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# Democracy, Decentralization and Political Dynasty: A Case Study of Banten

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## Abstract

Democracy and political decentralization policies aim to enhance and strengthen democracy at the local level in Indonesia. As part of strengthening democratization and decentralization, direct regional head elections were organized and held. However, in several cases the regional head election gave the opportunity for political dynasties to rise and perpetuate the power. In other words, through the election of regional heads, political dynasties enter and survive. The political dynasties have hijacked local democracy through the electoral arena. Such conditions occur in Banten, both at the provincial and district or city levels. The political dynasties in Banten emerged and won the electoral competition. There are several factors that contribute to the emergence and survival of political dynasties in Banten. First, the support of political parties. Second, the weak political elite's counter. Third, the weakness of civil society power and mass media control. Fourth, the weak of political culture of the society. As an analytical tool, this study uses the theory of decentralization, political dynasties and political culture. The research approach is qualitative by using data collection techniques through in-depth interviews and literature study.

**Keywords:** Democracy, Decentralization, Political Dynasties, Political Parties, and Regional Head Elections

## 1. Introduction

In line with the basic principle of decentralization, namely giving greater powers to regional governments in planning and managing development in their regions, there are two expectations that accompany the post-New Order decentralization policy, namely the consolidation of democracy and the improvement of government performance. Normatively, these expectations are based on the idea that when a public policy process is carried out at a smaller level, the opportunity for the public to participate in it will increase. Community participation will foster democratic practices at the local level and at the same time increase the government efficiency, among others by eliminating various obstacles in policy making and implementation. The accommodation of the

various interests and needs of the community will increase the level of acceptance of decisions made by the government (Prasojo, Maksum, Kurniawan 2006).

To realize such effective participation, there are several basic prerequisites that must be available, namely the existence of political equality and adequate local accountability. This is one of the fundamental problems faced by many developing countries in implementing decentralization, so that in many cases the expansion of decentralization does not always have a positive correlation with strengthening democracy and structural efficiency of governance at the local level. Crook and Manor in a comparative analysis of the implementation of decentralization in four countries in the South Asia and West Africa regions, namely the states of Karnataka in India, Bangladesh, Ghana and Ivory Coast, concluded that except in Karnataka, changes to the decentralization of these countries actually strengthened the political patterns at the local level that do not support democracy and better government performance (Crook and Manor 1998).

In several Southeast Asian countries, there is no inevitability of a directly proportional relationship between decentralization and democracy and the performance of this government is marked by the development of political dynasties in the form of local strongmen or bossism. Sidel (2005) concluded that the 1999 elections and the adoption of decentralization policies after the fall of the New Order in Indonesia further strengthened the possibility of accumulation of power by local strongmen and the emergence of political dynasties. Along with democratization, they use democratic mechanisms by hijacking democracy, buying political parties as vehicles to become candidates for regional heads, and conducting money politics (vote buying) to be elected.

Fitriyah (2020) in her study concluded that political dynasties have a negative impact on democracy at the local level. These impacts are: first, inequality in nominations between candidates with dynastic backgrounds and those without dynastic backgrounds; secondly, the greater probability of electability of candidates with dynastic backgrounds has hindered the elite circulation; third, dynastic politics impedes the operation of oversight mechanisms among political institutions because they are controlled by one family, and fourth, dynastic politics is proven to be close to corrupt practices.

During the Direct Regional Head Elections (Pilkada) in the 2005-2014 period, the number of political dynasties was only 59 candidates. However, when the direct Pilkada were held simultaneously in 2015, 2017 and 2018 there was a drastic increase in the number of political dynasties participating in the Pilkada as many as 86 candidates. Meanwhile, in the Simultaneous Pilkada last December 2020, the number of candidates for regional leaders from political dynasties was 124 candidates. Related to the 2020 Pilkada, Nagara Institute conducted research on the origins of political dynasties. The research shows that there are 124 candidates affiliated with political dynasties in which 57 candidates for regents and 30 candidates for deputy regents, 20 candidates for mayor and 8 candidates for deputy mayor, 5 candidates for governor and 4 candidates for deputy governor. Based on gender, the research mentions that there are 67 men and 57 women. Of the 57 women, there were 29 female candidates who were wives of the incumbent of regional heads.

Table 1: The number of candidates for regional heads who come from political dynasties

No	Year of Pilkada	The number of candidates for regional heads who come from political dynasties	The increase of regional head candidates from political dynasties	Remark
1.	2005 – 2014	59 candidates	-	<i>na (not available)</i>
2.	2015 – 2018	86 candidates	27 candidates	<i>na (not available)</i>
3.	2020	124 candidates	38 candidates	52 victories 72 defeats

Source: Nagara Institute 2020.

