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Implementation of Defense Policy Against Threats for Securing International Shipping Lanes in the Sunda Strait

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Abstract

The Sunda Strait is one of the areas in the Indonesian Archipelago Sea Channel (ALKI I). The flow of this voyage is used for international interests. Facing the factual and potential threats that occur today, the Sunda Strait waters has an important role for international interest, particularly in Indonesia, since the position of its capital city is relatively close. This study is using a qualitative descriptive method of phenomenology and using the theory of George Edward III. The results of the study indicate that the variable communication between related entities shows that it still needs to be optimized since it is still not integrated. In the variable resources of each entity related to the security of the Sunda Strait are still have many limitations, particularly in budgetary resources that are related to the availability of other resources. The disposition variable is still found by persons related to the attitude of the executor who makes the obstacle an opportunity to do negative things, and in the variable structure of the bureaucracy, opportunities are still found to optimize the security of the international shipping channel in the Sunda Strait.

Keywords: ALKI I, International Shipping Channel, Sea Defense Strategy, Sunda Strait

1. Introduction

Indonesia as an archipelagic country that has a vast sea area has the advantage of having extraordinary natural resources, as well as a large potential threat, the potential threat in the Indonesian sea is one of Indonesia's five biggest threats at this time, as stated by Marshal TNI Hadi when carry out feasibility tests as TNI Commander. The consequence of having a vast sea area, the state must be able to protect the region from factual threats and potential ones, Marshal TNI Hadi said that "Vulnerability in the sea as an archipelagic country, Indonesia is responsible for safety and security in the sea area which is the jurisdiction the free sea which borders the region" (Hadi, 2017).

The Indonesian Sea Area not only has an important meaning for Indonesia, it also has a very important meaning for the international world, because the Indonesian sea area is located in a cross position of the world which is often passed by sea transportation of other countries. One of the consequences of world recognition for Indonesia as an archipelagic country, Indonesia must create and establish several international lanes that pass through Indonesia's national jurisdiction to be used by various countries to cross the Indonesian sea (Lukman Yudho Prakoso et al., 2020).

In 1996, the Indonesian Government proposed to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) regarding the establishment of the Indonesian Archipelago Sea Flow (ALKI) and its branches in Indonesian waters. In accordance with Article 1 paragraph 8 of Law No. 6/1996 concerning Indonesian Waters, Islands Sea Flow is a sea channel that is passed by foreign ships or aircraft above the channel, to carry out shipping and flights in a normal way solely for continuous transit, directly, and as quickly as possible and not hindered through or above the archipelagic waters and adjacent territorial seas between one part of the Indonesian high seas or EEZ and in the other part of the high seas or the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (Prasetyo et al., 2019).

Each ALKI has a potential threat that is considered relevant and requires more serious coordination. Based on the author's interview with the speakers from the Sea Security Coordination Agency (Bakorkamla), each ALKI has different potential threats. The potential threat in ALKI I is related to the impact of conflict over territorial claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, such as the use of the ALKI I region for the activities of the state army involved in maneuvering. In addition, the impact of traffic congestion in the Malacca Strait, such as the use of ALKI I areas by pirates to avoid the pursuit of Indonesian security forces and joint security forces (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) or smuggling. The impact of the centers of growth and economy of Asia and Southeast Asia in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Singapore, such as the smuggling of illegal goods and also human trafficking, is also a potential threat in ALKI I, including the effects of the danger of natural disasters and tsunamis in the Sunda Strait, such as the threat of volcanic earthquakes / volcanic eruptions (Anak Krakatau) and the impact of Malaysia's expansionary politics, such as the possibility of claiming new territorial territories.

The factual threat that occurred in July 2017 shocked the Sunda Strait region, namely the arrest of smuggling of shabu-shabu 1 (one) ton in Banten waters (Yandhi, 2017). This shows that the existence of access to the waters of the Indonesian sea area is still very vulnerable and has the potential for warfare asymmetric threats, if only the methamphetamine is not caught can kill five million according to the Head of National Narcotics Agency Budi Waseso (Budi, 2018). After the incident, successively captured again smuggling by sea in the amount of Ton.

In this study, the place of research taken was in the Sunda Strait. One of the strongest reasons for taking place in the Sunda Strait is the position that is very close to the State Capital so that it has a very high escalation of potential threats, if the potential threat of defense that might occur in the Sunda Strait is not anticipated. The policy on national defense has been made by the Indonesian Ministry of Defense to protect all nations, but it is considered important to always be vigilant by incessantly conducting research on how the implementation of this defense policy is carried out especially in locations that have the highest potential level.

