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Implementation of the Philippines-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol in the Sea Border Area of Indonesia and the Philippines from the Sea Power Perspective

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Abstract

The Philippines-Indonesia coordinated patrol (Corpat Philindo) is an implementation of the 1975 Border Patrol Agreement (BPA) which was carried out on a scheduled basis by the two countries in the context of securing the Indonesia-Philippines maritime border. Corpat philindo is the response of the two countries to the existence of traditional border crossers of border communities as well as to guarantee the country's sovereignty from criminal acts and law violations in the border sea between Indonesia and the Philippines. The purpose of this study is to determine the advantages and disadvantages of implementing the Corpat Philindo which have been implemented from the perspective of marine power. The theories used in the analysis are international cooperation security theory and sea power theory. This study uses qualitative data analysis techniques using secondary data and then uses theory to identify a process of events that the author studied. The results of this study conclude that the use of defense equipment, operational areas and support bases in the Corpat Philindo have not yet fulfilled the embodiment of sea power in the Philippines-Indonesia border sea.

Keywords: Patrol, Border, Sea Power

1. Introduction

Indonesia and the Philippines are two neighboring countries directly adjacent to the north of Indonesia and have a long history of cooperative relations, especially residents in border areas. The group of islands in the northern part of the Indonesian island of Sulawesi which borders the mainland of the Philippines, namely the Sangihe Islands, the Talaud Islands and the Sitaro Islands which are commonly referred to as Nusa Utara. The geographic position of Nusa Utara which is closer to the mainland of the Philippines is the main reason the people of Nusa Utara Tenggara prefer the South Philippine mainland for their economic activities over the mainland of Sulawesi. In addition, the maritime culture that is characteristic of the Sangihe Talaud people is also one of the factors that support their spread so that they can settle in the southern Philippines border area. There are

approximately 7,483 Sangihe Talaud people living in the Provinces of South Cotabato, Davao Del Sur, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Zamboanga, Cotabato City, Davao Oriental, Samal Island in Davao Province, Davao City and most of them live in Balut and Sarangani Islands.(Musyaqqat, 2019).

This traditional transnational economic activity will be a threat to the defense and security of both countries if it is exploited by irresponsible people by committing transnational crimes. Realizing this, the two countries agreed to sign 2 agreements, namely the Border Patrol Agreement (BPA) and the Border Crossing Agreement (BCA) through a meeting of the border committee of the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines (Republic of Indonesia-Republic of The Philippine Border Committee / RIRPBC) on March 11, 1975 in Manila (RIRPBC, 2017). The agreement reaffirmed the purpose of the Revised Treaty on Direct Relations and Coordinated Patrol Operations in All Regions between the Philippines and Indonesia which was signed on 25 July 1963 as well as the affirmation of ideas at the Two-country Conference held on 29-30 May 1974, in Manado, Indonesia, between President Marcos from the Philippines and President Soeharto from Indonesia (RIRPBC, 2017, p. 4).

Over time, RIRPBC has changed its name according to the code or International Call Sign, the current country name to IDPHBC (Indonesia-Philippines Border Committee). The name change was agreed upon during the Chairmen Conference XXXIX in Davao City in 2020. the chairman of the Indonesian Border Committee is chaired by the Commander of Koarmada II while the Philippine Border Committee is chaired by the Commander of the Eastern Mindanao Command (Eastmincomm).

In its implementation, BPA has implemented the agreement in the border committee through the implementation of border security patrols which are carried out on a scheduled basis by the two Marines in the Indonesia-Philippines coordinated patrol program (Corpat Philindo). The coordinating patrol between the two countries is an effort to act at the same time to demonstrate the maritime power of the two countries as a deterrent effect or deterrent power in anticipating criminal acts and law violations at the border sea. Corpat Philindo uses patrol units from Koarmada II (formerly Koarmatim) and patrol units from NFEM (Naval Force Eastmincomm).

