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# Situational Criminogenic: The Financial Crime's Collaborative Factors in Indonesia

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## Abstract

Financial crimes in Indonesia from 2014-2018 were classified as quite dynamic with a total of 241,367 cases. In 2018 the legal unit area of Polda Metro Jaya had the highest number of cases of 5,526 cases of financial crimes. This study seeks to examine the determinant aspects of financial crime in Indonesia. I used the illustration of the case of First Travel and the Koperasi Simpan Pinjam (KSP) Pandawa that occurred in Indonesia with a total loss of up to IDR 1 trillion. Discussions in this paper begin from the point of view of white collar crime that elaborated with criminaloid and organizational criminogenic aspects. This study uses a grounded theory method through in-depth interviews of actors. The result is that on the criminaloid aspect, the perpetrators have a tendency to easily confess, have certain social and cultural status, has moral sensitivity and intelligence, and has skills, but hesitates in acting. Meanwhile, in the organizational criminogenic aspect, it was found that the perpetrators were in an environment with profit-oriented ambitions, had certain business perceptions, had a loyal attitude towards their group and their human resources tended to be homogeneous. The results of this study found that a supportive situation is needed in financial crime based on the illustrations of the cases used. Situational criminogenic aspects in research in the form of business that utilize religious sentiments, use a cooperative system and manage funds with a Ponzi scheme. This research will enrich criminology studies, especially in the field of white collar crime. Other than that, hopefully can be useful in the formulation of policies for stakeholders.

**Keywords:** Situational Criminogenic, Financial Crime, Criminaloid, Organizational Criminogenic

## 1. Introduction

Clinard and Quinney (1973) try to conceptualize white collar crime in 2 forms, namely corporate crime and occupational crime. White-collar crime is no longer limited to the high social status and honor the perpetrator has. However, white-collar crime also examines the perpetrator's motivation or purpose for committing the crime (Bruinsma & Weisburd, 2014). An example is corporate crime, which is a form of crime committed by individuals, organizations, or even the corporation itself, which aims to provide benefits to corporate activities carried out. Meanwhile, occupational crime is a form of crimes committed by individuals on the basis of a job or profession that aims to provide a personal benefit.

Occupational crime involving individuals as a form of white collar crime was further popularized by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990). Then, Craig and Piquero (2006) also produce a division of forms of white-collar crime, which can be reviewed on individualistic white-collar crime and organizational white-collar crime. Sutherland's contribution to the thought of white collar crime, on the one hand, has provided a significant rebuttal to the crime theory so far. However, on the other hand, it also creates ambiguity when it comes to unit analysis in white collar crime research. The question lies in whether the actual individual or organization becomes the unit of white-collar crime analysis (Holtfreter, 2005). This in turn creates a two-dimensional approach in studying white-collar crime, namely an approach that focuses on the individual element and that focuses on the corporate element.

White-collar crime with a corporate crime approach examines organizational elements and individual perpetrators who are involved in crimes with the aim of the organization's interests and benefits. The theoretical dimension of this approach lies in the criminogenic element of the organization which includes various aspects of the business environment, including the perpetrator as a form of corporate representation, the purpose of crime is oriented towards corporate objectives, and the corporation as a legal subject that can be charged with criminal and civil charges (Simpson & Piquero, 2002; Pearce, 2016; Cavender & Miller, 2013; Wang & Holtfreter, 2011). Meanwhile, white-collar crime with an occupational crime approach emphasizes the background of crimes committed by individuals, including aspects of convenience (Gottschalk, 2019), opportunity (Jordanoska, 2018), to self-control (Schoepfer, Piquero, & Langton, 2013).

The implementation of white-collar crime in Indonesia is based on data classification conducted by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), which refers to crimes related to fraud, embezzlement and corruption. Although classified as high, this crime trend tends to decline. During the 2014-2018 period, the Polri recorded fluctuations from 2014 as many as 48,608 cases, in 2015 as many as 54,115 cases, in 2016 as many as 49,198 cases, in 2017 as many as 47,594 cases, and in 2018 as many as 43,852 cases. The highest number of crimes related to fraud, embezzlement and corruption occurred in 2015 with a total of 54,115 cases.

The 2019 Indonesian Fraud Survey conducted by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) (2020), found that fraud was the most common financial crime in Indonesia, as it reached 69.9% of the total cases surveyed, and was the most expensive to lose, with a total of more than 373 billion rupiah. Based on the profile, the majority of fraud perpetrators were at the age of 36-45 years. At that age, the perpetrator occupies a position and has the opportunity to manage the finances of the company or institution. The educational background of the fraudsters, in the first place has a Bachelor's degree and second is a Masters. Fraud is committed by employees with a work period of 6-10 years. The survey results also showed that most respondents considered that the perpetrators of fraud were never punished.

In contrast to fraud, money laundering has special regulatory arrangements dealing with the crime of money laundering in Indonesia. Among them are regulations regulated by Bank Indonesia No. 30/10/PBI/2001, regulations by BI are important to prevent Banks from engaging in criminal activities. Money laundering prevention is based on identifying customers, monitoring customer transactions and reporting if there are transactions that are suspected of committing money laundering. Based on the latest data, there have been 404 money laundering cases that have been decided by the Court from January 2005 to June 2019. During that period, most of the Court Decisions regarding money laundering cases were decided by the Courts (including the District/Corruption Court, the High Court, and/or the Supreme Court) in DKI Jakarta area, namely as many as 140 decisions or 34.7%. The verdicts that have been decided by the court regarding money laundering cases are a maximum sentence of life and a maximum fine of Rp 32 billion.

## 2. Method

Approach of grounded theory sourced from empirical data through a variable constructivism process in financial crime which is sourced from indicators criminaloid and organizational criminogenic. The construction or reconstruction of the theory is obtained through inductive analysis from a set of data from field observations (Glaser and Strauss, 1990). Implementation of methods grounded theory in this research is divided into 6 stages

(Goulding, 1999; Creswell, 2008: 440). Research using an approach grounded theory applying various data collection techniques as mentioned above. Therefore, the authors make the series in a simple way with the following process:

1. The author will collect various cases of financial crimes from 2010 to 2018 and then create a pattern based on the trend of cases, namely fraud, embezzlement, and corruption.
2. Based on the trend of cases obtained, the writer will prepare theoretical sampling refers to the line of thought that has been made.
3. After getting a trend of cases and theoretical sampling then the authors will narrow the data found into certain cases, based on groupings of cases of fraud, embezzlement, and corruption.
4. The author will categorize cases based on predetermined variables, namely in criminaloid and organizational criminogenic aspects. In addition, the authors also prepare indicators as intervening variables consisting of financial motivation, organizational opportunities, and personal desires. At this stage, the author will conduct interviews with the perpetrators in order to get the peculiarities of each case.
5. After obtaining these peculiarities, the author will make a theoretical construction of white collar crime. This theoretical construction will explain the relevance of thinking assumptions on the basis of aspects criminaloid and organizational criminogenic, as well as hooks intervening variables (financial motivation, organizational opportunity, and personal desires) as determinants of white collar crime.
6. Various variables other than criminaloid and organizational criminogenic aspects will be included as additional assumptions that can strengthen the theoretical framework that the author has made.

To complement and confirm the initial data obtained from the literature study, in-depth interviews with appropriate informants are required. In-depth interviews will be conducted with white collar criminals to find criminaloid elements in the perpetrator. The perpetrator involved in fraud, embezzlement, corruption, and money laundering. The interview that was conducted was a structured interview. The author will make an interview instrument in advance with several questions as the focus. However, interview questions can develop in the field according to the needs of this study.

### 3. Results

In some cases of financial crimes, there are aspects found criminaloid and organizational criminogenic in one and the same case. This begins with a study criminaloid by using the case illustration of embezzlement in cases of ARM, FS, HB, SSK, and JAT. Next, organizational criminogenic aspects using illustrations involving corporations in the cases of CIP, GSG, IBR, LSA, and SR. Meanwhile, a study on the contribution of aspects criminaloid and organizational criminogenic through the illustrations of the FT and KSP PG cases. On this basis, it is known that in the case of the FT and KSP PG involved a combination criminaloid and organizational criminogenic. This is supported by Pickett and Pickett (2002) who explain 7 components of financial crime. By looking at these seven components, there is an attachment to the criminaloid component as well organizational criminogenic. Financial crime can provide benefits for individuals and businesses that are run by corporations with a combination of criminaloid and organizational criminogenic aspects. Therefore, the researcher created an aspect relationship table criminaloid and organizational criminogenic in the table below.

Table 1: Relationships Between Components in Criminaloid and Organizational Criminogenic

<b>Criminaloid</b>	<b>Relationship</b>	<b>Organizational Criminogenic</b>
How easy it is to confess	+	Profit orientation ambition, and business continuity & corporate targets
Social and cultural status	+	Business perceptions and distribution of responsibilities
Moral sensitivity and intelligence	+	Certain group loyalty
Ability and hesitation in acting	+	The composition of the company tends to be ethnocentric

*Source: reprocessed by researchers from interviews with resource persons (2021)*

The first relationship is the link between the ease of giving recognition to profit-oriented ambitions, and business continuity and corporate targets. The data findings in the case of FT and KSP PG show this. Where, AS and ADH (in the case of FT), as well as VL and SN (in the case of KSP PG) have a tendency towards a culture of hedonism. This finding was confirmed by a list of confiscated items owned by the perpetrators. The relationship that connects between criminaloid and organizational criminogenic are decisions made by individuals (Gorsira et al. 2016). A recent study shows that perpetrators perceive higher benefits of corruption, such as financial benefits, excitement, and pleasure, and that corruption costs are perceived to be lower, that is, lower chances of detection, and fewer harsh penalties, are more prone to committing corruption (Gorsira et al. 2016).

Thus, with rational motives and choices, the actors will refer to the ambitions of profit orientation and business continuity as well as corporate targets. This is also for the US, ADH, VL and SN as an effort to create a culture of hedonism. Thus, from the aspect of recognition of ambition in the context of realizing a culture of hedonism, it shows the same motive underlying the ambition of profit orientation, business continuity and corporate targets. This is related to fraudulent behavior that can develop when a strong focus on cultural hedonism combined with favorable circumstances (in this case related to corporate profits) can contribute as motivation and inducement towards unethical behavior (Eaton & Korach, 2016).

The second relationship is that there is an attachment between social and cultural status, which refers to overconfidence and over-appreciation for self-authority with perceptions of business and distribution of responsibility. The results of interviews with FT and KSP PG actors have shown that the characteristics possessed by the US and SN as the main recruits and owners refer to a charismatic form to encourage people to get involved in fraud cases. However, on the other hand, this is done instead as a form of implementing business perceptions and the distribution of responsibilities that the actors have. The US as the main recruit for FT commits various kinds of fraud to FT companies or partners. For example, fraud in making a visa, SN himself approached one of the Visa making companies. In addition, there is cooperation with PT Y, instead of SN promising to invest in the company PT Y, it is actually detrimental to the victim. According to the owner of PT Y,

These actions were carried out by SN as a form of responsibility as the president director, apart from that the responsibility was only carried out by him, because by doing so, the fraudulent acts he committed would be difficult to trace. In addition, there is a distorted business perception based on the internal side overconfidence and over-appreciation for self-authority. This is in line with research by Gorsira et al (2017), which states that the relationship between the perceived ethical climate of corrupt organizations is influenced by self-control from corruption. So further, a potentially effective way to motivate people to refrain from corruption is to reinforce personal and social norms against it, since personal and social norms appear to be important predictors of corruption, as well as an important pathway through which the ethical climate influences corruption (Gorsira et al. 2017).

The third relationship, namely moral sensitivity and intelligence, is related to moral force associated with attachment; involvement; commitment; and belief, have a relationship with certain group loyalty. Where, the loyalty of certain groups such as crime groups have a close relationship attachment; involvement; commitment; and beliefs owned by someone. According to Hirschi (1969) that individuals who commit white collar crimes are usually well integrated into society and have strong ties to the same group of criminals, at least at the level of involvement and commitment. Availability of elements attachment; involvement; commitment; and belief which refers to criminal behavior can encourage its formation crime coercive system.

Formation crime coercive system in the FT and KSP PG caused 4 elements of social ties that refer to criminal behavior owned by the US, ADH, VL and SN. In the case of FT, for example, the US has strong social ties in the community, but on the other hand, both ADH, his wife, were involved in fraud crimes. Then, in context involvement. Both AS and ADH are accustomed to having an attachment to deviant behavior, besides commitment both have is to commit fraud for profit. Up to the elements belief that they both do not have confidence in the applicable law and instead refer to the belief to commit deviations. Thus, the criminaloid within the US as well as ADH as the main recruiter and director of the FT, has driven the formation crime coercive system in the FT

company. This is in line with the explanation Scholten and Ellemers (2016) that companies often associate fraud with work culture and individuals who commit crimes.

The fourth relationship, the researcher sees that there is a relationship between the ability and doubt in acting that individuals have to commit crimes with the company's composition tends to be ethnocentric. This is evidenced in the data findings that the US and ADH in the FT case have absolutely no qualms about committing a crime, instead they are openly fraudulent. This can be seen when the US and ADH determine Umrah fees that are not in accordance with the market or adequacy for payment. In addition, by not giving the commission the agents have also proven that fraud will take place, coupled with the condition of the *Jamaah* who has not yet departed. With the fraud committed and to carry out such action, The US and ADH recruit employees who have the same goals and visions. One of them is SNH, who becomes the Head of the Finance Division. SNH was chosen by the US and ADH, because it has the ability to commit such fraudulent acts. This is done by the US and ADH, because it is in line with the findings of Victor and Cullen (1988) that the organizational ethical climate as a relevant organizational factor explains various unethical decisions of employees. It was also explained that there is a tendency for employee criteria to be related to ethical criteria that already exist in the company. The dominant considerations are maximizing personal interest (egotistical reasoning), maximizing mutual interest (benevolent reasoning), or adherence to principles (principled reasoning; Victor and Cullen 1988). who became the Head of the Finance Division. SNH was chosen by the US and ADH, because it has the ability to commit such fraudulent acts. This is done by the US and ADH, because it is in line with the findings of Victor and Cullen (1988) that the organizational ethical climate as a relevant organizational factor explains various unethical decisions of employees. It was also explained that there is a tendency for employee criteria to be related to ethical criteria that already exist in the company. The dominant considerations are maximizing personal interest (egotistical reasoning), maximizing mutual interest (benevolent reasoning), or adherence to principles (principled reasoning; Victor and Cullen 1988). who became the Head of the Finance Division. SNH was chosen by the US and ADH, because it has the ability to commit such fraudulent acts. This is done by the US and ADH, because it is in line with the findings of Victor and Cullen (1988) that the organizational ethical climate as a relevant organizational factor explains various unethical decisions of employees. It was also explained that there is a tendency for employee criteria to be related to ethical criteria that already exist in the company. The dominant considerations are maximizing personal interest (egotistical reasoning), maximizing mutual interest (benevolent reasoning), or adherence to principles (principled reasoning; Victor and Cullen 1988). because it is in line with the findings of Victor and Cullen (1988) that organizational ethical climate as a relevant organizational factor explains various unethical decisions of employees. It was also explained that there is a tendency for employee criteria to be related to ethical criteria that already exist in the company. The dominant considerations are maximizing personal interest (egotistical reasoning), maximizing mutual interest (benevolent reasoning), or adherence to principles (principled reasoning; Victor and Cullen 1988). because it is in line with the findings of Victor and Cullen (1988) that organizational ethical climate as a relevant organizational factor explains various unethical decisions of employees. It was also explained that there is a tendency for employee criteria to be related to ethical criteria that already exist in the company. The dominant considerations are maximizing personal interest (egotistical reasoning), maximizing mutual interest (benevolent reasoning), or adherence to principles (principled reasoning; Victor and Cullen 1988).

The above conditions were also carried out in the case of KSP PG, in which SN as the owner of the corporation, had recruited trusted people such as VL, RZ, SO and MN to commit fraud and money laundering. These individuals are personally selected by SN, because they have criteria in accordance with company ethics and culture. This is in line with the explanation that in such a climate, organizational members perceive that self-interest usually guides behavior, even if it is detrimental to others (Wimbush and Shepard 1994). Therefore, there is a tendency for individuals as owners to have appropriate criteria for committing fraud and money laundering crimes.

The of explanation low self-control in this case is seen in the personalities of the US and ADH who are unable to take control of the conduct of a legitimate business. One of this is related to the low self-control towards the acceptance of responsibility and the benefits that will be obtained by the corporation. In particular, it also reveals

that US and ADH personalities have become trapped in complacency, thus driving them to commit crimes, because these crimes can reduce US and ADH financial problems outside of the organization. This is in line with the explanation of Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) that the socialization process in the individual is not at the perfect stage to reject crime. Low self-control will affect commitment, responsibility, planning and diligence in carrying out the work.

In addition, it was found that low self-control was established long before individuals moved or became involved in a corporation. Therefore, organizations present new opportunities for criminals such as the US and ADH to pursue their own interests and often engage in risk seeking. This is in line with the findings of researchers that the US and ADH are indeed planning to deviate, in which the FT corporation is only one of the big opportunities that exist. In addition, it was found that the US, as the President Director, continued to commit various frauds and financial crimes involving the name of the FT corporation which was considered trusted and had great business value. This can be seen in the involvement of other companies that support FT activities as an Umrah Travel Agency.

Then, analysis of the US and ADH related criminaloid aspects has also proven that there is low self-control in the perpetrator. Among them, it seems that they (the US and ADH) are innocent and tend to neutralize, then have stability in committing crimes, the US and ADH show recognition of a culture of hedonism and finally have a moral force that tends to financial crime behavior. The above conditions are in line with the explanation that low self-control encourages individual behavior not to care about the long-term consequences for the perpetrator. When given the opportunity, individuals with low self-control are more likely to engage in activities that are immediately satisfied because of less effort (Pratt & Cullen, 2000).

SN as the owner of KSP PG has low self-control. The data findings show that SN cannot carry out its responsibilities as owner. In addition, it was also found that the KSP PG was one of the opportunities used by SN to channel low self-control and could not reject false profits without considering the long-term consequences of its crimes. This is reinforced by the finding that low self-control is a strong predictor of financial crime and fraud (Martinez, Rutledge, & Sher, 2007).

The researcher also saw that the participation of SNH in the FT case, then VL, RZ, SO and MN in the KSP PG case was related to self-control of the pressures contained in the corporation. Corporate crime researchers theorize about the non-organic aspects of crime of the organization and its environment, associated with low self-control. One of them is Yeager and Reed (1998) who explain that the main purpose of committing crimes can usually be done because it prioritizes organizational influence on managerial decisions. For example, a corporation sets goals that don't make sense and punishes managers who fail by creating a climate of pressure and fear among employees. This was found to affect self-control in every employee.

In the case of crimes by FT and KSP PG, there is employee involvement in perpetuating the crime, because the FT and KSP PG directors can make decisions that violate rather than for personal gain. This is in line with Tillman & Pontell (1994) which explains that corporate crime cannot be reduced to individuals and their characteristics. Thus individuals and organizations have been influenced by the symbiotic statements of managers, in this case the US and SN as the main director and owner of each corporation. In turn, the manager's statement becomes the culture and structure of the organization. Thus, in the view of SNH, VL, RZ, SO and MN, deviant behavior cannot be reduced, because it has become the culture, structure and activities of the company.

The above conditions are related to theory *corporate offending* (Finney and Lesieur, 1982). The contingency theory of organizational crime assumes that crime is developmental and contingent in nature, including events that lead to violations and the consequences of crime. In addition, crime is understood as a rational decision, even though crime is "limited" by information, conditions, and imperfect decision makers (Simon, 1976). The crime choice is more than the non-crime alternative, but refers to and is associated with the manager's subjective discomfort. This is in line with the data findings in the case of FT and KSP PG that the US and SN have a role as managers in making rational decisions based on low self-control to commit crimes. On the other hand, its employees, including SNH, VL, RZ, SO and MN instead have made deviant rational decisions, due to part of the company's activities.

This is in line with the explanation that from this organizational perspective, crime is related to intra- and extra-organizational performance pressures and barriers such as class tension (Vaughan, 1998).

The US and SN's low self-control makes them as managers view crime as a sensible action, given the relative (for legal action) costs and benefits (Coleman & Ramos 1998). This view of committing crimes has become a rational decision to reap financial benefits as well as to cut costs. In addition, the cultural and structural conditions of the FT and KSP PGs which tend to open up opportunities for deviance have led to anisotropic individual decision making in the organization.

However, organizational contingency theory sees that crime is not as easy as described by Gottfredson and Hirschi regarding low self-control. It relates to the kind of detailed planning and insight that managers use to calculate market decisions. Even the concealment that some companies use to avoid discovery or liability in criminal or civil matters is well planned and executed strategically (Sonnenfeld & Lawrence, 1978). The above conditions were also found in the case of FT and KSP PG, where they used a Ponzi scheme that was not tracked in the company's business activities to make offers and pressure consumers to continue to become victims.

#### **4. Discussion**

In addition, the author also conducts a deeper study regarding the emergence of dynamics criminogenic new in cases involving criminaloid and organizational criminogenic aspects, that is situational criminogenic. The emergence of a dynamic situational criminogenic the background of use situational action theory in this research. Researchers see the dynamics of the emergence of situational criminogenic as a process of the occurrence of crime, especially in crimes committed by companies. Researchers see that the motivation to commit financial crimes is profit. Where the benefits have been included in individuals who have a tendency criminaloid and a place in the form of a company as a place to collect profit that has a tendency organizational criminogenic. When the two aspects are in the same place, there are interactions which can be in the form of other determinants such as nature of industry, affinity frauds, and the socio-economic characteristics of victims in Indonesia. Then, the conditions of law enforcement and politics are corrupt. When the actors and the contribution from the company consider this, there is a choice of the perception that the Ponzi scheme is one of the strategies to realize these benefits.

In the end, the author has proven that to commit corporate crimes requires a very complex step, also related to the dynamics that exist in it. It should be noted that the case of FT and KSP PG is one of the extraordinary cases that is detrimental to society and the state. So that with the results of this study, it is hoped that the government and society will be more aware of the development of complex modes and strategies in corporate crime, especially financial crimes.

The results of this study indicate that aspects criminaloid and organizational criminogenic can contribute to corporate crime cases. Researchers have also explored deeper, thus finding dynamics criminaloid and organizational criminogenic which often occurs in corporate crime. Thus, the findings on criminaloid and organizational criminogenic implicates for the emergence of elements contained in each theory. Inside criminaloid indicator encouraging embezzlement crimes committed in an organizational context are low self-control (psycho-social), stability in committing crimes, easy recognition, moral sensitivity and high intelligence, and having social and cultural status. Inside organizational criminogenic indicator thus encouraging corporate crime, namely profit-oriented ambition, expansion and power, business continuity and a "safe" position for individuals, fear of failure to achieve targets, loyalty to certain groups, perceptions of business ethics and morals, bias in the distribution of responsibility, and tend to take an ethnocentric approach. Meanwhile, indicators in situational criminogenic resulting in financial crime are sentiment towards businesses that use a religious or belief approach, sentiment towards businesses that use cooperative systems, and business fund management models with risky systems, such as the Ponzi scheme.

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# Tourism as a Socio-Cultural Phenomenon: A Critical Analysis

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## Abstract

Global tourism is based on the movement of people from their usual environment, which makes interaction between people possible. It creates a mutual impact on tourists and the host community by bringing together people of different races, languages, and beliefs. Global tourism leads to a beneficial economic impact on the host country and it also increases the socio-cultural exchange between the host and tourist countries. In this respect, the current paper presents the analysis of tourism as a socio-cultural phenomenon. It presents a critical analysis of earlier findings on the evolution of tourism as a concept and sheds light on cultural and social factors leading to tourism in its present state as well as its social and cultural impacts, positive and negative. Furthermore identifies some sociological and cultural factors that shape the characteristics of tourists and highlights the role of socio-cultural motivations of tourists.

**Keywords:** Tourism, Socio-Cultural Phenomenon, Host Country, Tourist Country

## 1. Introduction

Tourism is a cultural, social, and economic phenomenon that involves movement of people to places or nations away from their day-to-day environment. The activities of these people involving expenditure, for business, leisure, and other purposes involve tourism expenditure (UNWTO, 2021). Economically, over the decades, there has been continued tourism growth. It has become one of the fastest-growing economic sectors in the world and experienced deepening diversification. The business volume arising from tourism is parallel to those from food products, oil exports, or automobiles. Globally, tourism has carved its niche in international commerce and contributes to growing economies around the world as their main income source (UNWTO, 2021b). International tourists' arrival has been on an increase since 2009 with estimated travelers growing to 1462 million in 2019 contributing to receipts of USD 1,480 billion. However, the trends were not observed in 2020 due to Covid-19 and international travel restrictions (UNWTO, 2020a). In the first eight months of the year 2020, international arrivals witnessed a decrease of 70%. Global tourism is expected to witness a rebound in demand in the third quarter of 2021 (UNWTO, 2020b).

Nevertheless, tourism has been closely linked with regional development and an increase in the number of new destinations across the globe. The interactions between tourists and the local population are known to have an impact on the pattern of the social fabric of the host community. These interactions also impact the material artifacts and cultural and social relations (Scheyvens & Russell, 2012). These dynamics in the global tourism act as a key driver for tourism being a socio-cultural phenomenon (Akova & Atsiz, 2019). The socio-cultural impacts of tourism include the impacts on the host communities as a result of direct and indirect interactions and relationships with the travelers (Amalu et al., 2020). In this respect, the current paper will critically analyze available literature to shed light on the socio-cultural factors that have led to the development of tourism. At the same time, the scholarly papers will also be analyzed to point out the positive and negative socio-cultural implications of tourism.

The socio-cultural value of tourism includes an increase in social capital following an increase in tourists, development of the sense of community identity, a keen sense of linkage with local environments (Ramos et al., 2016). The tourist destination may get positively influenced by the travelers towards acknowledging the differences in the socio-cultural outlook of people from different regions. Global tourism also leads to socio-cultural enrichment of the region by improved understanding of locals other people's habits. This allows the adoption of healthier practices and helps local live healthier lives (Pramanik & Ingkadijaya, 2018). Tourism further enriches the socio-cultural sphere of host communities by increasing prospects for women's participation in the sector including engagement in informal activities. It also helps increase recreation choices for the local population and increase concern among residents regarding their heritage resources (Sroyetch, 2016). Nevertheless, global tourism may also exert negative socio-cultural impacts on host destinations. These include the weakening of the traditional and cultural values by the development and acculturation process. In addition, there may occur changes in the socio-cultural outlook of the host population from aspects of seniority, religion, and family and community relationships. Tourism may facilitate individualism within the host communities where otherwise collectivism is encouraged and appreciated (Sroyetch, 2016). Such changes impact the socio-cultural nature of the host country and may even threaten indigenous identities community fabric, collective conventional lifestyles, morality, and ceremonies (Zhuang et al., 2019). Keeping the positive and negative impact of tourism in mind, this paper will analyze previous research and academic studies to identify patterns of findings and thought on tourism as a socio-cultural phenomenon.

## **2. Aim of the study**

The current study aims to critically analyze the role of socio-cultural factors in the development of tourism. The study also aims to shed light on the positive and negative socio-cultural implications of tourism.

## **3. Methodology**

### *3.1 Type of study and data*

A critical analysis is a heterogeneous approach used to examine the socio-political and historical dimensions of the subject under study (Allen, 2017). The current study is based on the secondary analysis of qualitative data. The method is chosen as it allows reanalysis of data collected and analyzed previously. This will allow the researcher to gain access to a larger dataset and utilize high-quality studies that contain a substantial breadth and involve larger samples (Johnston, 2014).

### *3.2 Selection criteria of studies*

Table 1: Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria for Critical Review

Type	Criterion
Inclusion	Published between 2011 and 2021
	Research, original studies, meta-analysis, survey, review, systematic review, and empirical analysis
	Search words: Socio-cultural Tourism, social tourism, cultural tourism.
	Studies only in English
Exclusion	Newspaper article
	Editorial discussion
	Studies Lacking supporting evidence in the main text
	Studies not involving socio-cultural impact of tourism.




Figure 1: Process of article selection Tourism and Socio-cultural Impact

The review focused on scholarly databases that were searched using the terms described in table 1 published between the period 2011 and 2021. The studies are considered based on inclusion and exclusion criteria and relevant references are recognized to help analyze tourism as a social-cultural phenomenon.

#### **4. Data Analysis**

For the selected studies, data were extracted to form a database with parameters of the year of publication, positive and negative socio-cultural impact of tourism, and findings. These selected studies were then grouped to facilitate critical analysis and cross-study comparison. The analysis allows familiarity with the data and shaping of analysis coherently (Allen, 2017).

##### *4.1 Validity and reliability of data*

To maintain the reliability and validity of data gathered is maintained using the constructs of consistency, neutrality, truth-value, and applicability. This includes strategies for the removal of personal biases that may influence the findings of the study. Care has been taken to ensure the data is transparent and consistent. This is done by representation and comparison of the differences and similarities among different perspectives on the subject under study (Noble & Smith, 2015).

#### **5. Discussion**

##### *5.1 Evolution of tourism concept (Definition and aspects motivating tourism)*

The term tourism is defined by the (UNWTO, 2021) as

*“Tourism is a social, cultural and economic phenomenon which entails the movement of people to countries or places outside their usual environment for personal or business/professional purposes. These people are called visitors (which may be either tourists or excursionists; residents or non-residents) and tourism has to do with their activities, some of which involve tourism expenditure”* (p.1).

The definition suggests that tourism is a broad concept and encompasses all visitor activities, including both overnight and same-day tourists. Further, tourist activities as per the definition are the pursuit of visitors and activities they indulge in.

Keeping in mind the rapid growth of the industry, Richards, (2015) suggests that one of the aspects promoting the growth of global tourism is an increase in the purchasing power of people. Specifically, the younger population of countries across the globe are influencing these trends with their increased power to spend on traveling and tourism (Arowosafe et al., 2020). Also, advances in technology motivate tourism in regions otherwise unexplored. The growth in information and communication technology has enabled widespread social relations that strengthen the tendency of tourism (Bethapudi, 2013; Hojaghan & Esfangareh, 2011; Morais et al., 2016). Further, Buffa, (2015) suggests that one of the key aspects that promote tourism is the discovery of new cultures, landscapes, inspection of natural and artistic heritage, learning through contact with the local community (L. L. Chang et al., 2014; Tiberghien et al., 2017). In addition, Yousaf et al., (2018) highlighted that the need of people to form relationships also promotes tourism. Tourism enhances the sense of social belonging and confirms an individual's ability to develop healthy relationships (Hindley & Font, 2018). The need for people to develop bonds with family and increase familiarity with local communities and destinations also motivate tourism (Khalid et al., 2019). Apart from the internal motivator for tourism, there are also push factors. These include the external simulation such as advertisement, beauty of landscape, and socio-cultural differences between host and home countries motivates tourism (Sirisack et al., 2014).

##### *5.2 Factors leading to tourism in its present state*

*a) Social*

Among the social factors that contribute to tourism in various nations in their present state, Kővári & Zimányi, (2011) highlighted the role of perception of safety and security in the region. These include the parameters of reliability of police services, political stability, hazards such as terrorist attacks, and tourists' death and injuries in traffic-related accidents (Kordić et al., 2015; Mastroianni, 2017; Mawioo & Kagiri, 2015). The second social factor is that of health and hygiene. High sanitary conditions, good quality of drinking water, and medical care are some health-based social factors that impact tourism (Jovanović et al., 2015). Also, Vasanicova, (2018) in a study highlighted that the social factor of health contributes to the competitiveness of a region. These also include the density of physician in the area, hospital beds, malaria incidence, and HIV prevalence, are leading contributor to tourism.

Furthermore, Seyidov & Adomaitienė, (2017) suggested the social factors of family, groups, roles, responsibility, and status play a role in leading tourism to its present state. Through these factors, families are exposed to a new lifestyle, personality, ideas, and conception that shape tourism needs (Cuculeski et al., 2015). In addition, age, life cycle, occupation, and social status are also some individual-based factors that influence tourism. Such as the need of people to identify themselves with a social class are influenced by the collective behavior. These include people's choices of tourist destination, mode of transportation, and accommodation (Fratu, 2011). Jin et al., (2016) in a study further highlighted that tourist's expectation of the destination in terms of usage of social resources is also an important factor. If it is considered to surpass the carrying capacity of an area, it impacts tourism negatively. The destination is perceived as crowded and impacts implicit destination choices for people (Alazaizeh et al., 2016). Park et al., (2012) further suggest that the social concept of norms, networks, and social trust facilitates cooperation and coordination in tourism. These help in tourism development and conflict management while effectively supporting local residents and promoting successful tourism development.

*b) Cultural*

Brida et al., (2013) explained the role of cultural factors in tourism. The authors suggest that cultural factors are intrinsically connected to the capacity of the destination to attract tourists. It thus shapes the destination's competitiveness. Among the cultural factors, impacting tourism in its present state includes the presence of monuments and heritage sites. These are cultural epitomes and mirror of society. Presence of monument in a region promotes tourism as it helps to co-join the past with the present. Monuments concretize the past while preserving the testimony of the past glory to shed light on the cultural identity of a community (S. P. Kumar, 2014). In addition, Özel & Kozak, (2012) in a study suggested that cultural motivation contributes to tourism in its present state. These include the parameters of creativeness, knowledge, experience, achievement, rest, socialization, sports, family togetherness, escape, fun and travel bragging. Also, the intrinsic desire to learn about any culture or its particular aspect contributes to cultural push-pull factor in promoting tourism (Correia et al., 2013). Bond & Falk, (2013) further suggested that identity-related desire also contributes to culture-based tourism. It offers tourists an opportunity for self-evaluation, self-reflection, self-exploration, and self-discovery. The heritage and cultural sites further promote tourism based on their ability to allow self-development and self-construction among individuals. It allows exploration and exploration of self-identity that through simple contact with cultures and people (Michael et al., 2020).

However, Richards, (2018) suggested that cultural factors promoting tourism comprise of both tangible and intangible heritage. These are also made of creativity and contemporary practices attached to storytelling, learning, narrative, and identity of a region. Matteucci, (2018) indicated that tourist engagement is essential for culture-based tourism. The creative tourists' experiences tend to motivate tourists to seek to experience authentic aspects of local cultures. These can be enhanced by fostered feelings of togetherness, and a sense of affiliation through tourists' close interactions with local artists and peers. Emotional solidarity and sympathetic understanding towards tourists support tourism (Hasani et al., 2016). Furthermore, the ability of a destination to provide new sensations to tourists allows them to confront their embodied identities by pushing them outside their comfort zones (Xavier Matteucci & Filep, 2017).

### *5.3 Sociological and cultural factors that shape the characteristics of tourists*

Among the sociological and cultural factors that shape the characteristics of tourists, Adam et al., (2019) identified the role of human behavior. The author states that as human behavior alters from time to time they shape the characteristics of tourists as well. The behavior change influences the needs of the visitors and their choice of destination. In addition, Tribe & Liburd, (2016) also indicated that sociological and cultural factors that shape the characteristics of tourists include the parameters of genders, instincts, senses, and values of tourists. Figueroa-Domecq & Segovia-Perez, (2020) in a study suggested that gender shapes the character of tourists as they differ in their choices of leisure activities. The authors also found that independent women travelers are more aware of their need for self-development and have different needs and expectations, such as safety and security.

Additionally, Tribe & Liburd, (2016) also found that the age or lifecycle of the tourists is also significantly important as characteristic. The preferences of tourists are different in the life eras of initial adulthood, medium adulthood, and final adulthood. Similarly, Zhang et al., (2020) also found the role of previous tourism along with tourists' life stage in shaping the characteristics of tourists as a sociological factor. The author found that both these factors contribute to tourists' needs and choices. For example, differentiation in the knowledge and experience of tourists were found to be influential in impacting the cultural and geographic choices of tourists.

Also, Schänzel & Yeoman, (2015) in a study indicated that cultural orientation of family and family togetherness are also sociological and cultural factors responsible for shaping the characteristics of tourists. These tourists focus on promoting family togetherness, creating family memories, and keeping family bonds alive. Dahiya & Batra, (2016) found the ability of an individual to get influenced by opinion leaders to formulate their tourist decision making. Furthermore, Correia et al., (2011) in a study identified the role of national culture in shaping tourists' characteristics. The study highlight that it influenced tourist behavior for example information search, complaining and satisfaction behavior, and their perceptions.

### *5.4 Socio-cultural motivations of tourists*

Among various studies highlighting the role of socio-cultural motivations of tourists, Cheung, (2016) suggest that the level of satisfaction among individuals based on Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory. As per the theory, tourists are motivated by fulfillment of needs and tourists ensure that their psychograph profiles match with their destination preferences. Also, Hurtado et al., (2014) explored other socio-cultural motivations for individuals that promote tourism. These include the opportunity for re-evaluation, self-discovery, opportunity to adopt a different role in different situations, and interaction with different people. Among other, the existing perception of tourists to be unable to participate in some activities at home motivates tourist also act as a motivator. This leads to tourist desires to participate in activities implausible in their usual lifestyle acts as motivation.

Further, Cheung & Fok, (2014) in a study suggested that cultural motivators for travelers include education and novelty. These factors shape tourists' intention to be inclined towards learning about the place of travel, be physically active, learn new outdoor skills, and meet people with similar interests. Also, the tourist characteristic is shaped by their income. Tourists of lower-income groups are motivated by knowledge-seeking, whereas, those belonging to higher income groups travel for motives such as escape, relaxation, and appreciation of nature (Jensen, 2015). Correia, (2014) also found that prestige is a motivation factor that impacts tourists. These include motivation to enhance social standing through travel.

Similarly, Kassean & Gassita, (2013) also identified the motives of escape, rest, and novelty among the motivation for travelers. Other factors identified by the author include nostalgia, self-actualization, escape, social interaction, prestige, and recognition. Paul & Varghese, (2015) also suggested that motivation can be classified as pull factors. The pull motivators for tourists include options for activities, cultural extravaganzas, events, that act as an ideal place for tourism. Opportunity for family bonding and a safe environment also motivates tourists. In addition, positive perception of the destination among the tourist act as motivator. This is shaped by the opinion from relatives and friends, attitude towards the destination, and experience from previous travelling (Said, 2018).

### *5.5 Positive socio-cultural influences of tourism*

To point out the positive socio-cultural impact of tourism, Zhuang et al., (2019) highlighted its role in poverty reduction in the host country. Specifically in the least developed countries, tourism helps in poverty reduction as it is a labor-intensive industry. It allows creation of jobs in remote areas where even unskilled laborers can find jobs in this diverse industry. These include increase in employment opportunities in sectors of transportation services, accommodation, travel agencies, food and beverage establishments, tour operation companies, cultural and natural attractions sites (Aynalem et al., 2016). In addition, the positive impact of socio-cultural tourism includes the benefits to the host communities arising from, development of social networks, improved sense of belonging, enhanced understanding and appreciation for the importance of the local area. These factors lead to an increase in social capital flow along with increase in tourism (Rasoolimanesh & Jaafar, 2016).

In addition, the positive socio-cultural impact of tourism includes community enrichment. Tourism gives local communities the chance to meet people of different cultures, backgrounds, and lifestyles. There takes place demonstration effect in the host country due to mixing of diverse culture from tourists lead to improved lifestyles and practices (Hau et al., 2013). Zaei & Zaei, (2013) further suggested that tourism leads to the betterment of local infrastructure and contributes to positive socio-cultural impact arising from tourism. Other common devices arising include an increase in income level, ameliorated health care, and education resources. Also, tourism helps in the improvement of the regional image of the host country. At the same time, it enhances the infrastructure construction in the region to become conducive for tourists. This further contributed to the improvement of recreational activities and the quality of life of natives (Woosnam & Aleshinloye, 2018; Zamani-Farahani & Musa, 2012). Furthermore, Lusetyowati, (2015) identified that tourism helps in the protection of cultural heritage. It is beneficial culturally as it allows accurate interpretation of resources available to the native and creates an authentic visitor experience. This further provides stimulation for an increase in revenues from cultural resources. It further promotes the transmission of cultural and historical traditions that contributes to the protection of local heritage, cultural arts, and crafts (A. Kumar, 2017).

### *5.6 Negative socio-cultural influences of tourism*

Despite there being positive influence of socio-cultural factors on tourism, several authors (Ghaderi & Henderson, 2012; Postma & Schmuecker, 2017; Zamani-Farahani & Musa, 2012) have recognized its negative impacts also. Among the negative factors of tourism impacting the living conditions includes racial discrimination as well as those arising from disparities in wealth, income, and discretionary spending. These lead to negative sentiments and social intolerance (Hudson et al., 2020; Tse & Tung, 2020). Other negative influences of tourism on living conditions include resettlement of traditional communities, crime, prostitution, littering, population size, increase in traffic congestion, and traffic accidents (Juan Carlos Monterrubio et al., 2012; Zhao & Li, 2018). Also, tourism can lead to a shortage of goods and services for the native population (Mihalic, 2014). The negative socio-cultural influence of tourism on living conditions also include difficulties of sustainable development, sporadic violence, and absence of shopping establishments and spaces (Hall et al., 2013; Zhuang et al., 2019)

Occasionally the local culture may also get negatively impacted due to tourism, for example, a decline of native culture and social order being disturbed (K. G. Chang et al., 2018). Tourism may even impact the religious and community values of host nations. Such as through the introduction of new food and cuisine negatively impacting the native dietary culture, introduction of drinking rituals, alteration in dress codes (Giampiccoli & Kalis, 2012; Jude et al., 2018; Postma & Schmuecker, 2017). In addition, the negative impact of tourism on socio-cultural setup is also observed on the parameters of the lifestyle of the host region. The breakdown of the conventional relations and family structure (Sroyetch, 2016). The change in behavior further poses a threat to community fabric, ceremonies, collective conventional lifestyles, and morality to threaten indigenous identities (Ghaderi & Henderson, 2012). J. Carlos Monterrubio & Mendoza-Ontiveros, (2014) in a study further observed that tourism might lead to alteration in the behavior of young generations to impact the language and tradition of the host country adversely. Also, there is a risk for the natives to face exploitation and cases of antipathy between the tourists and locals (Kc et al., 2020; Suntikul & Dorji, 2016).

## 6. Conclusion

The current study presents the critical analysis of prevailing literature on tourism as a socio-cultural phenomenon. Previous academic and scholarly findings suggest that tourism includes movement and activities of people within the country or outside its boundaries. Among the social factors that contribute to tourism in its present state, include the perception of safety and security, political stability, and health and hygiene. In addition, the social factors of family, groups, roles, and status shape tourism needs, personality, and ideas to influence tourist behavior. Also, cultural factors play an important role in contributing to tourism. They shape the destination's competitiveness, preserve cultural identity of a community, and fuel tourist need for creativeness, knowledge, experience, achievement, rest, socialization, sports, family togetherness, escape, fun, and travel bragging.

Also, the study identifies some sociological and cultural factors that shape the characteristics of tourists. These include the parameter of human behavior, genders, instincts, senses, and values of tourists. Further, it was found in the study that age or lifecycle also influence tourists' needs and choices. Other sociological and cultural factors identified in the current study include knowledge, experience, cultural orientation of family, and family togetherness. Apart from the factors, there are certain socio-cultural motivations for the tourists. These include satisfaction among individuals based on Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory, opportunity for re-evaluation and self-discovery, opportunity to adopt a different role in different situations, interaction with different people. In addition, nostalgia, self-actualization, escape, social interaction, prestige, and recognition are significant motivators.

Finally, the critical analysis of available literature is used in the study to shed light on the positive and negative influences of tourism in a region. The positive influences include those impacting the living conditions of the host country such as improved public infrastructure, education quality, and employment opportunity. Tourism leads to the amelioration of regional image and contributes positively to people's sense of local and national pride. However, the study also identifies some negative influences of tourism including, increase in crime, prostitution, traffic congestion, lack of sustainable development. These impacts also extend to local social order being disturbed and cultural decline through changes in societal and dietary cultures. In addition, there are chances of contradiction among the community and residents facing exploitation.

## 7. Limitations

This critical review is focused on the subjective knowledge gathered from various literature on tourism as a socio-cultural phenomenon. However, there are some limitations related to the methodology these include the lack of mixed-methods studies. The lack of quantitative data in the study poses a limitation to the present study. In addition, not all studies that have been undertaken on the subject have been analyzed in the present study. Hence, there are some socio-cultural factors of tourism that have not been analyzed in the present study. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized for specific locations.

## 8. Future Scope

To ensure transferability and generalization of results of the current study, a large-scale mixed method approach can be adopted in the future. The inclusion of quantitative data in the study may have highlighted some important findings regarding the role and impact of socio-cultural factors on tourism. As the current study reviewed studies that included a lack of specific information on the subject the reliability and validity of this study can be enhanced by first-hand collection of quantitative and qualitative data. In the future, the study can be further enhanced by taking into consideration the socio-demographic information of tourists to ensure transferability of the results.

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# The Strategy of The Republic of Indonesian Government in Dealing with Covid-19 Pandemic from the Perspective of Total War Strategy

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## Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic demands the Indonesian Government to act against the various impacts caused through various strategies and efforts. The spread of the Covid-19 pandemic is very fast, resulting in many casualties, not only the wider community but also health workers who carry out tasks throughout the country. The existence of the Covid-19 pandemic has also affected the political, economic and almost all sectors of life, including defense. In order to discuss the problem of the Covid-19 Pandemic, supporting theories are used, namely strategy theory, pandemic theory, universal defense theory and universal war strategy theory. The method used in the analysis of the Covid-19 pandemic is a qualitative descriptive phenomenology, that is, with the existing phenomena regarding Covid-19 and qualitatively explaining the data obtained from literature studies to gain an understanding of strategies for dealing with it. The results of the analysis found that there were various supporting factors and obstacles to handling efforts, implementing strategies, among others, to increase understanding of Covid-19, then preventive steps by using the next application of governance for handling Covid-19 and increasing a strong community superstructure. The aim of the strategy undertaken is to inhibit the spread and countermeasures from a Total War Strategy perspective.

**Keywords:** Strategy, Government, Pandemic, Covid-19, Total War

## 1. Introduction

The Covid-19 Pandemic was first discovered in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China, on December 31, 2019, with pneumonia symptoms in patients. On January 7, 2020, pneumonia was identified as a new type of Coronavirus (novel coronavirus), and in early 2020 was declared a global phenomenon. The spread of Pandemic is rapidly growing to become a health problem around the world. As of January 30, 2020, Covid-19 is designated a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) (ZA et al., 2020). In Indonesia, the first case was announced by President Jokowi on March 2, 2020, with two cases of Covid-19 positive patients (Ellyvon, 2020).

The defense white paper explains the various threats that Indonesia can face in the future and present. Such threats can be real threats and unreal threats—one of the real threats in the presence of disease outbreaks. Furthermore, currently, the Covid-19 Pandemic is hitting all parts of Indonesia with various consequences (Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2015).

The spread of the Covid-19 virus in Indonesia quickly caused many fatalities, disruption of economic and political activities, and other life areas. Since the beginning of the spread, Indonesia has not been able to solve the Pandemic that occurred until now. Efforts to anticipate early on the spread of covid-19, up to reduce the widespread impact it causes, still have not shown satisfactory results. However, the Government has made efforts to reduce the spread of Covid-19. Until now, it has reported an increase in coronavirus cases in many regions in Indonesia. The community has heeded the advice and regulations in daily activities, such as wearing masks, applying physical distance, and washing hands.

The mortality rate in Indonesian health workers are high. According to the Chairman of the Hospital Management Department, Hasanuddin University, Irwandy, the death rate of Indonesian health workers at that time reached 6.5 percent (Pusparisa, 2020). That is, in every 100 deaths, there are about six to seven health workers who die. Meanwhile, the Vice Chairman of PB IDI (Ikatan Dokter Indonesia), dr Adib Khumaidi, said that Indonesia's death rate in June 2020 is not much different from last month's figures (Souisa, 2020).

The number of news that intersects the truth of the Covid-19 virus is also a problem in itself. According to the Director-General of Information and Public Communication of the Ministry of Communication and Information, Widodo Muktiyo, the outbreak of covid-19 in almost all the world, including Indonesia, brings up much news, especially on social media (Doni003, 2020). Ministry of Communication and Information noted that 192 hoaxes news about the virus circulated on various social media platforms (Widodo, 2020), thus causing weakness in the face. Whereas the Government should be more able to monopolize the news to deliver accurate news and not be ambiguous and become a reference for the public.

The impact of the Covid-19 outbreak is seen in almost all sectors of people's lives (Mashabi, 2020). Social activities are banned and temporarily suspended, the economy weakens, transportation services are reduced and tightly regulated, tourism is closed, shopping malls are deserted, and informal sectors are closed such as; Ojek Online, Angkot driver, street vendors, mobile traders, MSMEs, and crude porters decreased income. Trade centers, such as malls, land markets that are usually crowded visited by the community are suddenly quiet and currently closed temporarily. The tourism sector is in decline; the Government is closing tourist attractions, entertainment venues (Mutiah, 2020). Work and study are done at home online (Binus, 2020).

Referring to the above problem, the author tries to examine how the Government prepares to deal with Covid-19 and how the Indonesian Government's strategy in dealing with the covid-19 Pandemic by implementing countermeasures from all sectors of life that are total.

## **2. Method**

This research uses a descriptive method of phenomenological qualitative. Researchers explain in detail the problems faced with existing phenomena in detail and efforts to solve them. In an effort to complete this research, researchers tried to discuss the efforts made from the perspective of the total war in the hope that efforts to combat the Covid-19 Pandemic become more accurate and successful. In this case, the data collection was done through a literature study, coupled with empirical experience during his stint as an Air Force soldier.

The main challenge faced is how the Indonesian Government's strategy in dealing with the Covid-19 Pandemic. The strategy is reviewed from the perspective of the total war to overcome the current Pandemic and anticipate similar situations by understanding various trends in the period 2020.

### 3. Results

#### 3.1 Early Covid-19

In early 2020, Covid-19 became a world health problem. The case began with information from the World Health Organization (WHO) on December 31, 2019, that mentioned a case of pneumonia cluster with unclear etiology in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China. This case continued to develop until it was finally known that the cause of this pneumonia cluster is a novel coronavirus. The case continued to grow until there were reports of deaths and importations outside China. On January 30, 2020, WHO designated Covid-19 as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). On February 12, 2020, WHO officially designated this novel coronavirus disease in humans as Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) (Kementerian Pertahanan, 2020). In Indonesia, the first case of Covid-19 occurred in Depok with indications of cough that has not healed since February 16, 2020. After the victim's friend's confirmation on February 28, 2020, the patient was declared a Covid-19 sufferer (Nuraini, 2020). The Government of Indonesia designates the Corona Virus or Covid-19 Outbreak as a National Disaster. The status was announced on Saturday afternoon, March 14, 2020, by the President through the Head of the National Disaster Management Agency, Doni Monardo, at the BNPB Building (Rokom, 2020).

Since the first case was announced, the number of positive cases of Covid-19 has continued to spike. On Wednesday, April 1, 2020, the number of positive cases of Covid-19 reached 1,677 cases, with 103 patients declared cured and 157 patients dying (Nuraini, 2020).




Figure 1: Covid-19 Pandemic Graphic in Indonesia

Source: National Task Force for Handling Covid-19 BNPB, 2020

From the chart above until December 3, 2020, there is still an increase in cases of the Covid-19 Pandemic in Indonesia every day, starting from the announcement of the Covid-19 Pandemic as a national disaster. The Corona Virus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic in Indonesia to date has not indicated a decrease in the number of positive patients. Based on the latest data accessed on the [www.covid.go.id](http://www.covid.go.id) page, the number of Covid-19 cases can be seen from the growing number of patients every day. In order to suppress the spread of Covid-19, the Government continues to implement various efforts (Puspita, 2020).

Table 1: Data on 5 Highest Case Provinces

No	Loc	Cases	Cured	Death
1	Jakarta	149.018	134.272	2.882
2	East Java	67.613	58.770	4.740
3	Center Java	63.610	43.316	2.544
4	West Java	63.043	51.727	1.025
5	South Sulawesi	22.402	19.269	512

Source: National Task Force for Handling Covid-19 BNPB, Dec 11, 2020

From the table above, it can be seen that the highest Covid-19 cases occurred in East Java, with a death rate of 4,493 people. The three areas that occupy the next highest death position are DKI Jakarta, as many as 2732, and Central Java, of 2409 people.

Based on government data entered until Tuesday (8/9/2020) at 12.00 WIB, 3,046 people were declared positive for Covid-19 in the last 24 hours. Thus, the number of Covid-19 cases in Indonesia has now reached 200,035 people, starting from the first patient's announcement on March 2, 2020 (Mashabi, 2020).

### 3.2 Economic impact

Restrictions on public activities affect business activities that then impact the economy. This August Central Statistics Agency (BPS) report stated that Indonesia's economic growth in the second quarter of 2020 was minus 5.32 percent. Previously, in the first quarter of 2020, BPS reported that Indonesia's economic growth only grew by 2.97 percent, down from 5.02 percent growth in the same period in 2019. The weakening economic performance also has an impact on the employment situation in Indonesia. SMERU Research Institute, an independent institution that conducts public research and studies, in August 2020 released their policy note entitled "Anticipating the Potential Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis on the Employment Sector". On that note, the SMERU research team underlined that there are at least two implications of Indonesia's economic crisis in the employment sector. First, an increase in the number of unemployed and a change in the post-crisis labor market landscape (Rizal, 2020).

Of the total Rp 695.2 trillion, the details, amounting to Rp 87.55 trillion for the health budget, social protection budget of Rp 203.9 trillion, business incentives of Rp 120.61 trillion, amounting to Rp 123.46 trillion prepared for the MSME sector, corporate financing to Rp 53.57 trillion, and for sectoral support K/L and Local Government of Rp 106.11 trillion. Justin explained that as a consequence of the additional costs to deal with Covid-19, the budget deficit in 2020 is expected to widen, from the deficit of 1.76 percent or Rp 307.2 trillion to 5.07 percent or Rp 852 trillion in Perpres 54/2020, and the new deficit is estimated at 6.34 percent or Rp 1,039.2 trillion. "In other words, there is an estimated increase in financing needs of Rp 905.2 trillion, from Rp 741.8 trillion to Rp 1,647.1 trillion," explained Yustinus (Fauzia, 2020).

Director-General of Tax of the Ministry of Finance (Kemenkeu) Suryo Utomo revealed three major impacts of the Covid-19 Pandemic on the Indonesian economy to enter a crisis period. The first impact is to make household consumption, or purchasing power, which is a 60 percent support to the economy falls quite deep. This is evidenced by BPS data, which records that household consumption fell from 5.02 percent in the first quarter of 2019 to 2.84 percent in the first quarter of this year. The second impact is that the Pandemic creates prolonged uncertainty so that investment weakens and implies a business cessation. The third impact is that the whole world is weakening the economy, causing commodity prices to fall, and Indonesia's exports to several countries also stalled (Zuraya, 2020).

### 3.3 Social impact

At the beginning of its appearance, the virus received a variety of responses that emerged from the People of Indonesia. Some begin to be cautious and implement healthy lifestyles, but more do not care and seem to underestimate; even make this virus a joke. Not only ordinary people but officials also underestimated the existence of this virus and did not make preparations or anticipation of the emergence of this outbreak in Indonesia. Even as COVID-19 began to spread rapidly to various regions, and some countries have closed access in and out, the Government and citizens of Indonesia still seem relaxed and do less to prevent this virus (Salsabila, 2020).

Uncertainty, confusion, and emergencies caused by the Coronavirus can be a stressor for many people. The uncertainty in knowing when the outbreak will end makes many groups of people, especially the lower middle class, confused about their fate. A life that goes on as usual without a livelihood makes it difficult for them to make ends meet. The existence of the Coronavirus that threatens everyone is likely to become a stressor for most people, and the impact can be just as severe as the impact if infected by the Coronavirus (Taylor, 2019).

### 3.4 The news

Various kinds of news that are difficult to distinguish right and wrong sometimes arise from the government. For example, through online media coverage, the government provides funds to combat the Covid-19 Pandemic through the 2020 State Budget of Rp 405.1 trillion, as explained by the Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati (Puspita, 2020). On another occasion, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) confirmed that the budget for handling the coronavirus pandemic (Covid-19) and the national economic recovery program (PEN) amounted to Rp 695.2 trillion (Putri, 2020). Previously, Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati revealed on her Instagram account @smindrawati about the Pandemic handling budget and pen program of Rp 905.2 trillion (Putri, 2020). Special Staff of Finance Minister Yustinus Prastowo conveyed word writing error to Kompas.com through a WA message, Friday (6/19/2020) night (Putri, 2020). Furthermore, the government plans to adjust the budget for handling covid-19 to Rp 695.2 trillion (Putri, 2020).

### 3.5 Indonesian Government Strategy

The Central Government, through the Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling Covid-19, makes four strategies that will be consistently carried out to strengthen physical distancing policy as a basic strategy to overcome the Covid-19 Pandemic (Wibowo, 2020).

- a. Movement masks for all with mandatory campaigns to use masks when in public places or outdoors
- b. Tracing of positive cases treated using Rapid Test or rapid test,
- c. The third strategy is the education and preparation of isolation independently in some tracing results that show reactive test results from rapid tests or negatives with symptoms to perform self-isolation
- d. The fourth strategy is hospital isolation for patients who show clinical symptoms who need services at the Hospital

The next strategy is in accordance with what President Jokowi said at a video conference on Tuesday, March 31, 2020, that government regulations (PP) on Large-Scale Social Restrictions and the Presidential Decree on the determination of public health emergencies have been published (Egeham, 2020). Government Regulation No. 21 of 2020 concerning Large-Scale Social Restrictions to Accelerate the Handling of Covid-19, known by the abbreviation PSBB (Siska, 2020). PSBB is a restriction on certain activities of residents in an area suspected of being infected with Covid-19 in order to prevent its spread. PSBB is carried out during the longest incubation period, which is 14 days. If there is still evidence of a new case, it can be extended within 14 days of the discovery of the last case (Syafriada, 2020). PSBB measures include school holidays, business premises, places of worship, and restrictions on people's social activities outside the home. With PSBB, the industry is also forced to adjust until the outbreak can be controlled, with all the consequences (Yurianto, 2020).

Article 13 decree No. 9 of 2020 regulates various activities limited by PSBB, namely: a) school and workplace holidays; b) restrictions on religious activities; c) restrictions on activities in public places or facilities; d) restrictions on social and cultural activities; e) restriction of transportation modes; f) Restrictions on other activities specifically related to aspects of defense and security This policy authorizes the Minister of Health to establish PSBB in a region based on a request from the Regional Head (governor or regent/major). The government has also issued a policy through Presidential Decree No. 12 of 2020 concerning the Determination of Non-Natural Disasters for the Spread of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) as a National Disaster.

#### 4. Discussion

##### 4.1 *Why the Total War Strategy?*

Some of the reasons that can be used as answers to the question of why total war strategies are used in an effort to deal with the Covid-19 Pandemic are as follows: the first is that the Covid-19 Pandemic outbreak has damaged and disrupted various areas of life, therefore tackling pandemic outbreaks must involve all components of the nation. As discussed above, through the definition of total war, the empowerment of all components of the nation both politically, economically, and security defense becomes important as a holistic collective power. In a broad sense that all components of the nation and in any strata affect the efforts carried out in the face of covid-19. Politically, the Government plays a role in making policies that support each other in various fields. This policy will be able to be used as a control so that the spread, covid-19 countermeasures can be implemented properly. The interdependence of various sectors is impossible to separate in the face of the current pandemic. The policies made must be in line as a whole and thoroughly. Such policies should always be within government control. So, the reason to use the total war in the face of covid-19 is so that the policies put in place and made by the Government can support each other successfully facing the covid-19 Pandemic.

The Second Pandemic, Covid-19, is an outbreak that is very easily transmitted through droplets and air. This causes more and more people to contract it easily when each component is not mutually supportive and apathetic. At least by involving all nation components, it will facilitate isolation against the spread and control of its impact. Therefore, in order for control efforts that can be done quickly, everyone or groups of people must always be in preparedness. The preparedness measures carried out are inseparable from outbreak management principles, namely in the prevention phase, detection phase, and response phase. In the prevention phase, what needs to be done is to make preparedness guidelines that refer to the Health Quarantine Law and the Infectious Disease Outbreak Law so as to support the implementation of global governance of outbreak management; submit a circular on Covid-19 prevention preparedness to all stakeholders, especially the provincial health office/district/city (Putri, 2020).

Moreover, the third is a rapid recovery to the impossible impact of partial implementation because the total war strategy is a recommended option. Professor of Political Psychology from the University of Indonesia (UI) Prof. Dr. Hamdi Muluk, M.Si, said that in the face of this pandemic, solidarity and mutual awareness could be strengthened by utilizing the nation's strong social capital. Because this nation has strong social capital such as gotong royong, for example, working together to stay at home to stop the spread of the virus.

Viewed from the Economic side, handling covid-19 must be prioritized in countermeasures. Various sectors of the economy can hinder the running of pandemic management efforts. Therefore, the Government needs to be selective in passing efforts to help the community in maintaining economic sustainability.

Socio-cultural factors can make a new way of life or pattern that can be implemented to implement the covid-19 Pandemic properly. Critical points in the community can be addressed with a new pattern of life being implemented. The use of masks wherever and whenever active, keeping distance with people who are considered potentially infected with Covid-19 or not, and always maintain personal hygiene, especially hands and faces throughout the day wherever they are.

Repeated misreporting makes people apathetic to inconsistent government policies. This has a severe impact on the Government's efforts to implement strategic policy socialization and must receive a positive response from the community in its implementation. Therefore, to maximize the Government's strategy in handling the Covid-19 Pandemic, it sets out a one-door information strategy. The Government also needs to consistently apply the rules fairly by providing punishment and reward, which applies in general.

Disaster management or Covid-19 outbreak is currently handled by BNPB (National Disaster Management Agency) because the Covid-19 Pandemic can be qualified as a non-natural disaster. BNPB has implemented maximum efforts in pandemic management amid the limitations. Handling the covid-19 Pandemic requires special qualifications and expertise, especially in anticipation of a pandemic that may occur in the future.

Based on Law No. 2 of 2002 on Defense. The country's defense system in the face of military threats places government agencies outside the field of defense as the main element, in accordance with the shape and nature of the threat faced with the support of other elements of the nation's strength. Based on Law No. 2, the Covid-19 Pandemic in an effort to deal with and counteract the Covid-19 Pandemic needs to have a body that is following the shape and nature of the threat which currently, the agency that specializes in dealing with pandemics as intended does not yet exist then it is necessary to form a special agency to anticipate supervising and researching disasters caused by bacteria or viruses that can turn into Pandemics.

Therefore, in anticipation of similar events in the future, it is very appropriate so that the Government better prepares itself early for the existence of special bodies that work to anticipate, overcome and overcome outbreaks/pandemics. Special bodies are directly responsible to the President. They can implement a variety of appropriate and comprehensive strategies so that future Pandemic outbreaks can be adequately addressed, not resulting in many fatalities, not disrupting economic and political, and socio-cultural life. The special agency is tasked to anticipate various possibilities related to viruses or bacteria that can turn into a deadly Pandemic. Specialized agencies work throughout the year later in a time when no Pandemic can work as researchers in anticipation of bacteria or viruses that may be able to develop. The special agency is also a countermeasure coordinator so that coordination with agencies that deal with Covid-19 problems in various fields and levels can be well established. Likewise, regarding preaching, it can be synthesized from the right sources.

The ability that must be possessed by the special agent is the handling of the Covid-19 Pandemic, including anticipating, predicting, preventing, tackling, coordinating, and carrying out research on bacteria or viruses that are capable or can be used as biological weapons. The special body consists of various military practitioners, physician or expert health practitioners, think-tankers, economists, psychology experts, public health experts, and other related experts.

#### *4.2 Strategies implemented*

In order to face the Covid-19 strategy implemented from the perspective of the total war, including the main strategy, reserve strategy, and supporting strategy. The main core of the activities facing the Covid-19 Pandemic, in general, is the prevention of the second is handling, and the third is recovery. In implementing prevention, several innovations are implemented to implement prevention; an example is the application of Covid-19.

The first is the Main strategy, implemented by medical personnel. This strategy aims to ensure that there is no status improvement for people in the surrounding environment to become Supervised Person (ODP), Patient Under Surveillance (PDP), or Suspect. Furthermore, intensive supervision so that ODP, PDP, or Suspect is not confirmed Covid-19 and the third is to perform curative actions, namely treatment of people who have been confirmed Covid-19. In order to ensure the implementation of this same strategy, it is necessary to form a unit that is ready to move in a short time in order to anticipate preventive activities carried out or implemented by the Government so that the efforts of strategies carried out by the Government can be carried out properly.

The second is a reserve strategy aimed at dealing with the continuing wave of pandemic spread/transmission. Experts found that this disaster has different implications for how the central/local Government allocates resources, especially resources that have never been optimally utilized. The rapid contagion effect means that the Government should be able to allocate resources effectively. Government policy is the main determinant of the size of the pandemic disaster. Mistakes in political decision-making will impact the number of costs to overcome the Pandemic and losses, both fatalities, exposure amounts, and economic losses (ZA et al., 2020). To reduce anxiety in the community, we should do various things to increase public optimism in the midst of this Pandemic. People who can still provide for their lives are increasing their care by contributing to help the poor by doing fundraising and making donations (Salsabila, 2020).

In addition, it is also necessary to prepare a strategy that is a supporting strategy that is the first to form a crisis center, which is an organization led by a person who has managerial abilities and is ready to carry out regulations and communicate to the community and Government. The second prepares medical personnel, and then the third prepares an information technology-based control system that makes pro-active fiscal policy so as to ensure economic resilience. The last is that logistics is managed professionally by the central and local governments so that logistics distribution channels intended to support Covid-19 countermeasures or recovery activities are not constrained.

## 5. Conclusion

Covid-19 is one of the real threats faced today, which has resulted in fatalities, broad economic impacts, and social impacts. The Government has implemented various efforts in anticipating, overcoming, and tackling the impacts caused by Covid-19. Efforts to overcome are carried out holistically involving all components of the nation because the Pandemic has damaged and disrupted various areas of life, so as to overcome it involves all components of the nation. The strategies implemented in pandemic management implemented through the application of total warfare strategies are very relevant and suitable in order to overcome the situation faced by all components of the nation. Public awareness by jointly being a big part of the Indonesian nation is very decisive in the success of the government's efforts.

In anticipation of pandemics, the Government is better prepared early through special agencies that anticipate, overcome, and overcome outbreaks/pandemics. Special agencies are directly responsible to the President and can implement a variety of appropriate and comprehensive strategies so that future Pandemic outbreaks can be appropriately addressed. Strategies implemented to deal with Covid-19 from a total war perspective include key strategies, backup strategies, and supporting strategies. The primary strategy, implemented by medical personnel, aims to restrain the increasing status of pandemic victims, while the reserve strategy aimed at dealing with the continuing wave of pandemic spread /transmission and supporting strategies, among others, is to form a crisis center, prepare medical personnel, prepare control systems, fiscal and logistics policies.

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# The Total War Strategy through Optimizing the Understanding of Pancasila Values in the Millennial Era

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## Abstract

The Indonesian nation is a large nation, has a very dense population. Inside there is the millennial generation who will play an important role in the continuation of the life of the nation and state. However, with the development of technology, the millennial generation has begun to be influenced and the understanding of the values of Pancasila has begun to fade. In writing this article, the author uses several defense theories to strengthen the results of research and methods by collecting data and information through the help of various materials contained in literature (books) or also known as types of phenomenological research associated with qualitative descriptive. From the results of the literature research, the writer finds that the understanding of the values of Pancasila from the millennial generation is mostly starting to fade due to the influence of foreign technology and culture, so that intolerance, radicalism and speech of hatred appear between fellow children of the nation. Therefore, the role of the government, institutions and society is needed in optimizing the understanding of the values of Pancasila for the millennial generation so that they are ready to be involved in Total war.

**Keywords:** Total War Strategy, Optimizing the Understanding of Pancasila Values, Millennial Era

## 1. Introduction

The Indonesian nation since 1945 has recognized Pancasila which is the basis of the nation and state. Ir. Soekarno called Pancasila the Philosophy of the Grondslag or fundamentals, philosophy, profound thoughts, souls and deepest desires of an independent Indonesia that stands eternally (Doweng B Andreas, 2016).

According to President Joko Widodo that in Pancasila there are noble ideals of the Nation which include the ideals, hopes and goals as well as the formation of a united Indonesia. Pancasila is the embodiment of the great soul of

the founding fathers, scholars and freedom fighters from all corners of the archipelago so that we can build a nation agreement that unites us".

The Indonesian nation is a great nation and possesses extraordinary wealth that is unmatched in this world. There are many potentials and demographic advantages, which are strategically located on the international shipping route, also have abundant biological and non-living natural resources and are endowed with endless energy sources. It is appropriate if Indonesia is dubbed the winning region, because this country has everything (Joni, 2018).

With the independence that has been achieved and the increase in the standard of living of the nation, which is marked by the decreasing mortality rate, it greatly affects the increase in population in Indonesia. During the New Order, the family planning (KB) program was implemented, but now family planning has never been heard of again in the hospital, in the media and so on. Based on data from the population census statistical agency (SP2020) in September 2020, the total population of Indonesia was 270.20 million. The total population of the SP2020 results increased by 32.56 million compared to the SP2010 results.

SP 2020 results are dominated by generation Z and millennial generation. Generation Z are residents who were born in the period 1997-2012 and millennial generations who were born in the 1981-1996 period. Generation Z reaches 75.49 million people, equivalent to 27.94 percent of the total population of 270.20 million people. Meanwhile, the millennial generation reached 69.90 million people or 25.87 percent of 270.20 million people (Rr., 2021).

With a large population of Indonesia coupled with technological developments and the rapid flow of information in the current digital era, the use of the right formula in instilling the values of Pancasila to all levels of society, especially the millennial generation, is a challenge in itself. The method must adapt to the current development of the digital world (Yakob, Arfin, Tyas, 2020).

The millennial generation or generation Y, currently aged 18–36 years, is a generation in their productive age. Generations who will play an important role in the continuation of the life of the nation and state (Ester, 2016). The advantages of this generation are high creativity, full of confidence and being connected to one another. However, because they live in an automatic era, this generation tends to want something that is instantaneous and very easy to influence. This condition can have a very significant impact on the future of our country and nation. It would be very unfortunate if the development of communication technology is so rapid and massive, it is not used properly and is beneficial for the millennial generation to be able to build unity and integrity among the nation's children.

Because with this technological advancement, millennials tend to spend their time in front of their computers or gadgets, but the time to meet and meet face to face with fellow millennials has decreased, especially in the midst of the current covid outbreak, almost 100% of all interactions are done via computers or gadget. This greatly affects the emotional relationship between one individual and another so that it will damage interpersonal relationships (Ester, 2016), Besides that, there is another influence, namely the understanding of the values of Pancasila is starting to fade, this can be proven by asking the millennial generation about the content of Pancasila and singing the Garuda Pancasila song, many of them who do not memorize it.

This condition is a challenge for us to unite all components of the nation, especially the millennial generation as cadres of state defense who truly understand the values of Pancasila. A strategy is needed to be able to optimize the values of Pancasila to the millennial generation so that with the capabilities they have can support the implementation of a total war strategy in defending the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) which can be relied on to maintain the disintegration of the Nation.

## 2. Methods

This research is a type of research by collecting data and information through the help of various materials found in literature (books) or also known as phenomenological research types. This type of research is a study aimed at describing the phenomenon of the millennial generation in understanding the values of Pancasila, which are currently starting to fade. Events, social activities, attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, thoughts of individuals or groups. To describe the phenomenon of optimizing the values of Pancasila in the millennial era.

In depth, the research used literature study associated with phenomenological qualitative descriptive. With literature study, empirical findings can be described in detail, more clearly and more accurately, especially various matters relating to the cyber community. For this reason, through this paper, it is hoped that literature study can help research in thinking and imagining, abstractly.

As previously stated, the strategy used in this qualitative research is phenomenology. According to Creswell, phenomenology was chosen because in it the researcher will identify a particular phenomenon, and requires researchers to study the subject by being directly involved in developing meaningful patterns and relationships.

In the context of the research that will be studied, the main focus in this research is to carry out data searches through literature studies on optimizing the understanding of the values of Pancasila in the millennial generation whose lives have been influenced by technological developments. The author will explore the activities carried out by the current millennial generation, their social status and solutions so that this millennial generation can participate in realizing national defense related to the total war strategy. Meanwhile, the research location is the place where the research will be carried out.

Determining the research location is a very important stage in qualitative research, making it easier for writers to conduct research. This location can be in a certain area or a certain institution in society. To obtain secondary data, the research location is based on data obtained through books, journals and other electronic media.

## 3. Results

The development of technology in the digital world greatly influences the prevailing habits in the community, where almost all activities have been carried out on a digital basis and strengthened by the internet network. The impact is very significant, especially for the millennial generation. In their daily lives, most of them spend time with their gadgets or computers. Especially with the current Covid-19 pandemic conditions, the trend of using gadgets and computers has greatly increased both to support the teaching and learning process, as well as being used for other activities such as playing games, e-commerce and social media as a means of exchanging opinions in cyberspace and so on.

According to the survey results, the use of gadgets in Indonesia currently amounts to 66.39%, if categorized based on age, the age group 9-19 years is 65.34%, 20-29 years old is 75.95%, 30-49 years old is 68, 34% and age 50-65 as much as 50.79% and as much as 80.90% use at home. Furthermore, the survey was conducted again and found that more urban people own gadgets than rural communities. This is all one of the impacts of the increasing number of smartphones being sold at low prices in the market which has triggered the high ownership of gadgets in Indonesia (Syarifullah, 2019).

Judging from the survey data, gadget users at a young age are very high, more than 50%, this indicates that the need for gadgets among the millennial generation is inevitable. The information that will be obtained can be received more quickly, whether it is educational or not. Kominfo has attempted to filter content with negative contents, such as preparing a new Ministerial Regulation (Permen) to regulate social media platforms and their users. (Pertiwi, 2020).

All efforts have been made by the government to overcome the spread of hoaxes or what is now termed an infodemic. Kominfo has identified 2,020 hoax content circulating on social media to date. (Pertiwi, 2020). In addition to negative content circulating in cyberspace, there are also hate speech.

With the existence of negative content and hate speech that has been increasing lately, this indicates that the understanding of the values of Pancasila has begun to fade. Fellow nationals insult each other, blaspheme through social media just because they have different opinions. Many incidents occurred due to trivial consequences resulting in many casualties, victims of infrastructure and also lingering trauma.

Millennials are heavily involved in it, social media is often used by certain parties to spread hate speech, incitement and propaganda targeting the millennial generation (Arianto, 2019). This can be traced from the many retweets and shares about information with the material of intolerance and radicalism that are far from the spirit of Pancasila. Including the increasing circulation of content campaigning for alternative ideologies and opposing Pancasila.

Every time there is an activity carried out by the government, the private sector and even individuals that are put on social media, the readers always get a response. Some of the responses provided were supportive and some were the opposite. Those who are opposite always respond with words that are disrespectful and blasphemous.

This condition is an indicator that the dynamics in social media are increasingly being driven by ideas of intolerance, radicalism and anti-nationality. If left unchecked, it is feared that these contents will tend to form opinions and in turn will divide the Indonesian people.

The millennial generation as the nation's successor who is expected to maintain unity and integrity will disappear in the middle of the road, this hope will not be achieved, the country will be destroyed, scattered and separated between tribes, religions and ethnicities because the understanding of the values of Pancasila has not been implemented too seriously.

With the development of science, most of the millennial generation has received a proper education, where some of the millennial generation have studied domestically and some have studied abroad. Culture and customs acquired from abroad are sometimes brought to Indonesia. So many times, these cultures are not in accordance with what is on the basis of our country's Pancasila, even these cultures have begun to break the ties of friendship between the nation's children.

Currently, radicalism cultures are starting to develop which teach their religion better than other religions. As a result, some people live in groups, some are according to their religion, some are in groups due to ethnicity and some are grouped according to their ethnicity.

Several incidents in schools impose an obligation to wear clothes according to a certain religion, because of the consideration that there are many religions in the majority, minority groups must adjust these rules, even though the school is a public school that can accept children from all religions and ethnicities and its applicable regulations. national rules are not foundation school rules.

Another finding is that a change in the mindset of the older generation will have an impact on the millennial generation, so that the millennial generation thinks that what the older generation is doing is right, this will be a bad example for the millennial generation and then brought up to adulthood. When President Soeharto was still in power, we rarely heard of hate speech between ethnic groups and religions.

There was never even a war between the nation's children because of differences in religion and ethnicity. At that time the program of practice for the values of Pancasila went well and its implementation was very strict and was followed by every citizen and was closely monitored by the application of the application of understanding the values of Pancasila in the midst of society.

The government program at that time was really carried out with full responsibility, such as every employee who had just been hired was obliged to follow the upgrading of the Guidelines for Living and Practicing Pancasila (P4) and this was carried out in stages, levels and continuously every year. This program also applies to the TNI and secondary schools.

This activity has a very positive impact, where people can ultimately apply in their lives with mutual respect, mutual respect, mutual tolerance between religious communities and the emergence of mutual cooperation that has revived in accordance with the culture of the Indonesian nation that was created by our ancestors long ago moment.

Currently, the Jokowi administration is trying to restore public awareness of the understanding of Pancasila values through the Pancasila Ideology Strengthening Sector (BPIP), a work unit formed by the President in 2016 which has the aim of reviving the P4 upgrading which is claimed to be able to ward off radicalism. This plan reappeared in February 2020, following a statement by a former member of the BPIP board, Mahfud MD, who said that several people had been trained. (Ardanareswari, 2020).

From some data obtained through literature research, it is concluded that a total war strategy will be difficult to implement by the current millennial generation because they have been largely influenced by technological developments. Technology changes everyone to be selfish, disrespectful of others and do not want to know about other people's conditions, especially with the conditions of the country. Because in this technology contains bad influences such as hating others, blaspheming others, not respecting each other so that the sense of togetherness, mutual respect, and tolerance between the nation's children has begun to fade.

Therefore, there is a need for a careful and precise strategy from the Government so that the millennial generation can be involved in defending this nation from all forms of threats and bad influences that seek to break the unity of this nation. The total war strategy through optimizing the understanding of the values of Pancasila for the millennial generation needs to be of special concern in the midst of this increasingly rapid technological development.

#### **4. Discussion**

The total war strategy is a strategy that is owned by the Indonesian nation by involving all citizens, territories and national resources that they have. Therefore, the state is determined to prepare as early as possible all the capabilities it has in order to face the coming of a threat (Lebo, 2021). By involving all citizens and national resources, it will produce great and sustainable strength in maintaining the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.

The universal defense strategy is a concept of national defense that prioritizes the values of struggle and is born from the history of the struggle of the Indonesian nation (Mulyana, 2020). An assessment of the national defense power is not only seen from the amount of budget obtained and the strength of the defense equipment owned, but this power mainly rests on the unity and unity of the people based on true love for the nation and state. Because basically the people are the power base of the nation.

The total war strategy in involving the millennial generation will be very beneficial for the strength of this nation, where the number of millennial generations is very large, has the ability and ability to capture excellent technology and still has the enthusiasm to carry out every activity.

Bung Karno once said, "Give me ten youths and I will shake the world," which emphasized the importance of the role of youth or the millennial generation in the progress of the nation and state. The good and bad of a country can be seen from the quality of its youth, because the young generation is the successor and heir of the nation and state (Surattini, 2018).

This statement from the First President Soekarno proves that the millennial generation can be counted on to be able to participate in the total war because basically the determination and spirit of this millennial generation is still full of enthusiasm and high optimism. Now it all depends on who directs where to take the millennial generation in the future. Because without examples and encouragement, the millennial generation has no direction to get involved in national activities. According to the theory presented by Sun Tzu (403-221) in his book *Art of War*, says "The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting." This means that "War is an art, conquering the enemy without fighting is the highest art of war." This is very relevant to the capabilities of the current millennial generation, they are no longer familiar with internet-based products. It is predicted that the future war will not occur between countries again, so that conventional war has begun to be abandoned because this war requires a very large cost of war.

Sun Tzu's statement is also very relevant to the statement made by Lt. Gen. TNI JS. Prabowo stated that the present and future total war should not be carried out by mobilizing the population "all out" to be played as combatants in combat (Prabowo, 2019).

With the use of technology, various ways are carried out, one of which is destroying the enemy in a hidden manner, no need to carry a large army, it is enough to use the capabilities and expertise possessed, but the impact of the damage is very large and can even collapse a country and it takes a long time to recover (Lebo, 2021).

Currently, there is a war with low intensity or Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), where this war mostly occurs within a country, not between countries. Meanwhile the war between countries has been much reduced. Ethnic conflicts, religions and civil wars are often exploited to create instability in a country as a characteristic of a new style of war (Kertopati, 2021).

It does not rule out that Indonesia, which has enormous natural resources with a very dense population and has various ethnic, religious and linguistic variations, will be chaotic by other countries that do not want to see Indonesia always safe and peaceful. They do not have to attack openly but by exploiting Indonesia's strengths which are also weaknesses Indonesia will collapse. This new style of war, or LIC, was triggered by globalization, economic competition, competition for resources, socio-economic inequality, paid organizations, the military, as well as the core target of society. The use of the millennial generation who master technology, if not anticipated from the start, will have fatal consequences. Because they are a Demographic bonus for the next 10 to 20 years.

In the midst of current technological developments, it is hoped that all of the nation's children can adjust to these developments, but are not complacent about all the bad influences that will bring this nation from destruction. Cultural influences from abroad and the influence of technology have proven that at present the sense of tolerance between religious communities has begun to fade. The spread of hate speech among the nation's children is increasingly massive. Even to the President, the people have dared to insult and blaspheme him. Citizens' education is currently getting higher, but morale and culture are getting lower.

Millennial generation who are very productive but easily influenced by the bad influence of negative content, in the form of intolerance, radicals, hoaxes and hate speech news as a result of their lack of moral strength and a spirit of nationalism. The bases for strengthening the spirit of nationalism are no longer in society. This national spirit, which is starting to become weak, must be nourished immediately so that it can grow back and become fertile. The role of the government in an effort to restore the strength of the nation's character and nationalist spirit should begin to be implemented. If necessary, imitate the P4 activities that have been carried out by President Soeharto. If deemed necessary, this P4 activity will be returned again by adjusting the current conditions.

The efforts made by President Jokowi by forming BPIP in which this ministerial-level institution were formed directly under the President with the task of coordinating, synchronizing, and controlling the application of Pancasila values. Its implementation targets include schools, government institutions to community organizations.

Even though the BPIP has been formed and the sanctions given are quite heavy for those who violate it, it has not succeeded in eliminating hate speech and intolerance among the nation's children. Likewise with other efforts, namely reducing the spread of intolerant and radical content that appears in the digital realm, but the government is not enough to simply block websites or take action against their disseminators based on the ITE Law alone. It needs the support of other competent institutions as well as the community in maintaining the integrity of this nation.