The phenomenon of the rise of political dynasties in power by utilizing local democracy is the political dynasties in Banten, both in the province and in the regencies and cities. Prior to the 2020 Pilkada, out of eight regencies/cities, only Tangerang City was not controlled by political dynasties. 7 Regencies/Cities are controlled

by political dynasties. Banten Province, Serang Regency, Serang City and South Tangerang City are controlled by the Chasan Sohib political dynasty. Meanwhile Cilegon city is controlled by the Aat Syafaat dynasty, Pandeglang Regency is controlled by the Dimiyati Natakusuma dynasty, Lebak Regency was controlled by the Jayabaya dynasty, and Tangerang Regency was controlled by the Ismet Iskandar dynasty.

These political dynasties develop and survive, passing from parents to children or to wives or grandchildren and son/daughters-in-law. In the case of the Chasan Sohib political dynasty, the power is passed down to children, grandchildren and son/daughter-in-laws. For the political dynasties of Aat Syafaat, Ismet Iskandar and Jayabaya, political power is passed down to children respectively. Meanwhile, in the Dimiyati political dynasty, the power was passed down to his wife. In this regard, the questions in this study are: (1) How is the condition of the political dynasty in Banten; and (2) What are the factors that cause the political dynasty survive.

To obtain answers to the research questions, the research used qualitative approach by using library research and interviews. Literature study is a data collection technique by conducting a review study of books, literature, records, and reports that are related to the research problem. Meanwhile the interviews were conducted in depth through the interview guidelines. The determination of informants was carried out purposively, with the consideration that the interviewees understood and knew how to answer questions of the study.

### *1.1. Literature Review*

Related to the regional autonomy, Muthalib and Khan (2013) argue that "conceptually, local autonomy tends to become a synonym of the freedom of locality for self-determination or local democracy". Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) further connect regional autonomy with devolution of power. In relation to decentralization, Smith (1985) states that decentralization is the transfer of power, from top level to lower level, in a territorial hierarchy, which could be one of government within a state, or offices within a large organization. Meanwhile Mawhood (1987) said that decentralization is the devolution of power from central government to local government. With such decentralization perspective, the meaning of decentralization is the same as devolution of power, namely the transfer from the central government to regional governments (Hidayat 2000).

The main objective of decentralization is to implement democratization at the local level in terms of political equality, local accountability and local sensitivity. In this context, the implementation of direct elections that occur in decentralization is a process of transferring the locus of power from the center to the regions. Power is no longer concentrated in the central government, but distributed to the regions. By placing decentralization like this, it is hoped that decentralization for democracy will be realized. The main objectives to be achieved through decentralization include the realization of democratization at the local level, the creation of efficiency and effectiveness of regional administration and economic development in the regions.

The problems that occur in local democracy and local elections are directly controlled by a handful of people or local strong people and political dynasties. Utilizing patronage networks, controlling the resources, using politics and violence, the political dynasty dominates politics in the regions. They use existing democratic mechanisms to 'hijack' democratic institutions and build alliances with public officials. Hadiz (2003) calls it a predatory oligarchy. While Sidel (2005) says that democracy at the local level is marked by the development of strong people at the local level (Local Bossism). This trend is related to political developments when the regional head elections began. Local bossism engages in various practices of vote buying, electoral fraud, or gathering personal wealth through illegal means which are more coercive than paternalistic or *clientelistic* reciprocal relationships.

The strategy used by local bossism to maintain its economic and political dominance, namely: placing relatives and cronies as mayors, deputy mayors and members of the regional legislature; forming a political machine as a vote broker; regulating the placement of regional officials; managing government projects and aspiration funds; controlling regional regulations, and others (Sidel 2005). These oligarchs and local bossism then build political dynasties at the local level. Querubin (2010) defines a political dynasty as a small number of families that dominate the distribution of power in a particular geographic area. Meanwhile Asako defines a political dynasty as a group of politicians who inherit public office from one of their family members (Effendi 2018).

Effendi divides political dynasties into three models, namely; The first is familism, the political dynasties based purely on direct blood relations in the family (consanguinity) and marital relations (marriage) with other clans. The second is quasi-familism. This model is based on the attitude of affection and solidarity from family members in the power structure. The third is egoism-familism. This political dynasty model is based on fulfilling functionalism aspects rather than just following lineage or blood ties (Effendi 2018).

Djati (2013: 226) classifies the political dynasties formed in Indonesia, namely populism dynasty, octopus dynasty, tribalism dynasty, and feudalism dynasty. Populism dynasty can be defined as political dynasties that were built with the excuse of being an effort to continue the development program of the previous regional heads. The basis of this dynasty was built from the romanticism of the previous regional head. Octopussy dynasty can be defined as political dynasties based on a power network in the form of an octopus because of its wide network. Tribalism dynasty can be defined as political clans based on ethnicity and the reproduction of royal cultural rites. The last is feudalism dynasty that can be defined as political dynasties that based on patrimonialism, figuration, elitism and pragmatism.

