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Regional Hegemonic Power, Integration and Governance: An Appraisal of Post-Democratization South Africa

Daniel N. Mlambo¹, Toyin Cotties Adetiba²

¹ Department of Public Administration, University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, 3886.
Email: mlambo1@ymail.com

² Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, 3886.
Email: AdetibaT@unizulu.ac.za

Abstract

This article addresses the question of what drives the character and orientation of South Africa's foreign policy post the apartheid era. The shift from apartheid to democracy in 1994 brought with it a new paradigm shift in both South Africa's domestic and foreign policy agenda. This was also driven by the need to redress the destabilization policies of the apartheid regime. The demise of apartheid in 1994 brought with it immense jubilation both continentally and abroad and South Africa was now for the first time in years reintegrated into the global economy. By undertaking this enquiry, the study attempts to draw a nuanced evaluation of South Africa's foreign policy, particularly in Southern Africa since its transition to democracy in 1994.

Keywords: South Africa, Regional Integration, Foreign Policy, African National Congress (ANC)

Introduction

Colonialism by European elites in Africa and apartheid driven by the National Party (NP) in South Africa brought with it massive economic, political and social challenges in the 1900s. Not only did colonialism hinder the economic growth of most African states, but it also severely hindered the current development challenges in most African countries (Rodney, 2018). By narrowing this to South Africa, the NPs domestic and foreign policies had dire consequences for South Africa and its neighbouring countries mainly due to the destabilization policies that were at play until the end of the obnoxious apartheid system. After the African National Congress (ANC) emerged victorious in the 1994 general elections and too much contentment both continentally and globally, there was a paradigm shift in South Africa's foreign policy decision making.

The ANC had to alter its strategic planning towards the development and economic growth of South Africa and Africa at large. Apart from this introduction, the rest of the paper is structured as follows. The first section looks at South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy. Section two looks at South Africa's foreign policy aspirations post-

democratization. Section three unearths some of the challenges facing South Africa's foreign policy. The fourth section looks at South Africa's foreign policy moving forward and the fifth section offers us the concluding remarks.

South Africa's post-1994 Foreign Policy: A New Paradigm Shift Post the Apartheid Era

In 2002, African scholars Korwa Adar and Rok Ajulu affirmed that the transformation that took place in Africa after the demise of the cold war provides convincing reasons for students, practitioners and scholars of International Relations (IR) to re-evaluate the methodological, theoretical and scholarly facts underpinning African states foreign policy and foreign policy-making processes. Qobo (2017) asserts that states are complex organizations whose integration with the world imitates both internal political contestations (through different political persuasion and between the fractions of the elite), the conception of their identity together with how they observe their place in the world to be. Therefore, in this view, organizational coordination, policy thrust and execution are all vital in fruitfully projecting a state's brand. As Landsberg and Masters (2017) inform us, foreign policy is rooted on the notion as to why certain decisions are taken, thus, foreign policy-making is an inherently political process because there is a range of state actors each having their objective(s) and interest(s) competing to have their voice heard. While heads of states at times drive foreign policy-making and decisions, the domestic and international environment, actors and institutions, through which they function are also pivotal. Van Nieuwkerk (2017) opines that foreign policy is made up and conducted in a context characterized by complexity and change inter alia:

1. A change in the resources, numbers and status of states and non-state actors
2. National security narratives marked by an old and new understanding of security and
3. Power and influence are exercised in new ways.

As a point of departure, it has been a long journey from the apartheid era where Pretoria was regarded as a pariah state and isolated from the world because of its destructive foreign policy aimed at defending and promoting white minority rule (Marthoz, 2012). According to Death (2011), South Africa is a pivotal case for debates on foreign policy as a result of the saliency of vital questions concerning the effectiveness and possibility of an ethical approach to international relations. During the apartheid regime, Pretoria's relations with the outside world was marked with isolation from international institutions and destabilization towards other African states. In his respected 1993 publication in foreign affairs titled *South Africa's Future Foreign Policy*, Nelson Mandela stated that "as the 1980s drew to a close, I could not see much of the world from my prison cell, but I knew it was changing. There was little doubt in my mind that this would have a profound impact on my country, on the Southern Africa region and the continent of which I am proud to be a citizen" (Mandela, 1993). Again, in this publication, he outlined the following aspects that were to form the pillar of South Africa's future foreign policy:

1. That the issue of human rights is central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental.
2. That just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide.
3. That considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations.
4. That peace is the goal to which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agrees and non-violent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed.
5. That the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign policy choices.
6. That economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world.