Next is the government's efforts to involve providers Telkom, Google and other application companies that have been granted a license to operate in Indonesia to support the Government's program by strengthening the dissemination of creative content that carries Pancasila values on social media.

The distribution of this content can be done by official government accounts and netizen actors who care about national values and Pancasila. With this step, at least it can encourage the millennial generation to jointly share and offer alternative information in the form of content with national values, diversity and of course Pancasila (Arianto, 2019).

The role of the older generation is also very much needed both at home, school and in the community to provide guidance to the millennial generation. By understanding each other between the millennial generation and the older generation, it is hoped that there will be an adjustment to the conditions of the times. The older generation can be a good example for the millennial generation.

The role of the media is quite crucial. In the past, media was only in the form of television, radio, newspapers or magazines, but in this era, there is a fairly large development of media, especially social media, which holds the key among the millennial generation. Through social media, various information is easily obtained. Integration between social media and television or print media is indispensable. The contents must contain the Pancasila ideology (DHI / DKP, 2016).

Currently, the Government has also enacted Law No. 23 of 2019 concerning the management of national resources for defense and its implementation is strengthened by Government Regulation No. 3 of 2021 concerning Reserve Components (Farisa, 2021). This is done because the concept of universal people's war that is owned by the Indonesian nation puts forward a sense of nationalism and national identity as the main power through understanding the values and spirit of awareness of State Defense. This State Defense Awareness is a proven and effective method to ward off all forms of threats to the integrity and integrity of the Indonesian Nation and State (DAS / ACP, 2017)

Through this State Defense program, the millennial generation can understand the meaning of the struggle of the nation's heroes in defending independence, so that the millennial generation with their abilities can maintain the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia from being split due to incitement and the spread of intolerant content and hate speech.

This State Defense Awareness will have an impact on the awareness of the millennial generation to safeguard and preserve Indonesia's identity, culture and natural wealth while maintaining the integrity and national unity of Indonesia.

Furthermore, if everything is carried out well and with full awareness, the total war strategy can be realized with the awareness of all citizens, especially the millennial generation, in facing all possible threats, both from abroad and from within the country.

The millennial generation is one of the largest generations in Indonesia. In today's modern era, they are closely related and involved with technological advances and are a generation in their productive age. Generations who will play an important role in the continuation of the life of the nation and state.

According to the survey results, it was found that the millennial generation is heavily involved in social media and is often used by certain parties to spread hate speech, incitement and propaganda. If this is allowed to continue, the more young people will be affected, the bigger the millennial generation will form bad opinions and in the end the country can go into chaos and lead to destruction.

The millennial generation is included in the citizenship so that in applying the concept of total war which involves all components of the nation and national resources, the millennial generation is a very good and very productive force that will give birth to a large and sustainable power in maintaining the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.

The government, institutions and society have attempted to carry out coaching for the millennial generation in optimizing the understanding of the values of Pancasila so that awareness will arise for the state and can be mobilized in order to support total war through the state defense program which can lead to a spirit of nationalism and a sense of unity among the nation's children. activities that involve Telkom providers, other applications by strengthening the spread of creative content that carries the values of Pancasila on social media, the involvement of the older generation in educating the millennial generation so as not to be influenced by negative content, hate speech, the role of the media integration of social media with television or print media. The content must contain the Pancasila ideology, then the Government forms the BPIP which has the aim of reviving the P4 upgrading which is claimed to be able to ward off radicalism and the government blocks sites that contain negative content or takes action against its disseminators based on the ITE Law.

In optimizing the understanding of Pancasila values in the current millennial era, there are several advantages and disadvantages as follows:

a. Advantages

The millennial generation is one of the greatest forces in this country and is still of a productive age and has a fighting spirit that can be used to support total war. The ability of the millennial generation in mastering technology can be relied on in the face of low-intensity warfare or LIC. Generasi milenial dapat menjadi komponen cadangan, sewaktu-waktu dapat digerakkan untuk terlibat dalam perang semesta. Millennials who have advantages in the IT field can join the Government in reducing and preventing the influence of negative content containing hate speech and intolerance.

b. Disadvantages

The success of optimizing the understanding of Pancasila values depends on the seriousness of the government, institutions and society in fostering the millennial generation. Optimizing the understanding of Pancasila values for millennial generations in rural areas will encounter obstacles if Pancasila content is disseminated through gadgets. With the current conditions of democratic freedom, efforts to optimize the understanding of Pancasila values for the millennial generation will encounter obstacles due to differences of opinion between one person and another, resulting in new conflicts. The readiness of the budget by the government in supporting activities to optimize the understanding of the values of Pancasila can create its own obstacles.

From the existing strengths and weaknesses, recommendations are needed so that the total war strategy through optimizing the understanding of the values of Pancasila in the millennial era can run as expected, as for the recommendations as follows:

It is necessary to reintroduce the P4 program from middle school to the time of getting a job, so that understanding of the values of Pancasila is more embedded in every child of the nation.

In carrying out the socialization of the Pancasila ideology, BPIP should also collaborate with private TV stations because the public is more likely to join these TVs.

It is necessary to involve Babinsa or Babinkamtibmas in assisting the Government in disseminating the Pancasila ideology in rural areas. There needs to be special guidance for religious leaders, community leaders, and educators who are always in touch with the millennial generation in carrying out the socialization of the Pancasila Ideology.

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# Religion and Military Security: The Military Still Matters

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## Abstract

The debate on changes and continuity in the field of security studies before and aftermath of the Cold War expounds certain security issues that have been reformed or changed and those that continue to be essential security concerns after the Cold War. The pervasiveness of military security might have been reconstructed at the aftermath of the Cold War but has remained ubiquitous despite scholarly argumentative prepositions debating its decline. This article uses secondary sources of data analysis by obtaining necessary information from textbooks, libraries, academic journals, online data and articles to examine the nexus between religion and violence leading to the renaissance of international terrorism after the attack of 9/11 that had propelled the involvement of military armed forces in domestic security of democratic governments constituting a debatable encumbrance to the principles of objective civilian control of the military entrenched in the liberal democracy and a justifiable argument for the potency of military security in the present liberal democratic states. It theoretically instantiates the emerging domestic role of the military armed forces signaling the subjective control of civil-military relations in incongruousness to the objective control as expounded under military professionalism of Samuel Huntington.

**Keywords:** Religion, Military Security, Militarize, Cold War, Traditional Security Approach, Non-Traditional Security

## Introduction

The debate on changes and continuity in the field of security studies before and aftermath of the Cold War expounds certain security issues that have changed or reformed and those that continue to be essential security concerns after the Cold War. The pervasiveness of military security might have been reconstructed at the aftermath of the Cold War but has remained ubiquitous despite many considerable scholarly arguments around its decline. Defining pieces of militarism continue to characterize the features of many democratic governments with the experience of ethno-religious conflicts often followed by military interventions. Consequently, this article finds it engaging to examine the relationship between religion, violence and domestic military role, which could be a surmising encumbrance to civil-military relations within the explanatory prepositions of military professionalism and secularized features entrenched in liberal democracy.

The nexus of religion and international security is regarded to as new by Robert Seiple & Dennis Hoover known as "*New Nexus of International Relations*" (Seiple & Hoover, 2004) whereby there have been few empirical studies

making potential contributions to religion and militarism (Beller, 2017). Religion has been historically neglected as a component of international relations but the changing nature of threats after the Cold War and the shock of terrorism during and after the attack of 9/11 followed by the awareness that religion was the main motivator behind the attack aided the awakening of recognizing religion as one of the driving forces of international relations/security (Durward & Marsden 2009). The meaning of religion in this article is based on the explanation of Marsden, (2019) where religion is clarified as a social construct and it is what we make of it. Whether religion is defined as peaceful or violent, the social construction is dependent of what a group considered as religion. Religion is political as it can be used to unmask or legitimize political objectives or individual or group selfish intentions.

The late recognition of religion as one of the main driving forces of international security as well as the weed-grown of its empirical studies have not hindered the historical pervasion of religious-motivated conflicts. Historically, wars such as Franco-Spanish War (1823), Austro-Sardinian War (1848), war of the Roman Republic (1849), Crimean War (1853), War of Italian Unification (1859) that eventually became the continuation of the Austro-Sardinian War (1848), Seven Weeks War (1866), Franco-Prussian War (1870), Second Russo-Turkish War (1877), Spanish-American War (1898), First Balkan War (1912), First Kashmir War (India-Pakistan War of 1948), the Suez War (1956), Second Kashmir War (1965), Six-Day War (Third Arab-Israeli War of 1967) and War over the Aouzou Strip (1986) are either religious-motivated wars or religion was part of the causes or instrument of wars (Cavanaugh et al, 2013). This article deniably considers religion as the only/main cause of violence compelling militarized outcomes after the Cold War and the attack of 9/11 but empirical studies have unveiled how religion has become instrumental to various conflicts erupted from political, economic and territorial sources, serving as either motivation or recruitment strategy (Jefferis, 2010). This necessitates the need to specifically look into religion in an attempt to examine cases of religious armed conflict and military security in democratic governments.

To analyze the relationship between religion and militarism, Qureshi (1981) elucidated there are around forty Muslim countries occupying one-quarter of the world and while some of them were products of colonialism, some have never been directly colonized but one evidential similarity among them is the ruler-ship of one strong man with the use of military power. Additionally, majority of the Middle Eastern (Muslim) countries have been ruled by soldiers for at least a millennium, mostly legitimized the regime with religious ideology. Catoggio & Brena (2011) unveiled how military dictatorships of 1960s and 1970s in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil used religion as their sources of legitimacy, which reflected in the messianic characters of military armed forces as well as various role played by the national Catholic institutions to aid and support the establishment military regimes in order to appropriate the doctrine of national security and to theologically and politically redefine it for the sake of restoring the values of "Western Christian morality." The proselytized and monotheistic nature of Christianity and Islamic religion as well as their higher rate of adherents in the world "*(2.2 billion Christians equivalent to 32% of the world's population and 1.6 billion Muslims occupying 23%)*" (Pew Research Center, 2017, p.9) are considerable factors justifying their eligibility as only targeted religion within the scope of this article.

The seminal work of two founding scholars of sociology in eighteenth century known as secularization theory argues that the advancement of modernized cultural pluralism and education in a society is resulting to the withdrawal of religion from the public sphere leading to its privatization along with the fact that the domination of social, political and economic institutions within modern society would separate religion from state affairs. The argument of this theory stating that progressive modernization of society would facilitate the waning of religion has dominated Western polity, which eventually constituted the bedrock of introducing laicism as part of the first amendment to American and French constitution (Marsden, 2019). The compartmentalization of religion under the argument of securitization theory has been criticized to have allowed political, economic and cultural actors becoming utility maximizers by reconstructing religion for their selfish specified ends (Durward & Marsden 2009). Cavanaugh (2002) rejected the claim of privatizing religion within liberal state as a way of preventing the excessiveness of religion resulting to domestic and international conflict. Securitization theory has also been described confusing and internally incoherent agitating for the fading away of religion as a result of modernization and also buttressing on the irrational, divisive and backwardness of religion with a propensity towards violent ends

(Durward & Marsden 2009). The pervasiveness of secularism within Western polity has been cited as the reason behind the lateness of the official recognition of religion, its insufficient empirical studies and its chances of construction for political, economic and territorial ends (Marsden, 2019). Shah, Stepan & Toft (2012) argued that religion has gained prominent influence in world affairs in the last generation but it has remained to be one of the least examined factors in empirical studies.

The ongoing violent conflict in Syria between the government and opposition forces demonstrating more of religious fault lines than democratic attitudes, the case of Alawites and Shia with the support of Shia forces of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian Revolutionary Guard in conflict against Sunni Muslims in the Middle East, the continuous bombing of Shia and Sufi mosques including Coptic Christian churches in Egypt, the genocidal attack launched by Myanmar military alongside their Buddhist supporters in Rakhine province against Rohingya Muslims, the attack of Daesh fighters against Yazidis and Christians on the Plains of Nineveh and the proceeding violence in Palestinian territory after the United States former President Donald Trump decided to move the United States Embassy to Jerusalem followed by the official declaration of recognizing Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel are illustrative issues reinforcing the preponderance of religion driving issues in national and international security as well as the recognition of nexus between religion, violence and military security (Marsden, 2019). Definitely, religion has started to pull weight and becoming a real matter of security concern with its ascendance into violence and legitimacy compelling the need to update military security (military domestic role) in democratic governments at the aftermath of the Cold War and most in particular after the attack of 9/11. Consequently, this article aims to clarify the nexus between religion and religious violence, its emergency as part of the driving forces in national and international security and how religious violence has facilitated the potency of military domestic role contrary to the military traditional role as well as suspectedly jeopardizing the principles of objective civil-military relations expounded under military professionalism.

### **The Debate on Religion in Religious Violence**

According to Pew Research Center (2017c, p.9), Christianity and Islam are described as the largest religions in the world with percentages of 31 (Christians) and 24 (Muslims) population. This might not be actual numbers of these religions' adherents but they officially represent the religions' identities or practitioners. Marsden (2019) argues that religious conflicts erupted not often as a result of theological differences but preferential treatments given to one group over another or when a group is blamed for challenging situations of another. Durward & Marsden (2009) give a distinguishing definition of “*Islam, Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism, Integrism and Jihadism.*” Islamism is defined as a politicized version of Islam, the part that has considered Islam as a direct opposition to the West, non-Muslims and those referred to as apostates. It is appealing to be conscious of the fact that Islamism is a microscopic minority part of Islam that cannot represent what Islam stands for (Durward & Marsden, 2009). According to Choueri (1990, p.9) Islamic fundamentalism is a term used to classify the militant ideology of contemporary Islamic movements. Fundamentalism as a term originated from Christian American context to connote conventional Islamic violent movements against modernity. The term has been rejected by Islamic scholars arguing that it was taken from the Christian context and it cannot be imposed on Islamic context (Durward & Marsden, 2009).

According to Robert (2003: 1) *integrisme* as a term originated from traditional tendency in contemporary Catholicism, which has been made synonymous to Islamist movements in France. Additionally, Jihadism as well cannot be imposed as Islamist movement and it has been mistakenly defined as waging war against the Infidel (Holy War). The term Jihad is derived from the word *Jahada* meaning struggle and endeavor. The original meaning of Jihad implies the struggle for peace and to be a better person spiritually. Waging war against infidels is described as a lesser idea of Jihad, which has been predominantly hijacked by Islamist ideologies giving it different interpretations (Durward & Marsden, 2009). Noorani (2002: 65) explains Islamism to connote a belief system focusing on the imposition of Sharia law, it ostracizes the place of reason in religion and banishes compassion from faith, it engages in intolerance, revivalism, moral blindness, extreme violence, rejection of rational discourse, fighting against pluralism, freedom of speech and democracy.

The prominent perception of Islamic religion by the West has been a consequential outcome of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the terrorist attack of 9/11 whereby Islam is considered as a movement of fanatics orchestrated to harm the West or a reaction against modernity while on the contrary, the oldest Islamic state (Saudi Arabia) has maintained friendly relations with the West (Hiro, 1989). This Western perception of Islam is also questionable considering the bolstering of Afghan fundamentalist camp in Afghanistan by Western arms and funds pitted against Marxist regime of Kabul (Durward & Marsden, 2009). It should be noted as well that casualties or victims of Islamist violence or terrorist attacks are not only the West, but also include Christians, apostates and those considered as insufficiently pious in accordance to the doctrine of certain Islamist leaders (Durward & Marsden 2009). On the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt (MB) has redefined Islam to a complete ideology incorporating society, politics and economics. The MB emphasizes on the ability of Islam to become an ideology as stated in their three main principles; *"Islam is a comprehensive, self-evolving system and ultimate path of life; Islam emanated from the Quran and prophetic tradition; Islam is applicable to all times and places"* (Enayat 1982, p.85).

Although, it has become something usual to associate Islam with terrorism but it could be a blunder scientifically. There are diversities among Islamic pious with two main groups; Shiite and Sunni. As put forward by Duarte (2015) that there are three different forms of Islam and only one of them known as *"Umma"* has favorably considered violence or terrorism. In addition, the statistical analysis of terrorist affected countries in the world shows (23%) for Iraq with the death rate of (24%), (13%) for Afghanistan with death rate of (23%), (9%) for India and (7%) for Pakistan illustrating the fact that majority of terrorist attacks have been carried out in Muslim countries (Pinto, 2019: 3). This is contradictory to how terrorism has been portrayed in the United States or the West due to the fact that terrorist attacks in non-Western countries are hardly broadcasted by the western international media compare to the noise made around any terrorist attack in the West. The devastating attacks of terrorists in Pakistan with the record of 10,116 victims between 2007-2012, Yemen and DR Congo combined estimated victims of 4,339 within same periods, 5,000 victims who were unarmed civilians in Muslim dominated part of Nigeria by Boko Haram and 6,994 victims recorded in Somalia were all unable to obtain the same level of broadcast in international media compare to any terrorist attack in the West. The media has been accused of portraying terrorism as Islamic crime against the West but on the contrary; Muslims and Muslim countries are predominant victims of terrorist attacks (Jetter, 2014: 1).

Additionally, it is also appealing to understand the complexity of diversities within Islamic religion whereby terrorist groups are not only attacking Muslims who belong to a different Islamic community but also Muslims who are of the same religious community such as a Sunni ISIS terrorist group attacking and killing the same Sunni people belonging to a different Islamist leader or Imam. ISIS terrorist attacks have been launched against all kinds of people that failed to share the same microscopic Islamic doctrines irrespective of religion and nationality (Pinto, 2019). However, the fact that both Islam (Quran) and Christianity (Bible) are composed of both peaceful and violent texts is described as a privilege for a social reconstruction of religion, its political usefulness, identity formation, legitimate use of force or violence and other attributes driving the agenda of global security (Durward & Marsden, 2009).

Furthermore, scholars in the field of religious violence have attributed the ascendance of violence in religion to the nature of religion itself. Many Christian hymns portraying violence, some verses in the bible describing Christians as soldiers, "marching to war," many stories of blood, sacrifice, enemies to be conquered filling the Bible and Quran texts have been described as sources of connection between religion and violence (Jefferis, 2010). Bible verses such as *"Go and completely destroy those wicked people, the Amalekites; wage war against them until you have wiped them out"* (1 Samuel 15:18). *"If God is for us, who can be against us"?* (Romans 8:31) can be interpreted to legitimize violence. Regina Schwartz attributed violence to identity formation and religion is mainly about identity formation whereby under the auspices of religion, there are formation of identities such as; ethnicity, race, gender and nationality rottenly resulted to the most disastrous acts of violence in history. Schwartz argues that Bible is a book of repeated efforts for identity formation, it started with rivalry between Cain and Abel and how a jealous God declared Israel as His chosen people (Schwartz, 1998). Mark Gabriel also pointed out that there are around 114 verses in the Quran advocating for the promotion of peace, love and forgiveness but they

have been overridden by subsequent verses advocating for the promotion of forceful conversion, war and violent jihad (Jefferis, 2010).

Levy (2016:306) explains changes and interrelations between religious community and industrialized democracies cited the example of how military chaplains have stepped into the created vacuum from the absence of spiritual care and answer given to soldiers' and commanders regarding the emergence of new ethical dilemmas (Just War) justifying the credibility of waging war as well as changes as a result of the emerging need for domestic deployment of military armed forces against noncombatants in urban warfare, counterinsurgencies and counter-terrorism. Levy has used the increasing involvement of rabbis in Israeli military affairs since 1990s as a case study and generally argues that such religious intervention in military affairs is encumbrance to the basic principles of civilian control of the military in democratic governments (Levy, 2016).

### **Theoretical Framework**

Military professionalism basically argues on how soldiers can be professionalized by separating their primary role from political business, avoiding the politicization and monetization of the military as well as ensuring adequate civilian control over military forces. It is an explanatory proposition regarding the debate of civil-military relations developed by Samuel Huntington in 1957. Huntington's debates on professionalizing the military might have been severely criticized by different scholars but still remain relevant and contemporarily considerable. He attributed a profession with three distinguishing features, which are; *"expertise, responsibility, and corporateness."* Expertise is defined by characterizing a professional person to possess specialized skill and knowledge acquired from two sources; a broad education and specialized skills. Based on the argument of Harold Lasswell, Huntington argues that specialized skill of military officer entails *"the direction, operation and control of violent organizations."* The peculiar skill of soldiers is management of violence, which required a life-long training and education. The common trait of military officers in the world is possession of a common professional skill regardless of geopolitical boundaries. The second defining quality of a professional person is social responsibility, which is explained to be an essential service to the functioning society. Society is thereby considered as a client of the professional and material compensation is excluded from the primary motives behind the attainment of professional services. This professional duty of military officer is to ensure solely the protection of society and state. The third and final trait of the professional is corporateness; this defines military officers to belong to a distinct body characterized with formal standards of competence, which includes schools, journals, custom and tradition (Alagappa, 2001: 2).

According to Huntington (1957), the completion of these three features is a potential identification and qualification of the professional, which is relatable to the case of military profession. Huntington's conception of military professionalism has been criticized by Alfred Stepan developing his contrast of "new professionalism." Stepan agreed with two stated distinguishing features of military profession under Huntington's theory; 'responsibility and corporateness' but questioned the colloquialism of expertise as the third feature emphasizing that the only skill of military officer is management of violence with supportive contributions from Morris Janowitz and others. Stepan argued that the responsibility of military officers is not limited to violence management whereby officers from developing countries have been involved in politics and military. The emergence of domestic conflicts and the required limited use of force or violence to address them have demanded military from Latin America and many countries to be equipped with a broad range of knowledge incorporating political, social and economic dimensions. This idea behind new professionalism justifies the politicization of military and broadening of its professional role. Huntington also shared similar belief with Stepan's argument that during domestic war, it is often impossible to differentiate military roles from political ones. The changing dimension of war from international to domestic symptomatically have substantial effect on the attitude of soldiers becoming less acquiescent to the objective civilian control. Stepan then argues that, the fact that domestic conflict possesses political, economic and military dimensions and the possibility of involving military officers do not justify the complete appropriateness of these dimensions to be within the expertise of soldiers but other agencies could be established with specialized skills in each dimension (Alagappa, 2001: 4-5).

Civilian control within the explanatory proposition of military professionalism is defined according to Huntington (1957) as subjecting the military as a whole under the control of the civil government, which also means the extent at which armed forces respond to the direction of civilian government. Civilian control is classified into two; subjective and objective control. Subjective control is defined according to Huntington as *"military mirrors society and there is identity of thought and outlook between civilian and military group."* Subjective control allows the military full participation in government and also obey the government thereby there is no clear division between the military and society and as a matter of fact, the military is presumed to reflect the society. Objective control proscribes the military to mirror the government; military cannot participate in the political affairs except as a tool of state policy and military leaders must obey the civilian government regardless of whether they agree with the political policy or not but simply because it is their official duties to submit under the will of government. Objective control has been the central tenet of liberal democracies in an attempt to ensure effective civilian control over the military in order to successfully implement democratic principles (Alagappa, 2001: 8-9). With the new wave of religious terrorism and prevailing domestic insurgencies in democratic societies, the need to involve military armed forces to ensure domestic security has shifted civilian control from objective to subjective control whereby there is no clear separation between the military and civilian governments thereby the attainment of civilian control of the military within liberal democracies could be presently described cumbersome.

### Updating the Military Security

One of the prominent scholarly arguments at the end of the Cold War is the declined importance of military armed forces at both national and international politics with supportive premises that military threats is less effective, military force is less useful and there is a need to reform national security agenda (Baldwin, 1995). The traditional national security agenda of Western democracies during the Cold War was to ensure suitable response to a broad spectrum of military and ideological challenges coming from the Soviet Union whereby militarized national and regional security provision was the main focus and the prime task of states' armed forces. There were pervasiveness of substantial military threats, arms race between the East and West and the need to manage inter-state armed conflicts were driving the management of armed forces for both deterrence and combat operations (Schnabel & Krupanski, 2012). Cold War period is described as a flourished era of realist/neorealist conception of security whereby military strength encompasses the political instrument of state; to guarantee domestic security of state, to foster counter threats, for preservation of peace, to gain international recognition, to combat external attacks, to engage in diplomatic negotiations, for political propaganda and to maintain territorial integrity of nation-states (Saleh, 2010: 3-4).

The fading away of the likelihood of ideological military war between the East and West leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which also resulted to the waning of realist primacy of military security in national and international security constituted symptomatic factors that ushered the end of the Cold War and consequently followed by different criticisms from scholarly arguments making military security less significant (Schnabel & Krupanski, 2012). Barry Buzan argues for the incapability of military security and its traditional approach to address emanating multidimensional security issues after the Cold War. This includes the emergency of non-traditional security issues from economic, political, societal, environmental and military instabilities becoming threatening to national and global security (Buzan, Weaver & Wilde 1998). The ascendance of non-military threats such as drug trafficking, illegal immigrants, overpopulation, ethnic conflicts, shortage of water and food, infectious diseases, poverty and environmental degradation as well as related emanating security issues from globalization occupying the front-line agenda of security studies have been cited as reasons behind the waning of military security (Naim, 2009; Anderson 2012; Baldwin 1995; Lin 2011). The attack of 9/11 and its Islamic affiliations with terrorism, national security and violence endangered Islamic religion in the Western perspective. It was immediately followed by the declaration of *"war on terror"* by the Bush Administration identifying phrases of *"who are with us"* and *"who are with terrorist"* which led to the United States military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq (Jamil 2014: 3).

The updated version of military security is associated with non-traditional role assigned to the military armed forces after the Cold War and most significantly after the attack of 9/11. According to Edmund (2006) non-

traditional role encompasses “a number of new or at least newly re-emphasized tasks” of the military deviating from the external military role characterizing the traditional security approach during the Cold War. The updated version of the military security implies operational challenges posed by international terrorism resulting to newly required role of the armed forces to engage in internal or domestic security. The agenda of the national security of democratic states started to incorporate prevention, deterrence and destruction of international terrorism as well as removal of autocratic Muslim states harboring terrorist groups as counter-terrorism military security agenda in order to prevent terrorists’ accessibility to chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological ammunitions. The rapid growth of globalization and technology has equally enabled the globalization of internal conflict and terrorism as well as transnational crimes illustrating the idea that the presence of terrorist organizations in a state is considered threatening to global security. The concentration of security agenda of a nation-state against terrorism and all other forms of violence mainly within its geo-political boundary was no longer enough considering the rise of non-state actors threatening the national security of states. This has propelled the advent of multilateral peace and stabilization operations and cases of neoliberal military operations in Kosovo, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq and Libya (Schnabel & Krupanski, 2012).

According to Edmund (2006, p.1062), *“the end of the Cold War has removed the dominant strategic lens through which armed forces were deployed and there has been a fundamental reconsideration regarding their purpose and legitimacy.”* Schnabel & Krupanski, (2012) argued that in spite of various scholarly arguments around the decline of military security after the Cold War, the advent of ‘war on terror’ and the need for the deterrence of terrorist threats have increased the significance of military forces in the United States. The predominance of religious terrorism in the Middle East reaching Northeast Asia, the ascendance of non-state actors threatening national security of states such as terrorist groups and drug traffickers, advancement of technological nuclear weapons and competitions over scarce resources occupy the new dimension of threats that have demanded the need to update the traditional military security. Schnabel & Hristov, (2010, p.76) elucidated both international and domestic role of updated military armed forces whereby international role consists of *“conflict reconstruction; enforcement of economic sanctions and maritime intercept operations; the enforcement of exclusion zones; ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight; counter-insurgency support; non-combatant evacuation operations; protection of shipping and anti-piracy missions; and recovery operations.”* In addition, military armed forces have been useful for international conflict management and post-conflict peacebuilding in terms of provision of humanitarian aids and protection of civilian aid organizations. Finally, armed forces have been handy to render assistance during natural disasters, to advise civilian authorities, to provide evacuation assistance, to manage and control the proliferation of ammunitions.

Domestically, military armed forces are trained contrary to the traditional military role to engage in cartographical and meteorological services; to educate civilians; to assist the police during terrorist attacks; for sanitary crisis after natural disaster; to provide medical support for poor communities; to carry out rescue operations; for law enforcement; environmental protection; border surveillance; to provide security services during major public events, to assist with security for supplies such as food, energy, transport, storage and distribution networks; to carry out counterterrorist offensive and defensive operations for the prevention, deterrence or as a response to terrorist activities; to carry out anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking operations; for counter-drug operations; to provide internal humanitarian aid; to integrate command, control, communications, computer and intelligence assets designed to interdict the movement of illegal drugs and also to replace important services during work stoppage such as strikes or labour movements that can cause disruptions to economic activity (Schnabel & Hristov 2010: 77).

These assigned and trained domestic duties of the updated military armed forces are also explained in relations to different cases in different countries. For instance, the role of armed forces in Belgium includes; the maintenance of public order and providing humanitarian assistance and relief assistance during natural disasters or terrorist attacks. In France, they are assigned with missions to assist the police and gendarmerie; beneficiary missions to civilian population and humanitarian aids; to engage in civil defence in responding to national catastrophes; to carry out counterterrorism operations and to preserve public order. In Spain, armed forces provide unarmed civil defence work and intervene in cases of emergency as well as counterterrorism operations. In the UK, armed forces

carry out internal tasks of restoring public security, natural disasters and cases of emergency. In Canada, armed forces provide security during major public events such as Olympic Games and international summits, they offer technical and equipment support for the enforcement of maritime laws and operations to maintain public order. In Italy, armed forces carry out many internal security services such as operations to restore public order, to respond to disasters, counterterrorism operations and to ensure the enforcement of law. In Germany, armed forces manage internal security tasks such as responding to disasters, restoring public order, provision of community support such as environmental protection and harvest support as well as rendering of technical aid as assistance to the police (Schnabel & Krupanski, 2012:18-20).

### **Religious Conflict and Role of the Military**

It is mystifying to consider religion and violence as strangers and the often militarized outcomes of their interrelations are indications of violent alliances between them. According to Hall (2003: 2) it is difficult to separate religion and violence whereby violent modern movements against governments of democratic states are interwoven with religious thread such as the struggles for reformation and counter-reformation in England as well as the renaissance of secularization in France. In addition, the author stated cases such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, protracted struggles between Jews and Palestinians, terrorist actions by extreme right Christian fundamentalists in the United States, the prevailing conflict in Northern Ireland, ethno-religious conflicts in Africa, nationalist conflicts in Balkans, conflict between Pakistan and India, the burning of church of the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God in Uganda leading to the death of hundreds as well as the persecution of Falun Gong in China exemplifying religious dimension of conflict. It is convincingly affirmed that among different religious conflicts that have historically pervaded nation-states internally, the renaissance of religious terrorism during 9/11 attacks and its aftermath has gained more international recognition and consequently been more globally militarized. The association of 9/11 terrorist attacks with religious justification followed by the official declaration of "war on terrorism" that led to the United States coalition military armed forces combating international terrorist organizations and destabilization of suspected nation-states harboring terrorist groups constitute the descriptive arguments behind the appropriateness of religion rationalizing the preponderance of military armed forces in democratic governments.

According to Jetter (2014: 1), terrorist attacks are usually launched for the sake of drawing attention to a particular cause such as; promotion of religious agenda (Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and ISIS) or for political reasons (like Kurds fighting for an independent state). Hughes (2011) has done a commendable analysis of the role played by the military in combating international crimes before 9/11 and international terrorism after 9/11. The author classified military role into different types and explained them in the following ways: Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA) is a type of the military role that is defined under the British law illustrating the deployment of the UK armed forces to engage in circumstances outside their traditional scope of work. MACA is divided into Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP), which means armed forces can be used to assist the civil authorities for restoring law and order as well as the Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC), which involves the use of armed forces for the relief of disaster and as a response to casualties of terrorist attacks. Deterrence is another type of military role connoting the deployment of military armed forces for preventive role in situations where authorities receive indicative intelligence of imminent terrorist attacks such as the failed Islamist militant attack in Glasgow airport in July 2007. Interdiction is another type of military role involving the use of maritime and air forces to intercept terrorist personnel and arms shipments such as the seizure of the *Karine-A* carrying \$15 million worth of weapons from Iran to the Palestinian Authority by the Israeli Navy on January 3, 2002 that was suspected for the purpose of *intifada* as well as the United States led Combined Task Force 150 (CTF150) off the Horn of Africa as anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and Yemen (Hughes, 2011: 45-50).

Training Allied Forces is a type of military role illustrating one of the main missions of Western armed forces to train security forces of friendly governments under the threat of Islamist terrorist groups or other violent organizations before and after the attack of 9/11. This encompasses the United States assistance to Central Asian military forces (Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) and the American-led Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTFHOA) with a Camp situated in Djibouti. Africa Command (AFRICOM) also engaged in the training of local

security forces in Northwest Africa as a response to al-Qaeda threat in the Islamic Maghreb. Operation FLINTLOCK was carried out by AFRICOM to engage in a training exercise in the Sahel, which involved 600 United States troops; 150 Europeans (France, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, and the UK) and 400 military personnel from Africa (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal). Preemptive Intervention is another type of military role connoting the use of military forces to apprehend terrorists during an attempt to launch attacks such as the disruption of Sunni and Shi'a insurgent activity in Baghdad by the American and British Special Forces units in 2007. This type of military role is similar to Targeted Killing, which is another type of military role but has been differently expounded. The later involves the naming and targeting of individuals for the purpose of assassination such as; the UAV strike on Qaid Sunyan Ali al-Harithi (a senior al-Qaeda terrorist) in Yemen in 2002 as well as the helicopter gunship attack on a convoy carrying Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in Somalia in 2009. Regime Change is the main type of military role after the attack of 9/11 conducted by the Western armed forces. This involves the invasion and overthrowing of governments accused or legally confirmed of harboring and promoting terrorism or providing safe havens for them or in possession of weapons of mass destruction. The United States invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, NATO intervention in Libya (debatably) as well as the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia with the help of the United States armed forces in December 2006 are exemplary events of this type of military role (Hughes, 2011:50-52).

### **Case Study: Boko Haram (BH) and State Response**

Boko Haram (BH) is a local radical Salafist movement that metamorphosed into a Salafi-jihadist terrorist organization after 2009. The Arabic name is '*Jama'atuAhlisSunnalidda'awatiWal-Jihad*' with Hausa name known as Boko Haram (BH) which means "*Western Education is forbidden.*" The sect was founded by Islamic cleric known as Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno state, northeastern Nigeria with the aim of establishing sharia government under the government of Ali Modu Sheriff (Governor of Borno, 2003-2011) (Agbibo 2015: 7). Yusuf was the leader of this sect until 2009 when he suffered extrajudicial death by the Nigerian security forces during sectarian violence that also recorded the death of 1,000 BH members. The goal of the organization changed after the death of Yusuf towards Islamization of Nigeria regardless of the fact that more than half of the Nigerian population is non-Muslims (Falode, 2016: 42). Yusuf and his BH organization was not defined as threatening to Nigerian national security until 2002/2003 when the sect started to use different forms of religious hate speech, blaming politicians and hardship economic conditions of the region. Based on record; between the periods of 1999 to 2003, politicians from Borno formed and armed a group of youth called Ecomog with the aim of fighting their political opponents and these armed youth were abandoned after election of 2003 and subsequently, most of them turned to the direction of violence and joined Yusuf Salafist movements (Albert, 2017: 121).

BH group is described to lack solid strategy towards achieving its goals before 2010 thereby engaged in the use of guerrilla tactics of hit-and-run to disrupt the society occasionally with commonly used weapons such as; machetes, molotov cocktails, knives and locally made guns. Things began to change after 2010 when the group started using bombs and improvised explosive devices in strategic locations. By 2011, a suicide car-bombing took place in the capital city of Nigeria (Abuja) directed against the UN building and resulted to the death of 21 people and left 73 people injured. The listed used weapons by BH terrorist group includes "*AK-47 rifles, grenades, rocket propelled grenades, surface-to air- missiles, vehicle mounted machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, T-55 tanks, Panhard ERC-90 'Sagaie' and explosives such as Semtex with more sophisticated tactics of operation*" (Falode, 2016, p.43). Starting from 2009, the single message of BH terrorist group has been one of jihad, seeking to destroy Nigerian state and anything they define as non-Islamic such as Christians and Muslims who failed to support them as well as people termed to as apostates or hypocrites (*Takfir*) (Agbibo 2015: 8).

As a response, Nigerian state has descriptively adopted two approaches; soft-handed and hard-handed. The soft approach implies the introduction of dialogue and negotiation in 2013 through the establishment of a 26 member of Amnesty Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North by the former President, Goodluck Jonathan. The new leader of the sect after the death of Yusuf known as Shekau responded to the amnesty with the claim that the group has done nothing wrong and Nigerian government should be held

responsible for all the committed atrocities therefore, the amnesty cannot be applicable to them with the vow to continue in the violent pursuit of establishing Islamic state in Nigeria. The group then launched two disastrous attacks after the amnesty, which resulted to the death of 55 and 53 people, setting of 13 villages ablaze in Benue state and freeing over 100 prison inmates (Agbiboa 2015: 9). The hard approach involves the establishment of a special Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2003 by the Nigerian government. This military unit (JTF) launched 'Operation Flush' in the same year with the aim of apprehending and containing BH activities in which this operation led to the death of Yusuf (the founder of Boko Haram). The death of Yusuf and the ascension of a new and more brutal leader marked the watershed of the group whereby they began to employ more sophisticated tactics and methods with the use of advanced weapons. The government responded by establishing a more advanced military unit known as Special Military Joint Task Force (SMJTF) in 2011 composing of officers from the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the Department of State Security (DSS), the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) and the Defence Intelligence Agencies (DIA). These new changes were followed by the mobilization of around 100,000 soldiers to confront BH group as well as the adoption of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategies. In addition, a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was established in 2013 composed of vigilante groups, hunters, farmers and youth to complement the efforts of military armed forces in combating BH terrorist group (Falode, 2016: 44).

Boko Haram (BH) also became threatening to the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) countries as result of the fact that some recruited members of BH group were retrenched peasants from fishing and farming who became victims of the drying up of Lake Chad. The Lake that was originally described as the sixth-largest in the world providing fresh water and agricultural resources for a massive population of people originated from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Central African Republic, Libya, Sudan and Algeria (Albert, 2017: 122). The emanating consequential economic difficulties as a result of the drying up of Lake Chad on many youth from these countries led them to join Boko Haram and also resulted to these neighboring countries becoming safe havens for BH terrorist members thereby they could launch attacks in Nigeria and immediately run back to these countries (Albert, 2017: 123). As a response, the Multinational Task Force (MNJTF) was established by Nigeria in 1994 composing of soldiers from these countries primarily aimed at addressing arms trafficking and cross-border attacks and later assigned to address the escalating Boko Haram crisis. In 2015, the headquarters of the MNJTF in Baga, Nigeria was attacked and captured by Boko Haram and as a result Chad and Niger officially withdrew their troops from the Force. In the same year, the African Union (AU) held a summit-level meeting to render support for MNJTF, which resulted to different changes and a well-refined mandate, leadership structure, rules of engagement, operational areas, change of headquarters and requirements for supporting and sustaining the mission (Albert, 2017: 124).

## Discussion and Conclusion

The debate on the ascendance of religion in international relations/security is fundamental to many scholarly works within the existing literature. It encompasses scholarly arguments on the hostile relations between Christianity (the West) and Islam (the East); the issues around the 'congenial and uncongenial' relationship between the democracy (West) and Middle East put forward by Nazih Ayubi; the Orientalist idea of Edward Said about the interrelations between the Orient (the East) and the Occident (the West), which is described as "*a relationship of power domination of varying degrees of complex hegemony as well as a Western style of dominating, restricting and having authority over the Orient*" (Gerges, 2007, p.208); the civilization clash in Samuel Huntington thesis of 1993 as a response to Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book, "*The End of History and the Last Man*" with Huntington predicting the future that cultural and religious identities of society would become the primary source of conflict at the aftermath of the Cold War thereby civilizational divisions would lead to global conflict (Baker, 2013) and lastly the terrorist attack of 9/11 with the aftermath rise of terrorist organizations in the world carrying out violent operations and human rights violations using a microscopic interpretation of Quran (Sharia) as motives behind their deleterious atrocities.

Consequently, the United States declaration of war on terror as a violent militarized response to the event of 9/11 has been cited not to only illustrate the continuing predominance of military security after the Cold War but also to be religious motivated response (Durward & Marsden 2009). The book titled "*Religion, Conflict and Military Intervention*" written by Rosemary Durward and Lee Marsden mainly argue on the religious motive behind the United States military invasion of Iraq by identifying how Christian faith, biblical interpretation and Christian

leaders in the United States justified the ethics of the war. The book also explains how the United States intervention failed to recognize the religious dimensions of war in Iraq such as identifying religious nationalists, radical jihadists and sectarian combatants as sources of religious violence in the country with the support of outsiders. Furthermore, the described excessive use of military armed forces along with advanced domestic role of the military has been criticized as the preeminence of militarism in democratic societies contrary to the principle of civil control of the military stated in the liberal democracy.

Hughes (2011) cited the comment of Ahmed Rashid claiming that the declaration of 'war on terror' by the United States has paid less attention to the political, economic, and social reforms as significant dimensions of counterterrorist policy in countries such as Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and many other associated countries with al-Qaeda thereby 'war on terror' is accused to in fact constitutes a war against Islam that has become considerable motivation for terrorist organizations becoming more violent, flourished and recruit members from Muslim countries. The strength of this article might have demonstrated how religious terrorism has facilitated the advancement of domestic military role (security) with exemplification of military role of the United States coalition forces in combating international terrorism as well as the use of JTF military forces to combat BH terrorist group in Nigeria but this article deniably argues that militarization of democratic governments has solely erupted as a result of religious conflict. There are democratic states with intensified military influence as a result of historical, political, economic and social conditions with the absence or less of theological reasons. For instance, the historical influential role of the military considered being fundamental to the formation of the modern Republic of Turkey at the absence of theocratic features under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the military has been historically defined as guardian of secularism and democracy in Turkey but the secularized features of Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and its popular loyalty from Turkish citizens have failed to solidify democracy in the country most significantly because of Turkey's military features as cited by the EU to be the hindrance towards the attainment of its membership (Haugom, 2019). Indonesia could be exemplified as another state with a long history of military predominance in the absence or less of theocratic features.

This article has mainly focused on the advancement and substantialness of military security most vividly after the occurrence of religious terrorism (9/11 attacks) coupled with the rampant growth of terrorist organizations in the world reinforcing the difficulty of sustaining stability and security within democratic governments without complex dependence on the military armed forces (military security). This is deconstructing scholarly arguments agitating for the declination of military security due to the emergence of multidimensional threats after the Cold War and this article argues that the military still matters. It also argues that the predominance of domestic role of military and the need for militarized democracies around the world today could be encumbrance to the principle of civilian control over the military buttressed within the scope of military professionalism by Samuel Huntington and new professionalism by Alfred Stepan. In the light of complexities inherent in the present domestic role of the military, the principles of civilian control of the military embedded in liberal democracy has shifted toward Huntington's subjective control, which is defined to be incongruousness to the objective control entrenched in the liberal democracy.

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# Role of the Indonesian Mass Media as National Defense Element from the Perspective of Total War Strategy

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## Abstract

Mass media as a means to disseminate news has independence in news publication regarding the company's target that depends on the latest news developments or trending topics. Total defense requires structuring a strategy that needs media involvement in delivering news to the public as part of the defense element in forming an opinion. This study aims to provide an overview of the critical role of media participation in supporting the government in various activities of disseminating information or actual news about the field of defense in the total defense strategy. According to Paul Long and Tim Wall (Paul Long, 2012), Media Power is associated with two aspects: the first is the power of control, which determines other parties' actions and is considered negative because it implies limiting the freedom of other parties. The other one is the power of self-determination, which is tied to the idea of liberty either to use power or from the superior's responsibility. The media tends to disseminate dynamic life-nuanced news that does not relate to defense, which is considered more favorable. The Ministry of Defense has created a media engagement program and has tried to measure information discussing security with positive, negative, and neutral sentiment. However, the results obtained are still unable to provide a comprehensive view because media respondents have not represented the media's opinion. This research used the descriptive qualitative method and attempted to discover data and facts from the media as an element of national defense in engaging the total war strategy. This study tries to increase the role of the media in strengthening the universal war strategy through reporting by forming public opinion.

**Keywords:** Strategy, Total Defense, Media, Public

## Introduction

National defense has the essence of the involvement of citizens as a whole related to awareness of their rights and obligations and the belief in their own strength, universality has the nature of the involvement of various elements including the role of the media in its duties and functions as a news anchor to the public or the public. In the 2015 defense white book, it is stated that the order of the elements of force is carried out as a whole, integrated under one unit of command by combining a defense strategy, so that it is the totality of national defense. This contemporary war has a very broad battlefield with interconnective and interimplicative aspects with abstractive boundaries (Helda, 2018). In facing non-military threats, placing Ministries / Agencies outside the defense sector

is supported by other elements of the nation's strength. During the war, when it was still using conventional war strategies in the past, the media system relations were in an asymmetrical relationship which was considered less favorable for the state, because media resources were only used by the state as a means of war coverage (for example press conferences, press releases and interviews). War in the future requires us to learn and master defense technology that is more sophisticated than the current one (Saiful, 2015).

The media is not an institution that solves all problems, but in its criticism, the media must provide solution options, including providing opportunities for state officials to do their best for the interests of the nation and state (Suryopratomo, 2019), a senior journalist's stated about the importance of independence of the media that cannot be controlled by certain interests. Information Media about Defense Studies & Strategies that Promote Identity, Nationalism & Integrity (Midhio I Wayan, 2019).

The development of the current pattern of warfare is increasingly considering to reduce the impact of civilian casualties or destruction that possibly invite international reactions and is considered to require large budget support so that the strategy that is considered the most effective and efficient is using irregular warfare, namely the existence of efforts to form public opinion using media.

## **Theoretical Framework**

### **Theory of media power**

According to Paul Long and Tim Wall (Paul Long, 2012), media power is associated with two aspects: the power of control and self-determination. For the first aspect, the power of control is regarded as the ability to determine the other's actions, which are considered negative because it implies limiting the freedom of others. Meanwhile, the power of self-determination is liberty either to use power or from the authorities' responsibility. There are two ways of practicing power. First is through physical power that uses violence to achieve goals, which is to force other parties to obey what the authorities want. The second way is using the power of ideas, which is when support is considered to be the most successful, is when the other party accepts the idea naturally and without any constraint.

### **Theory of role**

According to Soekanto (2001: 242), the role is divided into 3 such as follows:

#### **1. Active role**

An active role is a role appointed by the group members because of their position in the group as a group activity, such as administrators, officials, etc.

#### **2. Participative role**

A participatory role is a role appointed by group members to the member who provides beneficial contributions for the group itself.

#### **3. Passive Role**

The passive role is the passive contribution of group members, where group members refrain from giving opportunities to other functions in the group to run well (Syaron lantaeda, 2017).

The expert's statement or opinion is a representation of the pattern of an action that seeks to limit a person or an organization to carry out an activity based on mutually agreed objectives and conditions so that it can be done as well as possible.

### **The art of war theory**

On the other hand, according to Sun Tzu in *The Art of War* (Gowrie Vinayan, 2013), a general is explained to require a good knowledge of his enemy, his strength, the terrain, and the weather. Victory is best assured through expertise and flexibility: in other words, understanding of the situation and then adaptation to it. Flexibility can be

related to the pattern of warfare that now tends to use the effectiveness of the information function by involving the media's role as an element of defense in its operations.

### **Public opinion theory**

According to Ronald D. Asmus (2004), in his journal of Power, War, Public Opinion, the Government needs the formation of public opinion by the media during the war to legitimate support from the whole society (Asmus, 2004). Managing public opinion through the media is not a new way, but it will be influential in mobilizing the public to participate in responding to all threats through the media if it is done comprehensively by involving all levels of society.

### **Theory of total war**

In a book entitled "*Konsep Perang Semesta: Dari Perang Gerilya ke Perang Asimetris*" (The Concept of Total War: From Guerrilla War to Asymmetrical War") by Iswandi Syahputra (2016) is explained that overcoming armed conflict is not the only strategy to win a war. However, to conquer hearts and minds or win over the community where the conflict occurs, and other communities can be a way to get support (Prabowo, 2016). Efforts to win the people's hearts involve mass media's role with its coverage to form opinions. Therefore, people are willing to play a role using all their abilities by responding to various negative news in multiple media, including alternative media such as social media, online, and other news platforms.

### **Methodology**

This study is a descriptive qualitative research which is conducted by collecting data not in the form of numbers, but the data comes from interview manuscripts, field notes, personal documents, memo notes, and other official documents.

Bogdan and Taylor (Moleong, 2010), explain "a qualitative method as a research procedure that produces descriptive data in the form of written and spoken words from people and observable behavior." This study aims to obtain a clearer, more complete, and possible and easy for researchers to carry out observational research.

The data collected in this qualitative research was using interviews, observation, and documentation. Through those three data collection activities, it is hoped that the researcher will get valid data.

### **Interview**

The interview is a series of steps required in conducting a qualitative interview. The researcher got the data from sources persons, including five senior national media journalists (Kompas, The Jakarta Post, Antara, Rakyat Merdeka, Republika), through semi-structured interviews. Those senior journalists were chosen as resource persons based on their over five years of experience and educational background. Interviews are held in a discussion room in the form of a group discussion forum organized by researchers, aiming to get the broadest possible explanation with assumptions without imposing specific interpretations.

### **Observation**

The author carried out the observation in this research on the role of mass media as an element of national defense in the perspective of total war strategy as an observer. The object of this research is the various roles of mass media in forming opinions regarding the defense sector, including various activities and policies in media management.

## Documentation

According to Sugiyono (2015), documentation is a method used to obtain data and information in the form of books, archives, documents, written numbers, and images in the form of reports and information that can support research. Documentation is used to collect data as material to be reviewed (Sugiyono, 2015).

## Research locus

The author determined the research location where the research would be carried out. The research location is at the Public Relations Bureau of the Secretariat General of the Ministry of Defense, Jalan Medan Merdeka Barat no 13-14 Nasution building, 9th Floor and at Wisma Antara Jl. Medan Merdeka Cell. No.17, Gambir, Kota Jakarta, Gambir, Central Jakarta, DKI Jakarta. Those places were chosen because Antara, as a state-owned company, has a network of representatives throughout Indonesia and some abroad supported by cooperation with various domestic and foreign news agencies.

## Research focus

The research focused on the role of the mass media as an element of national defense in the perspective of total war strategy carried out by the media based on the report data from the Ministry of Defense and the press being the research object.

## RESEARCH OUTPUT AND DISCUSSION

### Research output

Media is seen as part of an overall social process used by dominant/powerful groups to instill their ideology. Meanwhile, in the book entitled *Cepat Majulah Bangsaku*, as the result of the Forum Group Discussion of senior Indonesian journalists for the 2019 Presidential Cup national media competition, Prof. Dr. Bagir Manan, SH.MCL emphasized the role of the media that first, to carry out the country's ideals. Second is to work based on capabilities and qualifications. The last one is contributing to the country's prosperity in maintaining peace and protecting the country from destruction.

At least, the press has a responsibility to the nation. In the same book and the same forum, the Managing Director of Metro TV, Suryopratomo, recalled what was conveyed by the late Jacob Oetama regarding journalists/media's attitude who has to question what the media has contributed to society. The press/media does not only have the responsibility to criticize and supervise, but also provide alternative solutions. The media is not an institution that solves all problems, but in its criticism, the media must provide solution options, including providing opportunities for state officials to do their best for the interests of the nation and state (Suryopratomo, 2019). As is known, often expressed by former Head of the TNI, Lt. Gen. TNI (Purn) Suryo Prabowo as the Total War system, because according to the Indonesian defense doctrine that the battlefield has an identity. Supporting and inhibiting factors for the formation of defense opinion by the media.

The role of the media in forming a public opinion in the defense sector, as the supporting and inhibiting factors for the Total War Strategy, the media as a black box in the middle need balanced and accurate input. Currently, the media is more comfortable conducting a review from various sources. The supporting and inhibiting factors in the Total War Strategy by the role of the media in the formation of public opinion in the defense sector are ourselves and the officials who have an interest there. It can be established by holding regular meetings that invite senior journalists who have sufficient understanding about defense and have been directly involved, such as the journalists who have been trained in Sanggabuana. Moreover, the inhibiting factor is the bureaucracy that hinders implementing a total war strategy that shapes public opinion in the defense sector. It is known that the defense sector is a partially closed and open field. However, the defense sector is currently too restricted in terms of information, so every defense issue is biased. There is no single source that journalists can immediately be referred

to. To win people's hearts by directing public opinion for defense interests is to put people's interests first because people still have a high patriotism spirit. As an agency that uses State Budget (APBN), the defense sector] should inform the public to attempt transparency and clear information flow.

### **The strategy of defense opinion formation with the media**

Journalists need to be provided with an understanding of the Defense White Paper to get a frame to inform the external. The best strategy that can be used for framing is to gather mass media crews, as is currently done by the Palace that conducts a meeting with the Chief Editors of the mass media every 2 (two) weeks to discuss updates on news developments. The White Paper or any framework from the Ministry of Defense will be used as a source of understanding for the media in shaping public opinion on defense issues so that the direction of the information becomes more apparent. For example, in the defense sector, the journalist got limited information about Rantis Maung, so the information is naturally running wild. The Total War Strategy in shaping public opinion by the media can be applied in Papua related to the Food Estate program.

At this time, the information flow is not smooth from the stakeholders as if it was a wild ball. Bureaucracy is necessary but not to obstruct the mission itself. For media support in this universal war, there must be support from the Defense Ministry itself. Now we are a single source because it is difficult to get information from sources person.

### **Literature Observation of the 2019 Work Program Report of the Public Relations Bureau of the Secretariat General of the Ministry of Defense regarding the Formation of Defense Opinions.**

The Public Relations Bureau of the Secretariat General of the Ministry of Defense also has the duty and responsibility to carry out guidance and network of State Defense opinions in opinion formation and counter-opinion activities.

The Opinion Division, led by the Head of Opinion Division, has the responsibility of carrying out the preparation of technical policy formulations and evaluation and technical guidance in opinion preparation, opinion formation, and cyber media. In carrying out its duties, the Opinion section carries out the function of forming opinions and preparing materials to prepare standards, norms, guidelines, criteria, and procedures. Furthermore, it is also implementing and evaluating policies in opinion formation, implementation of guidance, and technical supervision in opinion formation. The Subdivision of Opinion Formation is led by the Head of Subdivision, who has the task of preparing materials to formulate and implement technical policies and evaluation and technical guidance in opinion formation.

The Opinion Formation Subdivision activities that have been carried out in 2019 include; Public service broadcast / PSA (through TV media) related to the defense function, Public service broadcast / PSA (through printed media) related to the Defense Function. Another activity is Public service broadcast / PSA (through online media) related to the Defense Function, Implementation of talk show on the radio with official sources within the Ministry of Defense, Making banners with Defense's theme.

Activities of the Formation Subdivision that have been carried out throughout 2019 include; broadcasting public service / PSA (Public Service Announcement) through printed media related to the Defense function three times with details as follows:

- 1) March 11, 2019, in the Media Indonesia Daily with a resource person, the rector of Defense University (Unhan).
- 2) October 16, 2019, in the Republika Daily with resource persons from the Head of Education and Training Ministry of Defense.
- 3) December 4, 2019, in Kompas Daily with a resource person from the Ministry of Defense Director-General.

The Opinion Formation Subdivision also conducted ten talk show activities on the radio with official sources within the Ministry of Defense, with details:

- 1) Implementation on February 27, 2019, on Trijaya FM Radio with a resource person from Sesditjen Strahan with the theme of Socialization of the 2019 State Defense Policy.
- 2) Implementation on March 27, 2019, at Trijaya FM Radio, Karo Akademik, Defense University with the Promotion of New Student Admissions Program theme.
- 3) Implementation on April 10, 2019, at Trijaya FM Radio, Ditkomcad Associate Analyst resource person with the theme Getting to know more about the Draft Law on National Resources Management (RUUPSDN).
- 4) Implementation on May 15, 2019, at Trijaya FM Radio, with the Head of the Bekkomlek Research and Development Center for technical defense functionalist (Tekfunghan) as the resource person from the Research and development center (Balitbang) for the Ministry of Defense. The activity was conducted with the theme of Balitbang Policies in technical defense functionalist in 2019.
- 5) Conducted on June 19, 2019, on Trijaya FM Radio, a resource person at the Ministry of Defense Headquarters of the Ministry of Defense with the theme Social Service to Defend the State in the Context of I Anniversary
- 6) Implementation on July 24, 2019, at Trijaya FM Radio, a resource person for the Head of the *Kapuskod Baranahan Kemhan* with the theme Introduction to the Ministry of Defense's *Baranahan* Codification Center.
- 7) Implementation on August 21, 2019, at Trijaya FM Radio, a resource person from the Ministry of Defense *Kabainstrahan* with the theme Introduction to the Ministry of Defense.
- 8) Implementation on September 18, 2019, at Trijaya FM Radio, Resource Person for the Director of Veterans of the Directorate General of Medicine of the Ministry of Defense with the theme of the Main Policy of the Directorate General of Defense for Human Resources in 2019.
- 9) Implementation on October 23, 2019, at Trijaya FM Radio, Resource Person for the Head of Sub-Directorate for Education Development of the Ministry of Defense with the theme of Development of Defense Forces in the Human Resources Sector.
- 10) Conducted on November 20, 2019, on Trijaya FM Radio, a resource person from the Director of State Defense with the theme *Bela Negara, Semua Bisa* (Defend the State, Everyone is Possible).

The Opinion Formation Subdivision has also carried out public service broadcasts / PSA (Public Service Announcement) through TV media related to the defense function five times, with details:

- 1) February 20, 2019, in the 2019 National Defense Policy Principles program on Metro TV with Director-General of Defense Strategy.
- 2) April 24, 2019, in the 2019 National Defense Center's Role in National Defense program on iNews TV with Head of the rehabilitation center as a resource person.
- 3) July 31, 2019, in the International Cooperation and Defense Diplomacy program on Kompas TV with resource persons Secretary General of Defense Strategy.
- 4) October 22, 2019, in the Coffee Break program on TV One with Head of Education and Training Division as resource person.
- 5) November 27, 2019, in the Speak After Lunch program on iNews TV with a resource person from the Director of HR, Directorate General of Defense.

The opinion formation sub-division also carried out public service broadcasts/PSA (Public Service Announcement) through online media related to the defense function once for three online media with details; Media Kompas.com, Gatra.com, Media Indonesia.com.

Meanwhile, in fostering relationships with media crews, the News Section of Mass Media Sub-division has carried out several activities such as the implementation of the Chief Editor Meeting, Managing Editor Meeting, and conducting routine press conference with the direction of the Ministry of Defense, meetings with the media crew.

Activities of the Mass Media Relations Subdivision to build relationships with media crews in 2019 such as; 6 press conferences, 12 media crew meetings, 6 mass media Executive Editor Meetings, 1 Chief Editor Meeting, 1 Press Tour. On 3 - 4 July 2019, the Journalists Press Tour to Surabaya was held with PT PAL, *Pusdikhanudnas*, and *Koarmada II* as destinations. Throughout 2019, monitoring news regarding defense and military was compiled as many as 1,587 news items, shown in the table below.

Table 1: News Sentiment

No	Month	POSITIVE	NEUTRAL	NEGATIVE	TOTAL
1	January	109 74%	30 30%	8 6%	147
2	February	81 70%	31 27%	6 3%	118
3	March	80 75%	20 19%	6 6%	106
4	April	77 71%	28 26%	3 3%	108
5	May	61 66%	28 31%	4 3%	93
6	June	53 63%	25 29%	7 8%	85
7	July	89 65%	39 28%	1 7%	138
8	August	105 65%	46 28%	1 7%	163
9	September	71 62%	33 30%	1 8%	115
10	October	130 75%	40 23%	3 2%	173
11	November	129 69%	53 28%	6 3%	188
12	December	110 72%	38 25%	5 3%	153
	average	69%	27%	4%	132,25

Source: Public Relations Bureau Report of the Secretariat General of the Ministry of Defense, 2019

From the sentiment table above, it can be explained that each month there are 132, 25 news discussing defense and military news with an average positive sentiment at 69%, neutral news at 27%, and negative news at 4%.

## DISCUSSION

Media could make someone powerful if seen from the ability of a person or group of people to control the media organization or those who use control of the media for power. The media acts as an agent of power, which begins with the understanding that media technology is compelling, sending messages to the wider community supported by several theories and research results. It can become a strategy in driving public opinion in totality.

### 1. Understanding of Media Power

Basically, in understanding the role of media as news broadcasters have their own agenda. According to Paul Long and Tim Wall's opinion about media power, the media has the ability to control other parties through the news that aims to limit certain parties and authority to determine themselves, from the opinion. Journalists stated that the media have independence, but in another view, the media are not an institution that solves all problems. In a critic, the press must provide solution options, including providing opportunities for state officials to do their best for the interests of the nation and state (Suryopratomo, 2019). They should cover the news design related to the orientation of the nation's interests. Therefore, the news is related to its strength in forming a public opinion to increase its

role in answering news problems that have a negative tendency both from within and outside of the country or increase positive sentiment on defense news.

## **2. The role of media in totality**

The role of engaging the media can be understood through the opinion of Soekanto (2001: 242). The role of media is divided into 3, namely active, participative, and passive roles. From the data obtained by the media, they place themselves more as a control of the news to get a supportive role. The total war strategy requires an active role, not just a participative or passive role. An active role tends to involve its position and status in defense news coverage within the organization, such as administrators, officials, etc. Media involvement can be done through groups fostered by the ministry of defense or within its organization internally in certain sections to discuss specifically in defense reporting.

The formation of public opinion is an effort from various fields planned through certain concepts supported by parties who can convey messages to the public so that the goals to be achieved can be carried out as expected in the desired universal defense strategy.

## **3. Understanding of Media in the Art of War**

War always demands the most effective strategy to defeat the enemy. Thus, according to Sun Tzu's opinion, a good knowledge of the enemy is needed to recognize them against their ability. Victory is best assured through expertise and flexibility; in other words, understanding the situation and then adapting to it. From the data obtained regarding the role of the media as an element of national defense in the perspective of a total war strategy, from the results of interviews with journalists and defense ministry staff, it was found that the media lacked support for information to make coverage. That happens because there is still a lack of media involvement in various events related to the defense sector, which sometimes have secret content. At the same time, news that must be reported is often constrained by a hierarchical system that is layered from the original concept to at least three levels. The media systematically do not carry out coverage regularly. They will directly quote through official sources, such as press releases and the Indonesian Ministry of Defense's official website.

News requires speed and accuracy because the speed of publishing has its prestige among the media. Social media as an alternative media is the most popular medium because of its speed, which is currently considered the fastest in conveying information. The trend of developing media management has now grown rapidly. As an organization, the media tends to build a corporation that combines mainstream media with alternative media by managing news originating from one source by dividing them into various versions. Based on the interest survey, they divided news into multiple versions and measured which one is preferred, and prioritized it to be covered. In some instances, the news's speed is sometimes not always beneficial for the object being reported because the speed sometimes makes verification less optimal. Therefore, it can lead to misinformation. In the defense environment, this is very sensitive because it involves various parties' interests, including foreign countries with their interests and information management patterns.

## **4. Opinion through the role of the media**

The media, with its independence in making news, have a total role in various environments. It is beneficial in the realm of defense, especially in conveying opinions to the public. According to an expert, Ronald D. Asmus (2004), in his journal "Power, War, Public Opinion," explains that the government needs to build public opinion through the media during the war as a form of legitimacy for support from the entire community (Asmus, 2004). Shaping opinion is needed to have a positive impact and increase the legitimacy of particular interests aligned with the objectives to be achieved. Therefore, the media is required to disseminate the information referring to certain "frames" that are in line with the government's objectives. In this case, the ministry of defense, therefore, can gain support from the public. The media's involvement in responding to information warfare conditions between

countries is considered the most effective with asymmetrical conditions in terms of conventional combat capabilities because it is to maintain the state and save costs.

A war strategy using the media's role in conditions of asymmetry and in cost efficiency that involves the universe requires the support of facilities and infrastructure and human resources capable of disseminating news quickly and on target. The victory of the war in the information dimension requires planning and using the most effective strategy to achieve the expected goals. From the research results, which still need improvement due to the emergence of various news in the community, sometimes hoax about the defense sector will impact if it is not anticipated by the positive opinion.

## **5. The role of the media in the strategy of the Total War**

Media coverage (objects and attributes) will influence the public, where these objects and attributes become important and dominant in the public eye. The issues that are considered necessary by the public are then used as a basis or reference in providing evaluation (priming). The framing attribute is then used to evaluate an issue. Priming and its attributes will determine a trend of public opinion.

Regarding the total war strategy, the role of the media as a defense element as stated in the book entitled "Konsep Perang Semesta: Dari Perang Gerilya ke Perang Asimetris" (The Concept of Universal War: From Guerrilla War to Asymmetrical War) by Iswandi Syahputra (2016) explains that overcoming armed conflict is not the only strategy to be able to win a war. However, winning people's hearts and minds where the conflict occurs and the external to get support (Prabowo, 2016).

Shaping opinion is carried out by various parties, either by the state or by non-state actors. They may intervene to achieve their goals and interests by using the media. Otherwise, parties who feel threatened or aggrieved by the opinion formed will also use the media as a means of anticipation accordingly to the context discussed. Sometimes getting opinion formation is carried out by taking objects in certain areas of a country, so a strategy is needed in dealing with the construction of these opinions. The method developed in the pattern of the media's role in dealing with wartime and peacetime is used as a deterrent or an effort to enforce specific state goals.

The issue of defense was raised as a prominent object in the discussion and PSA, which had been carried out in a planned and measured manner, was not continued as a second level framing or agenda-setting as discussed with the media and media crews to bring out prominent attributes. It could be simple defense issues that could be used as priming attributes. Therefore, it can reinforce and give direction to the opinion.

## **Conclusion and Recommendation**

### **Conclusion**

Total war is involving the overall potential power of resources both in combat and in peaceful conditions. The role of the media can be described as follows;

- a. Based on several theories and the results of interviews and other data obtained, it requires an active role from the ministry of defense concerning the pace in providing information coordinated with the media so that the total war strategy can be published optimally.
- b. Public opinion needs to be formed and directed through the media to benefit from a total war strategy, using agenda-setting, framing, and priming steps as opinion formation to help the national defense.
- c. The need for the socialization of the universal war strategy to the media as an element of defense and a special organization was formed to handle in building public opinion.

## Recommendation

Based on the conclusions above, some recommendations can be offered to increase the role of media as an element of defense from the perspective of total war strategy;

- i. Regarding the total war strategy, the Ministry of Defense as an institution increases the role of mass media in an integrated, organized manner between the Ministry of Defense, in this case, the Public Relations Bureau of the Secretariat General of the Ministry of Defense and the media.
- ii. Both mainstream and alternative media use the power media pattern in the perspective of a total war strategy with real coordinated action involving the overall potential engaged in publishing.

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# Health Personnel and the Implementation of National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria

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## Abstract

Acknowledged as a policy target for the government of Nigeria, healthcare provision represents an important preoccupation for the government. As with other public policies, the achievement of policy goals in Nigeria is usually encumbered by numerous factors of implementation across various sectors. In the health sector, factors such as inadequate physical infrastructure, shortage of healthcare personnel, limited medical supplies etc. have hindered the implementation of several health policies. National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) is one of such policies and this study examined the effects of shortage of healthcare personnel on the implementation of NHIS policy in FCT, Abuja. Specifically, the study evaluated the opinions of health workers as well as enrollees of NHIS in four purposively chosen Area Councils of the six Area Councils in FCT. This study adopted a survey research design with Rensis Likert's five-point scale questionnaire instrument administered to both categories of respondents. The data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS Version 25) and the T-tested statistical tool was used to test the hypothesis. The study found out that shortage of health personnel is a major barrier to the effective implementation of NHIS in the FCT, Abuja. Consequently, the study recommends that there should be massive recruitment of qualified healthcare personnel; training and retraining of healthcare workers; and timely and adequate remuneration for the healthcare workers in FCT, Abuja.

**Keywords:** Healthcare, NHIS, Health Personnel, Public Policy

## Introduction

Research in health policies and their implementation has been a recurring decimal in extant literature. This preoccupation is not unconnected with the fact that investment in human capital through health is indispensable to national development. Good health boosts worker effectiveness, as well as the productivity of the worker through increased physical and mental capacities which are necessary for accelerating the pace of national development. Although the provision of health services is seen as a social good in some countries, in many others however (especially in developing countries), access to health is a big issue as it is fraught with difficulties with respect to issues of financing and cost recovery for services provided and received. Consequently, like many public services, it is not equally accessible to all people and so, limited physical access to basic health care continues to be a major

impediment to achieving the goal of healthcare for all. In the light of the forgoing, governments all over the world consciously attempt through policy formulation and implementation to bring effective health care services to people across economic divides and different social strata.

In 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) passed a resolution that social health insurance should be supported as one of the strategies used to mobilize more resources for health, for risk pooling, for increasing access to health care for the poor and for delivering quality health care in all its member states and especially in low-income countries, a strategy also supported by the World Bank (Hsiao, 2007). This is one of the ideals upon which the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was conceived and established in Nigeria.

The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) is an offshoot of the Nigerian National Health Policy (NHP) and it was established by Decree 35 of 1999 (Now Act 35) and became operational in 2005. It is a social health insurance programme designed by the Federal Government of Nigeria to complement sources of financing the health sector and to improve access to health care for the majority of Nigerians (Mbaya, 2009). It guarantees the provision of needed health services to persons without them having to pay fully at the time of need, because payment has previously been made by regular contribution from the insured or his employer or both. The scheme is statutorily mandated to ensure that Nigerians have access to affordable health care regardless of their social status. The implementation of this scheme has become a subject of several empirical evaluations. This study seeks to extend these empirical investigations by examining specifically the shortage of healthcare workers as a critical component of the militating factors against the achievement of the NHIS goals in FCT Abuja between 2005 and 2015.

#### **Access to Healthcare under the NHIS**

NHIS was launched and became operational in 2005 and has as its fundamental objectives, the achievement of effective, accessible, affordable and Universal Health Coverage (UHC) for Nigerians by the year 2015. In Nigeria, there is a past trend of ineffective implementation of government schemes. This has informed a general negative perception and attitude among the people towards such schemes regarding their success, effectiveness and sustainability (Enoh, 2011). A study conducted by Hafsa and Saidu (2016) revealed that in terms of coverage, between the year 2005 when the scheme became operational and 2015 which was the target year for the attainment of its fundamental objectives of effective, accessible, affordable and UHC for Nigerians, it was only able to cover 5.5% of the national population which is equivalent to Eleven Million, five hundred and fifteen thousand, one hundred and sixty-four (11,515,164) people. But more pathetically, this 5.5% covered came mainly from employees of the formal sector (particularly employees of the federal government who made up to 98% of the coverage so far (see FGN, 2015), while artisans, farmers, street vendors, traders and the unemployed remain largely out of the coverage. The implication, according to Felix and Uno (2016) is that most public and private health facilities are still operating on fees for service for the majority of its clients.

Again, providing effective, accessible and affordable health care to those who are already enrolled into the NHIS has also remained a serious challenge (Inougele and Mohammed, 2013; Owumi and Sakiru, 2013). And more importantly, Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN (2015) had actually corroborated the findings from other studies, when it reported that some challenges confronting the implementation of the NHIS during its decade of existence include (a) exclusion of certain categories of people in its benefit package; (b) low coverage across the country due to low health-seeking behavior; (c) low uptake by states and local government employees; (d) limit of free health protection programme for the poor and vulnerable; and (e) weak stakeholder responsibility.

Scholars have identified many factors resulting from implementation of the policy to be responsible for these challenges. Some scholars have tended to generalize these challenges to the entire health sector regardless of which sub-sector is being investigated. For example again, some scholars have identified the problems of shortage of health personnel, inadequate medical equipment, lack of drugs and consumables, poor health infrastructure, paucity of funds and hospital bureaucracy as major challenges confronting the entire health sector regardless of the uniqueness of some sub-sectors such as the NHIS.

On the issue of health personnel (health workers), one big challenge some scholars argue lies in the shortage of health workers to handle the quantum of health needs of the people especially in rural communities. Even in the urban centres, where medical facilities are relatively better, the number of patients to one doctor is very high. There are cases where patients wait for several hours to consult a doctor. Others can stay for about two days without accessing a doctor owing to the crowd and pressure on available medical personnel (Felix and Uno, 2016). Associated with this, is the attitude of health workers towards patients. As a result of pressure that is engineered by the high number of patients, there exists the tendency of health workers exhibiting uncaring, unfriendly and unkind attitudes towards their patients. A study conducted by WHO (2007) corroborated this. It identified gross shortage of personnel as one of the serious problem bedeviling the Nigerian health sector. In a similar vein, Ele, Ogbonna, Ochei and Odili (2017) also identified poor attitude of health personnel towards patients (enrollees) which is caused by pressure as a result of inadequacy of personnel as one of the major factors affecting the effective implementation of the scheme in South-Eastern Nigeria. Jegede (2014) also discovered poor attitude and lack of professional commitment of health workers as a major problem in Nigerian health care delivery system. This study, therefore, examines the extent to which shortage of healthcare personnel has been a major impediment to achieving the objectives of NHIS in FCT Abuja.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study adopted Anderson's health behaviour theory because of its compatibility with the study's objective. Andersen (1968) developed a theory of health care utilization which looks at three categories of determinants for health care service utilization. These include: (i) predisposing characteristics, (ii) enabling characteristics and (iii) need-based characteristics.

(i) *Predisposing Characteristics*: This category represents the proclivity to utilize health care services. According to Andersen (1968), health care utilization is determined by certain predisposing factors which include demographic factors such as age, sex, etc; social structure such as education, occupation, ethnicity, social network, social interactions and culture. The social position of an individual within the society in terms of aforementioned factors determines access to and use of health services. Another element of the predisposing characteristics is the health belief factors which include attitudes, values and knowledge that people have concerning and towards the health care system. An individual who believes health services are useful for treatment will likely utilize those services, than one who does not.

(ii) *Enabling Characteristics*: This category according to Andersen includes resources found within the family, community and health facility levels. Family or personal resources include income, health insurance coverage, location and quality of social relationships. The first two factors-income and health insurance coverage are particularly important because the level of family or personal income determines the amount of money that would be available to take care of health expenditure. Also health insurance coverage enhances an individual's access to and use of health services. Resources at the community level include available health facilities, health personnel and medical equipment. Health facilities, including health infrastructure must be present for use to take place. Also health personnel and medical equipment must be available within the health facilities for effective utilization of health care services. Adequate availability of health personnel and medical equipment reduces a patient's waiting time and thereby improving health care services utilization.

(iii) *Need-based Characteristics*: The third category of Andersen's health behavioural theory includes the perception of need for health services and evaluated perceptions of need. According to Andersen (1968), perceived need is how people view their own general health and functional state, as well as how they experience symptoms of illness, pain and worries about their health and whether or not they judge their problems to be of sufficient importance and magnitude to seek professional help and evaluated perception of need represents professional judgment about people's health status and their need for medical care.

The underlying assumptions of Andersen's behavioural theory of health care services utilization is congruent with the objective and thrust of this paper which examines the extent to which shortage of health personnel militate

against the successful implementation of NHIS in FCT. Community, family or personal enabling resources must be available for health care utilization to take place. First, community resources like health facilities must be available and these facilities must have the required personnel for adequate health care services utilization. Also families or individuals must have the means and know-how to access and use health care services. These include availability of income, health insurance coverage and regular source of care. Where these are lacking or inadequate, health care utilization is bound to be low.

### **Empirical Review of Literature**

A study conducted by Agba, Ushie and Osuchukwu (2010) investigated the potency of NHIS and employee's access to quality and affordable healthcare in Cross River State involving 1200 respondents. The study employed survey research method involving questionnaire to collect the data, and utilized ANOVA and student t-test to test the hypotheses. The authors revealed that there is a gross inadequacy of personnel and equipment for providing services to NHIS beneficiaries in Cross River state. The study concluded that the utilization of NHIS remains a mirage if these problems were not adequately addressed. Agba et al. (2010) failed to describe how the inadequacy of personnel and equipment constrains the utilization of the NHIS by employees sampled in the Federal, State and Local services.

Akande, Salaudeen and Babatunde (2012) examined the effects of NHIS on hospital staff, financial burden and satisfaction with services rendered in University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital Staff Clinic involving 29,422 patients. The study employed cross-sectional research design and used chi-square and t-test statistical tools to test hypotheses of the study. They found out that there is disparity among junior and senior staff with respect to the level of satisfaction of NHIS services. While majority of the junior staff were satisfied with the utilization of NHIS, the senior staff were not satisfied. The study showed that certain personnel or individual-related factors impede the utilization of NHIS services. They concluded that NHIS is highly necessary to reduce financial burden of illnesses. A critical look at Akande et al. (2012) reveals that they only reported opinion from a single sampled government institution. There is need to expand the scope of the sampled institutions.

A study by Owoseni, Jegede and Ibikunle (2014) examined the influence of socio-economic status on utilization of healthcare facilities, as well as ascertain the quality of healthcare facilities available in the rural communities in South-West Nigeria. The study adopted both the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) and Health Belief Model as theoretical framework. Methodologically, the study employed a descriptive research survey with a sample size of 400 people selected through a random sampling technique. After administering the questionnaire, a total of 357 copies of the questionnaires were retrieved. The hypotheses were tested with chi-square and Correlation to investigate the relationship between the variables. The outcome of the study indicates that most of the respondents (95.8%) agreed that they had utilized health facility, while 4.2% of the respondents had not utilized health facility. The correlation result  $R = -0.221$  (0.000) shows that there was a significant and negative relationship between education and utilization of health facility.

Lastly, a study carried out by Awoyemi, Obayelu and Opaluwa (2009) investigated the factors influencing the utilization of health facilities in rural area of Kogi state. 160 rural households and 60 health care providers were randomly selected for the study. Using a multi-nominal logic, the study revealed that household size, distance and total cost of seeking health care affect the utilization of health services. The study concluded that distance and cost of seeking health care are core issues in the utilization of health services. One limitation of the study is that the scope was limited. For example, the study did not consider other factors especially how shortage of personnel affect the effective utilization of health care services in the state.

### **About the NHIS**

The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) is a body corporate established under Act 35 of 1999 by the Federal Government of Nigeria to ensure access to health care by all Nigerians at an affordable cost. James (2003) defined the National Health Insurance Scheme as a social health insurance programme designed by the Federal

Government of Nigeria to complement sources of financing the health sector and to improve access to health care by the majority of Nigerians. It is a form of social health insurance which pays for health care services through contributions to a health fund. Contributions, which are usually from both employers and employees, are based on payroll and ability to pay while access to services is based on need. The fundamental rationale for health insurance is risk-sharing. According to James (2003), the programme aims at:

- a. Ensuring that every Nigerian has access to good health care services.
- b. Protecting families from the financial hardship of huge medical bills.
- c. Limiting the rise in the cost of health care services.
- d. Ensuring equitable distribution of health care costs among different income groups.
- e. Maintaining high standard of health care delivery services within the system.
- f. Ensuring efficiency in health care services.
- g. Improving and harnessing private sector participation in the provision of health care services.
- h. Ensuring equitable distribution of health care facilities within the federation.
- i. Ensuring the availability of funds to the health sector for improved services; and
- j. Ensuring equitable patronage of all levels of health care.

The National Health Insurance Scheme was launched formally as a Public Health Policy in 1997. The government recognizing the importance of the scheme as a good opportunity for mobilizing additional resources towards financing the health sector showed some political commitment by embarking on public enlightenment/ official launching of the scheme in the various geo-political zones, preparatory to its take off. According to Okonkwo (2001), National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) has been introduced in Nigeria in response to inadequate provision of health facilities, the general poor state of the nation's health care services, the excessive dependence and pressure on government-provided health facilities, the inadequate participation of private health services coupled with inappropriate distribution of both public and private facilities in the country, low income per person, the country's poor health indices, and its large population. The scheme is at the initial phase of transition to universal coverage in Nigeria. As a complementary or alternative source of health care financing, Mohammed (2008) reported that National Health Insurance Scheme has become important in developing countries. According to him, it is implemented as part of health reform programmes and strategies towards providing effective and efficient health care for all citizens, most especially the poor and the vulnerable populace. Mohammed further reported that the Scheme which aims at providing risk-sharing in health expenditures through the contribution of enrolled members is at the tail-end of its first-phase in Nigeria.'

As part of the health sector reform, the Scheme's vision is "a strong, dynamic and responsive government parastatal (Agency) that is totally committed to securing universal coverage and access to adequate and affordable health care in order to improve the health status of Nigerians, especially for those participating in the various programmes/products of the scheme. The mission of the Scheme is to facilitate fair-financing of health care costs through pooling and judicious utilization of financial resources to provide financial risk protections and cost-burden-sharing for people against high cost of health care, through various prepayment(s) programmes/products prior to their falling ill (NHIS Annual Report, 2006).

### **Methodology of the Study**

This study adopted a survey research design with Rensis Likert's five-point scale questionnaire as major instrument of data collection. This study however, made use of both secondary and primary sources of information. Secondary information was obtained through a review of existing literature relevant to implementation of NHIS in Nigeria. The primary data were generated through a questionnaire instrument which was distributed to stakeholders in the implementation of NHIS in FCT. The five-point Likert scale questionnaire provides five options with their numerical values as follows: Very High Extent (VHE 5), High Extent (HE 4), Undecided (U 3), Low Extent (LE 2) and Very Low Extent (VLE 1). For purpose of decision, the average of this Likert five-point scale is calculated as:

$$\bar{X} = \frac{5+4+3+2+1}{5} = \frac{15}{5} = 3.0$$

The value of  $\bar{X}$  is 3.0 which represents the cut-off along the Likert five-point scale for decision making. The decision rule is therefore given as follows: On the one hand, if a mean score of a statement is 3.0 and above, the decision is positive. This means that the mean score lies on the high to very high extent side of the continuum. And on the other hand, if a mean score of a statement is below 3.0, the decision is negative. This means that the mean score lies on the low to very low extent side of the continuum.

The stakeholders are of two groups - institutional and public. The institutional stakeholders are the health workers who are the primary focus of the study and are in a position to report the situation in healthcare centres, while the second group of stakeholders - the public population are the enrollees of NHIS who are the intended beneficiaries of the Scheme and are in a position to evaluate the availability of personnel in healthcare centres. Table 1 below shows the breakdown of the stakeholders who together form the population of this study.