In addition to guarding the border, Corpat Philindo is used to build trust and teamwork in border patrols as well as to improve interoperability between Eastmincomm and Koarmada II. Coordinated patrols between Indonesia and the Philippines are carried out by the Navy of the two countries every year or more according to the needs and agreements of both parties. This activity uses the code name CORPAT PHILINDO in its implementation. Until now, Corpat Philindo itself has implemented this agreement for the 34th time with the code name CORPAT PHILINDO XXXIV.

Although this coordinated patrol has been carried out up to 34 times, the Indonesia-Philippines maritime border has never been separated from security issues such as robbery, piracy at sea, Illegal Fishing, Illegal Entry and others. Since 2016, the intensity of piracy crimes that occurred in the waters of Sulawesi-Sulu has increased. According to data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), in 2016 there were 16 cases of piracy and hostage-taking.(Febriana, 2019, p. 440). And lastly, 2 hostages took place in 2018 and 2 others took place in 2019 (ICC, 2020). With some of these incidents, it is worth seeing to what extent Patkor Philindo's ability shows the power of the sea in the context of deterrence and control of the sea in the maritime border areas of the two countries

The theoretical basis used in this paper is The concept of Cooperative Security and the theory of sea power. According to Michael Moodley, the concept of cooperative security is generally defined as a process in which countries with common interests join through an agreed mechanism to reduce tension and suspicion, resolve or reduce disputes, build self-confidence, improve prospects for economic development. , and maintain stability in their region (Michael Moodie. 2000) (Febriana, 2019, p. 442). Meanwhile (Muladi. 2010: 1) provides a definition of cooperative security, encouraging countries to take a collaborative approach aimed at building multilateral efforts without assuming a relationship between friends and enemies. Thus it is an attempt to achieve security with others.

Regarding sea power, Marsetio (2013) formulates sea power which means the ability of a country to use and control the sea (sea control) and prevent opponents from using it (sea denial). In addition, sea power can also be interpreted as a country that has a strong naval power (Marsetio, 2013, p. 3). Meanwhile, according to Alfred Thayer Mahan in Warsono (2020), he believes that good political leadership and the Navy are no less important than geography when it comes to developing sea power. He said the Navy's primary mission was to secure naval command, which would allow the maintenance of naval communications for its own ships while denying its use to adversaries and, if necessary, closely monitoring neutral trade. Sea control can be achieved not by destroying trade but only by destroying or neutralizing enemy fleets (Marsono, 2020, p. 6). In line with Mahan's thinking, this approach is seen in the thought of Corbet (2005) who discusses how the use of Navy force where the focus of the strategic concept of a large maritime state is on Navy power (Corbett, 2005).

From some of the opinions of these experts, it is clear that the role of the Navy is significant in realizing a country's naval power. It can be concluded that sea power is the ability of a country to control and control the sea for its own interests and avoid the opponent's use of it.

2. Method

This research is structured based on library research, namely conducting research on books, scientific literature and other written sources as the main object (Bakry Umar Suryadi, 2016).

The type of research used is descriptive research in which the author describes Indonesia's efforts to secure the waters of the Indonesia-Philippines border. The type of data used in this research is secondary data, namely data obtained from a literature study and the results of searching through the internet. The data collection technique used in this research is literature review. The data analysis technique used is qualitative data analysis techniques, namely the author uses secondary data, then uses theory to identify a process of events that the author is studying.

3. Results

In accordance with the operating concept agreed upon in the two-state agreement that the implementation of coordinated patrol operations be carried out twice a year. However, its implementation can change according to the needs and agreements of the two countries where these changes can be appointed during the meeting of the Border Committee chairmen in the RIRPBC Chairmen Conference which is held annually.

The implementation involved units of the Navy warships and maritime patrol aircraft of the two countries. This is in accordance with the agreement between the two countries written in Article III of the BPA regarding the Concept of Operation which reads "The Concept of Operations shall primarily consist of air and/or naval patrols in the border areas between the two States. Further detailed operational requirements and procedures to enhance the patrol effort and make it responsive to the purpose of this Agreement shall be left to the operating levels of plan, coordinate and implement" (RIRPBC, 2017, p. 5).