Evans (1994) expounds from these six pillars and outlines that two transitional pillars drove Pretoria's new foreign policy post the apartheid era, these were (1) the revitalization of the South African economy and (2) the desire for a political solution to the internal problems of South Africa that satisfy the international community and ensure their support. We may draw South Africa's foreign policy in two phases, the first phase from 1948-1994 which was under the leadership of the NP and the second phase is that of the ANC from 1994 to date, the transition phase 1990-1994 is also covered under the second phase (Stephen, 2005). The landslide victory in the 1994 elections

(62.65%) by the ANC undoubtedly granted them to alter the country's foreign policy that had over the years leading to 1994 branded Pretoria as an authoritarian and racist state.

In this vein, post democratization, South Africa's foreign policy was viewed by the ANC government as a strategy to enhance further development within Pretoria's geographical area particularly the Southern African region. As Alden and Le Pere (2004) put it, the new South Africa faced clashing tensions with regards to developing in what they call an activist role in foreign policy premised upon a belief in the compatibility of human rights norms, its development and solidarity politics.

The ANC had a notion that better involvement by the country in sectoral cooperation projects, regional trade and joint development of regional resources together with infrastructure could pave the way(s) to promote development and growth both in South Africa and Southern Africa. Qobo (2017) maintains that the early developments after the ANC was victorious saw South Africa's greater inclination towards an idealistic thrust via various policy documents outlining greater premium to issues related to human rights and peace-building. To the South African government, the promotion of human rights in the context of economic, political, environmental and social settings is born out of South Africa's (fundamentally, the ANC's) legacy of resistance of the apartheid regime that was to all intentions and purposes a crime against humanity (see Ogunnubi, 2019).

Less than a year after the 1994 elections, Pretoria had already established full diplomatic relations with most countries comprising of 46 African states, moreover South Africa had been (re)admitted to full membership of the United Nations (UN), Organization of African Unity (OAU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and started negotiations with the European Union (EU) (Alden and Le Pere, 2004). Again, the first foreign policy document adopted by the ANC 'a Framework for Co-operation in Southern Africa' that was approved in 1996 by cabinet held out a high vision for the Southern African region via mutual assistance where necessary, economic cooperation and joint planning of regional development initiatives.

Dawn of a Democratic State and South Africa's new Foreign Policy Aspiration(s)

Graham (2012) points out that having had some sort of contact with the international community while in exile for its military and political support, ironically, the ANC surprisingly entered the transition negotiations with the NP unprepared not knowing what to expect in these talks. While in exile, the ANC theorized about governing South Africa, however, it never fully articulated its plans for the country when it achieved power. By 1990, the ANC had thus only created three documents pertaining directly to foreign policy. These were the Freedom Charter of 1955, the Final Report of the Commission on foreign policy from the Kabwe Conference of 1985 and the 1989 Harare Declaration. Nevertheless, such documents were never an acceptable basis of the foreign policy of an aspiring governing political party or a liberation movement for that matter, they were just a basic list of envisioned principles (see Graham, 2012).

On the 2nd of February 1990 at the South African parliament, De Klerk announced the immediate end to the ban of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), thus, bringing with it a beginning of a new era in the South African political landscape (Torreguiter, 2009; Jacobs, 2019). Pfister (2003) noted that after his release from prison in February 1990, by mid-1992, Nelson Mandela had taken 16 trips overseas and visited 49 countries. These were merely taken to smooth sanctions that had been imposed on South Africa, nevertheless, what was a further daunting task here is that the ANC had no guiding foreign policy framework from exile which could direct and inform such international efforts.

Lalbahadur (2016) argues that the alteration in power from the NP to the ANC undoubtedly intended that the newly elected and democratic South African government had to implement a more considered approach to address its foreign policy objectives which encompassed among other things as to how it was going to wield its economic might in a milieu of distrust. After the demise of apartheid coupled with the 1994 elections, major socio-political and socio-economic shifts brought for a major changeable environment which through policy-making, Pretoria's authorities endeavoured to shape towards a nationally democratized, unified and internationally competitive

society. South African leaders had to draft policies that were to reintegrate South Africa into the global economy, while at the same time policy-making had to also respond to internal conditions that featured high levels of inequality and poverty (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006).