### *1.2. Some Relevant Studies*

Theories about democracy have been formulated by many authors, so that Robert A. Dahl said that, "there is no democratic theory – there are only democratic theories.". He tried to formulate the criteria for democracy of 7 types as a political ideal, namely (Dahl 1992): 1. Elected officials. Oversight of government decisions regarding policies is constitutionally in the hands of elected officials; 2. Free and fair elections. Elected officials are determined in elections which are frequently held and fairly conducted, in which coercive measures are rarely used; 3. Inclusive voting rights. It can be said that all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials; 4. The right to stand for election. All adults are eligible to run for positions filled by general election; 5. Alternative information. Citizens have the right to seek alternative sources of information. Alternative sources are exist and protected by law; 6. Freedom of expression. Citizens have the right to express opinions without danger of harsh penalties on political matters; 7. Associational autonomy. Citizens have the right to form relatively free associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.

Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990) provide three criteria for democracy, namely: (1) there is extensive competition between individuals and groups or organizations in competing for government positions; (2) there is political participation that involves as many citizens as possible in elections; (3) there is a level of civil and political liberties. Such democratic criteria are also emphasized by Schumpeter and Huntington. Schumpeter (1947: 269) put forward democracy as "a system for making political decisions in which individuals gain the power to decide through competitive battle for the people's vote". Huntington (1995) emphasizes that the essence of democracy is competitive elections. He said, the main procedure of democracy is the election of leaders competitively by the people they lead (Huntington 1995: 4).

Based on the criteria of democracy as stated by those experts, the question that arises is whether the criteria for democracy are fulfilled when direct regional elections are always dominated by political dynasties. The number of political dynasties in direct regional elections causes the criteria for democracy (equality, effective and competitive participation) doesn't work properly. Meanwhile, when it is related to the election functions, among others (1) as a means of political legitimacy, (2) political representation, (3) political education, and (4) circulation or replacement of the ruling elite (Haris 1997: 6-8), it seems that democracy has failed. Electoral functions, in particular, related to elite circulation do not occur because those who are elected are part of a political dynasty.

## **2. Methods**

This study will employ descriptive qualitative research in order to define a phenomenon. Primary and secondary data with focus group discussions (FGD) are the two data sources used in this study. Through interviews with participants whom the research team had chosen, primary data were directly obtained. Chain referrals, also

known as snowball sampling, is a method of source selection used to collect the samples required for research studies from the existing subject.

### 3. Result

#### 3.1. *Decentralization and Local Democracy*

##### 3.1.1 New Regulations

After the fall of Suharto, along with the democratic transition from authoritarianism to democracy, B.J. Habibie as Suharto's successor issued a decentralization policy by implementing Law no. 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Government or often referred to as the Regional Autonomy Law. The birth of this Law, which replaced Law No. 5 of 1974, has opened the faucet for democracy and democratization at the local level. This can be seen from two things, namely the recruitment of political officials in the regions and the legislative process in the regions. In terms of recruiting political officials in the regions, full authority is handed over to the community through the DPRD and there is no longer any interference from the central government.

The process of legislation and regulations in the regions no longer have to be approved by the central government. This new law also implements a broad and real autonomy system. With this system, local governments have the authority to do anything related to governance except in the fields of foreign policy, monetary and fiscal, defense and security, justice and religion. Thus, Law No. 22 of 1999 has provided greater space for decentralization (politics and administration) to the regions so as to allow for wider space and opportunities to improve democracy and space for community participation at the local level (Gafar 2000).

In 2004, the Law No. 22 of 1999 was revised into Law no. 32 of 2004. Despite of some weaknesses of the revision of the regional autonomy law, the new law changes the method of the election of regional heads which were originally elected through the DPRD, then changed to the direct regional head elections. Thus, there has been a shift in the implementation of democracy, from representative democracy to participatory democracy (direct democracy) in which the people directly elect their leaders without going through intermediaries or their representatives in the parliament. There are a number of advantages in directly electing regional heads compared to elections through a representative system. Some of these advantages are: (1) breaking up oligarchic politics carried out by a group of elites in determining regional heads; (2) strengthening checks and balances with DPRD; (3) having a strong legitimacy because it directly receives a mandate from the people; (4) producing an accountable regional head; and (5) producing regional heads who are more sensitive and responsive to the demands of the people (Romli 2000).

In its development, the Pilkada is regulated by a separate law, separated from the Law on Regional Government. The law that regulates the direct election of regional heads is Law no. 8 of 2005. There is something new in this law, namely the permissibility of individual candidates in regional head elections. The presence of these individual candidates refers to the Constitutional Court Decision Number 5/PUU-V/2007 concerning individual candidate pairs that are supported by a number of people. In early 2015, the Regional Head Election Law underwent revision. Initially, regional head elections would be returned through the DPRD with the issuance of Law No. 1 of 2014 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors. However, this law was widely rejected by the public so that the government annulled it and issued the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2015, which canceled the Law No. 1 of 2014. The Government Regulation In lieu of Law was then approved by the DPR by issuing Law No. 8 of 2015. This law regulates simultaneous regional head elections that are national in nature starting in 2024. However, before the 2024 regional elections, several regions carried out simultaneous local elections.