Defense Equipment

In general, it can be stated that the use of the Navy defense equipment of the two countries involved in the CORPAT PHILINDO in the last 4 years can be presented in the table as follows:

Table 1: List of defense equipment in the CORPAT PHILINDO

No	Corpatt Philindo	Time	Units
1.	XXX	23-27 Mei 2016	KRI Sura-802 BRP Pangasinan PS31
2.	XXXI	3 - 6 Mei 2017	KRI Kerapu-812 BRP Ramon Alcaras FF16
3.	XXXII	4-21 Juli 2018	KRI Parang-648 BRP Cebu PS31
4.	XXXIII	17-26 Juli 2019	KRI Tombak-629 BRP Emilio Jasinto PS35
5.	XXXIV phase 1	12-15 Juli 2020	KRI Pandrong-801 BRP Apolinario Mabini PS-36 Pesud PN NV-390
6.	XXXIV phase 2	7-10 Oktober 2020	KRI Kakap-811 BRP Apolinario Mabini PS-36
7.	XXXIV phase 3	26-27 November 2020	KRI Malahayati-362 KRI Bima Suci-945 Maritime patrol aircraft U-6207 BRP Apolinario Mabini PS-36

Source: Report of ILO TNI for the period 2015-2020

From these data, it can be seen that the dominance of the units involved in the 2016-2020 CORPAT PHILINDO is the Fast Patrol Boat (FPB) (Indomiliter, 2019) type warship the Kakap class and the Jacinto class Corvette patrol (maxdefense, 2019). In general, both have the capabilities as in the following table:

Table 2: CORPAT PHILINDO's defense equipment capability

No	Dimensions	FPB57	Jacinto
1.	Speed	28,1 knot	25 knot
2.	Sensor	Surface radar	Surface radar
3.	Weapon	1x 40 mm 2x 20mm	1x 76 mm 1x 25mm 2x 20 mm 2x 12,7 mm

Source: processed by researchers

Both types of ships have anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare capabilities.

Operation Area

The agreement also stipulates that the designated operational area is the water and air area between the two countries. The focus of the operational area is determined by each commander in the field when carrying out operational planning before sailing to carry out sea patrols. The determination of the Area of Operation in each implementation of the CORPAT PHILINDO varies depending on several factors such as weather conditions, time available and the goals to be achieved in the CORPAT PHILINDO activity. In general, the description of

the Area of Operation on the implementation of the CORPAT PHILINDO XXX - XXXIII can be conveyed as follows:

CORPAT PHILINDO XXXI/17, The two naval ships of the two countries departed together from the NFEM Davao City base to the area of operation and ended at the Lantamal VIII Manado base (Kusuma, 2017, p. 69).




Figure 1: Operation Area of the CORPAT PHILINDO XXXI /17.

CORPAT PHILINDO XXXI/18, The two naval vessels of the two countries meet at the meeting point according to what has been agreed to carry out joint patrol operations in the waters of Tibanban, Philippines (Jacobus, 2019, p. 62).




Figure 2: Operation Area of the CORPAT PHILINDO XXXII /18.

CORPAT PHILINDO XXXIII/19, The two naval ships of the two countries met at the meeting point at point 4 as agreed to carry out joint patrol operations around points 5 and 6 (Jacobus, 2019, p. 65)




Figure 3: Operation Area of the CORPAT PHILINDO XXXIII /19.

CORPAT PHILINDO XXXIV/20 PHASE 1, The two Navy ships of the two countries met at point 5 in accordance with what had been agreed to carry out joint patrol operations around point 5 and point 6.




Figure 4: Operation Area of the CORPAT PHILINDO XXXIV /20 Phase1.

The implementation of coordinated patrols for 2020 will only be carried out at the Sea phase without the Harbor phase due to the Covid19 pandemic (Widodo, 2020b).