Table 1: Population of Health Workers and NHIS Enrollees across the selected Area Councils and Health care providers in FCT

Area Council	Health care Provider	Health Workers	NHIS Enrollees
AMAC	National Hospital	1369	22,000
	Wuse General Hospital	253	5926
	Nyanya General Hospital	177	8,892
Gwagwalada	UATH	857	30,892
	Gwagwalada Town Hall Clinic (PHC)	27	2,151
Kwali	Kwali General Hospital	99	2685
	Kwali PHC	14	472
Kuje	Kuje General Hospital	126	2533
	Kuje PHC	23	398
	<b>Total</b>	<b>2,945</b>	<b>75,250</b>

Source: -National Hospital (2017)  
 -Wuse General Hospital (2017)  
 -Nyanya General Hospital(2017)  
 UATH, (2017)  
 Gwagwalada Town Hall Clinic (2017)  
 -Kwali General Hospital (2017)  
 -Kwali PHC (2017)  
 -Kuje General Hospital (2017)  
 -Kuje PHC (2017)

The study adopted Taro Yamani's formula and proportional sampling technique to determine the sample size of the respondents. These allow for fair representation of the population. The details are presented below:

#### Determination of Sample Size of Health Workers based on the total Population of 2,945

Using Taro Yamani's formula =

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2}$$

Where n = Sample Size

N = Population Size (2,945)

e = Level of Significance (0.05)

I = Constant

$$\text{Therefore, } n = \frac{2,945}{1+ 2,945 (0.05)^2}$$

$$= \frac{2,945}{1 + 2,945 (0.0025)^2}$$

$$= \frac{2945}{1+7.362} = \frac{2945}{8.3625} = 352$$

Total Sample Size of all Health Workers = 352

Table 2: Sampled population of Health Workers and NHIS Enrollees across the Selected Area Councils and Health care Providers in FCT

Area Council	Health care Provider	Population of Health Workers	Sample size of Health Workers $\frac{SP * SS}{GP}$	Population of NHIS Enrollees	Sample Size of NHIS Enrollees $\frac{SP * SS}{GP}$
AMAC	National Hospital	1369	164	22,000	116
	Wuse General Hospital	253	30	5926	31
	Nyanya General Hospital	177	21	8892	47
Gwagwalada	UATH	857	102	30,193	160
	Gwagalada Town Hall Clinic (PHC)	27	3	2,151	12
Kwali	Kwali General Hospital	99	12	2685	14
	Kwali PHC	14	2	472	3
Kuje	Kuje General Hospital	126	15	2533	13
	Kuje PHC	23	3	398	2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>2,945</b>	<b>352</b>	<b>75,250</b>	<b>398</b>

#### Determination of Sample Size of Enrollees based on total Population of 75,250

Using Taro Yemani's formula =

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

$$= \frac{75,250}{1 + 75,250 (0.0025)^2}$$

$$= \frac{75,250}{1 + 188.125}$$

$$= \frac{75,250}{189.125} = 398$$

Total Sample Size of Enrollees = 398

The study also utilized proportional sampling technique to determine the sample size for each study unit according to the strength of their contribution to the general population of the respondents' category. The formula for this proportional allocation is given as:

$$\frac{SP * SS}{GP}$$

Where SP= Specific Population of a Study Unit

SS= Sample Size of Respondents' Category

GP= General Population of Respondents' Category

Data generated from the questionnaire instrument were analyzed using Version 25 of Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) and independent two-sample t-test was used to test the hypothesis.

### **Data Presentation and Interpretation**

Out of the 352 copies of questionnaire distributed to Healthcare workers only 311 copies were retrieved and found usable; and of the 398 copies of the questionnaire distributed to NHIS enrollees, only 361 copies were returned and found usable. Therefore analysis of data was based on the retrieved copies of the questionnaire.

Table 3 below presents the item by item descriptive analysis of NHIS enrollees and health workers' response to the statements on the extent to which shortage of health personnel affects the effective implementation of NHIS in FCT.

Table 3: Descriptive Analysis of the Extent to Which Shortage of Health Personnel Affects the Effective Implementation of NHIS in FCT

S/N	Statement	Category	Response Categories					Total	Mean score	Decision
			VH E (5)	HE (4)	U (3)	LE (2)	VL E (1)			
1.	Inadequacy of health personnel compared to enrollees.	NE HW	226 9	90 8	24 34	16 160	5 100	361 311	4.43 1.93	High extent Very Low extent
2.	Inadequacy of health personnel affecting effectiveness of service.	NE HW	191 129	133 94	22 23	12 49	3 16	361 311	4.38 3.87	High extent High extent
3.	Pressure occasioned by shortage of health personnel creating unfriendly attitude towards enrollees.	NE HW	212 128	102 83	28 26	15 57	4 17	361 311	4.39 3.79	High extent High extent
4.	Preferential treatment given to non-NHIS enrollees because of out-of-pocket payments made by them.	NE HW	173 98	145 108	19 39	16 59	8 7	361 311	4.27 3.74	High extent High extent
5.	Lack of professional commitment among available health personnel increasing poor service delivery to NHIS enrollees.	NE HW	156 80	158 80	24 47	17 77	6 27	361 311	4.22 3.35	High extent High extent
6.	Work pressure on health personnel increasing enrollees' waiting time to be served.	NE HW	165 72	152 80	20 36	16 101	8 22	361 311	4.25 3.25	High extent High extent
7.	Due to inadequacy of health personnel, non-doctors and nurses oftentimes attend to health needs of enrollees.	NE HW	159 74	140 114	28 28	23 78	11 17	361 311	4.14 3.48	High extent High extent
8.	Many inexperienced (but qualified) health personnel deliver services to enrollees.	NE HW	150 67	141 65	33 33	28 114	9 32	361 311	4.09 3.07	High extent High extent
9.	Existence of poor supervision of health personnel by higher authorities	NE HW	141 61	151 58	31 40	20 117	18 35	361 311	4.04 2.98	High extent Low extent
10.	On the whole, Existence of enrollees' dissatisfaction with the quality of services rendered by health personnel in the health facility.	NE HW	142 58	162 69	25 45	21 104	11 35	361 311	4.11 3.04	High extent High extent
Grand mean =			$\frac{NHIS\ enrollees\ (NE)}{Health\ workers\ (HW)} = \frac{4.23}{3.25} = \frac{high\ extent}{High\ extent}$							

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 3 above shows that the mean score of almost all the items for the two categories of respondents were greater than 3.0 (which is the cut off mean point in the 5 point Likert scale), except for the mean response of items **one** and **nine** of the Health workers which were 1.93 and 2.98 respectively.

The result also showed that the grand mean rating of NHIS enrollees was higher (with 4.23) than the grand mean rating of the health workers (with 3.25). Since the grand mean of both categories (i.e., 4.23 and 3.25) are greater than 3, the results imply that the shortage of health personnel affects **to a high extent** the effective implementation of NHIS.

Similarly, since the grand mean of enrollees (*mean = 4.23*) is more than that of health workers (*mean = 3.25*), it can be concluded that the mean response on the problem of shortage of health personnel as it affects the effective implementation of NHIS differs between the health workers and NHIS enrollees. Put differently, the NHIS enrollees perceive the problem of shortage of health personnel affecting the effective implementation of the NHIS **more** than the health workers themselves perceive the problem. This is not surprising because the enrollees are at the receiving end of the problem as the workers are the ones who offer the services to the enrollees.

In specific term, item one on table 3 above (which is concerned with the 'inadequacy of health personnel compared to enrollees') has the highest mean score of 4.43 based on the analysis of the opinion of NHIS enrollees within the health facilities in the FCT. This implies that the problem **exists to a high extent** based on the views of enrollees. However, the opinion of the health workers with a mean score of 1.93 indicates that the problem **exists to a very low extent**. Consequently, based on the opinion of the enrollees, it can be deduced that there is evidence of inadequacy of health personnel compared to NHIS enrollees in the FCT.

Item two on table 3 above shows that the existence of inadequacy of health personnel affects the effectiveness of service delivery **to a high extent**, as demonstrated by the mean scores of both the NHIS enrollees (4.38) and that of health workers (3.87). Furthermore, for item three, there is evidence also that the pressure occasioned by shortage of health personnel creates unfriendly attitude on the part of the health workers towards NHIS enrollees. This is reflected in the mean score of both the NHIS enrollees (4.39) and that of health workers (3.79). Evidence also exists across the health facilities in the FCT that preferential treatment is given to non-NHIS enrollees in relation to NHIS enrollees because of out-of-pocket payment that is associated with non-NHIS enrollees. This is revealed by the mean scores of 4.27 and 3.74 on item four for NHIS enrollees and health workers respectively.

Furthermore, table 3 reveals that lack of professional commitment among available health personnel increases poor service delivery to NHIS enrollees **to a high extent**. This is demonstrated by the mean score of 4.22 and 3.35 under item five for NHIS enrollees and health workers respectively. Item six reveals that to a high extent work pressure on health personnel, increases the NHIS enrollees' waiting time to receive service. This is demonstrated by the mean score of both NHIS enrollees (4.25) and health workers (3.25) respectively. Item seven on the table shows that as a result of the inadequacy of medical doctors in particular, non-doctors and nurses often times attend to the health needs of enrollees. The mean score of 4.14 and 3.48 for NHIS enrollees and health workers respectively support the presence of this problem **to a high extent**.

Again, the data from item eight revealed that **to a high extent**, many inexperienced (but qualified) health personnel deliver services to enrollees across the health facilities in the FCT. This is supported by the mean scores of 4.09 and 3.07 for NHIS enrollees and health workers respectively. Furthermore, there is difference of opinion on item nine. On the one hand, the opinion of NHIS enrollees reveals that **to a high extent**, there exists poor supervision of health personnel by higher authorities, as demonstrated by a mean score of 4.04. However, on the other hand, the opinion of the health workers (with a mean score of 2.98) contradicts that of the NHIS enrollees which says that the problem exists **to a low extent**. On the whole, the mean scores of NHIS enrollees and health workers on item ten (which are 4.11 and 3.04 respectively) show that **to a high extent**, there is the existence of dissatisfaction among the NHIS enrollees with respect to the quality of services rendered by health personnel in the health facilities in FCT.

## Test of Hypothesis

The study was guided by the following hypothesis:

*H<sub>0</sub>: The views of NHIS enrollees and health workers do not differ significantly regarding the shortage of health personnel as a barrier to effective implementation of NHIS in FCT*

*H<sub>1</sub>: The views of NHIS enrollees and health workers differ significantly regarding the shortage of health personnel as a barrier to effective implementation of NHIS in FCT*

In order to test the hypothesis, the mean response from the NHIS enrollees and health workers in FCT were subjected to an independent two-sample t-test analysis as presented in table 4 below.

Table 4: T- test result on shortage of health personnel as a barrier to effective implementation of NHIS between NHIS enrollees and health workers in FCT

Categories	Total	Mean	Std. deviation	T- test Result	t <sub>critical</sub>	D.F.	P – Value	Confidence Interval	
NHIS enrollees	361	4.23	0.707	-15.86	-1.96	670	0.00	-1.105	-0.862
Health workers	311	3.25	0.897						

## Interpretation of Results

The test shows that health workers have statistically significant lower mean response on shortage of health personnel as a barrier to effective implementation of NHIS ( $3.25 \pm 0.897$ ) compared to NHIS enrollees ( $4.23 \pm 0.707$ ), with mean difference = 0.98,  $t_{(670)} = -15.86$  and  $p = 0.000$ . Given this result therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted. This implies that the views of NHIS enrollees and health workers differ significantly regarding the shortage of health personnel as a barrier to effective implementation of the NHIS in FCT. In other words, this conclusion was reached because the calculated t – test of -15.8 is less than the t-critical of -1.96 and the p – value of 0.00 is also less than the 0.05 level of significance at the 670 degree of freedom (d.f.).

## Discussion

The result of the test of hypothesis reveals significant difference in the opinion of NHIS enrollees and health workers across the healthcare facilities investigated in the FCT. Although the opinion of NHIS enrollees and health workers differ on the **enormity of the problem** as revealed by the inferential statistical analysis, the descriptive analysis however indicates that their grand mean scores (NHIS enrollees = 4.23, health workers = 3.25) are all above the 3.0 mean cut-off or decision rule which signifies that the problem exists to a high extent. This therefore implies that both categories of respondents are of the opinion that the problem of shortage of health personnel affects the effective implementation of NHIS in FCT to a high extent. Also, since the grand mean score of NHIS enrollees (4.23) is higher than that of health workers (3.25), it implies that the enrollees perceive the enormity of the problem as higher than perception by the health workers. This may not be surprising, considering the fact that the enrollees are at the receiving end of the services provided by the health workers.

The major finding of this study confirms the revelation by Agba, Ushie and Osuchukwu (2010) that there is a gross inadequacy of personnel in the management of NHIS. Although their study was limited in scope, as it focused on one state of the federation, its finding nevertheless reflects the reality on the ground regarding personnel issues in the management of the NHIS. Again, the finding by our study corroborates that by WHO (2007) which it identified gross shortage of personnel as one of the serious problems bedeviling the Nigerian health sector.

Some other key findings of our study reveal much more the extent to which, many health personnel-related issues (other than the problem of inadequacy of personnel) affect the effective implementation of NHIS especially with respect to provision of services to enrollees in the FCT. These some other key findings include health personnel's unfriendly attitude towards enrollees; and increased waiting time of enrollees to receive services which might have

been caused by work pressure occasioned by shortage of health personnel. This finding confirms what Felix and Uno, (2016) revealed that enrollees could stay for about two days without accessing a doctor owing to the crowd and pressure on available medical personnel. As a result of the shortage of health personnel, many inexperienced (but qualified) health personnel deliver services to enrollees.

One other key personnel-related problem revealed by our study is the existence of lack of professional commitment among health personnel which increases poor service delivery to NHIS enrollees. This finding confirms that of Jegede (2014) that poor attitude and lack of professional commitment of health workers is a major problem in Nigerian health care delivery system. And related to this is that there is preferential treatment given to non-NHIS enrollees because of out-of-pocket payments. This finding further buttresses the fact that enrollees are not happy with the kind of treatment meted out to them whereby the non-NHIS patients are attended to swiftly (because of their out-of-pocket payments), while the NHIS enrollees are kept waiting for a long time before being attended to. This finding again confirms the revelation by Felix and Uno (2016) on the existence of delays experienced by enrollees before receiving service.

On the whole, the study established that there is the existence of enrollees' dissatisfaction with the quality of services rendered by health personnel across the various health facilities investigated in FCT. This state of affairs corroborates the finding by Ele, Ogbonna, Ochei and Odili (2017) on the poor attitude of health personnel towards patients (enrollees) which in turn leads to dissatisfaction of enrollees. In actual fact, all these personnel-related problems discussed above are generated by the pressure caused by inadequacy of personnel which ultimately affects negatively the implementation of the NHIS in the FCT.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

This study has demonstrated that one of the major problems militating against the effective implementation of the NHIS is inadequacy of health personnel in the provision of services to enrollees. Arising from this major problem are other key personnel-related problems such as health personnel's unfriendly attitude towards enrollees, and increased waiting time of enrollees to receive services. Some others include (a) the existence of lack of professional commitment among health personnel which increases poor service delivery to NHIS enrollees, (b) the existence of preferential treatment given to non-NHIS enrollees because of out-of-pocket payments, and lastly (c) the existence of enrollees' dissatisfaction with the quality of services rendered by health personnel across the various health facilities investigated in FCT. Based on these major findings, this study recommends as follows:

The first major recommendation is *the recruitment of Healthcare Personnel*. There exists the urgent need for the recruitment of more qualified health workers across the health facilities in the FCT. This will reduce both the work pressure on the health workers and the number of hours which enrollees and other healthcare seekers spend in the facilities waiting to be attended to. This can be achieved through a declaration of a state of emergency in the health sector particularly on the welfare of healthcare workers to reduce the incidence of brain drain. Such a declaration would make it possible to embark on a widespread recruitment of qualified personnel based on meritocratic considerations.

The second important recommendation is *the training of Healthcare workers*. There is need for periodic training and retraining of health workers. The curriculum of such training should be designed to capture both psychological and attitudinal training in order to inculcate the values of good work ethic and professionalism into them. This will help to enable the personnel exhibit friendly and courteous attitude as well as behavior towards the enrollees and other health care seekers. It is believed that friendly attitude towards a patient will help to improve their psychological wellbeing and go a long way in dousing the anxiety and tension caused by illness.

The third recommendation is *the timely and adequate remuneration of health personnel*. In addition, salaries and other incentives due to health workers should always be paid timely. This will go a long way in reducing shortage of health workers occasioned by the problem of brain drain whereby health professionals go abroad to seek greener

pastures. Also, adequate and constant supervision of the activities of health workers by their superiors should be encouraged by the management in health facilities.

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# *Perang Semesta* (Total War) Strategy for Preventing Terrorism Act (Study in Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport)

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## **Abstract**

Total war is involving all national components such as citizens, territories and national resources in order to defend territorial integrity, sovereignty, and national security from any threats. One of these threats is the act of terrorism which endangers the unity, sovereignty and security of the nation. Acts of terrorism are carried out to create a terror with ideological, political and religious motives and are carried out in vital objects of the state, the environment, and public facilities. One of the vital objects of a country that is prone to acts of terrorism is an airport, which is a place for various activities such as the movement of aircraft, people and goods. Moreover, an airport is a very important infrastructure in supporting the national defense. In this study, the researcher took Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport, Makassar, as the research site considering that several large cases of terrorism and radicalism have occurred in the South Sulawesi region. The objective of this study is to analyze the total war strategy carried out in the Sultan Hasanuddin Airport area as an effort to prevent acts of terrorism at the airport as a vital national object. The research method used is qualitative. The data have been collected from interviews, observations and literature study. The results of this research are in preventing terrorism, a total war strategy that is implemented has three components, including the 'ends,' which could prevent the acts of terrorism in Sultan Hasanuddin Airport and strengthen the national defense. The 'means' which is manifested in all national components, both government and private agencies, military, police and civil society, as well as facilities and infrastructure. The 'ways' which is the intelligence operations, strengthening cooperation between the military and civilians, strengthening synergy between ministries / agencies, training, counseling, completing security tools to prevent acts of terrorism.

**Keywords:** Airport, Prevention, Terrorism, Total War, Strategy

## **Introduction**

*Perang Semesta* (Total War) consists of two syllables namely *perang* (war) and *semesta* (total/universe). War has several meanings according to the times. Previously, war was defined as a massive battle that took place between two countries / kingdoms aiming to expand territories, establish the colonies, spread the religion, or overthrow the legitimate government (Prabowo et al., 2016). However, after World War II ended and the cold war began, the concept of war began to change. The definition of war has more or less experienced a shift in meaning, where war is no longer just a big battle with weapons, but a large-scale conflict that disrupts the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia, both from within and outside the country. This large-scale conflict is also not closed to armed conflict. Meanwhile, the word *semesta* literally means *seluruh* (whole), *segenap* (entire), *semuanya* (everything), and universal (Setiawan, 2019). It is a numeric word which expresses a very large and comprehensive number.

Therefore, from the meaning of these two words, the phrase *perang semesta* can be interpreted as a large-scale conflict either in the form of battle or in other forms, which disturbs the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a country, especially in this study, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). In its action, *perang semesta* (total war) involves all national components, namely all citizens, regions, and national resources (Prabowo et al., 2016). The form of disturbance other than armed conflict, whether ridden by foreign or domestic actors and carried out in all national aspects.

However, *perang semesta* is often equated with guerrilla warfare during the struggle against colonialism in Indonesia, where one of the similarities between universal war and guerrilla warfare is the involvement of all national components in the war. Even so, in this war the threats faced are not limited to the occupiers and armed actors who threaten the security of the Republic of Indonesia like guerrilla had done, but with a broader spectrum of threats and are not military threats.

These threats are greatly influenced by globalization that is currently happening throughout the world. According to the statement of the Minister of Defense, Prabowo Subianto, the threat is currently divided into three dimensions, the first is an unreal threat namely open warfare, the second is a real threat, and the last is a mindset threat. Of those three dimensions, the real threat dimension is realized and is known to be happening at this time, including (1) terrorism & radicalism, (2) natural disasters, (3) cyber & intelligence, (4) piracy & theft of natural resources, (5) drugs, (6) epidemics, (7) border problems, and (8) separatism / rebellion (Eksa, 2019).

Based on this statement, it is known that one of the real threats that is happening is terrorism and radicalism. In Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of 2018, terrorism is defined as an act that uses violence or threats of violence that cause mass casualties, and / or cause damage or destruction to strategic vital, the environment, public facilities, or international facilities with ideological, political, or security disturbance motives.

Before the terminology of terrorism has been widely known, acts of terror with a religious background had occurred in Indonesia. One of them was an airplane hijacking by Komando Jihad in 1977 (Nurdin, 2011). Nowadays, acts of terrorism have shifted in terms of objectives, targets, ways of raising funds, recruiting members, and communicating to spread radical-terrorism views. The globalization process that is currently taking place provides an opportunity for global terrorist organizations to develop. Terrorist organizations take advantage of the era of openness to obtain information and cooperate internally between one terrorist organization and another. In addition, the existing opportunities are also used to secure geographic access to financial support and weapons, so that globalization creates a change in the pattern of acts of terrorism itself.

One of the significant changes in the pattern is the target of the terrorist act itself. Previously, acts of terror were carried out at places related to certain religions, both places of worship and places where many non-Muslims gathered. However, currently the targets of terror are prioritizing areas where people gather, vital objects, public facilities, and the police.

Talking about vital objects as targets of terrorism, in the current era of globalization, the movement of the economic wheels of society which demands speed and timeliness, therefore air transportation services are a top priority in

the movement of people and goods. Airport is a strategic place for the development of threats with the argument that airports are one of the vital objects of the country where various activities are carried out, such as aircraft movement, hustle of people, and transport goods such as passenger baggage, cargo, and post, airports also have a role as infrastructure in supporting national defense, so that the possibility of airports being targeted by acts of terrorism is quite high, and if this occurs it will result in large losses both in material and non-material terms.

As mentioned earlier, before the terminology of terrorism was used, there was a terrorist act happened in Garuda DC-9 flight 209 of Jakarta-Medan flight route containing 48 passengers by 5 members of Komando Jihad on March 28, 1981. This action was thwarted by *Kopassanda* troops (now *Kopassus* – Special Forces Commando) with a military operation called "Operation Woyla." In this incident, 4 terrorists, 1 pilot, and 1 *Kopassanda* member died, and all the passengers on the plane survived.

After that, moving on from 2010 onwards, a bomb was set by Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen on February 3, 2016, in passenger plane in Somalia, and detonated shortly after take-off causing a hole in the plane. On 22 March 2016, two terrorists blew themselves up at the entrance to the international airport terminal in Brussels. On June 28, 2016 at Ataturk International Airport in Istanbul, Turkey, three terrorists opened fire at the departure terminal then detonated explosive vests, killing more than forty people and 150 others injured.

Based on data, there has been no recent act of terrorism in the airport area, although it cannot be neglected. Several reasons, namely, airports are symbolic targets of prosperity and mastery of technology because airports are places that have a high level of security. The acts of terror carried out at the airport will provide an international stage for the perpetrators, as well as the mastermind behind the terror attacks. In addition, the consequences for the state if acts of terror occur will greatly affect various national sectors such as politics, economics and international appeal. And most importantly, the security of Indonesia's territory and society itself is threatened.

One area that has a long history of terrorism is South Sulawesi, started 18 years ago. Bomb terror at the Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) motion on October 12, 2001, Mall Ratu Indah incident on December 5, 2002, bombing at the Sampoerna Indah cafe on January 10, 2004, bomb-throwing targeting Former Governor Syahrul Yasim Limpo in November 2012 by network members Poso, up to the latest, the suicide bombing in the Philippines by a married couple from Makassar in January 2019 (Alsair, 2019). It seems that this makes the rank of South Sulawesi Province, especially Makassar City prone to the threat of terrorism. So it is possible that the terrorist networks are still latent or a lone-wolfs, there are still many of them spreaded and have not been detected.

Up to now, there have not been any recorded acts of terrorism in the airport area or in the aviation sector in the South Sulawesi region, although it cannot be neglected. Therefore, a research was carried out at one of the international airports, namely Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport in Makassar. From the results of observations and data obtained, the problems of security disturbances that often occur at Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport include the smuggling of weapons and ammunition, Narcotics, illegal Natural Resources, prone to breaching the guardrail to the side of the Air Base area, and various actions of legal violations that have the potential to occur in the working area of Sultan Hasanuddin Airport. Of course it will be very crucial if there is an airport hijacking, such as a self-detonation action, or a hijacking of an aircraft targeting the airbase, it will be very fatal for the security and defense aspects of Indonesia considering the proximity of the airport and the airbase, especially Air Base's missile storage warehouse for combat aircraft.

Therefore, to prevent acts of terrorism within Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport, a strategy is needed to be implemented to determine the objectives, facilities and infrastructure, as well as ways that can be done to maximize the efforts to be carried out through *perang semesta* (total war) strategy. As said by Lt. Gen. TNI (Ret.) Joko Suryo Prabowo, in dealing with acts of terrorism, so many components of the nation were involved besides that the activities and war operations carried out were also very complex, therefore acts of terrorism, both handling and prevention, use a universal war strategy. Prabowo et al., 2016).

## Research Methodology

The researcher used a qualitative method in this research. According to Creswell, qualitative research is conducted with the aim of understanding a phenomenon based on the participant's point of view, so that researchers can identify problems directly, because they are involved in participant activities, or by investigating with a narrative approach, namely collecting stories from the individuals involved (Creswell, 2014).

Besides, the approach taken in this research is a case study limited to a narrow (micro) area, because it only focuses on phenomena that occur at the individual, group, or institutional level. The cases are also limited to certain types of cases, at certain places or loci, and within a certain time. Due to the narrow coverage area, case study research is not intended to draw general conclusions or derive generalizations. Therefore, this type of research does not require a population and a sample. This thesis only examines the cooperation made by related parties to prevent any terror threats that may occur in the Sultan Hasanuddin Airport area.

### ***Strategi Perang Semesta (Total War Strategy)***




Figure 1: Strategy Lykke Model

Source: Yarger, 2006, pages 107-113

In Figure 1, the model from Lykke provides a coherent form to strategy theory by depicting it with a strategy supported by three factors as a base including goals, means and mediums, as well as upholding national security on it. The model illustrates that  $\text{Strategy} = \text{Goals} + \text{Means} + \text{Mediums}$ . When those three base are unbalanced, it increases the risk of implementing this strategy. From Lykke's model above, Objectives are Goals, Concepts are ways to achieve goals and Resources are means to support the way things are done. The strategy is said to fail if those three are unbalanced which is caused by an imbalance of the legs that support the strategy and in the end will have a high-risk impact on national security.

Meanwhile, according to Joko Suryo Prabowo, *perang smesta* is a war (not only fighting with weapons) that has the aim of maintaining territorial integrity, upholding sovereignty, and realizing the safety of the nation from all threats by using all national components including citizens, territories and national resources. Furthermore, it is carried out in various ways, such as intelligence operations, diplomacy, and so on (Prabowo et al., 2016).




Figure 2: Illustration of *Perang Semesta*

Source: Prabowo et al., 2016, page 15

In Figure 2, it is explained that the scheme for conducting *perang semesta* requires many components with complex activities.

1. Overcoming conflict (armed).
2. Disturbing relations between opponents and the people.
3. Build relationships with the people.
4. Disturbing relations between opponents and the international community.
5. Build relationships with the international community.

Therefore, *perang semesta* strategy is a strategy that is established from the goals, methods and means, as well as upholding national security, where national security here is to prevent acts of terrorism that might occur in the area of Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport.

### Prevention

Preventive action is an action taken with the aim of avoiding deviant behavior or crime (Syaiful, 2008). Prevention as an effort to tackle crime can be pursued by: (1) Application of criminal law; (2) prevention without crime; (3) influencing people's views on crime and punishment through the mass media (Arief, 2011).

Efforts to prevent a crime by means of the criminal justice system can be carried out with repressive and preventive measures. Repressive actions are all actions taken by law enforcement officials after the occurrence of a criminal act. This action can also be seen as prevention for the future as a special prevention, namely an effort to reduce the number of crimes by giving (criminal) penalties to the perpetrators of crimes and also trying to commit acts by remedying the behavior of the perpetrators who commit crimes, so that the frequency of crimes can be minimized (Rochmah, 2005).

Meanwhile, Preventive Measures are actions taken to prevent or guard against the possibility of a crime occurring. This preventive effort must be carried out systematically and regularly to prevent the crime from arising. Preventive action can be developed from various sources that also have the potential for preventive-effects, for example the press / mass media, the use of technological advances and the utilization of the potential preventive-effects of law enforcement officials such as raids / operations, educative communicative activities with the community, and so on (Arief, 2008).

### Acts of Terrorism

Terrorism according to Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of 2018 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002

concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism into Law, is an act that uses violence or threat of violence that creates an atmosphere of terror or widespread fear, which can cause mass casualties, and / or cause damage or destruction to vital strategic objects, the environment, public facilities, or international facilities with ideological, political or disturbing motives security.

### **Airport Security**

In the Regulation of the Minister of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia Number PM 127 of 2015 and Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 1 of 2009 concerning Aviation, it is stated that an airport is an area on land and / or waters with certain boundaries used as a place for aircraft to land and take off, boarding and disembarking of passengers, loading and unloading of goods, and places for intra and intermodal transfer of transportation, which are equipped with aviation safety and security facilities, as well as basic facilities and other supporting facilities.

Furthermore, in the Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 70 of 2001 concerning Airport in Chapter XII, article 51. In paragraph (1) it is stated that airports or air bases can be used jointly for civil aviation and military aviation. Furthermore, in paragraph (2), it is stated that the joint use of an airport or an air base as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be carried out by taking into account:

- a. Aviation security and safety;
- b. Smooth flight operations;
- c. Airbase security and defense;
- d. Civil and military aviation interests

As a vital national object, the security of the airport must be protected and maintained. Security is carried out by airport managers as stated in Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 1 of 2009 concerning Aviation Article 327 paragraph (1) which states that Airport Business Entities or Airport Operational Units are required to create, implement, evaluate and develop airport security programs. air at each airport guided by the security program.

### **Discussion and Result**

In order to prevent acts of terrorism that occurred at Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport, a *perang semesta* strategy has been implemented. To implement this strategy, it is necessary to know the ends (objectives), means (medium, tools, resources), and ways that can optimize efforts to prevent acts of terror that may occur.

### **Potential Terrorism Threats at Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport**

The potential threat of terrorism at Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport can come from two factors, namely internal and external factors.

- a. Internal factors could arise from within the institution itself.
  - a) Human Resources

Potential threats that come from HR are in the form of internal personnel, namely airport employees, airline employees, or other personnel who have been exposed to radical groups and ideologies, so that they are free to carry out their actions in the airport area, both acts of terror and supporting acts of terror.

- b) Equipment / Facilities

The equipment or facilities in question are those related to airport security factors. Some of the machines owned by Sultan Hasanuddin Airport are standard equipment that must be provided by an airport. Meanwhile, some other equipment is only mandatory for airports, such as scanning machines (X-Ray). In addition to monitoring the area, we still use CCTV as a surveillance tool and walking patrols. The drawback is that CCTV has the potential to be hijacked by hackers, while walking patrols by officers have a shortage in the number of personnel.

- b. External factors are originating from outside the institution and their existence has a direct effect on the security of Sultan Hasanuddin Airport.

a) Cargo

JBW Group International (Zaroni and Basri, 2016) states that there are 4 types of threats to cargo, namely Shrinkage and Theft, Terrorism, Goods Smuggling, and Piracy.

- 1) Shrinkage is a product loss that occurs between production or purchases from the supplier to the point of sale. The reason is that the item was stolen by an insider (employee), mal-administration, or fraud.
- 2) Terrorism activities often use cargo transportation services to send something that has the potential to disturb the security of an area. Another nuisance was an attack on the cargo itself by terrorists.
- 3) Smuggling of goods through cargo services. Smuggled goods can threaten the smooth flow of goods shipments and risk causing legal, financial, and even damage to the company's reputation. Various methods are used in smuggling goods, such as fake seals on shipping containers, fake damage to goods, hacking into logistics company or port information systems, preparing criminals to 'work' as employees in manufacturing companies, and logistics as well as exchanging legal goods for illegal goods, which has the same weight at the transit point. The criminals are constantly growing and getting more and more creative in using legal shipments to smuggle their illegal cargo.
- 4) Piracy is a problem that has increased. Hijackers are constantly changing their tactics, targets using the latest weapons, and using more sophisticated techniques. This is solely intended to increase the success ratio.

b) Passengers

Airline passengers and prospective passengers are important users of an airport. Its existence can be used as a measure of the success of the aviation business in which the airport is one of its parts.

c) Intruders

People who can enter the Limited Security Area are prospective passengers who have air transport documents, individuals, aircraft personnel, and employees / employees who have entry permits. Except for Public Areas, there are a series of procedures used to enter Limited Security Areas, Sterile Areas and Restricted Areas.

A person who does not have the requirements to enter the three regions but still enters them secretly can be categorized as an intruder. An intruder is a person who enters secretly and without permission for a specific purpose. Intruders who successfully break into the area have the potential to threaten flight security and safety.

### **The strategy of *Perang Semesta* in Preventing Terrorism at Sultan Hasanuddin Airport**

Based on the strategic theory of the Lykke model, it has the outcome of maintaining national security, namely territorial integrity, as well as the nation's sovereignty and safety from all threats, where national security is supported by a strategy built from three things, namely ends, concepts (ways), and resources (means).

The goal of this strategy is to prevent acts of terrorism in the area of Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport, where the airport is in the same area as the Sultan Hasanuddin Air Base belonging to the Indonesian Air Force. In this case, it is clear that in order to achieve the objectives of this strategy, strong coordination is required of related institutions and agencies, not only law enforcement officials, as well as airport officers, but also military personnel, namely the Indonesian Air Force. If acts of terrorism occur, the danger that threatens is very great, apart from the possibility of hijacking aircraft or bombing the airport area, given the location of the ammunition warehouse belonging to the Indonesian Air Force is adjacent to the airport location so that more components need to be involved.

Meanwhile, means and ways can be determined based on the potential threat of terrorism in the Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport area.

Potential that comes from internal factors include:

a. Human Resource

Ways that can be carried out are mental coaching activities for human resources who are in the airport environment. Coaching is carried out by each agency such as airport managers, the police, and the Indonesian National Army, as well as the Regional Government in the framework of fortifying human resources from the influence of radicalism which can develop into acts of terror. Intelligence operations are also used to support this activity as early detection, in order to find out quickly and precisely about the development of radical understanding among human resources in the region.

Means used in making these efforts could be physical facilities and non-physical. Physical facilities can be done by providing guidance in the surrounding places of worship through utilizing trusted religious experts, while non-physical facilities can be in the form of policies that support these activities.

b. Facilities

Ways that can be done is updating the technology. The use of means in the form of CCTV placed on unexpected spots, face recognition tools, Handheld Explosive Trace Detector and xray security scanners that have the latest technology that has a high level of inspection speed and high accuracy will maximize the strategy implemented. Moreover, if the addition of cctv and face recognition is in parts that are very prone to terrorism attacks, such as in the area close to the missile storage warehouse belonging to Sultan Hasanuddin Lanud and the parking area. In addition to dealing with the hijacking carried out by terrorist actors at airport facilities, trainings are carried out to improve capabilities in the cyber field and the use of modern technology, both at local governments, airports, police, and the Indonesian National Army.

Potential that comes from external factors:

a. Society with radical views

Understanding of a teaching cannot be forced on someone, including ingrained radical understanding. Ways on this strategy in dealing with radical-minded people to prevent acts of terrorism at airports is counseling about the dangers of terrorism by local governments in collaboration with National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and universities. The involvement of cleric in warding off radical teachings that have the potential to become acts of terror. Meanwhile, the means they have are the existence of cleric and traditional leaders whose influence is greater on the community than the policies owned by the local government.

b. Intruder

Ways in this strategy in dealing with the threat of terrorism from intruders is the need for increased security on ticket checking and passanger checking at check-in. The use of the latest technology such as face recognition, fingerprint scanning can be quite an effective way of dealing with intruders who pretend to be passengers. Meanwhile, the means that are needed are the alertness of airport security, police and local TNI personnel in an emergency. In addition to infiltrating as passengers, abandoned spots will also become big gaps for intruders in the airport area that could possibly be used to detonate bombs or cause chaos, so it is necessary to install a perimeter instruction detection system.

c. Airport Visitors

Visitors are not only those who will act as aircraft passengers, but anyone who can enter the airport area by passing through the security guard are also airport visitors. Ways that is carried out is of course still maintaining security by not reducing the level of suspicion on all people in the airport area. Of course

this is done based on means owned, namely airport policies in preventing acts of terrorism committed by airport visitors.

### Conclusions, Recommendations and Limitations

The *perang semesta* strategy implemented in the Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport area, as an act of preventing acts of terrorism, is carried out by involving all components in the region. Human resources including airport personnel, policymakers, local governments where the airport is located, law enforcement officers, and TNI personnel who are at Sultan Hasanuddin Airport. Even though the airport is far from residential areas, aspects of the general public also become one of the considerations, considering that threats can come from anywhere by anyone since the strategy used is *semesta* (total/universal).

In the *perang semesta* strategy, in terms of preventing terrorism acts in the Sultan Hasanuddin Airport area, the actors involved are the Regional Government as the policymaker relating to the area where the airport is located and policymakers related to counseling related to the dangers of radicalism and terrorism to the community. The police, especially Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88 (Densus88) as actors to deal with acts of terror. The Indonesian National Army as a military, which one of its duties in Military Operations Apart from War is to assist the police in tackling acts of terrorism. Intelligence members from Indonesia Intelligence Agency (BIN), Police, and Indonesian National Army to carry out early detection so that early prevention can be carried out. Media as a channel of information to the entire community which is used in counseling and disseminating information about the dangers of terrorism. PT Angkasa Pura I as the policy maker in the Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport area. As well as people in South Sulawesi Province, especially in Makassar.

Prevention is carried out in this *perang semesta* strategy by means of preventive action because there has never been an act of terrorism at Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport before. Preventive action can be developed from various sources that also have the potential for preventive-effects, for example the press / mass media, the use of technological advances and the utilization of the potential preventive-effects of law enforcement officials such as raids/operations, educative communicative activities with the community, and so on. This is regulated in Government Regulation Number 77 of 2019, as follows: In the general public who, (1) have not been exposed to radicalism but have the potential to be exposed, (2) are classified as sympathizers, namely people who have a sense of sympathy but are still passive towards acts of radicalism and terrorism, (3) are having access to radical information, (4) are having a relationship with radical / terrorist elements, (5) are having a national spirit and a low economic level, and a culture that is easily exposed to radicalism (Santoso, Anwar, Waluyo, 2020).

Recommendations that can be offered in order to anticipate the potential threat of terrorism at Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport to enhance civil-military cooperation are:

- a. Carrying out continuous and integrated personnel development to minimize the potential threat of terrorism from insider factors.
- b. Upgrade and equip security equipment to increase the ability to anticipate threats of terrorism.
- c. Develop synergy with Sultan Hasanuddin Airport, especially in counterterrorism threat training at airports in accordance with the existing procedures.
- d. Maximizing the use of the media in an effort to minimize the increase in acts of terror that originate from radicalism.
- e. Maximizing the role of local clerics and traditional leaders in counter-radicalization, approaches to communities that tend to be radical so that this understanding does not develop into acts of terrorism.

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**Appendix 1: Regulations and Laws**

*Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Nomor 70 Tahun 2001 tentang Kebandarudaraan*

*Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 77 Tahun 2019 Tentang Pencegahan Tindak Pidana Terorisme dan Perlindungan terhadap Penyidik, Penuntut Umum, Hakim, dan Petugas Pemasyarakatan.*

*Undang-Undang RI Nomor 3 tahun 2002*

*Undang-Undang Nomor 34 tahun 2004*

*Undang-undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 2018 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2003 Tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2002 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme*

*Peraturan Menteri Perhubungan Republik Indonesia Nomor PM 127 tahun 2015*

*Undang-undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 tahun 2009 tentang Penerbangan*



# The Present Status of Using Written Hmong Language in the Hmong Community in the Northwest Region of Vietnam - Case Study in Sơn La and Lai Châu Provinces

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## Abstract

Writing system is an important part of a certain language. When a language has its own writing system and is widely used, it is apparent that the language will have a strong position and vitality. Hmong language is a mother tongue of Hmong people, an ethnic minority that are now residing in many parts all over the world and mainly in the northwest region (Tây Bắc) of Vietnam. Unlike many other languages which have only one writing system, Hmong has many different scripts that are being used at a time. Therefore, understanding how Hmong people use their written language is an intriguing topic to help demystify their language usage and furthermore, understand their spiritual life. From our practical fieldwork, in this paper we focus on the discussion of the current status of using written Hmong in its community in the northwest region of Vietnam.

**Keywords:** Hmong Writing System, Hmong People, Language Usage, Hmong Script, Northwest Vietnam

## 1. Introduction

In 1961, according to the Decree 206/CP of the Ministry of Education and Training (Decree 206, 1961), Vietnamese Government officially conceded the use Hmong language system. This event marked a milestone for Hmong ethnic people in having their official language. This Hmong script was developed and compiled by authors Van Chinh Nguyen and Thanh Phan based on the Latin alphabet characters via recording voice and taking phonetics from the people of Flower Hmong (named because of their bright, colorful embroidery costumes including Hmong Lènh, Hmong Si) in Sapa region (Lào Cai province) as standard. In addition, they also supplemented some phonemes of other Hmong groups in other localities. After more than a half of century, until now, apart from the Hmong writing system compiled by the two authors mentioned above, in the life of Hmong people in Vietnam, there has also appeared another type of Hmong script which is originated from the outside of Vietnam known as different names: Laotian Hmong, American Hmong, Regional Hmong, International Hmong, etc. Therefore, one should keep in mind this highly diverse picture of Hmong written languages in northwestern Vietnam in relation with Hmong speaking language. In order to evaluate the status of Hmong written usage in this

region, we have carried a case study by surveying 220 Hmong people in Tà Xùa village in Sơn La province and Sin Suối Hồ village in Lai Châu province. Our result discussed in this paper aims at contributing more realistic views on the status of using Hmong written in Hmong ethnic community in northwest region (Tây Bắc) of Vietnam.

## 2. Content

### 2.1 Overview of survey region

Tây Bắc is an important geopolitical region of Vietnam. This is not only a large area with 102,000 km<sup>2</sup>, but also multifarious in ethnicity with 30 ethnic groups living altogether since a very long time (Tran, 2016). Until now, the government has given special attention to Tây Bắc region. In particular, the outstanding goals are to maintain national security, develop a sustainable socioeconomy associated with improving people's education, preserving and promoting cultural values of their community.

Tây Bắc now includes four provinces including Hòa Bình, Sơn La, Điện Biên, Lai Châu in which Hmong people inhabit throughout the whole area. Although Sơn La and Lai Châu are in the same region, but Hmong people in these two provinces have some distinctive cultural and linguistic characteristics that can be typically representative for the northwest and northeast parts of Vietnam. This is the main reason for our study to be carried out in these two locations. In each province, we selected thoroughly a specific surveying area for our study based on their most prominent properties in which Tà Xùa village of Sơn La province and Sin Suối Hồ village of Lai Châu province were selected.



Figure 1: Sin Suối Hồ village 2020 (Source: NK Nguyen).

Tà Xùa is a central village of the same name Tà Xùa commune in Bắc Yên district, Sơn La province which can be considered as the most important part and a core area of Hmong people in Bắc Yên. Here, all inhabitants of Tà Xùa village and five other highland communes of Bắc Yên are native Hmong people. Today, Tà Xùa has totally

111 families with 650 people. Most of Hmong people living here are Black Hmong (Hmong Đuz). The economic activities of Hmong people are quite diverse. Besides the traditional agriculture activities such as growing rice, maize and raising livestock such as cow, buffalo and goat, they also grow green tea, hawthorn and take part in some touristic activities. Since a long time, Tà Xùa has created its own famous green tea trademarks like Tà Xùa or Thiên Đường Mây of Tà Xùa (which means “Paradise of Cloud”). Every year, Tà Xùa welcomes about 10,000 tourists. In addition, other business activities in Tà Xùa is also becoming very uproariously.



Figure 2: Touristic high spot Tà Xùa Paradise of Cloud 2020 (Source: NK Nguyen).

Table 1: Demographic statistics data 2019 in Tà Xùa village (Son La province)

Total	Gender		Religion	Profession			
	Male	Female		Farmer	Merchants	Public servants	Student
651 (100%)	338 (51,92%)	313 (48,07%)	0 (0,0%)	542 (83,25%)	23 (3,53%)	9 (1,38%)	77 (11,8%)

Sin Suối Hồ is also a central village of Sin Suối Hồ commune, Phong Thổ district, Lai Châu province. The only feature that makes this village distinctive from Tà Xùa is that 85% of Hmong inhabitants in Sin Suối Hồ are Protestants. Nowadays, in this village live 130 families with 674 Hmong inhabitants, in which most of them are Flower Hmong (Hmong Lệnh, Hmong Si). In the past 10 years, economy of Sin Suối Hồ has seen a remarkable change, Hmong people in which their lives mainly depend on growing rice, maize and livestock, is now shifting gradually to new economic activities such as touristic business based on the form of Homestay for tourists and growing Orchid plant (known as a high income activity in Vietnam). Yearly, Sin Suối Hồ attracts thousands of domestic and international visitors.

Table 2: Demographic statistics data 2019 in Sin Suối Hồ village (Lai Châu province)

Total	Gender		Religion	Professions			
	Male	Female		Farmer	Merchant	Public servants	Students
674 (100%)	342 (50,74%)	332 (48,26%)	539 (79,97%)	545 (80,86%)	37 (5,48%)	11 (1,63%)	81 (12,01%)

We chose these two locations for studying the status of using Hmong written language of Hmong people with following reasons. First reason is that Hmong people of these two villages (Tà Xùa and Sin Suối Hồ) are all native Hmong that belong to Flower Hmong (Hmong Lênh, Hmong Si) and Black Hmong (Hmong Đuz). The second reason is that the two villages are also very active in touristic activities, this means that the local people here communicate very frequently with people from other ethnic groups and other locations including foreigners. In the third reason, both Tà Xùa and Sin Suối Hồ locate in the central part of their two communes. For the fourth reason of this survey is that the two villages have a distinctive features in term of the religion of their inhabitants. Most of Hmong people in Sin Suối Hồ are Protestants while in a contrast, in Tà Xùa, all inhabitants are non-religious. Those typical features are the main reasons for us to choose these two villages to investigate because they possess many similarities as well as dissimilarities.



Figure 3: Hmong ladies with traditional costumes in a dance performance for tourism activities in Sin Suối Hồ village 2020 (Source: NK Nguyen).

## 2.2 Overview about Hmong writing systems

Hmong ethnic people have a long history and they reside in many different regions in the world (Nguyen, 2017). Hmong language is now the native language of about 10 million people inhabiting in different countries. Despite a long history of existence, many researchers in the world and in Vietnam have agreed that *ancient Hmong language has no writing system* (Ly, 2009) although in Hmong mythology, it was told from generation to generation that their ancient language has a script, but unfortunately the script was “*eaten by a cow*” Nowadays, in the Hmong’s belief, particularly during their important events such as wedding feast, funeral, New Year holiday or naming ceremony for newborn baby *etc.* Hmong people usually use a white paper carved with many little holes that create special patterns. They believe that those patterns are the special codes of Hmong script that have been passed on from their ancestors. Then this devoted wish of having a writing system for Hmong people has now come true. To date, Hmong is one of the very few languages which has different writing systems at a time.

In China, in 1904, missionary Samuel Pollard, as first set his foot in Yunnan China had compiled a Hmong script which was then called the Hmong Pollard. Hmong people in Yunnan afterward learned and knew this kind of script, they wrote Christian Bible and Hymn in Hmong Pollard. From 1949 to 1954, Chinese Government released three sets of Hmong scripts which were developed based on Latin alphabet system in three regions, namely Guizhou Hmong, Hunan Hmong and Yunnan Hmong. These three writing systems are different in number of consonants, vowels and tones. Nowadays, in these areas, Hmong people are still using these scripts for writing.

In Laos, throughout 40 years from the 50s to 90s of the twentieth century, four Hmong writing systems were established. Specifically, the Hmong Txwj Zeb script was created in 1950, Hmong *Latin* script (1953), Hmong *Song Lu* (1959), Hmong *Tsuj Yig* (1997). Among these scripts, the Latin Hmong script to which the Hmong people often called as the International Hmong (the English name for this Hmong script is Romanized Popular Alphabet–RPA or Hmong RPA) is the most influential. Today, Hmong people in Laos, Thailand, US, Australia, Canada... have agreed to use the International Hmong writing system as standard syllable for transliteration (Nguyen, 2016). The International Hmong script is recorded based on the White Hmong (Hmong Đơ) dialects. As a consequence, they have used this Hmong script to create many cultural and media publications.

In United States in 1990 and in Thailand in 1991, there appeared *the Hmong pictograms as the patterns decorated on their costumes*. However, this pictogram–based script had no strong vitality and popularity in Hmong community.

In 1917 in Vietnam, priest Father M. Savina had compiled a Hmong phonetic script in populating the Protestantism in the Hmong living areas. Unfortunately, this script have been no longer used as there is almost none of Hmong person in Vietnam knows how to use this script. In 1961, the Government of Vietnam approved the Mèo (Miao) script–another so-called name of Hmong written language in Vietnam (Decree 206, 1961). Two authors, Van Chinh Nguyen and Thanh Phan had compiled this Hmong script based on the Latin characters, taking the Flower Hmong dialect (Hmong Lênh, Hmong Si) of Sa Pa (Lào Cai province) as standard. This Hmong script has been used for teaching in many Hmong living regions in Vietnam until now and was usually called as Vietnamese Hmong.

## 2.3 Results and Discussions

### 2.3.1 The literacy status of Hmong people in the surveying areas

The result in the Table 3 shows that if considering in term of quantity, the number of literate Hmong people (ability to read and to write with Hmong script) is quite high. In Tà Xùa, the percentage of literate Hmong people is 60,90 %, while in Sin Suối Hồ, this rate is even higher which is up to 92,72%. In term of the age, most of Hmong people that are able to use Hmong script are under 60; there is obviously no difference in term of gender between the number of men and women that know Hmong script. In terms of occupation variables, Hmong students have the highest literacy rate, then followed by public servants and finally those who are merchants and farmers. However,

if considering the literacy rate in term of religion, there is a very clear difference among people which are in different religions. Hmong people who are Protestants in Sin Suối Hồ have much higher literacy rate compared to non-religious Hmong in Tà Xùa. Table 6 shows that number of Hmong people who are illiterate in Hmong writing in Tà Xùa is 39,10%, while that number in Sin Suối Hồ is 7,28% and all of them are over the age of 60. It is worth noticing that despite many Hmong people do not know Hmong writing, but they are very fluent in oral communication in Hmong language. Many of those are shamans and priest in Hmong community. This means that they teach Hmong language to their descendants via oral communication.

Table 3: Study result on the number of literate Hmong people

Village	Number of people	Ratio (%)	Know Hmong script		Do not know Hmong script	
			Number of people	Percentage (%)	Number of people	Percentage (%)
Tà Xùa	110	100				
Sin Suối Hồ	110	100	102	92,72	8	7,28

### 2.3.2 Current status of using Regional Hmong and Vietnamese Hmong

The survey result shown in the Table 4 reveals that total number of people who know Hmong written language, the proportion of Hmong people who know each type of Hmong scripts has a large difference. For example, the number of literate Hmong people in Tà Xùa and Sin Suối Hồ who know “Regional Hmong” script takes a large percentage of 89,55% và 98,03%, respectively. In a contrary, the number of Hmong that know “Vietnamese Hmong” script is very low of 8,19 % và 2,73 %, respectively. It is worth mentioning that the Vietnamese Hmong script created in 1961 that was originally compiled based on phonetics of Flower Hmong (Hmong Lệnh, Hmong Si), these Hmong people are also now living in Sin Suối Hồ. Thus, if assuming that the Vietnamese Hmong script are not popular in the Hmong ethnic community because of the phonetic difference between different Hmong groups is absolutely unconvincing in our opinion. Because today, Hmong people inhabiting in Sin Suối Hồ are Flower Hmong (Hmong Lệnh, Hmong Si). Considering at certain aspect, one might probably think that they should have felt familiar with Vietnamese Hmong script which was originally based on their phonetics. However, the fact that they feel “alienated” with this Hmong script is so unexpected. Meanwhile, the Regional Hmong script (International Hmong) which was compiled based on the phonetics of White Hmong (Hmong Đơ), a different Hmong group, those are not inhabitants of these two regions indeed has been widely used here. Then the question is “why is there such a high number of the Hmong people that know and use that Regional Hmong script?” To answer this question, we need a further investigation. Is it because of a fact that Regional Hmong has many published journals and books, then many Hmong people can use it? From our fieldwork in the location, we realized that most of Hmong people know Regional Hmong script (International Hmong) by *self-learning* and *self-researching*. In this scenario, they will learn the language by methods in which a person with better Hmong written knowledge will teach those who knows little. And in turn, the person that knows very little Hmong script will teach those who do not know any Hmong word. In fact all of them have never participated in any official language class. By self-learning, Hmong people in Tà Xùa village where is not influenced from Protestant religion still has a rate of literacy up to 60,9%. In Sin Suối Hồ, a religious region where most of Hmong are Protestants to which learning Regional Hmong is a mandatory (to read and understand Protestant Bible), the rate of literacy in Regional Hmong occupies 92,72% which is of course understandable. The above analysis from our data has shown different aspects of the whole picture in using different Hmong writing systems in Hmong ethnic community in the northwest region of Vietnam.

Table 4: Study result of Hmong who know all type of Hmong characters

Village	Total number knowing Hmong	Ratio (%)	Regional Hmong		Vietnamese Hmong	
			Number	Percentage (%)	Number	Percentage (%)
Tà Xùa	67	100	60	89,55	7	10,45
Sin Suối Hồ	102	100	100	98,03	2	1,97

### 2.3.3 The purpose of learning Hmong script

The study result shown in the Table 5 on the purpose of using Hmong script reveals that all Hmong people in Tà Xùa and Sin Suối Hồ use Hmong script for communicating purposes (for sending message) and entertainment (for watching movies and films) with 100% of people in both locations. On the other hands, they use the Hmong script for reading and writing books with lowest rate of 10% and 1% in Tà Xùa and Sin Suối Hồ, respectively. Particularly in Sin Suối Hồ, because of the need in reading and understanding the Protestant Bible, it is a compulsory requirement for the believers to learn Hmong script. For this purpose, all people here want to learn Hmong written language. From this aspect, one can see that Hmong writing system together with its speaking language are very important tools to connect the individuals inside the Hmong community, especially in term of their religion, which help them protect, preserve and pass on their cultural and spiritual values as well as connect individuals in a community.

Table 5: Study on the purpose of Hmong people in learning Hmong script

Purpose of using Hmong script			To write a letter	To send message	Watch TV and video	To sing <i>karaoke</i>	To read books and magazines	To write papers	To read Protestant Bible
Tà Xùa	Number of people	67	5	67	67	38	6	0	0
	Ratio (%)	100	7,46	100	100	56,71	8,95	0,00	0,00
Sin Suối Hồ	Number of people	102	8	102	102	89	15	2	102
	Ratio (%)	100	7,84	100	100	87,25	14,70	1,96	100

### 2.3.4 The attitudes of Hmong people in leaning Hmong script

Now let take a look at the data shown in the Table 6 which reveals that the number of Hmong people that like learning Hmong script occupies a high rate of 91,81% in Tà Xùa and 97,27% in Sin Suối Hồ. On the other hand, those people who dislike learning Hmong script are almost elderly. They said that they are quite old to learn how to write and to read Hmong script, thus they are not interested in learning. Otherwise, all the people who were questioned said that they want to learn Hmong and *quốc ngữ* script (official language of Vietnamese). To this desire, in our opinion, this is very legitimate and practical. The Hmong script in any type is an effective tool for the Hmong people to preserve their culture while “*quốc ngữ*” script is an important tool to help the Hmong integrate with the general development of the country and in addition with *Kinh* society (main ethnic group in Vietnam) in the main land. Our practical fieldwork study shows that Hmong people do not have stigmatized attitudes towards the different types of Hmong script. They believe that with any Hmong writing type, it only needs to be simple to learn, to remember and to use; it can be used to exchange information, their feelings and their love in the community. If one written language meets those requirements, then it can be considered as useful and valuable (the opinion of Ms. Thi My Giang, 28 years old in Sin Suối Hồ village). Actually, we believe such opinion on leaning Hmong script in Tà Xùa and Sin Suối Hồ comes from their love to their language. To some extent, such opinions may become suggestion in planning of the language policy and the cultural management for the Hmong people in Vietnam to find solutions that are suitable and effective in teaching and disseminating the Hmong script in the Tây Bắc, Vietnam.

Table 6: Study on the attitude of Hmong people with Hmong language

Villages	Number of people	Ratio (%)	Like learning		Do not like learning	
			Number of people	Ratio (%)	Number of people	Ratio (%)
Tà Xùa	110	100	101	91,81	9	8,19
Sin Suối Hồ	110	100	107	97,27	3	2,73

### 3. Conclusions

In summary, in the daily life of Hmong community in the northwestern region (Tây Bắc), Vietnam, they use two sets of Hmong scripts namely Vietnamese Hmong (released in 1961) and the Regional Hmong (imported from other Hmong communities outside of Vietnam). The similarity of these Hmong writing systems is that they use *Latin* characters to record the Hmong voices by different techniques. Nowadays both types of Hmong script are still being used in different regions at different levels depending closely on many factors such as religion, frequency of contacting with other individuals from other lands or with published Hmong written books and magazines or by *self-learning* method among Hmong individuals in each community. In addition, Hmong people also contact quite often with the Vietnamese Hmong script via the programs broadcasted from governmental and local television channels. The contingent of public servants who are Hmong and other ethnic personnel are making great efforts in studying Hmong script in order to obtain *Hmong language certificate* (Decree of Vietnamese Ministry of Education and Training, 2006) which is important so that it can be used to propagate and educate Hmong people with the governmental policies and documentary. On the other hands, these staffs can transfer new technology and engineered achievement through documents in Hmong language. However, Hmong people living in the Tây Bắc region, more specifically, those living in our survey area are standing on the brink of being illiteracy in Vietnamese Hmong, in a contrary they understand better and use more frequently the Regional Hmong. This paradox, according to our opinion, one should continue to study in order to find out a suitable solution for the problems in learning written Hmong.

Table 7: Questioning table used to interview

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Do you (Sir/Madame/Mister/Miss) understand any type of Hmong script?</li> <li>2. Could you please read the following Hmong script?</li> <li>3. What kind of Hmong script do you know? (The Vietnamese Hmong or the Regional Hmong (the International Hmong)?</li> <li>4. For what purpose are you using Hmong script?</li> <li>5. Do you have books or newspapers written by Hmong in your family?</li> <li>6. Do you like learning Hmong script?</li> <li>7. Why do you like learning Hmong script?</li> <li>8. By which methods have you learned the Hmong script?</li> </ol>
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Table 8. The paragraph written in Vietnamese Hmong script used for the survey

<p>Cur tsêr nhaoz ntourv ntangr trôngz saz. Tsêr khoangz thaov haz lăngx nzas. Tsêr tuôr cxangx. Kraor yongz zênhv thaz kraor trôngx zaos muôz ntông uô. Tsêr vur vuôl, ndêx tsêr zaos têx tul ntông lux thaz khênhx, yangr puôv đrangr phaos thaz hur si. Cur tsêr hax muôx iz luz rour đêx cxiv thur chiz. Đêx tâu chu lour tul char đêx pêv kraor đêx lul. Cur luz tsêr tuz uô nêr lul lak, tangz tsênhv chuô yaz cha. Ndis lênhl tao vangx, tao tsêr muôx ntâu zangv ntông naox txir (Nguyen, 1996).</p> <p>(Lao Cai College of Education, Tài liệu học tiếng Mông, p.52)</p>
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Table 9. Paragraph written in Regional Hmong (International Hmong) used to survey

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Kuv lub tsev</b></p> <p>Kuv lub tsev nyob puag saum toj roob siab. Kuv lub tsev dav thiab nyob laj cua heev, lub tsev yog tsev puab av, qhov rooj tsev yog muab ntoo ua. Saum qaum tsev vov vuas. Sab nraum tsev yog ib lub tiaj huv si thiab</p>
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muaj ib lub pas dej siv gach nkaig ua. Dej ntws raws lub raj puas pem hauv dej los. Kuv lub tsev twb ua tau ntev heev lawm tiam sis ntshia tseem zoo thiab tsiab heev. Nyob ib ncig kuv vaj tse yog txiv xyoob txiv ntoo.  
(this paragraph was written by Thi My Giang, preschool teachers, Sin Suối Hồ village)

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# Research on the Development of Small and Medium-sized Navy in Southeast Asian Countries

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## Abstract

There is no doubt that the entire Asia-Pacific region, especially Southeast Asia, is undergoing a large-scale naval modernization process. However, most analyses of this phenomenon have focused on its scope and nature, especially its possible consequences for peace and stability in the region. Of particular concern is whether we are seeing the beginning of an unstable naval arms race in the region. This is completely grounded, and it is indeed an important research area, which will be discussed in the article. In addition, we also look at the general naval modernization process, and discuss in essence how the country to develop or maintain the navy, as well as the special problems and challenges that the navy often faces in this process, for example, with the current economic growth and international trends, increasing the naval budget and procurement of related potential ship. The purpose of this paper is to review the naval modernization of the six countries in the South China Sea, which can be served as guidance for Taiwan's navy construction.

**Keywords:** Navy Modernization, Southeast Asia, South China Sea, Strategy, Issues

## 1. Introduction

The ocean covers two-thirds of the earth and contains rich resources. It needs to be properly managed and protected to maintain and optimize the available resources. Maintaining a smooth maritime channel is the main task of the Navy. Take the South China Sea that will be discussed in this article as an example. There are about five trillion U.S. dollars of maritime trade sails through each year (Ali, 2017). Although large navies reflect the dominance of maritime research, historical research shows that relatively small naval forces can also have a disproportionately significant impact on global events. From allied attackers in the 19th century to Somali pirates today, even the slightest maritime power can become a key player on the global issue (McDevitt, 2014).

This article discusses the problems and prospects of small and medium navies, especially the modernization of Southeast Asian navies, including six countries in the South China Sea: Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines (Goldrick & McCaffrie, 2013).

From a theoretical point of view, the task of becoming a maritime power and developing the navy seems simple, at least in principle. It is nothing more than coordinating a series of coherent decisions, goals, and means. The

levels include the macro-strategic decisions at the top of the government hierarchy to the implementation tactics at the bottom. However, the devil hides in the details. Many facts make it so difficult to perform the task. Due to the geographical, political, strategic, cultural, economic and general conditions, the actual details of each country are different. The best example is Russia and Japan that are located in Northeast Asia adopted completely different strategies for naval development, which had a decisive impact on the subsequent Russo-Japanese War (Papstratigakis, 2011). In this century, the reclamation of the South China Sea reef islands by the Chinese mainland (hereinafter referred to as the mainland) can be regarded as a reorganization of the world's sea power territories (Dolven, et al., 2015), who is proudly announcing the awakening of the Oriental Dragon to the world (Percival, 2007).

Therefore, although their experiences may seem quite different, there are many common factors that in fact determine the relative continuity and success or failure of a country's naval development. Special circumstances are extremely useful for explaining general points. To a certain extent, the modernization of the navies of Southeast Asian countries is regarded as a research object, not because their development is better or worse than other countries, but because their military situation is very similar to Taiwan's, and their experience can point out the other countries of Indo-Pacific region that if they follow suit, what challenges will they face (Ladwig, 2012).

## 2. The Research Issues and Scope of Naval Growth

In order to meet the challenge of naval modernization, the four main levels of decision-making seem to be particularly important, namely: 1. the first-level decision-making level of the grand strategy; 2. the implementation of the grand strategy and the level of resource integration; 3. levels of military policy and strategy formulation; and, 4. the level of naval policy/strategy formulation (Till & Supriyanto, 2018).

The distinction between these four decision-making levels is vague, but their hierarchical structure represents the determination of the highest national goals at the top and the assurance of naval means at the bottom. At each stage, the relevant decision makers must reconcile the purpose (objective), manner (method) and means (tools and procedures). The main problems at any level can be solved step by step, but it is inevitable that emergencies will occur in the hierarchical structure. Therefore, in the hierarchical structure, there needs to be a feedback system that develops cyclically. In addition, this is only a general strategic thinking model. After the operational objectives and action guidelines are determined, the detailed implementation means can be adjusted flexibly at any time.

When analysts look at the process of naval modernization, especially when it has the characteristics of an actual or potential naval arms race, they often conduct a series of analyses on motivations. First, whether the naval power that emerged from the decision-making process of a country is the result of a well-thought-out and coherent master plan at the grand strategic level. Or, on the other hand, it is an almost accidental product of various conflicting interests and opinions, which neither tells us about the overall intention of the plan, nor provides other countries with a reasonable response policy. Most navies show the mix of these two methods.

When trying to understand the various patterns of naval development in Southeast Asian countries, it seems natural to find some consistent symptoms, which will be explained in detail later. This article aims to propose basic directions for policymakers to think about the modernization of small and medium-sized navies similar to Southeast Asian countries. The basic argument is that after understanding the overall security goals of the countries concerned, they should adopt a macro-strategic vision and have a clear understanding of maritime interests, so that the Navy (or Coast Guard) can indeed play its due role in maintaining these interests. The suggestions may even be possible to use computer software tools such as artificial intelligence (AI) to conduct major strategic thinking, clearly formulate security strategy goals, as a guide for other lower levels, and at the same time, appropriately consider maritime cases in the decision-making process, and consider the priority and resources provided by government agencies to effectively transform the goal into a consistent strategy. Basically, the Department of Defense is suitable to promote the development of the navy from the perspective of the joint

force. In other words, the decision makers are based on their own system flaws, not for the purpose of destroying the environment, to assess the extent (if any) of the naval problems. In addition, to clarify the current state of army establishment is a system's "reasonable" policy or a coherent result under the strategy is very important.

The concept source in policy drive and strategy formulation implied by above arguments is complicated. Whether national nature or international environmental challenges should be used as the main evaluation factor is worthy of our in-depth discussion. In addition, how to view and explain the naval modernization process of other countries will also be helpful for a country to formulate the future military-building strategy. In other words, analyzing the consequences of naval modernization in other countries is the key factor in naval building decisions, even if it is indirect. Therefore, this article will review the causes, processes, and current status of Southeast Asian naval modernization, and then in the subsequent chapters, analyze the causes of problems, and finally put forward conclusions, suggestions, and future development directions.

### 3. The Participation History of Southeast Asian Countries in Naval Modernization

This article reviews the naval development of Southeast Asian countries as a whole, and finds that this is not just a naval arms race, but a normal naval modernization process (Till, 2012). It identified some possible consequences for the international stability of Southeast Asia.

Since the 1980s, the allocation of naval resources in Southeast Asian countries has increased significantly, focusing on the six most important countries in the South China Sea: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. According to the data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the total expenditure on the navy of the six countries in the three decades from 1970 to 1999 increased by about 1 billion U.S. dollars (see Table 1). The increase in expenditure has led to the expansion of naval platforms. These navies have transformed from platforms of "brown water" to platforms of "green water" and even recently have been able to perform limited "blue water" platform missions. In the second decade of the 21st century, most Southeast Asian and South China Sea countries have a keen interest in underwater combat capabilities, or have acquired such capabilities. Obviously, the trend of dedicating resources to develop naval capabilities has yet to show any abating sign.

Table 1: List of Defense Expenditure in Major Southeast Asian Countries

Country	Main project	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09	2010-13	2014-18	Total
Indonesia	Military aircraft	1,784	485	1,178	617	656	921	1,060	6,701
	Armored vehicle	311	48	141	110	31	42	351	1,034
	Artillery	40	10	111	23	24	40	101	349
	Navy vessel	1,270	361	1,596	1,075	1,021	110	1,357	6,790
Malaysia	Military aircraft	299	566	485	1,369	1,117	60	348	4,244
	Armored vehicle	12	109	281	28	241	51	121	843
	Artillery	2	89	38	8	51	23		211
	Navy vessel	261	680	877	720	1,218	350	74	4,180
The Philippines	Military aircraft	246	558	248	223	100	35	341	1,751
	Armored vehicle	11	67	35	43	5	3	34	198
	Artillery		8	66	6			4	82
	Navy vessel	109	481	14	156	19	108	245	1,132
Singapore	Military aircraft	20	887	1,348	1,720	2,288	1,562	856	8,678
	Armored vehicle	20	308	154	62	126	400	211	1,281

	Artillery		92		71	17	20		200
	Navy vessel	20	377		699	2,018	198		3,311
Thailand	Military aircraft	609	1,183	1,127	1,546	581	468	364	5,878
	Armored vehicle	142	63	522	346	26	146	400	1,645
	Artillery	38	61	200	206	31	41	32	609
	Navy vessel	114	460	554	1,781	22	115	221	3,276
Vietnam	Military aircraft	1,006	2,031	2,829	606	355	1,124	717	8,668
	Armored vehicle	239	2,178	240		18		121	2,796
	Artillery	519	396	34					949
	Navy vessel	250	280	574	300	314	760	2,261	4,739

Note: Expenditure of the main combat system (unit: million U.S. dollars), calculated in 1990 U.S. dollars.

Data source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2020). *SIPRI Databases (1960-2018)*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. <http://www.sipri.org/databases>

For this reason, we propose several key turning points: first, naval forces and capabilities increase with the increase of GDP; second, this is not just a simple replacement of outdated feature (in other words, it is not a simple modernization procedure), but a more complex structural transformation; third, the recent purchases of facilities have really changed the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities; fourth, they are changing the balance of regional naval power; fifth, the current large-scale procurement of several countries has led to the development of naval armaments. The competition is of special significance. It especially represents a huge follow-up influence on Southeast Asia and the larger Indo-Pacific strategy.

First of all, there are two theories trying to explain these turning points: the first is that these processes represent the naval arms race in Southeast Asia; the other is that these processes represent the modernization of the navy. In addition, other studies believe that the latest development of naval procurement in Southeast Asia should have different interpretations, at least in each country in the region should be regarded as a mature military development, and a slow and mature development in the navy. Generally speaking, the latter argument coincides with how each country views its own strategic environment and the resulting security tasks. But are the motives for modernizing the navies of the South China Sea countries really so?

### 3.1 Deconstructing the argument of the Southeast Asian Naval Arms Race

Since the 1990s, the arms procurement process in Southeast Asia, even if it is not an arms race, it is still regarded as having the potential to at least destabilize the region (Wood, 2014). Since then, military expenditures in this region have attracted international attention. Specially, Southeast Asia has always been regarded as a traditional economic region. When the comments of some politicians viewed these processes in a negative light, the idea that arms purchases in Southeast Asia might cause destabilization was strengthened.

It is true that at least some elements of the arms purchases in Southeast Asian countries are in line with an arms race argument. For example, in addition to naval procurement, the Minister of Defense of Malaysia (Najib Abdul Razak) announced a procurement of military aircraft F/A-18 and MiG-29 (Francis, 2010). The statement claimed that the Malaysian Air Force had returned to the same level as other services. (Defense Studies, 1993) Malaysia's reconfiguration of its armed forces from counterinsurgency to conventional operations is indeed the result of the continuous enhancement of the Singapore Armed Forces in conventional operations. Soon after the Malaysian Ministry of Defense announced the purchase of main battle tank PT-91, Singapore followed the launch of Apache Longbow helicopter Ah-64D. Myanmar's attempts to develop conventional land combat capabilities in the late 1990s were almost certainly driven by Thailand's growing military capabilities. Ostensibly, these patterns at least partly conform to the inherent element of "action-reaction" in any arms race (Bitzinger, 2010).

But how accurate are these arguments? As Richard Bitzinger, a senior researcher at RSIS in Singapore recently pointed out: it is problematic to describe the procurement of these weapons in Southeast Asia as an arms race. Although the internal politics of Southeast Asia is not completely stable, the argument about armed conflicts among Southeast Asian countries is almost certainly untenable at least for the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is wrong to describe Southeast Asian political relations as openly antagonistic and hostile to each other. It is almost certain that the manner of acquiring or declaring specific weapon capability is only unilateral, which does not conform to the "action-reaction" mode required by the arms race. Finally, since the 1990s, defense spending throughout Southeast Asia has not increased significantly. Indeed, defense spending in Southeast Asia has maintained significant consistency in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) or a percentage of the national budget.

It is true that in the 1990s, at least for some Southeast Asian countries, expenditures on naval platforms had increased considerably (see Table 1). In addition, a single acquisition seems to be at least parallel to some aspects of the arms race model. For example, Singapore ordered 6 guided missile frigates in 1983. Ostensibly, this is to assist the Singapore Navy in carrying out its established tasks and protect the maritime transport routes on which Singapore's economy depends. At the time, Singapore's naval strike capabilities included smaller brown water missile ships (Wong, 2015), while its neighbors had larger (and possibly more reputable) green water submarines.

Submarines are often described as the weapon of choice for the weak to stop the strong. Today, more and more countries in Southeast Asia are operating submarines, but their actual capabilities are worth exploring. Many smaller economies in Southeast Asia cannot match with the countries having large multi-purpose navies such as the mainland, India, or Japan, so they have invested in conventional submarines to deter their neighbors. From the perspective of deterrence theory, the proliferation of submarines in Southeast Asia has a major impact on the strategic balance of the region, but the maintenance and training of submarines also need to be considered. Basically, the challenges involved in establishing and maintaining a submarine force go far beyond the commonly understood or recognized challenges. At present, the navies of Southeast Asian countries have no ability and strategy to convincingly propose their own submarine power to play an effective deterrent effect. Although the proliferation of submarines in Southeast Asia may indicate that the strategic balance of the region is changing, the findings emphasize that it is very dangerous to confuse equipment purchases with actual capabilities (Andersson, 2016).

It is true that the guided missile frigate provides the Singapore Navy with anti-submarine warfare capabilities, but only Indonesia has submarines in the area, and before that, it no longer uses old seaworthy ships. In this way, in view of the mission of the Singapore Navy to protect waterways, obtaining countermeasure capabilities by deploying modern naval mine may be a more urgent requirement. We conclude that it is a political factor that drove Singapore to make this decision. Recently, the region's navy has been focusing on submarine purchases, first in Singapore, then Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam (Torode, 2014), and even Thailand is now interested in submarine purchases. Some commentators jokingly called these submarines as "keeping up with the Joneses." Countries in the region hope to satisfy the mentality of "not falling behind" through "outer outfits." However, there is also a very positive view, that is, these Southeast Asian countries "finally get" a more comprehensive naval force with both surface and underwater combat capabilities.

It can be said that "not falling behind" means that there is a competitive relationship between countries in the region, if not a completely confrontational relationship. Southeast Asia is certainly not a safe community. There are some lingering doubts and disputes in certain bilateral relations. However, under the current circumstances, there are still no definite confrontation and "action-reaction" events that have occurred, so the so-called arms race argument is undermined (if not invalid). In addition, as stated in the subsequent part of the argument, from a longer-term historical perspective, this kind of naval expenditure in the 1990s should actually be interpreted as an increase in naval platform expenditure to provide a non-arms race.

### *3.2 Long-term observations on Southeast Asian naval modernization*

First, looking at the defense expenditure pattern of the entire Southeast Asia, the general trend is that before 1990, the respective navy's defense budget share was not large. Examining the number of major surface warfare by the navies of various countries, the general trend of relative negligence is obvious (see Table 2). The Singapore Navy is the most obvious manifestation of this relatively negligent model. In terms of major surface combat capabilities, significant growth has only begun in the 1990s. The Vietnamese Navy only began to increase its main surface combat capabilities in the late 1970s. Indonesia used a large naval force to prepare for war in the early 1970s, but by 1979 its main surface combat capability declined sharply. This pattern had remained unchanged for 20 years, and it was not until the late 1990s that naval platforms increased substantially. In the 1970s, the Philippines' activities in major surface combatants and heavy maritime transport increased significantly, but after the 1980s, these numbers declined significantly.

Table 2: Naval components of major countries in Southeast Asia

Country	Component	1969	1979	1989	1999	2009	2019
Indonesia	PSC	21	11	15	33	30	13
	Heavy spreader	7	9	15	28	29	13
	Submarine	6	3	2	2	2	4
Malaysia	PSC	2	3	4	10	12	10
	Heavy spreader		3	2	3		10
	Submarine					2	2
The Philippines	PSC		18	3	1	1	1
	Heavy spreader	6	27	24	9	7	1
	Submarine						
Singapore	PSC				6	12	6
	Heavy spreader		6	5	3	4	6
	Submarine				3	6	4
Thailand	PSC	3	7	7	20	20	9
	Heavy spreader	14	5	6	9	6	8
	Submarine						
Vietnam	PSC		3	7	7	11	10
	Heavy spreader		3	7	6	6	4
	Submarine				2	2	8

Note: PSC refers to the principal surface combatant, including aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and light-armed speedboats.

Data source: IISS. (2019). Chapter Six: Asia. *The Military Balance*, 119(1), 222-319.

There are two notable exceptions. The Malaysian Navy might have been small in the 1969s, but so far, the number of heavy spreaders and major surface warships of the Malaysian Navy has not decreased significantly during the entire study period. This constantly emphasized naval platform echoes the strategic calculations in Malaysia's geo-environment. Similarly, the Thai Navy started very late, although its development was slow but stable, and the number of platforms did not drop significantly.

The more counter-intuitive fact of this model is that for these countries, the marine environment has always been an important part of national life. The history of Southeast Asian countries has always described the powerful ocean elements, whether it is the characteristics of the archipelago or the maritime trade from the colonial period to the present.

### 3.3 From relative neglect to naval modernization


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ocean elements, whether it is the characteristics of the archipelago or the maritime trade from the colonial period to the present.

The challenge we face is to explain these patterns of relative negligence in some cases, and explain the pattern of "from famine to feast" in other cases, that is, to explain the situation of getting rid of relative negligence, such as Southeast Asia. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the national navy was "saving food and clothing," but since the 1990s it has been "generously donating," and investment in naval platforms has greatly increased.


However, what is certain is that the strategic security reasons for this surge in investment in naval platforms are almost the same. Since the 1990s, maritime security (from criminal activities, competing territories, obtaining fisheries to the security of energy resource transportation routes) has become the focus of increasing attention in these countries. Considering the obsolescence or limited situation of naval systems and capabilities at that time, these navies must be modernized and expanded. In addition, as mentioned earlier, this phenomenon should not be regarded as a naval arms race. At least before the twenty-first century, it constituted a more or less slow-motion development of these countries towards a mature navy. There is a simple reason for this: the cost of maintaining at least a green water (if not blue water) platform on a naval platform is definitely much higher than that of a fighter jet. Therefore, from the perspective of military modernization, the financial burden has become an important consideration. From the perspective of gross domestic product (GDP) (see Figure 1), it is clear that the real significant GDP growth of these countries began in the 1990s. Therefore, there was a certain correlation between weapon procurement and economic prosperity during this period. However, after the beginning of the 21st century, this growth trend has stabilized. In other words, although GDP has increased (refer to Figure 2), defense spending as a percentage of GDP has almost remained at a level (refer to Figure 3).

Figure 1: GDP of major countries in Southeast Asia (1990-2018)




Data source: World Bank. (2020). GDP (1960-2019). World Bank Database.  
[https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktc.cd?most\\_recent\\_value\\_desc=false](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktc.cd?most_recent_value_desc=false)

Figure 2: Actual defense expenditures of major countries in Southeast Asia



Data source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2020). SIPRI Databases (1960-2018). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. <http://www.sipri.org/databases>

Figure 3: Defense expenditure of major Southeast Asian countries as a percentage of GDP



Data source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2020). SIPRI Databases (1960-2018). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. <http://www.sipri.org/databases>

At the same time, there are many targeted explanations for the surge in naval capabilities since the 1990s. In the case of Vietnam, it is obvious that from the 1960s to the 1970s, investment in the navy was relatively neglected:

because the Vietnam War mainly (in fact, almost completely) took place in the air and on land. Although the maritime domain is also important, it is small private ships that provide maritime supplies to the Viet Cong guerrillas to avoid detection by U.S. naval vessels. For most of the 1980s, Vietnam was involved in the Cambodian conflict (also known as the Third Indochina War), which led to the loss of its already scarce economic resources, and the United States fought the Second Indochina War for many years, and also paralyzed the country. In addition, Vietnam invaded Cambodia on December 25, 1978, and suffered an economic embargo. Therefore, it is not surprising that Vietnam's investment in naval platforms did not start to surge until the 1990s. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in a media speech, "giving 500 million U.S. dollars to the Vietnamese government to enhance its national defense capabilities," and saying that "due to the mutual defense cooperation between Vietnam and India, the South China Sea will be more stable, safer and more prosperous" (Minh, 2016).

As one of the important countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia's pursuit of maritime diplomacy and establishment of regional cooperation can be regarded as a way to achieve two goals: first, ensure security, (Supriyanto, 2016) second, actively resolve border disputes (Wijaya, 2014) and demonstrate the ability to coordinate international affairs and regional leadership (Sebastian et al., 2015). Indonesia ended the 1960s with the largest naval power in Southeast Asia. However, in the history of Indonesia, the Sukarno government favored the Soviet Union. During this period, the main surface combatants (PSC) deployed by the Indonesian Navy were Sverdlovsk class cruisers, 7 Skory class destroyers and 13 frigates. President Sukarno's subsequent downfall due to a military coup d'etat had affected relations with the Soviet Union. In any case, these Soviet ships were obviously not suitable for tropical conditions, especially the severely corroded hulls in muddy and high-salinity tropical waters, and then the fleet was returned to the Soviet Union or decommissioned. The military government that violated human rights replaced Sukarno, leading to an arms embargo and also affecting the number and quality of the entire Indonesian navy in the 1970s and 1980s. The surge in the PSC of the Indonesian navy in the 1990s could be attributed to the acquisition of former East German naval vessels by former President Suharto. This decision was mainly promoted by Habibie, the Minister of Research and Technology at the time. In completing this acquisition plan, it took full advantage of its close ties with the new German government. However, these ships were purchased at exorbitant prices. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that corruption was a key factor in the arms purchase case. (Robison, & Hadiz, 2004) In the next 10 to 15 years, Indonesia hopes become a major regional military power. The ambitions of the Indonesian Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) armed forces include a green navy with 274 ships, 10 fighter squadrons and 12 A diesel-electric submarines (Schreer, 2013).