The Regional Head Election Law has been revised to become Law No. 10 of 2016 due to the Constitutional Court decision No. 100/XIII/2015 concerning single candidate. However, with this revision, the requirements for individual candidates have become even more onerous. In Law no. 12 of 2008, pairs of individual candidates can register as partners if they meet the support requirements of 3% to 6.5% of the total population in the area

concerned. If the population is small, the maximum support requirement is 6.5%, whereas if the population is large, the maximum support requirement is 3%. According to the Law No. 10 of 2016 the conditions for support for individual candidate pairs have changed, namely, between 6.5% to 10%., both at the district/city level and at the provincial level.

### 3.1.1 The Rise of Political Dynasties

The policy of decentralization and democratization with the issuance of the accompanying law was followed by a number of revisions, instead of increasing democratization at the local level, what happened was that democracy experienced a setback. This happened, among other things, further the increasing number of single candidates. If in the 2015 Pilkada, there were only three regions with a single candidate pair, in the 2017 Pilkada it increased to 9 regions. Then, in the 2018 local elections, it increased to 16 single candidate pairs. The number of single candidates increased sharply in the 2020 Pilkada, namely to 25 regions with a single candidate pair.

Pilkada also opens opportunities to the emergence of political dynasties. The number of political dynasties in Pilkada is getting stronger and increasing from time to time. The number of political dynasties in the 2005-2014 period was only 59 candidates. In the 2015, 2017 and 2018 Pilkada however, the number increased to 86 candidates affiliated with political dynasties. In the 2020 Pilkada, out of 124 candidates affiliated with political dynasties, there were 57 regent candidates and 30 deputy regent candidates, 20 mayor candidates and 8 deputy mayor candidates, 5 governor candidates and 4 deputy governor candidates. The political dynasties participating in the regional elections tend to be the sole candidate. In the 2020 Pilkada, there are 13 single candidates coming from political dynasties, as shown in the table below.

Table 2: Single Candidate with Political Dynasties Background in The 2020 Regional Elections

No	Regency/City	Regent/Mayor	Status	Political Dynasties
1	Gunungsitoli City	Lakhomizaro Zebua-Sowaá Laoli	incumbent	Major
2	Pematangsiantar City	Asner Silalahi-Susanti Dewayani	newcomer	Vice Major
3	Ogan Komering Ulu Selatan Regency	Popo Ali Martopo-Sholehien Abuasir	incumbent	Regent
4	Kebumen Regency	Arif Sugiyanto-Ristawati Purwaningsih	incumbent	Vice Regent
5	Semarang City	Hendrar Prihadi-Hevearita G. Rahayu	incumbent	Vice Major
6	Sragen Regency	Kusnidar Untung Yuni Sukowati-Suroto	incumbent	Regent
7	Kediri Regency	Hanindhito Himawan Pramana-Dewi M. Ulfa	newcomer	Regent
8	Ngawi Regency	Ony Anwar Harsono-Dwi Rianto Jatmiko	incumbent	Regent
9	Balikpapan City	Rahmad Mas'ud-Thohari Azis	incumbent	Major
10	Kutai Kertanegara Regency	Edi Damansyah-Rendi Solihin	incumbent	Vice Regent
11	Gowa Regency	Adnand Purichta Ichsan-Abdul Rauf Malaganni	incumbent	Regent
12	Soppeng Regency	HA Kaswadi Razak-Lutfi Halide	incumbent	Vice Regent
13	Mamuju Tengah Regency	HM Aras T-H Muh Amin Jasa	incumbent	Regent

Source: Yanuar Nugroho, Yoes C. Kenawas, and Sofie S. Syarie, 2021: 4

The phenomenon of political dynasties, according to Hadiz's opinion, cannot be separated from the patronage network that had flourished during the New Order era. Moreover, Hadiz states that they were important players in local politics who previously occupied the lowest tier positions in the New Order patronage network. Now in a democratic system, they are rearranging themselves in a new patronage network that is decentralized, more fluid and competitive. Even the interests that they are fighting for at the local level appear to be more varied. They are ambitious political brokers and bookmakers, shrewd and still predatory state bureaucrats, ambitious new business groups, and various political gangsters, criminals, and civil security forces.

Meanwhile, a study conducted by Sidel (2005) found that the absence of an inevitability of a directly proportional relationship between decentralization and democracy at the local level is marked by the development of strong people at the local level. Sidel sees bossism showing the role of local elites as predatory political brokers who have monopoly control. Ironically, the accumulation of power by local powerful people is not only done through illegal means. Along with democratization, they also use existing democratic mechanisms. The phenomenon shows the ability of local strongmen to 'hijack' democratic institutions and build alliances with new public officials (Hadiz 2003).