CORPAT PHILINDO XXXIV/20 PHASE 2 AND 3, The two Navy ships of the two countries met at point 4 in accordance with what had been agreed to carry out joint patrol operations around point 4 and point 5 (Widodo, 2020a).




Figure 5: Operation Area of the CORPAT PHILINDO XXXIV/20 Phase 2 and 3.

If we pay attention to the implementation of CORPAT PHILINDO XXX/16 – XXXIV/20, the focus of the operation area is on the border areas in the Nusa Utara Islands and Balut Island, Philippines. This is of course due to various considerations including the traditional cross-border activities of the two countries which are still dominated in this area as illustrated in the map as follows:




Figure 6: CORPAT PHILINDO's dominant area.

This is also reinforced by the majority of people and goods crossing which are dominated by passers who depart from Balut Island in the southern Philippines to the Indonesian Nusa Utara archipelago or vice versa.

Naval Base

In implementing this patrol concept or method used in the implementation of the CORPAT PHILINDO, the patrol units of the two countries depart from the initial base jointly to the area of operation and end at the destination base in accordance with the agreement between the two countries. However, the method can change according to the needs and agreement of both parties. There are two bases used in the implementation of this patrol, namely Main Naval Base VIII Manado Indonesia and Naval Force Eastmincom (NFEM) Davao City

Philippines. If the initial base used is Manado Indonesia, the final base as the destination will be Davao City, Philippines. Thus the implementation is carried out alternately every year.

Of course, the appointment of these two cities as support bases in the CORPAT PHILINDO has a consideration because the two cities are the respective command places for the Navy of the two countries. This is why the Liaison Officer who is tasked with helping to facilitate the smooth communication of the Navy's two countries is also stationed in Manado and Davao City on a reciprocal basis. This is in accordance with the agreement in the BPA Article II Command, Liaison and Communication (RIRPBC, 2017, p. 5). "The duties and responsibilities of the Liaison Officers shall be determined by their respective military commanders, and shall be located at the following places:"

- Philippine Liaison Officer – Manado
- Indonesia Liaison Officer - Davao City

Furthermore, until now the implementation of Corpat Philindo has always used these two bases to support the smooth running of border patrols.




Figure 7: Position and base relations for CORPAT PHILINDO supporters

4. Discussion

The desire of the two countries to maintain stability and security in the border area through several agreements is a concept of cooperative security in which Indonesia and the Philippines with common interests join through agreed mechanisms such as the BPA and BCA 1975 to reduce tension and suspicion, resolve or reduce disputes, build confidence, increase prospects economic development and maintaining stability in the border region of the two countries. The cooperation in securing the border between the two countries has built trust and positive relations between the two countries. This CORPAT PHILINDO is proof of this belief. This is also in line with what was conveyed by the Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Yudho Margono that "priority programs in the field of enhancing the capability of the Indonesian Navy in facing non-conventional threat security are to increase professionalism of soldiers and strengthen diplomatic relations between the Indonesian Navy and other navies of other countries"(Airspace Review, 2020).

This relationship exists without the presumption of friend and foe relationships. Thus it is an attempt to achieve security with others. Indeed, basically sea power or naval power as conveyed by AT Mahan is not just the use of Navy power alone, but the use of naval force is used as an instrument of diplomacy, deterrence and political influence in peacetime is an important part of the element of sea power (Marsetio, 2015, p. 8). The use of the Navy of the two countries in the CORPAT PHILINDO is an effort to provide a deterrent effect against the possibility of criminal acts and non-conventional threats in the Indonesia-Philippines border area.

CORPAT PHILINDO, which was carried out by the Navy of the two countries to ensure the maintenance of marine communication for ships passing from the two countries, securing sea command and denying control or use of the border sea of the two countries by opposing parties such as pirates, terrorism, fish thieves and etc. This

is in accordance with Alfred Thayer Mahan's thinking in which he believed that the Navy's primary mission was to secure naval command, which would allow the maintenance of naval communications for its own ships while denying its use to adversaries and, if necessary, closely monitoring neutral trade (Marsono, 2020, p. 68).