As far as Singapore is concerned, its naval investment is in sharp contrast with the above-mentioned countries. The Singaporean Navy had tolerated for ten years from 2000 to 2009, mainly due to the influence of Israeli military advisers, who were the ancestors of the establishment of star-nation armed forces. These Israeli advisers arrived in Singapore after the astounding victory of a conspiracy during the 1967 Middle East-Israel-Arab War. They firmly believed that only by maintaining a greater advantage over potential enemies in the air combat system could they absolutely ensure the survival of a small country like Singapore. This strategy obviously hindered the development of the Singapore Navy. However, by the 1990s, with the maturity of the Singapore Air Force, the defense budget could then focus more on naval modernization or equipment upgrades. Just as Richard Lim, the former head of the Singapore Marine Corps, gave a speech on the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Singapore Navy on May 5, 1997, "It started as a small patrol and now finally has a balanced navy." Richard Lim further pointed out that the Singapore Navy had evolved from basic coastal defense capabilities of patrol boats and missile gunboats to a modern navy with maritime patrol aircraft, lightning protection ships and new patrol ships, which were sufficient to perform maritime defense tasks and maintain maritime transport routes. Especially in the 21st century, submarine combat readiness is further added to the list of combat forces required for such a balanced force (Lim, 1997).

Take Thailand as an example. The surge in the number of PSCs in the 1990s was attributed to the Chuan Leekpa government, which purchased a helicopter carrier and many Continental 053 Jianghu-class frigates from Spain. According to reports, the Thai navy was impressed by the quality of the mainland frigates, which were sold to

Thailand at the so-called friendship price. There are few explanations as to why these continental frigates were purchased, and they are far from the truth. On the face of it, the Thai Navy has been worried about the insufficient number of such ships. Under the escort of good relations between Thailand and China, the frigate was finally obtained. However, due to stagnant relations between the two militaries, the Thai Navy was unable to obtain better quality platforms and equipment. Therefore, it was more likely to speculate that despite the Thai navy's opposition, the frigates were purchased from the mainland, and these arms purchases were only part of the political relationship between Thailand and China.

### *3.4 Impact on the strategic stability of Southeast Asia*

The above-mentioned strategy in itself does not constitute a sufficient basis for the naval arms race. If an arms race is to take place, there must be a mutually-recognized antagonistic relationship between relevant strategic participants. Even if a country's interests in fisheries and energy resources conflict with the territorial claims of the opposing country, such conflicts are not enough to constitute the existence of "mutual recognition and confrontation" (Gray, 1996).

But this does not mean that we do not have to worry about the strategic stability of Southeast Asia today. Miscalculations can lead to situations of armed conflict that policymakers neither anticipate nor want. In the worst case, the two countries regard each other as potential rivals in future wars and conflicts over territorial resources and geopolitics. At least one party believes that its geostrategic conditions are fundamentally unfavorable, and therefore increase the cost of preemptive military operations. Finally, both countries have military capabilities to project weapons to each other. In other words, both countries have the ability to threaten each other's national interests and even the survival of the country.

After understanding strategic stability from this perspective, it is clear that this condition does not apply to Southeast Asia. As mentioned earlier, there is no obvious antagonism between Southeast Asian countries. It is true that there are disputes between specific countries, but these issues do not constitute a cause of open hostility.

The recent acquisition or ongoing naval platform acquisition plan does constitute a potential but very limited weapon projection and combat capability. The introduction of this weapon projection capability in the naval sector can change the strategic pattern of Southeast Asia to a certain extent. However, just like earlier studies, this change in the strategic pattern of the region has not yet taken place. Although the regional navy began to acquire weapon projection capabilities, the number acquired could only provide a very limited amount of weapon projection, and this type of weapon could not be operated in any continuous manner. Although having said that, we cannot completely rule out the possibility of misunderstanding. The signs show that this misunderstanding is gradually out of control and seems to be slowly falling into armed conflict.

Nowadays, there is a geopolitical issue in Southeast Asia. If it is not handled properly, it may get out of control and fall into armed conflict. That is the territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to describe the South China Sea as the hot pot of Asia, or the throat of the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. (Kaplan, 2014) The latest developments in the mainland's establishment of airfields and land reclamation activities on some atolls and small islands are particularly noteworthy. These activities can be regarded as evidence of the mainland's establishment of permanent military bases in the South China Sea, and can also be regarded as evidence that is not merely purely based on military considerations. In addition to the army's helicopters, (Son, 2014) Vietnam recently purchased 6 Kilo-class submarines (Izvestia, 2016) and 4 Gepard-class frigates (Kienthuc.net.vn, 2014) from Russia to enhance its naval capabilities and at least interfere with mainland naval operations in the South China Sea (Abuza, 2014). After since the mainland's official announcement of the "Nine-Dash Line" in 2009, the Vietnamese Navy began to actively modernize. Between 2011 and 2015, the naval vessel procurement budget accounted for 44% of the total defense imports (Abuza & Anh, 2016). Malaysia's acquisition of two Scorpene submarines and the Philippines' strong interest in purchasing submarines are almost certainly related to the respective interests of these countries in the South China Sea dispute (Laude, 2016a).

In addition, due to the lack of appropriate mechanisms for handling maritime incidents and other crises, the increasingly crowded nature of the South China Sea may eventually trigger a crisis; if not managed properly, the crisis may gradually get out of control and even evolve into conflict. Southeast Asian countries have their own processes, their own attitudes, and their own problems, all of which are reflected in their very unique naval policies (Till & Chan, 2014).

Undoubtedly, the South China Sea has become a potential tipping point in Southeast Asia, attracting widespread international attention, mainly due to the mainland's intervention in the area. Indeed, Southeast Asian countries are competitors for small islands and reef atolls in the South China Sea. Given that Southeast Asian countries only have the basic ability to project naval power into the South China Sea, and have not maintained the naval presence for a long time, it is reasonable to believe that the submarine and PSC procurement behavior is caused by the mainland's intervention in the South China Sea, while the territories of Southeast Asian countries. Declaring that the influencing factors are weak, which means that earlier observations in this study that there is no fierce arms race among Southeast Asian countries are still valid. The purchase of naval arms by Southeast Asian countries since the 1990s should not be regarded as a naval arms race. On the contrary, a more comprehensive modernization of naval forces should be regarded as the dominant pattern. Although progress has been slow, there has been an accelerated trend recently. There are different explanations for the progress of each country. Although economic growth has brought about an increase in the affordability of national defense, another reason is the special political development of each country, and people have gradually realized that the ocean is increasingly important to national security and economic prospects. . In short, Southeast Asian countries themselves do not have the conditions and motivations for the existence of a naval arms race.

But this is not to say that the increasing number of naval forces with green water capabilities such as PSCs and submarines is a target that is not worthy of attention. As mentioned earlier, the expansion of relatively advanced and capable naval ships, the South China Sea is not only a potential flashpoint of geopolitical tensions due to frequent shipping, but also in lack of appropriate mechanisms to manage these tensions and risks. In sea areas with potential crises, dangerous conflicts may arise at any time due to maritime accidents. Although Southeast Asia has experienced a period of relative strategic stability, the aforementioned naval procurement risks undermining regional strategic stability. Of course, if there is no appropriate management of the corresponding national weapons procurement plan, there will be no appropriate regional crisis management mechanism, and the strategic stability of Southeast Asia may deteriorate.

#### **4. Naval Modernization in Southeast Asia: Taking the Six Countries in the South China Sea as Examples**

Economic factors and geopolitics influence the modernization process of the navies of small and medium-sized countries, as do the Indochina Peninsula and South China Sea countries. Therefore, the development model of the Southeast Asian navy seems to have such a commonality. The detailed description is as follows.

##### *4.1 Singapore*

The security of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is drawing increasing attention from the outside world, and countries in the region are working hard to strengthen their measures. Japan and the United States are increasingly criticizing coastal countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The former believes that the latter is not doing enough to ensure the safety of shipping in the region. The high incidence of piracy and armed attacks on ships and the threat of maritime terrorism have been used as a means to support the new security recommendations. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have increased the number of patrols in the Malacca Strait, while India and Thailand have also patrolled access to the northern part of the strait (Bateman, 2005).

Before modern skyscrapers were encircled, Singapore was a relic of an ancient trading port. Not only was it prosperous and international, it was also a key node of the Maritime Silk Road (Miksic, 2013). From the 1990s

to the 21st century, from the perspective of several important modernization strategies, Singapore's current naval development has been continuous. The modernization of the Singapore Navy has always been very smooth because of injecting capital from time to time to the aging fleet and the serious combat gap (Chow, 2015). Despite the financial crisis in 1997-1998, Singapore's navy continued to grow, and therefore it was ahead of other neighboring countries in many respects.

By the beginning of this century, Singapore had completed most of the balance of naval forces in response to the original strategic vision, and the modernization process continued until 2010. In order to maintain and enhance the existing naval combat capabilities, Singapore has gradually strengthened its existing overall functions. Therefore, the implementation of projects in recent years has not been a radical addition to the force, but more precisely, it has been gradually strengthened or expanded. From a financial, operational and technical point of view, this reflects a more sustainable defense strategy, which enables Singapore to balance its maritime defense and security requirements in the ever-changing defense environment at home and abroad, while keeping pace with the latest naval technology.

#### *4.2 Indonesia*

This section presents Indonesia's maritime vision, derivative goals, and the challenges faced in achieving these goals. Obviously, it may be too early to give definitive answers to these questions. But the forecast of Indonesia's alternative ocean strategy seems to be sound. First of all, Indonesia's ambition to march toward the sea has roughly taken shape. In other words, a healthy marine economy, a national defense industry base, and a powerful navy and coast guard can contribute to general economic development, strengthening national integrity, and safeguarding national interests, thereby ensuring national security and regional security, even global security. Secondly, taking the failure of maritime procedures as the starting point, we have come to a conclusion that is completely opposite to the above speculation. The ocean is the source of strength, peace and prosperity for Indonesia and its neighboring countries. Everyone has common interests in sharing waters. However, the ocean is also a threat and an obstacle to national development, because the ocean is likely to keep the country out of the world. Especially, a country that combines naval forces to defend maritime interests will largely determine the rules of the international political and economic game. Of course, the above two points of view are at the two extremes of possibility, representing two completely different choices. In the similarities between them, what is more likely to happen will be more nuanced. Therefore, we can only wait and see what form of development the Indonesian navy may take and the consequences that may occur.

#### *4.3 Malaysia*

Geographically, the Strait of Malacca divides Malaysia into two parts: Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia. Peninsular Malaysia is located in the middle of Southeast Asia, below Thailand, with the waters of the Strait of Malacca to the west and the South China Sea to the east. East Malaysia is composed of two states in Malaysia. Malaysia connects east and west waters and has historically been influenced by merchants from all over the world. Malaysia's overall marine policy is to provide marine products, services, and development and economic activities on a constantly balanced and permanent basis (Basiron & Kaur, 2009).

Although there are still many inherently insufficient transparencies (Sutarji & Kasmin, 2009) in Malaysia's naval modernization process, (Malaysia's National Defense Policy, 2015) it also reflects the dangers and uncertainties that the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) should pay attention to in the decision-making system. (Basiron, 2012) Is this the mainland's overconfidence in the South China Sea, or the internal security issue taking the Sabah incident as an example, or non-traditional maritime security issues such as piracy or illegal fishing. These issues are partly due to uncertainties of very basic strategies. Obviously, there is a lack of consensus on Malaysia's naval development policy, (Matthews & Yip, 2013) and another difficulty comes from the decline in oil prices, which greatly reduces the purchasing power of oil and worsens the situation. The Malaysian currency and the consequent limited budget have raised very practical questions, (Bitzinger, 2015) that is, if anything happens, what capabilities Malaysia should have. At present, RMN opportunistically chooses the capabilities required for

universal deterrence from the long-term list. The project is mainly based on the current situation. This led to the creation of the Navy's defense procurement system. Despite the best efforts of the Navy's leadership, there is no theoretical continuity in practice (Ministry of Defense (Malaysia), 2010). In general, it is clear that there is an intention to improve the cost-effectiveness of the fleet by training savvy users and rationalizing inventory, but this is considered too diverse in terms of support and operational requirements. RMN currently operates about 15 ship-class ships, and the goal is to reduce them to 5 ships by 2030 and at the same time deal with obsolete ships accounting for 40% of the total. In the current situation, this is indeed a challenge.

Malaysia is located on the mainland's "One Belt, One Road" and is the throat of the mainland navy from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. During Najib Abdul Razak's tenure as prime minister, Malaysia actively developed relations with the mainland (Teoh, 2016). In addition to assisting in the development of infrastructure such as high-speed railways, the mainland also vigorously subsidized the Malaysian navy to purchase armaments (Leng, 2013). Regarding the overlap with the mainland's sovereignty in the South China Sea, Najib believes that disputes should be handled calmly and rationally through dialogue, in accordance with the rule of law and peaceful negotiations, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Taiwan (Beng, 2016).

#### *4.4 Vietnam*

Unlike the well-trained and experienced Vietnamese ground forces, the Vietnam People's Navy (VPN) has hardly participated in large-scale naval battles since its establishment. Lack of proper training of modern naval combat strategies, VPN faces the most severe challenge, because the navy itself cannot obtain relevant new weapon systems, as well as the knowledge and experience required for actual combat operations. Due to budget constraints, there are very few live ammunition naval exercises. In order to overcome this obstacle, VPN has recently purchased some training simulation systems for naval systems from Russia, such as the Gepard class frigates and Molniya class fast attack boats. The deployment of these first training ships by VPN can also help the Naval Academy improve training courses. However, a qualified and well-organized training program depends entirely on future budget allocation and clear policy formulation in which naval training will play a key role in modernization.

The quality and quantity of the fleet is another major issue. Most of the VPN surface detachment is still made up of outdated Soviet-era small ships. Due to the vast exclusive economic zone, more and more advanced mainland warships invade the sovereign waters, and the ability of VPNs to protect maritime rights and interests is threatened. The recent accumulation of Vietnam's maritime affairs is obviously not enough to ensure the deterrence in response to maritime conflicts in the South China Sea. As mentioned earlier, VPN requires time and other resources to train seafarers to use new weapon systems and related tactics.

The ultimate challenge comes from a naval strategy that lacks public debate. Although Vietnam announced its naval strategy in 2011 and pointed out some future directions for the development of the country's navy, in addition to comprehensively integrating economic and maritime defense measures, it actually did not publish any detailed information on how to develop a navy with sufficient combat power. So far, no real naval strategy has been disclosed, and due to confidentiality, it seems extremely unlikely for the public to learn more about the relevant strategy. Even in Vietnam, experts and analysts can only collect scattered information. Therefore, an incomplete analysis can only be made from VPN contracts with foreign navies and the statements of several leaders. The deep secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding the formulation process of the Navy and related strategies restricts the decision-making process of other intellectuals outside the military field, thus forming unnecessary restrictions on how to make comprehensive but effective comments or provide feedback (Barrie & Waldwyn, 2016).

#### *4.5 Thailand*

In contrast, Thailand seems to be less concerned about the complex jurisdictional benefits of the South China Sea. Since 2004, the Thai army, like the Philippines, has long been concentrated on the land borders adjacent to

Vietnam and Cambodia, or the threat of terrorism and insurgency in the southern region. Therefore, Thailand is particularly dependent on the army and air force while downgrading the navy. However, this does not mean that Bangkok will ignore the protection of its maritime borders. Since the 1990s, the Royal Thai Navy has acquired mainland-built frigates and the former Spanish light aircraft carrier HTMS Chakri Naruebet, which has upgraded the navy from its brown water capability to a limited blue water capability.

The modernization of the Thai navy continues to accelerate, but this does not mean that Thai defense has been sea-oriented. Due to strategic and political considerations, military personnel still dominate the development of national defense. The lack of conventional maritime threats, such as the threat faced by the Philippines, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (People's Republic of China), 2014) is unfavorable to the huge and effective navy construction motivation. Therefore, a question is often raised "If Thailand's defense and military strategy are still centered on land, then why choose a sea platform that is as expensive as an aircraft carrier?" Perhaps political and economic non-strategic factors can answer this question.

In a way, Thailand, on the Indochina Peninsula, is similar to Vietnam. Land-based threats from the mainland and Cambodia, coupled with the military legacy of a long civil war, forced Vietnam to maintain a large standing army, while its naval capabilities were limited to coastal and river defense. This policy was not changed until the threat from the mainland gradually shifted from the northern border of Vietnam to the South China Sea, and Hanoi was competing with Beijing for the ownership of some islands in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. The Vietnamese Navy is composed entirely of torpedo boats and fast assault boats. Through the purchase of Russian-built Gopard-class frigates and six Russian Kilo-class submarines, Vietnam's naval capabilities have been greatly improved. Submarine introduces Vietnam into the field of undersea operation. In theory, at least, the submarine will enable Vietnam to asymmetrically challenge the mainland's maritime control in the South China Sea during the conflict and monitor mainland maritime forces during peacetime.

Owning platforms is one thing, while operating and maintaining them effectively is another. Therefore, in this case, we must keep watch for Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar's strong ambitions to purchase and operate general naval platforms, especially the ambition to maintain the submarine military. After-sales support and training may make the purchasing country spend far more than the initial payment of the platform itself. Considering the political attention and financial investment that must be put into the Navy, maintaining the effectiveness of the Navy is also a political strategic decision. This is where political leadership and operation are most important. Without political and economic support to ensure sustained and sufficient funding, it is difficult to see how submarines and other naval platforms maintain operational deployment and strategic effectiveness. Indeed, a recent analyst concluded that most submarine operators in Southeast Asia have not yet convincingly demonstrated their ability and strategy to operate their submarine fleets, thereby acting as an effective deterrent.

#### *4.6 The Philippines*

The Philippines Navy (PN) is the naval warfare service department of the Philippine armed forces. PN patrols maritime borders together with the Philippine Coast Guard that was previously an affiliated unit and became an independent maritime law enforcement unit in 1998. As a maritime country and archipelago country with about 95 million people, the Philippines has a total of 1,707 islands, not to mention many disputed islands in the South China Sea. There is no doubt that PN can play an important role in national security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (People's Republic of China), 2016).

The revised version of Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program (RAFPMP) is implemented in three phases. (Nepomuceno, 2018) The first phase of the so-called "Horizon One" was implemented from 2013 to 2017. The second phase of "Horizon Two" is implemented from 2018 to 2022. The third phase of "Horizon Three" will be implemented from 2023 to 2028. PN is integrated with the entire armed forces and is currently implementing modernization in accordance with PN's 2020 Strategic Navigation Plan.

As part of "Horizon 2", PN is buying new battleships to improve maritime combat capabilities, (kknews, 2018) including the introduction of a new type of anti-submarine missile frigate for the Ocean Combat Force (OCF) under the Corvette Purchase Program. This is in line with PN's expectation that the force will have a mixed capability upgrade plan. In fact, the plan requires the purchase of 12 additional frigates between 2013 and 2028. The Philippine Armed Forces procurement plan submitted in December 2016 includes 12 naval frigates, of which 8 are planned for the "Horizon 2" phase, and the other 4 are for the "Horizon 3" phase. Finally, according to the latest plan submitted by PN (the "Horizon 2" phase in 2017), only 2 frigates are about to be funded. Based on the official document issued by President Duterte, the proposed budget in June 2018 is Php28 billion (Laude, 2016b).

On August 22, 2019, PN announced the "Government to Government (G2G) Approach" and planned to purchase 2 frigates from South Korea (NAVAL Technology, 2019). At the same time, the South Korean government was planning to donate two additional groups of Pohang-level personnel to support and improve the Philippines' naval capabilities. As part of this plan, PN's maritime transport and amphibious capabilities were strongly modernized and ready to replace the country's traditional ships. The service required support and funding to purchase two strategic maritime transport vessels (SSV) as part of a priority project of "Horizon 2."

In the RAFPMP released by PN in 2012, the fleet needed to purchase at least four strategic shipping vessels between 2013 and 2028. In the last document submitted by PN to the Department of Defense (DND) at the end of 2017, through Malacanang's review and approval, PN requested the purchase of 3 strategic maritime transport vessels with a budget of Php7.5 billion (or an average of Php2.5 billion for each SSV). However, with the reduction of "Horizon 2" to two ships by Malacanang, the plan was approved in early 2018, and the entire budget was reduced to Php5.0 billion.

From the perspective of PN's navy modernization content and the types of assets to be purchased, PN has no intention of building a navy with blue water capabilities. The main purpose of the modernization of the PN is to defend offshore territories and protect the borders of the islands and its own waters, especially the region passed by the new Philippine Islands Baseline Law. This policy can be obtained from the purchase of second-hand Hamilton Class Cutters from the United States, in which the clues of the PN modernization plan can be seen.

The Philippines regards naval modernization as an important policy necessary to safeguard sovereignty and national construction. In essence, PN modernization still has five challenges to be overcome: the current threat perception of decision-makers, restrictions on procurement resources, competition between services, suffocation and difficulty of procurement system, and in lack of social acceptance. Unless the Philippine government reformulates its national security policy to overcome these challenges, it will be difficult for PN to regain the glory of the world's outstanding navy (Banlaoi, 2012).

## **5. Conclusions, Suggestions and Prospects**

In short, most of the Southeast Asian countries studied in this article are not prepared to prioritize the navy as a clear political goal. Due to the improvement of the economic situation (or worse), the modernization of the navy in the region seems to be a gradual process, not accidental or even accidental, but they do not come from the highest political leadership or are jointly supported by a well-coordinated plan.

Changes in the political and economic environment may change the pace and even the continuity of naval modernization. It should be remembered that initially the countries in the region were able to expand their military and air forces in the early 1990s, mainly from the economic miracle of the time, but shortly afterwards, in 1997, policymakers faced the Asian financial crisis, which weakened their abilities to maintain the military expansion at the time. As in other regions, naval decision makers of Southeast Asian countries have indeed been waiting for opportunities.

According to news media reports at the end of 2020, (Lu, 2019) after attending the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting, US Secretary of Defense Mark Thomas Esper called on the South China Sea countries to actively

express their views in Manila, and strongly protested the mainland's expansion of sea power in the South China Sea in recent years. There is no doubt that the entire Asia-Pacific region, especially Southeast Asia, is currently undergoing a large-scale naval modernization process. This phenomenon is completely aimed at the mainland's invasion of the South China Sea, because it has formed an arms race that threatens peace in the region. Although at the end of the last century, economic prosperity was the main reason for the expansion of naval armaments.

Since the 1980s, there has been a significant increase in the allocation of naval resources in Southeast Asian countries, especially the six countries in the South China Sea: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (SIPRI, 2020) the total expenditures on naval platforms of the six countries mentioned above increased by about one billion U.S. dollars during the 30 years from 1970 to 1999.

For these countries, the marine environment has always been an important part of national life. The history of Southeast Asian countries has always described the powerful ocean elements, whether it is the characteristics of the archipelago, or the maritime trade from the colonial period to the present. Today, such geopolitical issues in Southeast Asia may get out of control and fall into armed conflict if they are not handled properly.

Entering the second decade of the 21st century, the South China Sea has become a potential tipping point in Southeast Asia, arousing widespread international concern, mainly because of the mainland's intervention in the region. Indeed, Southeast Asian countries are competitors in the economic interests of small islands and reef atolls in the South China Sea. Given that Southeast Asian countries only have the basic ability to project naval power into the South China Sea, but do not have the ability to maintain a navy's existence for a long time, we have reason to believe that the procurement of submarines and major sea surface combatants is caused by the mainland's intervention in the South China Sea.

In response to the mainland's policy to intervene into the South China Sea, the United States has significantly increased the size of its navy, the degree of freedom of navigation, and the level of interaction with Southeast Asian navies in the area in recent years. Asian countries are also willing to devote energy and resources to their naval development. Under the leadership of former President Obama, the United States has participated in ASEAN affairs and has indeed made significant progress in influencing local policies. Similarly, Trump promised to increase the naval construction from the current 274 to 350, which shows that the United States is still actively preventing China from expanding its autonomy in the South China Sea.

Changes in the political and economic environment may change the pace and even the continuity of naval modernization. Initially, countries in the South China Sea region were able to expand their armaments in the early 1990s, mainly due to the economic miracle at that time, but shortly afterwards, they faced the Asian financial crisis in 1997, which weakened their ability to maintain military expansion at that time. However, in recent years, the mainland's intervention in the South China Sea, regardless of whether its purpose is economic or military, has caused Southeast Asian naval decision makers to "sit on their backs."

In the future, the mainland's self-confidence in the South China Sea will further promote the modernization of the Southeast Asian navy, which may or may not be, because this is related to the mainland's economy to a certain extent. Secondly, the uncertainty about the future direction of the United States in Southeast Asia, the reliability of its security guarantees, the withdrawal of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Indo-Pacific strategy in the Trump era, and Biden's coming to power in 2021 all affect the future of the South China Sea. There are many variables in the forecast of the development of the situation.

However, basically, the only reasonable way forward is the plan to prepare for the threat of the enemy, respond to the uncertain future, and create more capabilities, and it is also a principle of sustainable development. If this is indeed the direction of the actual efforts of Southeast Asian naval planners, then, in the foreseeable future, the worry that the modernization of the navy will destabilize the regional situation will be reduced.

Maritime security is a major issue in the Asia-Pacific region, but until now, solutions have been highly plagued by complex "political problems". These include different interpretations of the Law of the Sea that supports regional maritime security, lack of maritime order, numerous conflicting claims on maritime jurisdiction, the impact of increased naval activity in the region, and the lack of agreed maritime boundaries. Arms expansion will never resolve the South China Sea disputes. Basically, the effective concrete plan is to return to the law and consultation mechanism. Among them, the recently established "Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)" is a good organization for consultation, because it covers almost all stakeholders in the South China Seas. For those with economic and trade interests, under the coordination of economy and politics, the situation of fierce warfare should be avoidable.

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# Pancasila as the Foundation of Political Ethics in Indonesia, Case Study of the Struggle for the Chairman of a Political Party in Indonesia

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## Abstract

The world of politics is becoming something interesting to discuss. Every time there's something new going on. There is no eternal enmity or eternal friend in politics, but the infinite is only essential (read: power struggle). At some point, a person could be a friend, but other times he could be the enemy. It's still fresh in all of us how frenetic the last presidential election we held yesterday. The frictions have felt very hot, so people are wary from mutual claims of victory, to each other's accusations of cheating, to the last in the Constitutional Court. However, after that, it continued on social media for months. This feud resulted in two terms that are very viral in Indonesia, namely *cebong* and *kampret*. This is an accumulation of fanaticism of both sides' supporters ("Tidak Ada Musuh Atau Teman Abadi Di Dalam Politik – Independensi," n.d.). This article was written to give a clearer picture of the politics in Indonesia. So there is a difference between politics in Indonesia and other countries. The political system of a different government, including various cultural roots, will give its characteristics. Research through literature and various other readings and discussions conducted in the classroom and multiple seminars. Also, based on the development of the current political situation. There is still a need for a deeper understanding of political actors as well as from academia. So that political life in Indonesia will be better. Political education, especially political ethics in Indonesia as a State based on Pancasila, must be continuously improved. This is the shared responsibility of all components of the nation. Indonesia should not be destroyed because there are foreign hands who interfere in politics in Indonesia.

**Keywords:** Coupt, Education, Ethics, Politics, Systems

## 1. Introduction

### Preliminary

After the end of the New Order regime in 1998, many changes have occurred in almost all nation and State sectors. The most striking thing is the birth of new political parties. During the New Order regime, we only knew

3 (three) parties. So, after the New Order, which we know as the Reformation Order, new parties emerged from the old Party splits, or new parties with new ideas emerged ("General Election 1999: Islamic and Nationalist Political Parties Fighting Without Communism - Tirto. ID," nd). This situation may be the same as the election during the Old Order ("Pemilu 1999: Papol Islam Dan Nasionalis Berlaga Tanpa Komunis - Tirto.ID," n.d.).

In the old order, more than 25 parties were participating in the election. In the old order, the Party's ideology was different from one another; there were PNI-PARTINDO-IPKI-etc. Nationalists, PKI Communists; Islam NU-MASYUMI- PSII-PI PERI, Socialist PSI-MURBA, Christian PARKINDO, etc. Elections during the Old Order were almost the same as now. The old order period was the search for a period of implementation of the Pancasila form, especially in the state system. Pancasila was implemented in different forms during the old order. There are three different Pancasila implementation periods: the 1945-1950 period, the 1950-1959 period, and the 1959-1966 period ("Old Order Political System | Dindafaradina," n.d.) ("Sistem Politik Orde Lama | Dindafaradina," n.d.).

During the Reformation Order era, there were repeated struggles for the leadership of the existing parties. This is an exciting phenomenon to discuss. What is the problem of what could cause this to happen and happen again? The last is what happened in the Democratic Party. One of the major parties that go back and forth for 2 (two) periods of Government. 2004-2009 and 2009-2014. This phenomenon is interesting because it involves people outside the Party and ahead of the presidential election in 2024. Although it is still a long time, at that time, there must have been a change of Government because the current Government has entered its second period ("DIFFERENCES IN INDONESIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | PAPER COLLECTION FULL, "nd).

Plato and Aristotle were both teacher and student, and both had the same teacher, namely the great ancient Greek philosopher Socrates. Both are philosophers who talk about many things, and one of them is about socio-political thinking. Plato and Aristotle's socio-political philosophy is well known in the world of thought (Roswanto, 2015). Politics is the art and science of gaining power in a constitutional and non-constitutional manner ("Let's Learn More Wisely About Political Science!" N.d.).

Besides, politics can also be viewed from different points of view, namely (Roswanto, 2015):

- a) Politics is an effort taken by citizens to realize the common good.
- b) Politics are matters relating to governance and the State.
- c) Politics is an activity directed at gaining and maintaining power in society.
- d) Politics is everything about the process of formulating and implementing public policies.

In understanding politics, several keys need to be understood, including political power, legitimacy, political systems, political behavior, political participation, the political process. It is also essential to know the ins and outs of political parties.

### **Research methods**

This study uses a variety of existing literature. To complement each other the necessary information. Because some of the events took place in the past, it is required to make comparisons to avoid the misinformation obtained. The references obtained are very informative to researchers so that researchers can get this information. Readers can do research again based on the references used by the researcher. This will add to the repertoire of knowledge for both readers and the institutions that employ these references. Researchers will try to discuss this problem with the concept/theory of strategy and theory of LYP.

Universally, the concept/strategy shows the relationship of three elements/elements, namely ways, means, and ends or goals (Hooker, 2011). Mathematically, the process is assumed to be a means plus an objective, with the formula:

St = W + M + E where:

St (Strategy) = Strategy

W (Ways) = The means taken to achieve the goal

M (Means) = resources, facilities, and infrastructure that can be used to achieve goals.

E (Ends) = Objectives that have been defined in the policy

LYP Implementation Concept / Theory. Implementation (Prakoso, 2016).

- a) Integrated, whether the activities carried out have been integrated with other departments.
- b) Interactive, whether the activities carried out to interact with other fields.
- c) Transparency, whether the activity is carried out transparently.
- d) Control, how is the control system so as not to get out of the planned rail.
- e) Accountability, all activities must be accountable, especially when using funds/budgets.

Indonesia's current political system is Pancasila democracy. At least so constitutionally. The case applied by neoliberal is debatable. Pancasila democracy is a political system based on Pancasila, which is implemented in the State of Indonesia. As a political system, Pancasila democracy is one of the various forms of democracy in the world. Apart from Pancasila democracy, we know liberal democracy and social democracy. The Indonesian political system can be understood as the whole of the activities carried out by Indonesian state institutions to achieve goals in the public interest, namely the Indonesian people's interests. These activities are carried out by high state institutions included in the legislative, executive, and judiciary components.

Next, we enter the section on the explanation of the superstructure and political infrastructure. The political superstructure is a high institution of the State. These institutions run the political system in Indonesia. Political infrastructure is an institution in society that functions as a channel for people's aspirations. Political parties, mass organizations, mass media are some examples of the institutions in question. Both are important because how the Indonesian political system works cannot be explained unless it explains the two institutions' work. The aim of running the country's political system is to achieve what is in the common good. Politics is about the distribution of power and decision-making. In the end, everything is focused on what is in the interests of the people, not the interests of the group. State institutions run the political system. The institutions in the society propose what the aspirations of the people are.

Political ethics is a political philosophy branch that discusses political behavior or actions regarding good and evil. Political philosophy is a set of social, national, and national beliefs defended and fought for by its adherents, such as communism, fascism, democracy. This philosophy is closely related to the names of its predecessors, such as communism by Karl Marx (Veraza Urtuzuástegui, 2018) / fascism by Mussolini (Mussolini, 1933), and democracy by Thomas Jefferson (Jefferson, 2011).

We cannot confuse political philosophy with an economic system that grows together between the two; democracy is a political philosophy. At the same time, capitalism is a financial system in which there is private ownership of the means of production, and the incentive for the results of labor then lies in the profits obtained by the person.

Entrepreneur.

Communism as a philosophy needs to be distinguished from communism as an economic system, precisely socialism; communism is a political philosophy accompanied by a social, economic system. As a financial system, communism rejects private ownership of the means of production and puts the war for the results of subsequent labor solely on the increasing welfare of all people; profit as a motive needs to be rejected if which only means profit—personal gain, which means the accumulation of wealth by a person for himself alone.

Fascism as a philosophy needs to be distinguished from a corporate economic system. A corporate financial system is a form of capitalism in which the State regulates all jobs alternating the conflicting trade unions and employers' unions. The highest fascist board closely monitors the corporate economic system. In short, the corporate State is a capitalist with a dictatorial form of Government. So political ethics is a branch of political

philosophy. Therefore, whether political actions or behavior are assessed in political ethics, judgments are based on political philosophy. Pancasila as a philosophical system is essentially a value so that it is the source of all the translation of norms, both legal norms, moral norms, and other state norms. It contains a thought - a thought that is critical, basic, rational, and comprehensive (overall), and this system of thinking constitutes a value.

As a value, Pancasila provides basic and universal principles for humans in living in society, as a nation, and as a state. These values are then translated into explicit norms so that they become a guideline. These norms include:

a) Moral norms, namely those related to human behavior, can be measured from an excellent or wrong perspective.

b) Legal norms, namely a system of laws and regulations in force in Indonesia. In this sense, Pancasila is the source of all sources of law in the Indonesian State.

Judging from the formula for the unity of the Pancasila principles, the ethical issue, in this case, is the political ethics of Pancasila, which is the closest to the second principle. Therefore the formula for the unit sequence with the other four precepts is as follows: Pancasila political ethics is political behavior or actions following just and civilized humanity, which has the third cross, the fourth cross-legged cross, the fifth cross-legged, and the one cross-legged. Ethical issues are issues of values, while the postulate about Pancasila philosophy's importance is the essence of the human being Pancasila. Therefore, the formula for a series of unified principles in Pancasila relating to Pancasila Political ethics starts from the second principle: Just and Civilized Humanity. To translate this fundamental formula into a relatively brief description of the political ethics of Pancasila, it must be adjusted according to its needs. Each Pancasila principle must be translated into its general definitions from the general to the more concrete-specific. Simultaneously, it must not be forgotten that the other four principles automatically qualify every meaning of translating the Pancasila principles.

A case in point is how to campaign following Pancasila ethics? Then the answer is various, but in principle: Campaigning is not against human values; for example, do not interfere with others' security, do not harm others, maintain good relations with fellow human beings, and not clash with other parties. This step is based on the 3rd precept. Campaigning rules must be obeyed because obeying the rules means following all of us. This step is based on the 4th precept. Election and especially campaigning, the end goal is for our life's welfare and prosperity together, try not to obstruct efforts towards mutual prosperity. This step is based on the 5th precept. Know that all evil deeds that cause elections or campaigns are always inseparable from Almighty God's observations. This step is based on precepts 1.

The essence of political problems is not limited to issues of power. But politics is a matter of beliefs in society, nation, and State, which is defended and fought for by its adherents, namely the Pancasila people trying and struggling to carry out a life of society, nation, and State based on Pancasila. That was the scientific definition of "politics." Also, there is a non-scientific understanding of "politics," where the principle of struggle is for the sake of victory in power, the issue of human values is not essential; if necessary, "the goal justifies the means."

The values of Pancasila are also not always adhered to; if necessary, act and act contrary to Pancasila, it may even be hidden the desire/desire to replace Pancasila with another state basis. This is not scientific because it cannot be accounted for in Pancasila. History has shown that such political behavior or actions will not bring social justice to all Indonesians. From a "political" perspective, in this scientific sense, how many of our politicians seem to be "problematic."

Let's look at the world political stage. The end of President Sadam Husein's rule, which can be considered tragic with the various sorrows behind it, is not Sadam Hussein's goal. Likewise, the end of President Soekarno and President Suharto, who could be considered "uncomfortable" with the various problems behind it, indeed not his goals. All this shows that realizing Political philosophy correctly as proven by sticking to political ethics in a scientific sense is not easy. Therefore it must always be strived for.

If it is not pursued seriously, obstacles, difficulties, and temptations will always divert politicians and people, in general, to carry out "politics" in an unscientific sense, which cannot be accounted for to the Political Philosophy of Pancasila. A political party (partol) is a group consisting of various groups of individuals. It is not surprising that there are prone to differences in opinions, views, and visions among its members within a political party. Not a few of the political parties were eventually divided, just because of differences in views. Since Soekarno's leadership (old order), Indonesia has experienced the ebb and flow of intrigue in political parties. This has happened since before independence.

## Results and Discussion

### 1. Sarekat Islam (SI): SI Red Vs White SI

Sarekat Islam (SI) originated from the Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI), originally a collection of indigenous traders. Formed in 1905, this group was created as a resistance to indigenous traders against market conditions controlled by Chinese traders (Yasmis, 2017). As SI proliferated, its group gradually began to be infiltrated with revolutionary socialism starting in 1914. HJFM Sneevliet brought this understanding through its organization called ISDV (Indische Sociaal - Democratische Vereeniging) ("ARISING AND BROKEN OF ISLAMIC SAREKAT IN SEMARANG 1913-1920," 2011). ("MUNCUL DAN PECAHNYA SAREKAT ISLAM DI SEMARANG 1913-1920," 2011)

Having a similar goal to help the poor and fight against capitalism, several young figures such as Semaoen, Darsono, Tan Malaka, and Alimin Prawirodirdjo also embraced this ideology (Yeon, 2013). SI held its sixth congress on 6-10 October 1921 to discuss the prohibition of dual membership in party bodies. This was done after receiving pressure from Abdul Muis and Agus Salim, who wanted to rid SI of communist elements. Since then, SI has split into two parties. SI Merah which is based in Semarang and SI Putih which is based in Yogyakarta. SI Putih was led by HOS Tjokroaminoto and SI Merah, who embraced Communism-Socialism led by Semaoen.



Figure 1: Sarekat Islam

Source: *organisasi-sarekat-islam.jpg (589×296) (staticaly.com)*, 2019

### 2. Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI): Soerdjadi vs. Megawati.

The split in the Party with a bull's head has become one of the darkest moments in the world of Indonesian politics (Rahmat, 2013). This incident began when 16 functionaries of the PDI DPP held the congress to separate from Megawati Soekarnoputri. Implementing the congress, which took place in Medan, was led directly by Fatimah Achmad. Megawati immediately gave a strong response by sacking the 16 functionaries. This dismissal was carried out because they were deemed to have defected and violated the PDI's Articles of Association and Household Budget (AD / ART).

Despite strong opposition from the Party, this congress was still running and was allegedly received support from the then President, Soeharto. This suspicion gained a strong basis after the congress on 20-22 June 1996 was opened by remarks from the Minister of Home Affairs at that time, Yogie S Memed. The congress went

smoothly and culminated in the Deputy Speaker's appointment of the DPR / MPR Soerdjadi as the PDI new chairman. This conflict eventually became more and more sobering and ended in death ("JULY 27 1996: Conflict in the Indonesian Democratic Party between Megawati and Soerjadi's camp - UPI Repository," n.d.).



Figure 2: Peristiwa 27 Juli 1996

Source: peristiwa 27 juli 1996 - Bing images, 1996

### 3. National Awakening Party (PKB): Gus Dur vs. Cak Imin

In line with Democrats, PKB has also experienced a similar case ahead of the 2009 Election ("Sudurism and Conflict of Cak Imin vs. Gus Dur," n.d.) ("Sudurisme Dan Konflik Cak Imin Vs Gus Dur," n.d.). This split began when the late Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dur), who served as Chairman of the PKB Syuro Council at that time, removed Muhaimin Iskandar from his position as chairman the PKB. Gus Dur took this decision after he smelled Cak Imin's maneuvers that seemed to want to defect from him.

Not accepting his dismissal, Cak Imin countered Gus Dur at the South Jakarta District Court (PN). The Extraordinary Congress (MLB) members began to be busy voicing the voices of their own. After various pressures, finally, the MLB was implemented. However, MLB is executed by both parties. PKB members who followed Gus Dur conducted MLB at Al-Asshriyyah Ponpes, Bogor. Meanwhile, those who took part in Cak Imin held it at the Hotel Mercure, Ancol. Gus Dur's final MLB decision established him as the General Chair of the Syuro Council and Ali Masykur Musa as the General Chair of the Tanfidz Council. Meanwhile, the MLB Cak Imin appointed himself as the Chairperson of the PKB and KH Aziz Mansyur as the General Chair of the Syuro Council.



Figure 3. Gus Dur dan Cak Imin

Source: Gus Dur vs. Cak Imin - Bing images, 2009

### 4. Golkar: Aburizal Bakrie vs Agung Laksono

Golkar is also inseparable from dualism within its Party. It was recorded that in 2014, this banyan tree party had experienced the duality of leadership. This incident began when the Golkar national meeting (munas) in Bali was deemed undemocratic ("The Battle of Agung Laksono vs. Aburizal Bakrie, Who Deserves to Lead Golkar?" n.d.) ("Perseteruan Agung Laksono Vs Aburizal Bakrie, Siapakah Yang Sebenarnya Pantas Memimpin Golkar?" n.d.).

This started when Airlangga Hartanto and Hajriyanto resigned from the Golkar Party Ketum candidate exchange. She was making the Bali National Congress ended with Aburizal Bakrie's election as Golkar's new chairman. Not accepting this fact, several Golkar members held a counter-munas in Ancol. This national conference ended with Agung Laksono being elected as the new chairman of the Golkar Party. In March 2015, through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Kemenkumham), the Government decided on the results of the Ancol National Congress, which was approved by its legality. This decision allegedly emerged because Agung Laksono sided with Jokowi's Government while Ical was acting in the opposition. After long intrigue and debate, this dualism was finally successfully ended in 2016. Both parties agreed to hold an Extraordinary National Conference (Munaslub) in May 2016. Unlike the previous election, this time, Agung and Ical did not nominate themselves as the new Golkar chairman. This Munaslub produced a final decision, which appointed Setya Novanto to be the new chairman of the Golkar party for the 2016-2019 period ("Agung Laksono Minta Kubu Ical Tak Pesimistis Untuk Islah Golkar - News Liputan6.Com," n.d.).



Figure 4: Agung L dan Ical

Source: Aburizal Bakrie vs Agung Laksono - Bing images, tahun 2016

##### 5. United Development Party (PPP): Djan Faridz vs. Romahurmuziy (Romy).

PPP experienced dualism chaos after Suryadharma Ali was named by the KPK as a suspect in a corruption case in organizing the haj in 2014. Ali's arrest left a void in the position of party chairman. Therefore, party officials agreed to hold the congress. Instead of gathering into one forum, PPP even had conferences in Surabaya and Jakarta ("Djan Faridz Faces Romy With a 'Cold' Attitude - This is Com #News," n.d.) ("Djan Faridz Hadapi Romy Dengan Sikap 'Dingin' - Inilah.Com #News," n.d.). The congress in Surabaya was initiated by Romi and ended with the appointment of Romi as the new head of PPP. Meanwhile, the Jakarta congress was created by supporters of Ali and appointed Djan as its chairman. The appointment of Romi as chairman immediately received an official decree from the Government. Even so, Djan did not give up and continued to challenge the decision to the State Administrative Court (PTUN). For almost three years, the two camps continued to compete in fighting for their legitimacy as the General Chairperson of the PPP. Until finally, after receiving a Judicial Review by the Supreme Court (MA) in 2017, Romi assured that now PPP had reunited.



Figure 5: Romi dan Djan Farits

Source: romi vs djan farits - Bing images, 2017

#### 6. Party of Conscience of the People (Hanura): Oesman Sapta Odang (OSO) vs. Vice Marshal (Ret.) Daryatmo

Similar to PKB, this dualism stems from the mutual firing of DPP Secretary-General Hanura Syarifuddin Sudding and Ketum Hanura Oesman Sapta Odang (OSO) in 2018. Sudding fired OSO because he thought it violated party rules. On the same day, OSO fired Sudding, who he considered incompetent in carrying out his duties. Sudding and his camp in Hanura held an Extraordinary National Conference (Munaslub), which was an order from Wiranto. The Munaslub, which was held in Cilangkap, resulted in a decision on the appointment of Daryatmo as the new chief executive officer of Hanura.

OSO did not accept this decision either. He, who still feels as the official chairman, thinks that his decision to fire Sudding is in accordance with the prevailing regulations. In accordance with the Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights regarding the restructuring, repositioning, and revitalization of the Hanura Party DPP management for the 2015-2020 term of service number M.HH-01.AH.11.01 in 2018.



Figure 6: Partai Hanura

Source: oso vs. daryatmo - Bing images, 2015

#### 7. Democratic Party (PD): AHY vs. Moeldoko

The Democrat Party is one of the most recent examples of this case. Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY), who is the general chairman of the Democratic Party, tried to be ousted from his throne (“This is a Complete Chronology of AHY’s Coup Efforts from the Democratic Party: National Okezone,” n.d.) (“Ini Kronologi Lengkap Upaya Kudeta AHY Dari Partai Demokrat : Okezone Nasional,” n.d.). The emergence of this coup allegedly occurred because there were members who showed dissatisfaction with AHY’s performance. Some cadres also feel that AHY’s presence perpetuates political dynasties within the Democratic Party. Moeldoko and several members of the Democratic faction held the Extraordinary Congress (KLB) in Deliserdang on Friday (5/3/2021). This outbreak ended with the election of Moeldoko as the Party’s new chairman. The internal conflict within the Democratic Party is arguably the most recent, but not the first.



Figure 7: AHY dan Moeldoko

Source: ahy vs moeldoko - Bing images, tahun2021

They knew the causes for the splitting of large, organizationally established political parties. In general, politics is a theatrical choice, where politics can be said to be cruel and can also be said to be suitable for state life. Depending on the individual and the group who undergo a politics. The division of a difference of opinion that results in conflict so that a problem arises. As is the case with the major parties in Indonesia, which have experienced internal disputes within the Party. For example, the PPP party's breakup (the united development party) and the GOLKAR party (the class of work party). The two parties have indirectly made the people uneasy; how come the Indonesian people have finished celebrating a democratic party that elects a new president, the community is faced with problems of party interests and personal interests carried out by parliamentary leaders, directly The congregation was treated to the breakup of the GOLKAR party, which previously the PPP party had also split. Thus arising a view in the eyes of the public that today's leaders are not much different from kindergarten children who do not know what to do as a leader ("Gus Dur's Satire for DPR Members: From Kindergarten Children to Provocateurs," nd )("Sindiran Telak Gus Dur Untuk Anggota DPR: Dari Anak TK Hingga Provokator," n.d.).

Knowing the causes of the division of significant political parties that are well established organizationally, have long experience in national politics, and have reliable human resources, as well as considerable financial resources. The breakup of the United Development Party (PPP). The United Development Party (PPP) began to experience divisions within its Party after Suryadharma Ali (SDA) joined the Gerindra party's open campaign. The split continued until the dismissal of Suharso Monoarfa as Deputy Head of PPP and the Secretary-General's transfer to become one of the DPP PPP chairs. Still, the latest news states that Secretary-General Romahurmuzi or who is usually called by the name Romi noted that the transfer was illegal and sued the decision of SDA., which brought PPP into a coalition with Gerindra as a decision that violated the PPP Mukernas.

A split in the body of a political party, generally primarily because of having political interests. However, it has never appeared in support of Prabowo Subianto and the coalition with Gerindra. Moreover, the issue of Rp. Sixty billion from Prabowo Subianto as a "political dowry" in the election of Jokowi-Ahok in the 2012 DKI Jakarta Pilkada has already circulated in the media course, support for Prabowo Subianto by Surya Darma Ali, on behalf of PPP is believed not free support at all.

A political conspiracy theory seems to be being worked on by certain people in making the "batman trap" in the PPP case supporting Gerindra; of course, the trap is aimed at Prabowo Subianto and PPP himself. First, with the support from Surya Darma Ali to Prabowo Subianto, which caused divisions within the PPP body, Prabowo Subianto did not get permission from the grassroots PPP because the split within the PPP body will cause the masses at the grassroots of the PPP to also split so that PPP support was not maximal in the 2014 presidential election at that time.

Second, PPP was deliberately sacrificed to break up the Islamic Political Party Coalition initiated by Amien Rais et al.; With the entry of PPP to Gerindra, it is clear that the coalition will be "sterile" because the only similarities between the platforms and PPP are PAN and PKB. The PPP choice, apart from splitting the Islamic Political Party Coalition, was also aimed at "holding" PAN and PKB into the Gerindra grand coalition. Still, of course, the two political parties also rethought if they wanted to join the Gerindra grand coalition because it could be that their internal solidity could be broken. -book as well as PPP. Because PKB gets more profit if it is not close to PPP because its mass base is almost the same as PPP, within PAN, there is a tendency to save Hatta Rajasa as cawapres there is a Political Party Coalition that wants PAN to join him. The figure of Hatta Rajasa at this time is also difficult to sell because his son-in-law Ibas Yudhoyono is facing a "cold war" with Anas Urbaningrum; it is feared that before the Presidential Election, there will be a new upheaval in the Anas Urbaningrum court that could drag Ibas Yudhoyono's involvement so that it will damage the victory in the upcoming Presidential Election. Therefore, the PPP split is most likely part of the scenario of "dividing" the PPP and making Prabowo Subianto gain false support.

The breakup of the Golongan Karya Party (Golkar). The Golkar Party is an organizationally established political party, has a long history of national politics, and has reliable human resources and considerable financial

resources. The conflict in the Golkar party body is not due to the Party's system or organization. It is not a matter of differences in the National Congress's implementation, but about the different views of the two camps, namely the status quo and the reformists. Due to the ARB problem being less able to become a good leader in the party body. One solution that can be taken to save Golkar is that ARB resigns from the candidacy for chairman because the Party that triumphed in the New Order era needed reliable young leaders who could accommodate all cadres' interests. A conflict that is allowed to go on for a long time can become an irritant for the Party.

There are two versions of the organizers of the IX Golkar Party National Conference. According to the ARB camp, the National Conference was held in Bali from November 30 to December 3, 2014. Meanwhile, according to the Agung Laksono camp, the general assembly was held in January 2015. There would be time for the candidates for the general chairman to consolidate with the regions. The breakup of Golkar was only a matter of time when Surya Paloh and Prabowo Subianto lost the race to become Golkar Party Chairman. They one by one declared a new political party carrying the carriage of the Golkar majority followers. However, this time the Political Party, which still holds the symbol of the "banyan tree," has finally broken apart because they both still want to maintain their existence. Aburizal "Ical" Bakrie's camp with its interest in holding a National Conference on November 30, 2014, means that the National Conference was hastened from the original schedule in January 2015; Meanwhile, the Agung Laksono camp still wants to hold a National Conference following the results of the previous 2009 National Conference, which was held in January 2015. The acceleration of the Ical camp's National Conference is suspected of being a step to smooth Ical back into the seat of the General Chair. This suspicion is not without reason because in Golkar "engineering" is no longer an everyday thing. They are very "experts" in it. Many suspect that Ical's ambition to keep the Golkar party in the KMP (Coalition of Red and White) is seen as part of Ical's engineering personal interests to continue to exist in politics to protect his business empire.

With the existence of "two National Congresses" in Golkar, it means that the Party is following the conflict of its "younger brothers," namely the PPP (United Development Party); The two political forces in the New Order era finally broke out during the reform era because they followed the political ambitions of their leaders who allegedly carried their interests. Of course, this irritates some management of the two political parties who still have high ideals in politics and do not carry personal interests. These are the ones who are now continuing to fight by taking carriages of the younger generation who still have high ideals and, of course, do not have too many interests.

The public understands that whoever entered the world of politics in the New Order era had their own business. Business and politics seem inseparable because many advantages in making business and mining concessions are obtained because they are in political circles and are very close to the authorities. These interests are continuously maintained, and politics are used as "riding horses" to preserve their business existence. The Jokowi-JK Government, which did not want to accommodate political and business interests that were considered to be laden with KKN, was then made a "common enemy" on the grounds of being a "counterweight"; This is the factor that has angered the young generation of Golkar & PPP who still have high ideals to develop the country by going into politics. This conflict between ages had to be paid handsomely by Golkar and PPP because, in the end, the two parties split organizationally.

It was viewed from a psychological perspective, social groups, the causes of the breakup of significant political parties. Seeing the above problems, the conflict that occurred in the two major parties was only an internal problem that was brought to the external within the Party, and there is a possibility that the conflict will create a moment that benefits one of them, both an individual and a party in the sense of seeking sensation in the community so that the Party is the topic of news in the mass media for some reason or other factors.

When viewed from the psychological aspect of social groups, the Party entered into secondary social groups from the dualism split. It is explained that a secondary social group is a group where there is an indirect, unfamiliar, far from the formal, and less familial relationship among its group members. This group tends to be

objective and rational. Secondary groups' role in human life is to achieve a particular goal in society objectively and rationally. It is clear from the dualism problems that the major parties both desire priority, the desire to be superior in status to others.

In terms of concept/strategy theory. The 'coup' must have calculated carefully and carefully about what will happen. Why did they do the "coup." How can the "coup" be carried out and the infrastructure used for the "coup" to ensure "the coup is successful. From the several "coups" that occurred, new management was produced. This cannot be separated from the Government's role (Kemenkumhan), which has the authority to decide which Party wins. In the end, nothing ended smoothly. It must leave a grudge that one day will come back unless someone wants to give in by establishing/creating a new party. The concept/theory of strategy is used by both sides who come from the same Party. Have the same ideology. But something is forgotten/left behind that we have the Pancasila ideology. Suppose everyone returns to Pancasila and wants to be honest. So the "coup" didn't have to happen. One parameter was found, namely Honesty. What exactly did the "coup" want?

It was viewed from the concept/theory of LYP implementation. Similar to the review using the concept/theory of strategy. If we examine carefully, those in dispute, especially those who carried out the "coup," have certainly carried out integration activities with other parts that could support the "coup." Interaction with different fields for a successful 'coup' has also certainly taken place. It is impossible without integration and interaction. They also act transparently so that all know it. We are trying to win over other people so that the "coup" doesn't matter. Supervision is carried out at every stage so that nothing is missed so it can make a failure. The use of the budget must be accounted for, especially at this time. Supervision by the KPK is stringent. But the result is the same; in the end, it only leaves a "time bomb" which can explode at any time. They should not abandon Pancasila as an ideology. If implemented with a transparent and honest heart, the precepts in Pancasila will reduce or even negate the ambition to fight for power.

### **Conclusion Recommendations and Limitations**

From the description above, it can be concluded that we must return to our own identities. The Indonesian nation has made Pancasila an ideology. We have launched the Pancasila Demonstration, which the Indonesian people use. There is no choice or want to use another ideology in Indonesia. The precepts in Pancasila are sufficient to bring the Indonesian nation to strive to achieve its goals and realize its national objectives. National interest can be recognized if we can implement it properly. What causes failure is our lack of Honesty in what we already know and must do. Whatever belief/religion we profess teaches Honesty.

Politicians or anyone who runs this country must be honest. If the culture of Honesty is not implemented, various agencies or commissions will continue to happen as they are today. Political party 'coup' basically arises because there is dishonesty there. So that a motion of no confidence appeared, etc. ("Members of the DPR are lazy to report wealth to the KPK. There are netizens who remember Gus Dur's words: DPR is like kindergarten children," n.d.)("Anggota DPR Malas Lapor Kekayaan Ke KPK Ada Netizen Yang Ingat Ucapan Gus Dur: DPR Seperti Anak TK," n.d.).

The understanding of Pancasila, especially the precepts of the One Godhead in it, includes instilling Honesty. Be honest with the rules. Fair to the situation and conditions, no manipulation or the term ABS (as long as you are happy). The culture of deception in every sector of life must be eliminated immediately. Examples and role models in a patrilineal society like Indonesia are essential. The consequence is that there is no manipulation in anything. The formation of the KPK needs to be reviewed. Because of negative perceptions, there are still things that are not honest. The researcher's recommendation is to add the parameter "Honest" in every concept and theory. Hopefully, Pancasila can be reinterpreted and implemented honestly. This research needs to be followed up with more in-depth analysis, especially dealing with other Pancasila principles.

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# United Nations Role in Conflict Resolution Process: Case Study in Sierra Leone 1991-2002

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## Abstract

The phenomenon of international conflict that occurred after the Cold War opens the United Nations' opportunity to play a more significant role in maintaining international peace and security. UN peacekeeping operations are one form of response to the challenges that arise at this time. This operation is a multidimensional operation that includes peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding activities. The complexity of the conflict in Sierra Leone, West Africa, in the early 90s was caused by poor governance and illegal exploitation of diamonds, resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties and various other problems, such as rising poverty and unemployment increasing numbers of refugees. Given the Sierra Leonean government's powerlessness in resolving the conflict, the UN, about international organizations, intervened in restoring and achieving peace. In this article, the author tries to analyze the role of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to resolve Sierra Leone's internal conflicts in 1994-2005, with activities as a mediator for the warring parties and sending peacekeeping forces in the country. This paper is based on the author's experience as a Military Observer at Unamsil and literature studies. The U.N./Unamsil played a significant role in resolving the conflict there. This needs to be known and informed to the general public and the military to understand the United Nations' role better.

**Keywords:** Role, Conflict Resolution, Process. UN Mission, Sierra Leone

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Introduce the Problem

Today's peace and security issue tends to be increasingly complex. The conflict is no longer only between countries in the East vs. West or Communist vs. Capitalist paradigm but tends to be internal or inter-communal. The role of the United Nations, especially the UN Security Council in the 21st century, has not been able to resolve conflicts between countries (interstate) entirely or within countries (intrastate)(Gill, 2011). The UN's role still revolves around resolving disputes between countries, the economy, poverty, the environment, drugs,

human rights violations, etc. UN restructuring demands by most countries in the world have yet to be realized, so the UN's role shortly is unlikely to change.

This article is entitled "The Role of the United Nations in the Conflict Resolution Process: A Case Study in Sierra Leone 1991-2002" (Peters, 2013). It is essential to write this point to illustrate the UN's role and a real-life example that occurred in Sierra Leone. A country in West Africa that has experienced civil war and caused many victims. The things that cause the conflict will be discussed in this paper. The author's experience is part of Unamsil, and the literature study will complement this paper (Bernath & Nyce, 2004). The United Nations' role in resolving complex conflict problems in a country is crucial.

## **2. Method**

The research method used is descriptive qualitative with a pragmatic approach; the data used is in literature studies plus the author's experience as a Military Observer at Unamsil in 2002-2003.

## **3. Results**

### **3.1 Sierra Leone background**

Sierra Leone is a country prosperous with diamonds. The Republic of Sierra Leone is a country in West Africa, precisely on the Atlantic Ocean coast. Guinea borders the country to the north, Liberia to the Southeast, and the Atlantic Ocean to the southwest. Sierra Leone is located on the southwest coast of West Africa, situated primarily between latitudes 7° and 10° N (a small area to the south of 7°), and longitudes of 10° and 14° W. Guinea bordered to the North and East, Liberia to the Southeast, and the Atlantic Ocean to the West and Southwest.

Sierra Leone has a total area of 71,740 km<sup>2</sup> (27,699 mi<sup>2</sup>), divided into 71,620 km<sup>2</sup> (27,653 mi<sup>2</sup>) of land and 120 km<sup>2</sup> (46 mi<sup>2</sup>) of water. The country has four distinct geographic areas. The climate is tropical, with two seasons that define the agricultural cycle: the rainy season from May to November, and the dry season from December to May, which covers Harmattan, when cool, dry winds blow from the Sahara Desert, and at night the temperature can be as low as 16° C ( 60.8° F). The average temperature is 26°C (78.8° F) and varies from about 26 to 36° C (78.8 to 96.8°F) throughout the year (Peters, 2013).

### **3.2 Sierra Leone conflict**

There was an internal conflict between Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels and Sierra Leone's government for 11 years. (1991 to 2002). The armed conflict killed 75,000 Sierra Leonean civilians and displaced 500,000 people.

Definition of Internal Conflict. Conflict is a relationship between two or more parties (individuals or groups) who have, or feel they own, incompatible goals. Conflict is an inevitable fact of life. Conflicts occur when community goals are not in line as they should be, and conflicts are often resolved through violence (Boulton, 2011).

According to functionalists, conflict occurs because of complex changes in social institutions that cannot provide for society's basic needs (Axtmann, Wall, & Lipset, 1987). When two or more groups involved in a conflict face each other and then make contact with each other which is threatening, hurting, destroying, and controlling each other, this situation is known as armed conflict. Examination of armed conflict concerning the "inter-state system" approach can be classified; some can be recognized as inter-state conflict and intra-state conflict and conflicts that are a combination of the two. Intra-state conflict can be defined as a conflict that occurs within the territory of a country. Usually, this conflict manifests in two forms.

3.2.1 The conflict between the government power and the forces that enforce their desire for autonomy or what are often known as separatist groups.

3.2.2 Conflicts relating to the composition and form of government, which usually involve civilian groups. This conflict usually refers to ethnic group lines, language, religion, culture. If these conflicts overlap and eventually transcend national borders, this conflict will likely turn into a confrontation between countries (Sudira, 2017).

The post-Cold War was marked by the increasing number of civil wars and armed conflicts within countries which threatened international peace and security and caused tremendous human suffering. Internal conflict seems more destructive, irrational, and uncontrollable (Ikenberry & Regan, 2000; "The World; The Century of Refugees Ends. And Continues. - The New York Times," n.d.):

3.2.3 The absence of a legitimate/official, authoritative institution in the State can pressure warring groups to stop their destructive actions, especially if the government in that country is also part of it.

3.2.4 The conflict will be more protracted if the motivation for humanitarian intervention is infiltrated by opportunistic interests even though there are difficulties for external parties to directly intervene in humanitarian areas of conflict on the grounds of state sovereignty.

In general, four factors were identified that could influence violence in internal conflicts, namely, structure, politics, social / economy, and culture (James, 1997). These four factors can be the leading causes (underlying causes) and the causes (proximate causes).

### **3.3 Sierra Leone's Internal Conflict**

In 1930, a large diamond deposit was discovered in the eastern part of the Kono District. This diamond then became the largest export commodity in Sierra Leone, after palm oil. Around 1951-1961 there was a change of power in Sierra Leone, where the colonial government also gave its government seat to several Sierra Leonean citizens. This can be seen in the election of several Sierra Leonean citizens to become ministers in 1953. This ministry is responsible for regulating domestic government, except for matters of foreign relations and defense. In the church's composition, Sir Milton Mharga was one of the Sierra Leonean citizens who served as Chief Minister.

Sierra Leone gained independence from the British colonial government in 1961. Since then, Sierra Leone has continued to inherit the parliamentary government system, with Milton Mharga, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) leader, appointed as President. In 1964 Milton Mharga died and was replaced by his younger brother Sir Albert Mharga, who led the government from 1964 to 1967.

In the 1967 elections, the Governor-General of Sierra Leone appointed Siaka Stevens, the All People's Congress (APC) party leader, as Sierra Leone's next President. During his reign in Sierra Leone, there was a gap between the Creole ethnic group in Freetown that dominated the political and economic sector at the beginning of the 150-year Colonial period, and other groups with a higher population level were less developed.

The deteriorating domestic conditions in Sierra Leone eventually led Stevens to retire in 1985, and he appointed Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh to be his successor. During Momoh's reign, there was a tendency for the number of unemployed to rise to trigger violence and crime.

Two opposition parties exploited this weak leadership:

3.3.1 Corporal Foday Sankoh led the rebellion through the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and was supported by the National People Front (NPFL) rebel forces in Liberia. The RUF is a rebel group originating from a rebellion spillover in neighboring Liberia. In 1987, an attempted coup against Momoh's rule marked the

beginning of his downfall. This was supported by the vindictive attitude of Charles Taylor, Liberian warlords/warlords (became President in 1997), due to Taylor's refusal to operate in the East of Sierra Leone with the lure of money by Momoh. On March 23, 1991, the RUF attacked eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia. It was at this time that the internal conflict in Sierra Leone began. The RUF aims to carry out this rebellious action to end the APC regime rule, which has lasted for more than 24 years in Sierra Leone.

3.3.2 Captain Valentine Strasser, who led a group of soldiers, staged a military coup. In 1992, Strasser succeeded in overthrowing the Momoh government and then ruling the country through a new governing body, The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). During his reign, Strasser hired EO (Executive Outcomes), a mercenary security company from South Africa, to help Sierra Leone government troops fight against the RUF. However, Sankoh and the RUF continued to fight against the new Strasser military government. In 1996 there was a multiparty general election which was won by Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who was the leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), who later became the next President of Sierra Leone. During his reign, President Kabbah signed the Abidjan Peace Accord with the RUF at the end of November 1996.

### **3.4 The root of the Conflict Problem**

#### *3.4.1 Bad Governance Factors*

In general, the root causes of the internal war in Sierra Leone have been experienced since the beginning of the country's formation. Domestic conditions that can ultimately lead a nation to internal conflict generally lie in a fundamental problem that has been going on for quite a long time. Several factors, namely mainly cause the whole situation in the case of internal war in Sierra Leone:

3.4.1.1 Political and economic fields. Therefore, efforts to create peace in Sierra Leone must solve the fundamental problems in that country.

3.4.1.2 Historical inheritance from the government. Apart from the aforementioned fundamental problem factors, another factor that triggers Sierra Leone's internal conflict is the government's historical legacy. Both directly and indirectly, this historical legacy also shapes the political and economic structure.

3.4.1.3 The slave trade. The protracted internal conflict in Sierra Leone is closely related to this country's history, a former British colony. The British government's motive for establishing a colony in Sierra Leone was for its economic interests. Since 1750, most of the African continent's indigenous peoples had been the primary commodity of the slave trade by the colonial government. When slavery began to be abolished in 1787, and Sierra Leone served as a shelter for freed slaves, the British colonial government played a role in the country's newly formed government structure.

3.4.1.4 Characteristics of governance. After granting independence from the British government in Sierra Leone's case, the government's characteristics have a similar pattern. First, in the political sphere, all the leading governments in Sierra Leone have been identical in running the country. For example, the centralization of power in certain political groups, SLPP or APC, generally has a sentiment between ethnic groups. However, overall, this centralization still focuses based on classification based on political parties.

#### *3.4.2 The Diamond Factor*

Problems in the diamond sector have either directly or indirectly tainted the conflict in Sierra Leone.

3.4.2.1 Diamonds are an incentive for violence. This was practiced by both the RUF and government soldiers. Both of these groups show an interest in illegal diamond mining. Regular battles in these internal conflicts are rare, but the actions that occur are often located in diamonds' vicinity. Thousands of civilians have been driven away and driven from the diamond-rich region by RUF rebels.

3.4.2.2 Diamonds have helped in terms of financing violent action. The RUF group has used diamonds to buy weaponry, both from government soldiers and outside the country. Several diamond traders who also benefited from the violence also helped finance the RUF rebellion. Third, diamonds have also helped exacerbate the conflict because it has caused frustration with the imbalanced profits from diamond mining.

### 3.5 Actors involved in the Sierra Leone Internal Conflict

3.5.1 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Rebel Group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started a rebellion against the central government in Freetown, Sierra Leone's capital, by attacking the Sierra Leone region bordering Liberia in March 1991. Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was formed in the 1980s by members of an activity group that attempted to overthrow the All People Congress (APC) regime. The regime was in power from 1968, under the constitution of a one-party state since 1978. The members of this group come from Sierra Leoneans themselves. Most of them are young people who the government has neglected. Some are accustomed to the criminal culture in Freetown. Some come from areas where the mining industry is located, and some college students have become radicalized due to Sierra Leone conditions. Corporal Foday Sankoh, a former military member who was jailed for seven years for his involvement in the 1971 coup attempt against Siaka Stevens' government, led the rebel group RUF.

3.5.2 Neighboring countries; Liberia. Other countries in one region often become passive victims due to the over-flow of problems from other countries' conflict areas. Still, it does not rule out, and it is not uncommon that neighboring countries are actively involved in contributing to conflict escalation and regional instability through opportunistic interventions.

### 3.6 Impact of Conflict

There are many reasons why internal conflicts have implications for security and peace at the regional and international levels. Most journalists and policymakers argue simplistically and mechanically. Simplistic because it sees the problem from one direction only, in which areas currently in conflict will have humanitarian, political, and military/security impacts and make neighboring countries passive victims.

Mechanistic because it blames the conflict as something that develops out of control, rather than, for example, on the decisions and most profound of the actors/parties involved and their government.

3.6.1 The phenomenon of Internally Dis-placed Persons (IDPs). Internal displacement has been a character of forced migration since before World War II. Hitler and Stalin are known to be behind the forced displacement of millions of residents before World War II. The war itself has resulted in more and more people seeking refuge within the borders of their country.

The movement of large numbers of people is one of the main characteristics of the humanitarian crisis in Sierra Leone. At the height of the fighting, more than 3,000 communities suffered destruction. About 75,000 refugees have been repatriated back to Sierra Leone by UNHCR. About 50,000 others still occupy Guinea camps and the regions of Ghana, Ivory Coast, and The Gambia. The increasing number of refugees led to efforts to relocate these refugees to safer areas.

The number of IDPs in Sierra Leone is estimated at more than 400,000, of which 170,000 occupy 18 official IDP camps and thousands more occupy the Port Loko and Tonkolili districts with residents. OCHA's report said that the refugees who settled areas with residents did not receive enough humanitarian assistance.

3.6.2 Violation of Human Rights (HAM). Another result of this internal conflict in Sierra Leone was human rights violations against civilians, which reached a very high number. Approximately 5000 civilians were killed, including members of the government and journalists, and children were kidnapped, where they were then trained to become child soldiers(Denov, 2010).

In the development of the RUF rebels, there is a group of insurgents; former SLA / AFRC and former SLA-defectors (splinter), the "West Side Boys" group. This group has committed acts of violence on a broad scale, including murder, kidnapping, mutilation, and rape. They kidnapped civilians, missionaries, security officers from NGOs, and UN personnel. Apart from that, they also carried out attacks on humanitarian aid convoys and looting of security supplies. Even though both parties had signed the Lome Agreement at that time, the practice

of violence continued. Even refugee camps located in border areas are often the target of war by the RUF group or government troops.

The United Nations estimates the number of individuals kidnapped by rebel groups during the 1991-1999 periods at 20,000. Meanwhile, UN members and humanitarian aid officers' kidnapping was carried out to take them as hostages to the RUF.

On the other hand, although rebel groups committed most human rights violations, the government also carried out similar violent practices. The Sierra Leonean government and ECOMOG have reportedly carried out extrajudicial executions of suspected rebel groups and their allies. This was especially true when the RUF / AFRC was successfully forced to withdraw from Freetown and then adopted guerrilla tactics. At that time, the government had difficulty identifying the RUF / AFRC among civil society. Hence, the government often carried out executions of civilians who were considered members of the RUF / AFRC. The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) also reported human rights violations connected with the training and reorganization in 2000. It was even said that the SLA had recruited child soldiers to face the child army division of the RUF.

According to Amnesty International, in May 2000, about 25 percent of the combat troops fighting government troops near the Masiaka area were estimated to be under 18 years of age. Some of them were as young as 7.

The UN began to intervene in November 1994 to negotiate between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF.

One of the main goals of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security. Since its founding, the UN has frequently been asked to prevent conflicts from escalating into warfare, persuade the parties to use conference tables instead of arms force, or restore peace when conflict erupts. Over the decades, the United Nations has helped end several competitions, often through the Security Council's actions (the main organ in tackling international peace and security).

The involvement of the United Nations in resolving internal conflicts in Sierra Leone began in November 1994. It started with a request from the President of Sierra Leone in a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General to facilitate negotiations between the Sierra Leone government and the RUF. In December 1994, the United Nations then launched an exploratory mission to analyze the conflict.

Based on the report from the exploratory mission team, it can be said that the country has suffered a lot of damage in various ways as a result of the conflict that has been running for three years. Be it politically, economically, socially, morally, and structurally; Sierra Leone has experienced a setback. One of the factors that triggered the conflict was diamonds. This is evident in the actions taken by both the RUF and government soldiers, where diamonds have helped the RUF in terms of financing their acts of violence. The RUF uses diamonds to buy weapons, both from government troops and from abroad.

The weak and lousy governance factor also exacerbates Sierra Leone's situation where the existing government cannot run a good government. Sierra Leone has become collapse and weak against protracted insurgency attacks.

The UN collaborates with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) so that negotiations and formulation of solutions can be realized. The UN has installed several peacekeepers and also conducts preventive disarmament.

Furthermore, the United Nations issued the following resolutions:

3.6.2.1 S / RES / 1270 (1999) October 22, 1999, Termination of the Mandate of UNOMSIL and the mission was continued with the establishment of UNAMSIL.

3.6.2.2 S / RES / 1260 (1999) August 20, 1999, Welcoming the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement and agreeing to expand the substance of UNOMSIL.

3.6.2.3 S / RES / 1245 (1999) June 11, 1999, Extending the mandate of UNOMSIL to December 13, 1999.

3.6.2.4 S / RES / 1231 (1999) March 11, 1999, Extends the mandate of UNOMSIL to June 13, 1999, and welcomes the good intentions of the UN Secretary-General to re-inaugurate UNOMSIL in Freetown as soon as possible.

3.6.2.5 S / RES / 1220 (1999) January 12, 1999, Extends the mandate of UNOMSIL to March 13, 1999, and keeps the UN Secretary General's proposal to reduce the number of military observers from UNOMSIL.

3.6.2.6 S / RES / 1181 (1998) Establish UNOMSIL for an initial period of six months

These resolutions show that in handling internal conflict cases in Sierra Leone, the UN is not only at the diplomacy and negotiation stage, but the UN also sends UNOMSIL peacekeepers to ease conflict tensions carried out by the RUF (Olonisakin, 2015). In carrying out its mission, UNOMSIL underwent three mandate extensions until finally, on October 22, 1999, UNOMSIL's mandate was terminated, followed by a new UN peacekeeping mission UNAMSIL.

UNAMSIL has the mandate to carry out the following tasks:

3.6.2.7 Cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and other parties related to the Peace Agreement in the implementation/implementation of the Peace Agreement.

3.6.2.8 Assist the Government of Sierra Leone in implementing the disarmament, demobilization/dispersal of troops, and reintegration plans.

3.6.2.9 Ensuring security/security and freedom to conduct operations for UN personnel.

3.6.2.10 Observe and supervise the parties involved in the agreement to carry out a ceasefire following the ceasefire agreement made on May 18, 1999.

3.6.2.11 Encourage the parties to build a mutual trust mechanism to create a trust-building agency and support their planning.

3.6.2.12 Facilitate and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance.

3.6.2.13 Provide support for operations carried out by UN civilian officials, including the Special Envoy from the UN Secretary-General and his staff and human rights personnel and civil affairs personnel from the United Nations.

3.6.2.14 Providing assistance and support to hold elections following the constitution that will apply in Sierra Leone.

Following Security Council resolution 1289 (2000) of February 7, 2000, the mandate of UNAMSIL was subsequently revised to involve the following tasks (undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter):

3.6.2.15 Providing security/security guarantees at critical locations and Government buildings, particularly in Freetown, important intersection points, and major airports, including Lungi airport.

3.6.2.16 Facilitating the local community by providing necessities and humanitarian assistance along the designated roads.

3.6.2.17 Provide security/security guarantees at all locations for disarmament, demobilization/dispersal of troops, and reintegration programs.

3.6.2.18 Assist and coordinate with law enforcement officials in Sierra Leone in the discharge of obligations.

3.6.2.19 Safeguarding and securing weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants would later be sold or even destroyed.

UNAMSIL has a mandate that is not much different from UNOMSIL because UNAMSIL only continues the proclamation of UNOMSIL. However, the UN Security Council also mandated UNAMSIL to take actions deemed necessary to fulfill these additional tasks and stated that UNAMSIL, despite its previous mandate, was allowed to take steps that were considered essential to ensure the security situation and freedom of its personnel. To operate and to be able to seek and provide protection to civilians from the threat of war and physical violence, and to bring them to become the responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone. This is done considering Sierra Leone's security situation is still prone to conflict.

UNAMSIL's strength was around 17,500 military personnel, including 260 military observers (S / RES / 1346) and 170 police personnel. (S / RES / 1436). Countries contributing to the contribution of personnel to military forces for UNAMSIL include Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Croatia, Egypt, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sweden, Tanzania, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Zambia. Meanwhile, countries that have contributed personnel to the police force for UNAMSIL include Australia, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Canada, Gambia, Ghana, India, Jordan, Kenya Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway. Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

UNAMSIL can be said to be one of the successful peace models and the types of UN peacekeeping that have received attention. Following its mandate, the mission plays a role in disarming thousands of former rebels in cooperation with the regional organization's forces, ECOMOG.

The formation of UNAMSIL, primarily to assist parties related to the Lome Peace Agreement to implement the agreed agreement and assist in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration / DDR). The DDR program in Sierra Leone is implemented in three stages. The first phase lasted from September to December 1998. The second stage was from July 1999 to May 2000. The third stage was from May 2001 to May 2002. By the end of the second phase, namely in May 2000, UNAMSIL had collected 12,695 weapons and 253,535 ammo. However, the large number of disarmament carried out by UNAMSIL was not destroyed because President Kabbah argued that he would use the weapons as equipment for the Sierra Leone Military and police (SLA and SLP).

Based on the explanation above, UNAMSIL has carried out all the UN Security Council's tasks. Its role in the field UNAMSIL also helps volunteers return more than half a million war victims and internally displaced persons. This allowed Sierra Leone's government to restore its power, which was also supported by holding general elections in January 2002, social services in locations that rebel groups previously controlled. Also, this mission has trained around 1000 police officers and constructed/reconstructed a large number of police stations. This mission is working with agencies from the United Nations to form a project that aims to provide jobs for the thousands of unemployed people consisting of youth, ex-combatants, and providing public services to local communities. UNAMSIL forces also reconstructed schools and clinics, established and funded agricultural projects, and sponsored free health clinics.

When UNAMSIL did these things, Sierra Leone still faced many challenges, such as; the fact is that the country is still very vulnerable, and it is necessary to take concrete steps to find the root causes of the conflict and promote a culture of respect for human rights. The economy of Sierra Leone is still very much dependent on financial aid. Inequality of income from diamond mining, there are still many frauds perpetrated by the private sector. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was the largest of 15 UN operations in the past five years (1997-2002), with 16,654 military personnel at the end of September, including 839 Zambian troops. The availability of data on the deaths of six people from UNAMSIL forces on January 8, 2002, brings a total of 65 people to the end that UNAMSIL has suffered since the program was launched in October 1999, and 38 Zambian soldiers who died on UN duty. Of those who died in Sierra Leone, 26 people were killed in accidents, 24 from illness, eight from conflict, and seven from other causes. The United Nations' achievements in terms of peacekeeping assistance, humanitarian assistance, and the recovery process have been quite successful so far. This was then followed by the formation of UNIOSIL (United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone), which is the center of activities related to the role of Peacebuilding where all UN elements such as agencies, donations, and programs work together for the realization of quality improvement. Life of Sierra Leone people through development in all life areas (economic, social, and infrastructure), development of a democratic and transparent government, security assurance, etc.

The success of the UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone, among others, was influenced by the support provided by member countries that were contributors to the troops. In UN peacekeeping operations at UNAMSIL, there are around 30 member countries who are contributors.

#### 4. Conclusions, recommendations, and limitation

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the UN's role is still relevant and necessary. The success of the United Nations in several missions that have been carried out in several countries provides evidence that the problems that occur in those countries can be resolved. Indonesia's UN mission's participation offers considerable benefits for the State and personnel, thereby increasing insight and experience. It needs to be appropriately prepared and trained for the personnel to be sent to join the UN mission.

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# The Role of the Ministry of Defense in Preparing Strategic Logistics Reserve for Facing the National Food Emergency

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## Abstract

The theme of this article is about the role of the Ministry of Defense in preparing for national food security, especially the role of the Ministry of Defense through the Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency in anticipation of facing a national food emergency, especially in the context of Sishanta. Currently the Ministry of Defense is in the function of preparing universal defense by directing all national potential which is not yet maximized, especially in preparing the logistic needs for the needs of TNI troops as the core force as well as logistical needs for supporting components and reserve components. In this paper, the author tries to use several theories concerning the Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency program, which include the theory of the role of organization, logistics theory, food security theory and Sun Tzu's theory of war in his book *The Art of War* and submit proposed solutions to these problems in the Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency framework. The research method used is a qualitative method using secondary data, as well as literature study. The data analysis technique used a qualitative descriptive analysis. This article seeks to identify various problems in implementing Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency at the policy and operational levels. From the research results, there are findings that illustrate that logistics supplies in the face of universal defense are unable to support both the needs of the TNI and the needs of its supporters.

**Keywords:** Role, Reserves, Food, National, Logistics

## 1. Introduction

When evaluating in general the condition of adequacy, resilience and self-sufficiency of food, Indonesia is still in an inadequate condition, and is not yet independent in terms of supplying national food needs and reserves. The problem of food in Indonesia, especially regarding the national demand for rice, will tend to remain high, due to the growing population, and the relatively high per capita consumption of the Indonesian population (Febriaty, 2016). The increasing need for rice, on the other hand, is actually faced with the condition of the decreasing area of agricultural land due to the change of function that continues from year to year. This

condition of inequality is exacerbated by the decline in the level of the nation's independence, because the fulfillment of part of the rice needs is filled through imports.

Based on the above problems, it appears that in 2020, especially until 2045 (when Republic of Indonesia turns 100), if Indonesia does not take strategic and fast steps in increasing the food production sector, then nationally Indonesia will be very dependent on imports from other countries in meeting their food needs. The implication is that the nation's independence will get weaker and this imbalance that is specifically related to national defense is that Indonesia's increasingly dominant position as an importer of foodstuffs is unhealthy in terms of economy, trade, as well as in terms of national defense and security, both in the short term, medium, let alone long term.

Overcoming the imbalance in food availability, sufficiency and security, the government has endeavored with various strategic steps. During the New Order era, one million hectares Peatland Development project was initiated, which was strengthened by Presidential Decree No. 82 of 1995 regarding the Peatland Development Project. But three years later the New Order government ended, and the project was abandoned. Subsequent presidents, such as President Megawati Soekarnoputri, to President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, tried to revive neo-PLG, but they also failed. During the Joko Widodo administration, a Food Security Agency was formed which is under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture, together with Logistics Affairs Agency, Food Security Agency is trying to secure 11 national strategic foodstuffs, as stipulated by the National Food Security Agency. (Ministry of Agriculture's Food Security Agency, 2020). The government's next step is to form a food estate which in the first phase will be concentrated in Central Kalimantan Province. The government entrusts the handling of the national food barn to two ministries, namely the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Defense.