The phenomenon of political dynasties and the presence of local strongmen also occurs in Banten. The emergence of local strongmen and political dynasties cannot be separated from the structure of society and the structure of the state itself. In a society structure that is still paternalistic in nature, people who have influence tend to be respected by society. In this case it is precisely the structure of the state that creates the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of strong people at the local level. This phenomenon is related to the operating in the shadow of a regional regime which is characterized by an alliance of bureaucrats, party bosses, businessmen and thugs. They have monopolistic control over coercive power and economic resources.

### *3.2. The Backgrounds of Democracy Setback*

#### *3.2.1. Political Party's Role*

Theoretically, one of the functions of political parties is to carry out political recruitment by attracting as many people as possible to become member or cadre of the party. Political recruitment is also carried out to fill political positions, both in the executive and legislative branches. The Law on Political Parties no. 2 of 2011 article 29 paragraph (1) states that political parties recruit Indonesian citizens to become: a. members of political parties; b. nominees for members of the People's Legislative Assembly and Regional People's Legislative Council; c. prospective regional head and deputy regional head candidates; and d. candidates for President and Vice President. Furthermore, paragraph (3) states that the recruitment must be democratic and transparent.

According to Fitriyah (2020) in political recruitment for candidacy for regional elections by political parties, although it seems open, by accepting registration of candidates from internal (cadres) and external (non-cadres), the selection process is centralized and informal, and becomes exclusive when political parties add requirements that show the level of popularity, electability, as well as the financial capability of the candidate. This leads to pave the way for candidates with dynastic backgrounds to be nominated due to their financial resource. This centralized recruitment occurs because Law No. 8 of 2018 Article 42 stipulates that documents proposing candidates for regional heads and deputy regional heads to the local General Elections Commission (KPUD) must be accompanied by a Decree from the Central Executive of a Political Party regarding approval of the proposed candidates.

This condition happens in Banten. Even though political parties openly exposed the registration to everyone to be candidates for regional heads, at the end, the nominated regional heads will come from the political dynasties. The Golongan Karya Party/Golkar (Functional Group Party), for example, both at the provincial and district or city levels, always nominates political dynasties to become regional heads. At the provincial level, since the election through the DPRD in 2002, the Golkar party has nominated Ratu Atut Chosiyah who comes from a political dynasty to become Deputy Governor. During the direct regional head elections moreover, the Golkar

nominated Choisyah as the governor in the 2006 Banten regional elections and 2011 Banten regional elections respectively.

In the 2017 Banten regional elections, the Golkar then nominated Andika Hazrumy, Ratu Atut Choisyah's son as vice governor of Banten. For the 2024 Simultaneous Pilkada, the Golkar supports Airin Rachmi Diany, wife of TB. Chaeri Wardana, the younger sister of Chosiyah, to become a candidate for governor of Banten. For Regency and City levels, the Golkar also promotes political dynasties, such as in Serang Regency, Serang City, South Tangerang City (Chasan Sochib Dynasty), Pandeglang Regency (Dimiyati and Chasan Sochib Dynasty), Tangerang Regency (Ismet Iskandar Dynasty), and Cilegon City (Aat Syafa'at dynasty).

These political dynasties in Banten also control or lead political parties in their respective regions. For Ismet Iskandar's political dynasty, his son became the Chairman of the DPD II Golkar Regency Tangerang Party before the Chairman of the DPD I DKI Jakarta. The political dynasty of Tb. Aat Syafa'at positions Aat's children to become the Chairman of DPD II Golkar of Cilegon City namely Tb. Iman Aryadi and now his position was replaced by his sister, Ratu Ati Marliati. Jayabaya's political dynasty, his daughter as the Regent of Lebak Regency becomes the Chair of Democrat Party in provincial level. Meanwhile, the political dynasty Chasan Sochib controlled and led the Golkar Party (see table below).

Table 3: The Domination of Chasan Sochib Dynasty in Golkar Party

Name	Position
Airin Rahmi Diany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinator of Women Affairs of the Central Board of Golkar 2019- 2024</li> <li>Chief of Golkar of Tangerang Selatan City 2014-2019</li> </ul>
Andika Hazrumy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vice of General Secretary of the Central Board of Golkar 2019-2024</li> </ul>
Ratu Tatu Chasanah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chief of Golkar of Banten Province 2020-2025</li> <li>Chief of Golkar of Banten Province 2015-2020</li> </ul>
Tubagus Haerul Jaman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Member of DPR RI of Golkar 2019-2024</li> <li>Official of Golkar of Banten Province</li> </ul>
Ratu Ria Maryana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chief of Golkar of Serang City</li> </ul>
Adde Rosi Khoerunnisa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Member of DPR RI of Golkar 2019-2024</li> <li>Vice chief of Golkar of Banten Province on Arts and Culture (2016-2021)</li> </ul>
Tanto W Arban	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Golkar cadre who became the vice of treasury of Golkar of Banten Province 2013-2015</li> </ul>

Source: Sutisna 2023.