In line with Mahan's thinking, this approach is seen in the thought of Corbet (2005) who discusses how the use of Navy force where the focus of the strategic concept of a large maritime state is on Navy power (Corbett, 2005). Make it clear that the role of the Navy through CORPAT PHILINDO is to realize the maritime power of the two countries in an effort to control and control the sea for its own interests and avoid the opponent's use of it.

Defense Equipment

In peacetime, the use of the Navy can be used as maritime diplomacy to influence the behavior of state or non-state actors. This is commonly known as Gun Boat Diplomacy where "Gun Boat diplomacy is the overt display, demonstration, threat or use of limited sea-based force by state or non-state actors designed to coerce an opponent to further a political goal, often unstead, by compellence or deterrence" (Sir James Cables in Griffin, 2005: 109) (Nugraha & Sudirman, 2016, p. 2). In the context of Patkor Philindo, the use of the Navy's forces from both countries is aimed at vibrating non-state actors or as deterrence to parties that have the potential to pose a threat to the sovereignty of the two countries.

In its implementation, CORPAT PHILINDO uses units of the Navy of the two countries as its implementation in the field. From several times its implementation it is known that the units involved from the two dominant countries used patrol type warships (FPB Class and Jacinto Class). This must have been a consideration and without reason because this type of ship is considered capable of facing threats as mentioned in attachment "A" BPA 1975 where there are no threats or military opponents in the sense of warships of foreign navies or third countries that are mentioned as threats to both countries. In attachment "A", BPA 1975 states the types of threats and criminal acts such as smuggling, piracy, intrusion, infiltration, illegal entry, illegal fishing, illegal fire arms and other illegal activities (RIRPBC, 2017, p. 10). The ability of Maneuver, sensors and weapons can have a deterrent effect or deterrence against perpetrators of crimes categorized as threats. Faced with the threat set by the two countries in the BPA 1975, the patrol boats involved in CORPAT PHILINDO could have a dreadful effect and deterred the use of the sea by the parties categorized as a threat.

From the speed dimension, these two types of ships cannot yet be categorized as fast patrol boats because they have a maximum speed of 28 knots or below 30 knots, which should have been the speed of a fast patrol boat to reach 40 knots (Lurssen, 2020). This speed is needed when facing threats such as smuggling ships and pirates who often use ships or speedboats at high speed to carry out their actions. However, if only confronted with non-conventional forms of threat in the form of illegal fishing, it is sufficient to deal with it.

From the dimensions of the weaponry that is attached the smallest caliber is 12.7 mm. This caliber can already have a deterrent effect on pirates and pirates which could potentially occur on borders. The dither effect was amplified by the other larger caliber which was installed as the patrol boat's weapon system. Based on the dimensions of speed and weaponry, the units of the CORPAT PHILINDO can provide influence, control and deterrence against threats at the border sea. However, the ability of the dimensions of speed and weaponry is considered unable to provide control of the ocean without the support of detection sensors and surveillance is faced with the width and length of the Indonesia-Philippines border area which reaches 1,162.2 km or 627.5 nautical miles (Devi, 2017, p. 93). It would be very difficult to rely solely on the surface radar sensors of the patrol boats. To be able to cover the shortage of ships regarding detection, maritime aircraft can be used to be used as "eyes in the air". In line with Geoffrey Till's thoughts which teaches that to develop a navy and control technology requires an airplane as an early warning for supervision (Hidayat, 2019, p. 325). The minimal use of maritime aircraft defense equipment in CORPAT PHILINDO has implications for the weak monitoring and detection of coordinated patrol marine forces facing the vast area that must be monitored. In other words, the marine power in CORPAT PHILINDO can provide a control, control and deterrence effect from the dimensions

of the defense equipment that is limited to the operational area not to the entire maritime border area of the two countries.