Regarding the food barn, the Ministry of Defense has a strategic role. From an organizational perspective, the government through the Ministry of Defense has formed a logistical reserve agency that is under the control of the Ministry of Defense, namely the Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency (SLRA). SLRA focuses more on ensuring the availability of strategic logistical reserves for national defense. The formation of BKP, SLRA, as well as strengthening and development Logistics Affairs Agency which has been established since 1967 is an implementation of the mandate of Law No. 18 of 2012 concerning Food. The Ministry of Defense also formed an implementing company for the implementation of food barns for the portion to be handled by the Ministry of Defense, namely PT Agro Industri Nasional (PT Agrinas). Through Agrinas, the Ministry of Defense has collaborated with local governments in various provinces, among others.

The role of the Ministry of Defense in formulating a strategy to prepare strategic logistical reserves is the role of the Ministry of Defense in preparing land originating from forest land that is no longer productive, or agricultural land managed by the local government but does not produce. The role of the Ministry of Defense in preparing ADM to manage the SLRA program through various collaborations, including that carried out by Agrinas. The role of the Ministry of Defense in preparing modern agricultural tools through PT Pindad, the Ministry of Defense has identified one million hectares of land scattered on the large islands in Indonesia. The role of the Ministry of Defense in managing plants and production markets in collaboration with Perum Bulok and other related parties as well as aspects of disthousandtion and aspects of warehousing. From the several roles that the Ministry of Defense plays, it can be seen as very strategic, because it prepares logistics for national defense needs or during a national food emergency. Therefore, it is interesting to study how steps must be taken in preparing land, personnel, technology, cultivation, production, distribution and warehousing as national food reserves to face food emergencies.

## **2. Method**

The method used in this research is phenomenological qualitative descriptive method, which is a series of interpretive research techniques, by describing and finding the meaning of a phenomenon that occurs naturally in the social environment. Qualitative research aims to gain an in-depth understanding of a situation (Cooper & Schindler, 2014: 656).

Measuring the role of the Ministry of Defense in preparing national food security, among others, can be measured qualitatively with the following indicators:

- a. The role of the organization through Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency and Agrinas
- c. The role of providing land data
- d. The role of coordination and cooperation with relevant ministries, and Local government
- c. The role of the provision of manpower (personnel)
- d. The role of providing technology (modern agricultural equipment)
- e. The role of cultivation
- f. The role of the post-harvest production process
- g. The role of warehousing
- h. The role of food distribution
- i. The role of securing food locations, routes and warehouses.

Based on the technique of obtaining data, this study uses secondary data types. Secondary data is data that is obtained in finished form and has been processed by other parties, usually in the form of publications (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). Secondary data collection techniques are carried out through library research, particularly through desk studies via the internet, by studying text book, scientific journals, internal agency documents, and relevant and credible publication news.

The analysis technique of this article is a qualitative-descriptive analysis to describe the data about the barns. Qualitative data analysis in this study followed four stages of qualitative analysis according to Miles, Huberman & Saldana (2014: 31-33), namely: (i). data collection, (ii) data condensation, in the form of a process of selecting, focusing, simplifying data, (ii) presenting data, and (ii) drawing and verifying conclusions.

### **3. Results and Discussion**

Indonesia adheres to a universal defense system, or total defense, which in principle involves components outside the main component (Indonesian National Army or TNI). The two components that support national defense are the Reserve Component and Support Component. As stipulated by Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning State Defense, Article 1 paragraph (2) defines the state defense system as a national defense system that is universal in nature that involves all citizens, territories and other national resources, and is prepared early by the government and is carried out in a total, integrated, directed and continuous manner to uphold state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the safety of the entire nation. from all threats.

The National Defense Philosophy, especially in situations of war or long disasters, pandemics, force majeure and other emergency situations, obliges the Indonesian people to have sufficiency, independence and food security. In connection with the doctrine of national defense, which means that it involves all components of the nation. Therefore, the evaluation of the condition of adequacy, resilience and food self-sufficiency is in the context of the Indonesian nation as a whole.

In connection with the national defense doctrine, in a situation of war or emergency, four national strategic reserves are needed. The four national strategic reserves are (i) weapons or the main weaponry system, (ii) strategic food reserves (in the form of carbohydrates and protein), (iii) pharmaceutical reserves and strategic medical devices (primary drugs and main medical devices), and (iv) strategic energy reserves (renewable fuel oil) (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, 2020). One of the four national strategic reserves in the context of national defense is the national food reserve. The importance of food in winning the war has been recognized since BC.

One of the four national strategic reserves in the context of national defense is the national food reserve. National food reserves are an anticipation of: (i) the occurrence of non-military threats and food crises in support of national defense. (ii) as part of strengthening the total defense, namely components of natural resources and

artificial resources (Samego, 2015). Food reserves are defined in Article 1 of Law Number 18 of 2012 concerning Food as “the availability of food in the territory of Indonesia as a product of human consumption as well as in anticipation of price supply disruptions, food shortages and emergencies. One of the elaborations of this law is Government Regulation Number 17 of 2015 concerning Food Security and Nutrition.

An emergency that requires food reserves, is stated among others in Law Number 18 of 2012 concerning Food which states that an emergency is a condition or situation that arises beyond human capacity in order to avoid and prevent severe famine, natural disasters, and social conflict (including the result of war). Food, as intended in point (2) Article 1 of Presidential Decree No. 48 of 2016 concerning Assignment to Logistics Agency Public Company in the framework of National Resilience, covers 11 (eleven) kinds of foodstuffs. The eleven kinds of food are rice, corn, soybeans, sugar, cooking oil, wheat flour, shallots, chilies, beef, purebred chicken, and chicken eggs.

In connection with the doctrine of national defense, namely total defense, which means involving all components of the nation, what is meant by food needs is not only to meet the needs of the main component (TNI), but also the component of Indonesia's human resources (people). Therefore, the evaluation of conditions of adequacy (produced and reserved in sufficient quantities), independence (produced and reserved domestically), and resilience (produced and reserved in a sustainable manner, including in force majeure conditions), is in the context of the nation. Indonesia as a whole. Among the 11 kinds of foodstuffs, the Ministry of Defense and Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency focuses on the cultivation of three foodstuffs, namely rice (rice), corn and cassava (as an ingredient in tapioca flour).

When evaluating in general the conditions of adequacy, resilience and food independence, Indonesia is still insufficient, and is not yet independent in terms of supplying food needs and reserves. In Indonesia, there are 514 districts and cities, of which 81 districts (15.75% of the total city districts) are still categorized as food insecure. Today it is estimated that 19.4 million Indonesians are still experiencing hunger (Kurnia et al., 2020). If there is no strategic policy in dealing with food for the long term, in the next 10-20 years, Indonesia will experience a wider food crisis than just what 81 districts and cities are currently experiencing.

The calculation of population growth in a reticular way, and food growth are like the Malthus count sequence, in fact today it does not occur to the extreme extent of Malthus's calculations. However, this trend of imbalance is clear. Food and Agriculture (FAO) and UN (2019) data shows that as of 2019 there are still 820 million people in the world who are still suffering from hunger, while about two billion of the world's population is in a moderate place or experiencing food insecurity. This data is further away from the target of reaching a world without hunger (Zero Hunger) by 2030. Regarding the imbalance trend, it can be illustrated by the need for rice, as the main staple in Indonesia.

The total demand for rice (as of 2020) is 111.58 kilograms per capita per year. The total demand for rice includes direct household consumption of 94.47 Kg / Kap / Year plus consumption outside the household (animal feed, seeds / seeds, non-food industrial raw materials, and shrinkage / scattered) of 17.11 Kg / Kap. / Th (Ministry of Agriculture's Food Security Agency, 2020), If the total per capita rice demand per year is multiplied by the national population in 2020 (269,603,400 people), then the total national rice demand in 2020 is 30,082,347 tons, which means more than 30 million tons of rice per year. If the total population is projected to 2045 (when the Republic of Indonesia has its 100th birthday), namely 369 million people (BPS, 2020) or grows by around 37 percent, then the demand for rice in 2045 will increase to 41.1 million tons.

Dependence on imports to meet national food needs, means further weakening the independence, adequacy and security of national food. As explained in the dependency theory initiated by Johan Galtung in 1971 (Galtung, 1971), the dependence of another country will destroy local entrepreneurship, inhibit technological innovation, and weaken the position of domestic entrepreneurs. Indonesia's dependence on imported food, in addition to weakening the trade balance and the country's foreign exchange place, also weakens the place of Indonesian farmers and agricultural industries, keeps the Indonesian nation from achieving economic independence.

Apart from rice, corn food also has a deficit in demand, the availability of corn food (NBM, 2019) is 1.45 Kg / Kap / Th, while direct consumption of maize exceeds this availability, namely 1.67 Kg / Kap / Th. The need for maize does not include indirect needs, namely the need for corn for the feed industry of 6.85 million tons, 3.48 million tons for local animal feed, and 6.01 million tons for the non-feed industry (Ministry of Agriculture, 2020). If the per capita need per year (1.67 Kg / Kap / Th) is multiplied by the national population (269 million), then the direct household need for corn is 44.923 million tonnes in 2020 and will increase to 62.36 million tonnes year 2045. If the direct demand for national maize in 2020 is added to the indirect demand for corn, the total demand for corn per 2020 will be 61.26 million tons. Meanwhile, the total national demand for corn in 2045 will be between 85-90 million tons.

The problem also occurs in cassava food. Indonesia is a cassava granary, but not yet global. This can be seen from the following data: (i) RI's cassava exports were only 1.44% of the total world singlong exports compared to Thailand which reached 58.0%. (ii) Indonesian cassava production ranks fourth in the world (after Nigeria, Congo and Thailand); (iii) Cassava production continued to decline from 2014 to 2018, due to the lack of investors and farmer funds to plant cassava. Whereas in the case of cassava, Indonesia has a comparative advantage in world cassava production and market. as recapitalized in Table 1.

Table 1: Production and Indonesian Cassava on the International Stage

Subject	Comparison
Cassava production rate per hectare	Indonesia 23 tonnes / ha (compared to Thailand 2 tonnes / ha; Vietnam 19 tonnes / ha; China 16 tonnes / ha). Indonesia has a competitive advantage
World cassava production ranking	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Nigeria (59.485.947 ton)</li> <li>2. 2 Kongo (31.596.046 ton)</li> <li>3. 3 Thailand (30.973.292 ton)</li> <li>4. peringkat 4 <b>Indonesia</b> (19.046.000 ton).</li> </ol>
The world's largest cassava export ranking	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Thailand (58,9%)</li> <li>2. Kamboja (13,3%)</li> <li>3. Vietnam (11,0%)</li> <li>4. China (7,48%)</li> <li>5. Laos (4,84%)</li> <li>6. Indonesia (1,44%).</li> </ol>

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2020.

Table 1 explained Indonesia still imports a lot of raw flour, where the number of imported tons of flour is almost the same as the total consumption of flour, which means that both the domestic flour production and the total Indonesian flour exports are very insignificant. Table 2 shows the need for flour raw material imports, which has barely changed its place from 2013 to 2018.

Table 2: Production, Import, Consumption and Export of Indonesian Flour Raw Materials (thousand tons)

Tahun	Import	Consumption
2013	6.744 (USD 2,4 billion)	6.744
2014	7,439 (USD 2,4 billion)	7.439
2015	7,418 (USD 2,1 billion)	7.418
2016	10,544 (USD 2,4 billion)	10.525
2017	11.442 (USD 2,6 billion)	11.442
2018	8.196 (USD 2,4 billion)	8.194
Rata-Rata	8.630 (USD 2.38 billion)	8,627

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2020.

Based on the description above, it seems that from 2020 to 2045, if Indonesia does not take strategic and fast steps in increasing the food production sector, Indonesia will be very dependent on imports from other countries

to meet its food needs. The implication is that it will further weaken Indonesia in terms of national food sufficiency, independence and security. This will weaken Indonesia's defense posture.

### Implementation Strategy

First of all is land preparation. The Ministry of Defense prepares a strategic reserve of land or a strategic logistical reserve area, which is a certain area whose allotment is determined and managed to become a CLS area for national defense. The land target for the strategic logistics reserve area, has identified more than 1 million hectares in the form of forest so far. Broadly speaking, the land includes: (i) Non-forested forest areas in Central Kalimantan Province, consisting of 805,000 hectares consisting of seven blocks. As of 2019, there is still a need for follow-up collaboration with the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. (ii) Non-forested forest area of Merakue Regency, covering an area of 440,000 hectares consisting of three blocks. As of 2019, there is still a need for follow-up collaboration with the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. (iii) Food areas whose use has not been ideal, include the untapped rice fields of the ex-Peatland Development Central Kalimantan project, covering an area of 136,550 hectares. The rice fields for the opening of the Ministry of Defense and TNI 2015-2019 covering an area of 225 thousand hectares, and other land controlled by the local government and the private sector, which was submitted to the Ministry of Defense.

The provision of rice fields opened by the Ministry of Defense and TNI has been opened since 2015. Until 2019, the Ministry of Defense and TNI has succeeded in clearing non-productive land to become a rice field covering an area of 225,000 hectares. The lands that have been cleared by the Ministry of Defense and TNI are scattered throughout Indonesia, including: (i) Ogan Komering Ilir Regency, South Sumatra Province, covering an area of 16,993 hectares; (ii) Mesuji Regency, Lampung Province, covering an area of 10,185 hectares. (iii) Merauke Regency, Papua Province, covering an area of 8,915 hectares. (iv) Bima Regency, West Nusa Tenggara Province, covering an area of 7,387 hectares. (v) Sanggau Regency, West Kalimantan Province, covering an area of 7,050 hectares, and (vi) Tulang Bawang Regency, Lampung Province, covering an area of 6,571 hectares.

Table 3: The Scheme of Cassava and Rice Cultivation Land

Schemes	Detail	Main Match	Land Status (2020)
1	Land owned by the state (Ministry of Defence), which previously belonged to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry / Pemda. Agrimas manages this scheme 1 land for singlong / rice cultivation on the basis of orders from Ministry of Defence as the owner.	This land is in the form of: 1. Non-forested forest land belonging to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry of the Republic of Indonesia. 2. Local government paddy fields / plantations that are not managed optimally	Consists of: 1. About 800 thousand hectares of land Ministry of Environment and Forestry of the Republic of Indonesia in Central Kalimantan. 2. Approximately 400,000 hectares of land Ministry of Environment and Forestry of the Republic of Indonesia in Merauke
2	The land belongs to the state. The government manages this land for cassava / rice cultivation on the basis of long-term cooperation (borrow and use 20 years or more) with the Government).	In the form of rice fields / plantations owned by the local government that are not managed optimally.	Covers 5,000 hectares of local government land in Bangka Belitung.
3	Private land. The private sector manages this land for cultivation of cassava / rice on the basis of long-term cooperation (borrow and use 20 years or more) with the private sector.	In the form of private rice fields / plantations that are not managed optimally	Includes: 1. 130,000 hectares of land owned by a private company (Company "A") in East Kalimantan. 2. 180,000 hectares of land owned by a private

Schemes	Detail	Main Match	Land Status (2020)
			company (Company "B") in East Kalimantan.

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2020.

Based on available data on cassava cultivation, Table 4 shows the plan to gradually produce cassava until it reaches one million hectares of planting land, absorbs a workforce of 60,758 people, and produces around 5 million tons of flour per year 2026 (Ministry of Defense, 2020).

Table 4: Cassava Production Plan (2021-2025)

Land Clearing Stage	Luas Lahan	Penyerapan Tenaga Kerja	Jumlah (ton)
Phase 1	60.000 Ha	2 brigade + 3.574 people	294 thousand
Phase 2	150.000 Ha	5 brigade + 8.935 people	735 thousand
Phase 3	300.000 Ha	10 brigade + 17.870 people	1,5 million thousand
Phase 4	510.000 Ha	30.379 people	2,5 million thousand
Total	1.020.00 Ha	60.758 people	5 million

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2020.

The simulation is based on cassava plants, excluding maize and rice. The three food plants have different characteristics. Judging from the frequency of harvest, for example, maize is more productive than cassava. Corn can be harvested four times a year, while cassava harvest time is even longer, which is 8 months. Meanwhile, rice can be harvested 2-3 times a year (Permadi, 2020).

### Technology

As many have reported in the media, the average land for a food barn is flat. However, not a few lands are still in the form of swamps, such as land for the ex-Peatland Development project. Of course, the technology used is adapted to land conditions, land area, and availability of labor. The development of the food estate area is carried out using intensive swampland optimization technology to increase production and cropping index (IP). The development of the food storage area is being worked on on a large scale, so it requires mechanization of modern tools.

In relation to meeting the needs for modern agricultural equipment, the Ministry of Defense had impact. So far the Ministry of Defense and PT Pindad has collaborated with the Ministry of Agriculture to produce agricultural tools and machinery. Among the agricultural tools and machinery that can be used in food estate projects are drones for fertilization, floating tractors for piracy purposes, planting rota, combine multi-commodities, paddy drawers for drying food (especially rice), to silos for storing crops. agricultural tools and machinery is suitable for productive agricultural mechanization on large areas. For example, a floating tractor can plow two hectares of land per day (Kompas.com, 09/10/2020. Regarding food estate, the Ministry of Defense c, q PT Pindad can also contribute to electricity needs. Electrical equipment that can be useful for a food estate includes electricity generators. As is known, the need for electric machines at PT PLN is now mostly fulfilled by the Ministry of Defense and Pindad.

### Employment

Cassava production for 30,000 hectares, requires the establishment of one factory, and requires four battalions. workers. If the needs of these workers are simulated in military human resources (HR), it can be calculated as in Table 5 below:

Tabel 5: Simulation of Labor Needs in Cassava Cultivation

Human Resources	Target Cultural Team	Target Processing Team
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Human Resources	Target Cultural Team	Target Processing Team
1 Brigade	Total land area of 30,000 ha per brigade. Production target of 600,000 tons of tubers / year, covering 300 working days, 2,000 tons of tubers / day, with a productivity of 20 tons / ha.	Number of factories: 1 tapioca / mocap factory. Production target: 500 tons of flour / day
4 Battalions	3 Cultivation battalions. 10,000 ha / battalion and 474 workers / battalion.	1 Battalion factory processing: 1 tapioca / mocap factory and 280 workers / battalion.
1 Company	Consists of four companies with the division: nursery company, planting and maintenance company, harvesting company, and logistics company.	Processing company which consists of: production company as well as infrastructure and engineering company.

*Source: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2020.*

Part of the workforce needs of Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency and Agrinas will be taken from the reserve component formation program (Komcad). The legal basis for taking Komcad for Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency and Agrinas workers is Law No. 23 of 19 about National Resource Management, in particular Article 1, Article 33, and Article 35. The target of Komcad participants for 2020 is 15,000. After basic military training, Komcad who wishes to join BC: S / Agrinas will undergo agricultural training, and work as Agrinas employees (Ministry of Defense RI, 2020). According to the Minister of Agriculture Syahrul Limpo, food estate efforts can create jobs in rural areas, can provide social protection, can increase farmer family income, in addition to ensuring national food security. The food estate development area will be built a farmer organization business model involving farmer groups per 100 hectares, and farmer groups association on land per 1,000 hectares (Kompas.com, 09/10/2020).

### **Investation**

The central government has budgeted for the printing of new rice fields at IDR 19 million per hectare, but not many local governments are interested. One reason is that the average paddy field in each region, especially in Java, is already at maximum (Permadi, 2020). In accordance with the 2020 Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency Presidential Decree, Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency funding comes from: (i) State Expenditure Budget, (b) Regional Expenditure Budget, and / or, (iii) other sources of funding that are legal and not binding in accordance with laws and regulations. Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency itself offers investors to invest in the Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency program with profit sharing scheme. Cooperation with investors can be in the form of land participation in the program, or equity participation in Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency (Permadi, 2020).

### ***Post-Harvest Production, Processing, Warehousing, and Distribution***

Post-harvest production, processing, warehousing, and distribution of harvested or production products are of course adjusted to the area of Post-harvest production, processing, warehousing, and distribution activity. The products of Post-harvest production, processing, warehousing, and distribution whose activities are more focused on the central, eastern and western parts of Indonesia; can adapt post-harvest activities to these areas. Regarding the distribution and warehousing of the Ministry of Defense through its subsidiary PT Pindad (PT Pindad International Logistic), it can contribute to aspects of logistics transportation (especially distribution by sea and land), to warehousing.

Apart from carrying out various post-harvest activities on its own, Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency can also collaborate with related parties. For example, in the four stages of logistics specifically for food prepared by Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency (maize, cassava, rice), Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency cooperate with Logistics Agency Public Company. In accordance with Article 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 48 of 2016

concerning the Assignment of Logistics Agency Public Company in the Framework of National Resilience, the task of Logistics Agency Public Company is to control the availability and distribution of food, which includes procurement, processing, alignment of stock between regions as needed, and distribution. In the context of the four tasks of Logistics Agency Public Company, Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency and Bulog can complement and strengthen each other, and at the same time avoid overlapping functions and activities between institutions managing national food security.

Likewise, Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency cooperate with the Food Security Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture. This collaboration has now been formed between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Defense. This can be seen from the division of tasks in the food estate program, in which there has been a division of tasks regarding the location of arable land, as well as the type of food. The Ministry of Agriculture focuses on rice, while the Ministry of Defense focuses on corn and cassava.

### **Security System**

The Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency security system can be both general and special. The security system in general is regulated and implemented in the national security system which has so far been generally accepted. The security system is specifically established by the Ministry of Defense and Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency, which is regulated and implemented according to the needs of each Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency working area. The working area of Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency in general is the territory of Indonesia, but specifically is the area in which there are areas for food planting, namely the Provinces of Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Papua, Bangka Belitung, South Sumatra, Lampung, and other provinces which were determined later by a Ministerial Decree. Defense as Head of the Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency. So far, the implementation of policies regarding national food reserves has been running. Food reserves have begun to be implemented both in terms of the statutory basis, organizational structure, command, and bureaucracy, human resources.

### **Control**

The Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency is an agency that ensures the availability of strategic logistics reserves for national defense. As an organization, the agency is under and responsible to the President as Supreme Commander. Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency is led by the Head of the agency who is held by the Minister of Defense, and the Deputy Head who is held by the Deputy Minister of Defense. Furthermore, members of the Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency consisting of 10 ministers, the TNI Commander, the Chief of Police, and the Governor / Regent; deputy; and professional staff.

Regarding land provision, the Ministry of Defense Land Team coordinates with the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (LHK), Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning. The National Land Agency and the Regional Government to seek potential land that is compatible with the characteristics of The Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency's land, namely: (i) Forest land has never been forested belonging to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry; (ii) Local government rice fields / plantations that are not managed optimally.

### **Conclusion**

Based on the findings of the researchers above, the role of the Ministry of Defense in preparing national food security can be discussed through 10 qualitative measurements as mentioned above.

1. Organizational roles through Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency and Agrinas. Organizationally, the Ministry of Defense together with the Ministry of Agriculture has gained trust and responsibility in preparing a food barn (food estate). Especially for the Ministry of Defense, a Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency has been formed. Judging from its place, the Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency is quite important. because he is directly responsible to the President of the Republic of Indonesia. Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency members

consisting of 10 ministers, TNI Commander, Chief of Police, and Governor / Regent, deputies, and professional staff. Internally, the Ministry of Defense has formed an implementing company for the implementation of food storage for the part that will be handled by the Ministry of Defense, namely PT Agro Industri Nasional (PT Agrinas). However, considering that Bulog has also been formed since 1967, and the Defense Agency (BKP) under the Ministry of Agriculture, the related institutions must further clarify their place, function and clear division of duties, there is no overlapping. In addition, between the agency and other related institutions, coordination and close cooperation are needed, so that the goal of preparing national food security can be achieved optimally and on time.

2. The role of providing land data. The role of the Ministry of Defense and Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency in providing land is very important. One of the factors that has become the superiority of the Indonesian nation is that the Indonesian state has a large area of land. Unfortunately, so far, many of these vast lands have been controlled by the private sector for commercial purposes, so the people at large have not felt the benefits directly. Partly there is a lot of land that has been controlled by the state, but some of it is unproductive, or is forest that is not forested. In this case, the role of the Ministry of Defense is quite large in converting the land for the sake of preparing a national food barn. The plan to manage 1 million hectares of land is already an achievement. Of course, along with the increasing population of Indonesia, a larger area of land is needed than the targeted 1 million hectares.

3. The role of coordination and cooperation with relevant ministries and local governments. So far the Ministry of Defense and Strategic Logistics Reserve Agency have made various collaborative efforts with related ministries and the local government. Coordination and cooperation between the Ministry of Defense and related agencies is very important because most of the land has been controlled by the relevant ministries and the local government. This cooperation is needed not only at the land preparation stage, but also for later stages. It is hoped that when the government changes, this pattern of cooperation must continue.

4. The role of providing workers. It is appropriate if the Ministry of Defense provides its own staff for land preparation, cultivation, production processes, as well as warehousing and distribution. This is because the Ministry of Defense c.q TNI has a good command structure, has adequate and well-organized trained and disciplined human resources. It should be remembered, the reason that caused the failure of the 1 million hectare Peatland Development project during the New Order era was due to the lack of human resources, who at that time relied more on farmers. Farmers, especially local farmers, will of course be involved, but at the next stage of implementation and remain under the coordination and control of the Ministry of Defense and TNI.

5. The role of providing technology (modern agricultural equipment). The Ministry of Defense and PT Pindad is believed to be able to provide most of the needs for modern agricultural equipment for large land mechanization. Tool products of the Ministry of Defense c.q PT Pindad are not only for the cultivation stage, but also for the food processing and warehousing process.

6. The role of cultivation. The Ministry of Defense and TNI, through the deployment of staff in a systematic, structured and scheduled way, and supported by modern agricultural equipment, it is hoped that the cultivation of cassava and maize can be carried out massively, so that it can meet the set targets. At this stage, some farmers can be involved so that later they can become pioneers for other farmers.

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# Pancasila as the Basis for Indonesia's Universal Defense

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## Abstract

The complexity of Indonesia requires Pancasila in forming its defense system which is universal. Because the form of defense of the Indonesian state is universal. This means that national defense requires all citizens and is not limited to the role of the Indonesian National Army and the Police. To be able to form universal defense, Pancasila is needed as the basis. This is a qualitative research. The data were obtained from literature studies, then their validity was tested through triangulation techniques, and analyzed. The results showed that Indonesia really needed Pancasila in shaping its universal defense system. Pancasila naturally forms the national identity of the Indonesian nation, which then becomes the basis for the formation of a universal defense system. One of the obstacles in the application of Pancasila values is globalization. The solution to deal with this is by holding a state defense program, as well as continuing to strengthen the sense of nationalism and the spirit of patriotism in the community by continuing to carry out campaigns. Campaigns are carried out in various sectors, including Education and government.

**Keywords:** Pancasila, Basic, Universal Defense

## 1. Introduction

Indonesia is one of the most unique countries in the world. From a geographical point of view, Indonesia is located in Indonesia, located between the Asian Continent and the Australian Continent, also between the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean. Such a strategic position makes Indonesia a sea and air traffic lane. Then Indonesia also became a cross point of world trade, such as between Japan, Korea and China with countries in Asia, Africa and Europe (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2020). The Strait of Malacca is an example of a cross point of world trade in Indonesia. The strait is the fastest link between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The Strait of Malacca is one of the nine chokepoints that act as Sea Lanes of Trade (SLOT) and Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC) (Sulistyani, 2019). It is recorded that more than 90% of the world's total trade is carried by sea. Of this amount, as much as 40% of the total goods are carried through Indonesia via the Natuna Sea (Defriandi, 2020).

Then from the demographic side, Indonesia is one of the countries with the largest population in the world. According to the Central Statistics Agency, the total population of Indonesia in 2020 is 270.2 million. Indonesia also has more than 300 ethnic groups or ethnic groups, to be more precise there are 1,340 ethnic groups in the

country according to the 2010 BPS census. Javanese are the largest group in Indonesia with an amount reaching 41% of the total population (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019).

Such complex conditions, coupled with the vast coverage of Indonesia's territory, require special attention in the defense sector. The Indonesian National Army will not be able to protect the entire defense territory of Indonesia, along with all its national resources. The solution is Indonesia needs a specific defense system. In this case, Indonesia's defense system is a universal defense system. A universal war strategy is needed to be able to control the scope of Indonesia's defense area. Because defense policy is a policy that can guide the government to become advanced and strong. Defense policy will affect everyone, both civilian and military. These impacts occur in the short, medium and long term (Supriyatno & Ali, 2019).

The Indonesian defense system according to Article 30 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution explains that national defense and security efforts are carried out through the people's defense and security system while the TNI and the Indonesian police are the main force and the people as the supporting force. This means that all citizens have the responsibility for national defense. So that the universal defense system cannot be implemented, if all elements of life in Indonesian society do not have the same perception. As before described, the complexity of state life in Indonesia is something that is very unique. For example, in one province, namely Aceh, there are three main ethnic groups that have unique cultures and even languages that differ from one another. Thus, in understanding a problem, the seven ethnic groups may have different views. The description of this condition can be found in one province, while Indonesia has 33 provinces.

Indonesia has the Pancasila ideology. According to the preamble to the 1945 Constitution, there are five principles in Pancasila: (1) Almighty Godhead, (2) Just and Civilized Humanity, (3) Indonesian Unity, (4) Democracy Led by Wisdom in Deliberation and Representation, and (5) Social Justice for All Indonesian People. Pancasila is the principle of national and state life. This means that every Indonesian citizen understands Pancasila as part of their daily way of life. All Indonesian citizens, consisting of hundreds of ethnic groups, share one ideology, namely Pancasila. This research will discuss Pancasila and its role in supporting Indonesia's universal defense system. Then explain its influence on the defense system.

## **2. Method**

This research is qualitative research, which is research that describes, summarizes various conditions, various situations, or various variables that arise in the community that is the problem, then draws to the surface as a feature or description of certain conditions, situations or variables. Descriptive research can be of qualitative and quantitative types, while the qualitative type is the data expressed in the form of words or sentences and descriptions. This research also has a quasi-qualitative design. Because its construction is still influenced by the quantitative tradition, especially in placing theory on the data it gets (Bungin, 2017).

Datas are collected through literature studies, namely data collection by reviewing books, literature, notes, and reports that are relevant to the research carried out (Nazir, 2013). The data obtained were then checked for validity through triangulation techniques. Triangulation testing of data from different sources and analyzing the evidence obtained will strengthen the justification for the accuracy of the data (Cresswell, 2015). Triangulation of data used in this study is source triangulation, which is to test data using the same source to obtain data (Sugiyono, 2017).

The data will then be analyzed inductively. This means that the analysis of the data obtained will then be developed into a hypothesis. The data search process will continue to be carried out repeatedly through triangulation, so that it can be concluded that the hypothesis is accepted or rejected. If the hypothesis is accepted, the research results can develop into a theory (Sugiyono, 2017).

### 3. Results

#### 3.1 Pancasila as Ideology

Pancasila was born from the results of deliberations from various groups of society. The Pancasila ideology itself was formulated by the Nine Committee and based on the speech of Ir. Soekarno on June 1, 1945 (Yanggih, 2020). Pancasila is more of a crystallization of thought as a nation rather than a product of individual thought. The values contained in Pancasila, both as a philosophy and as an ideology, grew out of the history of our own nation. Especially in the history of the struggle for independence. This ideology is open and has ideal and actual values, which means that it is dynamic in response to various dynamic changes in its surroundings. So that Pancasila can live in various times. However, this openness does not diminish the values contained in it, namely (Pancasila Ideology Development Agency of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021):

1. Basic values which include divinity, humanity, unity, people and justice. These five things are fundamental guidelines that are universal in nature, containing the ideals of the state and good and right goals.
2. Instrumental value that includes direction, policies, strategies, targets, and implementing institutions. This concept is a development from the previous basics. Thanks to that, adjusting the implementation of something basic will be clearer to be able to solve the problems that occur.
3. The value of praxis, which includes the realization of the instrumental which is real and can be used for the life of the state. With this last value, Pancasila can make development and changes so that it can be suitable if applied in the changing conditions of Indonesian society.

In its application in everyday life, all the precepts contained in Pancasila move simultaneously and are inseparable from one another. So that by implementing Pancasila, naturally every Indonesian citizen has helped his country in shaping national defense. Because every principle in Pancasila strengthens the unity of Indonesia, which is the basis for forming a national defense system.

#### 3.2 Indonesian Universal Defense

In Indonesia's defense policy, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia explains that state defense is held to defend the sovereignty of the country, the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of the entire nation from threats and disturbances to the integrity of the nation and state from all forms of threats. Efforts to implement national defense that are universal are based on awareness of the rights and obligations of citizens and belief in their own strength (Ministry of Defense, 2018). Indonesian Universal Defense is a form of state life from the country itself. Indonesia's independence was obtained from the struggle of all ethnic groups throughout the archipelago. So that naturally, the universal defense system becomes the ideal defense system for Indonesia. This defense system consists of four components, namely the main component, the reserve component, the supporting component, and the state defense education (Ministry of Defense, 2015).

This defense system also involves all national resources which are prepared early by the Government and implemented in a total, integrated, directed and sustainable way to uphold state sovereignty, maintain territorial integrity and the safety of the entire nation from all forms of threats. National resources are human resources, natural resources, and artificial resources (Ministry of Defense, 2015). Human resources include all Indonesian citizens. This is due to the very wide coverage of Indonesia's sovereignty. So that the Indonesian National Army and the Police, as the main components in national defense, are unable to protect the entire territory.

### 4. Discussion

National defense is formed as a form of anticipation of threats. So it is important to understand the nature of the threat. The complexity of threats is classified into multidimensional patterns and types of threats in the form of military threats, non-military threats and hybrid threats which can be categorized as real and not yet real threats. Thus, future national defense requires integrated military and non-military defense through efforts to build

strong and respected national defense forces and capabilities that have high deterrence (Ministry of Defense, 2015).

Such a wide-ranging threat requires the attention of every citizen. Because with a universal defense system, it requires all elements of society and is not limited to the roles of the Indonesian National Army and the Police. Indonesia consists of hundreds of ethnic groups and regional languages. So that we need a binder in the life of the nation and state. In this case, what binds all Indonesian citizens is Pancasila. As previously explained, the principles in Pancasila have values that unite all elements in Indonesia, as well as become the basis of a form of universal defense.

Naturally, Pancasila gave birth to the national identity of the Republic of Indonesia. National identity is the national personality or national identity possessed by a nation that distinguishes one nation from another (Astawa, 2017). Indonesia's national identities include (Hasanal & Rosmawati, 2020):

1. The national or unified language, namely Indonesian.
2. The flag of the country, namely the Red and White. The National Anthem, namely Indonesia Raya.
3. The national symbol, namely the Garuda Pancasila.
4. The country's motto, namely Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.
5. The basic philosophy of the state, namely Pancasila. The country's constitution, namely the 1945 Constitution.
6. The form of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia with people's sovereignty.
7. Concept of Archipelago Insights.
8. Regional culture that has been accepted as a national culture.

Through one identity, all differences in Indonesia, such as hundreds of ethnic groups and regional languages, are no longer there. This is because Indonesia already has one national identity, only as an Indonesian nation. There are no more Acehnese, Minang, Sundanese, and others. All of them have merged into one. The use of one language, namely Indonesian, also unites the populist communication system. Everyone speaks the same language.

When all elements of society have the same unity in their identity, then national defense can be formed according to the universality itself. Indonesia's universal defense began to take shape since the war era to reclaim Indonesian independence which occurred in the period 1945-1949 (Supriyatno & Ali, 2019). Various battles were recorded that occurred in the early period of independence (1945–1949), especially against the Dutch and their allies who continued to insist on regaining control of Indonesia through the Dutch Military Aggression I and II. The Dutch military strength at that time was far more dominant than Indonesia, which had just become independent, but the Indonesian people and army continued to struggle to defend their independence through various wars with guerrilla tactics (Slamet JP, 2020).

The guerrilla strategy was first implemented by A.H. Nasution. The strategy launched by Nasution originally came from the condition that the troops were almost defeated and moved back from the war. Indonesian troops basically lost on all sides. Poor weaponry, troop skills, coordination between groups, to poorly trained troop members. As a result, the Indonesian military was unable to deal directly with the Dutch army. All Indonesian troops retreated to the new line of defense by walking west of the Garut-Cirebon provincial border, along the southern coastline. Nasution ordered not to go head-to-head, but to move back into the enclaves and counterattacked. This strategy is not the first to be implemented in the world, but Nasution can apply it very well, also very quickly, even though the army he leads is actually in a very bad condition (Turner, 2018). The universal defense that is applied today is certainly different from the time of war to regain independence. However, it has the same essence, namely the involvement of all elements of Indonesian citizens in defending the sovereignty of their country.

Every citizen, in forming universal defense, must apply the values contained in Pancasila. The application of the values contained in Pancasila is not fixed on just one principle. Because Pancasila is a system in which all the precepts move simultaneously and are inseparable. The application of Pancasila values can be carried out in various sectors of social life. Examples are having a sense of pride and love for the homeland and nation, being willing to sacrifice for the sake of the nation and state, developing mutual respect, fostering good relations with all elements of the nation, promoting association for the sake of national regulations, upholding Indonesian unity and integrity, and so on.

The application of Pancasila values also has obstacles in its implementation, especially in the era of globalization. In the era of globalization, all information moves very quickly and the entry and exit process cannot be hindered. Automatically this will also have an impact on the social life of countries in the world, including Indonesia. For example, globalization of culture has an impact on giving birth to a global culture that has become a trend in countries around the world such as westernization. In its development, Westernization has gained a rival as a global culture which is marked by the emergence of Hallyu (Korean Wave) which can also be said to be the Asian version of Westernization (Larasati, 2018). This becomes important to note. Because it will also have an impact on national identity.

As previously described, Indonesia's national identity, which uses the same identity, is the basic asset of universal defense. If people start to be reluctant to communicate in Indonesian and instead use English, then the national identity will immediately fade away. Likewise, the free entry of various information, if not anticipated, will have the potential to destroy Indonesia's entire national identity. For example, future generations will no longer memorize the national anthem. The worst possibility is that they no longer understand Pancasila, so they are unable to fully implement the values of Pancasila in everyday life.

To be able to face this challenge, one of the ways that the Government of Indonesia has implemented is by organizing a state defense program. This application is in accordance with Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning State Defense. It is stated in the law that defending the state is the attitude and behavior of citizens who are animated by their love for the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia which is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in establishing the survival of the nation and state as a whole. So it is hoped that through this state defense program, there will be awareness in the participants to be able to serve their country in a better way. Because defending the country is different from compulsory military service. State defense does not require special matters in its implementation. Such as obeying the regulations that have been made by the government, paying taxes, working discipline, not getting involved in corruption and drugs, and so on.

The State Defense Awareness Fostering Program has been strengthened by the issuance of Government Regulation Number 3 of 2021 concerning Guidelines for Implementing Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning Management of National Resources for State Defense. State Defense is a right and obligation mandated in the 1945 Constitution Article 27 paragraph (3). The rights and obligations of State Defense are also regulated in Law Number 3 of 2002 Article 9 and further strengthened by Law Number 23 of 2019. Everyone can participate in this awareness development program to defend the country. The method used in State Defense Awareness Education refers to the pedagogical, andragogical, heutagogical and / or geragogical approaches, including lectures, demonstrations, dialogues, discussions, group work, experiments, inquiries, assignments, simulations (inside and outside the classroom), broadcasts, and other methods (Wantannas, 2016). Several universities in Indonesia, such as the Indonesian Defense University, have implemented this program. Every year before holding lectures, all new students carry out the state defense program for a certain period of time in the Main Military Region Regiment belonging to the Indonesian National Army.

Another way is through campaigns. In the era of the industrial revolution 4.0, nationalism is the most important element that must be built and owned by society to strengthen national identity that is threatened by globalization. Pancasila values must be given and practiced at all levels of formal education. Including knowledge of the nation's history. All Indonesian must know and understand the severity of the struggle to be free. So that the spirit of patriotism can arise within him, which will directly strengthen his sense of nationalism.

Indeed, in the Indonesian Education curriculum, there are already civic subjects. However, to be able to answer the challenges of globalization, change is needed. This change is in the form of renewing lesson content, namely by strengthening the core values of Pancasila in each subject of the study, so that in its development each study substance is inspired by the values of Pancasila philosophically (Muchtarom, 2012).

The government, through its power of attorney, must be able to campaign in various media. For example, when delivering government programs, it must be able to minimize the use of foreign languages and prioritize Indonesian. Furthermore, disseminating content that educates, enlightens, empowers, and builds national character. All state civil servants can also campaign for the love of the country through their daily activities. This has been implemented very well in several areas. For example, the City Government of Pekalongan, Central Java, requires state civil servants to wear batik sarongs every Friday as an effort to preserve batik crafts and improve the community's economy (Purboyo, 2019). Then before carrying out national seminars, especially at universities, they are obliged to sing the national anthem.

Strengthening Pancasila values, like building national defense, cannot be carried out by one party alone. However, the government has the task of maintaining domestic security and defense, it must be able to properly facilitate the things needed to make this happen. Pancasila is the basis of all Indonesian life, including its universal defense system. So that by strengthening the values contained in it, it will directly strengthen the defense of the Indonesian state.

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# Pancasila Revitalization Strategy in the Era of Globalization to Face the Threat of National Disintegration

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## Abstract

The Diversity and pluralism of the Indonesian nation are adhered to by the motto of Bhineka Tunggal Ika and Pancasila as the basis of the state and the nation's outlook on life. Globalization has resulted in a degradation of the character of the nation as indicated by the increase in intolerance and radicalism as well as a decline in the spirit of nationalism and patriotism which have created threats of national disintegration. This study aims to revitalize Pancasila in facing the effects of globalization in order to ward off and eliminate intolerance and radicalism and to increase the spirit of nationalism and the spirit of patriotism in order to maintain national integration by using the method of literature study presented with descriptive argumentative and comprehensive analysis. The results of the research resulted in two strategies in dealing with the effects of globalization in order to face the threat of national disintegration, namely by carrying out the revitalization of Pancasila through national character education to face the effects of globalization in order to ward off and eliminate intolerance and radicalism in order to face the threat of national disintegration and carry out the revitalization of Pancasila through state defense activities to face the effects of globalization in order to increase the spirit of nationalism and the spirit of patriotism in facing the threat of national disintegration.

**Keywords:** Character Education, Globalization, Revitalization of Pancasila, State Defense Strategy

## 1. Introduction

The Indonesian nation is a plural and pluralistic nation with various ethnic groups, religions, cultures and customs stretching from Sabang to Merauke with thousands of islands within it which are united as an archipelago within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The pluralism and pluralism of the Indonesian nation are adhered to by the motto of Bhineka Tunggal Ika and Pancasila as the basis of the state and the nation's outlook on life. Pancasila is the source of all sources of law in the State of Indonesia. The

best works of the nation's founding fathers were extracted from the national identity and noble values that were not owned by other nations.

The development of the strategic environment today is marked by globalization. In general, globalization is a social change in the form of increasing linkages between society and the factors that occur as a result of transculturation and the development of modern technology (Ubaedillah & Rozak, 2006). The Indonesian state is currently in the midst of the influence of globalization in all aspects of human life which includes natural aspects and social aspects including territory, natural resources and population, as well as ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural and security defense aspects (Wahyudi, 2016).

The influence of globalization is marked by advances in telecommunications and transportation, increasing mobility and changes in lifestyle, which have the potential to change geographic structures, demographics, national identity and the concept of nationalism. Globalization threatens to lose the character and identity of the Indonesian nation (Agung, 2017) and the values of nationalism, patriotism and love for the country so that it needs to be improved again (Irhandayaningsih, 2012).

Globalization has resulted in a degradation of the character of the nation as indicated by the increase in intolerance and radicalism as well as a decline in the spirit of nationalism and patriotism which have created threats of national disintegration. The current efforts made by the government to overcome this problem have not succeeded significantly so that other efforts need to be made to overcome this problem through the revitalization of Pancasila. Revitalizing the values of Pancasila is a process of reviving or understanding and re-living the noble values of Pancasila in the life of society, nation and state.

This condition is a driven force for all elements of the nation to revitalize the values of Pancasila as the basis of the state and the nation's way of life. Revitalizing the values of Pancasila in general is to restore Pancasila to its function as the basis of the state and national ideology, namely rebuilding the spirit of nationalism, affirming people's sovereignty and the rule of law, respect human rights, eliminate authoritarianism and so on. Revitalization is also intended to maintain national integrity and strengthen the nation's ability to respond to the challenges of globalization (Latief, 2020).

Based on this phenomenon, the problem faced is how the strategy of revitalizing Pancasila to face the effects of globalization in order to ward off and eliminate intolerance and radicalism and to increase the spirit of nationalism and the spirit of patriotism in order to maintain national integration.

## **2. Method**

The research method used in this writing is literature study which is conveyed by descriptive argumentative, through comprehensive analysis, it is found that various problems that are being faced are found to be discussed and steps to solve the problems are sought. This paper also presents reasons related to the Pancasila revitalization strategy to face the effects of globalization in order to ward off and eliminate intolerance and radicalism and to increase the spirit of nationalism and the spirit of patriotism in order to maintain national integration.

## **3. Results**

Pancasila is the ideology and basis of the state as well as the way of life of the Indonesian people. The basis of the state is the basis for regulating the constitutional administration of a country in the fields of ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture, defense and security. The foundation of the state is also the manifestation and desire of its people. The basis of the state is a solid and strong foundation and comes from a view of life or a philosophy (a reflection of civilization, culture, nation) that is accepted by all levels of society.

The outlook on life of a nation is the ideals of the nation and deep thoughts and ideas about a better life form. Pancasila as the nation's view of life contains a basic conception of the life to aspire to. Pancasila as the nation's view of life is a crystallization of values that are rooted in the culture and outlook of life of the Indonesian people. Thus, the Pancasila view of life for the Indonesian nation which is Unity in Diversity must be the principle of unifying the nation so that it is not allowed to kill diversity. As the essence of the cultural values of the Indonesian people, Pancasila is the national moral ideal that provides guidance and spiritual strength for the nation to behave nobly in everyday life in society, nation and state (Hadiwijono, 2016).

Pancasila as the state ideology of the Republic of Indonesia is an open ideology which is an open system of thought and has the characteristics that the values and characteristics to be realized cannot be imposed from outside, but are extracted and taken from the morals and cultural values of the community itself (Latif, 2011). Pancasila is very compatible with the reality of the Indonesian nation with various interests that may initially conflict with each other diametrically (Muslimin, 2016).

The determination of Pancasila as the basis of the state implies that the Indonesian state is a Pancasila state. This implies that the state must submit to it and defend and implement it in all laws. The Pancasila State is a state that is established, maintained and developed with the aim of protecting and developing the dignity and human rights of all Indonesian citizens (just and civilized humanity), so that each can live properly as a human being, develop himself and realize physical and mental welfare as complete as possible, advancing general welfare, namely physical and mental well-being for all people, and educating the nation's life (Greenberg, 2009).

The Indonesian state is currently in the midst of a world that is completely modern, technologically advanced, and an era of globalization in all aspects of human life which includes natural and social aspects. Covering territory, natural resources and population, as well as aspects, ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture and defense and security or *Ipoleksosbudhankam* (Wahyudi, 2016). As an archipelagic state, which has diversity in terms of ethnicity, religion, language and customs, as well as natural resources. This diversity, if not managed properly in a fair and equal manner, will become a potential conflict, thus threatening the integrity of the nation (Lemhanas Study Team, 2015).

The globalization faced today directly or indirectly affects the life order of the Indonesian nation. The general assumption that has surfaced is that the Indonesian people are currently starting to lose their identity where people are faced with a cultural dilemma where one side of the existing cultural patterns is still attached to the order of social life, while on the other hand the community is faced with the increasingly swift flow of outside culture. The multidimensional crisis facing the Indonesian nation is the impact of global changes. Thus, it can be estimated that the multidimensional crisis indicates how fragile the cultural foundations of society are in holding back the flow of outside culture (Suminar, 2003).

Over time, the existence of Pancasila did not escape the threat of national disintegration. The dynamics of the development of the strategic environment, whether global, regional or national, greatly influence the mindset, attitude and action patterns in addressing the various fundamental problems faced by the nation. The era of globalization and its implications has changed the perception of threats to the existence of a country. Threats to the nation and state are no longer manifested in the form of physical threats, but rather more complex threats that cover all dimensions of national life. Therefore, it is necessary to revitalize the values of Pancasila so that they can be used as a reference for the Indonesian people in answering various problems faced now and in the future (Situru, 2019).

The degradation of Pancasila values is marked by the increasing threat of disintegration of the nation with the waning of national character and identity which has led to the proliferation of intolerance and radicalism as well as a decline in the spirit of nationalism / nationalism and the spirit of patriotism. This shows the weak implementation of the noble values of Pancasila in the life of the Indonesian nation. According to Lickona, these signs can describe the destruction of a nation (Fauzan et al, 2019).

Diversity is a condition of society in which there are many differences in various fields, such as ethnicity, nation, race, belief and between groups. The diversity that Indonesia possesses must be balanced with the tolerant attitude of its citizens to defend the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. This attitude of tolerance is shown to respect the differences in religious, racial and cultural opinions belonging to groups or individuals. A lack of understanding of the diversity in Indonesian society leads to attitudes of intolerance. Intolerance is the opposite of tolerance. The word is a noun which means unwillingness to accept different beliefs and behaviors, and does not agree with what people outside of themselves believe (Haryani, 2019).

Global development, globalization, democratization, and science greatly influence the development of tolerance in Indonesia. Globalization has eroded the noble values of the East and increased intolerance (Nugraheny, 2019). Komnas HAM data for 2010-2013 shows that there are still many complaints about incidents of intolerance in the form of violations of freedom and religious diversity. In 2010 the state institution received 84 complaints, consisting of 26 cases of destruction, disturbance and sealing of houses of worship, with 14 cases of violence against sects claimed to be heretical, 7 cases of internal conflicts and disputes, and 6 cases of violations against prohibition of Ahmadiyah, as well as other violations. In 2011, there were 83 complaints, with 32 cases related to violations of the destruction of places of worship, 21 cases related to Ahmadiyah, disturbances and violations of worship in 13 cases, and discrimination against religious minorities in 6 cases. Meanwhile, in 2012, there were 68 complaints to Komnas HAM, with details of 20 cases of vandalism and sealing of houses of worship, 19 cases of internal conflicts and disputes, 17 cases of religious disturbance, and 6 cases of minority discrimination. Then in 2013 Komnas HAM received 39 complaint files, 21 cases in the form of discrimination, threats and violence against religious adherents, 9 cases of obstruction of the construction of places of worship and 9 obstruction of religious rituals (Haryani, 2019).

Meanwhile, radicalism is a notion that calls for change, replacement of a system in society to its roots and using violent means. Radicalism movements accompanied by anarchist actions greatly influence conditions of conducive and dynamic political stability. The dynamics of globalization, especially in the field of information technology, are so fast that they are increasingly opening up opportunities for the growth and development of radicalism, especially for the younger generation (Lemhanas Study Team, 2015).

Radicalism has a very strong connection with terrorism, both of which are acts of violence or threats to human life. These crimes were actually committed by a minority group who rejected and at the same time did not believe in the existing democratic system and process. The movement wants political and social changes drastically with violence, while religion is used as a foundation that is understood in an extreme way (Prasetyo, 2016).

In the era of modernization marked by the swift flow of globalization, Indonesia faces major challenges in terms of national and state awareness. The rapid onslaught of foreign cultures facilitated by media and internet technology can freely present itself in the midst of our society and has the potential to dominate and influence local culture. Coupled with other state problems that threaten the sovereignty of the nation, especially after 1998, such as the emergence of ideologies that are contrary to state ideology, terrorism, radicalism, and social conflicts based on ethnicity, race and religion. The various problems of the nation above explain that Indonesia is facing serious challenges related to nationalism.

The results of the LSI Denny JA survey on September 8 to 17 2019 showed that from 2005-2018 the number of pro-Pancasila residents had decreased by at least 10%. At the level of formal education, especially youth groups, the number of pro-Pancasila groups also decreased. As many as 66.4 percent of citizens who still identify themselves as part of the Indonesian nation, 19.1 percent of residents identify themselves as adhering to a certain religion, and 11.9 percent of residents identify themselves as part of a certain ethnic group. There is 33.6 percent of citizens who do not prioritize nationalism, indicating that nationalism is still in challenge (Setyowati, 2019).

Nationalism faces significant challenges in the reform era. This is indicated by the start to marginalize the content of Pancasila at the level of formal education, which is largely focused on technological and economic

developments. The waning of nationalism in this era can also be highlighted by the rise of racial-based social conflicts such as the Poso, Ambon, Aceh, Papua cases, and the release of East Timor from Indonesia, the emergence of mass organizations that emphasize cultural identity, and the many alternative ideologies that often conflict with the ideology of the nation. Not to mention, the rampant primordial narratives and sentiments based on the issue of SARA that developed in society during the presidential election in the last two periods seemed to make cultural barriers stronger and inevitable. Departing from this fact, nationalism needs to be voiced again to maintain national sovereignty and bring Indonesia to a better direction because otherwise unity and integrity will be threatened and future generations will be apathetic towards their own country (Setyowati, 2019).

Pancasila as integral values that underlie the life of the nation and the State of Indonesia is developed and maintained with the aim of protecting and developing the rights, obligations, dignity and of all citizens, especially in implementing the democratic system in Indonesia (Mutiani, 2016).

In the era of globalization, Pancasila as a national identity is the guide so as not to be carried away by the current of change. Pancasila is the hallmark, differentiating our nation from other nations. Pancasila is not something rigid and static, Pancasila is dynamic in line with the progress of the times. Pancasila as an open national identity continues to evolve to renew its meaning so that it is relevant and functional to the current situation (Budimansyah, 2010).

In general, revitalization is to restore Pancasila to its function as the basis of the State and national ideology, namely rebuilding the spirit of nationalism, affirming people's sovereignty and the rule of law, respecting human rights, eliminating authoritarianism and so on injustices inherited from the past. Revitalization is also intended to maintain national integrity and strengthen the nation's ability to respond to the challenges of globalization (Latief, 2020).

Based on the description above, the influence of globalization has degraded the character and identity of the nation as well as the spirit and spirit of nationalism and patriotism. The indicative condition of this phenomenon is reflected in the increasing action of intolerance and radicalism as well as the waning spirit of state defense which has an impact on the threat of national disintegration. The current efforts made by the government to overcome this problem have not been successful significantly so that other efforts are needed to overcome this problem through the revitalization of Pancasila.

Revitalizing the values of Pancasila is a process of reviving or understanding and re-living the noble values of Pancasila in the life of society, nation and state (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2016). This paper offers a concept of revitalizing Pancasila through national character education and state defense.

### **Revitalizing Pancasila through National Character Education**

The Indonesian nation is a nation that is multicultural (plural and plural) and has diversity united by a collective awareness to live as an independent and sovereign nation. Globalization has influenced the mindsets, attitudes and actions of the nation's future generations in responding to various national problems. The understanding of the nation's future generations regarding the values contained in the four pillars of national and state life (Pancasila, UUD NRI 1945, NKRI and Sesanti Bhinneka Tunggal Ika), is increasingly degraded by the swiftness of new values that are incompatible with the national identity (Budiwibowo, 2016).

The influence of globalization has an impact on the decline in the character and national identity as indicated by the attitude of intolerance and acts of radicalism that threaten the disintegration of the nation. The crisis in the loss of national character and identity forces us to continue to ground the values of Pancasila. Pancasila can be brought to life in the educational process which includes two main interests, namely the development of individual potential and the inheritance of values. Education provides a more flexible transfiguration. Educational practice is not only implemented in schools, but is also found in everyday life (Latif, 2011).

Character education is one of the answers to the problems of national disintegration. Character education is the most significant part in maintaining the characteristics and identity of the Indonesian nation (Rahmat & Tanszil, 2017).

Pancasila can be used as a filter from the influence of globalization and modernization that can threaten the civilization of the Indonesian nation. This is because the Indonesian nation has a characteristic about the basis of the State. So the right approach is to use the Pancasila Approach. What is meant by the Pancasila Approach is a way of thinking, acting and behaving in everyday life, the family, community and state environment must always consider the consistent practice of Pancasila principles (Wahyudi, 2016).

Through the Revitalization of Pancasila, it can make Pancasila as public discourse so that it shows a reassessment or reassessment of the meaning of Pancasila so far, to then produce new thoughts and meanings. Thus, making Pancasila as a public discourse is a crucial action for the re-development of Pancasila as the basis of the state and the nation's outlook on life can be interpreted continuously, so that it remains relevant in the life of the Indonesian nation and state (Budiwibowo, 2016).

Revitalization of Pancasila values is aimed at: a. Realizing Indonesian people with the Pancasila concept of resources with the spirit of nationalism and patriotism; b. Provide directions to local governments to implement technical policies for implementation and facilitation in the context of revitalizing and mobilizing the values of Pancasila; c. Embedding Pancasila values in administrators and government at the regional level, organizational politics, community organizations, and educational institutions (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2016).

Revitalization in the life of the nation and state, must be immediately programmed and implemented with commitment and consistency, both with community programs that sincerely every citizen feels that Pancasila is a necessity not mere doctrine or with formal programs through existing institutions such as educational institutions and government agencies so that the values of Pancasila remain sustainable and can be a lantern and a guide to achieving the goals of the Indonesian nation (Fauzan et al., 2019).

Historically, the founding fathers have determined that the character building of the nation is important in nation building. This issue re-emerged when it was felt that the nation's mentality had deteriorated amid the influence of globalization that hit the Indonesian nation which had implications for the destruction of the national order. National character development is a strategic matter in facing the threat of national disintegration that arises as a result of the influence of globalization. Internalization of state defense awareness will generate a spirit of nationalism and love for the nation. National character development is directed at building character within the framework of Indonesian unity. Therefore, the issue of Indonesian unity must be taught and practiced at all levels of education. In this case, the role of education in terms of national character building is very important to become the basis of national education.

From an ideal educational perspective, Indonesian education is to create intelligent people holistically and competitively. The principle of character education is value based, derived from the noble values of the nation, namely Pancasila. Character education is the internalization of values, not just a transfer of knowledge (Wahyu, 2013).

The character and culture of a nation must be maintained so that it can be distinguished from one nation to another. To maintain the existence of the Indonesian nation, it is necessary to carry out character building which is an effort to embody the mandate of the Pancasila and the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. In other words, good character education must involve good knowledge (moral knowing), good feelings or loving good (moral feeling) and behavior. good (moral action) so as to form a unity of behavior and attitude to life of students.

In implementing and overseeing the formation of national character, a serious commitment is needed so that the inculcation of good values to school members can make students become plenary human beings which of course involves curriculum content, learning and assessment processes, quality of school community relations,

management of learning, management of various activities. students, empowerment of facilities and infrastructure as well as the work ethic of all school members based on Pancasila, UUD 1945, NKRI and a sense of love and defense for the country and homeland (Rachmah, 2013).

The values of Pancasila as the nation's philosophy of life need to be implemented to awaken the nation's character which is decreasing. Pancasila is a critical and rational reflection as the basis of the state and the cultural reality of the nation, with the aim of obtaining the main points of understanding in a fundamental and comprehensive manner. Pancasila as an ideology in terms of state ideology or national ideology is still maintained (Wahyudi, 2016).

Efforts to build the character of citizens are basically the process of inheriting national values, ideals and goals that are stated in the state constitution (Sapriya, 2007). The implementation of character education can be done in three ways, namely: a. integration through subjects; b. integration via local content; and c. integration through self-development. Character education that is integrated in subjects, local content and self-development is the introduction of values that get awareness of the importance and how the values are internalized into the daily behavior of students through the learning process, both inside and outside the classroom.

Character education aims to develop values that shape the character of the nation, namely Pancasila which includes: a. Developing the potential of students to become human beings with good hearts, good minds and good behavior; b. Building a nation with the character of Pancasila; c. Developing the potential of citizens to have a confident attitude, be proud of their nation and country and love humanity (Ministry of National Education, 2011).

The national character and national identity which is Pancasila is a national identity that must be upheld so as not to be carried away by globalization. This national identity is the hallmark and differentiator of the Indonesian nation from other nations. Pancasila is not something frozen and static, Pancasila tends to be open, dynamic, in line with the wishes of the people who adhere to it. The implication is in our national identity which seems open, and continues to evolve to renew its meaning so that it is relevant and functional to the current situation (Budimansyah, 2010).

Based on the description above, it can be concluded that the revitalization of Pancasila is a way that can be implemented through the means of character education for the Indonesian nation that is in accordance with Pancasila to be used to face the challenges of the influence of globalization on the character and national identity that is tolerant and respects pluralism and pluralism so that it can maintain integration. nation. For this reason, a strategy can be formulated, namely implementing the revitalization of Pancasila through national character education to face the effects of globalization in order to ward off and eliminate intolerance and radicalism in order to maintain national integration.

### **Revitalization of Pancasila through State Defense**

Globalization, which is marked by the development of advances in science, technology, communication, and information, greatly influences the patterns and forms of threats. Threats to state sovereignty are growing from conventional (physical) to multidimensional (physical and non-physical), both from abroad and from within the country. Pancasila as integral values that underlie the life of the nation and the State of Indonesia are developed and maintained with the aim of protecting and developing the rights, obligations, dignity and of all citizens (Budiyo, 2017).

Globalization has made it easier for human mobility to have the potential to change the demographic structure, identity and concept of nationalism of a nation. Globalization also threatens to lose the identity of the Indonesian nation. The key to the strength of the Republic of Indonesia in facing the inevitability of the flow of modernization and new globalization, namely by strengthening the national identity and building solid unity and integrity of all components of the nation through strengthening awareness of defending the state and revitalizing

the values of Pancasila where national values are the capital of strength and binder of unity so that the Indonesian nation in facing every challenge of the dynamics of globalization (Agung, 2017).

Based on this, one of the efforts to deal with the effects of globalization that threatens the disintegration of the nation can be done by carrying out the revitalization of Pancasila in order to increase nationalism and national patriotism through state defense activities whose implementation has been regulated in various state policies.

The values of Pancasila provide space for the regeneration of better national leaders. The independent Indonesian state is not temporarily but forever. Therefore, the struggle of the Indonesian nation must continue to be encouraged. Our struggle today is not taking up arms against the imperialists. However, we all struggle to instill the values of Pancasila in our daily lives. Thus we are able to compete, work, be proud, and committed together that we are the people of Indonesia (Mutiani, 2016).

For the Indonesian people, defending the state is the determination, attitude, and behavior and actions of citizens, both individually and collectively in maintaining the sovereignty of the state, territorial integrity and safety of the nation and state which is imbued with love for the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the Law. -The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in ensuring the survival of the Indonesian nation and the State from various threats (Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning Management of National Resources for State Defense, 2019).

In accordance with Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2002 concerning State Defense Article 9 (1) Every citizen has the right and obligation to participate in efforts to defend the state which are manifested in the implementation of state defense. (2) The participation of citizens in efforts to defend the state, is carried out through: a. civic education; b. compulsory basic military training; c. voluntary or compulsory service as soldiers of the Indonesian National Army; and D. service in accordance with the profession (Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2002 concerning State Defense, 2002).

The implementation of state defense adheres to the principle of active citizen participation based on rights and obligations in defending and defending the independence and sovereignty of the country, territorial integrity and the safety of the entire nation from all threats. State defense embodied by participation in national defense efforts is the responsibility and honor of every citizen. Therefore, no citizen may be spared from the obligation to participate in the defense of the state, unless it is stipulated by law. This principle implies that national defense efforts must be based on awareness of the rights and obligations of citizens and belief in power.

Every citizen has the right and obligation to participate in efforts to defend the state as a reflection of the life of the nation which guarantees the rights of citizens to live in an equal, just, safe, peaceful and prosperous manner. The defense aspect is a very essential factor in ensuring the survival of the country. Without being able to defend itself against threats from abroad and/ or from within the country, a country will not be able to maintain its existence. This requires the unanimous determination of all citizens to actively participate in defending, defending and enforcing independence and the sovereignty of the state and nation based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

Citizen participation in state defense efforts as stipulated in Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning Management of National Resources for State Defense is organized through: a. civic education; b. compulsory basic military training; c. voluntary or compulsory service as soldiers of the Indonesian National Army; and D. service according to profession.

Citizens' rights in defending the country in the form of: a. get civic education which is carried out through the Development of State Defense Awareness; b. register as a candidate for the Indonesian National Army; and c. register as a candidate member of the Reserve Component. The Obligations of Citizens in the State Defense business include: a. obligations imposed on citizens who are soldiers of the Indonesian National Army as a means of State Defense; and b. obligations imposed on citizens as members of the Reserve Component who are

mobilized in the face of military threats and hybrid threats (Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning Management of National Resources for National Defense, 2019).

Based on the description above, it can be concluded that the revitalization of Pancasila is a method carried out through state defense activities in accordance with Pancasila with the aim of being able to be used to face the challenges of the influence of globalization on nationalism and national patriotism so as to maintain national integration. For this reason, a strategy can be formulated, namely implementing the revitalization of Pancasila through state defense activities to face the effects of globalization in order to increase the spirit of nationalism and the spirit of patriotism in order to maintain national integration.

## **Conclusion**

From the description and discussion above, the following conclusions can be drawn:

Globalization has had a negative impact on Pancasila as the basis of the state and the way of life of the Indonesian people. The character and identity of the nation and the spirit of nationalism and the spirit of patriotism have decreased as indicated by rampant acts of intolerance and the growing development of radicalism in Indonesia which has implications for the threat of national disintegration.

In facing the threat of national disintegration from the influence of globalization on the character and national identity that is tolerant and respects pluralism and pluralism, it can be carried out through the revitalization of Pancasila which is carried out through character education of the Indonesian nation in accordance with Pancasila values. The strategy that can be used is to carry out the revitalization of Pancasila through national character education to face the effects of globalization in order to ward off and eliminate intolerance and radicalism in order to maintain national integration.

To face the threat of national disintegration from the influence of globalization on nationalism and national patriotism, it can be carried out through the revitalization of Pancasila which is carried out through character education of the Indonesian nation that is in accordance with Pancasila values. The strategy that can be used is to carry out the revitalization of Pancasila through state defense activities to face the effects of globalization in order to increase the spirit of nationalism and the spirit of patriotism in order to maintain national integration.

## **Recommendation**

The thoughts developed in this paper can be used as guidance in restoring character, national identity, the spirit of nationalism and the spirit of patriotism in accordance with the values of Pancasila as the basis of the state and the way of life of the Indonesian nation in maintaining national integration to be used as a modality in building the Indonesian nation.

There is a need for in-depth research on the values of Pancasila as the basis of the state and the way of life of the Indonesian nation so that it is increasingly relevant in facing the effects of globalization on all aspects of the life of the nation and state. The Pancasila revitalization strategy through national character education and state defense activities can be implemented to face the effects of globalization in order to ward off and eliminate intolerance and radicalism and to increase the spirit of nationalism and the spirit of patriotism in order to maintain national integration.

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# The Total War Strategy: Challenges in Facing Traitor of the Nation: A Historical Approach During the Indonesian War of Independence

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## Abstract

The Indonesian state implements a total defense system, meaning that it involves all the people and all national resources, national facilities and infrastructure, as well as the entire territory of the country as one defense unit. This system demands awareness of the rights and obligations of every citizen to defend the state as a manifestation of its totality. Efforts to raise awareness of defending the state for every citizen are a formidable challenge, recorded in Indonesian history as inseparable from attempts to betray the nation's struggle. Based on this phenomenon, the writer is moved to reveal several historical events during the war for independence in 1945-1949 which recorded the existence of certain people and groups who became traitors to the nation. The discussion in this article uses a qualitative research method using a historical approach, in which the preparation procedure goes through four stages, namely: heuristics, criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The data analysis used is historical analysis, with an emphasis on sharpness in interpreting historical facts. From the analysis conducted, it can be proven that during the war for independence in 1945-1949, the implementation of the total war strategy, which should have received the support of all the people, actually faced quite a tough challenge. This challenge was caused by the existence of certain people and groups who defected to side with the Netherlands, either by joining forces formed by the Netherlands or as spies for the Netherlands. Of course, this is very contrary to the values of state defense that must be possessed by every citizen.

**Keywords:** Total War, Traitor, Spies, State Defense

## 1. Introduction

In essence, national defense is all universal defense efforts universal, where awareness of the rights and obligations of citizens and belief in their strength is the basis for their implementation. It is said to be universal, because its implementation involves all citizens, utilizing all national resources and the entire territory of the

state in national defense efforts. The history of thinking about the concept of universal war in Indonesia was born during the independence war in 1945-1949, this is inseparable from T.B. Simatupang and A.H. Nasution, who gave his points and discussed together with General Soedirman to produce a new strategy and outlined in the Strategy Order Number 1. In the Strategy Order, he decided to return to guerrillas, abandon linear defense methods and form guerrilla groups that decentralized (Soetanto, 2006).

Guerrilla warfare is a war that is carried out clandestine, full of speed, sabotage, and usually in small groups but very focused and effective. To be able to implement effective guerrilla tactics requires the ability to control the territory and get the support of the people, both in terms of logistical support and information about the whereabouts of the enemy. The confidentiality factor is the key to the success of guerrilla tactics and it is greatly influenced by popular support (Prabowo, 2009). It was these guerrilla tactics that gave birth to a formulation of the concept of Indonesian state defense, namely the Total War, in which the support and involvement of all Indonesian people became the main foundation in its implementation. Based on historical records, it must be admitted that the support provided by all the people has not been fully realized.

During the independence war in 1945-1949, history has recorded several incidents of betrayal of the nation's struggle by certain people and groups from some of the Indonesian nation who wanted to gain personal or group benefits by sacrificing the interests of the nation or often referred to as "stooges- Netherlands henchmen." Betrayal of the nation's struggle was carried out either by joining forces with the Netherlands formation or as spies for the Netherlands. This is of course very contrary to the values of state defense that should be embedded in every Indonesian citizen.

The period of the war for independence in 1945-1949 was chosen in this discussion because at that time Indonesia had declared its independence as a sovereign nation. Thus, it has clearly defined the boundaries of the parties loyal to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and the parties who betrayed Indonesian independence. From this historical experience, it may become a meaningful lesson in developing a future Total War Strategy. For the Armed Forces, the history of the struggle for independence also contained materials for developing theories on the problem of tactics and organization. Therefore we must try to record the history of the struggle for independence as completely and honestly as possible (Simatupang, 1981).

## **2. Method**

The method used in the preparation of this article is qualitative research using a historical approach. This research is descriptive which seeks to provide a specific description of a situation, mechanism, and process based on elementary information which in turn will produce an explanation of the phenomenon under study (Neuman, 1994). The analysis in this research was carried out by studying the documents. In the document study, the data collection used was historical data tracing. Historical data related to the independence war in 1945-1949 were collected and carried out historical analysis using a qualitative approach. The data that has been collected is processed into relevant data or as criticism. The process of criticism explains whether the source is valid, according to time and place, can be trusted, and so on. Furthermore, the interpretation of the data is carried out to be processed into facts accompanied by objective interpretations, without any tendency or interest. The final step is a presentation in written form, namely historiography (Bungin, 2007).

## **3. *Devide et Impera* Part II**

The Allied victory in World War II on August 15, 1945, resulted in the Allies having the right to Japanese rule in various colonies including Indonesia. With the enactment of the Civil Affairs Agreement, on 23 August 1945, the British together with the Netherlands troops landed in Sabang, Aceh. Furthermore, on September 15, 1945, the British army as the allied representative arrived in Jakarta accompanied by the Netherlands representative to the allies, Dr. Charles van der Plas. The presence of allied troops was also accompanied by NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) led by Dr. Hubertus J van Mook, to open negotiations based on Queen Wilhelmina's radio broadcast speech in 1942 (conception of state), which stated that a commonwealth would be formed led by

the Queen of the Netherlands with members including the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies (Iqbal, 2010).

The situation encountered by the allies and the Netherlands was beyond their expectations because Indonesia had declared its independence, even though this was not recognized by the Netherlands. The desire of the Netherlands to return to occupy Indonesia had an impact on the revival of the spirit of the Indonesian nation's struggle to be able to defend its independence. Resistance and fighting took place in several regions in the country to oppose and oppose the presence of allied forces and NICA, such as the Bojong Kokosan battle led by Lt. Col. Eddie Sukardi, the November 10 incident in Surabaya led by Colonel Sungkono, the Medan Area battle led by Colonel Achmad Tahir, Palagan Ambarawa led by Colonel Soedirman, etc.

Facing this situation, the Netherlands tried to re-implement their strategy during the colonial period, namely divide et impera to be able to divide the unity of Indonesia. The politics of divide et impera were considered an outdated strategy in the colonial era, but this strategy was still used by the Netherlands to be able to continue their rule in Indonesia. Machiavelli ([1521] 2003) in his book *Art of War* describes this strategy as a strategy carried out by war leaders to weaken the concentration of enemy resistance, "A Captain ought, among all the other actions of his, endeavor with every art to divide the forces of the enemy, either by making him suspicious of his men in whom he trusted, or by giving him cause that he has to separate his forces, and, because of this, become weaker." The quote illustrates that this strategy is used to be able to seize power and maintain power by dividing the resistance of large groups into small groups so that they are easy to subdue, and preventing the possibility of these small groups from being able to reunite. The goal of using this strategy is to be able to divide while maintaining its condition or even be able to expand the division in opposing groups.

The efforts made by the Netherlands to re-implement the divide et impera at that time had succeeded in dividing Indonesia into states, namely: the State of East Indonesia (now Papua), the State of East Sumatera, the State of Madura, the State of Pasundan, the State of South Sumatera, and the State of Java. East (Putra, 2014). Of course, this is a big question, how could the Netherlands be able to carry out the divide et impera strategy after Indonesian independence? This question is answered if we look at the fact that the Netherlands was able to regroup native parties which during the colonial era provided support to the Netherlands.

Before the outbreak of World War II, many educated natives preferred to become colonial employees of the Netherlands Indies. They felt a more settled life by becoming employees of the Netherlands Indies colonial, with guaranteed regular income, facilities, and positions that were considered higher. The choice to take up arms against the Netherlands colonial government would certainly pose a big risk to their lives. Another group was indigenous people who were members of the colonial military who were members of the Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger (KNIL). Apart from that, there were also private parties who were pro-colonial, who usually worked for companies or became traders. The private sector often became the eyes and ears of the Netherlands intelligence called the Nederlands Force Intelligence Service (NEFIS). There were reasons for their economic, power and, religious background so that they sided with the Netherlands colonialists. Their existence had a big role in extending the Netherlands colonization of the country for hundreds of years. After Indonesian independence, many of them remained loyal to the Kingdom of the Netherlands by assisting the Netherlands efforts to re-occupy Indonesia.

#### **4. The Members of the Netherlands troops are Indigenous**

To face resistance from the Indonesian army, the Netherlands again formed special units and units to strengthen their troops, some of whose members also came from natives. The Netherlands formed the Infantry Battalion V (5e Bataljon Infanterie) or known as the "Andjing NICA Battalion," on December 2, 1945, in Bandung, when a period of conflict and social chaos had occurred since the Japanese surrender to the allies (Saleh, 2000). This battalion was known for its courage and cruelty in counter-guerrilla operations and was involved in Military Aggression I and Military Aggression II. Members of this Battalion consisted of former Dutch and Indo prisoners of war and internees, as well as indigenous people who registered, mainly from Ambon, Manado,

Timor, Java, and Sunda. This battalion was nicknamed "Andjing NICA" because they used the badge "barking dog" as the identity of the battalion's emblem, something the Indonesian nationalists did not know coincidentally as a kind of insult to those who supported the Netherlands (Oostindie, 2016). The Andjing NICA Battalion is part of Brigade V, which has the duty and responsibility to protect the Bandung area and its surroundings from various activities of Indonesian independence fighters who they consider to be terrorists.

Apart from the NICA Andjing Battalion, the Netherlands also formed 1e Parachutisten Compagnie (1e Para Cie). It was a paratrooper unit formed on the suggestion of Lieutenant PE Van Beek at the end of 1945. On March 1, 1946, starting with the formation of the School voor Opleiding van Parachutisten (SOP), then on May 1, 1947 on the orders of Lieutenant General Spoor, stood 1e Parachutisten Compagnie (1e Para Cie) led by Captain Sisselaar. The 1e Para Cie troops were dominated by soldiers from Europe, but there were also indigenous soldiers from the Ambon Tribe who were prominent among the paratroopers. To support its military operations, the Netherlands also formed a special force, namely the Depot Speciale Troepen (DST). The DST unit was formed on the advice of Captain W.J. Schepens on 15 July 1946 in Jakarta, initially, the members of the DST were taken from volunteers. In January 1948, the DST was renamed the Korps Speciale Troepen (KST) led by Captain Westerling, with his trademark green beret. In the early stages, this troop educated around 1,250 soldiers consisting of Dutch War Volunteers (OVW'ers), Indo-European soldiers, and indigenous soldiers.

The Netherlands effort to recruit and mobilize natives was also carried out by forming the Hare Majesteit's Ongeregelde Troepen (HMOT), The Queen's Non-organic Forces. This troop was formed by Lieutenant Koert Bavinck, intelligence officer of Battalion 3-9-Regiment Infanterie. The majority of HMOT members are former members of Laskar Rakyat Djakarta Raya (LRDR), which is the largest Laskar group in the East Jakarta area (Karawang-Bekasi). The LRDR has a political line that is opposite to the Indonesian government, this is the reason the Indonesian Republic Army on April 17, 1947, carried out an attack that disintegrated the LRDR's power. As many as three hundred frustrated Panji-led LRDR members were recruited by the Netherlands into a troop unit which was later named HMOT (Elands, Gils, & Schoenmaker, 1996). The existence of the champions in the Netherlands troops was also involved in Military Aggression I, they were not only as guides but also fought like professional soldiers. The existence of HMOT also contributed significantly to the seizure of the Karawang and Cikampek areas by the Netherlands on 23 July 1947 (Cribb, 2010).

## 5. Netherlands Spy Agency

The revolutionary period or the era of the Indonesian independence war in 1945-1949 was a period full of chaos, according to Ricklefs (1991) that "academic investigations of the Revolution attempted to obtain a kind of structure regarding an essentially chaotic period." This period of chaos made things uncertain. Information circulating in the community about social and political conditions in Indonesia is confusing. In this period it is difficult to be able to ascertain the difference between friend and foe, it is almost imperceptible. This is due to the development of slander and the issue of spies between one party and another. The situation was increasingly confusing with a lot of news and information flow about the Indonesian situation with no clear source of news, which made the atmosphere tense. The party considered to have played a major role in creating this situation and worsening the situation during the Indonesian revolution was Netherlands intelligence.

The Netherlands recruited indigenous people to become spy agents, as part of an intelligence operation carried out by the NEFIS-Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (De Moor, 2015). This strategy allowed anyone to become a potential Netherlands accomplice or spy. The boundaries between friend or foe became unclear because the Netherlands also used Indonesians to support their efforts to re-occupy Indonesia. This situation also made it easy for anyone to accuse or be accused of being a Netherlands spy. The natives who became Netherlands spies were known as "NICA agents," even though they were employed by NEFIS because NICA was not a military organization, but a temporary transitional form of civilian government. To be able to carry out the recruitment of spies, NEFIS often used a provocation strategy to play against fellow children of the nation, with this strategy many indigenous people later became Netherlands spies (Tantri, 1960).

By using native agents, it was easier for the Netherlands to enter the Republic's territory and observe their movements closely. Spy agents who were informants from the indigenous civilian population were also frequently tasked with obtaining information about the Republic's military strength. These spy agents in their daily lives dress like ordinary people, such as farmers or traders in the market, they sometimes even wear uniforms of warriors or Laskar when carrying out a mission (Nordholt, 1997). These informants are willing to do the work because NEFIS offers a reward in the form of money, food, sarongs, or clothes (NEFIS / CMI Archives). Very difficult conditions and the shadow of poverty and hunger made many of them willing to take the job, even at the risk of risking their lives.

The existence of this spy agency also almost caused a guerrilla war led by General Soedirman to experience failure and destruction. When the night before leaving Dasun, a mysterious man suspected of being a Netherlands spy asked Sudirman's whereabouts. Responding to this, when they heard the news that the Netherlands had arrived at Pagung, Sudirman's troops decided to look for another safer place. To outwit the Netherlands spy, a plan was made to distract him. One of the Young Marine Lieutenants, Heru Kesser who looks like Soedirman, is dressed to resemble Soedirman. He was also stretched using a stretcher that Soedirman used. The fake Sudirman on a stretcher headed to the new post (southwest of Kediri) accompanied by Soepardjo Rustam. Meanwhile, the original Soedirman was carried towards Parang Village. After walking for several hours in the opposite direction, they were then able to catch up with Soedirman's group, who were no longer stretched. This diversion plan was successful so that Soedirman could continue his guerilla (Tjokropranolo, 1993). Soedirman was fortunate to have loyal friends and soldiers and received the support of the people who were sympathetic to his struggle, they worked together to make a stretcher to go down a road that was not easy to reach with his increasingly severe illness (Asura, 2015).

Another incident that showed the existence of treason by the Netherlands spy agency was also proven by the arrest of the guerrillas "Pangeran Papak's Army." The Papak Pengeran Troops are part of the Siliwangi Division troops that remain in West Java, not following the move to Central Java. This strategy led to continued resistance against the Netherlands in West Java, such as the ambush and attacks on Netherlands military posts in the Karawang, Purwakarta, and Garut areas. The actions taken by Pangeran Papak's troops were quite disturbing for the Netherlands because there were former Japanese soldiers who joined in the guerrilla and fought to defend Indonesia, namely: Yang Chil Sung (Komarudin), Hasegawa (Abubakar), and Masahiro Aoki (Usman). The Netherlands responded to this condition by creating an elite team of hunters, namely Yon 3-14-RI (Regiment Infanterie) led by Colonel P.W. Van Duin, to arrest the former Japanese soldiers (Jo Hendi, 2018). The Dutch did not hesitate to give big rewards to anyone who wanted to spy and provide information to them. This tactic was successful, the Netherlands launched an ambush operation at Mount Dora, Parentas Village (Garut-Tasikmalaya border) on 25-26 October 1948, and captured the three former Japanese soldiers and Lieutenant Djoehana. The success of the Netherlands was obtained due to information from spy agencies regarding the location and whereabouts of Pangeran Papak's troops.

## **6. Conclusions and Recommendations**

The Indonesian state defense system implements a total defense system that demands awareness of the rights and obligations of all citizens to defend the country in order to realize its totality. The awareness of defending the state during the independence war in 1945-1949 has not been fully realized. History has recorded several incidents of betrayal of the nation's struggle by certain individuals and groups or often dubbed "Dutch stooges" who wanted to gain personal or group gain at the expense of the nation's interests. Betrayal of the national struggle was carried out either by joining forces with the Netherlands formation or as a spy agent for the Netherlands.