2. Problem Formulation

Based on the background above, the formulation of the problem in this study is how is the Defense Policy Implementation in the face of the threat of asymmetric warfare especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait, to secure international shipping lanes?

3. Method and Theory

The method used in this study is descriptive qualitative, phenomenology. The informants involved were all stake holders related to law enforcement in the Sunda Strait region. The theory used to answer the research problem formulation according to George Edward III, Edward proposed four factors that play an important role in achieving successful implementation or failure of policy implementation, namely communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure factors (Edward in Widodo, 2011: 96-110).

4. Discussion

The Sunda Strait is part of the Indonesian Archipelago Sea Channel (ALKI) I, which connects the waters of the Indian Ocean through the Karimata Strait to the South China Sea or vice versa. ALKI is a consequence of Indonesia as an archipelagic country after the Indonesian government ratified the UNCLOS 1982 International Sea Law through Republic of Indonesia Law Number 17 of 1985. Indonesia has designated three ALKIs as crossing lines of foreign ships in shipping from an open sea (ZEE) to other free seas. covers the air path above it (Buntoro, 2012: 95). The Sunda Strait is a route commonly used for international shipping. In these waters there are also crossing lines from Java Island (Merak port) to Sumatra Island (Bakauheni port), operated by the Transportation Ministry of Lake and Crossing Transportation (ASDP) (Lukman Yudo Prakoso et al., 2021).

Asymmetric warfare is a war that has a pattern that is different from the pattern of warfare that we generally know. Asymmetric warfare is carried out not militarily; mobilize troops; use defense equipment or invade a country. Asymmetric warfare is carried out non-military (without military force), even the range of war areas is wider than military warfare, and can be carried out without declaring war or deploying troops (Harris et al., 2019). Aspects that can be reached are not just military or political. More broadly Asymmetric War has the power to influence all aspects of life. The principle used in Asymmetric War is to use the minimum resources to get maximum results (Suhirwan & Prakoso, 2019a).

The implementation of Defense Policy in dealing with potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait is as follows:

4.1 Communication

Communication in policy implementation includes several important dimensions, namely information transformation (transmission), information clarity (clarity) and information consistency (consistency). Submission of information regarding the contents of the policy to the implementor is very important, so that the policy can be implemented properly and the main tasks can be carried out (Redita et al., 2020).

Transmission of communication / delivery regarding national defense in the face of the potential threat of asymmetric warfare especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on the research data from the interview to the resource person regarding the field of transmission / communication transmission, that: the national defense policy has been understood and has been implemented and described in the programs, informed and constraints and differences in perceptions can be resolved properly, and delivered by utilizing activities formal or through official announcements (Madrohim & Prakoso, 2021). Clarity of communication regarding national defense in the face of the potential threat of asymmetric warfare especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait.

Implementation in the Sunda Strait of the Banten Province. Based on the research data from the interview to the informants in the field of policy content, that: the contents of the national defense policy can be understood and described in programs and actions in accordance with the fields of duties and responsibilities of each maritime implementor, implemented in sea patrol activities (Risahdi et al., 2020). Consistency regarding national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the

dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on the research data from the interview to the resource person regarding the consistency factor of communication, that: there is consistency from each implementor in the implementation of their duties and functions that are carried out continuously in the form of programs and evaluated according to the rules and work programs of each implementor (Kurniawan et al., 2018).

4.2 Resources

Staff / executive staff resources from the parties involved in the implementation of national defense in the face of the potential threat of asymmetric warfare especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on research data from interviews to resource persons on the factors of staff / personnel implementing resources, that: there is a limited number of personnel in carrying out their main tasks and responsibilities compared to the broad scope of supervision, however the implementation of the main tasks and responsibilities can still be implemented. Use of personnel in the implementation of duties and functions so that they are able to always carry out improvement in the quality of human resources through education and training (Prihantoro et al., 2021).

Budget support in the implementation of the goals, objectives and contents of policies regarding national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on the research data from the interview to the resource person on the budget support factor, that: there is budget support but the budget support is insufficient and the amount is minimal, its use is optimal in carrying out the main tasks and responsibilities according to the task fields of each implementor. If there is a development of a strategic environment in accordance with the dynamics in the field, the use of the budget is adjusted to the scale of priorities (Suhirwan et al., 2020).