Operation Area

As previously stated, the CORPAT PHILINDO was implemented in the Indonesia-Philippines sea border area. In accordance with the operating concept stipulated in the BPA agreement that the determination of the area or area of operation in the CORPAT PHILINDO is carried out according to the mutual agreement discussed before carrying out border sea patrols. From the results of research on the implementation of CORPAT PHILINDO for the last 4 years, it is known that the dominant implementation of CORPAT PHILINDO was carried out in the border area between the Islands of Nusa Utara Indonesia and Balut Island of the Philippines. This means that there are areas that CORPAT PHILINDO cannot yet cover. The areas that CORPAT PHILINDO have not been able to cover are around the Sulawesi Sea and Sulu Sea.




Figure 8: Uncoverage Area CORPAT PHILINDO

The absence of this area is due to the separation of the areas of authority and command in the Indonesia-Philippines maritime border area in the Philippines by the AFP (Armed Forces of The Philippines) between Eastmincom (Eastern Mindanao Command) and Westmincom (Western Mindanao Command). As the management of PHBC (Philippines Border Committee) is handed over to Eastmincomm, the chairman of PHBC is held by the Eastmincomm Commander. Therefore, the implementation of Patkor Philindo to date can only be carried out in the Eastmincomm work area and cannot be carried out in the Eastmincomm area. The limit of authority between Eastmincomm and Westmincomm lies at position 04 ° 29.1 'N 124 ° 04.7' E (Kusuma, 2017, p. 63).

From the Indonesian side, it is no longer an obstacle because the border area between Indonesia and the Philippines is under the control of Koarmada II, where Koarmada II Commander acts as chairman of the IDBC (Indonesia Border Committee). This certainly has an impact on not all border areas being controlled and controlled by the two countries through this CORPAT PHILINDO. From the operational area dimension, sea power cannot be realized in the border area through CORPAT PHILINDO due to the presence of patrol units only in part of the border area, namely between the islands of Nusa Utara Indonesia and Balut Island of Sarangani Philippines. The ability to influence the enemy, in this case the cause of the border threat, cannot be done as the understanding of the definition of the sea power theory regarding the ability of a country to control the sea and prevent the opponent from using the sea itself (Marsetio, 2013). The absence of the territory from the presence of patrol units which causes the area to be used as a communication channel for opponents and the area in which they act.

In addition, Mahan's statement in (Marsono 2020) that the Navy was held to protect its own trade and disrupt trade against opponents. The way to do both is to rule the sea. From the operational area dimension in the implementation of the CORPAT PHILINDO, it is clear that this understanding cannot be realized because the

CORPAT PHILINDO boats cannot be present along the sea of Indonesia-Philippines border as a result of the separation of territorial authority from the Philippines.

The decision by PHBC leaders to be able to facilitate the implementation of the CORPAT PHILINDO along the Indonesia-Philippines border will have a major impact on efforts to manifest sea power along the borders of the two countries. This is in line with Mahan's belief that good political leadership is no less important than geography when it comes to developing sea power. Then all will return to the political will of the leadership of each country.

Naval Base

The main purpose of naval bases in general is to provide shelter, repair and supplies for ships and rest and recreation for the crew, to act as a focus of force as close to potential adversaries as possible, to be part of the voyage, to warn against enemy attack, and to ensure control of delivery by our self (Pandjaitan et al., 2019, p. 24).

The use of the Navy bases of the two countries aims to support the patrol boats of the two countries involved in CORPAT PHILINDO. As a result of the research, the bases available and used during the implementation of the CORPAT PHILINDO were the Manado Navy base and the Davao Philippine NFEM base. The two bases take turns getting the opportunity to host the opening and closing of the CORPAT PHILINDO. The two bases can provide support as any other Navy base functions in the world such as logistical support, repair, crew recreation, health and others.