Fundamentally, internal and external foreign policy-making was geared on addressing vital areas which consisted of socio-economic change, democratic consolidation, international competitiveness and national and racial unification. However, post the apartheid era and as most have noted, it has not been a smooth journey for policymakers to merge objectives related to globalization with the national transformation (see Cornelissen, 2017). Post democratization, because of its smooth transition to democracy, the international community has looked on Pretoria to spearhead values of human rights, underdevelopment, democracy and eradication of poverty. Hence, South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy has been solely devoted to the African continent precisely Southern Africa (South African Government, 2011; Mlambo and Adetiba, 2020). Although the ANC government possessed no previous experience in actually governing a country, nevertheless, from the transition period of 1990-1994, it was able to transform itself from a liberation movement into a solid political party and then into government. Post democratization, one may look at South Africa's foreign policy in four phases. Phase one is that of Nelson Mandela (1994-1999), phase two is Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008), phase three was the Jacob Zuma administration (2009-2018) and the fourth phase is the current Cyril Ramaphosa (2019 to date). Right after assuming office, the Mandela administration devoted their attention towards consolidating Pretoria's already strained relationship with most African states particularly those in Southern Africa.

We argue that while the Mandela administration had no governance experience, it, however, showed the international community that it could reintegrate itself in regional, continental and international organizations. Besides such, This (Mandela's) administration dedicated much of its attention to Africa largely because the country was now seen as a major power in the continent. Fundamentally, Mandela's administration was focused on the reorientation and renewal of South Africa's diplomacy, pursuing the participation and re-organization of South Africa in the international economy. Also, policymakers at this time focused on what Shoba (2018) considers a triple strategy that focused on uniting South Africans after the aftermath of apartheid, building a non-sexist and non-racial society together with forging alliances with African states importantly those in Southern Africa. This was to be done by forming a rainbow nation a named coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu to depict post-apartheid South Africa as a multiracial or multicultural country and putting into consideration the importance of the international community.

Ogunnubi (2013) posits that when the second South African (Thabo Mbeki) president post the apartheid era assumed office in 1999, there was a slight paradigm shift in South Africa's foreign policy. His approach was more on African renewal and was to bring a sense of purpose and direction. Mbeki sought to establish himself as an African statesman and pan-Africanist through the notion of his African Renaissance which contained a message of endeavour and African unity. In doing so, when looking at it from a Southern African perspective, Mbeki emphasized on the restructuring of the SADC, such as Ogunnubi argues was essential with regards to his African agenda outlook.

However, considering the fragile relationship between South Africa and its neighbours, such foreign policy principles were not going to be welcomed by some merely because of the apartheid regimes destabilization policies that were driven with apartheid exceptionalism, spearheaded by beliefs of racial dominance together with ideological differences actively isolated the government from any political engagement(s) with other African countries (Lalbahadur, 2016). Mlambo (2018); Mlambo and Ogunnubi (2018) note that throughout his tenure in office, Mbeki sought to downplay suggestions that South Africa was a hegemonic state, rather a country focused on the development of Africa as a whole and Southern Africa through the SADC together with strengthening the AU.

Thus, we are of the view that he sought to spearhead such through promoting democratization, regional integration, economic growth, peace and security and improving the standard of living for the general populace. Again, this was to strengthen the institutional capacity and governance of the SADC while making sure that whatever

timeframes are put afore by the SADC, South Africa can meet such. His passionate driving spirit for African renewal showed in his commitment with regards to the African Renaissance project, the transformation of the OAU to the AU and planning and supporting of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as an economic outlook, these organizations contained the notion of African upliftment and economic governance. Such was because he recognized the pivotal role(s) multilateral forums could play in stimulating Africa's security architecture, economic growth and development (Ogunnubi, 2013). When Jacob Zuma assumed office in 2009 amid much controversy because of pending corruption and fraud charges against him, his foreign policy marked another paradigm shift from North to South. Such, however, did not alter on South Africa's stance in its importance foreign policy on the Southern African region.

His inauguration also brought with it a name change from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO); analysts quoted this as a wise move in Pretoria's foreign policy that also reflects its domestic policies vis-à-vis cooperation with SADC member countries. Zuma's administration was also rooted in the development and economic growth of South Africa. Naidoo (2010) contends that Zuma's "Outcomes-Based Approach" (See table 1) adopted by his administration in 2009 encompassed four priority areas which reflected the principles of peace, security, prosperity and integration. Such was rooted in the fact that defined Pretoria's overarching objective of creating a better South Africa while also contributing to a better and safer Africa.