Indeed, it is not only the Golkar Party that promotes and supports political dynasties, other parties such as *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*/PKB (National Wakening Party), *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*/PDIP (Indonesia Democracy Party-Struggle), *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*/PPP (United Development Party), *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*/PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), and others also have a similar path. In the 2017 Lebak Regency Election, for instance, PDIP supports the Jayabaya political dynasty, along with the Democrat Party. Likewise PPP at the Serang Regency level it became a loyal supporter of political dynasty. Indeed, the pattern of political parties that support the political dynasty is not the same, in fact the party has fought against political dynasties at the Regency or City level. In Cilegon City for example, PKS has always opposed the Aat Syafa'at political dynasty, but in Serang Regency it supports the Chasan Sochib political dynasty.

### 3.2.2. The Lack of Counter-Elites

One of the objectives of carrying out general elections, including regional head elections, is the circulation of elites or the replacement of political rulers, namely regional heads. As previously explained, instead of elite circulation of power, a stagnation of elite circulation appears. This happened because the regional head elections

were dominated by political dynasty power. As a result, the change of power occurred around the political dynasty only. Initially, her husband became the head of the region, after two terms the term of office ended, then in the next local election his wife or child becomes the ruler. In other cases, after the mother's term of office expires, she is replaced by a child, as happened in Banten.

One of the factors that supports the survival of political dynasties in Banten is the absence of a rival elite force that can replace or stem the behavior of these political dynasties. Even if there is an elite that rivals the dynasty, they are not strong or weak so they cannot win the election. In the case of Banten Province, the Chasan Sohib dynasty always wins in gubernatorial elections because the elites who emerge as candidates for regional heads do not have a strong base in society. Apart from that, the elites who want to overthrow political dynasties are fragmented or divided so that this condition benefits political dynasties.

In the case of the 2006 gubernatorial election, for example, there were 3 pairs of candidates running apart from political dynasties (Rau Atut Chosiyah-Mohammad Masduki), namely Tryana Syam'un-Benyamin Davnie; Irsyad Djuwaeli-Mas Ahmad Daniri; and Zulkieflimansyah-Marissa Haque. With the fragmented challengers, the political dynasty won the gubernatorial election. In the 2011 gubernatorial election, there was a strong challenger to the political dynasty namely Wahidin Halim, a two-term former Mayor of Tangerang. Wahidin Halim has a strong base in Greater Tangerang, especially in the densely populated City of Tangerang. However, because his running mate, Irna Narulita, was not politically strong and there were other candidate pairs, namely the governor candidate pair Jazuli Juwaeni-Makmun Muzakki, the political dynasty of Chosiyah who was partnered with Rano Karno from PDIP, came out as the winner. When Chosiyah became a corruption suspect, Rano Karno was later appointed as the Governor of Banten.

In the 2017 Banten Gubernatorial Election, Chosiyah was succeeded by her son, Andika Hazruni, who became deputy governor. We argue that actually the political dynasty in Banten could be stopped if Wahidin Halim, who ran for the second time, was not partnered with Harzuni. Initially, Rano Karno as the incumbent was going to be paired with Harzuni or Chosiyah's younger brother, namely Haerul Jaman, a former Mayor of Serang City. However, due to pressure from various elements, Rano Karno did not pair up with a political dynasty, instead he took Embay Mulya Syarif, one of prominent figure in Banten. However, something extraordinary happened, when Wahidin Halim, who has a strong base in Greater Tangerang and who initially strongly opposed the political dynasty, chose Harzuni as his vice Governor. The result of the 2017 Banten Governor Election were the victory of Halim-Harzumi. It made a political dynasty continued to exist and survive, even though Chosiyah and his younger brother, Tubagus Chaeri Wardana are in jail for some corruption cases.

### 3.2.3. The Weak of Civil Society

In Indonesian context, civil society is constructed by the formation of various non-government organizations that have to some extent autonomy to control the government's agenda and programs (Masroer and Darmawan: 2016). The presence of the non-government organizations in Indonesia can be traced back in the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century when *Sarekat Dagang Islam*/SDI (Islamic Trade Union), Budi Utomo, Muhammadiyah, Persis, and *Nahdlatul Ulama*/NU (Ulama Awakening) were established in 1905, 1908, 1912, 1923, and 1926 respectively.

In Banten context, two non-government organizations, Mathlul Anwar dan Al Khairiyah, arose in 1906 at Menes (Pandeglang Regency) and in 1925 at Citangkil (Cilegon City). Except the SDI which in 1912 became Sarekat Islam dan Budi Utomo, all civil society organizations have been organizing, managing and maintaining their programs related to education, health, social, culture, including democracy in Indonesia. Therefore, civil society become one of the elements in the process of development in Indonesia.

