa (Abubakar), and Masahiro Aoki (Usman). The Netherlands responded to this condition by creating an elite team of hunters, namely Yon 3-14-RI (Regiment Infanterie) led by Colonel P.W. Van Duin, to arrest the former Japanese soldiers (Jo Hendi, 2018). The Dutch did not hesitate to give big rewards to anyone who wanted to spy and provide information to them. This tactic was successful, the Netherlands launched an ambush operation at Mount Dora, Parentas Village (Garut-Tasikmalaya border) on 25-26 October 1948, and captured the three former Japanese soldiers and Lieutenant Djoehana. The success of the Netherlands was obtained due to information from spy agencies regarding the location and whereabouts of Pangeran Papak's troops.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

The Indonesian state defense system implements a total defense system that demands awareness of the rights and obligations of all citizens to defend the country in order to realize its totality. The awareness of defending the state during the independence war in 1945-1949 has not been fully realized. History has recorded several incidents of betrayal of the nation's struggle by certain individuals and groups or often dubbed "Dutch stooges" who wanted to gain personal or group gain at the expense of the nation's interests. Betrayal of the national struggle was carried out either by joining forces with the Netherlands formation or as a spy agent for the Netherlands.

This article discusses a historical review of the 1945-1949 war of independence which focused on treason committed by certain individuals and groups of the Indonesian nation for personal or group gain. This becomes quite interesting when efforts to build the spirit of defending the country today will be faced with challenges in the form of betrayal by some of our own nation. The treasonous efforts carried out are of course inseparable

from the divide et impera politics applied by foreigners. Faced with current conditions, further research on the politics of divide et impera needs to be carried out as proof that whether this politics is still relevant today?

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