Table 1: Showing "Outcomes-Based Approach" identifying South Africa's Foreign Policy Objectives.

Outcome Based Priorities	Sub-Outputs (Deliverables)
Output 1: Enhanced the African agenda and sustainable development.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deepened contribution to regional and continental security and stability and sustainable development • Contribution to peace missions and Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) • Enhanced technical and development cooperation
Output 2: Enhanced regional integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional economic integration • Regional political integration
Output 3: Reformed global governance and peace and security institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened regional, continental and global governance institutions and international platforms. • Enhanced representation of South Africans in international institutions.
Output 4: Enhanced trade and investment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased value-added exports to targeted economies • Increased inward investment from targeted countries • Increase our market share through aggressive marketing.

Source: See Naidoo (2010).

His (Zuma) administration continued its support and vast contribution to the AU and its official frameworks such as the African Monetary Fund, the African Central Bank, the African Court of Justice, the African Investment Bank, NEPAD, the African Court of Human and Peoples right and the African Peer Review mechanism (APRM). However, Zuma's foreign policy also brought with it an interest in emerging global economies as a year after becoming South African head of state, South Africa became the first African country to become a member of

BRICS¹, just two years after the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crises. Hence, while the reaction from scholars and policymakers alike are twofold on Pretoria being a BRICS member (positive and negative), to some this is one of the best foreign policy achievement post democratization (Shoba, 2018).

Drawing from the above viewpoint, Anthony, Tembe and Gull (2015) are of the opinion that the BRIC countries have influenced South Africa's foreign policy-making. While the Mandela and Mbeki foreign policy was more Afrocentric in nature, there was a slight shift from that of Zuma. Mainly because as these authors further argue, first, such (BRICS membership) gave South Africa a robust platform to further succeed where it was failing too, to be a Sub-Saharan leader and influential role player, secondly, to have a strong saying in international multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and UN. Amao (2019) aver that South Africa's BRICS membership provides it with the perfect platform not only to further lead the Southern African region but to also lead the whole continent. To him, this is a result of four pivotal criteria's which consists of (1) power resources, (2) claim for leadership, (3) acceptance of leadership and (4) employment of foreign policy instruments, thus, South Africa can be recognized as a regional power. It is this vein that van Wyk (2017), asserts that in order to amply illustrate the vision of former South African heads of states, she provides us with what she calls the discourse formations (see table 2) of South Africa's foreign policy during various presidencies post 1994² era.

Table 2: Showing discourse formations of South Africa's foreign policy during various presidencies post democratization.

Head(s) of State(s)	Nelson Mandela 1994-1999	Thabo Mbeki 1999-2008	Jacob Zuma 2009-2018
State Identity	<i>New South Africa</i>	<i>African South Africa</i>	<i>Solidarity South Africa</i>
Founding and maintenance of myth	South Africa miracle	African Renaissance	Diplomacy of Ubuntu
Object of foreign policy	<i>The people</i>	<i>The African people</i>	<i>The people of the global South</i>
Foreign policy purpose	South African Uniqueness	South Africa as a problem-solver	South Africa as a carer
Status	Returnee	Reformer	Leader

Source: van Wyk (2017).

Drawing from the above, van Wyk aims to offer us a nuanced appraisal as to the direction that was taken by former South Africa heads of states with regards to how they approached their foreign policy narrative in South Africa post democratization. Nevertheless, Knecht and Weatherford (2004) inform us of the fact that foreign policy-making is not an easy process and involves (see table 3) many actors and five important stages.

¹ These are regarded as five emerging economies who were known as BRIC before South Africa's arrival. These are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. They meet regularly to discuss a variety of development-oriented issues including security, trade, investments, energy, global government reforms etc.

² As stated earlier, Kgalema Motlanthe is omitted from this discourse due to his relatively short spell in the office while the current Ramaphosa administration has just assumed office.

Table 3: Showing stages of foreign policy formulation.

Stage	Action	Plan
One	Agenda setting	Foreign policymakers delineate a list of potential areas of focus and decision-makers point out the rewards and dangers involved.
Two	Opinion generation	Such is made up of a brainstorming session, decision-makers make a list of the most important and urgent areas of concern.
Three	Policy design	Here policy decisions are made as to the issues identified in the previous stage.
Four	Implementation	This stage includes strategies and tactics through which the policy formulated is put into action. This stage includes both state and non-state actors.
Five	Policy review	Here decision-makers evaluate the success and failure of the policy and make necessary amendments or abandon the policy depending on the outcome of the evaluation process.