Regarding the use of naval bases, Corbett argues that in naval warfare the deployment is very important. He believed that the level of division required was proportional to the number of Navy ports where the enemy could act against maritime interests alone and the extent of the coastlines over which they were spread (Bartholomees, 2012, p. 318). Provides the understanding that the deployment of the forces of Navy ships must be in accordance with the number of enemy bases scattered along the coast which can interfere with maritime interests themselves. Departing from this idea CORPAT PHILINDO should be able to use other naval bases in the border area to reduce and anticipate the movement of threats that may spread along the coasts of the two countries. It is certain that the beach in question is a beach that faces and has access to the sea borders of the two countries. Referring to Corbett's opinion, of course, the use of other bases is very important in order to be able to bring maritime powers in the area along the border between the two countries more evenly.

In line with Corbett's thoughts on the use of bases, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who had thoughts about controlling the sea by using the strength of a large concentrated Navy fleet to defeat the enemy fleet by fighting it, had to be supported by coal refueling bases or stations spread over the whole world (Bartholomees, 2012, p. 315). Base support is inseparable from the system in theory Sea Power itself. The existence or presence of a marine fleet in an area is due to the supporting force behind it, namely the base.

The use that is concentrated only on the two naval bases of the two countries, namely Manado and Davao City in each event for the implementation of the CORPAT PHILINDO, causes the spread and presence of the patrol ships involved to be uneven along the border of the two countries.

It will be different when CORPAT PHILINDO involves other naval commander spread across the sea borders of the two countries so that at least the route that is passed when carrying out border patrols can bring patrol boats at the border through this coordinated patrol activity. Other base uses are the Main Naval Base XIII Tarakan and the Philippines Naval Force Westmincomm (NFWM) base as illustrated in the following figure:




Figure 9: Naval Base in Corpat Philindo (proposed)

The involvement of the Westmincomm NFWM base and the Lantamal XIII Tarakan will provide a different concept of the Corpat Philindo operation from before with the aim of the presence and control of the sea borders of the two countries through this activity will be accommodated.

CONCLUSIONS

The implementation of the CORPAT PHILINDO as an implementation of the border agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines in the BPA 1975 has built the trust of the two countries in the concept of cooperation security. Apart from dealing with threats that can arise at the border, this border patrol activity can increase the confidence of the navies of the two countries in carrying out border security together. Increase professionalism and interoperability in a joint operation.

In general, Corpat Philindo is still unable to fulfill the rules of embodiment of Sea Power in the maritime borders of the two countries due to the minimum use of maritime patrol aircraft which has an impact on the weak sensing capability and surveillance coverage in patrols, the two areas of operation that have not reached the entire border area of Indonesia-Philippines and third is that other naval bases have not been involved which can support the implementation of this patrol.

However, within the scope of local security, the existence of CORPAT PHILINDO has been able to provide a deterrence effect and control of the sea around the operation area by using units of fast patrol boats while at the same time refuting AT Mahan's opinion about Sea Power which must be formed and built by tough, large warships, large and armed with a large caliber too. This is because the threat of sea power during the Mahan era which still focuses on the strength of the opposing fleet is different from today's threats, especially in border areas which require patrol boats with high maneuverability, fast and armed with medium caliber in facing the threat of transnational crime.

In addition, Mahan's opinion about using naval warships to deal with pirates is a waste that cannot be justified. This is due to the fact that the current threat spectrum shifts to anything that can interfere with the country's sovereignty will be considered a threat so that at this time robbers and pirates are factual threats at sea that must be faced by the Navy as a marine power itself.

RECOMMENDATION

To be able to realize Sea Power in CORPAT PHILINDO in the Indonesia-Philippines border area, at least one maritime patrol aircraft should be involved in every implementation of this coordinated border patrol operation. Next is the operational area which must cover the borders of the two countries. And lastly, there needs to be a permanent involvement of Westmincomm Philippines in the organization of IDPHBC so that the CORPAT PHILINDO operation area can cover the entire border area of the two countries as well as the use of more support bases to expand the operational reach of these CORPAT PHILINDO patrol units.

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