Information on port governance in the implementation of the goals, objectives and contents of policies regarding national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on the research data from the interview to the resource person on the information resource factor regarding port governance, that: at present there is clarity of information and port governance. However, there are private ports that have not been included in the supervision of government port authorities, this will create vulnerability in terms of supervision, so that it can allow crime in the asymmetric field of warfare to occur there (Dipua et al., 2020).

The executive authority of the parties involved in implementing the goals, objectives and contents of the policy regarding national defense in the face of warfare asymmetric potential especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on the research data from the interview to the informant on the resource authority's executor, that: there is already the authority of the main duties and responsibilities of each implementor in the maritime field and carried out in accordance with the laws and functions of each, however, there is a need for socialization and education to parties outside of each agency. The implementation of the implementation is carried out in a mutually assisting and supportive manner in preventing crime (Sartono et al., 2020).

Physical facilities or infrastructure and facilities in implementing the objectives, objectives and contents of policies regarding national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on the research data from the interview to the resource persons on the field of physical facilities / infrastructure and facilities, that there are sufficient facilities and infrastructure to carry out support in the sea defense but still need additions according to the ideal needs. In the case of the Navy and lack of facilities and infrastructure, the Indonesian Navy coordinated with the implementor related to their use, so that the implementation of their respective duties and functions could be carried out properly (Ali et al., 2021).

Support of Defense and Security Equipment in implementing the goals, objectives and contents of policies regarding national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions

of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on research data from interviews with resource persons (Defense and Security Equipment Tools), that: there are limitations (Defense and Security Equipment Tools) and if there are inadequate, both in the number and ability to carry out supervision in their respective working areas. In the case of the Indonesian Navy's limitations (Defense and Security Equipment), it will coordinate with the maritime implementer with involvement (Under Operation Control) of ships from other maritime agencies and coordinate with the unit regarding support (Defense and Security Equipment Tools) for marine security operations (Kusuma et al., 2021).

4.3 Disposition

Disposition or attitude of the parties involved in implementing the implementation of national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats, especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait (Hermawan et al., 2020). Based on the data from the interview research on the resource persons in the field of implementing attitudes, that: there is / the attitude of the maritime sector implementor strongly supports the implementation of the maritime defense sector and is described in the main tasks and responsibilities of each maritime implementor. Implementation in the field is carried out by coordinating with each other (Listiyono et al., 2019b).

Commitment from the parties involved in implementing the implementation of national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats, especially in the dimensions of the sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on data from interviews with informants on the attitude factor of the implementers related to commitment, that: there is / there is a high commitment of maritime implementors to carry out tasks in the face of the threat of asymmetry warfare, which is manifested in written regulations and verbal instructions, so that implementation the main tasks and responsibilities can be carried out properly (Supriyono et al., 2019)

4.4 Bureaucratic Structure

The organizational structure in charge of implementing the policy has a significant influence on policy implementation. The aspect of organizational structure is Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and fragmentation. Organizational structures that are too long will tend to weaken supervision and lead to complex and complex bureaucratic procedures.

Standard Operational Procedure (SOP) on the implementation of the implementation of national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats, especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on data from research interviews to SOP resource persons in carrying out the task of facing asymmetric warfare, that: there are SOPs for each maritime sector stakeholder in accordance with their respective areas of main duties and responsibilities, but still need shared perception so that implementation can be carried out well (Arto et al., 2019). The implementation of existing SOPs has been carried out as part of the standard in carrying out tasks, so that members in the field can know what their main tasks are and what they do (Kusuma et al., 2019).

Fragmentation (division of roles) of organizational structures implementing implementation of national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. From the interview data to the resource person regarding the fragmentation factor (division of roles) of the organizational structure, that there are already roles for each maritime field implementor in accordance with their respective duties and functions outlined in the implementation instructions and supervision, the division of roles for tasks internal and external tasks carried out in stages (Sartono, Prakoso, & Suseto, 2019).

Synergy or relationship between one work unit and various other work units in the implementation of the objectives, objectives and contents of the policy on the implementation of national defense in the face of

potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. From the interview data to the resource person regarding the synergy factor, that there has been a synergy in the implementation of the main tasks and responsibilities of each of the implementers in the maritime field, although it is still running separately, this can be proven in the absence of information exchange. Others seek information on their own. Combined official forums are needed that can bring together the implementers to exchange information that can be used for the benefit of tackling asymmetric warfare in the Sunda Strait in accordance with the potential of their respective task fields and functions (Sartono, Prakoso, & Suseto, 2019).