Source: Knecht and Weatherford (2004).

Such confirms that for every state, its foreign policy is goal-oriented, as there are objectives to be met. However, success concerning the attainment of such objectives is not given as a country might fail to achieve its desired goals. To track some of the ways South Africa has used its foreign policy, one may look the role it has (post democratization) played in vital multilateral initiatives that are of Afrocentric in nature such as the transformation of the AU to the OAU, the APRM and the NEPAD. Such as Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2015) stipulate has made Pretoria to further build on its already impressive soft power attributes.

Therefore, as this scholars further submit, this has made South Africa to effectively exercise robust leadership on multilateral platforms on behalf of Southern Africa, Africa and the developing world. In essence, South Africa has transformed herself from a benign regional powerhouse to a benevolent one via a carefully orchestrated foreign policy as a result of its soft power credentials. In this way, its foreign policy has in some way gained immense international legitimacy, global reputation, respect, recognition and gained more respect than other African powerhouses such as Nigeria and Egypt. In this vein, while Pretoria might not be the biggest powerhouse in Africa (albeit one in Southern Africa) since been surpassed by Nigeria, however, its foreign policy and soft power attributes show vast possible contention with regards to its leadership status in Africa and particularly Southern Africa.

When one has to look at the latest government blueprint the National Development Plan (NDP) vision 2030 that was undertaken by the National Planning Commission (NPC) in 2011. Chapter seven which focuses on positioning South Africa in the world outlines that Pretoria's foreign policy must be shaped by the interplay of political, environmental, diplomatic security, economics and regional cooperative dynamic that define early 21st century dynamics. Again, this foreign policy shall remain cognizant of global shifts in the hard, soft, smart or metal power from west to east. Importantly, a critical and clear understanding of Pretoria's regional and continental priorities should drive South Africa's foreign policy. Such should be done by increasing regional integration driven by increased trade importantly via the immediate SADC neighbours where the South African business has an effective say in foreign policy-making (National Planning Commission, 2011).

We may, therefore, assume that foreign policy is a multidimensional set of principles, objectives, policies, plans and objectives. Given, the past and current participation of South Africa in both regional, continental and international forums and platforms, one might deduce that it has fully integrated itself in both continental and the international community. In essence, while it is of pivotal to unearth on the success of South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy, no foreign policy of a state is forever deemed perfect, hence, there are bound to be hindrances.

Constraint's Facing South Africa's Foreign Policy Post Democratization.

While it is significantly important to recognize a state's foreign policy, nevertheless, it is also pivotal to unearth or perhaps track some hindrances in a country's foreign policy, in this case, South Africa. As Marthoz (2012) argues, the challenges are there and are immense. For instance, Ogunnubi (2019) posit that foreign policy-making is by no means an easy thing, to him, such is because of diverse factors which include opposing opinions between those assigned with the responsibility of articulating foreign policy, lack of financial and material resources to implement foreign policy, continuous changes in the global landscape together with other factors. Firstly, post democratization, South Africa had to create a foreign policy from scratch linking itself with many countries that earlier boycotted it because of the apartheid regime, joining dozens of continental and international organizations that had also turned their back on it. 27 years later, one would say Pretoria was never a pariah state, however, while it has gained credible global recognition post-1994, its foreign policy has continued as observed by many scholars (see Husar, 2016; Headley and van Wyk, 2012 and Thies and Nieman, 2017) to be skewed, torn between ethics and interests, tolerating authoritarian regimes together with being contradictory.

According to Hadebe (2015), South Africa has often in recent years been labelled as a country that sets out targets but fails on the implementation and even monitoring of such. Thus, post democratization, South Africa's policy has been seen as incoherent and inconsistent. During the tenure of the Mandela administration, his foreign policy was criticized for often lacking direction. One might offer the view that perhaps he had just assumed office and had no prior experience in governing a state together with the lack of knowledge on the ministers that were supposed to guide him in his decision-making processes. During his presidency, when unrest unfolded in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), his administration chose to first isolate itself and intervene via the neutral route aimed at negotiating a ceasefire when tensions were already at boiling point.