Since its establishment in 2000 as one of the new provinces in Indonesia however, the function of civil society embodied in non-government organizations in Banten seems weak and fragile especially when they have to encounter the political dynasties agenda before, during, and after the regional head election or general election. The weakness of the non-government organizations in Banten can be caused at least by two factors. First, most of the non-government organizations do not have their own financial resource to support their activities. This

leads to the dependency of the non-government organizations to the provincial government of Banten in the form of *Hibah* (the Grant) and *Bantuan Sosial/Bansos* (the Social Assistance). Every year the Banten province government including local government in Regency and City in Banten pour billions of APBD to the non-government organizations. The amount of money will be significantly increased when the local government face the regional head elections.

The problem emerges when the incumbent that mostly part of political dynasties uses the *hibah* and *bansos* programs as their strategy to increase their popularity, influence, and electability among Bantenese society. When Ratu Atut Chosiyah, the daughter of Chasan Sochib, became the governor of Banten for instance, she managed to increase the amount of money in *Hibah* and *Bansos* program. In 2009 the amount of money distributed to non-government organizations was only Rp. 74 billion, the number significantly increased a year later, reached Rp. 290,70 billion. The amount of money boosted into 391,5 billion in 2011 (antikorupsi.org). Due to the fantastic amount of money of *Hibah* and *Bansos* programs in 2011, the Indonesian Corruption Watch (the ICW) suspected that there were allegations of misappropriation of funds conducted by political dynasty led by Chosiyah.

Second, the fragility of the non-government organizations in Banten to be inserted by political dynasty's accomplice. Through the local government's "generosity program" of *Hibah* and *Bansos*, the political dynasty intervened the non-government organizations by inserting their family members as well as their member of election winning committee (*Tim Sukses*) in many strategic positions. Although the non-government organizations did not openly declare their support to political dynasty, the accomplice in the non-government organizations moved to influence members of the organizations until the grass root level. The situation leads the non-government organizations in Banten unwilling to criticize the political dynasty.

#### 3.2.4. The Weak of Political Culture of the Society

One of the political cultures of Bantenese society is paternalistic (patron-client relationship) in which there is a strong relationship between the older and the young, the ruler and the ruled. This attitude tends to make someone in below position do not have the courage to give advice and criticism to someone in the top position because it will be considered disrespectful and impolite.

In the paternalistic society like Banten, the influence of public figure is important because they can influence their people. The political dynasty of Tubagus Chasan Sochib is aware the importance of recruiting powerful public figure among Bantenese society. Therefore, they recruit *kyai* (Bantenese expert of Islam), *jawara* (strongmen), and other public figures including student activists to influence the people. Besides using *Hibah* and *Bansos* of APBD to control the non-government organizations, Chasan Sochib dynasty also used his own money to finance the public figures.

The political dynasty always gives the public figures who visited their residence or office some money before they leave the residence or office. Political dynasty of Chasan Sochib also did the same strategy to the voters in the grass root level. Under the control of Chosiyah, almost all provincial agencies worked to succeed Chosiyah's image as loyal leader by distributing cash, goods, and services to the society. This policy develops the political dynasty's image as a loyal and populist leader in Banten. Therefore, the corruption cases involved political dynasty do not change the perception of voters in Banten toward the political dynasty.

Other political culture that is popular after the implementation of the direct head election is the permissiveness of voters in Banten toward money politics. Although the anti-money politics have been campaigned massively especially during the campaign period, about 70% voters in Banten still tolerate the money politics. Moreover, they will choose the candidate who provide and give them more money before the election.

#### 4. Discussion

Several studies have been conducted on the survival and strength of political dynasties in regional head elections in relation to the economic resources they have and the strength of their networks. A study conducted by Kenawas (2015), for example, reveals that these political dynasties seize public office either to create, strengthen, or expand their power base through a democratic process, namely elections, but by using anti-democratic methods. These political dynasties then consolidate through the power of informal family networks and the accumulation of material wealth. These two factors help dynastic politicians to create an unequal competition arena that hinders the opposition from seizing office in regional head elections.

Effendi (2018) in his study said that the survival of the political dynasty in Banten was due to the stagnation of the regeneration of political parties in recruiting quality regional head candidates. Another factor is due to the context of the people's support on the figures who have a very close and strong relationship to the incumbent. While Sukri (2020) says that the survival of a political dynasty cannot be separated from the strong roots of a political dynasty in the form of an octopus dynasty, political strategy, and the low political participation of the people of Banten.

Above studies tend to have monolithic perspective or answer on such issue and analysed those possible variables or elements separately. Those variables included matters such as economic resources, slow process of regeneration inside the political party and society's characteristic that tends to support political dynasty. In contrast to the things stated above, this study contends that there are other factors that led to the survival of the political dynasty in Banten, namely: the role of political parties, the weakness of political elite counters, the absence of civil society power and control of the mass media, and the political culture of society. In this regard, we explain these four factors below.