This article discusses a historical review of the 1945-1949 war of independence which focused on treason committed by certain individuals and groups of the Indonesian nation for personal or group gain. This becomes quite interesting when efforts to build the spirit of defending the country today will be faced with challenges in the form of betrayal by some of our own nation. The treasonous efforts carried out are of course inseparable

from the divide et impera politics applied by foreigners. Faced with current conditions, further research on the politics of divide et impera needs to be carried out as proof that whether this politics is still relevant today?

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# Water Management Policies in Cameroon: Interference Through Technology Transfer

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## Abstract

Water is an indispensable resource for human life and for social and economic development. But Oswaldo de Rivero (2003) notes that ninety-seven percent of all water on the planet is salty, only 3% is fresh and three-quarters of it is concentrated in inaccessible places such as the polar regions and glaciers. Therefore, only a small fraction of the earth's water is fresh and accessible in rivers, lakes and groundwater. According to international hydrological studies carried out by the United Nations and the Stockholm Environment Institute, this small fraction is declining and by 2025, two-thirds of the world's population will be affected by water shortages due to the decrease in the earth's hydraulic cycle caused by the urban population explosion. The search for a balance between population growth and vital resources such as water has a pride of place in the MDGs, which show that disparities in access to water are high, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, and require the pooling of all energies. In Cameroon, the resurgence of endemic water-borne diseases prompted the government to set up a drinking water supply system known as the "Scandinave Water Project." This article attempts to describe the water management policies that eventually led to the re-emergence of water-related diseases. The data for this study were collected between 2006-2009 as part of doctoral studies. This collection is still going on in other localities of the country. This reflection is based on two theoretical approaches: The sociology of knowledge, which, according to David le Breton (2004), strives to identify laws that escape agents carried away by the weight of their class habitus. Knowledge is then viewed as a conquest, an enterprise 'against,' where it is a question of forcing the agent give up a conduct whose motivation he does not know. Science then brings out the hidden, the unknowing, it is an illumination, the revelation of obscure laws of operation to those who live them. Then comes pragmatism, an empirical theory of knowledge of which Widmer (1968) is one of the representatives. The relevance of this theory is measured by its consequences on reality. Pragmatism rehabilitates knowledge as it participates in the mutual construction of the world and brings about changes. The failure of this water supply project is above all the non-involvement of the populations and the lack of communication.

**Keywords:** Independence, Policy, Water, Development, Technology

## Introduction

At the beginning of the 1960s, Africa had better assets for rapid economic development. These assets included, among other things, many natural and human resources, and there was therefore hope that this part of the world would emerge from its state of poverty and assert its political and economic sovereignty. But before the end of the first decade of independence, people quickly began to decry the decline in yesterday's development performance in the face of the evolution of some socio-economic indicators. Kamajou (1992) reports, for example, that the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, which was 1.2 between 1960 and 1970, fell to 0.9 and -3.4 for the periods 1970/1980 and 1980/1984 respectively. It is only from this moment onwards that one begins to become aware of the extent of the deterioration in the economic performance of African countries such as Cameroon<sup>1</sup> where the majority of development projects have not lived up to expectations, as Olivier de Sardan (1995) puts it. The fact is that the concept and the process of development involve human interests which are still largely under the absolute control of representatives of the active Western civilization, so much so that this word itself needs approaches based on analysis and doubt. This control has not always been scientifically informed by a knowledge of all the facts involved. Even today, one wonders whether the changes that have taken place in African societies are such that can bring about a common existence consisting in harmonious cooperation; or should they lead to temporarily suppressed but powerful forces of rupture, upheaval and historical catastrophes of unprecedented magnitude! The transfer of hydraulic technology to Cameroon seems to be a perfect illustration of a model of interference and Westernization of Africa. Behind this transfer is still hiding a colonial development ideology that is dominant and concomitant with the American hegemony that opportunely takes over from the African ideology. The transfer of hydraulic technology from Scandinave Water, which was supposed to provide drinking water to the populations in order to reduce the rise in water-borne diseases that have plagued the entire country until now, has hardly ever worked. In this perspective, Serge Latouche (2005) has no illusions about the conception of development for African countries. He says about it that, presented as the solution to the problems of the South, development is often just another face of the westernization of the world. Whether it is "durable," "sustainable" or "endogenous," it always fits, in a more or less violent way, into the destructive logic of capitalist accumulation. It means inequality, destruction of the environment and cultures. However, solutions can be imagined taking into account the diversity of the world and are based on the experiences, carried out here and there, of non-market economy. The interest of studying the failure of this development project and the modalities of transfer of this technology will only be possible if we seek to understand the problems that its arrival poses for the development and fulfillment of the Cameroonian populations.

### 1. The dissemination of an ideology through science and technology

The idea of transferring technology to developing countries in general and to Cameroon in particular integrates the most essential concerns of the great powers and especially "*Point IV2*" of *President Truman's speech at the end of 1948, taken up by Gilbert Rist* (1996). It stands out from this speech that the advantages of the technical

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<sup>1</sup> Cameroon is a Central African country, covering a surface area of 475,442 km<sup>2</sup>, with an ancient population that has had contact with the Western world since the fifteenth century when the Portuguese set foot on the coasts of Douala. During the Cameroon general population and housing census of 11 to 30 November 2005, the Bakassi area was excluded from the operations, since it was still under Nigerian military occupation. After the first stage of the transfer of authority on 14 August 2006 in the occupied areas, a special census operation was envisaged. It had not been successful, since on the ground people were reluctant to be counted. In the villages, those who did not feel concerned tore up sensitization posters under the helpless gaze of the Cameroonian military. The latter had been instructed not to give in to provocations that could lead to acts that could complicate the process of transfer of authority. Statistics set at 12,062 people the number of inhabitants of this area "recovered" by Cameroon after a brave fight and more than 8 years of trial at the International Court of Justice against Nigeria. The results of the April 1987 census, however, already estimated the population of Bakassi at 9,000 people. The Cameroon Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT) works on the basis of a population of 130,000 inhabitants for the N'dian Division, including 60,000 for Bakassi and Bamouso. In the introduction to the document defining the planning and development strategy for the Bakassi zone drawn up in 2008 by the Prime Minister's Office, we learn that the "peninsula has a population estimated at 75,000 inhabitants. The issue of counting the population of Bakassi remains problematic.

<sup>2</sup> Fourthly, we need to launch a bold new programme that harnesses the benefits of our scientific advance and industrial progress to serve the improvement and growth of underdeveloped regions. More than half of the people of this world live in near-poverty conditions. [...] They are victims of diseases. Their economic life is primitive and stationary. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to the more prosperous regions. For the first time in history, mankind possesses the technical and practical knowledge that can alleviate the sufferings of the people.

knowledge reserve must be made available to "peaceful" peoples in order to help them achieve the better life to which they aspire. At the same time, the other countries were called upon to pool their technological resources in this operation so that it would be a collective enterprise in which all nations collaborate through the United Nations and its specialized agencies as far as this is feasible. Thus, the peoples of developing countries will be confronted with the challenges which arise from their integration into the " World-Economy " where exchanges with the outside are developed. This model of transaction seemed indispensable for the development of Africa since it had already taken place in the history of humanity and had been an important development issue in several countries<sup>3</sup>. Technology transfer follows this logic of development and cooperation assistance, reiterated at the Rio Conference of 1992 and which contributed to redefining, in part, the forms of international assistance (Ndonkou 2009). It is in this logic of exchange that Africa is trapped and since then, doctrines follow one another like metaphors of the same myth (Rist 1996) and the concept of development has been enriched with particles (Latouche 2005) contributing to the ideology of interference (Rossi 2000). The theoretical and practical history of development, even if it had positive effects in the North (reconstruction of Europe in ruins after the Second World War), stands out in Africa from the developmentist rhetorics and ideologies that are the focus of analyses. The economic context of African countries and the modalities of transfer do not allow the monitoring of projects.

## 2. Paradigms around a project

As early as the 1960s, the social and cultural components of technology transfer were at the centre of the French rural sociology programme (Jollivet 1966). It focuses on the local social context, which constitutes the unit from which it is possible to study the forms that the processes of innovation and change to which they are associated can take. During the 1980s and 1990s, technology transfers gave rise to a quantity of publications (Wisner 1981, Boutat 1991, Perrin 1983, Wisner 1997...). Apart from codes of conduct for technology transfers and specific conventions such as that of the International Labour Office (ILO), this work was mainly carried out by economists. In this movement, the social sciences are not at all involved. From an anthropological point of view, these decades are mainly marked by a series of critical and non-contradictory approaches ranging from the classical **diffusionist thinking of the early 20th century to the problematic of acculturation**. From a sociological point of view, the paradigm of "**diffusion of innovation studies**" presents the richest and best structured series of works based on an empirical data set covering several decades. The works resulting from this line of thought insist on the modalities of adoption of innovations (Cresswell 1983), the role of individuals or groups of individuals which are in all cases abstract categories resulting from scientific construction (Olivier de Sardan, 1995). In these works, these individuals and groups were given very little consideration.

Today, however, there is a reinvestment of work on the social and cultural components, but also, within it, a critical look at this paradigm. To some extent, the works of anthropologists such as Raulin (1967) and Cresswell (1983) also follow this trend. For Raulin, the ethnologist should facilitate the task of technical support in development programmes. By giving priority to the dissemination of traditional techniques, he is supposed to produce knowledge to help solve questions relating to technical transformations. Cresswell (1983) extends his vision of traditional technology transfer further. The technical choice is conditioned by the analysis of social relations integrated into the technical organisation of the societies concerned. Basically, this choice must be based on a detailed study of technical processes. This is the only way to assess the adequacy of the borrowed element with the existing technical organisation (Martinelli, 1987). Therefore, it is possible to consider the impact of the innovation. The works of anthropologists explicitly refers to the question of learning and training modalities which are one of the key factors in the dysfunctions observed in technology transfer.

The objective of this study is to make an inventory of research on Africa since Independence through the transfer of hydraulic technology. This project resembles those carried out within the framework of colonial policies, or at a distance, by exogenous or endogenous actors. This reflection is based on two theoretical approaches: The

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<sup>3</sup> In the 18th and 19th centuries, reports Jacques Perrin (1983), countries like the United States, France, Germany and Poland started their industrialization process by importing techniques previously developed by England. Japan imported technologies developed by Western countries in the first decade of the last century.

sociology of knowledge, which, according to David le Breton (2004), strives to identify laws that escape agents carried away by the weight of their class habitus. Knowledge is then viewed as a conquest, an enterprise 'against,' where it is a question of forcing the agent give up a conduct whose motivation he does not know. Science then brings out the hidden, the unknowing, it is an illumination, the revelation of obscure laws of operation to those who live them. Then comes pragmatism, an empirical theory of knowledge of which Widmer (1968) is one of the representatives. The relevance of this theory is measured by its consequences on reality. Pragmatism rehabilitates knowledge as it participates in the mutual construction of the world and brings about changes. It is not a question of finding out where the ideas come from, but of observing their practical consequences, it is necessary to collect them in order to understand them. The research methods that led to this study are commonly used in social science. Direct observation and directive and in-depth interviews with the various actors involved in the project made it possible to collect the data that accompany the following lines.

### 3. Historical overview of water management policy in Cameroon

Before 1960, like many other African countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Tanzania, Uganda...), Cameroon did not have a formulated water and sanitation policy. At the dawn of the 1960s, the management of the water sector in Cameroon was gradually put in place thanks to circumstances and events that sharpened the awareness of people on the stakes of this resource. The few hydraulic projects, essentially made up of drinking water distribution networks in large urban centres, did not fit into a long-term national perspective. These networks were built to meet the water needs of the wealthiest, grouped together in shopping centres. In 1960, drinking water production and distribution activities in Cameroon were carried out by a multitude of companies and local authorities. In addition, water and electricity services were intermingled. Thus, the *Compagnie centrale de distribution d'énergie électrique* (CCDEE) manages water and electricity in the localities of Yaounde, Maroua, Mbalmayo and Nkongsamba while the *Société Eaux & Assainissement* (SOCEA) manages water in Douala. During the same period, the *Société Energie Electrique du Cameroun* (ENELCAM) manages water and electricity in Dschang, Ebolowa, Edéa, Foumban and Kribi. In Bafang, Bafia, Garoua, Mbanga and Sangmelima, water and electricity are under the control of autonomous municipal boards. The choice of cities was also dictated by the colonial presence. In 1963, only about ten towns in East Cameroon had a drinking water supply system. The plethora of management bodies and the extreme diversity of conventions governing them create a confused situation, which delays the harmonious development of the water and electricity sectors. Faced with this situation, the State decided to create in 1964 *Electricité du Cameroun* (EDC) and the *Service Provisoire des Eaux du Cameroun* (SPEC). In the wake, studies were carried out to set up a national body in charge of producing and distributing drinking water to the populations. These studies led to the creation, on 13 May 1967, of the Cameroon Water Corporation (SNEC), responsible for the production and distribution of drinking water in the country's urban areas under a system of concessions. SNEC then had 14 centres. Twenty-five years later, the company manages 103 centres across the country. This notwithstanding, the need for drinking water keeps growing. The State undertakes to supply villages and urban peripheries with a view to making up for this shortage through the ScandinaVe Water project which assists populations in case of water emergencies and also participates in development programmes. The choice of installation areas was based on the annual health report from the Ministry of Public Health and these stations were located in localities with high endemicity of water-borne diseases (onchocerciasis, bilharziasis, river blindness, amebiasis, etc.). This project fell into disuse under the inquisitive eyes of public authorities. How can we explain the fact that the State has allowed a strategic sector where real development assets exist to deteriorate to such an extent?

#### 3.1. Presentation and escheat of the system

The ScandinaVe Water project mainly had to do with the distribution of drinking water. Its installation and operation system consists in creating a water retention tank near a watercourse and immersing a motor in it to capture the resource. This water is then conducted into the metal cage through pipes where the reservoirs are placed, each having a role. Some are used for settling and filtration, others for water treatment and distribution. ScandinaVe Water was established in Cameroon at the beginning of the 1980s by a Finnish limited company (Scandinavian Water Technology SA), under the Drinking Water Supply (DWS) programme funded by the

Public Investment Budget (PIB). In 1986, another series of installations will take place and even in other localities in Cameroon. This system also required electrical energy for its operation, managed by SONEL which later became AES-SONEL after privatisation in 2004. It provided electricity for the operation of the system. Following this privatisation, the price per kilowatt witnessed three increases in four years. With this rise in prices, the electricity supply by SONEL and the meters installed in the Scandinave Water distribution stations were interrupted. As a result, these stations will be abandoned in the bush due to lack of maintenance. They will be exposed to bush fires and are a resting place for domestic animals (goats, sheep, pigs...). SONEL's electric meter is disconnected, the mechanical system of the installations is uninstalled by the populations to be sold in the informal sector. Photos (1), (2) and (3) below show this state of defectiveness. In these conditions of escheat, the State could not count on the financial participation of the populations whose incomes are already meagre and who consider water as a providence.



Photo 1



Photo 2



Photo 3

Source : Peguy Ndonkou, 2005.

### 3.2. Failure of innovation: from business conditions to structure

The technological knowledge and technical science made available to Africans in general and Cameroonians in particular have not really changed the health landscape since independence. In the field of transfers, the Western technology has not benefited Africa. Philippe Geslin (2002) points out that during the 1970s and 1980s and up to the early 1990s, technology transfers were mostly part of an international context that tends to point to the failures or damage caused by these processes since independence. The works on technology transfers during this period (Wisner 1981, Cresswell 1983, etc.) illustrates the complexity of these phenomena, describes the different ways in which they are implemented and opens up avenues for reflection on the forms they should take in the future, as soon as one asks oneself how to accept or reject the innovations and their long-term consequences. We note in particular that these works insist on taking into account the social and cultural characteristics of reception contexts and on the discrepancies that we observe between the stated objectives of these processes and the effects they produce in reality. The failure of this project can be attributed to multiple factors and can therefore be read from the economic hardships that African countries, and Cameroon in particular, have been going through for decades. Jean Tchédjou, 49 years old, Legal Officer, in the litigation department of the Ministry of Water and Energy of Cameroon thinks that *the failure of this project is partly due to the economic crisis that the country is going through. The State had reached a level where it could no longer take charge of everything, hence the decentralisation policies. It saw its field of action shrink and its modes of intervention, and even its legitimacy, contested. The logic of globalisation is not understood, the rapid and unhindered movement of people and goods and even capital does not recognize state borders and regulations. No one can really tell you how this project happened to be here, but we can see what it has become...failure.* This testimony still calls into question the role of the State, whose populations do not understand when faced with certain situations. With a State without instructions on the changes in society, no one would be surprised by the current state of this project.

We must also read in the failure of this project, the responsibility of the institutions. Christian Freud (2006) takes exception to the donors and says that their logic is that of turnover. The civil servant is rated by his hierarchy according to the number of projects he dishes out in a year. The institution itself is judged by its constituents (the

members of National Assembly who vote the budget of the Ministry of Cooperation in France, the American Congress which passes the budget of the World Bank) according to the credits it consumes. If the commitments are lower than the allocated credits, the budget may not be renewed, to the same tune, the following year. Therefore, anything contributes to the acceleration of the financing process. Sylvie Vincent (1986) shows that the concern of promoters and rulers to "consult" the populations is relatively recent; Just fifteen years ago, the communities concerned were not informed that they would soon benefit from a major development project.. If new paradigms have emerged while others, much older, have been called into question, one can nevertheless wonder which ones are currently in force in research on the African continent, what are their weights and influences, particularly on the studied societies? Within this framework, what roles do the institutional contexts animating and surrounding research play?

### 3.3. Methods of technology transfer: from interference to dependence

Do technology transfers from developed to developing countries by multinationals benefit the host countries or is it simply interference? Through technology transfers, Jacques Perrin (1983) asserts that they do not seek to promote the development of the host country, but to make profits and not to increase the national product, reduce unemployment or boost the scientific and technical potential of the host country in order to reduce its economic and technological dependence on the industrialised countries. Technology transfer to developing countries aims at continuously expanding the economic and social space for their interventions in order to find new avenues for profit-making. It is understandable that the establishment of Scandinave Water could not get very far inasmuch as the populations and their cultures were not taken into consideration; despite the good intentions behind this project. Jacques Perrin (1983:59) states that : *Technology transfer is not the primary tendency of foreign firms [...] They are nevertheless led into participating in transfer operations to consolidate their marketing strategy, to ensure a regular supply of raw materials and to exploit cheap labour.*

From every indication, transnational firms, in the name of technology transfer and development ideology, are interfering in several areas of social life in developing countries. However, Jacques Perrin comes back to the final declaration of the International Conference on Cultural Imperialism in Algiers (11 to 15 October 1977) and notes that : *Any domination, even simply, so to speak, economic or technological, carries cultural imperialism like the cloud carries the storm. Much vigilance is needed to ensure that technical and cultural cooperation, the importation of equipment and technologies, do not impose an unsuitable model of development, encourage brain drain and, under the guise of cooperation, lead to a new dependence.* The lesson hitherto had not been learnt, since René François Bizec (1981) shows that companies, whether multinationals or not, transfer techniques that they know are threatened by technological progress. They thus retain control over novelty.

The majority of authors who have worked on technology transfers to developing countries also point to dependence whereby the interests of Northern firms and consultancy firms take precedence over humanitarian issues. Jean-Jacques Perennès (1993) shows, for example, that the hold that the theory of dependence still exerts on economic thinking is likely to discredit the invitation to technological audacity. For him, there is no shortage of arguments, nor examples, to show that recent technical choices have often promoted the interests of multinationals and consultancy firms from developed countries: overcharging for construction, very high rates of return for selling a project, inadequate or outdated equipment. There is therefore an urgent need to review the terms and conditions of technology transfer. Anne Stamm (1998:90) states that : *all these factors are a major handicap for African countries, all the more so because at the time of their independence, the developed nations, believing that they had found an outlet for their industry, granted them loans whose interests today mar the puny efforts that they can make to progress.*

### 3.4. Impact of the arrival of technology transfer and resurgence of water-borne diseases

With the arrival of this transfer of water-related technology, the entire social life of the populations is turned upside down for industrial reasons. Serge Latouche (2005 : 95-96) rightly points out that [...] *The realisation of major projects based on the massive adoption of cutting-edge techniques leads to failures that are now well*

*known and recognised [...] The immediate causes of these failures are now admitted. The technical company is not a real machine that you buy turnkey. People, their beliefs, their traditions, their skills are essential cogs for the proper functioning of the machine and they are not delivered with it plug-and-play. The technological shortcut is an illusion because technique is not only the machine to which it gave birth, but the whole the relationship between the people, the tools and the environment during the process of production and consumption. Everything must go together. Any loophole in the circuit leads to failure. There are therefore countless failures, and their causes are infinitely diverse.* We thought it would be useful to take this author's thoughts as a witness, because he shows how, dispossessed of their sociality, and therefore of knowledge of their reality, the populations do not recognise themselves in the new technical, political, legal and administrative relationships resulting from the stakes involved in the transfer of water-related technology. The transfer of hydraulic technology from the perspective of Serge Latouche (2005) has the appearance of deculturation, i.e. the outright destruction of traditional economic, social and mental structures, only to be replaced, over time, by a large pile of scrap metal destined to rust.

Upon admission of failure, the populations could only return to their former and untreated source of supply (swamps, rivers, ponds and wells) in search of drinking water. Salomon Mbiat, 56, a primary school teacher in Bangangté says : *Scandinave Water has not changed people's lives in any way. These imported houses remain a decoration in the landscape of many localities in Cameroon The project was as brief as a dry season rainfall. The populations use water from the springs as usual.* As a result, the endemic water-borne diseases for which this project was intended to address are increasingly emerging. The majority of African countries are currently in perpetual epidemic crisis. The cholera epidemic raging in Cameroon since 1972 has increased in scale in recent decades and the 2004 epidemic in Douala (Cameroon's economic capital) has had particular resonance in stigmatizing a social group (Ndonkou, 2009). From 2004 to 2011, the disease spread at a dizzying rate. 2,078 registered cases including 155 deaths in the Far North region, 2,558 cases reported in the Centre region according to the media and websites. Thus, human development and the fulfilment of populations cannot be possible in a context of water scarcity and insalubrity. Typhoid is not left out. It weakens populations that do not already have access to adequate health care. This is why they resort to traditional healers, who sometimes try to treat them anyway, telling them that their illness due to an evil spell.

#### **4. Transfer of management to users**

The unfavourable socio-economic context of African countries did not allow the State to follow the Scandinave Water Project with the drop in the rate of gross domestic product in the decade of this transfer. Admittedly, the ideology of dependence maintained by the developed countries, although having influenced technological development, could not by itself delay Africa's development when some non-Africans (Serge Latouche 2005, Gilbert Rist 1996, Oswaldo de Rivero 2003...) militated for a liberal logic, and of which some Africans grasped the moral and pragmatic content. These authors believe that Africa is not a continent in its own right since it integrates the challenges of globalisation. Field observations show that users of Scandinave Water took ownership of the project so as to rehabilitate it, as water is part of their lives. The question of development must also include the analysis of projects and be appropriate to the context in which it is implemented. Olivier de Sardan (1995) analyses development in Africa in terms of social change and distinguishes three approaches<sup>4</sup> which explore the interactions of all kinds occurring in the world of development, bringing into play representations and practices, strategies and structures, actors and contexts.

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<sup>4</sup> The first approach is that of deconstructing the discourse of development, which is often reduced in a caricatured way to a single, hegemonic and evil model. The second approach is of the "populist" type: an "ideological" populism, which systematically exalts popular knowledge and practices, is sometimes mixed with a "methodological" populism, which seeks to explore the cognitive and pragmatic resources of actors, however destitute they may appear to be. The third approach, which is defended here, is concerned with the 'tangle of social logics' and the heterogeneity of the actors who confront each other in development operations.

## Conclusion

Africa is suffering from its endeavour to adhere to an ideology of development through Western science and technology. This is the substance of what Mbonji Edjenguèlè (1988) shows by insisting on a cultural revolution and the cultures of development available in Africa. Alf Schwarz (1980 : 35) notes in his own way some of the issues at stake in this ideology: *"The great industrial powers have succeeded perfectly well in convincing the entire planet that henceforth the salvation of humanity as a whole rests solely on the sciences and techniques developed in the West. It would suffice to surrender to this single science to surely make up for lost time and become the equal of today's wealthy nations. This is a doctrine which literally numbs the critical mind of the majority of African researchers and intellectuals.* It is therefore understandable that the majority of development projects towards Africa like the Scandinave Water Project was doomed to failure in the face of deteriorating economic performance. Moreover, the analysis of transfer modalities shows that water management remains dependent on economic policies. But in reality, the State cannot totally disengage from a transfer it enabled the installation, nor even abandon these facilities in the current context. The project is far from having achieved its objectives. Rehabilitation margins are reported on the ground, they do have limitations, but it is and remains a voluntarist operation in a context of abundant capital for official development assistance. How can sustainability be established in this project that engages future generations? Were women not forgotten in the various phases of the project?

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# *E pluribus unum* Shrugged: Ayn Rand *Against* American Conservatism and Libertarianism

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## Abstract

The past decade has witnessed a renewed interest in the works of twentieth-century Objectivist philosopher Ayn Rand. Political events ranging from the rise of the Tea Party to the 2016 election of Donald J. Trump have only helped to spur this resurgence, further evident in film adaptations and reissues of her popular literary novels. Political pundits abound have, in turn, deemed the return of Ayn Rand as a victory for libertarian thought and the Republican Party, more broadly. However, in this paper I contest such a theoretical synergy and complicate the Rand/Republican Party interplay by suggesting that it rests on false grounds. Drawing from Rand's Objectivism, I argue that modern-day Republican Party politics, specifically conservative and libertarian strains of thought, fail on epistemological grounds. The philosophical writings of the Russian-born, turned-American philosopher therefore are not only incompatible, but function as a forceful critique *against* the governing platform of the Republican Party in preparation for the 2022 midterm elections.

**Keywords:** Ayn Rand, Party Ideology, Objectivist Philosophy, Republican Party, Conservatism, Libertarianism

“It relates to business, beauty, life and inner emotions.

That book relates to ... everything.”<sup>1</sup>

- Donald J. Trump

“If America perishes, it will perish by intellectual default.”<sup>2</sup>

- Ayn Rand

Ayn Rand is having a moment. Or, at least, so it seems. From *The Washington Post* to *Salon Magazine* to the commentaries of the progressive-liberal intellectual milieu, such as Robert Reich, the former-Trump administration had been baptized as the perfect embodiment, if not, the flat-out conquering of Rand's thought on

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<sup>1</sup> President Trump described his affection for Rand's *The Fountainhead* in an interview with Kirsten Powers. Following his praiseworthy assessment of the text, he suggested that he identifies with the novel's protagonist, Howard Roark. In the novel, Roark was presented as an ambitious, highly individualistic architect, refusing to capitulate to the progress-stunted establishment. In many ways, Roark signifies the Übermensch in the Randian galaxy. For the full interview, see Kirsten Powers, “Donald Trump's 'Kinder, Gentler' Version,” *USA Today*, 11 April 2016. For an engaging study that looks at the parallels between Rand's archetypal man and Nietzsche's Übermensch, see Stephen L. Newman, *Liberalism at Wits' End: The Libertarian Revolt Against the Modern State* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1984).

<sup>2</sup> Ayn Rand, “For the New Intellectual,” in *For the New Intellectual* (New York: Random House, 1961), 46.

the American republic.<sup>3</sup> Of course, to suggest that the work of the towering twentieth-century Objectivist philosopher maintained no influence on the past administration is to ignore the facts, both real and alternative, to summon the dystopian parallels between the Orwell and Conway connection, so to speak. Former officials such as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and CIA Director Michael Pompeo, defeated Secretary of Labor nominee Andy Puzder, and, of course, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, and even the president himself – notorious for his anti-intellectual, philistine leanings towards reading – have cited Rand’s literary works as highly influential and key to their personal, financial, and political successes. In the words of President Trump, Rand’s 1943 novel *The Fountainhead* retains an important place in his narrow pantheon of essential readings, precisely because “It relates to business, beauty, life and inner emotions. That book relates to ... everything.”<sup>4</sup>

But with the 2022 midterm elections on the horizon and traditional red-state strongholds becoming up for grabs – from Georgia to Ohio to Wisconsin – it is important to assess how this striking image of a post-Trump Republican Party *qua* Ayn Rand influence is, quite *untenable*. It is thus timely to return to the works of Rand – not as a mode of theoretical or policy adoption – but rather to offer the tenets of her Objectivist philosophy to produce an immanent critique of the current state of the Republican Party, post-Donald Trump. By taking up Rand’s biting appraisal of both libertarianism and conservatism – two dominant poles of Republican thought that have functioned harmoniously and, at times, in opposition over the past four decades – a process of exposure unfolds. Specifically, an opening occurs establishing a fruitful theoretical plane to be envisioned within the enclosure of the American body politic, one that draws out the contradictory nodal points of modern-day American “Republican” thought. Moreover, an assessment of Rand’s view on these two strains of thought contained within the platform of the Republican Party helps to reveal an entrenched *incompatibility* with an Objectivist worldview.

This paper attempts to sketch out the crucial lines of Rand’s Objectivist philosophy. By turning attention to her bifurcation of three schools of thought – intrinsic, subjective, and objective – Rand constructs a system of thought that is adamantly anti-Kantian by denying a split between morality and practice. For Rand, Objectivism is a philosophy for living on this earth situated in a nexus of metaphysical realism instantiated by the axiomatic concepts of existence, consciousness, and identity. Negating the transcendental framework of Kant’s moral philosophical program, Rand represents a caesura with modern philosophical thought through her postulation of an open system.<sup>5</sup> Moving beyond the fixed totality of subjectivist philosophy, Rand reopens the universe to the actions and deeds of man through an Archimedean point that is redirected back towards the world. In turn, the essence of Rand’s Objectivist philosophy is epistemological as it is, in Rand’s view, the only system consonant with man’s nature as a rational being.

Directing focus to Rand’s Objectivist philosophy will enable me to demarcate her project from modern Republican thought, and, in turn, illuminate her critique *against* conservatism and libertarianism. The utilization of her philosophy in contemporary American politics, predominately expressed by the inner circle of Trump’s White

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<sup>3</sup> For an engaging survey of how mainstream news media has linked Rand with the current political climate, see Firmin DeBrabander, “How Ayn Rand’s ‘Elitism’ Lives On In The Trump Administration,” *The Conversation*, 3 April 2017; Robert Reich, “Trump’s Brand is Ayn Rand,” *Salon Magazine*, 19 March 2018; Jonathan Chait, “How Ayn Rand’s Theories Destroyed ‘Never Trump’ Conservatism,” *New York Magazine*, 13 December 2016; Jonathan Freedland, “The New Age of Ayn Rand: How She Won Over Trump and Silicon Valley,” *The Guardian*, 10 April 2017.

<sup>4</sup> President Trump interview with Kirsten Powers, 11 April 2016.

<sup>5</sup> In a point of unexpected commonality, Frankfurt School critical theorist (Second Generation), Jürgen Habermas advances a line of critique against Kant in a similar manner as Rand. According to Habermas, the form of knowledge characterized within modernity is an aporia as it locates the cognitive subject, beyond the ruins of metaphysics, while still fully self-reflective of its finite power into a project that necessitates infinite power. This aporia was transformed by Kant, a move that was demonstrated by Foucault, by repositioning the cognitive subject within an epistemological framework through a reinterpretation of the finite faculty of a cognitive subject’s as “transcendental conditions of a knowledge that progresses on into infinitude.” Since Kant’s move to position the subject as a transcendental subject, the “I” has assumed a double function. On the one hand, the reflecting subject has maintained an empirical status as one particular object within a world of other objects. The knowing subject sees and experiences the world already in existence as an external, obscure object. On the other hand, reflective activity of the absolute “I” is situated as a transcendental subject that exists against the totality of the world by constituting the spectrum of objects available for reflection and experience. This methodological focal point provides reflection with a constituting force to transcend an object that exists *in itself* to a heightened level of awareness through the recognition of its *for itself* objective. In Rand’s Objectivist view, Kant is guilty of erecting the transcendental subject in opposition to the present-world, a critical violation of an intrinsic, subjective, and objective framing embedded within an open-system. See Jürgen Habermas, “Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present: On Foucault’s Lecture on Kant’s *What is Enlightenment?*” in *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, ed. Michael Kelly (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994), 153.

House, but also noticeable in the rhetoric and governance behaviors of Senator Rand Paul (KY) and former Speaker of the House Paul Ryan (WI),<sup>6</sup> should thus be seen as an attempt to commodify, sensationalize, and co-opt a system of thought that is, in fact, antithetical to the platform of the Republican Party in its purest form and throughout its various iterations. Former President Trump and his cadre of self-professed and prophetically-anointed Rand acolytes are, therefore, faux disciples of the Objectivist movement;<sup>7</sup> bewildered in the political desert of the Republican Party their prayers have not been answered as they long for manna to rain down upon them in the form of a surefire ticket to prosperity, but misguided in their interpretations of the canonical texts of their political goddess.

To begin, I first turn attention to the loose, yet overly exaggerated association between Rand's philosophical writings and prominent Republican leaders. Next, I engage in a methodical exegesis of her Objectivist philosophy teasing out its salient features and tenets. Finally, I conclude by exploring how libertarianism and conservatism fail on epistemological grounds and thus cannot be embedded within an Objectivist methodology.

### 1. Modern Republican (Party) Thought

“What truly matters is not which party controls our government,  
but whether our government is controlled by the people.  
Today will be remembered as the day the people  
became the rulers of this nation again.”<sup>8</sup>  
- Donald J. Trump

“The expert state eliminates every interval of appearance,  
of subjectification, and of dispute in an exact concordance  
between the order of law and the order of the facts.”<sup>9</sup>  
- Jacques Rancière

Lost in the wilderness of an ideological abyss, the Republican Party searches for a viable theoretical vehicle to maintain the contours of institutional executive and legislative power following its resounding defeat in the 2020 General Election. Cobbled together by an assemblage of racist and xenophobic rhetoric, a slash and burn governance mentality of the federal system, and a tightrope balancing act of *appearing* compassionate while maintaining a fervent commitment to austerity policies and supply side economics, the Grand Old Party continues to drown in an aporia of contradictory ideological strains. While some Republican politicians and candidates are quick to assert their adherence to Reaganomics, others purport to ride the wave of the AstroTurf movement of the Tea Partiers, others remain devout Trump disciples. Imprisoned within a governing nexus that seeks to both conserve and repudiate the past (President Trump's acrimoniously infamous, “Make America Great Again” slogan in contrast to Gov. John Kasich's (OH) post-2016 election formed Super PAC, “New Day for America”), the Party of Lincoln finds itself trapped without an exit strategy inside a paradoxical ethos that not only hinders, but delegitimizes, its very own ontological grounding through an never-even game of ideological roulette.

The matrix of the ideological parameters of the Republican Party is, in turn, schizophrenic: a porous Frankenstein-esque corpus that alienates its disenchanting base by a mash up of myriad internal contradictory nodal points along the plane of Republican thought that cannot reconcile the altruism of Judeo-Christian morality with *laissez-faire* capitalism. In short, Trump devotees, Eisenhower Republicans, Reaganites, compassionate conservatives, and Tea Partiers are all united (or chained) by a singular vision: a theoretically deficient schema that is absent of a political

<sup>6</sup> On a number of occasions, typically placating to influential donors on the Right, both Senator Paul and former Speaker Ryan have articulated their respect and admiration for Ayn Rand. Both have, unequivocally, praised the thought of Rand as the catalyst for their entry into political office.

<sup>7</sup> For a litany of those members of Trump's key advisory circle – past and present – and their admiration of the works of Ayn Rand, see James Hohmann, “Ayn Rand-Acolyte Donald Trump Stacks His Cabinet with Fellow Objectivists,” *The Washington Post*, 13 December 2006.

<sup>8</sup> This passage cuts to the very core of President Trump's inaugural address. For the full transcript, see <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/>

<sup>9</sup> Jacques Rancière, *Dis-agreement: Politics and Philosophy*, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 112.

philosophy, effectively devoid of a vision of the future beyond the ill-fated insurrection of 6 January 2021. The instantiation of this *anti*-ideology – an articulation that is analogous to the bankrupt culture of post-modernity – materializes not in policies, or ideals, or even bipartisan dialogue, but rather, through the articulation and dissemination of fear.<sup>10</sup>

As the Republican Party wallows in its own philosophic indeterminacy, attempts have been launched within its own register to rehabilitate the ailing party. Most notably, two strains of thought have emerged, only to dissipate at various points, which aim analogously to deflate the monstrous size of the American federal government and re-center its orientation towards an atmosphere of first order principles fixed in a calculus of market efficiency terms. The first strain of thought – one that persists as a tentative framing on both ontological and epistemological grounds – is conservatism. I take American conservatism to express a disaggregated assembly of political and economic beliefs that are underscored by i) a devout affirmation of capitalist-relations and solutions, ii) a loose heritage of Judeo-Christian ethics, and iii) a permanent retention of fear triggered by foreign or external threats (ranging from Islam to left-wing politics to the foreign worker) as typified in the writings of William F. Buckley and George Will and the governing practices of Senators Ted Cruz (TX) and Mitch McConnell (KY) as well as Supreme Court Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett. On the other hand, libertarianism represents a subunit, yet distant entity of conservative thought, defined by i) a crusade to trim the fat of the federal government and eradicate the obstacles that inhibit individual achievement and success via a free market system, ii) a commentary on the moral fiber of America that has allegedly been undone by welfare handouts, bloated defense budgets, and a sprawling military that serves as the police of the world, and iii) a strong promotion of civil liberties through a hands-off approach to governance. Drawing heavily from the camp of anarcho-capitalism, the modern-day American libertarian movement has shifted since the 1970s, disavowing its more anarchist and radical leanings, instead offering the capital market as the *only* appropriate arena for individual economic prosperity.<sup>11</sup> The transformation of libertarianism in the American context – a move that empties out its anti-state and anti-capitalism orientation – can be seen in the writings of Milton Friedman and the Cato Institute and in governance by modern-day libertarian icon Rep. Ron Paul (TX) and former governor and ill-fated presidential nominee Gary Johnson (NM). I take these two hegemonic strains contained within the incomplete, undeveloped political philosophy of the Republican Party not as a unitary articulation of thought, but rather as two different modes of governance that operate in concert under the neoliberal order. While neither of these registers properly captures the totality of the Republican base, I suggest that these respective programs produce a type of political, economic, and cultural saliency and efficacy that help to illustrate a broad conceptual picture of Republican Party politics. Taken collectively – while still cognizant of key ideological differences – it signals *an obfuscation of any vision of American society*, opting for a reconfiguration of classical republican civic values into a polity defined by a myopic subjectification of *homo economicus* into a disordered, disinterested, de-totalized state-reliant-subject.

Ostensibly, the political programs of proclaimed Rand acolytes stem from the philosophical writings of Ayn Rand as they are quick to publicly assert that the specificities of their own governing patterns are highly influenced by the twentieth-century Russian-born, turned-American philosopher. In many ways, Rand's works have garnered a resurfacing effect due to the linkage between her Objectivist philosophy and the emerging libertarian strain of American politics from the rise of the Tea Party to the electoral success of Trump in 2016. Reissues of her seminal novels *Atlas Shrugged* and *The Fountainhead* have splashed across the counters of American coffee shops and the bookshelves of big box retailers as well as Hollywood film adaptations that sought an even wider consumer audience.

As the Rand acolytes ground their political thinking and, in turn, their approach to governance, in the philosophic writings of Ayn Rand, it is crucial to analyze if the salient lines of conservative & libertarian thought run analogous to Rand's philosophical system of Objectivism. At a quick glance, political pundits and even the American populace would situate the Rand acolytes' rhetoric and voting records within the cosmos of Randian thought. For example, two emblems of their perceived ideological affiliation can be identified in Senator Rand Paul's anti-

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<sup>10</sup> Ayn Rand, "The New Fascism: Rule by Consensus," in *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal* (New York: Signet Books, 1967), 203.

<sup>11</sup> See Saul Newman, *The Politics of Postanarchism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).

governmental philosophy that pays homage to Ayn Rand as he ‘cut his teeth’ on her works and former Speaker Ryan’s disclosure that he requires his staff interns to read *Atlas Shrugged*.

But to situate the modern-day Rand acolytes within the constellation of the Randian universe would be to ignore Ayn Rand’s scathing and unflinching critique of not only conservatism, but also, more importantly, libertarianism. For Rand, both conservatism and libertarianism ultimately fail on epistemological grounds as they advance a philosophical system that lacks an ontological grounding. Without any foundational points, these systems of thought recede into a morally subjective aporia essentially detaching politics from an ethical structure. The aversion to ground political principles within a moral philosophy renders conservatism and libertarianism as a subjective value-system that is directed towards the good of man’s consciousness, but *independent of reality*.<sup>12</sup> Bent on forcing men to find or discover their own good, the subjectivism of conservatism and libertarianism negates man’s nature.

## 2. Rand’s Objectivist Philosophy

“Truth isn’t truth.”<sup>13</sup>

- Rudy Giuliani

“What we are witnessing is the self-liquidation of philosophy.”<sup>14</sup>

- Ayn Rand

In her essay, “What is Capitalism?” published in *The Objectivist Newsletter* in late 1965, Rand provides a scathing critique of modern philosophy and political economy accentuating the strong current of collectivism that runs throughout their application. For Rand, philosophy has essentially collapsed in the twentieth century as primitive mysticism has rear its ugly head within the field of scientific development *qua* technological advancements. In the humanities, the collapse has crystalized with new fields sprouting up in the form of psychology and political economy in the attempt to study human behavior. But these branches of scientific inquiry are short-sided and misguided for Rand as both adamantly ignore man as a rational being. Instead, psychology and political economy shift attention away from man as a conscious being by elevating the collective *over* man. What we are left with, then, is a conceptualization and instantiation of a social system that is essentially absent of man. This is the great failure of modern philosophy – a degeneration that commenced in the nineteenth century through a post-Kantian disintegration – the coupling, or more precisely, the uncritical acceptance of the tenets of collectivism as the central axioms of modern day thought.<sup>15</sup>

Central to her critique of political economy is the way in which capitalism is misunderstood in the field. For Rand, political economy has advanced a tribalism culture that affirms altruism while ignoring the true creator and producer of wealth and value: man himself. Rejecting the notion that social surplus is created by a collective and thus facilitates an expansion of productive capacities, Rand vigorously opposes, writing, “There is, of course, no such thing as ‘social surplus.’ All wealth is produced by somebody and belongs to somebody.”<sup>16</sup> Rand’s assertion here cuts directly to the heart of her main problem with political economy, and, more broadly speaking, modern philosophical inquiry. It is precisely this notion that man is wedded to a tribal (or collective) entity that, for Rand, undoes and strips man of his rational, creative, and productive powers. To truly understand capitalism, the tribal premise of man *qua* man must not only be challenged, but also jettisoned for man to regain his place in the world.

This is *why* and *how* Rand’s entire objectivist philosophy rests upon epistemological grounds. Rand’s objections to the contemporary understanding and, ultimately, the fatalistic implications of the linkage between capitalism

<sup>12</sup> Ayn Rand, “What is Capitalism?,” in *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal* (New York: Signet Books, 1967), 21.

<sup>13</sup> Giuliani made this highly Orwellian/Nixonian claim on “Meet the Press” in defense of President Trump’s actions surrounding the ongoing investigation by special counsel Robert Mueller. For an analysis of the interview between Giuliani and Chuck Todd, see Rebecca Morin and David Cohen, “Giuliani: ‘Truth isn’t truth,’” *Politico*, 19 August 2018.

<sup>14</sup> Ayn Rand, *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology* (New York: Signet Books, 1967), 163.

<sup>15</sup> Rand, “What is Capitalism?,” 11.

<sup>16</sup> Rand, “What is Capitalism?,” 14.

and society, are generated by the epistemological foundation of her thinking. In her 1957 novel, *Atlas Shrugged*, Rand first alludes to the ontological core of her epistemological schema of thought, primarily, the assertion that man is a living being and thus our observations, understanding, and, in turn, our philosophical system must reconcile with. Rand succinctly writes, “There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or non-existence – and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms.”<sup>17</sup> Rand continues, and it is here that we can start to see the extension of man as a living being in context to her critique of the collectivist ethos of political economy, “Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. [...] It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible.”<sup>18</sup> This central axiom of Rand’s epistemological project gets reincorporated and further flushed out in her critique of political economy, postulating, “A great deal may be learned about society by studying man; but this process cannot be reversed: nothing can be learned about man by studying society [...]”<sup>19</sup>

For Rand, the reason why nothing is to be gained by directing our focus to society is because it ignores the second axiom of her epistemological framework: man’s means of survival is *by* and *through* the utilization of reason. Constructing a social system premised upon the systematic flows of an aggregate population conceals the rational powers of the individual, essentially negating man’s essential characteristic: his rational faculty. In her 1961 essay, “The Objectivist Ethics,” Rand stresses this point, posting, “Consciousness – for those living organisms which possess it – is the basic means of survival. For man, the basic means of survival is reason. Man cannot survive, as animals do, by the guidance of mere percepts.”<sup>20</sup> This second axiom of her epistemological project gets tied back into her critique of political economy via modern philosophy. For Rand, a basic premise of political economy (and its extension to a social system) is that when evaluating production, it starts with a tribal premise rather than with man. What is necessary, therefore, is a reversal of the driving agent of production and innovation. To properly approach political economy, Rand contends that a rejection of the tribal premise is crucial to enable an identification of man’s nature. Moreover, his nature is his rational faculty, as his survival impinges upon the utilization and degree of his rationality. “Production,” then, Rand argues, “is the application of reason to the problem of survival.”<sup>21</sup>

Since thinking, and thus in turn, rational action is central to the Randian man, it is necessary to see how capitalism fits into her Objectivist philosophy in relation to the third axiom of her epistemological foundation. As man is a living being, one that utilizes reason as *the* means for survival, the articulation or exercise of reason itself is volitional. This is crucial to Rand’s philosophical project because it is from the focal point of a process of a cognitive, voluntary choice that the Randian actor must find himself embedded within the proper social system, one that fosters and protects the autonomy of individual choice. Rand first alludes to the act of freely making a choice in her 1938 novelette *Anthem*. In strikingly short, yet emphatic prose, Rand writes, “I am. I think. I will.”<sup>22</sup> We can see in just three brief declarations the entire underpinnings of her Objectivist philosophy: man as a living being (‘I am’); survival of man via reason (‘I think’); and the exercise of reason as volitional (‘I will’). It is this latter claim, the volitional of man’s rational faculties, that provides the impetus for her entire understanding of capitalism as well as her critique of statism. In Rand’s view, capitalism is the only system that answers the question, “Is man free?” in the affirmative. In her 1961 essay, “For the New Intellectual,” Rand argues that “Man is the only living species who has to perceive reality – which means: to be *conscious* – by choice. [...] For an animal, the question of survival is primarily physical: for man, primarily epistemological.”<sup>23</sup> Choice, then, for Rand, must be situated within a social system that enables voluntary exchange. It is the connection – this interplay – between man’s epistemological ontology of reason and his survival as a living being in the world that “capitalism recognizes and protects.”<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Rand, *Atlas Shrugged*, selections, in *For the New Intellectual*, 121.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.

<sup>19</sup> Rand, “What is Capitalism?,” 15.

<sup>20</sup> Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” in *The Virtue of Selfishness* (New York: Signet Books, 1964), 21.

<sup>21</sup> Rand, “What is Capitalism?,” 17.

<sup>22</sup> Rand, *Anthem*, selections, in *For the New Intellectual*, 64.

<sup>23</sup> Rand, “For the New Intellectual,” in *For the New Intellectual*, 15.

<sup>24</sup> Rand, “What is Capitalism?,” 19.

For Rand, capitalism is not legitimized or justified on practical grounds. It is not, as the collectivists assert, a mechanism that enables the most efficient and equitable distribution of resources. Rand's opposition to this claim should not surprise us. Just as she denied the possibility of a social surplus, here too, Rand rejects the claim that man is a "national resource," one that possesses raw materiality that can be shaped, transformed, and exploited for the benefit of the nation-state.<sup>25</sup> Rather, Rand argues that capitalism proceeds and, in turn, is justified along moral grounds. Rejecting the assertion that capitalism is the best way to articulate and realize a common good, Rand contends, "The moral justification of capitalism lies in the fact that it is the only system consonant with man's rational nature, that it protects man's survival *qua* man, that its ruling principle is justice."<sup>26</sup>

Capitalism, for Rand, then, is the social system that effectively protects individual rights, including, and central to her articulation, the vital recognition of privately owned property rights. Within a truly *laissez-faire* market society, all relationships are voluntary with a governmental apparatus retaining only a retaliatory function. What results is not only a reduction of conflict between rational men, but rather a harmony of interests. Conflict, in a physical, coercive sense, is eradicated in a *laissez-faire* society precisely because man's fundamental interest is to live, or more aptly put, to live as a rational, just, productive, independent being. In an emphatic tone to begin her 1962 essay, "The 'Conflicts' of Men's Interests," Rand asserts, "there are no conflicts of interests among rational men."<sup>27</sup> For Rand, conflict arises when we consider the interests of men as undefined, left open to the subjective interpretation of each particular actor or to the dubious conceptual device of the collective common good. Rand accentuates her rejection of a cognitive collective thought process in *The Fountainhead*, postulating, "[...] the mind is an attribute of the individual. There is no such thing as a collective brain. There is no such thing as a collective thought."<sup>28</sup> Here, once again, Rand stresses the third axiom of her epistemological project: the exercise of reason as volitional and its compatibility *only* with capitalism. In "For the New Intellectual," Rand provides us with her most succinct description of capitalism and the voluntary nature of its processes, which directly leads us to the core of her Objectivist philosophy. I quote at length to highlight the three axioms of her project as well as the role that objectivity will play out in her work as *the* proper school of thought:

Capitalism demands the best of every man – his rationality – and rewards him accordingly. It leaves every man free to choose the work he likes, to specialize in it, to trade his product for the products of others, and to go as far on the road of achievement as his ability and ambition will carry him. His success depends on the *objective* value of his work and on the rationality of those who recognize that value.<sup>29</sup>

The voluntary nature of *laissez-faire* capitalism thus facilitates and protects man's nature because it is the only morally justifiable social system that provides for man's total freedom. For Rand, our current world is inherently a struggle over freedom *qua* free market capitalism versus exploitation and repression through statism.<sup>30</sup> This is not to suggest that Rand is a thinker of continuity or consensus. A free market society, one that protects private property and rewards the industrious of the world, is not a homogeneously governed society. Rather, in a capitalist society it is the right to disagree *qua* the institution of private property that "keeps the road open to man's most valuable attribute [...]: the creative mind."<sup>31</sup> What we find in all three of these various iterations of a repressive society – socialist, fascist, and statist – is the denial of man's rational faculties and a ruling governance system that is based on consensus. This type of governance – a cultural malaise of consensus – is emphatically an anti-ideology instantiated by a dissemination of fear rather than freedom, which stands in opposition to the three central axioms of Rand's Objectivist philosophy. Rand, then, in a rejection of the deficiencies of modern philosophy and its collusion with state theory is a thinker of anti-consensus.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Rand, "What is Capitalism?," 20.

<sup>26</sup> Rand, "What is Capitalism?," 20.

<sup>27</sup> Rand, "The 'Conflicts' of Men's Interests," in *The Virtue of Selfishness*, 50.

<sup>28</sup> Rand, *The Fountainhead*, selections, in *For the New Intellectual*, 78.

<sup>29</sup> Rand, "For the New Intellectual," 26.

<sup>30</sup> Rand, "Extremism, or The Art of Smearing," in *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal*, 178.

<sup>31</sup> Rand, "What is Capitalism?," 19.

<sup>32</sup> Rand, "The New Fascism: Rule by Consensus," 202.

Viewing Rand, as a proponent of an anti-consensus model, requires us to examine her crucial bifurcation of three schools of thought: intrinsic, subjective, and objective. The intrinsic school of thought posits that the concept of good is inherently a good-in-itself. Certain actions or objects independent from the social experiences in which they occur are intrinsically good. This vulgar insistence on the optimal value of activities delinks the conceptual parameters of value from purpose. From a position of intrinsic goodness, man will do anything – including excessive force – to accomplish his task. Similar to the intrinsic theory, subjective thought “holds that the good bears no relation to the facts of reality, that it is the product of a man’s consciousness, created by his feelings, desires, ‘intuitions’ or whims, and that it is merely an ‘arbitrary postulate’ or an ‘emotional commitment.’”<sup>33</sup> For Rand, both the intrinsic and subjective theory are congruent, and in fact, essential to every dictatorship and the absolute state. Highlighting the inherent violence in these schools of thought, Rand argues, “Whether they are held consciously or subconsciously [...] these theories make it possible for a man to believe that the good is independent of man’s mind and can be achieved by physical force.”<sup>34</sup> The sharp dismissal of these theories by Rand functions not only as a critique of the modern Weberian state, but also as a rejection of the entire theoretical underpinnings of modern philosophy. In an unequivocal tone, Rand assails Kantian thought as the central force that has unleashed horror, oppression, and slaughter, succinctly asserting, “It is not an accident that Eichmann was a Kantian.”<sup>35</sup>

Contra the intrinsic and subjective schools of thought, Rand advances the objective theory as a morally justifiable, anti-force theory of values. For Rand, the objective theory is the only moral theory that is fully *incompatible* with a rule by force. The good – unlike the intrinsic model that locates it immanently within an object/action and in the subjective model locatable through man’s emotional responses – for objective theory exists in an “evaluation of the facts of reality by man’s consciousness according to a rational standard of value.”<sup>36</sup> The good, then, is an element, or an aspect, of reality in direct relation to man as a living, rational being in the world. Value and purpose remain in concert, not separated, or delinked as in the intrinsic and subjective models. For Rand, the good is objective, “determined by the nature of reality,” but discoverable by the rational faculties and capabilities of the mind.<sup>37</sup> This is precisely why capitalism, according to Rand, is the only social system that is based on an objective theorization and actualization of values. The free market represents the application of an objective theory of values in a *social* context not by coercive governmental force or majoritarian rule, but rather by constructing a space free from conflict to ensure that the determination of values is rendered by the nature of reality discernible through reason. In an astute observation, Rand suggests that this type of free market society *has never existed* due to the vicissitudes in market stability directly affected by a philosophy that advances both altruism and statism. For Rand, pure capitalism – a social system not yet instantiated – contains an immanent philosophical foundation. Not surprisingly, this theoretical base is formulated on and through the objective school of thought.

What our examination of Ayn Rand’s Objectivist philosophy has illuminated is a critique of both modern philosophic thought – in the form of intrinsic and subjective theory – and its socio-political ramifications as well as the tribal premise that is immanent within collectivist conceptions of political economy. By turning to the three central axioms of her philosophical thought and her prioritization of the objective theory, the lines of her theoretical plane have been demarcated in contrast to dominant concretizations of Kantian morality, a Weberian vision of the legitimate state via the monopolization of force,<sup>38</sup> and Keynesian state economics. Rand is, in turn, a wholly original and systematic thinker offering an alternative vision of the political-philosophical world. Sketching out the theoretical underpinnings of her Objectivist philosophy will now enable us to elucidate her thought as a critique *against* conservatism and libertarianism. In what may present itself in a surprising fashion, especially considering the co-opting of Rand as a, if not, *the* prominent thinker in the cosmos of the modern-day American conservative

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<sup>33</sup> Rand, “What is Capitalism?,” 21.

<sup>34</sup> Rand, “What is Capitalism?,” 22.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 22. This claim is confirmed by Hannah Arendt’s coverage for *The New Yorker* of Adolf Eichmann’s 1961 trial. Arendt writes, “[...] he suddenly declared with great emphasis that he had lived his whole life according to Kant’s moral precepts, and especially according to a Kantian definition of duty.” Arendt, however, is clear that Eichmann should not be considered as acting in accordance with Kantian principles as he followed the will of the Führer rather than practical reason. See Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), Section VIII: Duties of a Law-Abiding Citizen.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>38</sup> See Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in *The Vocation Lectures*, ed. David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 33.

and libertarian movements, Rand offers a biting and philosophically consistent assault against the embedded layers of statist theory intrinsic to these respected theoretical projects.

### 3. Conservatism and Libertarianism: An Obituary

“America, fashionable observers say, is a non-ideological nation.”<sup>39</sup>

- William F. Buckley

“So much for those American ‘conservatives’ who claim that religion is the base of capitalism – and who believe that they can have capitalism and eat it, too, as the moral cannibalism of the altruist ethics demands.”<sup>40</sup>

- Ayn Rand

Rand’s rejection of conservative thought found its first instantiation in her 1957 novel, *Atlas Shrugged*. In this work, Rand outlines, to a strong degree, the main thrust of her Objectivist philosophy in relation to politics. Primarily, her rejection of religion through a repudiation of altruism and traditional Judeo-Christian ethical values sent shockwaves throughout the conservative constituency. Leading figures on the Right, such as William F. Buckley and Whittaker Chambers, dismissed Rand’s abhorrence to religion. But her philosophy was not totally denounced and deplored by the Right. Rand’s advocacy of a purely unfettered *laissez-faire* capitalist social system resonated strongly with right-wing populist. Her advancement of egoism found in *Atlas Shrugged* and then in a fuller articulation in *The Virtue of Selfishness* still resonated with leading figures on the Right. Even with her adamant rejection of religion and traditional values in place, conservatives were reluctant to throw the baby out with the bathwater due to her stringent promotion of capitalism. Republican Party leaders and popular public conservative intellectuals maintained the thrust of Rand’s critique against socialism as well as her unwavering support of capitalism while keeping at bay her rejection of an altruistic ethical system.

The tepid relationship between Rand and the Right took a schismatic turn with her 7 December 1960 lecture held at Princeton University, titled, “Conservatism: An Obituary.” In this lecture, later reprinted in 1963 by the Nathaniel Branden Institute, Rand unleashed her most ferocious critique of the Right. For Rand, conservatism cannot reverse the brutalizing and sweeping trend towards statism as what they seek to conserve is generated from an altruistic moral system that is inherently antithetical to capitalism. Assailing conservatives for not properly defending or attempting to ‘conserve’ capitalism, Rand asserts, “[...] capitalism is what the ‘conservatives’ dare not advocacy or defend. They are paralyzed by the profound conflict between capitalism and the moral code which dominates our culture: the morality of altruism.”<sup>41</sup> It is the inherent contradictions of conservative thought, then, for Rand that leads to an incompatibility between capitalism – and, effectively, her Objectivist philosophy – and the altruism of the hegemonic Judeo-Christian morality. The irreconcilability of the two, and, in Rand’s view, the lack of a challenge against altruism makes conservatives complicit in the alienating trend towards statism. “So long as the ‘conservatives’ evade the issue of altruism,” Rand argues, “they cannot escape the question of: back to what?”<sup>42</sup> For Rand, unequivocally, capitalism, and the possibility of *laissez-faire* capitalism, was destroyed by altruism. Returning to a prior age does not suffice for Rand, because pure capitalism did not exist in the past; rather, capitalism, like the rational faculty of man, is *future-oriented* and only implemented through “man’s right to exist – from man’s inalienable individual right to his own life.”<sup>43</sup>

What Rand’s opposition to conservatism enables us to do is to ask how and in what ways her critique could be applied to a libertarian lens. Although Rand only briefly addressed the emerging libertarian movement, her lines of thought against American conservatism open a new terrain for the issue to be explored. Central to a Randian

<sup>39</sup> William F. Buckley, *Up From Liberalism* (Cambridge: Ravenio Books, 2012), introduction.

<sup>40</sup> Ayn Rand, “Requiem for Man,” in *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal*, 315.

<sup>41</sup> Ayn Rand, “Conservatism: An Obituary,” in *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal*, 195.

<sup>42</sup> Rand, “Conservatism: An Obituary,” 200.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 201.

critique against libertarianism is the saliency that toleration plays in libertarian thought. Essentially, and we can see this most strongly in the rhetoric of Senator Rand Paul, in a bifurcation of politics from ethics. Libertarians argue that civil liberties must be protected from infringement and excessive encroachment of governmental forces while maintaining the autonomy of an ethical value system *independent* from politics. This stands in clear opposition to Rand's Objectivist philosophy as every political theory is an ethical system and must be morally justified.<sup>44</sup> As we have seen, capitalism, in Rand's view, is the only morally justifiable social system because it is fully congruent with man's nature. For Rand, then, any attempt to bifurcate politics from ethics, as in the clear delineation found in libertarian thought, is principally a mitigation of man's freedom. This detachment of politics from an ethical system is problematical for Rand as it demonstrates a political system that is not grounded in a moral philosophy. A *hands-off* approach to ethics and the instantiation of an onto-political body, one that is devoid of an ethical foundational point, results, in turn, in a slippage into moral subjectivism. For Rand, all values – social, political, and economic – must be objective.

Rand would also find problems with the libertarian understanding of capitalism. Following closely in line with anarcho-capitalism, the American libertarian movement has maintained that getting the government out of the market would result in a maximization of efficiency. The removal of governmental barriers manifesting in the form of tariffs and regulations as well as in the intrusion of the government in the market via subsidizations has been, and continues to be, a rallying cry for the anti-federal governmental mentality of libertarians. But the linkage of this premise with Randian thought is short-sided. Although Rand is a proponent of exculpating the market from the hegemony of the modern state, her argument is not justified upon grounds of productive efficiency. Rather, as we have explored, Rand's justification of capitalism proceeds from a moral justification, not from a position in which a social system merely maximizes wealth for particular individuals.

Production, for Rand, is the extension of man's reason in relation to the second axiom of her Objectivist epistemological thinking: the objective necessity of man's survival impinges upon his application of reason. In the 1965 essay, "The Obliteration of Capitalism," Rand further articulates this understanding of production – a crucial element of her thinking first outlined in *Atlas Shrugged* – as a morally justifiable cognitive process of thinking and action to ensure man's survival. Rand writes, "Capitalism was the only system in history where wealth was not acquired by looting, but by *production*, not by force, but by trade, the only system that stood for man's right to his own mind, to his work, to his life, to his happiness, to himself."<sup>45</sup> The libertarian claim of efficiency as the justification for a free market society – a claim that is espoused and embedded within typical Republican Party rhetoric – thus, for Rand, fails on an epistemological account because it negates an objective theory of action and rational selfishness in favor for an ontology of moral subjectivity.

The role that productive efficiency via competition plays in libertarian thought draws its theoretical origins from the anarcho-capitalist movement of the 1970s,<sup>46</sup> which extended the notion of competition *beyond* the economy into the political realm. For the anarcho-capitalists, competing governments within the same geographical territory would compete for citizens as governmental alliance and support would be facilitated through a producer-consumer paradigm. With citizens free to choose the government that best suits their own interests the playing field of competition would permeate all aspects of society. The germ of this thinking still manifests itself within the modern American libertarian movement. Calls for the privatization of local police forces and public transit systems, including formerly publicly controlled roads, finds its theoretical impetus from the belief of a proliferation of competition to ensure market efficiency. In one of her last writings, "The Nature of Government," written in 1974, Rand focuses on this percolating move towards hyper-competition. Dismissing it not necessarily because it is contradictory, Rand asserts that the claim cannot be substantiated because it is conceptually flawed regarding the treatment of both government and competition. Rand is persistent that a government is "an institution that

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<sup>44</sup> Rand, "Requiem for Man," 301.

<sup>45</sup> Rand, "Conservatism: An Obituary," 191. Emphasis Added

<sup>46</sup> By this claim, I am drawing upon the highly influential anarchist literature of the 1970s, particularly David D. Friedman's *The Machinery of Freedom* (1973) and Murray Rothbard's *Power and Market: Government and the Economy* (1970) as well as *For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto* (1973).

holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographical area.”<sup>47</sup> Rand continues, linking the territorial boundaries of a government with the objective theory of value, arguing, “A government is the means of placing the retaliatory use of physical force under *objective* control [...]”<sup>48</sup> Government, and in turn, competition is morally bound to an objective ethical position: the genesis and implementation of law (and force) is determined by reality as perceived by reason. Rand thus rejects the extension of unethical competition to the sphere of competing governments, posing a rhetorical situation:

Suppose Mr. Smith, a customer of Government A, suspects that his next-door neighbor, Mr. Jones, a customer of Government B, has robbed him; a squad of Police A proceeds to Mr. Jones’s house and is met at the door by a squad of Police B, who declare that they do not accept the validity of Mr. Smith’s complaint and do not recognize the authority of Government A. What happens then?<sup>49</sup>

What we can locate in Randian thought, therefore, is a clear, coherent, and trenchant critique of both conservatism and libertarianism. On both fronts these projects fail to jettison altruism thus logically drowning in the incompatibility of it and its affiliation with capitalism. For Rand, her attack on conservatism placed her outside the mainstream cadre of Right thinkers, yet her veneration of the free market still loosely connected her to the Right. Using the main thrust of her criticisms against conservatism, we have been able to apply it to the American libertarian movement. Based on the central premises of her epistemological philosophy and her critique of conservatism, libertarianism fails on myriad fronts for her thinking. This conclusion thus challenges the affinity between her philosophical project and prominent political leaders of the Republican Party.

#### 4. Conclusion

What then lies ahead for the American republic, the prominent empty signifier of democracy? To buttress the creative and autonomous potentialities of the American *demos* as well as open new spaces for the articulation of equality and liberty a *return* is necessary. Perhaps this *return* summons an invocation back to the heart of the libertarian tradition, namely the co-harmonious possibilities of equality and liberty, while still remaining cognizant to the forces of late capitalism à la the project of post-anarchism. While I argue that it would be a fatalistic philosophic move to suggest that the ills of American political philosophy and the republic at-large can be overcome through a reactionary plane,<sup>50</sup> I affirm that a critical interrogation of both the Republican and Democratic parties offer valuable insights and possible avenues for an invitation for a renewed sense of American civic-life. There is much to be gained by looking within the republic and asking, “Why has the American populace become so disenchanting? Why, indeed, has *E pluribus unum* shrugged?”

The implication of a perceived affiliation between popular Republican political leaders and Ayn Rand’s thought has resulted in an oscillating party platform that is highly inconsistent. Utilizing Randian thought as a catalyst for governance further obscures the muddled base of the Republican Party. For Republicans, the lack of a clear vision of American society will continue to hinder their electoral stability as midterm elections approach. Attempts to fill-in the theoretical gaps of the Republican platform with tenets of Randian thought have been misguided producing an inarticulate and theoretically disembodied party. The panacea for the Republican Party does not rest in an embrace of the Randian universe, but rather through a unified, moderate, and logically sound ontology capable of articulating policies that reflect the changing socio-political realities of America. The thought of Ayn Rand does not vehicle the Republican Party to where it needs to be to situate itself within the complex and changing psyche of the American electorate; it does, however, help us to shine light on the inherent deficiencies and contradictions that continue to undermine and strangle the Grand Old Party.

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<sup>47</sup> Ayn Rand, “The Nature of Government,” in *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal*, 329.

<sup>48</sup> Rand, “The Nature of Government,” 331. Emphasis Added.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 335.

<sup>50</sup> In this sense I am arguing against the total critique of modernity that has emerged from reactionary tribalism through paleoconservatism and radical conservatism. Primarily, I am drawing from Robert Antonio’s insightful article, “After Postmodernism: Reactionary Tribalism,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 106, No. 1, (2000): 40-87.

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# Online Donation for Covid-19 as Connective Action in Indonesia and Vietnam

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## Abstract

This study discusses how the internet facilitated the online donation movement to help deal with the Covid-19 in Indonesia and Vietnam. The internet has critical roles in online donations by spreading information, connecting individuals, and making an online donation movement. We use the connective action concept to explain how the social movement is developed by connecting people through the loose organizational or no-organizational platform. We find that the internet and social media have an essential role in informing, connecting, and simultaneously being a means of online donation activities of individuals from various backgrounds. In this action, individuals are connected emotionally and encourage their empathy and solidarity across identities. In other words, the online connection encourages people to gather and donate as social action. However, in contrast to the connective action concept based on real (offline) action, the online donation for Covid-19 shows that individuals are connected and act online. Therefore, conceptually, the online donation case could enrich the connective action concept in the context of online connection and online action.

**Keywords:** Covid-19, Online, Donation, Connective, Action

## 1. Introduction

The Covid-19 outbreak had not only health but also economic impacts. The government faces a dilemma between health and economic interest to deal with Covid-19. On the one hand, governments restrict individual movements to reduce the spread of Covid-19, but on the other hand, the policy had an effect by reducing economic transactions and resulted in decreases in productivity and public consumption. There is not only under government responsibility to handle this pandemic but also the responsibility of all parties. The World Health Organization (WHO) emphasizes cooperation from all parties to overcome the crisis to face the Covid-19 pandemic. One of the contributions to help overcome this crisis is donating to fund health and economic programs and help people who suffer from the pandemic effect.

Since January 2020, the trend of humanitarian donations to help deal with the Covid-19 pandemic has increased. Governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and individuals participate in humanitarian donations against Covid-19. This donation had various programs, both related to health programs and other indirect assistance programs such as assistance to economically affected people due to the Covid-19 pandemic. One of the trends is the increase in donations made online, known as online or digital donations. The term online donation arises when people use internet facilities to donate to humanitarian aid programs initiated by the government, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and individuals such as celebrities and community leaders. This online donation is a rational choice for donors, especially amid the Covid-19 pandemic, which requires them to carry out activities virtually and, as much as possible, avoids direct contact with other communities. A Fidelity Charitable reports that millennial groups are increasing their attention to making online donations during the Covid-19 pandemic (FideliCharitable 2020). The internet is making donations easier through online transactions and protects donors not to make donations directly. In other words, the internet has an essential function as a means of disseminating information, connecting people, building public awareness, and mediating social activities in online donations.

Indonesia and Vietnam are two countries in the Southeast Asia region that experienced an increasing trend in online donations during the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2019, based on the Charities Aid Foundation report, Indonesia ranked 10th on the CAF World Giving Index (CAF 2019). The report shows that the Indonesian people are ranked second globally as people who like to do charity activities. The reports from several humanitarian aid distribution agencies in Indonesia- since the Indonesian government announced the first Covid-19 case in early March 2020-shows that there has been an increase in online donations on various aid platforms that have reached IDR 74 billion (Evandio 2020). Meanwhile, the increasing charity trend also happens in Vietnam. Most of the donations include an online donation, are managed by governmental institutions, and initiated by celebrities or community leaders to attract public attention to help alleviate the impact of Covid-19. In Indonesia and Vietnam, social media plays a vital role in sharing online donation information with the public. This article discusses online donation activities in Indonesia and Vietnam, using the concept of connective actions. In general, connective actions discuss an action formed by connections between individuals with different backgrounds and interests, but the same emotions unite them to act, both social and political (Bennet and Segerberg 2012). In contrast to collective action, which relies on an organization's role that facilitates relationships between individuals in action, connective action does not require a particular organization for mediation, but emotional relationships as the main force that connects individuals to take collective action. In other words, the action in the connective action is more fluid and flexible than the action in the collective action. This article explains the online donation activity related to Covid-19 as connective action in several sections. First, we describe the connective action concept by Bennet and Segeberg. Second, we describe the pattern of online donation related to Covid-19 in Indonesia and Vietnam. Third, we discuss online donation in Indonesia and Vietnam, and the fourth is the discussion of online donation as a connective action.

## **2. Connective Action**

Collective action recognizes the essential role of the organization to organize and shape the action. The organization becomes a medium for forming common interests and creating a network of interests and goals. Meanwhile, connective action emphasizes actions that are not based on membership in an organization. In other words, the role of the organization in action is minimal or non-existent. Connective action explains social or political action in a society that seems unorganized in one large organization. The action participants are mediated by a shared emotion and connected by digital media, including social media. Digital media or social media is what evokes emotional relationships between participants in the action. Rather than being driven by the same principles, identities, and backgrounds associated with the organization in collective action, active participants in connective action are "linked" to shared emotions that can be followed by individuals with different identities, principles, and backgrounds, even they may not come from the same organization.

The fundamental difference between connective and collective action is in the origins of the action itself. Collective and connective actions have differences in their basic logic (Bennet and Segerberg 2012). Collective

action emphasizes the organization's role in forming a collective identity, organizing a network of relationships between individuals or members, and carrying out collective actions. Collective action based on this organization has challenges in the context of forming a shared identity (socialization or education), organizational costs, and the emergence of individual dilemma situations in the process of forming a shared identity or inaction. Meanwhile, connective action emphasizes digital media's role, facilitating the emergence of shared interests between individuals who are connected in loose social networks. In other words, digital media plays an organizational role in connective action.

In connective action, digital media facilitates communication and networks between individuals who may have different backgrounds. These individuals are connected, form interpersonal trust, shared belief, and solidarity, then participate in collective action (Caraway 2015; Heberer 2016; Ingrams 2017). Connective action forms interpersonal communication that rests on symbolic inclusiveness, a framework for action, and the use of technology that gives individuals the freedom to participate in action (Gromping and Sinpeng 2018). Digital media, especially social media, have two critical roles in connective action. The first is to build trust between individuals (Carson 2020), and the second is to facilitate content sharing between individuals (Carson and Vromen 2017). The existence of digital media also provides benefits by reducing costs and time in collecting and sharing information so that actions can be carried out quickly, easily, cheaply, and at the same time provide more extensive space for interaction between individuals (Cieslik et al. 2018). This interpersonal network in digital media allows the content to be shared widely and quickly to reach social effects. Therefore, digital media's role in connective action is crucial in "sharing" information and emotions through various channels, including social media. The power of this sharing can extend beyond national borders (Lim 2013). In other words, the function of "sharing" is the main factor of connective action where social media performs this sharing function in forming networks and relationships between individuals, spreading information, building solidarity, and forming collective action.

Bennet and Segerberg explain the differences between collective and connective action in three types. The first is collective action, where the organization plays an essential role as a coordination center for action, and digital media is used to shape and mobilize participants in the action. The second is connective action, where there is no or at least minimal role for the organization in managing the action. In other words, action networks are managed independently based on personal expressions shared on social networks in actions that are open to participants' access. The third is connective action in terms of the hybrid type. The hybrid type of connective action is a mix of collective and connective action. In this type, the organization provides a loose network. In other words, there are organizational actors, but their roles are not as significant as the first type as a coordination center, but only provide a means of sharing with personal action, unlike the second type, as the main force. This type's main characteristics are loose organizational relationships, technology, and action in the personal framework.

In practice, the connective action, in some cases, deals with more specific concepts. In the pan-European Stop-ACTA protest, Mercea and Funk proposed the concept of participatory coordination in connective action (Mercea and Funk 2014). According to them, the personal action frame, which is the essence of connective action, allows individuals who have different personal reasons to form common interests and form movements to make changes. In this movement, participatory coordination has an essential role in coordinating each individual's motivation to participate in the movements formed. In Downing Street e-petition, Wright argues that although it is based on connective action, the implementation of e-petition has a difference with connective action (Wright 2015). Wright saw the e-petition as more detailed and specific in their demand, and in spreading the message, the petitioner could not change the petitioner's actual text. Also, levubith's e-petition is linked to traditional media.

Meanwhile, in the #boycottautismspeak case, Parsloe and Holton proposed the concept of cyberactivism (Parsloe and Holton 2017). This concept is part of connective action, emphasizing the importance of the peer production process in a self-motivated sharing culture that makes individuals or participants distribute various forms of digital artifacts to address specific issues. Cyberactivism develops on social media platforms. Another concept related to connective action on social media is connective affordance. This concept discusses relational

relationships, which include the relationship between users and technology and the interdependence between users, and the potential effects of interdependence on technology use (Vaast et al. 2017). Social media has facilitated actors from different backgrounds to play interdependent roles and reach out to connective action.

The development of information technology, especially social media, has made connective action increasingly popular, especially among young people. In the Ukraine elections, the younger generation plays an active role in actions based on connective action (Doroshenko et al. 2018). Social media facilitates new types of political communication carried out by young people through broadcasts, new information, everyday political talks, and new political actions (Vromen, Xenos, and Loader 2015). Many young people are also actively voicing their opinions and forming collective identities through their various life stories, photos, memes, and other online artifacts through social media such as Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, and other social media platforms (Marchi and Clark 2018). From a journalistic point of view, Marchi and Clark call this group of youth action "connective journalism" because it builds and shares narratives about personal experiences and problems in the broader community on social media. Such information is not available in professional media. Marchi and Clark claim that in this case, connective journalism could be a precursor to connective action. Social media can also be the scene of connective action. Some activities that reflect connective-collective action on social media are formed online or in cyberspace. Other examples of connective action on social media are commenting, relaying information received, uploading materials and affiliating (Nekmat et al. 2015).

Connective action through social media does not only occur in democratic countries but also occurs in authoritarian countries. Feminist groups in China use connective action as a counter-censorship strategy when dealing with government restrictions on collective action (Zeng 2020). Meanwhile, in the case of the right to drive the women's movement, social media plays an essential role in shaping the online movement covering connective and collective action in Saudi Arabia (Khalil and Storie 2020). Collective and connective action complement each other, where Twitter and YouTube are used to expand campaigns, while WhatsApp and Telegram are used to build movement identities and plan collective action.

Several conditions influence the success of the action through the connective action. In practice, connective action needs to pay attention to the event's nature and how personal content in the crowd-sourced virtual protest can attract attention (Trevisan 2017). The case of disability group protests at elections in the United States shows that a controversial event such as an election can trigger mobilization but does not guarantee the success of the connective action to spread widely. The key to successful connective action is its internal coherence and personalizable action frames. The limitations of these two elements in connective action make it difficult for individuals to engage in action, problems with sustainability, and limited references to personal stories on the content of information shared. Criticism of connective action is also related to the limited explanation of the relationship between connective action with culture and ideology that causes action. Pond and Lewis respond to the critics by emphasizing the importance of understanding discourse as essential to form a network that ultimately results in connective action (Pond and Lewis 2017). Also, in implementing connective action, it is necessary to pay attention to the time to distribute the primary sources for connective action (Mercea and Funk 2014) as well as the critical role of characters or actors who have the charisma to influence emotions and mobilize support even though on the other hand this charismatic factor can be of short duration (Nils and Noomi 2017).

This article discusses Indonesia and Vietnam's online donation movement using the connective action concept, especially the hybrid connective action based on Bennet and Segerberg's typology. Online donation is a charity activity that uses internet technology. Internet technology has shifted the individual charity behavior from an offline way or donates in real, to a virtual or online way. The internet provides online platforms like websites, blogs, text messages, and social media to share and update donation information directly to the individual (Choi et al. 2018). The concept "online" here refers to the connection served, controlled, and operated by a computer network or telecommunication system, included the internet (<https://www.dictionary.com/browse/online?s=t>). The internet in online donation plays essential roles as the tool to share and update information and donate.

Online donation is used interchangeably with a digital donation to describe the donation activity on the internet and telecommunications, but we use the online donation concept in this article.

Hybrid connective action allows an organization that manages the action but not strictly and only acts as a network provider. Meanwhile, the formed network is determined by personal relationships and is not tied to the organization. In other words, there are potential roles for actors outside the organization, such as charismatic actors who influence emotions and mobilize participants in action. Online donations in Indonesia and Vietnam are usually managed by specific organizations that provide donation services. However, they do not strictly bind participants as members or part of these organizations but are more inclusive so that individuals from different backgrounds can participate. On the other hand, celebrities or famous people also play an essential role in fostering participants' emotions, who then mobilize the movement to make online donations. The following section discusses online patterns in Indonesia and Vietnam.

### **3. Method**

This study is a qualitative research where data was collected from secondary data. The qualitative method uses non numerical data and non-statistical analysis (Lamont and Boduszynski 2020). We collected the data from journals, book, mass media and internet for the information about online donation in Indonesia and Vietnam. Then we were doing analyze to find the pattern of online donation for Covid-19 in Indonesia and Vietnam.

### **4. Result**

#### *4.1 Online Donation for Covid-19 in Indonesia*

Handling the Covid-19 problem that crosses health, economic, and social issues require the community's role from various parties. Some Indonesians were then moved to donate movement to relieve the victims of Covid-19, including the people affected by it. The Indonesian people themselves are known to be fond of donating and humanitarian activities. The 2019 World Happiness Report states that 68.7% of Indonesians make money donations, and 38.8% of Indonesians are willing to volunteer (Helliwell, Layard, and Sachs 2019). Meanwhile, in October 2019, the Charities Aid Foundation, an international charity organization based in the United Kingdom, released a report on the World Giving Index 10th edition. This report results from interviews and surveys of 1.3 million individuals from various countries in the world for ten years about community charity's behavior in various countries. In this report, Indonesia ranks 10th on the CAF World Giving Index (CAF 2019). However, among the top 10 countries with the highest index, Indonesia is the only top 10 country to have improved over recent years. The report shows that 69% of Indonesians like to donate their money, and 40% of the population participate in the voluntary movement. In Indonesia's case, this report notes that Indonesia's achievements are also related to religious giving. Based on this report, the Indonesian people are considered to have high social awareness, including donation activities. This donation activity also increased when the Covid-19 outbreak hit Indonesia. One philanthropic institution reported that amid the Covid-19 pandemic, philanthropic donations from the Indonesian people increased by 122% compared to 2019 (Mulyawan 2020).

In Indonesia, several online donation platforms appeared on the internet before the Covid-19 outbreak. However, when the Covid-19 broke out in Indonesia, there was an increase in online donations from the Indonesian people, especially in April, when Indonesians entered the month of Ramadhan. Marketplace company, Tokopedia, recorded a 20 times increase in its online donation features in April 2020 (Evandi 2020). Several online donation platforms state that there has been an increase of between two and four times the number of community donations, which reached 74 billion in donations collected by the GoPay platform (Evandio 2020). Several online donation platforms focus on specific fields related to Covid-19 and use social media to campaign for their programs (Setiawan 2020). Financial application OY! in collaboration with three humanitarian agencies with further assistance. First, the National Zakat Agency (Basnaz) focuses on assistance to health workers and families in need using #BantuCegahCorona. Second, the Amanah Foundation focuses on helping families who have to carry out independent isolation and medical kit assistance to workers who have to work during a

pandemic, such as medical personnel, cleaners, security guards, and logistics workers. Amanah Foundation uses #FlattentheCurve to campaign for its donation program. Third, *Aksi Cepat Tanggap* uses the hashtag #BersamaLawanCorona to campaign for food aid programs.