Pfister (2000) argues that such a blunder showed a lack of direction in the first South African administration after apartheid as the government should have intervened earlier as the tense situation in the central African country had been visible much earlier. Again, when the tiny kingdom of Lesotho was experiencing political instability in the aftermath of the elections in September 1998, South Africa only intervened when sanctioned by the SADC. Saunders (2014) affirms that in the same year, Mandela's foreign policy was further hampered when his administration ignored the severe concerns of other Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) members by signing a bilateral Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU. Such showed that there was no sign of cooperation from South Africa's point of view with regards to its neighbours. Prys (2009) offers us another blunder in South Africa's foreign policy, to her, South Africa was severely criticized post the 2000 era on its quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe at the time when Mbeki was head of state.

On a contradictory point, the author outlines that president Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy" ensued regional stability, however, we tend to argue and question such argument. In this regard, how in her view can such bring about regional stability and the protection of human rights when the rights and instability of millions of Zimbabweans were effected. Such points to the fact that human security was more important than regime security. Likewise, did the years moving forward help to stabilize Zimbabwe's economy and its populace or did it further shrink the economic growth of the country bringing with it vast sanctions and internal protests. From 2000, Zimbabwe was confronted with massive amount of internal complications including sanctions, embassies in European and other countries being closed down, termination of aid and a twelve-month suspension from the commonwealth (Miti, 2012; Alao, 2012). Berger (2007) noted that in 2007, leading up to the country's general elections, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) affiliated Morgan Tsvangirai and Lovemore Madhuku were severely beaten and

arrested and in the eyes of many such acts were orchestrated by the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU – PF). The country in 2008 was experiencing inflation of 231 million %. Hence, such revelations further outline that Mbeki's quiet diplomacy stance on the Mugabe regime did not yield any significant results on the economic growth of Harare (Death, 2011).

While Mbeki's quiet diplomacy stance may be traced to the colonialism and apartheid bond between the ANC and the ZANU-PF, in the end, we are of the view that his quiet diplomacy towards Mugabe's regime further hampered the growth of Zimbabwe's economy while supporting his authoritarian regime. As such, the crisis in Zimbabwe post-2000 has undoubtedly posed as one of the greatest foreign policy hindrances to the South African government. While the human rights of millions of Zimbabweans were affected, South Africa did not show that it values human rights (something that was and still is enshrined in its foreign policy) values. Thus, the criticism aimed at Pretoria is a result of it prioritizing its special relations with ZANU – PF over ensuring the application of its human rights agenda in its foreign policy. South Africa's stance on not taking an active role in the Zimbabwe issue also brought with it harsh criticism from the West predominantly the United Kingdom (UK), the EU and the Commonwealth whose stance on Zimbabwe centred on the removal of Robert Mugabe as head of state (Lalbahadur, 2016). However, through years of quiet diplomacy, he (Mbeki) may be applauded with his role in the dialogue between the ZANU – PF and MDC which in September 2008 led to the Global Political Agreement³ (GPA) that laid the foundation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) which encompassed arrangements on security, legal, constitutional, power-sharing and economic improvements within the country (Miti, 2012).

Alden and Le Pere (2004) are of the view that diverse actors involved in South Africa's foreign policy are also of concern. The erstwhile DFA often found itself in crossroads with other actors involved in foreign policy-making which ultimately led to inconsistency, incoherence and opaqueness in policy formulation. Again post democratization to date, domestic hurdles such as unemployment, inequality, population growth, crime have not played a significant role in South Africa's domestic policies which has ultimately affected its foreign policy projections in Southern Africa and afar. Therefore, the terrain of the Southern African region where South Africa should be at the fore seems to be (albeit some success) a challenging one over the last two decades. Nevertheless, one may presume that South Africa is still a young and developing state confronted with a host of domestic challenges, which at times limits its regional outreach capabilities.

South Africa seems to be confused to distinguish between the importance of the BRICS grouping and the SADC, also between the SADC and other groupings it is part of. Moreover, what undoubtedly affected in its foreign policy was Zuma's tenure as president. His time in office was hindered by immense corruption-related scandals and state capture related charges further hampering South Africa's continental and international image together with its foreign policy. He (Zuma) has in his time as head of state been confronted with vast allegations of making his family and those close to him rich while poor South Africans have remained to suffer at the expense of greedy politicians from the ruling ANC.