The random pattern of political parties in supporting or not supporting political dynasties is due to the pragmatic-opportunistic factors. Some of the interviewees emphasized that political parties tendency to support political dynasties is due to pragmatic-opportunistic reason, not ideological ones. This pragmatic-opportunistic factor is mostly related to the financial compensation and how possible the candidate to have potential to win the election. There is even a sort of "unwritten agreement" that parties will support a political dynasty for the provincial level due to the strong dominance of the Chasan Sohib political dynasty. For most parties, they tend to go "playing safe" by continuously support candidate who part of political dynasty.

In addition, this condition is getting stronger for political dynasties because various political elites in Banten are very dependent and easily co-opted. Many of Bantenese elites who engaged in the business field are really relied on the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD) funds, that managed by the political dynasty apparatus. If they oppose the political dynasty, it is almost certain that they will not get any projects from APBD funds as consequence. This situation makes the political elites always under control from the political dynasty.

On the other hand, the more independent elites who did not depend on the APBD for their business are very weak. Those elites usually have their own business networking outside the Banten Province. Unfortunately, their connection with the grassroot is not strong and they eventually do not have a solid mass base. One good example of this is Tryana Syam'un, a successful Bantenese entrepreneur who did not live in Banten. When he participated in the 2006 gubernatorial election, he failed to seize the power from the political dynasty because he did not have a strong mass base.

Furthermore, the opposing elites were not in power are also divided. There are three prominent organizations that most community of elites joined, namely the *Paguyuban Warga Banten/Puwnten* (Association of Banten Residents), the *Perkumpulan Urang Banten/PUB* (Bantenese Association), and the *Badan Koordinasi (Bakor) Pembentukan Provinsi Banten* (The Board of Coordination for the Formation of Banten Province). It seems that these three organizations are not united in fighting towards the political dynasty. It mainly because of the fact that some of the elites of those three organizations became part and supporters of political dynasty. This condition eventually benefitz benefits the political dynasty.

Moreover, the absent of civil society also contributes to the strengthening of political dynasty. The idea of civil society had a long history and roots in European political thought traditions. Daniel Bell (2004) argues that the concept of civil society emphasizes voluntary associations, churches and communities arguing that decisions should be made locally and should not be controlled by the state and its bureaucracies. Meanwhile Charles Taylor (1990) proposes that civil society became part of any continuing struggle for freedom in the modern world. However, the Banten context it was still far from the reality. Most of the civil society in Banten is not mature and still depend on the elite or even political dynasty. A few of them tries so hard to be independent and play a role to be more critical to the political dynasty. But this effort is not easy to conduct, mainly due to political oppressing from the political dynasty proxies or apparatus.

The condition was worsened by the presence of the *jawara* in the cycle of political dynasty. When someone or organizations criticizes political dynasty' policies or even when only had different opinion with the political dynasty, the *jawara* will soon intimidate them as a quick response. One of the examples was when a politician of PKS criticized the condition of development in Banten that far from the expectation, he was then intimidated in his office by the *jawara* who used machete or even gun (<https://pkscibitung.wordpress.com/2014/09/20/>). Even the *jawara* will easily intimidate a journalist who wrote the exact number of mass rally participant that was conducted by political dynasty and push the newspaper to overwhelm the number of the participants of the mass rally published in the news.

## 5. Conclusion

After the fall of President Suharto, both at the national and local levels, significant political changes took place. At the local level, the government issued a decentralization policy by giving broad authority to the regions to manage their own households (local government). Along with that, regional heads who were originally elected by the Regional People's Legislative Assembly were replaced by being directly elected by the people in their respective regions. With this direct regional head election, the people directly elect governors and regents or mayors in each region. Under such conditions, at the local level there was a wave of democratization by directly involving the community in electing regional heads.

However, the democratization at the local level is distorted when democracy is hijacked by political elites. The wave of local democracy through regional elections moreover bring out the birth to many political dynasties. These political dynasties go through democratic procedures, namely electing elected regional heads and trying to maintain their power by giving their power to their wives/husbands or children. Such a phenomenon of political dynasty occurred in Banten. In this area, only Tangerang City is not controlled by a political dynasty. Starting from the provincial level to the Regency or City is dominated by political dynasties. The political dynasty that dominates the area is the Chasan Sochib political dynasty. He through his children, son in-laws and grandchildren became the regional head in Banten.

The Chasan Sochib political dynasty reigned and survived not only because of its political network and strong material (economic) resources, but also because of other factors that contributed to making this political dynasty strong and enduring. This includes the support from political parties, especially the Golkar, as a party which always nominates for political dynasty; the fragmentation of the political elite in Banten, the weak position of the opposing elite vis a vis the political dynasty, and the weak of political culture of Bantenese society.

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