The online donation process in Indonesia, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, is divided into two stages and involves several actors. However, previously, we confirmed that this online donation activity involved many actors and channels, and we only focused on online donations carried out by crowdfunding organizations that provide online donation platforms. We divide the online donation process into two stages: the idea and dissemination of online donation information and online donation actions. Meanwhile, the actors involved are actors who initiate and disseminate online donation information, online donation actors, and actors who coordinate online donation actions. In the first stage, the idea of online donation was raised and disseminated to the public. The institutions, companies, banks, organizations, mass media, crowdfunding organizations, or individuals who usually influence the public, such as artists or other public figures, could play roles in this process. They create an issue, idea, or activity like a charity concert to attract attention and concern by touching the public's emotional side by using social media to disseminate information or campaign for online donation programs. At the beginning of the Covid-19 case recorded in Indonesia in March 2020, public figures, NGOs, and the general public made 513 campaigns and raised 1.4 US dollars (Fachriansyah 2020). An Indonesian celebrity successfully invited the public through his Instagram account to donate to help fight Covid-19 and collect 4 billion rupiahs in just two days (Winarno 2020). Indonesian artists also play an active role in fundraising activities to help overcome the Covid-19 outbreak by conducting online campaigns or concerts. Didi Kempot, a Javanese pop singer, managed to collect 9 billion rupiahs online in one night (Simanjutak 2020). The information about this online donation can be received directly by individuals from information sources or through other individuals on their network of friends through their social media. At this stage, mobilizing individual support for online donation occurs, and social media plays a critical role in disseminating information and mobilizing action.

The second stage is an online donation by individuals. They take this action by transferring some money to social organizations and crowdfunding organizations. Crowdfunding institutions provide an online donation platform that makes it easier for individuals to make donations online by providing bank account numbers or collaborating with other applications such as e-money and e-pocket to donate without making bank transfers. We see that individuals from different backgrounds receive the same information about online donations and moved to carry out donation actions or activities together online. In this context, we see the connective action at work at this stage. These individuals move personally and independently to act or belong to a particular community or group and move together.

An example of Indonesia's online donation action is the crowdfunding platform Kitabisa.com (literally means WeCan). Kitabisa.com is a platform that provides two main features, namely facilitating donations and raising donations. The donations made cover many fields such as health, humanity, education, and other humanitarian fields. Alfatih Timur founded Kitabisa.com in 2013 as a social movement that aims to help people who want to create social projects. In 2014, this platform turned into an online donation platform, and in 2017 the Kitabisa's application was launched. In 2018, Kitabisa.com connected with 1 million people in Indonesia, with funds raised of 500 billion rupiahs by popularizing the #OrangBaik (good people). In 2019, they launched the Kitabisa Plus program, which focused on health assistance and routine donation programs that made it easier for individuals who wanted to donate online and regularly every month. In 2018, Kitabisa received the Padma Award from the Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia for Orderly Reporting in the Implementation of Money or Goods Collection. As of May 2020, there were 3,850,333 people joined, with a total number of programs of 63,964. In campaigning and implementing its online donation program, Kitabisa collaborates with companies, government institutions, NGOs, Mass Media, Hospitals, and Public Figures.

In Covid-19, Kitabisa is one of the platforms often used and trusted by the Indonesian people to distribute online donations. Some of its partners, such as companies, government institutions, NGOs, Mass media, hospitals, and public figures, have created and campaigned for online donation programs to help deal with the Covid-19

pandemic. We can also have their informed programs via social media such as Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Tiktok, and LinkedIn. On April 13, 2021, Kitabisa's Instagram account has 3,048 posts, 757K followers, and 1,075 followings. Kitabisa's account on Facebook (@kitabisadotcom) is liked by 277,104 users, while on Twitter (@kitabisacom), Kitabisa is followed by 38,4K users, while Kitabisa's account on Youtube has been subscribed by 236K users. The use of various social media and the #OrangBaik and #SalingJaga makes it easier for Kitabisa to reach the wider community to inform and campaign for its online donation program.

Together with its partners, Kitabisa makes campaigns for an online donation program to fight Covid-19. Individuals in society with various backgrounds - whether related to organizations, government institutions, NGOs, and people who get information from mass media, hospitals, or fans from public figures - jointly carry out online donations through crowdfunding Kitabisa.

#### *4.2 Online Donation for Covid-19 in Vietnam*

At the beginning of the Covid-19 epidemic diseases, Vietnam was regarded as a highly vulnerable place of its long borderlines and extensive trade with China. Policy Responses of Vietnamese Government follows critical principles: The first is to control the epidemic, respond earlier as in January 2020, with strategy: preventing, finding, tracing, quarantining, widely testing; Participating of the whole political system, especially mobilization of local resources and military forces; Transparent, widely and on-time communication (Lâm and Thanh 2020). After three weeks of "social distancing" in April, Vietnam had no local transmission Covid-19 case within 99 days. Then Covid-19 outbreak in the Central Region since July 25, 2020; Danang has been locked down (Beech and Doan 2020). The situation is now under control. According to Dr. Vo Tri Thanh, the Vietnamese government's spirit that "Fighting the epidemic as fighting the enemy" is the most important factor for minimizing the impacts of Covid-19 and recovering the economy (Lâm and Thanh 2020). Besides, daliaresearch.com shows that Vietnam has the highest percentage of respondents who think that the government does the "right policy" in response to Covid-19 (VietnamNews 2020).

To deal with the problems under the context of Covid-19, it is necessary an effort from whole-of-society. Depending on the Vietnamese citizens' and organizations' specific conditions, they may implement direct help or online donation to overcome challenges, including online donations. At the end of March 2020, in Hanoi, the Ministry of Information and Communications, the Ministry of Health, representatives of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, and the Vietnam Red Cross organized a launching ceremony of "the entire people support the prevention and control of COVID-19 epidemic". The launching ceremony was held online to 63 points bridge of provinces and cities nationwide (Vu 2020). Governmental institutions called for donations from individuals and organizations.

Contributions from individuals and organizations will be sent to the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front, one of the mass organizations. This program is a popular way of donating in Vietnam to coordinate the humanitarian portal with texting/message on the phone. In other words, sending the message on the phone follows the regulation of the donation movement. The formula of this program is "CV n," sent 1407. There are many times that citizens intend to donate; one n equals 20.000 Vietnam Dong (VND). For example, if an individual wants to donate 100.000 VND, they will use the text "CV 5" and send it to 1407. This donation program was conducted for 90 days, from March 19 to June 18, 2020. During three months of performance, the results increased significantly from 133 billion VND (on April 9) to 153 billion VND (on June 18, 2020) that come from mobile subscribers (Hà 2020; N.a 2020; Vu 2020).

The money reached from this program will use to support health cadres, people who directly joint in preventing and fighting against Covid-19 in the quarantine centers, victims of Covid-19 who is being treated in hospitals, medical facilities; people are isolated in medical facilities, community and people that directly impacted on Covid-19 (the disadvantage groups). The program got attention from individuals and widely supported in Vietnam. Mainly, they use and take advantage of telecommunications. The internet's role is to spread information because, without the internet, citizens may still donate to this movement. Actually, "the high level of

Internet penetration in the population has several important implications for virtual association in Vietnam," and social media has become a part of the daily life of many ordinary people (Thiem 2016).

Besides, in Vietnam, artists also play an essential role in propagating, inspiring, and fundraising activities to get over the Covid-19 difficulty by organizing various online concerts. At the beginning of the prevention and fight against the Covid-19 period, famous Vietnamese artists performed for audiences via social media from their homes to encourage the campaign "Happy at home" in the context of implementing a strictly social distancing policy. For instance, a "24 hours music marathon online" was organized at the end of March 2020 and continue hold by Vietnamese artists to perform with the interaction of netizens on social media. Through these online concerts, the public figures also call for their fans and community to express the responsibility and support to donating for the crowdfunding of Vietnamese Fatherland Front or for a specific account of the program's organizers to support vulnerable groups Covid-19 impacts negatively. Moreover, the Vietnam Women's Union and RSVP Joint Stock Company, an innovative company operating for the community's benefit, holds an online concert called "Stay Strong Vietnam" (*Kien Cuong Vietnam*) on April 25, 2020. This event aims to call for individuals, families, companies, and organizations to join hands with the Vietnamese Fatherland to support women directly involved in preventing and controlling the epidemic and helping people who are most severely affected by the Covid-19 epidemic.

The online music live show was officially spread on YouTube channel "RSVP Vietnam," social media Gazo, Lotus, and channel partners, with exciting songs and performances for the audience. Livestream by famous artists from their houses such as Diva Thanh Lam, Dong Nhi, Thao Trang, Si Thanh, Bao Tram Idol, Thinh Suy, Min, Ho Trung Dung, Erik, Miko Lan Trinh, Phuong Vy Idol, Trong Hieu, ISAAC, Miss Ngoc Han, Queen Thuy, Singer Phan Manh Quynh, MC Phuong Mai and other guests. Many songs aim to inspire and enhance awareness for citizens performed by these artists in this event. Taking the "Ghen Covy" (Jealous Coronavirus) song as an example, this is a typical Vietnamese song disseminating information about disease prevention and control to the people through music. After that, it became a social networking phenomenon that attracted young people to record videos to raise their vigilance. Then it was translated to the English version. It is one of the exciting songs that Billboard selected.

These events not only bring about valuable spirit, but they also aim to donate to the fight against Covid-19. For fundraising, audiences donate through ZaloPay or bank transfers before, during, and after the show. Firstly, for support via ZaloPay, participants open Zalo, scan the QR code or visit the link [bit.ly/quyen-gop-zalopay-2](https://bit.ly/quyen-gop-zalopay-2) to support. For each amount of donation, ZaloPay donates correspondingly to the anti-epidemic fund. This amount will be sent to the Covid-19 epidemic prevention fund of the Vietnam Fatherland Front. The second way to donate is via bank transfer. During the time of 2.5 hours of broadcasting, the program received more than 450,000 live followers and reached more than 1.3 billion VND. The donation money will be used to support women who are directly involved in the fight against the epidemic, and women who are negatively affected by the Covid-19 epidemic, disadvantaged women groups (Hà 2020). Apart from the "Stay strong Vietnam" concert, famous artists also hold charity events called "Vietnam Revival," which they perform and are supported by online platforms, including social media. On May 30, 2020, the concert "Vietnam revival" (Hoa Nhạc hoi sinh) attracted up to 1.5 million followers on nearly ten broadcast channels, including the organizer's fan pages and youtube - Dep magazine and Vinaphone, TV channel MyTV, VTV3, Tiktok, and many other platforms. So far, the amount of money raised to the account of "Hoa Nhạc Hoi Sinh" is more than 353 million VND (Thịnh 2020).

Besides, "Coreference" is a series of online donations to promote people overcome challenges caused by a coronavirus. The initiators were all 9x young people. The leading spirit of Coreference is "Pay it Forward", help to share knowledge, the pervasive positive inspiration for the community, and this is a part of the effort to donate for activities to fight against Covid-19. Admin of this fan page is Hoang Duc Minh (30 years old), who established the foundation of charity donation Kindmate.net. This event attracted 1,400 participants. This program called participants to donate to prevent and fight against Covid-19 and share their Facebook account to spread with the community. Then, people continue to the other event on April 14, 2020, hosted by Nam Phuong,

a famous health coach. Donations are made through e-wallet Momo, coordinating with the Central Committee of Vietnamese Fatherland Front and Hanoi Medical University, used for supporting forces directly involved in the fight against epidemics (Thùy 2020).

On April 18 2020, Saigon children's charity, a British NGO and active in Vietnam, opened a virtual sports event register. Saigon children's charity holds a program called "The Virtual Steps Challenge." The program is a virtual race, where anyone may record their steps to donate for the disadvantaged kid in the context of Covid-19. The aim of this program is no kid left behind. Participants must register on [irace.vn/races/the-virtual-steps-challenge](http://irace.vn/races/the-virtual-steps-challenge) with the free of charge is 250.000 VND per person to join this program. Players may select the aim from 50.000 to 300.000 steps to accomplish during four weeks of the race. For instance, all physical activities, running, going on foot, exercising, doing yoga, and housework, are also permitted to calculate these steps. When participants download the application Google Fit on the phone and access the account of iRace, mobile phones will be a tool to count steps (Tram 2020). The way to donate in this case is through the register's fee for players within the community. The way for the community to interact is through social media. On August 2, 2020, Vietnam Television coordinated with VitaDairy, a dairy company in Vietnam called support and protection for the medical practitioners. Netizens join the campaign by post the photo of the campaign on Twitter with the hashtag #Baovebacsi24h or #VitaDairybaovebacsi24h. VitaDairy will donate on behalf of netizens 10,000 VND to the 24h Doctor Protection Fund. The time to take part in this campaign is August 2-15, 2020. This fund will be used to buy Personal Protective Equipment for Healthcare Personnel. VitaDairy campaign has gained more than 600,000USD (more than 15 billion VND) (Dairybusiness 2020).

The online donations in Vietnam draw attention from individuals and organizations in the community to face and overcome challenges in the context of Covid-19. Calling for and supporting through online platforms plays an essential role in the charity, especially in social distancing. Although actors participating in calling for and supporting online donations are diverse, they may both individuals and organizations (for instance, famous artists, governmental institutions, NGOs, companies), they have a common interest and spirit that share a sense of community responsibility. Like in Indonesia, there is an organization that is organizing the donation, the Vietnamese Fatherland Front. However, other actors like celebrities and NGOs play essential roles in informing and create connective action for online donation.

Moreover, in some cases of the specific online donation called for by individuals or organizations, but the result/contributions from other individuals, groups would be sent to a specific public account of the organizers. These organizations or groups directly spent these funds themselves for specific disadvantaged groups (kids, women). In other words, they would not send money for these funds to the Vietnamese Fatherland Front (*e.g.*, "Vietnam Revival" concert, "The Virtual Steps Challenge" program).

## 5. Discussion

We try to explain the online donation activities in Indonesia and Vietnam against Covid-19 through the concept of connective action. Bennet and Segerberg (2012) explain that connective action is related to actions that are based on personal rather than organizational logic. Also, they mentioned that information technology provides facilities for interpersonal communication and a means of mobilizing action. The main difference between connective and collective action is in the organization of movements wherein collective action and the organization have a central role in organizing the action or movement. In contrast, in connective action, action or movement is organized personally, and there is no or minor organizational role. Even so, Bennet and Segerberg also provide a typology between these two forms of action, namely hybrids included in the connective action type, but there is still movement or action organization but not as strong as the collective action.

The online donation movement or action in Indonesia and Vietnam is part of the hybrid type's connective action. There is an organization that organizes this activity, namely a crowdfunding organization in Indonesia and Vietnam. Crowdfunding is a method to fund an idea or project by pooling money from many people (Clark 2011). Crowdfunding is an evolution from other concepts like microfinance, microlending, and peer-to-peer

lending. In the context of business, crowdfunding plays as the intermediary to fund the business and occurs as a new form of individual financing projects or ventures (Hemer 2011). With the development of the internet in the 1990s, crowdfunding grew to fund creative industries and then went to social projects. The crowdfunding in the social project, the charitable crowdfunding, encourages individuals from many potential funders to join online donation, usually for micro charity (Liu, Suh, and Wagner 2017). In other words, crowdfunding provides individuals from many backgrounds to fund social projects or programs by online donation.

According to Indonesia and Vietnam case, the crowdfunding institution has a dual role, namely initiating and campaigning for online donation programs to the public. Personal emotion is a crucial aspect that becomes the main target of connective action to get attention, empathy, solidarity, a feeling of the same fate or shared identity, and inspire them to take collective action. The success of online donations in the Covid-19 case is proof that connective action has succeeded in mobilizing individuals from various backgrounds to have solidarity to help deal with Covid-19. The Indonesia and Vietnam case also shows that social media has an essential role in disseminating information about online donations and becoming a forum for campaigning for this program. However, crowdfunding is not a single actor in this process because its partners also play essential roles in initiating, campaigning, and sharing information with the public. Although Kitabisa in Indonesia is a private organization and the Vietnamese Fatherland Front in Vietnam is a government-related organization, they play the same roles in coordinating online donations.

Even so, there are two issues related to online donation against Covid-19 as a connective action. First, the cases described by Bennett and Segerberg in Covid-19 are actual actions such as demonstrations or protest movements. Several other studies also use real action as an example of connective action. They do not emphasize the form of the action but the process of forming the action. In the case of online donation against Covid-19, the actions or movements that occur are not material actions but digitally or online. In this context, digital technology's role is to facilitate connections between individuals involved in connective action and facilitate actions resulting from the connective action itself. In other words, the connective action may create online action, the action in the digital world. Second, the organization's role in the hybrid type of connective action is to coordinate the connective action to assume that individuals who have different backgrounds may not be related to the organization's coordinated actions within the organization. Individuals are connected and act together. However, in the case of online donations against Covid-19, not all individuals are connected freely like illustrated. Crowdfunding is not the only actor coordinating movements or actions. Crowdfunding plays an essential role in the process of online donation. However, in the context of mobilizing support or participating in the action, other actors such as organizations, government institutions, mass media, NGOs, or public figures develop specific ideas related to online donations. In other words, ideas for action also emerged from these actors, and crowdfunding played a role in coordinating the action's implementation. In this context, two actors play in the connective action, namely the actor who has the idea of action- the actor who initiates or campaigns for the donation program - and the actor who coordinates the action. The roles of these two actors can be played by one actor or organization but can also be performed by different actors.

The contribution of online donation comes from mostly individual accounts (e.g., mobile phone number/ users, Facebook accounts, e-wallet, e-banking account). This movement may include the role of organizations that initiate, coordinate, co-operate, and call for other actors. However, if the organizations have not had the individuals' broad support, take advantage of media, information technology, whether their programs would be successful. In other words, organizations may call for donations, but their programs depend on whether communities or individuals are willing to pay for money, share, support, and donate for these campaigns/ programs or not. The online donation process for the Kitabisa case in Indonesia is relatively similar to the Vietnam case. Therefore, we suggest that organizations play an essential role in this movement, but we also emphasize individuals' role in online donation activity by taking advantage of media, information technology. In other words, the evidence supports the background theory, in particular, "hybrid-type," which is one of two types of connective action that Benet and Segerberg (2012) mention.

Connective action is a necessity in human relationships that are mediated by information technology. Information technology makes relationships between individuals closer and beyond boundaries of identity and background. Connective action allows individuals with different identities and backgrounds to connect, form emotions and solidarity, and ultimately act together. The case of online donation against Covid-19 in Indonesia and Vietnam shows that individuals from different identities and backgrounds connected, build empathy and solidarity to help victims of Covid-19. However, online donation as connective action is how the connection is formed, and action itself is performed online. Therefore, action in this concept needs to be expanded not only as actual actions such as protests, demonstrations, and other movements but also in an immaterial context both online and at an ideational level.

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# Study on the Implementation of the Total War Strategy in War Against the Dutch Occupation (Pattimura War Case Study)

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## Abstract

The Total people's war is essentially a total war for all Indonesians by mobilizing all national strength and resources to uphold state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national safety from other nations that threaten or occupy the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. The Total People's War is characterized by populist, totality and territorial characteristics. The Pattimura War was a war of the Maluku People led by Kapitan Pattimura against the Dutch occupation which took place from 16 May 1817 to 16 December 1817. This war was one of the battles the Dutch had ever fought during their occupation in Indonesia. This study aims to determine the extent to which the implementation of the total war strategy in the Pattimura War in 1817 carried out by Kapitan Pattimura in Maluku by identifying it from the aspects of the philosophy of defense science and total war strategy by using historical research methods and qualitative descriptive research methods with literature study techniques. The results of the study stated that in the context of the Pattimura War, the total war strategy could be synthesized as a total war for all the people of Maluku by exerting all their strength and resources to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity and the safety of the nation from the threat of Dutch occupation. Kapitan Pattimura has implemented a total war strategy characterized by populist, totality and territorial in the Pattimura War.

**Keywords:** Maluku, Pattimura War, Philosophy of Defense Science, Total War Strategy

## 1. Introduction

The Pattimura War was a war of the Maluku People led by Kapitan Pattimura against the Dutch occupation which took place from 16 May 1817 to 16 December 1817. This war was one of the battles the Dutch had ever fought during their occupation in Indonesia.

Since the 16th century, the spirit of colonialism and imperialism emerged in European nations to seek resources from other parts of the world, including Nusantara, to fulfill their daily needs. Spices that have high economic

value have become part of the international trading community, which is one of the factors for the European nation to dominate the Asian continent. Since then, Nusantara has been used as a colony. Portuguese, Spanish, British and Dutch took turns controlling Nusantara. The natural resources of Nusantara were exploited to enrich the colonial country. Maluku, as a region rich in spices, has long been the target of European nations (Sampono, 2015).

The Dutch occupation of Maluku began in 1605 after successfully defeating the Portuguese and controlling Ambon Island and its surrounding areas. Apart from wanting to control natural resources in the form of spices, the Dutch wanted to control the Maluku region politically. With the politics of divide et impera, the Sultanate and kingdoms in Maluku were pitted against one another so that the Dutch succeeded in controlling the countries in Maluku. The Dutch then conducted a monopoly on the spice trade by implementing various policies that were very burdensome and made the life of the people of Maluku very miserable. This oppression is felt in all aspects of people's lives, both in terms of socio-economic, political and social psychological aspects (Pattikayhatu, J.A., 1983).

In 1811 Britain under the leadership of Thomas Stamford Raffles controlled all Dutch-controlled areas in Indonesia, including Maluku in it. When the British came to power, all policies of the Dutch Colonial government were abolished. During the British rule under Raffles, the Maluku situation was relatively calm because the British were willing to pay for the crops of the people of Maluku. Even Maluku youths were given the opportunity to work in the British army service (Sardiman, 2017). Thomas Matulesy is one of the young Maluku youths who took part in the recruitment and was appointed leader of the Corps 500 with the rank of sergeant major at the age of 34 years. The Corps 500 only lasted more than six years, because in May 1817 this Corps was disbanded by the Dutch (Huliselan, 2017).

On August 13, 1814, based on the agreement of the London Treaty I, Britain handed overall control of Nusantara to the Netherlands in 1815. With the London I Treaty, the Netherlands returned to control the country of Maluku (Sampono, 2015). The Dutch again implemented various policies towards Maluku which were abolished by the British. The various policies of the Dutch government were very burdensome for the people, which resulted in people's dissatisfaction in the Maluku country. This became the reason for the emergence of the Maluku people's rebellion and resistance against the Dutch which became known as the Pattimura War (Huliselan, 2017).

The war strategy carried out by Kapitan Pattimura in the Pattimura War received support from all the people of Maluku by taking up arms against the Dutch. Kapitan Pattimura also made use of all available strength and resources to support the war. The war area that expanded throughout Maluku was used as a battlefield and space for fighting in developing a strategy to face the Dutch. This shows that basically Kapitan Pattimura has implemented a total war strategy characterized by populist, territorial and totality in his war against the Dutch.

To find out the extent of the implementation of the total war strategy in the Pattimura War in 1817 which was carried out by Kapitan Pattimura in Maluku, it is necessary to conduct more in-depth research and investigation of the history of the Pattimura War and identify it in terms of the aspects of the philosophy of defense science and total war strategy using several research questions as follows:

- a. What war strategy did Kapitan Pattimura use?
- b. How was the mobilization of strength by Kapitan Pattimura?
- c. How did the diplomacy work in the Pattimura War?
- d. Who were the winners in the Pattimura War?

## 2. Methods

This research uses historical and descriptive qualitative research methods, with literature study techniques. The historical method goes through four stages of the preparation procedure, namely; heuristics, criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The data sources used are written sources which include books, documents, and journals related to the Pattimura War incident. The historical method is a systematic set of rules or principles for

collecting historical sources effectively, evaluating them critically and testing the synthesis of the results achieved in written form (Garraghan, 1957).

Qualitative descriptive methods are used to obtain data to describe, prove, develop and find knowledge, theories for understanding, solving and anticipating human life problems (Sugiyono, 2012). The data collection technique used was literature study technique. This literature study makes a systematic description of the literature review and the results of previous research that are related to the research carried out aimed at finding a problem to be studied (Nawawi, 1993). The data analysis used is historical analysis, which is an analysis that uses sharpness in interpreting historical facts.

### 3. Discussion

On August 13, 1814, the Netherlands and England signed the London Treaty I. The agreement in the London Treaty I that the Dutch colonial assets from 1803 onwards must be returned by the British to the Dutch Government in Batavia. Thus, Nusantara from British control was returned to the Netherlands in 1815. With the London I Treaty, the Dutch returned to control the country of Maluku (Sampono, 2015).

When the Dutch colonized again, the old rules of the Dutch government that were abolished by the British were re-applied, including: 1) Control over the people's clove income through the determination of quotas. If there is excess production, the clove trees must be destroyed (felled) or honggi tochten; 2) Body work by requiring each country to provide male labor as labor for Dutch development projects such as building forts, houses, arombai (boats); 3) Obliging each country to provide arombai (boat) and rowers for the Dutch government in conducting surveillance trips at sea and honggi shipping; 4) Purchasing spices (cloves) at a predetermined price (far below the market price); 5) Kwarto work (outpouring of energy) for each adult male once a week without pay; 6) Must use a travel permit for everyone who will travel to other places (Huliselan, 2017).

To strengthen Dutch military strength in Maluku, the Dutch tried to recruit ex-native British soldiers to join the Dutch army service. Thomas Matulesy refused to join the Dutch military service for strong reasons that emerged from his conscience as a country boy who saw the various injustices and oppressions carried out by the Dutch in his country (Sampono, 2015).

These various Dutch government policies created dissatisfaction for the people in Maluku. Moreover, the Dutch also then imposed taxes on lands belonging to the indigenous people (land rent). This policy is increasingly burdening the people. Monopoly and various oppressive practices carried out by the Dutch colonial government caused suffering to be experienced by countries in Maluku. This became the reason for the emergence of the Maluku people's rebellion and resistance against the Dutch which became known as the Pattimura War. This was proven by the appearance of Thomas Matulesy alias Kapitan Pattimura who on May 15, 1817 together with his friends to lead the Maluku people to carry out a rebellion against the Dutch colonialists. This rebellion was known as the Pattimura War (Huliselan, 2017)

Thomas Matulesy, as a young man who had patriotism, loved his country, then built and aroused awareness among the kings of patih and kapitan in the country of Maluku. The figure of Thomas Matulesy, who has a leadership spirit, made him successful in embracing the kings in Maluku to fight against the Dutch Colonial (Sampono, 2015). Thomas Matulesy received support from countries in Maluku that are culturally, linguistically and religiously different. It is very difficult to unite the countries in Maluku, but Thomas Matulesy can do that. Said Parintah from Sirisori Islam, Kapitan Ulupaha from Hitu, and Kapitan Paulus Tiahahu from Abubu Nusalaut, gave their support to Thomas Matulesy. On May 14, 1817 all the people took their oath and a revolt broke out (Kartodirjo, 1987).

On May 15, 1817 at Mount Saniri, a deliberation was held which was attended by state leaders and 90 leaders from Maluku countries, namely from Saparua, Haruku, Nusalaut and Seram. In the meeting it was agreed by all present, besides giving the title Kapitan Pattimura also had the responsibility to lead the war. Thomas Matulesy

was appointed as a warlord with the title "Kapitan Pattimura" which means to lead those who will uphold the truth. Kapitan is a title for a leader who has great and formidable physical strength (magic) and becomes the head of an army or warlord (Latuconsia, 2020). His experience as a former British military personnel helped forge his career to become an accomplished warlord (Pattykayhatu, 2008). Pattimura is a figure who is very tough, brave, and hard to beat because and is supported by all the people and the small kings of the Maluku islands (Ajisaka, 2008).

Since then the struggle against the Dutch colonialists under the leadership of Thomas Matulesy was known as the "Pattimura War" (Huliselan, 2017). The beginning of the resistance against the Dutch in the 19th century started from Saparua and Saparua had become the center of the struggle. This was because the people of Saparua suffered the most from the Dutch monopoly system. Because that's also understandable why the strongest Duurstede fort was built on a rock hill as high as 20 meters on the coast of Saparua City (Huliselan, 2017)

On May 16, 1817, all the forces of the public army, under the leadership of Kapitan Pattimura, stormed the Duurstede fort. In that war the Dutch troops were led by Resident van den Berg. Meanwhile, the fighters were also led by other figures such as Christina Martha Tiahahu, Thomas Pattiwail and Lucas Latumahina (Sardiman, 2017). The fort was captured and all Dutch soldiers in Fort Duurstede died, including the Resident, his wife and two children who were also killed (Dermawan, 2017).

After Dursteede Fort in Saparua fell into the hands of the fighters, the kings of patih and the leaders of the people gathered and agreed to announce the proclamation of Haria. The proclamation aims to build solidarity and solidity between the perpetrators of the struggle and provide the basis for the people's independence revolution and is a statement that the revolution that took place was a people's revolution that was fully supported by the people (Zachrias, 1984).

Kapitan Pattimura controlled Fort Duurstede for three months, this shows how strong the strength of Kapitan Pattimura troops. The fall of Fort Duurstede in Saparua caused a great stir and anger among the Dutch. Three days later the military leadership in Ambon sent a military expedition consisting of 300 soldiers led by Major Beetjes to retake the Duurstede fort (Leirissa, 2013). These troops were escorted by two warships, namely the Nassau and Evertsen ships (Sardiman, 2017). The Beetjes Expedition consisted of Dutch infantry troops led by Captain Stalman and Lieutenant Verbrugger. Meanwhile, the Javanese infantry was led by Lieutenant Abdulmana. The Marines from the warships Evertsen and Nassau were led by Marine Lieutenants Munter de Jong, Scheidus, Musquiter, Rijk and de Jeude. Also in this expedition, the King of Siri, Salomon Kesaulya and the Orang Kaya of Batumerah. This expedition was quite tough and very proud of the Dutch leaders, equipped with sufficient weapons and supplies (Pattykayhatu, 2008).

The troops led by Major Beeltjes made landings at Waisisil Beach. The Dutch also tried to conquer Kapitan Pattimura's resistance through negotiations at the negotiating table, but they were always rejected by Kapitan Pattimura. In the face of attacks from the Dutch army, Kapitan Pattimura demonstrated his ability as a war leader who understood war strategy. Soon Kapitan Pattimura arranged tactics and battle strategy. People's troops numbering about a thousand people were organized in defense along the coast from Haria Bay to Saparua Bay (Pattykayhatu, 2008). Kapitan Pattimura ordered the evacuation of Waisisil village, artificial mines were installed, residents were evacuated around Fort Duurstede.

When the Dutch troops landed, they thought that there were no Kapitan Patimura troops on the beach and Waisisil Village. When the Dutch troops landed and then entered the village, they were caught in a natural mine trap and received resistance from fire from the Kapitan Pattimura troops who were hiding in the trees. In a short time the enemy forces were pushed back and forced to retreat and flee (Huell, 1835). However, the ship in which he was riding had drifted into the sea so that the Pattimura troops easily killed them, including Major Beetjes. The Dutch troops numbering nearly 200 people were killed, only a few people managed to escape, managed to board the ship back to Ambon.

This victory further fueled the struggles of fighters in various places such as in Seram, Hitu, Haruku, and Larike. Furthermore Pattimura focused on attacking Fort Zeelandia on Haruku Island. Seeing this sign, the Dutch troops strengthened the fortress defense under its commander Groot. Patrols also continue to be tightened. Because the fort's defenses were too strong to be broken, the people did not succeed in capturing the fortress of Zeelandia (Marpelina, 2020). Therefore, Pattimura failed to penetrate Fort Zeelandia (Sardiman, 2017).

In the following days in the struggle against the Dutch, the Nusalaut people led by Kapitan Abub, Paulus Tiahahu and Martha Christina Tiahahu as well as King Titawaai Hehanussa launched an attack on Fort Beverwijk in Sila-Leinitu. The beginning of the resistance, the Beverwijk fortress in Nusalaut was easily captured by the people. All Dutch soldiers were all killed except for a Dutch corporal named Biroe and two Indonesian soldiers who managed to hide themselves. In this struggle, Martha Christina is always involved in fueling the spirit of war (Marpelina, 2020).

A few months later the Dutch made the second military expedition. Facing the second expedition of the Dutch army, Kapitan Pattimura changed his strategy, namely by emptying his troops at Fort Duurstede. Kapitan Pattimura troops pulled out of the fort. When the Dutch soldiers attacked and managed to take control of the fort, they thought they had won, they were caught in a trap because they were trapped in the fort. The Kapitan Pattimura troops then opened fire on the Dutch soldiers from outside the fort. The Dutch soldiers experienced difficulties because the source of drinking water was not in the fort, they had to go out to fetch water from the well, many of the Dutch troops were shot. To save the Dutch troops confined in the fortress, the Dutch then deployed a large military force, attacking the bases supporting the Pattimura forces outside Saparua. The strength of the Pattimura troops was due to the support from the buffer areas of Hitu, Seram Selatan and Ambon (Sampono, 2015).

Kapitan Pattimura and the kapitan of Maluku countries, among others, Said Parintah, Kapitan Ulupaha from Hitu, Melchior Kesaulya, Anthoni Rhebok, Philip Latumahina ignited the spirit of resistance against the Dutch in countries in Maluku, resistance spread to the Hatawano area, Uuw- Ullath, Hitu, Ambon Island and South Seram.

The Pattimura struggle also echoes outside the Maluku region. From the East, Flores and Sumba, Pattimura received weapons and bullets. Bugis - Makassar sailors broke through the Dutch blockade and also helped Pattimura with bullets and foodstuffs. The kings of Bali and Sultan Sepuh from Jogjakarta (Mataram) also blessed Pattimura's struggle. Thus a bond of struggle was created in Nusantara to jointly fight imperialism (Pattikayhatu, J.A., 1983).

The Dutch changed their war strategy by first trying to conquer the rebellion outside the Saparua region, which began with: 1) Hitu Area First expedition, 15-17 October 1817; 2) Haruku, the second expedition, November 1 - 8; 3) Saparua third expedition, 8-12 November; 4) Nusalaut Fourth expedition, 6 - 10 November and 5) South Seram Last expedition, 1 - 5 December (Huliselan, 2017).

Massive military operations carried out by the Dutch succeeded in weakening the strength of the Pattimura troops. With the politics of fighting against each other by the Dutch, the strength of the Pattimura troops was getting weaker. Dutch troops were increasingly operating in Saparua. On November 11, 1817 there was a raid on Kapitan Pattimura and his friends in a house in Sirisori Country by Dutch soldiers who were led by the King of Booi who betrayed the Dutch as a guide. Kapitan Pattimura was finally captured by the Dutch army and put into a detention room on the Evertsen ship to be transported to Ambon. When brought to Ambon, the Dutch tried to persuade Kapitan Pattimura to admit their defeat against the Dutch and would be given ranks by the Dutch government. Kapitan Pattimura remained in his beliefs and ideals of his struggle and was not tempted by the Dutch government's offer.

Kapitan Pattimura together with his followers namely Philips Latumahina, Anthoni Rhebok and Said Parintah on December 16, 1817 were finally tried and sentenced to death physically on a gallows located in the field in front of Ambon New Victoria Fort. The patriotism of Kapitan Pattimura and his followers could not be defeated and

conquered by the Dutch Colonial. They chose to be executed on the gallows as Kabaresi (brave men). This also marked the end of the Patimura War between the Maluku People against the Dutch.

### **Kapitan Pattimura War Strategy**

The Pattimura War was one of the major battles the Dutch had experienced during their occupation of Indonesia. The imbalance of power with the Dutch in terms of weaponry and the number of troops was offset by Kapitan Pattimura through the support of the population and available resources as well as control of geographical conditions and implemented with the right tactics. In carrying out the war Kapitan Pattimura used existing resources. At the beginning of the war, Kapitan Patimura carried out direct attacks against strategic targets, namely Dutch fortifications such as Duurstede fortress in Saparua, Zeelandia fort on Haruku Island and Beverwijk fortress in Sila-Leinitu. This succeeded in paralyzing the power base of the colonial troops. The mastery of the Duurstede and Beverwijk fortresses caused significant loss of personnel and material from the Dutch. Psychologically, the fall of Benteng Duurstede in Saparua caused the greatest furor and anger among the Dutch.

The Kapitan Pattimura resistance was carried out in a decentralized manner throughout the Maluku region simultaneously and sporadically. This can be done because of the help and cooperation of other war leaders such as the attack on the fortress of Beverwijk in Sila-Leinitu which was led by Kapitan Abub, Paulus Tiahahu, Martha Christina Tiahahu and Raja Titawaai Hehanussa (Marpelina, 2020). This made the Dutch have to share their concentration and continue to ask for help to increase their strength.

Facing the Dutch landing operation in Waisisil waters in order to reclaim the Duurstede fortress, Kapitan Pattimura used deception as well as creating an element of surprise. The deception tactic was carried out by Kapitan Pattimura by evacuating the Waisisil village, the residents were evacuated around Fort Duurstede. Artificial mines were installed, about a thousand people's troops were arranged in defense along the coast from Haria Bay to Saparua Bay so that when the Dutch troops landed there were no Patimura Kapitan troops (Pattykayhatu, 2008). The element of surprise was shown when the Dutch troops landed and then entered the village, they were caught in an artificial mine trap and received resistance fire from the Kapitan Pattimura troops, who were hiding in the trees. So that in a short time the enemy troops who were pressed were forced to retreat and flee (Huell, 1835). Dutch troops numbering nearly 200 people including Major Beetjes were killed. Only a few people managed to save themselves and managed to get on the ship back to Ambon (Sampono, 2015).

Facing the Dutch strategy of increasing strength through several military expeditions, Kapitan Pattimura used a strategy of pulling his troops out of the fort and letting the Dutch regain control of the fort to further attack and lock them up inside the fort. The Kapitan Pattimura troops then opened fire on the Dutch soldiers from outside the fort.

Facing the strong resistance of Kapitan Pattimura, the Dutch changed their war strategy by first trying to conquer the rebellion outside the Saparua area by carrying out several military expeditions starting with: 1) Hitu Area First Expedition, 15-17 October 1817; 2) Haruku, the second expedition, November 1 - 8; 3) Saparua third expedition, 8-12 November; 4) Nusalaut Fourth expedition, 6 - 10 November and 5) South Seram Last expedition, 1 - 5 December (Huliselan, 2017).

Apart from using military force, the Dutch also tried to divide the people of Maluku by using the divide at impera strategy. The divide at impera strategy eventually became the determining factor in the defeat of Kapitan Patimura. With the politics of fighting against each other by the Dutch, the strength of the Pattimura troops was getting weaker, the Dutch troops were increasingly operating freely in Saparua. The betrayal of some of the country's leaders in Maluku who sided with the Dutch caused the Dutch to find the hiding place of Kapitan Patimura so that they were finally caught and taken prisoner.

### **Mobilization of the Kapitan Pattimura Force**

Mobilization is the act of simultaneously mobilizing and using national resources which have been fostered and prepared as a component of the state defense force to be used appropriately, integratedly and with direction for overcoming military threats or a state of war that endangers the territory and sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Undang-Undang Nomor 23 Tahun 2019 Tentang Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Nasional Untuk Pertahanan Negara, 2019)

In the perspective of resource mobilization, according to Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy (2004), it emphasizes the conditions that support the transformation of values into real action and emphasizes conditions that make it easier for social movement organizations to cooperate and compete. Edwards and McCarthy and Zald explain important aspects in mobilizing resources such as support bases, strategies and approaches, relations with the wider community. A social movement is not a closed movement, but has extensive links and networks with other organizations. The resource mobilization approach investigates the diversity of resources that must be mobilized in a social movement, the linkages between social movements and the networks of other groups, the dependence of social movements on external support to achieve success and the tactics used by the authorities to achieve success controlling or engaging in social movements (Edwards, B., McCarthy, 2004).

In the context of the Pattimura war, the mobilization carried out by Kapitan Pattimura was to direct and simultaneously use the resources of the Maluku people according to the strategies and tactics that had been determined precisely, integrated, and directed in the context of dealing with the Dutch colonialism. In the perspective of resource mobilization, Kapitan Pattimura transforms existing resources into concrete actions and emphasizes conditions that facilitate the resistance movement by working with each other with supporting Kapitan as well as with troops from outside Maluku. An important aspect in mobilizing the resources owned by Kapitan Pattimura is the base of popular support and support from other areas outside Maluku.

On May 16, 1817, all troop forces under the leadership of Kapitan Pattimura, stormed the Duurstede fort. Fortress can be mastered (Dermawan, 2017). After the success of capturing the Duurstede fortress, the people gathered and agreed to announce the proclamation of Haria. The proclamation aims to build solidarity and solidity between the perpetrators of the struggle and provide the basis for the people's independence revolution and is a statement that the revolution that took place was a people's revolution that was fully supported by the people (Zachrias, 1984). Kapitan Pattimura also mobilized support from other areas outside Maluku to get weapons and bullets as well as food supplies (Pattikayhatu, J.A., 1983).

To counterbalance the resistance of Kapitan Pattimura, the Netherlands mobilized its strength by withdrawing troops from other regions and carrying out various military expeditions equipped with sufficient weapons and supplies (Sardiman, 2017) to weaken the bases for supporting the Pattimura troops outside Saparua (Sampono, 2015).

### **Diplomacy Efforts in the Pattimura War**

The strength of diplomacy is one of the elements of national power (Morgenthau, 1948), which is then made clear again that the existence of diplomacy is a mechanism used for national interests and protection of national security (Fendreck, 2010). Diplomacy also cannot be separated from the total war, because in this form of war it does not only use military force but also uses non-military power (Abdi & Wijayanto, 2020).

In the Pattimura War, the national definition was defined as the support and interests of the Kapitan Pattimura to fight against the Dutch. If it is said that the Pattimura War used the total war strategy, then of course Kapitan Pattimura also used the power of diplomacy to achieve the interests he hoped for.

The most important diplomacy carried out by Kapitan Pattimura was in the context of gathering strength to support the war being waged. The influence of the Pattimura War spread beyond Maluku. Kapitan Pattimura maintains

diplomatic relations and cooperation with other areas outside Maluku. Diplomacy is aimed at obtaining war logistical assistance such as weapons, bullets and food supplies. Aid came from the East, Flores and Sumba. Bugis - Makassar sailors also helped by breaking through the Dutch blockade to hand over bullets and foodstuffs. The kings of Bali and Sultan Sepuh from Jogjakarta (Mataram) also gave their blessing to Kapitan Pattimura's struggle. Thus a bond of struggle in the archipelago was created to jointly fight imperialism (Pattykayhatu, 2008). On the other hand, the Dutch also tried to conquer Kapitan Pattimura's resistance through invitations to negotiate at the negotiating table, but they were always rejected by Kapitan Pattimura (Pattykayhatu, 2008).

### **Winner in the Pattimura War.**

Regarding victory in a war, William C. Martel (2011) in his book "Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Strategy" states that whether victory is intended as a result or as an ideal, both must be examined at several levels: tactics, strategy, big strategy (Martel, 2011). Tactically victory is a military condition and the judgment is based on sufficiently understood military criteria; military outcomes which achieve their objectives and give one party a significant and recognized advantage over its adversary; can be judged by measurable criteria (ratio of casualties, captured or lost territory, number of sorties flown, tonnage sunk, prisoners captured, etc.). Meanwhile, strategically: public opinion; positive assessment of the post-war political situation in terms of attainment and assertiveness that is recognized, sustained, and resolves the underlying political problems.

The success of the Dutch in breaking the resistance of the Maluku people was inseparable from various actions and methods that were not knightly and inhuman. In addition to the betrayal of the nation itself which is affected by the politics of fighting, it is coupled with a shortage of weaponry. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the honesty and norms of war that were upheld by Kapitan Pattimura and his friends had been deceived by the dishonorable Dutch tactics. As a result, the resistance of the Maluku people was tactical be broken.

After the Pattimura War, the Dutch carried out strict guard against the Maluku people and to win over the people again were given relief in the political policies of the Dutch colonial government. Strategically, this is a form of victory for the Maluku people who were fought for through the Pattimura War. In 1824 the Governor General Van der Capellen personally visited the Maluku region. A new form of politics was specially devised for this region and its people. The people of Maluku began to be persuaded and taken in to be loyal to the Netherlands (Pattikayhatu, J.A., 1983).

### **Pattimura War According to the Philosophy of Defense Science**

Philosophy is the mother of all knowledge. Philosophy can give birth to defense science if it consistently works in dealing with national defense problems consistently. The relationship of ontology, epistemology and axiology can be connected to show the common thread of research and the basis for the formation of indicators for the assessment of scientific works (Halkis, 2020). Defense science is the object of defense which reflects the state's behavior to maintain and develop the sustainability of the country concerned. Defense science is also the science of all aspects related to security on a national scale that are inherent in the objectives of implementing national defense (Tippe, 2016). Defense Science or War Science is a strategic, tactical and technical effort in defending sovereignty, territory, people and legitimate government by means of violence or diplomacy (Halkis, 2020). The science raised in this paper is philosophy with a branch of philosophy of war and a twig of the philosophy of war of the Indonesian nation in the context of militancy and history with branches of military history and branches of lesson learned and strategy.

The Pattimura War was a war of the Maluku People led by Kapitan Pattimura against the Dutch occupation which lasted from May 16, 1817 to December 16, 1817. This war was one of the major battles the Dutch had ever experienced during their occupation of Indonesia.

Thomas Matulesy was appointed as a warlord with the title "Kapitan Pattimura" which means to lead those who will uphold the truth. Kapitan is a leader who has great and formidable physical strength (magic) and becomes the

head of the army or warlord (Latuconsia, 2020). His experience as a former British military personnel helped forge his career to become an accomplished warlord (Pattykayhatu, 2008). The emergence of Thomas Matulesy alias Kapitan Pattimura who on May 15, 1817 together with his friends to lead the Maluku people to carry out a rebellion against the Dutch colonialists. This rebellion was known as the Pattimura War (Huliselan, 2017).

Epistemologically, the Pattimura War was a physical struggle and resistance of the Maluku people to achieve independence and sovereignty and to stop various acts of monopoly and violence by the Dutch colonialists. This effort was carried out with a war that lasted from 16 May 1817 to 16 December 1817 throughout the Maluku region with the support of the entire population and using all available resources through various strategies and tactics under the leadership of the Kapitan Pattimura warlord.

Axiology is the useful value of science, the investigation of its valuable principles. Etymologically, the term axiology comes from ancient Greek, which consists of the word "axos" which means value and the word "logos" which means theory. From the axiological aspect, the Pattimura War has shown the values of nationalism, patriotism and leadership as well as unity and integrity which can be studied and analyzed for further use in facing future threats to the nation.

Nationalism is shown through the principle of the Maluku people as a nation that loves peace but loves independence more. In order to defend their sovereignty and freedom, the Maluku people were willing to sacrifice their souls to fight against the Dutch colonialism. Patriotism is shown through sincerity, spirit of self-sacrifice and an unyielding spirit of Kapitan Pattimura and all the Maluku people to the last drop of blood in order to fight for dignity, self-respect and rights as an independent nation. The leadership values were shown by Kapitan Pattimura and his assistants through their capacity, capability and heroism in directly leading the struggle of the Maluku people using all available resources by implementing various strategies and war tactics that were proven in the early days of the war to defeat the Dutch.

One of the factors supporting the success of Kapitan Pattimura is the support from the people of Maluku. Maluku is known as the land of kings because many countries in Maluku are led by kings (Sampono, 2015). But all of them were united and loyal to support Kapitan Pattimura. This shows that unity played an important role in the Pattimura War. But on the other hand, the difference in the interests of the kings of the country was also the cause of the defeat of the Pattimura War. The Dutch *divide et impera* strategy succeeded in persuading part of the king of the country to betray and side with the Dutch. This resulted in the weakening of the Kapitan Pattimura troops and the peak of Kapitan Pattimura himself could be arrested by the Dutch because of instructions from the traitors.

The strategy and war tactics used by Kapitan Pattimura generally involved the support of all the people, mobilizing the resources they had and using the entire region as a fighting space to develop a war strategy. This shows the implementation of the concept of total war strategy in the Pattimura War.

### **Implementation of the Total War Strategy in the Pattimura War**

The basic thing that becomes the guideline in the implementation of war is belief in one's own strength, not knowing surrender and not giving up or surrendering territory to the opposing party. The belief in victory, and resistance will not stop until victory. War is held with a layered and deep defense strategy by utilizing all national strength and capabilities into the concept of universal people's war. The universal people's war is essentially a "total war for all Indonesians by mobilizing all national strength and resources to uphold state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national safety from other nations that threaten or occupy the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. The People's total war is characterized by populist, totality and Territoriality" (Kemenhan RI, 2007).

Populist is manifested through the participation of all Indonesian people according to their roles, abilities, professions and expertise as a manifestation of the rights and obligations of every citizen in defending the country. Totality is realized through the mobilization of all Indonesian national strength and resources to be able to be mobilized in the interests of facing threats, both from outside and within the country. Territoriality is manifested

in the empowerment of the entire territory of the country as a fighting space in developing a defense strategy to achieve goals (Prabowo, 2019).

The populist characteristics of the Pattimura War were shown by the participation of all Maluku people according to their roles, abilities, professions and expertise as a manifestation of their rights and obligations in defending the country. The war strategy carried out by Kapitan Pattimura in the Pattimura War received support from all the people of Maluku by taking up arms against the Dutch. The participation of all the people of Maluku in the Pattimura War was first manifested in the form of support for Thomas Matulesy to lead the war against the Dutch. On May 14, 1817 all the people took their oath and a revolt broke out (Kartodirjo, 1987). The success of Kapitan Pattimura was due to the support of all the people and the little kings of the Maluku islands (Ajisaka, 2008).

Furthermore, in the war, on May 16, 1817, the participation of the people, which was transformed into a force under the leadership of Kapitan Pattimura, attacked the Duurstede fortress. Fortress can be mastered (Dermawan, 2017). After the success of taking Duurstede, the people of Maluku carried out the Haria Proclamation which aimed to build solidarity and solidity between the perpetrators of the struggle and provide the basis for the people's independence revolution and was a statement that the revolution that took place was a people's revolution that was fully supported by the people (Zachrias, 1984).

The totality characteristics of the Pattimura War were shown through the mobilization of all available forces and resources to support the war. The ability to carry out war continuity is certainly supported by various factors, namely always maximizing strength, logistical support capabilities, weapon support capabilities, knowledge of fortifications and defenses. Kapitan Pattimura transformed existing resources into concrete actions and emphasized the conditions that made it easier for the resistance movement to cooperate with each other's Kapitan assistants as well as with troops from outside Maluku. An important aspect in mobilizing the resources owned by Kapitan Pattimura is the base of popular support and support from other areas outside Maluku. Kapitan Pattimura also mobilized support from other areas outside Maluku to get weapons and bullets and foodstuffs (Pattykayhatu, 2008).

In the face of the Dutch landing operation at Waisisil, about a thousand people were mobilized in defense formations along the coast from Haria Bay to Saparua Bay (Pattikayhatu, J.A., 1983). Kapitan Pattimura ordered the evacuation of Waisisil village, artificial mines were installed, residents were evacuated around Fort Duurstede. The Dutch landing operation was thwarted and Fort Duurstede remained under control. Furthermore, the people's troops were concentrated on capturing the Zeelandia fort on Haruku Island. Because the fort's defenses were too strong to be broken, the people did not succeed in capturing the Zeelandia fort (Marpelina, 2020). Therefore, Pattimura failed to penetrate Fort Zeelandia (Sardiman, 2017).

Facing the second expedition of the Dutch army, Kapitan Pattimura changed his strategy by pulling out his troops at Duurstede Fortress and exploiting the water source outside the fort. The strategy worked. The Dutch troops were trapped in the fort and had difficulty drinking water. The Pattimura troops then attacked the beleaguered Dutch soldiers.

The territoriality characteristics of the Pattimura War were manifested in the form of a war area that expanded throughout the entire region or country in Maluku, namely on Ambon Island and the surrounding islands which were used as battlefields and fighting spaces in developing strategies to face the Dutch.

The success of capturing the Duurstede fortress further fueled the struggle of fighters in various places such as in Ambon, Seram, Hitu, Haruku, and Larike, Nusulaut. The strength of the Pattimura troops was due to the support from the buffer areas of Hitu, South Seram and Ambon (Sampono, 2015).

Kapitan Pattimura and the kapitan of Maluku countries, among others, Said Parintah, Kapitan Ulupaha from Hitu, Melchior Kesaulya, Anthoni Rhebok, Philip Latumahina ignited the spirit of resistance against the Dutch in

countries in Maluku, resistance spread to the Hatawano area, Ouw- Ullath, Hitu, Ambon Island and South Seram (Sampono, 2015).

The Pattimura struggle also echoes outside the Maluku region. From the East, Flores and Sumba, Pattimura received weapons and bullets. Bugis - Makassar sailors broke through the Dutch blockade and also helped Pattimura with bullets and foodstuffs. The kings of Bali and Sultan Sepuh from Jogjakarta (Mataram) also blessed Pattimura's struggle. Thus a fabric of struggle was created in the archipelago to jointly fight imperialism (Pattikayhatu, J.A., 1983).

Based on the description above, in the context of the Pattimura War, the total war strategy could be synthesized as a total war for all the people of Maluku by exerting all their strength and resources to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity and the safety of the nation from the threat of Dutch occupation. Kapitan Pattimura has implemented a universal war strategy characterized by populist, totality and territoriality in the Pattimura War.

## Conclusion

The Pattimura War was a war of the Maluku People led by Kapitan Pattimura against the Dutch occupation which lasted from May 16, 1817 to December 16, 1817. This war was one of the major battles the Dutch had ever experienced during their occupation of Indonesia.

The strategy and war tactics used by Kapitan Pattimura generally involved the support of all the people, mobilizing the resources they had and using the entire region as a fighting space to develop a war strategy. The war strategy carried out by Kapitan Pattimura in the Pattimura War received support from all the people of Maluku by taking up arms against the Dutch. Kapitan Pattimura transformed existing resources into concrete actions through mobilization to face the Dutch threat. An important aspect in mobilizing the resources owned by Kapitan Pattimura is the base of popular support and support from outside Maluku. The theatre of Pattimura War extends throughout the region or country in Maluku, namely Ambon Island and the surrounding islands which are used as battlefields and fighting spaces in developing strategies to face the Dutch.

In the context of the Pattimura War, the total war strategy could be synthesized as a total war for all the people of Maluku by exerting all their strength and resources to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity and the safety of the nation from the threat of Dutch occupation. Kapitan Pattimura has implemented a universal war strategy characterized by populism, universality and territoriality in the Pattimura War.

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# Regional Hegemonic Power, Integration and Governance: An Appraisal of Post-Democratization South Africa

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## Abstract

This article addresses the question of what drives the character and orientation of South Africa's foreign policy post the apartheid era. The shift from apartheid to democracy in 1994 brought with it a new paradigm shift in both South Africa's domestic and foreign policy agenda. This was also driven by the need to redress the destabilization policies of the apartheid regime. The demise of apartheid in 1994 brought with it immense jubilation both continentally and abroad and South Africa was now for the first time in years reintegrated into the global economy. By undertaking this enquiry, the study attempts to draw a nuanced evaluation of South Africa's foreign policy, particularly in Southern Africa since its transition to democracy in 1994.

**Keywords:** South Africa, Regional Integration, Foreign Policy, African National Congress (ANC)

## Introduction

Colonialism by European elites in Africa and apartheid driven by the National Party (NP) in South Africa brought with it massive economic, political and social challenges in the 1900s. Not only did colonialism hinder the economic growth of most African states, but it also severely hindered the current development challenges in most African countries (Rodney, 2018). By narrowing this to South Africa, the NPs domestic and foreign policies had dire consequences for South Africa and its neighbouring countries mainly due to the destabilization policies that were at play until the end of the obnoxious apartheid system. After the African National Congress (ANC) emerged victorious in the 1994 general elections and too much contentment both continentally and globally, there was a paradigm shift in South Africa's foreign policy decision making.

The ANC had to alter its strategic planning towards the development and economic growth of South Africa and Africa at large. Apart from this introduction, the rest of the paper is structured as follows. The first section looks at South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy. Section two looks at South Africa's foreign policy aspirations post-

democratization. Section three unearths some of the challenges facing South Africa's foreign policy. The fourth section looks at South Africa's foreign policy moving forward and the fifth section offers us the concluding remarks.

### **South Africa's post-1994 Foreign Policy: A New Paradigm Shift Post the Apartheid Era**

In 2002, African scholars Korwa Adar and Rok Ajulu affirmed that the transformation that took place in Africa after the demise of the cold war provides convincing reasons for students, practitioners and scholars of International Relations (IR) to re-evaluate the methodological, theoretical and scholarly facts underpinning African states foreign policy and foreign policy-making processes. Qobo (2017) asserts that states are complex organizations whose integration with the world imitates both internal political contestations (through different political persuasion and between the fractions of the elite), the conception of their identity together with how they observe their place in the world to be. Therefore, in this view, organizational coordination, policy thrust and execution are all vital in fruitfully projecting a state's brand. As Landsberg and Masters (2017) inform us, foreign policy is rooted on the notion as to why certain decisions are taken, thus, foreign policy-making is an inherently political process because there is a range of state actors each having their objective(s) and interest(s) competing to have their voice heard. While heads of states at times drive foreign policy-making and decisions, the domestic and international environment, actors and institutions, through which they function are also pivotal. Van Nieuwkerk (2017) opines that foreign policy is made up and conducted in a context characterized by complexity and change inter alia:

1. A change in the resources, numbers and status of states and non-state actors
2. National security narratives marked by an old and new understanding of security and
3. Power and influence are exercised in new ways.

As a point of departure, it has been a long journey from the apartheid era where Pretoria was regarded as a pariah state and isolated from the world because of its destructive foreign policy aimed at defending and promoting white minority rule (Marthoz, 2012). According to Death (2011), South Africa is a pivotal case for debates on foreign policy as a result of the saliency of vital questions concerning the effectiveness and possibility of an ethical approach to international relations. During the apartheid regime, Pretoria's relations with the outside world was marked with isolation from international institutions and destabilization towards other African states. In his respected 1993 publication in foreign affairs titled *South Africa's Future Foreign Policy*, Nelson Mandela stated that "as the 1980s drew to a close, I could not see much of the world from my prison cell, but I knew it was changing. There was little doubt in my mind that this would have a profound impact on my country, on the Southern Africa region and the continent of which I am proud to be a citizen" (Mandela, 1993). Again, in this publication, he outlined the following aspects that were to form the pillar of South Africa's future foreign policy:

1. That the issue of human rights is central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental.
2. That just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide.
3. That considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations.
4. That peace is the goal to which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agrees and non-violent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed.
5. That the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign policy choices.
6. That economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world.

Evans (1994) expounds from these six pillars and outlines that two transitional pillars drove Pretoria's new foreign policy post the apartheid era, these were (1) the revitalization of the South African economy and (2) the desire for a political solution to the internal problems of South Africa that satisfy the international community and ensure their support. We may draw South Africa's foreign policy in two phases, the first phase from 1948-1994 which was under the leadership of the NP and the second phase is that of the ANC from 1994 to date, the transition phase 1990-1994 is also covered under the second phase (Stephen, 2005). The landslide victory in the 1994 elections

(62.65%) by the ANC undoubtedly granted them to alter the country's foreign policy that had over the years leading to 1994 branded Pretoria as an authoritarian and racist state.

In this vein, post democratization, South Africa's foreign policy was viewed by the ANC government as a strategy to enhance further development within Pretoria's geographical area particularly the Southern African region. As Alden and Le Pere (2004) put it, the new South Africa faced clashing tensions with regards to developing in what they call an activist role in foreign policy premised upon a belief in the compatibility of human rights norms, its development and solidarity politics.

The ANC had a notion that better involvement by the country in sectoral cooperation projects, regional trade and joint development of regional resources together with infrastructure could pave the way(s) to promote development and growth both in South Africa and Southern Africa. Qobo (2017) maintains that the early developments after the ANC was victorious saw South Africa's greater inclination towards an idealistic thrust via various policy documents outlining greater premium to issues related to human rights and peace-building. To the South African government, the promotion of human rights in the context of economic, political, environmental and social settings is born out of South Africa's (fundamentally, the ANC's) legacy of resistance of the apartheid regime that was to all intentions and purposes a crime against humanity (see Ogunnubi, 2019).

Less than a year after the 1994 elections, Pretoria had already established full diplomatic relations with most countries comprising of 46 African states, moreover South Africa had been (re)admitted to full membership of the United Nations (UN), Organization of African Unity (OAU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and started negotiations with the European Union (EU) (Alden and Le Pere, 2004). Again, the first foreign policy document adopted by the ANC 'a Framework for Co-operation in Southern Africa' that was approved in 1996 by cabinet held out a high vision for the Southern African region via mutual assistance where necessary, economic cooperation and joint planning of regional development initiatives.

### **Dawn of a Democratic State and South Africa's new Foreign Policy Aspiration(s)**

Graham (2012) points out that having had some sort of contact with the international community while in exile for its military and political support, ironically, the ANC surprisingly entered the transition negotiations with the NP unprepared not knowing what to expect in these talks. While in exile, the ANC theorized about governing South Africa, however, it never fully articulated its plans for the country when it achieved power. By 1990, the ANC had thus only created three documents pertaining directly to foreign policy. These were the Freedom Charter of 1955, the Final Report of the Commission on foreign policy from the Kabwe Conference of 1985 and the 1989 Harare Declaration. Nevertheless, such documents were never an acceptable basis of the foreign policy of an aspiring governing political party or a liberation movement for that matter, they were just a basic list of envisioned principles (see Graham, 2012).

On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of February 1990 at the South African parliament, De Klerk announced the immediate end to the ban of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), thus, bringing with it a beginning of a new era in the South African political landscape (Torreguiter, 2009; Jacobs, 2019). Pfister (2003) noted that after his release from prison in February 1990, by mid-1992, Nelson Mandela had taken 16 trips overseas and visited 49 countries. These were merely taken to smooth sanctions that had been imposed on South Africa, nevertheless, what was a further daunting task here is that the ANC had no guiding foreign policy framework from exile which could direct and inform such international efforts.

Lalbahadur (2016) argues that the alteration in power from the NP to the ANC undoubtedly intended that the newly elected and democratic South African government had to implement a more considered approach to address its foreign policy objectives which encompassed among other things as to how it was going to wield its economic might in a milieu of distrust. After the demise of apartheid coupled with the 1994 elections, major socio-political and socio-economic shifts brought for a major changeable environment which through policy-making, Pretoria's authorities endeavoured to shape towards a nationally democratized, unified and internationally competitive

society. South African leaders had to draft policies that were to reintegrate South Africa into the global economy, while at the same time policy-making had to also respond to internal conditions that featured high levels of inequality and poverty (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006).

Fundamentally, internal and external foreign policy-making was geared on addressing vital areas which consisted of socio-economic change, democratic consolidation, international competitiveness and national and racial unification. However, post the apartheid era and as most have noted, it has not been a smooth journey for policymakers to merge objectives related to globalization with the national transformation (see Cornelissen, 2017). Post democratization, because of its smooth transition to democracy, the international community has looked on Pretoria to spearhead values of human rights, underdevelopment, democracy and eradication of poverty. Hence, South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy has been solely devoted to the African continent precisely Southern Africa (South African Government, 2011; Mlambo and Adetiba, 2020). Although the ANC government possessed no previous experience in actually governing a country, nevertheless, from the transition period of 1990-1994, it was able to transform itself from a liberation movement into a solid political party and then into government. Post democratization, one may look at South Africa's foreign policy in four phases. Phase one is that of Nelson Mandela (1994-1999), phase two is Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008), phase three was the Jacob Zuma administration (2009-2018) and the fourth phase is the current Cyril Ramaphosa (2019 to date). Right after assuming office, the Mandela administration devoted their attention towards consolidating Pretoria's already strained relationship with most African states particularly those in Southern Africa.

We argue that while the Mandela administration had no governance experience, it, however, showed the international community that it could reintegrate itself in regional, continental and international organizations. Besides such, This (Mandela's) administration dedicated much of its attention to Africa largely because the country was now seen as a major power in the continent. Fundamentally, Mandela's administration was focused on the reorientation and renewal of South Africa's diplomacy, pursuing the participation and re-organization of South Africa in the international economy. Also, policymakers at this time focused on what Shoba (2018) considers a triple strategy that focused on uniting South Africans after the aftermath of apartheid, building a non-sexist and non-racial society together with forging alliances with African states importantly those in Southern Africa. This was to be done by forming a rainbow nation a named coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu to depict post-apartheid South Africa as a multiracial or multicultural country and putting into consideration the importance of the international community.

Ogunnubi (2013) posits that when the second South African (Thabo Mbeki) president post the apartheid era assumed office in 1999, there was a slight paradigm shift in South Africa's foreign policy. His approach was more on African renewal and was to bring a sense of purpose and direction. Mbeki sought to establish himself as an African statesman and pan-Africanist through the notion of his African Renaissance which contained a message of endeavour and African unity. In doing so, when looking at it from a Southern African perspective, Mbeki emphasized on the restructuring of the SADC, such as Ogunnubi argues was essential with regards to his African agenda outlook.

However, considering the fragile relationship between South Africa and its neighbours, such foreign policy principles were not going to be welcomed by some merely because of the apartheid regimes destabilization policies that were driven with apartheid exceptionalism, spearheaded by beliefs of racial dominance together with ideological differences actively isolated the government from any political engagement(s) with other African countries (Lalbahadur, 2016). Mlambo (2018); Mlambo and Ogunnubi (2018) note that throughout his tenure in office, Mbeki sought to downplay suggestions that South Africa was a hegemonic state, rather a country focused on the development of Africa as a whole and Southern Africa through the SADC together with strengthening the AU.

Thus, we are of the view that he sought to spearhead such through promoting democratization, regional integration, economic growth, peace and security and improving the standard of living for the general populace. Again, this was to strengthen the institutional capacity and governance of the SADC while making sure that whatever

timeframes are put afore by the SADC, South Africa can meet such. His passionate driving spirit for African renewal showed in his commitment with regards to the African Renaissance project, the transformation of the OAU to the AU and planning and supporting of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as an economic outlook, these organizations contained the notion of African upliftment and economic governance. Such was because he recognized the pivotal role(s) multilateral forums could play in stimulating Africa's security architecture, economic growth and development (Ogunnubi, 2013). When Jacob Zuma assumed office in 2009 amid much controversy because of pending corruption and fraud charges against him, his foreign policy marked another paradigm shift from North to South. Such, however, did not alter on South Africa's stance in its importance foreign policy on the Southern African region.

His inauguration also brought with it a name change from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO); analysts quoted this as a wise move in Pretoria's foreign policy that also reflects its domestic policies vis-à-vis cooperation with SADC member countries. Zuma's administration was also rooted in the development and economic growth of South Africa. Naidoo (2010) contends that Zuma's "Outcomes-Based Approach" (See table 1) adopted by his administration in 2009 encompassed four priority areas which reflected the principles of peace, security, prosperity and integration. Such was rooted in the fact that defined Pretoria's overarching objective of creating a better South Africa while also contributing to a better and safer Africa.

Table 1: Showing "Outcomes-Based Approach" identifying South Africa's Foreign Policy Objectives.

Outcome Based Priorities	Sub-Outputs (Deliverables)
<b>Output 1:</b> Enhanced the African agenda and sustainable development.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deepened contribution to regional and continental security and stability and sustainable development</li> <li>• Contribution to peace missions and Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)</li> <li>• Enhanced technical and development cooperation</li> </ul>
<b>Output 2:</b> Enhanced regional integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional economic integration</li> <li>• Regional political integration</li> </ul>
<b>Output 3:</b> Reformed global governance and peace and security institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthened regional, continental and global governance institutions and international platforms.</li> <li>• Enhanced representation of South Africans in international institutions.</li> </ul>
<b>Output 4:</b> Enhanced trade and investment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased value-added exports to targeted economies</li> <li>• Increased inward investment from targeted countries</li> <li>• Increase our market share through aggressive marketing.</li> </ul>

Source: See Naidoo (2010).

His (Zuma) administration continued its support and vast contribution to the AU and its official frameworks such as the African Monetary Fund, the African Central Bank, the African Court of Justice, the African Investment Bank, NEPAD, the African Court of Human and Peoples right and the African Peer Review mechanism (APRM). However, Zuma's foreign policy also brought with it an interest in emerging global economies as a year after becoming South African head of state, South Africa became the first African country to become a member of

BRICS<sup>1</sup>, just two years after the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crises. Hence, while the reaction from scholars and policymakers alike are twofold on Pretoria being a BRICS member (positive and negative), to some this is one of the best foreign policy achievement post democratization (Shoba, 2018).

Drawing from the above viewpoint, Anthony, Tembe and Gull (2015) are of the opinion that the BRIC countries have influenced South Africa's foreign policy-making. While the Mandela and Mbeki foreign policy was more Afrocentric in nature, there was a slight shift from that of Zuma. Mainly because as these authors further argue, first, such (BRICS membership) gave South Africa a robust platform to further succeed where it was failing too, to be a Sub-Saharan leader and influential role player, secondly, to have a strong saying in international multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and UN. Amao (2019) aver that South Africa's BRICS membership provides it with the perfect platform not only to further lead the Southern African region but to also lead the whole continent. To him, this is a result of four pivotal criteria's which consists of (1) power resources, (2) claim for leadership, (3) acceptance of leadership and (4) employment of foreign policy instruments, thus, South Africa can be recognized as a regional power. It is this vein that van Wyk (2017), asserts that in order to amply illustrate the vision of former South African heads of states, she provides us with what she calls the discourse formations (see table 2) of South Africa's foreign policy during various presidencies post 1994<sup>2</sup> era.

Table 2: Showing discourse formations of South Africa's foreign policy during various presidencies post democratization.

Head(s) of State(s)	Nelson Mandela 1994-1999	Thabo Mbeki 1999-2008	Jacob Zuma 2009-2018
<b>State Identity</b>	<i>New South Africa</i>	<i>African South Africa</i>	<i>Solidarity South Africa</i>
<b>Founding and maintenance of myth</b>	South Africa miracle	African Renaissance	Diplomacy of Ubuntu
<b>Object of foreign policy</b>	<i>The people</i>	<i>The African people</i>	<i>The people of the global South</i>
<b>Foreign policy purpose</b>	South African Uniqueness	South Africa as a problem-solver	South Africa as a carer
<b>Status</b>	Returnee	Reformer	Leader

Source: van Wyk (2017).

Drawing from the above, van Wyk aims to offer us a nuanced appraisal as to the direction that was taken by former South Africa heads of states with regards to how they approached their foreign policy narrative in South Africa post democratization. Nevertheless, Knecht and Weatherford (2004) inform us of the fact that foreign policy-making is not an easy process and involves (see table 3) many actors and five important stages.

<sup>1</sup> These are regarded as five emerging economies who were known as BRIC before South Africa's arrival. These are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. They meet regularly to discuss a variety of development-oriented issues including security, trade, investments, energy, global government reforms etc.

<sup>2</sup> As stated earlier, Kgalema Motlanthe is omitted from this discourse due to his relatively short spell in the office while the current Ramaphosa administration has just assumed office.

Table 3: Showing stages of foreign policy formulation.

Stage	Action	Plan
One	Agenda setting	Foreign policymakers delineate a list of potential areas of focus and decision-makers point out the rewards and dangers involved.
Two	Opinion generation	Such is made up of a brainstorming session, decision-makers make a list of the most important and urgent areas of concern.
Three	Policy design	Here policy decisions are made as to the issues identified in the previous stage.
Four	Implementation	This stage includes strategies and tactics through which the policy formulated is put into action. This stage includes both state and non-state actors.
Five	Policy review	Here decision-makers evaluate the success and failure of the policy and make necessary amendments or abandon the policy depending on the outcome of the evaluation process.

*Source: Knecht and Weatherford (2004).*

Such confirms that for every state, its foreign policy is goal-oriented, as there are objectives to be met. However, success concerning the attainment of such objectives is not given as a country might fail to achieve its desired goals. To track some of the ways South Africa has used its foreign policy, one may look the role it has (post democratization) played in vital multilateral initiatives that are of Afrocentric in nature such as the transformation of the AU to the OAU, the APRM and the NEPAD. Such as Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2015) stipulate has made Pretoria to further build on its already impressive soft power attributes.

Therefore, as this scholars further submit, this has made South Africa to effectively exercise robust leadership on multilateral platforms on behalf of Southern Africa, Africa and the developing world. In essence, South Africa has transformed herself from a benign regional powerhouse to a benevolent one via a carefully orchestrated foreign policy as a result of its soft power credentials. In this way, its foreign policy has in some way gained immense international legitimacy, global reputation, respect, recognition and gained more respect than other African powerhouses such as Nigeria and Egypt. In this vein, while Pretoria might not be the biggest powerhouse in Africa (albeit one in Southern Africa) since been surpassed by Nigeria, however, its foreign policy and soft power attributes show vast possible contention with regards to its leadership status in Africa and particularly Southern Africa.

When one has to look at the latest government blueprint the National Development Plan (NDP) vision 2030 that was undertaken by the National Planning Commission (NPC) in 2011. Chapter seven which focuses on positioning South Africa in the world outlines that Pretoria's foreign policy must be shaped by the interplay of political, environmental, diplomatic security, economics and regional cooperative dynamic that define early 21<sup>st</sup> century dynamics. Again, this foreign policy shall remain cognizant of global shifts in the hard, soft, smart or metal power from west to east. Importantly, a critical and clear understanding of Pretoria's regional and continental priorities should drive South Africa's foreign policy. Such should be done by increasing regional integration driven by increased trade importantly via the immediate SADC neighbours where the South African business has an effective say in foreign policy-making (National Planning Commission, 2011).

We may, therefore, assume that foreign policy is a multidimensional set of principles, objectives, policies, plans and objectives. Given, the past and current participation of South Africa in both regional, continental and international forums and platforms, one might deduce that it has fully integrated itself in both continental and the international community. In essence, while it is of pivotal to unearth on the success of South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy, no foreign policy of a state is forever deemed perfect, hence, there are bound to be hindrances.

### **Constraint's Facing South Africa's Foreign Policy Post Democratization.**

While it is significantly important to recognize a state's foreign policy, nevertheless, it is also pivotal to unearth or perhaps track some hindrances in a country's foreign policy, in this case, South Africa. As Marthoz (2012) argues, the challenges are there and are immense. For instance, Ogunnubi (2019) posit that foreign policy-making is by no means an easy thing, to him, such is because of diverse factors which include opposing opinions between those assigned with the responsibility of articulating foreign policy, lack of financial and material resources to implement foreign policy, continuous changes in the global landscape together with other factors. Firstly, post democratization, South Africa had to create a foreign policy from scratch linking itself with many countries that earlier boycotted it because of the apartheid regime, joining dozens of continental and international organizations that had also turned their back on it. 27 years later, one would say Pretoria was never a pariah state, however, while it has gained credible global recognition post-1994, its foreign policy has continued as observed by many scholars (see Husar, 2016; Headley and van Wyk, 2012 and Thies and Nieman, 2017) to be skewed, torn between ethics and interests, tolerating authoritarian regimes together with being contradictory.

According to Hadebe (2015), South Africa has often in recent years been labelled as a country that sets out targets but fails on the implementation and even monitoring of such. Thus, post democratization, South Africa's policy has been seen as incoherent and inconsistent. During the tenure of the Mandela administration, his foreign policy was criticized for often lacking direction. One might offer the view that perhaps he had just assumed office and had no prior experience in governing a state together with the lack of knowledge on the ministers that were supposed to guide him in his decision-making processes. During his presidency, when unrest unfolded in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), his administration chose to first isolate itself and intervene via the neutral route aimed at negotiating a ceasefire when tensions were already at boiling point.

Pfister (2000) argues that such a blunder showed a lack of direction in the first South African administration after apartheid as the government should have intervened earlier as the tense situation in the central African country had been visible much earlier. Again, when the tiny kingdom of Lesotho was experiencing political instability in the aftermath of the elections in September 1998, South Africa only intervened when sanctioned by the SADC. Saunders (2014) affirms that in the same year, Mandela's foreign policy was further hampered when his administration ignored the severe concerns of other Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) members by signing a bilateral Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU. Such showed that there was no sign of cooperation from South Africa's point of view with regards to its neighbours. Prys (2009) offers us another blunder in South Africa's foreign policy, to her, South Africa was severely criticized post the 2000 era on its quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe at the time when Mbeki was head of state.

On a contradictory point, the author outlines that president Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy" ensued regional stability, however, we tend to argue and question such argument. In this regard, how in her view can such bring about regional stability and the protection of human rights when the rights and instability of millions of Zimbabweans were effected. Such points to the fact that human security was more important than regime security. Likewise, did the years moving forward help to stabilize Zimbabwe's economy and its populace or did it further shrink the economic growth of the country bringing with it vast sanctions and internal protests. From 2000, Zimbabwe was confronted with massive amount of internal complications including sanctions, embassies in European and other countries being closed down, termination of aid and a twelve-month suspension from the commonwealth (Miti, 2012; Alao, 2012). Berger (2007) noted that in 2007, leading up to the country's general elections, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) affiliated Morgan Tsvangirai and Lovemore Madhuku were severely beaten and

arrested and in the eyes of many such acts were orchestrated by the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU – PF). The country in 2008 was experiencing inflation of 231 million %. Hence, such revelations further outline that Mbeki's quiet diplomacy stance on the Mugabe regime did not yield any significant results on the economic growth of Harare (Death, 2011).

While Mbeki's quiet diplomacy stance may be traced to the colonialism and apartheid bond between the ANC and the ZANU-PF, in the end, we are of the view that his quiet diplomacy towards Mugabe's regime further hampered the growth of Zimbabwe's economy while supporting his authoritarian regime. As such, the crisis in Zimbabwe post-2000 has undoubtedly posed as one of the greatest foreign policy hindrances to the South African government. While the human rights of millions of Zimbabweans were affected, South Africa did not show that it values human rights (something that was and still is enshrined in its foreign policy) values. Thus, the criticism aimed at Pretoria is a result of it prioritizing its special relations with ZANU – PF over ensuring the application of its human rights agenda in its foreign policy. South Africa's stance on not taking an active role in the Zimbabwe issue also brought with it harsh criticism from the West predominantly the United Kingdom (UK), the EU and the Commonwealth whose stance on Zimbabwe centred on the removal of Robert Mugabe as head of state (Lalbahadur, 2016). However, through years of quiet diplomacy, he (Mbeki) may be applauded with his role in the dialogue between the ZANU – PF and MDC which in September 2008 led to the Global Political Agreement<sup>3</sup> (GPA) that laid the foundation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) which encompassed arrangements on security, legal, constitutional, power-sharing and economic improvements within the country (Miti, 2012).

Alden and Le Pere (2004) are of the view that diverse actors involved in South Africa's foreign policy are also of concern. The erstwhile DFA often found itself in crossroads with other actors involved in foreign policy-making which ultimately led to inconsistency, incoherence and opaqueness in policy formulation. Again post democratization to date, domestic hurdles such as unemployment, inequality, population growth, crime have not played a significant role in South Africa's domestic policies which has ultimately affected its foreign policy projections in Southern Africa and afar. Therefore, the terrain of the Southern African region where South Africa should be at the fore seems to be (albeit some success) a challenging one over the last two decades. Nevertheless, one may presume that South Africa is still a young and developing state confronted with a host of domestic challenges, which at times limits its regional outreach capabilities.

South Africa seems to be confused to distinguish between the importance of the BRICS grouping and the SADC, also between the SADC and other groupings it is part of. Moreover, what undoubtedly affected in its foreign policy was Zuma's tenure as president. His time in office was hindered by immense corruption-related scandals and state capture related charges further hampering South Africa's continental and international image together with its foreign policy. He (Zuma) has in his time as head of state been confronted with vast allegations of making his family and those close to him rich while poor South Africans have remained to suffer at the expense of greedy politicians from the ruling ANC.

Again, just as the earlier point concerning quiet diplomacy and human rights abuse, Mills and James (2016) make a very useful point regarding such. To them, why did the South African government in 2013 protect former Sudanese president (Omar al-Bashir) who was in the country and was wanted for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court<sup>4</sup> (ICC). What picture does this paint on South Africa's stance against human rights abuse? Something it aimed to stand for in its post-1994 foreign policy. While it did such with regards to the Zimbabwean issues, it repeated it with regards to al-Bashir, hence, instead of arresting al-Bashir, South Africa's intended to withdraw as a member of the ICC<sup>5</sup> (See Cornelissen, 2017). Nevertheless, as Langa and Shai (2019) note, there is also the hostility that the ICC is selective in its persecutions, hence, South Africa would have received

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<sup>3</sup> Signed in September 2008 and effective from February 2009, the GPA was an accord between Zimbabwe's three main political parties, the ZANU-PF and the two MDC structures (Human Rights Watch, 2010). It was a power-sharing agreement between these parties that aimed to address internal challenges (political and economic) facing Zimbabwe.

<sup>4</sup> The ICC is tasked with the prosecuting perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and relies on state parties to arrest wanted individuals and surrender them to the court (Fehl, 2004).

<sup>5</sup> South Africa's attempt to withdraw from the ICC was nevertheless ruled unconstitutional and invalid by the South African high court in 2017, hence, halted (Langa and Shai, 2019).

much criticism from other African states if it had gone ahead and apprehended al-Bashir. There was a notion that Pretoria had two choices; (1) that of arresting Bashir as its ICC membership dictates and (2) supporting a fellow AU member state in Sudan. Drawing from the above viewpoint, we contend that irrespective of its ICC mandate and criticism that it was going to receive from other African states, South Africa showed no remorse for human rights abuses as it should have (if serious about such as per its foreign policy documents) arrested Bashir and handed him to the ICC.

The ANC under the Mbeki administration undermined human rights by receiving financial donations from Indonesia which perpetrated human rights abuse in occupied East Timor. Again, post-1994, South Africa strengthened bilateral ties with what Graham (2012) calls pariah states such as Cuba, Libya and North Korea while continuing with arms sales to countries such as Angola, Rwanda and Zaire (currently known as the DRC). Thus, Strategic Comments (2017) submits that South Africa's foreign policy serves little purpose particularly under the Zuma administration one might say Zuma used his superiority in government to enrich his allies including the controversial Indian-based Gupta family. For example, in 2014, it is estimated that US\$ 400 million in kickbacks was rewarded to Gupta related companies in doing businesses with South African SOE's such as Eskom, Transnet and South African Airways (SAA).

Further hampering the South African government image was when he (Zuma) and other KwaZulu-Natal government departments especially the Department of Public Works were targeted as a result of the irregular expenditure accrued in the upgrading of his Nkandla resident in Northern KwaZulu-Natal which included allegations of corrupt activities (Motsepe, 2015). Mlambo (2019) is of the view that the recurring xenophobic attacks, particularly from 2008, have not done justice to South Africa's foreign policy regionally, continentally and abroad. Thus, its foreign policy is bound to experience some form of setbacks. While the 2011 white paper on South African foreign policy outlines that the South African government intends to narrow this gap between the rich and the poor, such seems to be me a mere projection that will be hard to achieve when one looks at the current statistics. Besides, these were the same projections that were made by the Mandela administration 27 years ago. One may argue that, have such promises beard any fruit? Has the South African government from Mandela to Zuma been able to diminish such a gap?

We contend that such has continued to rise and seems though it will continue to happen moving forward if one looks at the ever-rising statistics predominantly in the number of unemployed individuals and the ever-increasing population rate. Again and concisely, that there is a lack of interaction between the people and the state in foreign policy-making. People ought to be engaged and consulted in the drawing up of domestic and foreign policy, therefore, involving active consultations with the citizens. Nonetheless, from a South Africa perspective, Pretoria's policy formulation remains and restricted project such that the lack of public hearings on government foreign policy says a lot. One should expect that a democratic government engages with its people in foreign policy-making as this not only assists the state both in the short and long run but also the citizens.