Again, just as the earlier point concerning quiet diplomacy and human rights abuse, Mills and James (2016) make a very useful point regarding such. To them, why did the South African government in 2013 protect former Sudanese president (Omar al-Bashir) who was in the country and was wanted for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court⁴ (ICC). What picture does this paint on South Africa's stance against human rights abuse? Something it aimed to stand for in its post-1994 foreign policy. While it did such with regards to the Zimbabwean issues, it repeated it with regards to al-Bashir, hence, instead of arresting al-Bashir, South Africa's intended to withdraw as a member of the ICC⁵ (See Cornelissen, 2017). Nevertheless, as Langa and Shai (2019) note, there is also the hostility that the ICC is selective in its persecutions, hence, South Africa would have received

³ Signed in September 2008 and effective from February 2009, the GPA was an accord between Zimbabwe's three main political parties, the ZANU-PF and the two MDC structures (Human Rights Watch, 2010). It was a power-sharing agreement between these parties that aimed to address internal challenges (political and economic) facing Zimbabwe.

⁴ The ICC is tasked with the prosecuting perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and relies on state parties to arrest wanted individuals and surrender them to the court (Fehl, 2004).

⁵ South Africa's attempt to withdraw from the ICC was nevertheless ruled unconstitutional and invalid by the South African high court in 2017, hence, halted (Langa and Shai, 2019).

much criticism from other African states if it had gone ahead and apprehended al-Bashir. There was a notion that Pretoria had two choices; (1) that of arresting Bashir as its ICC membership dictates and (2) supporting a fellow AU member state in Sudan. Drawing from the above viewpoint, we contend that irrespective of its ICC mandate and criticism that it was going to receive from other African states, South Africa showed no remorse for human rights abuses as it should have (if serious about such as per its foreign policy documents) arrested Bashir and handed him to the ICC.

The ANC under the Mbeki administration undermined human rights by receiving financial donations from Indonesia which perpetrated human rights abuse in occupied East Timor. Again, post-1994, South Africa strengthened bilateral ties with what Graham (2012) calls pariah states such as Cuba, Libya and North Korea while continuing with arms sales to countries such as Angola, Rwanda and Zaire (currently known as the DRC). Thus, Strategic Comments (2017) submits that South Africa's foreign policy serves little purpose particularly under the Zuma administration one might say Zuma used his superiority in government to enrich his allies including the controversial Indian-based Gupta family. For example, in 2014, it is estimated that US\$ 400 million in kickbacks was rewarded to Gupta related companies in doing businesses with South African SOE's such as Eskom, Transnet and South African Airways (SAA).

Further hampering the South African government image was when he (Zuma) and other KwaZulu-Natal government departments especially the Department of Public Works were targeted as a result of the irregular expenditure accrued in the upgrading of his Nkandla resident in Northern KwaZulu-Natal which included allegations of corrupt activities (Motsepe, 2015). Mlambo (2019) is of the view that the recurring xenophobic attacks, particularly from 2008, have not done justice to South Africa's foreign policy regionally, continentally and abroad. Thus, its foreign policy is bound to experience some form of setbacks. While the 2011 white paper on South African foreign policy outlines that the South African government intends to narrow this gap between the rich and the poor, such seems to be me a mere projection that will be hard to achieve when one looks at the current statistics. Besides, these were the same projections that were made by the Mandela administration 27 years ago. One may argue that, have such promises beard any fruit? Has the South African government from Mandela to Zuma been able to diminish such a gap?

We contend that such has continued to rise and seems though it will continue to happen moving forward if one looks at the ever-rising statistics predominantly in the number of unemployed individuals and the ever-increasing population rate. Again and concisely, that there is a lack of interaction between the people and the state in foreign policy-making. People ought to be engaged and consulted in the drawing up of domestic and foreign policy, therefore, involving active consultations with the citizens. Nonetheless, from a South Africa perspective, Pretoria's policy formulation remains and restricted project such that the lack of public hearings on government foreign policy says a lot. One should expect that a democratic government engages with its people in foreign policy-making as this not only assists the state both in the short and long run but also the citizens.

Perhaps, it is worth noting the point in Ogunnubi's published article titled; *Soft Power: The Fourth 'Tentacle' South Africa's Foreign Policy*. Here, he outlines that from an Afrocentric standpoint, regional powers face an array of hindrances and the domestic, regional, continental and global level ranging from domestic instability (internal political conflicts) and the lack of and resistance of small states to accept its hegemony (Ogunnubi, 2017). Such a point perhaps supports the aforementioned hindrances that are currently facing the South African government post democratization. With that said, perhaps it is of importance to outline some strategies that perhaps could be adopted by the ruling ANC to strengthen its foreign policy projections moving forward.

South Africa's Foreign Policy Moving Forward: What remedy (if any).