5. Conclusions

Conclusion of Defense Policy Implementation in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait to secure international shipping lanes.

5.1 *Communications*

Information transformation (transmission), has been conveyed to the implementer and has provided understanding. The implementation of the acceptance of this policy has been translated into programs and informed to the implementer through formal activities and official announcements. Clarity of information (clarity), has been clearly understood, this can be seen by the elaboration into programs and actions in accordance with the tasks and responsibilities of each maritime field holder stake. The implementation of the clarity of the acceptance of defense policy is implemented in the activities of security patrols at sea. Information consistency (consistency), the consistency of the implementation of defense policies that have been carried out continuously in the form of programs and evaluated in accordance with the fields of duties and responsibilities of each maritime sector stakeholder. The implementation of duties and functions is carried out in accordance with the regulations in each implementer and carried out continuously and continuously, if it changes according to the dynamics in the field, it will seek approval from the head office.

5.2 *Resources*

Staff or implementers, have not run effectively because there are limitations in the number of personnel in carrying out their main duties and responsibilities when compared to the extent of the coverage area that must be implemented, however the implementation of the main tasks and responsibilities can still be implemented. In order to improve the ability of personnel to be able to carry out their duties and functions, quality improvement is carried out through education and training. By having trained personnel, the tasks given will be completed according to the duties and functions of each implementor.

Budget support, does not work effectively because there is budget support, but the budget support is insufficient, its use is optimal in carrying out the main tasks and responsibilities according to the respective task fields of stakeholders with a scale of priorities, thus defense policy in the sea in the Sunda Strait will not work effectively in achieving goals and objectives.

Information on port governance is not effective because there is information about domestic port data that has not been integrated in the port governance information system. This condition will make the implementation of the policy ineffective because the government port authority cannot carry out supervision, so that it can enable the occurrence of crime in the asymmetric warfare field in the sea of the Sunda Strait region.

Authority, has been effective. The implementation of the implementation is outlined in the regulations. Implementation of these regulations is carried out by means of socialization and education to the implementor and to parties outside of each agency. The implementation of the duties and functions of each implementor is carried out based on the rules of each implementor, in the event of problems in the

implementation, then each implementor will coordinate and help each other so that the crime does not occur.

Facilities or Infrastructure facilities, not yet effective, because there are still a lack of facilities and infrastructure, for additions it becomes a problem itself with limited budget support. In the case of one implementor does not have the facilities and infrastructure so that coordination between implementors is carried out by carrying out loans, so that the duties and functions of the implementor can be carried out properly.

Alpalhankam support, there is a shortage of defense and security and if there is inadequate both the number and ability to carry out supervision in their respective working areas. In the case if Indonesia Navy lacking Alpalhankam, it will coordinate with maritime implementers by involving BKO ships from other maritime agencies as well as coordinating with the top unit regarding al-Khalam support for Sea Security operations.

5.3 Disposition

The attitude, the attitude of the implementers of the policy has been effective, because the implementor strongly supports defense policies in the Sunda Strait sea, this is a good attitude for the implementor. For the success of the implementation, the implementation is carried out by copying the coordination in accordance with the respective task areas and functions.

Commitment, there is a high commitment from the implementor in carrying out their respective duties and functions. The implementation of this commitment is in the form of written regulations and verbal instructions, so that the implementation of the main tasks and responsibilities can be carried out properly.

5.4 Organizational Structure

SOP, that there is already an SOP for each implementor as a guide for all members in carrying out their duties and functions in the field. The implementation of this SOP is to achieve the implementation of defense policy so that its implementation can be carried out properly.

Organizational structure, that the organizational structure of each implementor is flexible in carrying out their duties and functions. The implementation of this activity is that it can be implemented to adjust the SOP in accordance with the development of the dynamics in the field, the SOP conformers are requested to approve the head office.

The synergy between one work unit and various other work units, is that there is no optimal synergy, because the implementation of defense policy is still running on its own, so that there is no information sharing implemented, the acquisition of information is obtained individually. Given the importance of information in the implementation of the duties and functions of defense policy, a joint forum is needed which is used as a meeting place for implementors in terms of exchanging information to carry out tasks on each implementor.

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