Perhaps, it is worth noting the point in Ogunnubi's published article titled; *Soft Power: The Fourth 'Tentacle' South Africa's Foreign Policy*. Here, he outlines that from an Afrocentric standpoint, regional powers face an array of hindrances and the domestic, regional, continental and global level ranging from domestic instability (internal political conflicts) and the lack of and resistance of small states to accept its hegemony (Ogunnubi, 2017). Such a point perhaps supports the aforementioned hindrances that are currently facing the South African government post democratization. With that said, perhaps it is of importance to outline some strategies that perhaps could be adopted by the ruling ANC to strengthen its foreign policy projections moving forward.

#### **South Africa's Foreign Policy Moving Forward: What remedy (if any).**

While it has been stated that there is no consistent (particularly from an Afrocentric perspective) foreign policy, one might not look at the positive, negative and fail to give any recommendations to amend current foreign policy limitations. While these recommendations might not be sufficient depending on one's view, nevertheless, they provide us with a point of departure moving forward. For example, Qobo (2017) in his analysis amply affirms that there is a dire need for businesses and government to have and share a common purpose that is aimed at boosting

national economic competitiveness while also improving the reliability of a state's economic policies domestically and internationally. Again, to him, what is lacking is a strategic form of leadership, effective strategies together with clear ideas. Some African states are not accepting Pretoria's leadership particularly those in Southern Africa, such that even the NDP recognizes that South Africa's power is declining particularly if compared to that of 1994 when the Mandela administration came into power.

Equally, the failure of the current ANC government to uplift the lives of its ordinary black citizens (mostly affected by poverty) seems as if it will not assist its foreign policy moving forward partly because it is still severely affected by vast domestic issues. Accordingly, to improve such obstacles (domestic challenges) post democratization, there is a severe need to alter its domestic policies before its foreign policy. Perhaps Mills and James (2016) unearth some pivotal arguments here, to them, if South Africa is to realize its foreign policy ambition(s) post the democratic era, three strategic thrusts stand out. Firstly, there is a need to alter the foreign policy from a national interest viewpoint as defined in South Africa's constitution. Such means Pretoria must fight poverty and advance human rights values. Secondly, South Africa should render support to its most influential and persuasive brand in spearheading the support for human rights and democracy predominantly from an Afrocentric point of view.

Lastly, the government should strive to create conditions for excellence in thought leadership, regenerating needed resources to DIRCO is of fundamental in re-shaping South Africa's foreign policy chiefly in conjunction with other departments such as the Department of Defense (DoD), Labour and Home Affairs while also utilizing its robust business and civil society sector. Isike and Ogunnubi (2017) put to the table another argument with regards to re-shaping South Africa's foreign policy. They identify other government departments that can play a pivotal role in Pretoria's current and future foreign policy through utilizing its soft power reservoirs. These include the departments of (1) Tourism, (2) Communications, (3) Arts and Culture, (4) Sports and Recreation, (5) Home Affairs, (6) Science and Technology and (7) Higher Education and Training. They argue that, while these departments are not active in foreign policy formulation or implementation, they are, however, becoming significant in outlining South Africa's soft power status.

Therefore, the South African government ought to incorporate them in foreign policy-making whether directly or indirectly, this is also not forgetting no state actors such as Non-Profit Organizations (NPO's), corporate businesses, academics, civil society, the media, research institutes, etc. Such would create a nuance platform for Pretoria to influence her foreign policy by representing South Africa's interests. During the transition period (1990-1994) and after the demise of apartheid, many non-state actors and NPO's emerged and hoped for a sea change in state-society relations. Hence, the end of apartheid brought with it other research institutes that were to critically analyze South Africa's foreign policy. Such that in 1994, the Foundation for Global Dialogue (FGD, now IGD) was established, later came the Institute for Defence Policy (now ISS), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) established in 1992, Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS), Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS) at the University of the Western Cape (UWC) and the Centre for Policy Studies that was established in the 1980 (Landsberg, 2017).

Again, think tanks such as the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI), Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), and Human Science Research Council (HSRC) have and are still playing a vital role when it comes to influencing South Africa's foreign policy (Isike and Ogunnubi, 2017). It must, however, be noted that not all these think tanks have a major influence in foreign policy decision making as some are mainly concerned with domestic issues such as unemployment, poverty and inequality. Nevertheless, some have been prominent to engage in regional and continental integration projects spearheaded by sub-regional bodies such as the SADC and continental institutions such as the AU (Landsberg, 2017). For the current Ramaphosa administration, restoring South Africa's dignity will be a major priority in the next two to three years. With no confidence and trust of its counterparts, Pretoria will lag in acquiring any policies via regional development goals.

## Conclusion

The paper has assessed South Africa's foreign policy aspirations post democratization. It aimed to address the vital paradigm shift that confronted the ANC government when it assumed power in 1994. Indeed, there was a major shift in South Africa's foreign policy post-1994 that brought with it enormous opportunities and challenges for the ANC importantly and moving forward. The authors argue that there is still much groundwork to be done in South Africa's foreign policy. There is a need for robust leadership and different role players to further address the current shortfalls of South Africa's foreign policy to improve the reliability of a state's economic policies domestically and internationally.

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# Makassar War in the Perspective of the Indonesian Total War

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## Abstract

The purpose of writing this article is to take a lesson from history and then make a comparison in order to find the strengths and weaknesses of a nation in implementing a defense system, and it is stipulated in a state document in the form of law if we look at events that occurred in the past, the location of the port Somba Opu is located in a very strategic area, which is located between Malacca and Maluku which makes the VOC (Verenigde Oost Indische Compagnie) or the East Indies Trade Association intending to implement monopolistic practices; therefore Makassar port must be controlled and must be under VOC control. In addition, the VOC did its best to provide spices to the European market by monopolizing the spice trade in the archipelago. While also wanting the divine government to be under VOC control, this was a threat to the interests of trade and shipping on the island of Maluku for the Makassar Sultanate since the arrival of the VOC. Because of that, there was trade competition between the Kingdom of Gowa and the VOC, and it was inevitable that there would be friction which resulted in the emergence of social conflict between the Sultanate of Makassar and the VOC, which at its peak broke out in a war between the two sides known as the Makassar War in the XVII century. The conflict continued after the Bongaya agreement on November 18, 1668, which led to major changes in the Bugis-Makassar Kingdom. The VOC obtained a trade monopoly in Makassar, and all non-Dutch Europeans were forced to leave Makassar. The conflict in Makassar resulted in an unstable security situation. The universal defense system, as stated in the Republic of Indonesia Law (RI Law) Number 3 of 2002 concerning national defense, has stipulated that the Indonesian defense system is SISHANKAMRATA, where the contribution of the people in it is an important part).

**Keywords:** Universal War, Pakassar War, Aru Palakka, Kingdom of Gowa.

## 1. Introduction

The Makassar War was a long war and included a fairly large war during the struggle for independence; this war was against the work of Gowa against the VOC (Verenigde Oost Indische Compagnie). They were supported by the Kingdom of Bone which at that time was led by Aru Palakka. This war is quite complex because it occurs on the basis of various interests, including the struggle for hegemony, the struggle for the spice route, revenge, the desire to escape colonialism, and many other motives that characterize this war (Mappasomba, 2020).

The 17th century was the peak of the greatness of South Sulawesi, the kingdoms of Gowa and Tallo, which succeeded in initiating that greatness, where at that time, the territory of Gowa covered Nusa Tenggara Maluku, Sulawesi, and even to North Kalimantan. However, the Bugis ethnic group, Bone, although only ruling limited to South Sulawesi alone, is also proud of being able to conquer the authority of Gowa's leadership (Sulistyo, 2014). Then cementing its position as an important and international port, the Kingdom of Gowa Makassar helped establish political and economic relations with Banda, Ambon, and Tidore, regions that could supply merchandise to their ports (Alwi Daud, 2020). Progress in the trade sector was also greatly felt in that era because the Kingdom of Gowa controlled the spice trade route, then it was sold to buyers from anywhere, at an agreed price for the prosperity of the people such as traders from Portugal, Denmark, China, France and England, pp. This was deemed unfavorable for the VOC (1602). Because the VOC was not able to develop and practice the system of trade monopoly or special rights (Suryanti, Ihsan Mz, 2020).

Meanwhile, the conflict between local political elites between the Kingdom of Gowa and the Kingdom of Bone during the colonial period in South Sulawesi also still colored elite competition in Sulawesi at that time. It can be divided into three historical chapters. First, the conflict between political elites in the XVII century, the conflict between Sultan Hasanuddin and Arung Palakka. Second, the conflict between political elites in the XVIII century was marked by competition between the allied forces of Bone-Soppeng led by Arung Palakka and the allies of Gowa-Wajo led by Sultan Muhammad Ali. And third is the conflict between political elites in the XIX-XX centuries, the conflict between kings as a result of Dutch colonial politics (Mappangara, 2014).

Aru Palakka, who at that time became the King of the Bone kingdom, assessed that there was the arbitrary treatment of prisoners of war who came from the Bone kingdom by the Makassar aristocrats and soldiers of the Kingdom of Gowa. As a highlight, Aru Palakka did not accept the treatment given by the soldiers of the Kingdom of Gowa to his parents, who were considered inhuman by the soldiers of the Kingdom of Gowa. This is what triggered the second Elite Conflict at that time between Aru Palakka and the Kingdom of Gowa, but with the strength that Aru Palakka has, he has not been able to put up significant resistance to the Kingdom of Gowa and its allies.

The universal defense strategy is a derivative of the universal defense system as stipulated in the Republic of Indonesia Law (RI Law) Number 3 of 2002 concerning national defense. In the context of the philosophy of science, axiologically, the RI Law is a form of defense science. In the same context, namely, epistemologically, defense science is multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary. Whereas the ontological view, defense science is the study of why and how the existence of a country can be maintained, its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national safety from all kinds of threats, from within and outside the country (Tippe, 2016). Based on this thought construction, defense science can be used as a philosophical basis of thought to contribute to solving various problems. The resulting output is the embedded awareness of state defense, which consists of being willing to sacrifice, never giving up, and being selfless, while the resulting outcome is the emergence of a deterrent effect or deterrence (Tippe, 2016).

It is hoped that a good historical understanding of an incident can be used as a lesson about the strengths and weaknesses of a nation in implementing a defense system and is stipulated in a state document in the form of a law. State defense is one of the functions of state government which is an effort to create a unity of national defense in order to achieve national goals. The understanding of defense as a science is not yet widely known by the public,

so that defense science can be used as a tool to find solutions to a problem. This is considered important because it connects the history of the nation's struggle with the right state defense system.

## 2. Method

In writing this article, using a descriptive research type in which the author describes a state defense system that is connected to history that shapes culture in society as part of a national defense system. This study uses a second data type, where data is obtained from a literature study through searches on the internet. The data collection technique used in this study was a literature review. The data analysis technique used is qualitative data analysis techniques, where the authors use secondary data, then use theory to identify events.

## 3. Results

In this study, there were at least two interests in the Makassar war. Namely, the interests of the VOC were to control the spice trade route and have the privilege of implementing monopolistic politics and the interests of the Kingdom of Bone in the struggle for power in the South Sulawesi area. To discuss the above matters, it is necessary to find things that are essential in this war, among others, as a result.

### 3.1 Pre-conflict

Since the beginning of establishing Loji in Makassar 1607, the Dutch have always persuaded local businesses to get deeper rights in trade and evicted Portuguese, Spanish, Danish, English traders from Makassar, but Sultan Alaudin and Karaeng Matoaya always said that my country was open to all nations, and whatever I did have is for you (Andaya, 1981).

The attitude of this ruler triggered a conflict with the Dutch, culminating in the incident of the Enkhuizen ship at the port of Makassar on April 28, 1615 Syahbandar from Enci Husen and a Makassar nobleman Daeng Maceta were ambushed with 11 guards when they boarded the ship, their weapons were about to be disarmed so that they became resistance as a result. Killed, two people under the ship went to Banten as compensation so that the Sultan would pay a number of Dutch Loji debts covered by his own head, Abraham Sterck,

On December 10, 1616, a Dutch ship on Eendracht From Australia via Ambon arrived in Makassar. They did not know about the incident conveyed a demand to the Sultan to prohibit Makassar people from trading in Maluku; the Sultan clearly rejected this demand By saying that it was never heard of someone being prohibited from learning to sail in the sea (Colendrander 1919) They showed Congkak behavior on land so that it aroused the anger of the hidden population after the Enkhuyzen incident, all 15 crew members were killed.

In 1623 the VOC council in Batavia decided to reopen the login in Makassar, but the Sultan did not allow it; the Makassar people continued to Trade in Maluku, the struggle for spices could not be avoided that anyone who controlled the shipping lanes would easily bring spices to his country or place of sale, between regions. contested is Buton, he was first implemented by Makassar in 1626-1626.

Meanwhile, in the XV - XVI centuries, there was a competition between countries or local kingdoms in fighting for the hegemony of power. Generally, the countries that carried out the competition were the countries of the Bugis and Makassarese people. There were conflicts between elites in the Gowa (Makassar) and Bone (Bugis) regions, both internal and external. In the XVII century (1605), the South Sulawesi region was marked by conflicts between the two main elites, namely Sultan Hasanuddin and Arung Palakka. (NAS, 2014). Various efforts were made by Aru Palakka to carry out resistance to Sultan Hasanuddin's power by inviting King Wajo, Sultan Buton, and Datu Soppeng.

In several wars, Aru Palakka suffered defeat, until finally Aru Palakka fled and hid in the Buton kingdom, in November 1663, then with the rest of his troops left Buton for Batavia (now Jakarta) to meet and discuss the

Company's assistance to the Gowa kingdom, the arrival of Aru Palakka received a very good reception by the Company, and accepted Aru Palakka as an ally for the same goal of conquering the Kingdom of Gowa.

### *3.2 The seizure of the Somba Opu fortress*

The dispute between the two major occupational figures of Gowa and Bone was exploited by the VOC. Aru Palakka proposed cooperation against Sultan Hasanuddin. The presence of Aru Palakka in Batavia was warmly welcomed by the Company because combining the two VOC and Bugis forces would make it easier to attack Makassar from sea and land.

The decision to fight Makassar was made in the Hooge Regering van Batavia meeting on October 5, 1666. The meeting appointed Mr. Johan van Dam to lead the expedition, but Van Dam refused, and the choice fell to Cornelis Janszoon Speelman with a large fleet assisted by Aru Palakka and Jonker van Manipa. From PU! Au Manipa (Ambon), leaving the port of Batavia on November 24, 1666, and arrived at Makassar waters on December 19, 1666 (Mattulada, 1990).

To face the strength of the VOC and Aru Palakka, everything was prepared by the Kingdom of Gowa. The fortifications along the coast, starting from Galesong Fort, the southernmost part of the defense, to the northernmost Mangara'bombang (Tallo) Fortress, prepared all kinds of weapons, including cannons to spew out ammunition. Panakkukang Fortress, which protects Somba Opu Fortress in the south and Ujung Pandang Fortress in the north, is ready with all war equipment. The soldiers from the land, from Kale Gowa, Ana 'Gowa, and Bajeng were on full alert to occupy their respective places to face the attacks that were to be launched by the Company and Aru Palakka.

The situation in Makassar is tense and dangerous. The traders who settled in Makassar, both local residents and foreigners, immediately stopped their trading activities and prepared protection from the explosions of the cannons that exploded at any time.

On January 1, 1667, Speelman arrived in the waters of Buton. At that time, Buton City and its surroundings had been occupied by Gowa troops under the leadership of Admiral Karaeng Bontomarannu approximately two months earlier. With the appearance of the Dutch fleet in Buton waters, the Bontomarannu fleet was immediately greeted by the fleet which was temporarily anchored in Buton. The sea battle was fierce.

At first, the Gowa troops were able to beat Buton back and control him. But after Speelman arrived with Aru Palakka to attack, Bontomarannu's troops were beaten back. The unbalanced war resulted in a crushing defeat on the part of Bontomarannu so that the Gowa nobles were taken prisoner. After the fleet was completely destroyed by Speelman's troops, Karaeng Bontomarannu surrendered to Speelman. About 5,500 of them were sent to an island around Buton in dire conditions without foodstuffs so that many died of hunger and were stricken with deadly diseases, while 400 Macassar troops were made slaves (Vandenbosch, 2013).

After Buton, the VOC Fleet and Aru Pallaka planned to attack Gowa from land and sea. The VOC's first landing was in Bantaeng as the first step to attack Gowa from the south towards Fort Sanrobone and Galesong. In that fierce battle, on July 12, 1667, Speelman then left Bantaeng waters for Makassar to ask for help because many Company troops were stricken with the disease.

The center of VOC attack power after attacking the Bantaeng and Turatea areas was now centered in Galesong because Galesong was the main base of the royal troops and the center of the barns. On July 30, 1667, Dutch troops and their allies attacked the Gowa defense in Galesong. Laskar Aru Palakka and Poolman, with 6,000 troops from Bone, crossed the mountain and then attacked Galesong.

On August 18, 1667, Aru Palaka launched an attack on the Galesong defense. Galesong Fortress underwent an attack from the sea on August 19, 1667. Part of Speelman's troops landed and after experiencing a counter-attack

from the Galesong Laskar. The fighting in Galesong was fierce until the resistance of Galesong's troops was able to repel Aru Palakka's troops. Hearing the news that Aru Palakka was in a rush, Speelman then headed for Galesong with fully armed troops consisting of Dutch, Javanese, and Ambonese.

After holding a fierce battle, Aru Palaka managed to seize the defense. However, suddenly a large Gowa royal army arrived. Aru Palaka and his troops are in a dire state. If it is not immediately assisted, it may be destroyed by the Gowa royal troops. If this happens, the Netherlands will be doomed. Therefore, Speelman immediately sent reinforcements to save Aru Palaka. The attacks of the Gowa troops came insistently. Only because of their superior weaponry did the Netherlands and its allies survive. The Dutch troops and their allies were getting worse and worse. Many Dutch troops fell ill. Bullets and gunpowder were running low and had to be saved. Therefore, Speelman sent a letter to Batavia to immediately send reinforcements. If not, then all of Speelman's attempts are doomed to fail. VOC power and influence in eastern Indonesia would be threatened. Speelman tried to cover up his dire situation, especially against the Macedonians. Unfortunately, the condition of the Netherlands was not well known by the Gowa royal troops (Rochayati, 2010).

After reinforcements arrived to help Speelman, the combined strength of the VOC and Aru Palakka and Jonker grew. Galesong Fortress was besieged by land and sea, resulting in Galesong's defense falling into the hands of the Company and its allies. Galesong troops pushed north towards Barombong. The success of the troops of Speelman and Aru Palakka, and Jonker made the defense stronghold in Galesong controlled by the Dutch. Immediately the Fort was destroyed and burned. Galesong was then used as a concentration place for the Company troops and their allies for further attacks. The main objective of the attack of the Dutch Company and its partners was the fortress of Sombaopu, which became the capital and residence of Sultan Hasanuddin.

One of the strategies carried out by the Dutch Company to weaken the strength of the Gowa troops was to immediately burn the barns of food supplies in Galesong. In this way, the Gowa troops were sure to have difficulties with foodstuffs until finally there was starvation, and with this tactic, Aru Palakka's troops were finally able to paralyze part of Gowa's strength.

From Galesong, they attacked Barombong Fortress. Early in September 1667, Speelman's fleet besieged Barombong and showered him with continuous cannon fire. However, Barombong Fortress can be defended with the strength of 18-pound cannons, Barombong's defense can beat the Dutch troops back. Additional war troops came from Captain Pierre Dupon with five warships he was carrying, attacking the Fort with continuous cannon vomit. Finally, Barombong was taken over. Four days after going through a fierce battle, Speelman succeeded in carrying out a tight siege on the Makassar force based in Somba Opu, both from land and from the sea (Ali Tahir, Najamuddin, 2020)

The Gowa troops who were deployed to the battlefield suffered a very severe defeat. The defeats of Gowa and its allies forced him to make a peace decision, even though the enthusiasm of the Gowa soldiers persisted in continuing the war. Sultan Hasanuddin responded to this decision, that the war did not resolve the dispute between Gowa and Bone. Instead, there was bloodshed among the nations. After several negotiations between the Dutch and Sultan Hasanuddin, finally, on Friday, November 18, 1667, a peace agreement was reached in a place near Barombong, called Bungaya, and the Dutch-named it "Het Bongaisch Verdrag."

According to *Corpus Diplomaticum Deel II*, Bls. 370-380, Bongaisch Vedrag, signed November 18, 1667, carried out by oath before the Qur'an by Sultan Hasanuddin and before the Bible by Speelman. Then Sultan Hasanuddin handed a gold necklace to Speelman as a sign of friendship. The peace agreement Cappaya ri Bungaya was in fact very detrimental to the Kingdom of Gowa, but it could not be avoided by the worsening situation. Although the Bongaya treaty had been signed, armed resistance to the Company continued. As was the case among the royal authorities and the allied kings of Gowa, many did not accept the very adverse Bongaya agreement, the working relationship between Gowa and VOC continued to taper, and on several occasions, Gowa's troops continued to fight. It was only after the Sombaopu fortress was taken over by the Company in 1669 that Makasar was completely

in the hands of the VOC. With the defeat of Makassar, many Bugis patriots went to Banten and East Java to continue their struggle against the Dutch (Mappasomba, 2020).

The end of the Makassar war marked the fall of a major civilization in South Sulawesi. The fortresses in Galesong, Sanrobone, Barombong, Pa'nakkukang, Garassi were destroyed and razed to the ground. Fort Rotterdam was taken over by the VOC, and the main fortress of the Gowa kingdom at Somba Opu was burned down all the buildings and contents in it. So that remains the ruins of the robustness of the empire that ever existed.

### *3.3 Migration*

After the Bongaya agreement as to the end of the Makassar war, it resulted in a deep fall for the Gowa aristocrats, including their allies. The Kingdom of Gowa, which previously controlled almost the entire territory of the eastern archipelago, but after the Makassar war resulted in Gowa's defeat against the VOC, with an agreement as to the end of the war, Gowa's territory only left Gowa and Tallo and a few small kingdoms that could be defended. The prosperity that previously made the aristocrats honorable is now no longer incarnate as an authoritative ruler over his own country. This condition is a form of beating that tore the dignity of the nobles.

This situation had made Gowa difficult for years, especially since the division within the palace made it more painful for the Sultan and the aristocrats. In the end, this situation added to the pain of the Gowa officials. In such conditions, the difficult situation worsened the political conditions of the Gowa royal palace. This betrayal poisoned the atmosphere in Gowa and Tallo in the years after the war and prevented the formation of effective governments that could demonstrate the leadership the people desperately needed, as their morale was collapsing. After Sultan Hasanuddin abdicated and was replaced by his son I Mappasomba Daeng Nguruga Sultan Amir Hamzah in 13 years old. At that time, the people of Gowa continued to fight against the Dutch, such as the King of Tallo Sultan Harun al Rasyid with Karaeng Lengkesse, but in that atmosphere of battle, they were defeated and surrendered. During the reign of Sultan Amir Hamzah, Gowa was controlled by the Company so much that the Sultan of Gowa was unable to do much. After the death of Sultan Amir Hamzah, I Mappaosong Daeng Mangewai had the title Sultan Muhammad Ali replacing his brother.

The Dutch troops attacked the followers of Sultan Muhammad Ali, numbering around 400 people. After two months of fighting, Sultan Muhammad Ali's troops began to weaken against the fully armed Dutch troops, unlike the Gowa troops who were supported by simple and makeshift weapons. Eventually, Gowa lost, and on July 27, 1677, Sultan Muhammad Ali was arrested and held at the Pannyua fortress until finally he was exiled to Batavia. The last insult was Aru Palakka's freedom to intervene in the internal affairs of the Goa Kingdom. After the death of Sultan Hasanuddin in 1670, many important Makassar princes and nobles considered it a deprivation of their pride. Such treatment is considered as a painful deprivation of self-respect because it is related to harassment, especially if it is related to siri', deprivation of self-respect is considered tarnishing siri.'

The leaders of Gowa and their main allies Wajo, Luwu, and Mandar, in such a difficult situation, continued to try to rebuild unity, so they agreed that in the war that was stopped due to the Bongaya agreement, there was no reason to struggle again to pinpoint their dreams of realizing an empire. Big as before. In this difficult situation, they issued a declaration stating that it was Sultan Hasanuddin who surrendered on the basis of humanitarian and brotherhood considerations. This attitude became the basis for the future between the Gowa noblemen and their allies to continue to strive to build resistance to the position of the VOC wherever they were.

In such a difficult situation, the Gowa aristocrats and their allies started a new round of displacement, and this method is the last solution to enforce their self-esteem. The main mission of this evacuation was not initially to settle in the destination country but as an effort to consolidate politics and cooperation with the destination country while strengthening troops and designing war strategies. And when their strength returned to strength, then it was just a matter of waiting for the right time for them to regain the fortress and its sovereignty which had been captured by the VOC and Aru Palakka.

And among the five people in atas, Karaeng Bontomarannu came out first Sulawesi makes a journey. In addition, there was also Sayyid Jalaluddin Al Aidid, a scholar of Arab descent who spread the religion of Islam in Cikoang, Takalar district, as well as a religious teacher I Maninrori Karaeng Galesong, who participated in the group to Sumbawa.

#### **4. Discussion**

Among the people, there are many understandings about universal war. One understanding that is developing is that universal war is a massive battle involving all Indonesian people in order to face enemy aggression. There is also a growing thought that universal war is the same as guerrilla warfare as it is during the struggle for and defending independence (Suryokusumo, 2015).

The meaning of war today is increasingly broad, war does not always use weapons, and it is a matter of the State, not only a matter of the army, such as trade wars, ideological wars, information wars, and many other wars (Prabowo, 2002).

##### *4.1 Populist*

The populist nature of Indonesia's universal defense system is manifested through the participation of all the people, in accordance with the role of professional ability and expertise as a manifestation of the rights and obligations of every citizen in defending the country, in the Makassar war the populist nature shown by the people of the Kingdom of Gowa in the pre-era, during the war, and after the Makassar war took place. This is shown in the involvement of all the people in advancing the economy of the Gowa kingdom, the people trying to fulfill their commodities from other regions, especially from Ternate, to be traded to the world community in the Kingdom of Gowa, so that economic life in the Kingdom of Gowa at that time was very rapidly developing.

The people of the Kingdom of Gowa at that time were very well known as accomplished sailors. They made voyages to other kingdoms in the eastern region of the archipelago to look for trading commodities, and this could work. Well, if there is a good governmental relationship that is built with other kingdoms, and this good relationship is not only mutually beneficial but also because of the value of the Gowa Kingdom's war, one of which is its military power.

During the war, the people fought by supporting the logistical readiness of the fighters, then the people (women, the elderly, and children) obeyed the instructions from the Kingdom to take shelter in a place that had been prepared by the Kingdom so as not to be hit by a bomb during the battle.

During the Bongaya Agreement, which caused the loss of the Kingdom, elements of the people who felt injustice carried out resistance sporadic and after being defeated, they carried out Migration to other areas to gather strength, then regained the glory of the Kingdom of Gowa

##### *4.2 Territoriality*

The territorial nature of the universal people's war is manifested by the empowerment of the entire territory of the country as a fighting space and the development of a defense strategy in order to achieve its goals. (Prabowo, 2002) To face the VOC and Aru Palakka forces, the Kingdom of Gowa carried out preparations by strengthening the fortifications along the coast, starting from Galesong Fort, the southernmost part of the defense, to the northernmost Mangara'bombang (Tallo) Fortress, not just strengthening fortresses in various ways. Territory, but the Kingdom of Gowa also equip all kinds of weapons, including cannons equipped with Panakkukang Fortress ammunition that protects Somba Opu Fortress in the south and Ujung Pandang Fortress in the north, ready with all war equipment. The soldiers from the land, from Kale Gowa, Ana 'Gowa, and Bajeng were on full alert to occupy their respective places to face the attacks that were to be launched by the Company and Aru Palakka.

In the implementation of the battle, with the strength that the Soldiers have prepared and supported by the people to defend their territory steadfastly and never give up, they are risking their whole body and soul to defend the territory and the Kingdom. It is seen that the soldiers and people defend the fortress of Galesong, Barombong, and others as a form of their love. To his homeland.

#### *4.3 Universality*

In the universal nature of the Makassar war, it was realized through the mobilization of all the strength and resources of the Kingdom to be able to be mobilized in the interests of facing threats from outside and from within the country, this was shown by the people, government and soldiers of the Kingdom of Gowa to defend the Kingdom from enemy attacks.

Both in the pre-war era, during the war, and after the war, The people and small kingdoms who were very loyal to the Kingdom of Gowa continued to carry out resistance to the unfair agreement and harm the people of the Gowa kingdom by mobilizing all their capabilities and resources by guerrilla and attacking sporadically against the forces of the Company.

After the collapse of the Gowa kingdom and being taken over by the Company, their struggle was not finished, with the initiation of five people from the small Kingdom, soldiers and supported by the people who were loyal to carry out Migration to Java to gather strength and establish good relations with the Javanese Kingdom. to help fight They in reclaiming the glory of the Kingdom of Gowa.

### **5. Conclusions**

The Makassar War, which occurred in the XVII century, was a long war and included a considerable war during the struggle for independence. This war was fought between Gowa's work against the VOC—supported by the Kingdom of Bone which at that time was led by Aru Palakka. The 17th century was the pinnacle of the greatness of South Sulawesi, the teachings of Gowa and Tallo that successfully initiated the greatness, were at that time, Gowa's territory included Nusa Tenggara Maluku, Sulawesi, and even up to North Kalimantan. Because the VOC was unable to develop and practice the monopoly system of trade or the privileges of.

Makassar war at that time has fulfilled the elements of the universe war because the three elements that became the nature of the universe war, namely the persimmon, regional and populist, this can be seen in the involvement of the people who participated in supporting the Kingdom of Gowa both during the preparation, implementation, and purification of the Makassar war seen the people of the Kingdom strongly support the Kingdom of Gowa

#### *5.1 Recommendation*

To be able to realize a strong defense system by involving the people and all citizens, territories, and other national resources, it is necessary for government involvement in the efforts to prepare in a total, integrated, directed, and continued to uphold the sovereignty of the country, territorial integrity, and organized and the safety of all nations from all threats. Therefore we will not be separated from a history that is used as a lesson, and no less important is to make a culture that is expected to instill awareness of the defense of the country, which consists of willing sacrifice, unyielding and selfless that produces a deterrent effect or high durability. To be able to realize a strong defense system by involving the people and all citizens, territories, and other national resources, it is necessary for government involvement in the efforts to prepare in a total, integrated, directed, and continued to uphold the sovereignty of the country, territorial integrity, and organized and the safety of all nations from all threats. Therefore we will not be separated from a history that is used as a lesson, and no less important is to make a culture that is expected to instill awareness of the defense of the country, which consists of willing sacrifice, unyielding and selfless that produces a deterrent effect or high durability.

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# Foreign aid, China's aid and Africa's Development: Interrogating the Dynamics

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## Abstract

The distinctiveness of aid to economic growth and development of developing countries has stirred up discussions over the years. The conventional arguments have sought to evince both optimistic and pessimistic views about aid to development in Africa while at the same time studies are copiously emerging around Chinese aid to Africa's development within the broader China-Africa engagements. This article interrogates the dynamics surrounding the subject to examine foreign aid, China's aid practice toward Africa and the possible implications for Africa's development. Probing into the general perspective in literature and other primary sources, the study submits that China's active aid practice has heightened the uncertainties around foreign aid to Africa's development. Notwithstanding the verity of China's aid policies and principles being germane to Africa's development, the practical implementation maintains certain attributes that provoke divided thoughts. Hence, the requisite platform of action should be bolstered to consider both the Chinese interests and the African needs for a well-balanced development in the acclaimed South-South cooperation partnership.

**Keywords:** Foreign Aid, Aid Effectiveness, China-Africa Relations, Africa's Development

## 1. Introduction

Foreign aid, in other words development assistance, is a global phenomenon that is considered important for growth, development and international relationships. Although the provision of assistance and support – financial or material – from one state to another cannot be assumed to have only emerged in the 20th century, it registered an exponential growth and political prominence from the end of the World War II. Before the WWII, aid was mainly allotted for humanitarian and altruistic incentives but thereafter, it has encompassed broader foreign policy motives, while being justified for its effectiveness for development (Shaw, 1997).

Generally defined, foreign aid is the transfer of capital, goods, services and resources from a country or an international organization to a beneficiary country for social, economic and political benefits. It could be in the forms such as humanitarian/emergency intervention, military and peacekeeping assistance, infrastructure and equipment supply, human resource development, technical assistance and training. More technically, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines foreign aid as official development assistance (ODA) which by interpretation is a government assistance to the developing countries for economic

development and welfare (OECD, Website). Unequivocally, most foreign aid are arranged and allocated by the economically advanced countries through bilateral channels but at times executed by multilateral organizations.

China, possibly to be positioned as a responsible state actor, is currently a prominent country that provides foreign aid to assist the least developed and the low-income countries. China emphasizes on aid being allocated as a long-term development partnership, economic cooperation and for alleviating poverty, rather than short-term response to humanitarian needs. That attribution seems to be resonating more with the recipient African countries as cooperation and development aid for mutual benefits. To Africa as a recipient, foreign aid is believed to have positive effects on growth when it could promote investments, infrastructure development and human capital formation (Minoiu & Reddy, 2009). To China as a donor, foreign aid might be employed to achieve not just the economic benefits, but also political and diplomatic influence, for which reason aid could be regarded as a foreign policy tool for such an advanced nation (Morgenthau, 1962).

The academic interrogations of China-Africa relations keep emerging but tend to be predominantly encircling the broader areas of the engagement, while few others explore aid but from the economic perspective. A recent survey has revealed that, the five general recurring areas of China-Africa studies have remained: 1) the impacts of China's economic engagement in Africa and on the economic development of Africa; 2) China's interaction with Africa on security issues especially participation in peacekeeping activities; 3) historic and recent patterns of migration; 4) public health and environment and 5) media studies and representation in China-Africa relationship (Alden & Large, 2019).

Consequently, the aim of this article is to explore China's aid features and practices in Africa, but carefully evading the inveiglement of viewing it together with the broader Chinese engagements, setting it apart from most other studies on the subject. This is considerably expected to devote attention to the peculiarities and limits of the denotations for Chinese aid, in order to achieve an analytical clarity. Additionally, the discussion connects foreign aid to development, exploring how aid should be administered to the development of Africa amidst the virtues and shortcomings of China aid. To achieve the intended aim, the study reviews and connects views from articles, books, op-ed, reports and statistical records to show what scholars and experts have established. The data, mostly secondary types, but also some primary ones, have been sourced from libraries, government official websites, journals, online databases and news portals. The study further gathered information from field contacts and engagements for opinions from civil society, government officials, scholars and policy-makers, and observations. Precisely, the study employed the qualitative method for data collection, presentation and the analysis of results. The qualitative method conforms to other prominent works into China-Africa relations that also include aid.

## **2. Debating Aid to Development of Africa**

Literature about foreign aid seems to evolve predominantly around Africa due to the number of countries from the region relying on aid, and the often-argued effectiveness of aid for Africa after five decades or so dependence on foreign aid. Respectively, there are complex views expressing pessimisms and optimisms about aid to Africa's development. One popular argument is that foreign powers continue their influence and interference in the African countries through other forms even after independence, which foreign aid as a major tool, is assumed to emphasize less on Africa's development but emphasizes more on the interests of the donor countries. Such a position is founded on the theory of neocolonialism, which proposes that an African resistance to any new foreign invasion through capital aid is not the total rejection of aid and capital from the developed countries, but it is resisting the power behind such finances being executed in a way that depletes the less developed (African) countries (Nkrumah, 1965). This is established on the conviction that the economically advanced states seek to dominate the developing countries through capitalism, forces of globalization and other institutions driven by such foreign powers within the international political economy (Satre, 2001). As has been asserted in a similar tone, the interference becomes intense in countries with multifarious natural resources such as gold, diamond, forest reserves among many others that are enviably a mark of the African continent (Besong, 2005).

Into the more recent years, it has been opined that the involvements of the leading powers (especially China and the U.S.) in Africa through financial packages including aid do not empower the continent to become rightly autonomous. More so, concerns are increasingly expressed regarding the exiguous support for Africa's policies and aid related practices that could enhance the desired growth and development to become less aid dependent (Eom et al., 2017). In turn, limiting Africa's negotiating potency and leverage when engaging with external powers. As another scholar firmly argues through the work, *Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub Saharan Africa*: aid in fact foments corruption amongst the governing leadership of the African countries, which consequently affect development (Moss et al., 2006). Emphatically opined, the developed countries have provided foreign aid to Africa in many forms since the 1950s: if such aid could end poverty and enhance economic growth as projected in most of the backing policies, poverty and underdevelopment should not have been Africa's biggest challenge now (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2014). Those assertions that sought to demonstrate the despairing use of aid in Africa tend to imply that the African countries need less aid for humanitarian and altruistic purposes, but more as a development cooperation, that reinforces investment, trade and equitable economic engagements.

Aside the doom and gloom, certain findings distinctively justify that foreign aid after all has been expedient for Africa's economic growth and development. Aid, according to a finding, enhances economic growth by strongly correlating with investment in most of the African countries (Loxley & Harry, 2008). Likewise, the effects of aid on 25 sub-Saharan African countries found positive economic growth, driven by increase in investments (Gomanee et al., 2005). Against the backdrop, that Africa's impaired growth could be due to capital shortage and limited foreign exchange, aid has been demonstrated to positively influence some particular variables for development. Aid connects savings to investment, bridges the gap between export and imports, primarily complements domestic resources, enhances human capital, increases income and promotes endogenous technical change (Bhavan et al., 2005). Moreover, foreign aid has quite significantly assisted in the accumulation of human and physical capital, and developed infrastructure as essential determinants for economic growth in Africa (McGillivray, 2009).

Other counter-factual evidences reflect some salient points. They point to one main argument: Perhaps aid would have had consequential positive effects on development if the extent of other factors such as the receiving countries' internal politics, governance structure, financial policies and developmental objectives are favorable or being addressed (Guillaument, 2008). Looking at the heterogeneous character of the developing countries, the effectiveness of aid to development of the African countries should rather be generalized cautiously. This is because the developing countries' natural resources diversity, social characteristics, economic outlook as well as cultural orientations should be discussed a little further when cross-country comparisons are employed in establishing the effectiveness of aid (Hansen & Tap, 2001). As for example, for the 1960s to the early 1970s, while aid had a positive impact on Kenya, it was negative for Ghana and Tunisia (Chenery & Carter, 1973).

To address the uncertainties regarding the generalized findings on aid to Africa's development, a more rigorous estimation technique ought to be employed to examine the particular cases. That could ensure robustness since most of the studies use economic models (Adams & Atsu, 2014). Moreover, to determine the contributions of aid to development, it is appropriate to examine how the recipient African countries use fiscal and country-specific development policies to direct aid toward the needs of the country (Quartey, 2005). That is important owing to how challenging it could be to isolate aid from the other engagements in order to establish its sole economic effects on development. Therefore, donors can potentially help Africa's economic growth and development by adopting the procedural actions that improve aid effectiveness while the African governments ensure that institutional weaknesses, acts of corruption and profligate spending are tackled (Olimide, 2011). Besides, researches should not over concentrate on the macro economic impacts of aid to development but attention must equally be focused on demonstrating how aid policies, contingent on a wide range of modern development dynamics including global goals, could prove aid effectiveness in Africa (Simplice, 2014). Establishing strong effectiveness of aid in any African country upon especially the principles of the *Paris Declaration for aid Effectiveness* and the *Accra Agenda for Action* would invariably enhance development harmonization of aid to current global development goals (Quartey et al., 2011).

Another contending area is the debate as to whether Africa could benefit immensely from development financing geared toward economic cooperation that competitively enhances trade and investment, than to rely on aid potentially tied to the donor interests. Perhaps one of the most widely recognized work that advocates for Africa being weaned off aid is Dambisa Moyo's *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*. Her assertions are that, aid has been ineffective, malignant and not only failed in addressing the economic and poverty challenges of the continent, but has made it worse off. The solution, she argues, is to phase out aid significantly within the shortest period, rely on alternative financing that expands trade, attracts more FDI, exposes Africa to the international market, and increase remittances for robust domestic savings. To achieve that, it requires the political determination supported more especially by Western activists while Africa and the traditional partners embrace deeper commercial and financial interconnectedness with emerging economies like Brazil, China and India (Moyo, 2009). Besides, foreign aid, further argued, is hurting rather than helping Africa, requiring a reconstruction since it is not working. Consequently, global powers should not be making things worse for Africa if they cannot help, and that incentives and new policies could be initiated for progress instead of the apparent failure. Thus, it suggested that 1) aid is reconstructed into trade, 2) the re-enhancement of African citizens' capabilities to become wealth and enterprise creators, 3) maintaining stronger institutions and good governance and 4) prudent economic management (Lyons, 2014).

On the merits of the emerging arguments, it looks like aid over the years has not achieved the intended purpose and possibly the alternatives proposed by scholars could facilitate development at a faster rate for Africa. In spite of those sentiments, it has not been adequately addressed whether the alternatives cannot be reinforced while at the same time maintaining aid. That being the case, the problem is not particularly due to aid but the other factors that induce the effectiveness of aid. Again, less has been said to prove that, if Africa's development engagements with the other actors in investment, trade and the likes become intensive while reducing aid, domestic weaknesses such as the weaker institutions, poor governance and mismanagements would not persist. As a sort of connecting argument between aid and possibly other substitutes for aid, factors referred to as the 'four traps' – natural resources, conflicts, bad governance and being landlocked by bad neighbors – contribute to the so-called aid failure. In consequence, if the likes of the 'four traps' are addressed, aid could potentially reinforce the other alternatives that some studies suggest to replace aid. During a round table discussion at an international conference, a panelist explained: It is important to understand that Africa could not forego aid anytime soon due to the complexities of its developmental challenges, therefore, aid should be viewed as part of the solution rather than being part of the problem (Anonymous, personal participation in a conference, April 03, 2019). The failure of the donor community has rather being that they in a way claim solve Africa's problems instead of empowering Africa to on its own utilize the aid effectively, opening the Pandora's box for the dependency syndrome (Park, 2019).

All in all, into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, aid for Africa's development should be implemented along the lines of the United Nations and its development agencies, and the global development objectives such as the Sustainable Development Goals as well as Africa's Agenda 2063. The aforementioned structures do not intend to replace aid with the other alternatives, but propose to implement aid in a way that could enhance all the other variables for development. Sustainable development has been relevantly stressed as the channel for achieving a better society for today and tomorrow. Hence, donor countries ought to increase the amount of aid to poorer countries but geared towards the achievements of such development goals (Sachs, 2015). That would comprehensively enhance the other alternatives such as investment and trade to promote development for the African countries. Having said that, humanitarian needs and its impacts on development cannot be overlooked. Aid to such demands would continue to remain salient even after Africa becomes more integrated into international trading and financing for development (Edwards, 2014).

Aid to development in Africa might have not achieved the expected rate of development but hardly could it be claimed a fiasco. Indubitably, when viewed from the different frame of debates, without aid intervention, Africa could have been far worse off than it is now with the very factors argued to inhibit aid probably more serious in inhibiting the other alternatives too. All the same, in the view of an academic expert, policy motives of the donor countries, the type and the nature of aid as well as the domestic challenges of the African countries are interconnected elements that could be restructured for aid effectiveness in far-reaching enhancement for Africa's

development (Anonymous, personal communication, November 16, 2019). To achieve that, the role of aid in China-Africa relations is very crucial to accessing the implications of aid for Africa's development.

### 3. Examining Chinese Aid to Africa's Development

To illustrate China's aid to Africa, probably one of the most important issues to interrogate is the sources of data for analysis. Unfortunately, the argument regarding the nature of Chinese aid is inhibited by the 'lack of reliable and consistent data' (Parks & Strange, 2014, p. 29). It is more so because China neither participates in the global aid reporting mechanism nor discloses year-to-year and country specific aid spending. Even while China is becoming somewhat transparent with policy and governance, aid figures remain state secret by releasing only the barest information (Brautigam, 2009).

As to why China would be that opaque on aid figures, official explanation is still hard to come by. However, some views have been harvested from Chinese officials pointing out that aid figures are generally regarded as sensitive but not secret per se. The sensitivity prevents the detailed disclosure for some apparent reasons. First, it is due to a peculiar cultural tradition and philosophy that giving handouts to friends is immoral. Second, the rational is more of South-South cooperation mutual benefits than maintaining a donor-recipient relationship. Third, to avoid presumable pressure from the partner African countries that may compare their aid shares to that of the other recipients. Last, there are urgent pressing needs that such assistance could have been used for back home in China (Grimm, 2011). From an outsider view, Beijing's disinterest in disclosing aid figures also reflects its lack of interest in conforming to Western standards, but then 'the absence of detailed, comprehensive and reliable information has fueled speculations and confusions about China's aid to Africa' (Strange et al., 2015, p. 6). Even in the recipient countries, it is almost impossible to gain complete official figures on aid provided by China. The best primary source in a way is through news reporting on official visits, commissioning programs and media briefings from the African countries.

Into the more recent years, the lack of data seemed to have improved a bit after China in 2011 released an official white paper on aid, followed by another one in 2014. Even with those efforts, it remains obscure which financial flows were included in that calculation and which were not, while it only discussed limited Chinese aid aspects. In addition to the white papers, other inquiries use multiple primary data sources from both China and the recipient African countries to connect the pieces of the puzzle together. A more prominent database that statistically illustrates China's financing to Africa is the China Africa Research Institute by the Johns Hopkins University, which recently updated its data in collaboration with the Boston University Global Development Policy Center. The researcher was a participant in the event.

From the estimations, Chinese foreign aid increased from USD 631 million in 2003 to around US 3 billion in 2015 indicating an annual growth rate of 14% (Landry, 2018). Further to this, official Chinese government figures affirm that, about half of all China's aid is directed to Africa and in almost all the African countries, and by far the majority covered in any other continent (State Council, 2011; 2014). Such aid from China, the Dragon's gift, possesses some peculiarities that sets it apart 'both in content and in the norms of aid practice' – it is simpler, changes far less often, delivery influenced by China's experience, lays much emphasis on infrastructure projects, multi-faceted to include other aspects that traditional donors may be less willing to offer (Brautigam, 2009, p. 11).

In so far as the Chinese aid increase to Africa, criticisms crop up – some genuine, others propaganda – especially from Western sources, motivating studies that sought to properly situate China's aid to that of the OECD because of the constant comparison of apples with oranges in discussing the two sources of aid, and how 'China's official aid program is widely misunderstood.' With the exception of occasional changes in the OECDs definition, particularly technicalities relating to 'concessionality,' the official description of aid provided by China is similar to that of the OECD. In a simplest comparison, China's foreign aid just like that of the OECD consists of grants, zero-interest loans and concessional loans (Brautigam, 2011). According one Chinese official in Ghana, China acts slightly different as a donor but its peculiar mode of implementation is meant for a strategic partnership for Africa's development (Chinese embassy official, personal communication, 2019).

In respect to administration, on the one hand, grants and zero-interest loans to Africa are managed by China's Ministry of Commerce, broadly meant for diplomatic activities and political motives. The Ministry of Commerce tends to have overlapping activities, and conflicting policy implementation measures with the Ministry of Finance and even the various Chinese embassies in Africa (Corkin, 2011). The 2014 China's Foreign Aid White Paper highlights further that the budget is under the unified management of the Ministry of Finance in line with the budget and final accounts system. On the other hand, the Exim Bank, combining political motives with development and commercial objectives, administers the concessional loan which the Department of Foreign Aid of MOFCOM subsidizes the original interest rate (Ibid).

As another peculiarity, China provides university scholarships as foreign aid to African students, currently more than any other development country provides, although appropriated within China through the Ministry of Education, and accounted for from the overall foreign budget commitments (Brautigam, 2011). China has considerably, through bilateral arrangements, provided education aid in many forms and kinds to Africa, but seems to be much more focused on higher education and university engagement through the Confucius Institute than primary education, except in the aspects of occasional education infrastructure in the recipient countries. The Chinese government scholarships, together with seminars, refresher courses and educational training programs, are human resource development interventions that somehow sought to promote soft power (King, 2013). As explained by a postgraduate scholar who benefitted from the Chinese scholarship package, there is a feeling of indebtedness and love for China and the Chinese people for their generous educational offer. Besides, beneficiaries are strongly connected to the Chinese language, the culture and their approach to tackling developmental issues (Chinese scholarship beneficiary, personal communication, February 21, 2021).

Further, on the nature of the aid, the Chinese foreign aid to Africa is mostly given at the request of the recipient countries with the aim of addressing the specific development needs of such African countries. As demand-driven, thus given out for projects mostly suggested by the recipient countries rather than by the donor country, the aid addresses the specific needs of such countries (King, 2013). Interpretively, China might not completely fit into the quite critical attribution of being a rogue donor that does not focus on development, as such extreme characterization might be borne out of misinformation. That said, into the other end of the bargain, the Chinese aid might not efficiently target the development needs of the African countries especially when they do not adequately coordinate with the other international development agencies. Moreover, although Beijing is credited for allowing African leaders to own and provide policy space for their aid projects, the leaders subsequently influence the geographic location of the aid for their parochial interests more than to be directed to where it could be needed the most (Dreher et al., 2016).

From the positive views, China combines aid with trade, investment and technology, which heightens partnership and development cooperation for Africa's development. For instance in Ghana, some major Chinese aid-assisted infrastructure such as the Bui Dam, the Kpong Water Project, rural electrification in areas along the Volta Lake and a number of Stadiums are either mixed financing or connected to other trade and investment initiatives.<sup>1</sup> Such an approach by the Chinese is founded on their experimented practice that helped them out of poverty, which might be relevant to the broader economic needs of Africa, and not just as an act of altruism. Furthermore, emerging out of experience, China's foreign aid model retains a long history as a well-established program in Africa, where both actors have over the years, learned from failures such as administrative lapses and problematic innovation project innovation. That long-standing commitment was shown even at the time of the global recession, when China lived up to the promise of doubling aid as discussed in the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (Li, 2007). To that effect, China's aid is aimed at long-term partnership for market, energy, space and leadership, with the grand strategy of transformation, rather than the narrow claim of thirst for Africa's oil and natural resources. In that positive respect, China provides a potential source of development assistance that Western sources may not be willing to provide and the benefits could be harnessed for development if managed well by the African leadership (Alden, 2007).

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<sup>1</sup> The author visited the mentioned project areas to observe and interact, during fieldwork at separate times in 2019 and 2020.

On the pessimistic note, the Chinese aid holds some features that are considered a cause for concern. For instance, one expert with interests in the Chinese aid explained that, the disposition to undermine local content and production because the credit facilities are tied to Chinese goods and services, likely to culminate in higher levels of commodity dependency (Anonymous, personal communication, April 21, 2020). Arguably, tied aid is not exclusive to only China, but also the other OECD countries, as for example, explained: aid tied with goods and services was actually practiced by other traditional donors like Japan (Brautigam, 2009). Regardless, the Chinese strategy, according to the founder and president of ILAPI-Ghana, could lead to higher aid dependency as never witnessed before, more especially as debt-strapped countries continue to access China's aid loans, which could further worsen such countries' vulnerability due to debt entrapment (P. Kwofie, personal communication, June 23, 2019). Consequently, for the long haul, African states could be subjected to favoring China on geostrategic issues for political and economic advantage, may lead to depressed economic growth and negatively affecting good governance and institutionalism in the African countries, according to the reflections by a political science professor (Anonymous, personal communication, November 23, 2019). On top of all that, the lack of transparency into China's aid even makes it some more alarming (Brazys & Vladamannati, 2018).

Other corroborating gauges about China's foreign aid argued to be having dire consequences on African economies and development are captured herein. The aid is mostly driven by China's need for natural resources, which could be predated on Africa's resources (Lum et al., 2009). In addition, it is embedded with the intentions for soft power and human resource influence on the recipient countries primarily through scholarships and human resource development activities. Last, the aid is in some cases imprudently used to fund unproductive infrastructure projects like stadia, which might not be the most pressing needs for such African countries at the time of implementation (Chadwick, 2017).

Perhaps the view of another scholar who bemoaned that, the Chinese aid is quite tricky, and could be argued convincingly from opposing perspectives is a revealing one (Anonymous PhD researcher, personal communication, March 30, 2019). The Chinese aid attributes maintain an appealing symmetric policy relation with the African countries but practically exercised with 'Chinese characteristics' that do not, at least for now, adequately embrace the global cooperativeness on common objectives for Africa's development. Inherently, it provides the alternatives for Africa's demands especially in infrastructure while at the same time, entertains certain attributes that could inhibit the expected rate of development. That is the more reason why collaboration with the other development partners might effectively help to align and harmonize the aid for Africa development.<sup>2</sup>

#### 4. Conclusion

The contributions of aid toward development in Africa have been primarily argued from two opposing forces. On the one hand is the claim that aid has failed to ignite the engine for Africa's growth and development, hence, alternatives such as investment, trade and industrialization should be reinvigorated more than aid. On the hand, is the argument that aid after all is not a total failure. It has facilitated Africa's development by addressing issues relating to relieving poverty, satisfying humanitarian needs, tackling infrastructure deficits and providing support for economic programs.

Irrespective of whichever side one may view the argument, one thing remains crystal clear: aid has not expedited Africa's development, as it should have (Landry, 2018). This is due to complex but interrelated political and economic factors from both the donors and the recipients' ends. The major donor countries continue to consider interests defined in terms of influence and power, manifesting in the foreign policies that drive aid to Africa (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2014). Whereas, the recipient African countries are faced with challenges in respect to institutional weaknesses, misappropriation and misapplication of aid. Amidst aid's failure to meet expectations, the 21<sup>st</sup> century has brought some reforms, such as the *Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness* and aligning aid to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. At the same time, a major influential state, China, has attracted

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<sup>2</sup> A general view maintained in a focus group discussion with a group of scholars. October 14, 2020.

attention to how it implements aid with the Chinese characteristics, arousing the discussion as to whether China aid, could advance Africa's development. That has further expanded the debate.

China's aid to Africa is either a monster or a messiah, an evil in representing China's selfish interest for natural resources to damage Africa's governance and sustainable development, or virtuous as it could be contributing to a foundation for lasting economic development through infrastructure projects and profit ventures (Sun, 2014). Chinese aid policies and implementations in Africa involve a comprehensive and a multi-dimensional agenda that cannot be analyzed just with the simplistic categorization of it being completely good or bad. That said an underscoring pressing dynamic could not be downplayed regarding China's policy and behavior as a revisionist power in global affairs evident in engagements in Africa. Consequently, such interests in some ways drive how China dispenses and utilizes aid.

The study has demonstrated that, Chinese aid to Africa is ethically projected with policies that seem to align with Africa's development. In short, the policies are driven by the principles of South-South cooperation and mutual benefits rather than maintaining a donor-recipient relationship. They seem to position flawlessly with Africa's developmental needs as a region from the global South, which shares some common identities with China. Besides, China's aid is delivered as a component part of broader economic engagement and financing, which appears to be a partnership for development approach. Indeed, if the above-mentioned attributes are genuinely put into practice, it could be right for Africa's development. However, some traits about the Chinese aid arguably override or counterbalance the gains, both for the past years and if not addressed, could spill over into the future. The fears of undermining institutional reform for Africa, weakening local content, debt-entrapment and resource extraction are the major issues that would need to be addressed.

From the preceding analysis, it could be succinctly but briefly suggested that, Africa should engage with China especially through the FOCAC mechanism, but also the bilateral arrangements to establish concrete measures that would set to rights such stumbling blocks of China's aid to Africa's development. In fact, Africa cannot disregard foreign aid as an integral part of Chinese development financing, hence, the best for Africa's development under the circumstances, is for the spotted shortcomings to be addressed.

### **Declaration**

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# Social Capital as the Key to the Female Legislative Members' Success in East Nusa Tenggara's Regional House of Representatives during the 2014 General Elections

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## Abstract

This study elaborates how several female legislative candidates succeeded in being elected during the 2014 General Elections for the 2014-2019 period, and is based on the journey of six female candidates who managed to secure a seat in East Nusa Tenggara's Regional House of Representatives. This study uses Robert Putnam's social capital theory and Claudia Derich, Andrea Fleschenberg, and Momoyo Hustebeck's moral capital theory. Qualitative in nature, the findings of this study are gathered through an in-depth interview with these women. It reveals how patriarchal culture ingrained in men (husbands and fathers), specifically those who are influential public figures, cultural figures, politicians, and local leaders were used by these six women to gain support and secure their place in the parliament. As a form of social capital, these women's close ties with male elites led, not only to their election, but also resulted in the highest number of women elected in East Nusa Tenggara's Legislative Body. Compared to the 2009 General elections, the number rose by a hundred percent.

**Keywords:** Women, Politics, Social Capital, Regional House of Representatives, East Nusa Tenggara

## 1. Introduction

The election of female legislative candidates in Indonesia's general elections signifies a breakthrough in electoral politics. Women change the nuance of policy-making and it proves to be strategic because of their different life experiences and ways of socializing. In this aspect, women provide values, experiences, and skills that are distinct from men (Budiarti, 2011). Trust, as a form of social capital, is formed by strong and direct interpersonal relationships, as well as primordialism arising from ethnic similarity (Minangkabau Tribe). In addition, female

legislative candidates are able to perform their legislative duties and this becomes the foundation of their constituents' trust. (Putri, 2018).

In several instances, women's election in the central and local bodies illustrates women's awareness of the importance of political participation. This urge is catalyzed by their concern towards issues relating to women and children. In East Nusa Tenggara, women's motivation to participate in politics is driven by issues relating to women. For example, Aleta Baun, an environmental activist and public figure in East Nusa Tenggara, was against the natural exploitation caused by marble mining companies and mobilized the locals to oppose the mining activities that were conducted in their area. As a result, the mining companies ceased their operations. The people from her region continued to support her continuously, until she was elected as a legislative member and succeeded in creating a regional environmental policy that opposed natural exploitation in East Nusa Tenggara (Jovani, 2021). Although East Nusa Tenggara is dominated by a patriarchal culture, women still receive care and support from the general public. The six women's success in politics can be attributed to trust, one of Robert Putnam's three social capital. Robert Putnam, an expert in political science, stated that social capital is inherent in social relations. It is built through a vast network comprising of: 1) trust or positive values that appreciate development and achievements; 2) social norms and obligations; 3) a social network that serves as a platform for social activities, specifically those that take on the form of voluntary association. According to Putnam, voluntary association is important in the development of social capital because it allows communication to flow effectively. It is also a place where the actors could interact and conduct transactions, which will then give birth to a reciprocal relationship (Putnam, 1993).

According to Putnam, social capital is an actor's individual asset which, in time, could change into a collective asset. Close relationships are vital in identifying social capital because it signifies trust, norms, and reciprocity. With regards to its function, social capital is an agent of change that supports individual actors or groups in achieving their purpose and fulfilling their interests.

If norms on reciprocity and cooperation are established through a network of social institutions or bodies, social capital will strengthen. Trust is closely related to cultural roots, especially in terms of morals and ethics. In East Nusa Tenggara, women's representation in the Parliament is supported by constituents who are extended families of the female legislative members. These constituents believe that female candidates could realize their needs through policies.

Claudia Derichs, Andrea Fleschenberg, and Momoyo Hustebeck's *Gendering Moral Capital: Morality as a Political Asset and Strategy of Top Female Politicians in Asia* (2006) provides an explanation on how moral capital, as a female politician's asset and strategy, could influence their election. In Asia, female politicians such as Wan Azizah from Malaysia, Aung San Suu Kyi from Burma, Park Geun-hye from South Korea, and Tanaka Makiko from Japan was raised in a political background and utilized moral capital to reach the political peak in their respective countries (Derichs, Fleschenberg, & Hustebeck, 2006).

Aside from the four women mentioned above, there are also seven female Asian leaders that utilized moral capital: Begum Khaleda Zia (wife of Ziaur Rahman) and Sheikh Hasina Wajed (daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman) from Bangladesh, Aung San Suu Kyi (daughter of Aung San) from Burma, Megawati Sukarnoputri (daughter of Sukarno) from Indonesia, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail (wife of Anwar Ibrahim) from Malaysia, Benazir Bhutto (daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) from Pakistan and Corazon Aquino (wife of Benigno S. Aquino Junior) from the Philippines.

In Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi's study on four Javanese-Muslim female political leaders, she illustrated how these women used the idea of gender, piety, and sexuality in women's personal life as a political strategy (Dewi, 2017). In various cases, female politicians possess the ethics to serve because of their awareness of issues relating to gender in their areas.

These female politicians are considered to be more caring and nurturing. This concept of 'care' becomes a strategic tool that could potentially be used by female politicians to garner support (Dewi, 2019).

In addition to social capital, moral capital is also one of the key factors. This is evident in that the professions of these women are considered "good" and depicts them as a "role model." Kristien Samiyati, Kristofora Bantang, and Angela Piwung are teachers; Adriana Kossi is a minister; Yeni Veronika is an advocate and was the head of the Family Empowerment and Welfare Body (wife of a regent); and Aleta Baun is an environmental activist. In addition, the husbands and/or parents (fathers) of these six women are prominent public and political party figures, and regional leaders.

The social capital theory and moral capital theory can answer the following question: How did the six female legislative candidates utilize social capital to secure a seat in East Nusa Tenggara's Regional House of Representatives during the 2014 General Elections?

## **2. Method**

The research method used in this study is qualitative in nature and includes two categories, namely literary review and field study in the form of in-depth interviews with the relevant sources. Furthermore, secondary data is gathered through literary study that focuses on books, journals, research reports, documents, and other written sources on the relevant subjects. Literary study is needed to support the theories and concepts used in this research. The case study in this research aims to explain the social and moral capital possessed by six female legislative members of East Nusa Tenggara's Regional House of Representatives (2014-2019 period), namely Kristien Samiyati, Adriana Kossi, Kristofora Bantang, Yeni Veronika, Angela Piwung dan Aleta Baun.

## **3. Results**

The background and motivation of these six women in entering politics and participating in electoral contestation are influenced by three factors. Firstly, the individual capabilities of these women, which becomes their social capital are entering electoral politics. These individual capabilities include, among others, their good personality and public communication, as well as their leadership skills which are reflected through their respective professions as teachers, ministers, advocates, and activists. These professions directly influence their public communication towards their constituents. Furthermore, their leadership in their respective organizations also becomes a key factor in their success. Secondly, their social and humanistic values. According to Dewi (2020), with regards to women's character in policy-making, women tend to accentuate on specific issues relating to women, children, social welfare, health, and other issues that correlates with women's caring nature. Thirdly, the support of their husbands, parents (father) and people. These six women succeeded in becoming legislative members due to the support given by husbands and fathers, who are prominent and have influence in society.

During the early stages of their political career, these six women possessed individual capabilities that led them into entering politics and advocating social and humanistic values in the parliament as policymakers. Although Adriana Kossi was doubtful and anxious, the support she gained from her husband gave her the courage to convince her constituents, which mostly consist of her extended family, to vote for her. The professional background of these women contributed to earning the trust of the constituents and convinced their constituents that they are capable of fighting for the interests and needs of their constituents. Furthermore, the support they received from their loved ones (husband, father, and extended family) became the main capital and key factor that led to the success of these women in becoming legislative members.

Putnam illustrates social capital is inherent in social relations. Social capital is built through a network that comprises of three elements: first, trust or positive values that appreciate development and achievements; second, social norms and obligations; and third, a social network that serves as a platform for social activities, specifically those that take on the form of voluntary associations. The social capital possessed by these six women is accompanied by reciprocity and cooperation between a network of social institutions. This study shows that trust towards these six women stemmed from their husbands, parents (fathers), families, and friends. The trust of the

constituents either resulted from similarity in values, race, or organization. As a social capital, trust is based on the individual identity of the female candidates. For example, Kristien Samiyati is the daughter of a politician and public figure in the Regency of Southwest Sumba; Yeni Veronika, despite originating from Sumatera, were accepted by the people because she is the wife of a politician and local leader that was incumbent for two periods in the Regency of Manggarai; Angela Piwung is the daughter of a renowned medical worker and the wife of a local leader's son in the Regency of Ngada and Nagekeo; and, Aleta Baun is not only an environmental activist, but also the daughter of a cultural and public figure in the Regency of South Central Timor. The social capital of these women can be seen on the table below:

Tabel 1: Trust as a Social Capital of Six Female Members of East Nusa Tenggara's Regional House of Representatives (2014-2019 period)

No	Female Member	Social Capital
1	Kristien Samiyati	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Her father was a political</li> <li>- Her extended family resides in NTT III, her area of election</li> <li>- She is a teacher and owns a culinary business</li> </ul>
2	Adriana Kossi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Her husband is a politician</li> <li>- Her husband's extended family resides in NTT III, her area of election</li> <li>- She is a minister in GMIT</li> </ul>
3	Kristofora Bantang	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Her best friend is a politician</li> <li>- Her parents' extended family resides in NTT IV, her area of election</li> <li>- She is a teacher and is active in the WKRI community</li> </ul>
4	Yeni Veronika	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Her husband is a politician</li> <li>- Her husband is a local leader</li> <li>- Her husband's extended family resides in NTT IV, her area of election</li> <li>- She is active as the head of the Family Empowerment and Welfare Body.</li> </ul>
5	Angela Piwung	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Her father is a public figure</li> <li>- Her husband and extended family resides in NTT suami dan keluarga besar di dapil NTT V</li> <li>- She was a former legislative member in East Nusa Tenggara's Regional House of Representatives (2009-2014 period)</li> <li>- She is active in the Parliament's Women's Caucus</li> </ul>
6	Aleta Baun	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- She is a famous environmental activist</li> <li>- Her parents' extended family resides in NTT VIII, her area of election</li> <li>- Her supporters reside in NTT VIII, her area of election</li> <li>- Her father is a cultural and public figure</li> </ul>

*Source: An analysis of the primary data*

This study reveals that trust between these six women and their constituents was built upon the innermost circle, familial relations, and an external circle that consist of knowledge-based friendship. The introductory process between these women and their constituents is personal in nature, which leads to trust that is also personal. Furthermore, the trust build is also reciprocal in nature because of the similarity in values stemming from the same family, ethnicity, and organization. As a family members, these women have an advantage because they are able to discuss programs and issues informally, except in indigenous societies, where discussions must be conducted

through a cultural ritual that differs depending on the area. For example, as Sumbanese women, Kristien Samiyati and Adriana Kossi must engage in rituals.

The author followed Kristofora Bantang to West Manggarai Regency, where she sought her ancestor's consent during the 2019 General Elections. This ritual was conducted in a traditional house (gendang house) and consisted of two traditional rituals, which are “teing hang” (give offering to the ancestors in a traditional gendang house) and “wuat hai” (provision given by the elders). This ritual is conducted as a form of respect towards their ancestors. Chickens are used as a medium for these rituals and symbolize sincerity in fighting for and serving the people (Jovani, 2021).

Likewise, in Ngada, Angela Piwung holds an important position compared to most men. Therefore, she often participates in cultural rituals for women until late. This is also conducted as a form of respect for her ancestors. Similarly, Aleta Baun also faces a similar situation. She also holds an important position compared to men, so she participates in cultural rituals until late at night. For these women, this culture must be preserved because it is an inheritance passed down from their ancestors, and not because it guarantees them to secure a seat in the elections. The trust between these women and the people is built from intensive communication, which started when they began to divulge in social, public, and religious organizations. Hence, trust as a social capital that is possessed by these women was obtained through their identity/fame. It can be said that trust was built upon familial, tribal, social, and religious relations. Therefore, this relationship eases the political campaign they conducted in their electoral area. The people's trust towards them is rooted from the belief that these women will advocate the family's or people's aspirations, and fulfill their promise if they are elected as legislative members.

Kristien Samiyati and Adriana Kossi from NTT III focused on female workers, education, health, and child marriage. Kristofora Bantang and Yeni Veronika from NTT IV focused on infrastructure like roads, clinics, school renovations, and the supply of water and electricity. Angela Piwung from NTT V focused on the construction of health facilities, places of worship, schools, farming tools and the empowerment of weaving. Meanwhile, Aleta Baun from NTT VIII focused on issues relating to the environment and economic empowerment. These six women became the hope that will convey their constituents' aspirations (Jovani, 2021).

In addition, Putnam stated that social capital is a public good, where trust becomes an attribute of social structure ingrained in an individual. However, there is a lack of trust that occurred due the infamous track record of a legislator, where the position obtained does not bring significant impact for the constituents in the electoral area. Therefore, trust as a social capital must be preserved by building a continuous relationship and providing a positive impact to the people. Additionally, trust built by these women originated from continuous social and religious activities (Putnam, 1993).

Besides knowledge and education, organizational and work experience becomes an important capital for female legislators in policy-making. Based on the results of this research, these six women have various organizational experiences. Most are social and political activists, and was once an administrator in their respective organizations. This became an asset for them and refined their leadership and political skills. Below is an illustration of the six women's organizational experience:




Figure 1: Organizational Experience of the Six Female Legislative Members of East Nusa Tenggara's Regional House of Representatives

Based on the above illustration, these six women have leadership experience before becoming a legislative members. Their respective organizations, such as the Child Protection Services (Lembaga Perlindungan Anak/LPA), Legal Aid Services (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum/LBH), Indonesia' Catholic Women's Body on Female (Wanita Katolik Republik Indonesia/WKRI), Evangelical Christian Women's Group in Timor (Gereja Masehi Injili di Timor/GMIT), Taim Hine Foundation (an environmental foundation), non-govermental organizations (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat/LSM), Family Empowerment and Welfare Body (Pemberdayaan dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga/PKK), Indonesia's National Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia/GMNI), Indonesia's Christian Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia/GMKI), and the Indonesian Businesswomen Association (Ikatan Wanita Pengusaha Indonesia/IWAPI).

After explaining the social capital owned by these women as female legislative candidates, we will discuss the moral capital of these women based on Derichs, Fleschenberg and Hustebeck's perspective. The election of these women was supported by moral capital because of their professions as teachers, ministers, advocates, and activists, where these profession are considered "good" and "close" to society (Derichs, Fleschenberg & Hustenbeck, 2006). This can be seen from the campaign conducted by these women, where they portray themselves as a mother that offers comfort and honesty.

These women took advantage of these assets to build a close relationship with the people. Even after their election as legislative members, these women returned to their electoral area, helped, and listened to the aspirations of the people. In addition, these women used the "acting for" representation (Pitkin, 1967) because of the strong individual capital and support from a patriarchal culture resulting from their closed ones (their husbands and fathers) who are also politicians, public and cultural figures, and local leaders. The most pivotal aspect is their acceptance of the trust given by their constituents.

#### 4. Conclusion

The success of these six women in the 2014 general elections stems from the constituents' trust towards them, a social capital that was born from men (husbands and fathers). This trust is a result of similarity in values, tribe, and organization. The people's belief in the men (husbands and fathers) who are public and cultural figures, politicians, and local leaders influenced the election of the six women.

In addition to social capital, moral capital, which is evident in their professions as teachers, ministers, advocates, and activists, also becomes a key factor to their success. Furthermore, the individual capital of these women, which took on the form of a good personality, way of communication, and leadership in their respective organizations is also a factor that contributed to their success. With regards to the social and moral capital theory, the contribution

of this research lies within the trust resulting from the prominent figures of men (husbands and fathers) that hold influence over the people. The election of the women as legislative members is bolstered by patriarchy, and is contrary to the general portrait and reality of East Nusa Tenggara.

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# Comparative Study: Chinese and Western Theoretical Sources for Sustainable Development Theory

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## Abstract

Countries around the world are now plagued by deteriorating environmental problems (including global warming, desertification, reduction of biodiversity, and possible sources of unknown viruses such as COVID-19). Besides cooperation at the international level, countries, especially the East and West, have adopted different approaches. Philosophy can guide our actions, and exploring the theories of each period could help us understand what people know about and how they behave. The Chinese “San cai” and “Sheng Wang Zhi Zhi” theories and the “Anthropocentrism” and “Resource are limited” of the West countries have their on the relationship between human beings and environment, which play important roles in their traditional philosophies before the largely accepted definition of Sustainable Development (SD).

**Keywords:** Sustainable Development Theory, Theoretical Sources, Chinese Theory, Xun Zi

Science shows us the facts about our changing environment. The economics inform us of the cost of human’s action, and other disciplines have further contributions to make. But more ideas are needed if come to humane conclusions about the world and one-selves. The humanities, and with no doubt philosophy, can make a real contribution to reflection on environmentally responsible action (J. Garvey, 2011). Philosophy can guide our actions, and exploring the theories of each period could help us understand what people know about and how they behave. Both eastern countries and particularly China and western countries have their theories on the relationship between human beings and environment, which play important roles in their traditional philosophies before the largely accepted definition of Sustainable Development (SD) (in the report of *Our Common Future*, April 1987) widely used in an international range. The philosophy of human’s role in environment is constantly changing, along within different social and historical contexts. With the development of some relative ideas of the relationships between humans and environment, theories are expanding at the same time through both the private and public spheres to support SD theory. No one can give a history of SD with a fixed range. Thus I strive to start from some dominant environment philosophies of Chinese and Western countries’. From them, it would help us better understand the philosophical significance of sustainable development in Chinese and Western societies.

Chinese “San Cai” theory and Chinese “Sheng Wang Zhi Zhi” theory is chosen, as they are the earliest Chinese theories about the relationship between human and nature. Both of them are from Chinese Zhou Dynasty’s (1046 B.C- 256 B.C)<sup>1</sup> documents.

“San Cai” theory posited that each person plays a role in a group; it can transform a single “force” into an influential role. It indicates that in the formation of “people” concept, “people” are treated as a group, also an individual as well. It is considering not only the natural resistance of individuals, but also their social environment. In San Cai theory Chinese people know how to adjust their social relations to increase the strength of their power.

## 1. CHINESE “SAN CAI” THEORY

Chinese “San Cai” theory (translated into English as “with God” or “three powers”) came from the overall nature of Confucian harmony. “San Cai” refers to the “three basic elements in nature,” that is, the sky (temperature, meteorology, sunshine, etc.), the earth (land and soil), and the human beings. “San Cai” theory comes from the book “Yi Jing” (wrote during the Chinese Western Zhou Dynasty, 1046 B.C- 771 B.C). “San Cai” dominates the world because such basic elements are the roots of consciousness, feelings and spirit of the world.

Since the Chinese Western Zhou Dynasty, intensive agricultural techniques have been developed. "Intensive agriculture" refers to the initiative of people to overcome the negative aspects of the natural environment, and to farming with the manpower inputting or the technology advantage to achieve maximum output. During the Chinese Western Zhou Dynasty, the technology of field farming and field drainage was further developed. Therefore, as an element of agriculture, people developed much careful thought and valiant efforts to respect others. The farming affairs were no longer only dependent on nature weather. From that time, humans were no longer being a servant of God or nature. The "San Cai" asserts that only on the basis of respecting the others, can a "human" be formed side by side with the god and nature.

The most frequently mentioned in “San Cai” theory is the sky, the earth and human are parallel moving and developing. This parallelism reflects an awareness of people's status, and people’s role in "San Cai." There is also an organic link between man and man. Agricultural production is inseparable from the ability of people. Nevertheless, agricultural production is not made by an isolated individual, but rather is raised by a clan. It’s a result of the behavior of social groups. Therefore, “San Cai” theory not only refers to the natural environment but also applied to the social environment. It shows the ancient Chinese people have begun to pay attention to the sustainable development of society.

“San Cai” guides many agricultural theories, which influence continues today. And its first apply to agriculture was recorded in the essays of Mr. Lv (“Lv Shi Chun Qiu,” wrote during the Qin Dynasty, 221 B.C- 206 B.C) titled Spring and Autumn Annals-Superiority of Agriculture. The essay summarized the representatives of the pre-Qin books on agriculture and was the earliest book on agronomy practices. In the book Superiority of Agriculture, the importance of agriculture is also emphasized. Another chapter of Spring and Autumn Annals—Farming According to Land proposed ten issues of soil tillage and stipulated the general principles of farming technology.

## 2. CHINESE “SHENG WANG ZHI ZHI” THEORY

The book “Xun Zi” (published during the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (environ 250 B.C.), which is ancient Chinese Realist Confucian collection of philosophical writings, was written by philosopher Xun Zi (313 B.C- 238 B.C) and his students. Xun Zi represents the Chinese Realist Confucian philosopher. In the chapter of this book Wang Zhi, which the main philosophy is about the republic, he wrote “Sheng Wang Zhi Zhi ”that signifies “the holy spirit of an imperial politic system.”

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<sup>1</sup> Chinese Zhou Dynasty divided into two periods: Chinese Western Zhou Dynasty (1046 B.C- 771 B.C) and Chinese Eastern Zhou Dynasty (771 B.C-256 B.C)

The Confucian advocated respect to the rhythm of nature and life, and “prohibition” of some people’s actions. The ancient orient environmental ethics and ecological wisdom are from the analysis of the natural world. “Xun Zi” claimed that the Holy Spirit should prohibit by law the acts as follows:

- *When the flowering vegetation is blossoming, a felling axe is forbidden in the forest to assure that the growing vegetation is not disturbed;*
- *When the sea animals are in gestation, pets and poisons are restricted to put into swamps to guarantee that the animals will not be killed but will continuously grow;*
- *The tillage in spring, the weeding in summer, the harvesting in autumn and the storage in winter should always be accomplished on schedule so that the grain can continual to increase, and food can be harvested and gathered abundantly;*
- *Fishing is strictly prohibited within a specified date in ponds, pools, rivers, and lakes;*
- *Following the regulations in the fishery, people have additional resources, e.g., fishes and turtles; seeding, cultivating and proper conservation of trees in the season are essential, so that the forest will not be bare, and excess wood accumulated.*<sup>2</sup>

Xun Zi’s theory concerned about the maintenance of human society and the universal survival of humankind underlying that human cannot live alone beside the natural environment. The ancient Confucian doctrine did not provide universal bans or critics for killing but stressed the fact that the people could do these things at sometimes, and that sometimes it was impossible to do so. The purpose is not to promote total abstinence, but to control human desires. This Chinese doctrine promotes the joint development of man and nature. Xun Zi advocated eliminating people's superstition and ignorance, reducing people's negative self-esteem at the same time, and establishing self-confidence, restoring the status and dignity of the people in the universe, getting harmony between heaven and human unity at a higher level.

This traditional oriental culture recognizes that the cognitive ability of people is powerful. It advocates intuition, insight, and other non-rational cognitive abilities. This culture, thus, avoids the monotony of thinking and rigidity. The Chinese ancient environmental ethics were not only remaining in the field of ethics but also extended to the field of political and ideological spheres and the rule of law. The formation of political thinking and the legal awareness of environment are the bases of the environmental standards on the future social life and economy development. Since the Zhou Dynasty (1111 B.C), almost every Chinese dynasty has enacted specific institutions and decrees to protect the natural resources. The environmental ethics in ancient China was always considered. The environmental ethics continuously affected political philosophies, environmental laws, and regulations transformation. The social protection of the natural environment is required to produce considerable robust binding and mandatory so that this protection can completely integrate the national environment, ethical culture, and spiritual transformation.

### 3. WESTERN ANTHROPOCENTRISM THEORY

Western Anthropocentrism Theory was a controversial and an influential deep thinking on SD, explored from 1970s. Webster’s New World Dictionary defines anthropocentrism as:

- *“Considering man to be the central or most significant fact of the universe;*
- *Assuming man to be the measure of all things;*
- *Interpreting or regarding the world in terms of human values and experience.”*

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<sup>2</sup> Xun, Z., (Zhou dynasty). Wang Zhi. (n.d.). *Xun Zi*.

Origin words in Chinese :

草木荣华滋硕之时则斧斤不入山林，不夭其生，不绝其长也；鼃鼃、鱼鳖、鳅鳍孕别之时，罔罟、毒药不入泽，不夭其生，不绝其长也。

From a long time, anthropocentrism had been seen as anti-environment, which considers human beings in priority place rather than nature. Illustrated by Goodpaster (1978); Rolston (1983) and Taylor (1983), anthropocentrism considers that human is the center of the universe. The anthropocentrism judge value from human's view, everything needs to serve human interests, and humans dominate the nature. It may cause the environment crisis. Anthropocentric view is a specific performance of ancient philosophy. Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889-1975), a British historian, stated that the belief of Jewish - Christians and the religion rules about human nature over the doctrine are the ideological roots of humanity against the natural environment, but this informal idea was implemented from the 17th century.

However, in fact, people live in the environment. The air we breathe, the water we drink, the temperature we feel, the view we see are the natural environment around. Admitting the value of the environment is to protect human beings' benefit. The environmental sustainability development corresponds with the long-term development of humans' will and requirements. Therefore, anthropocentrism leads to focus on what are human beings' rights and responsibilities towards the around environment.

#### 4. THE EXPRESSIONS THAT STRESS THAT WESTERN RESOURCE IS LIMITED

Development is never simple when it occurs. Such a phenomenon affects the role of other factors integrated into a complex system. In western countries, some ecologists have indicated that the development issue is only the matter of needs and limits. In 1968, biologist Paul Ehrlich introduced "population explosion" in his *Book of The Population Bomb* in a terrible manner with the over-population problem into the public eye. He predicted that in the near future, the excessive population growth would inevitably lead to wide famine and epidemic diseases.

In 1972, the economists in the Club of Rome published a report entitled *The Limits to Growth*, which explores the global economy and the environment by computer simulation analysis. The conclusion was the following: given that the sustainable economic growth and the abundance of the resources in the world are being depleted, the available time is running out. In the same year, a journal of Britain *Ecologists* published a special issue on the "Survival of the Blueprint." The magazine warned that: "If the current trends continue to allow social collapse and the life-support systems on Earth will not be reversed towards it, the collapse will possibly occur at the end of the century, and will undoubtedly happen in the middle days of our children." Correspondingly, ecologists called for the establishment of an eco-society to replace a failed industrial society. Many people believe that this sensitive issue is tantamount to a declaration of Armageddon. The apocalypse in the 1970s continuously occurs and leads to an environmental crisis thereby providing realistic evidence. The case studies of South Africa showed that the environmental scarcity emerges within a political, social, economic, and ecological context. Furthermore, the environmental scarcity interacted with many of these contextual factors to contribute to a great social violence. The system of nature has certain limits that produce an ensemble of interacting constraints on the human action where these limitations have to be accepted.

To conclude, these two Chinese theories show the Chinese people's unified nature-society view of the world, the earth, animals, and human beings. Also reflects the resource utilization and management thought of resource utilization and management in a modest way. However, the two western theories trait nature as the resource for people's development. Two different views of nature enable Westerners to manage environmental issues more rationally and objectively. However, the Chinese people's fusion thinking needs to start with people first, and improve people's thoughts and behaviors in order to affect the changes in the environment.

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