While it has been stated that there is no consistent (particularly from an Afrocentric perspective) foreign policy, one might not look at the positive, negative and fail to give any recommendations to amend current foreign policy limitations. While these recommendations might not be sufficient depending on one's view, nevertheless, they provide us with a point of departure moving forward. For example, Qobo (2017) in his analysis amply affirms that there is a dire need for businesses and government to have and share a common purpose that is aimed at boosting

national economic competitiveness while also improving the reliability of a state's economic policies domestically and internationally. Again, to him, what is lacking is a strategic form of leadership, effective strategies together with clear ideas. Some African states are not accepting Pretoria's leadership particularly those in Southern Africa, such that even the NDP recognizes that South Africa's power is declining particularly if compared to that of 1994 when the Mandela administration came into power.

Equally, the failure of the current ANC government to uplift the lives of its ordinary black citizens (mostly affected by poverty) seems as if it will not assist its foreign policy moving forward partly because it is still severely affected by vast domestic issues. Accordingly, to improve such obstacles (domestic challenges) post democratization, there is a severe need to alter its domestic policies before its foreign policy. Perhaps Mills and James (2016) unearth some pivotal arguments here, to them, if South Africa is to realize its foreign policy ambition(s) post the democratic era, three strategic thrusts stand out. Firstly, there is a need to alter the foreign policy from a national interest viewpoint as defined in South Africa's constitution. Such means Pretoria must fight poverty and advance human rights values. Secondly, South Africa should render support to its most influential and persuasive brand in spearheading the support for human rights and democracy predominantly from an Afrocentric point of view.

Lastly, the government should strive to create conditions for excellence in thought leadership, regenerating needed resources to DIRCO is of fundamental in re-shaping South Africa's foreign policy chiefly in conjunction with other departments such as the Department of Defense (DoD), Labour and Home Affairs while also utilizing its robust business and civil society sector. Isike and Ogunnubi (2017) put to the table another argument with regards to re-shaping South Africa's foreign policy. They identify other government departments that can play a pivotal role in Pretoria's current and future foreign policy through utilizing its soft power reservoirs. These include the departments of (1) Tourism, (2) Communications, (3) Arts and Culture, (4) Sports and Recreation, (5) Home Affairs, (6) Science and Technology and (7) Higher Education and Training. They argue that, while these departments are not active in foreign policy formulation or implementation, they are, however, becoming significant in outlining South Africa's soft power status.

Therefore, the South African government ought to incorporate them in foreign policy-making whether directly or indirectly, this is also not forgetting no state actors such as Non-Profit Organizations (NPO's), corporate businesses, academics, civil society, the media, research institutes, etc. Such would create a nuance platform for Pretoria to influence her foreign policy by representing South Africa's interests. During the transition period (1990-1994) and after the demise of apartheid, many non-state actors and NPO's emerged and hoped for a sea change in state-society relations. Hence, the end of apartheid brought with it other research institutes that were to critically analyze South Africa's foreign policy. Such that in 1994, the Foundation for Global Dialogue (FGD, now IGD) was established, later came the Institute for Defence Policy (now ISS), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) established in 1992, Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS), Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS) at the University of the Western Cape (UWC) and the Centre for Policy Studies that was established in the 1980 (Landsberg, 2017).

Again, think tanks such as the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI), Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), and Human Science Research Council (HSRC) have and are still playing a vital role when it comes to influencing South Africa's foreign policy (Isike and Ogunnubi, 2017). It must, however, be noted that not all these think tanks have a major influence in foreign policy decision making as some are mainly concerned with domestic issues such as unemployment, poverty and inequality. Nevertheless, some have been prominent to engage in regional and continental integration projects spearheaded by sub-regional bodies such as the SADC and continental institutions such as the AU (Landsberg, 2017). For the current Ramaphosa administration, restoring South Africa's dignity will be a major priority in the next two to three years. With no confidence and trust of its counterparts, Pretoria will lag in acquiring any policies via regional development goals.

Conclusion

The paper has assessed South Africa's foreign policy aspirations post democratization. It aimed to address the vital paradigm shift that confronted the ANC government when it assumed power in 1994. Indeed, there was a major shift in South Africa's foreign policy post-1994 that brought with it enormous opportunities and challenges for the ANC importantly and moving forward. The authors argue that there is still much groundwork to be done in South Africa's foreign policy. There is a need for robust leadership and different role players to further address the current shortfalls of South Africa's foreign policy to improve the reliability of a state's economic policies domestically and internationally.

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