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The Future of China's Minorities with the Growing Power and Breadth of Technology

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Abstract

This paper investigates the different methods used by the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China to subjugate its ethnic minorities. Through this, it predicts the situations of minorities with the growing breadth of technology within the People's Republic of China and globally.

Keywords: Subjugation, Minorities, CP, Uyghurs, IJOP, Social Credit, Campaigns, Genocide

1. Introduction

China always finds itself in the headlines for various reasons, right from maritime disputes in the South China Sea to land border disputes with neighboring countries. There is one field in which China has consistently been making headlines for years in a row, which is the field of human rights or lack thereof. The Chinese mistreatment of its religious minorities has been among the topics of discussion at various human rights conferences worldwide, and numerous experts have commented on this dire situation.

Numerous recent leaks of documentation have revealed a great deal about what truly goes on inside the Chinese borders, especially the condition of its minorities. These leaks have consistently laid light on the multiform methods used by the Communist Party, or *CP*, to subjugate its religious minorities. The *CP*, however, maintains the narrative that there is nothing illegal taking place within its border and everything that happens is within the bounds of the law, calling any claims absurd (Uighurs: Chinese foreign minister says genocide claims 'absurd', 2021).

While the international community makes an effort to mitigate a solution that guarantees fundamental rights to the Chinese religious minorities, other countries, and world leaders are reluctant to take punitive action against the Chinese government due to their influence in worldly affairs. There are many studies on the different methods used to target China's religious minorities. However, these are often fragmented studies dealing with specific methods. This paper aims to fill this gap by consolidating this information to describe the condition of these minorities. While doing so, it aims to predict the future of these religious minorities with the growing breadth, and power, of technology. This paper argues that the advancement of technology in China would lead to further subjugation of its minorities on a much larger scale.

2. Demography of China and the History of Hate

China is an East Asian country bordering the East China Sea, Korea Bay, Yellow Sea, and the South China Sea, between North Korea and Vietnam. It consists of a total land area of approximately 9.6 million square kilometers with a 15,400-kilometer coastline. China's climate is diverse, with a tropical climate in the south and a subarctic climate in the north. It consists of a majority of mountains, high plateaus, deserts in the west. And plains, deltas, and hills in the east (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021).

An overwhelming percentage of the population resides in the eastern part of the country and is scarce in the western regions due to the mountainous terrain and vast deserts. Although China has the highest population globally, of close to 1.4 Billion, its population density is lower than most Asian countries. The regions with the highest population densities lie along the Yangtze and Yellow River valleys, the Xi Jiang River delta, the Sichuan Basin (around Chengdu), the areas surrounding Beijing, and the industrial area around Shenyang (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021).

China has a limited ethnic distribution with a large majority, almost 92% of the whole population belonging to the Han Chinese ethnicity. All other ethnic groups contribute the remaining 8% (Figure 1). The majority of the Chinese demography, close to 52%, conforms to no religion and remains unaffiliated. Approximately 22% account for folk religions and 18% for Buddhists. The remaining 8% account for other religions such as Christianity, Islam, Hindu, and others (Figure 2) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021).

The recent history of hate in China, especially towards minorities, stems from a rather unconventional source than one might attribute. Initially, the Uyghurs meted out hate toward the Hui Muslims in China. The Hui and the Han shared the same neighborhoods while the Uyghurs would keep themselves distanced, considering the Hui to be inferior, hostile, and threatening (Bellér-Hann, Community matters in Xinjiang, 2008).

In the mid-1900s, reciprocity was fundamental in the social community structure in China (Bellér-Hann, Community matters in Xinjiang, 2008). The Uyghurs shunned interactions with the Han community and kept their distance from them, especially any piryotki, also known as Han-Uyghur children (Westerlund & Svanberg, 1999) (Bellér-Hann, Situating the Uyghurs, 2007).

The Baren Township riots served as the beginning of the modern conflict between the Uyghurs and the CP. The Chinese side termed this conflict as a terrorist attack in which 200 Uyghur terrorists, armed with advanced weaponry, attacked military and local police establishments around the town of Baren (Patrick, 2010). The Uyghurs called this a protest in which 200 men from the East Turkistan Islamic Party stood against the mass influx of Han Chinese into Xinjiang.

Ethnicity	Percentage of Population
Han	91.60%
Zhuang	1.30%
Hui, Manchu, Uighur, Miao, Yi, Tujia, Tibetan, Mongol, Dong, Buyei, Yao, Bai, Korean, Hani, Li, Kazakh, Dai, and other nationalities	7.10%

Figure 1: Breakdown of different ethnic groups in China

Religion	Percentage of Population
Buddhist	18.2%%
Christian	5.1%%
Muslim	1.8%%
Folk Religion	21.90%
Hindu	<0.1%
Jewish	<0.1%
Others (includes Daoist)	0.70%
Unaffiliated	52.20%

Figure 2: Breakdown of different religious groups in China

Other sections of the Uyghur community call these protests the result of the forced abortion imposed upon 250 pregnant Uyghur locals in Xinjiang (Guo, 2015) and local Uyghurs not being allowed in Mosques ("Uighur Developments in the 1990s", n.d.). The Baren Township riots effectively laid the foundation for a bleak future for the Uyghurs as the CP could now categorize them as terrorists. After the riots ended, close to 8000 Uyghurs were arrested for "Criminal activities of ethnic splittists and other criminal offenders" ("Uighur Developments in the 1990s", n.d.) (Sulaiman, 2017).

This history of hate, blame, and crime along with numerous misunderstandings and misinterpretations results in a dire situation. The religious minorities of China, especially in Xinjiang face unimaginable levels of cruelty. The CP views Xinjiang not only as a region that houses extremists but also as one of great strategic importance. Xinjiang is located in north-western China and borders Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India among others (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021). Considering the disputes with India over Kashmir as well as its strong ties with Pakistan, gaining complete control over Xinjiang is a key task for the CP as it serves as a buffer to protect the geopolitical core of China (Xinjiang Geopolitical Importance in China's Ambitions, 2020). Economically, Xinjiang is a key region for the energy sector as well as the gateway to the middle east making it one of the most valuable regions for the CP.

3. Methods of Subjugation

3.1. Disparity in Laws

The simplest way for a state to subjugate its minorities would be to have specific laws that target these minorities. China, a firm believer in this logic, does exactly this. For apparent implications in the international community, China cannot directly ban a religion. However, they have found an ingenious way to do so. Rather than outlawing the religion itself, the CP has banned certain aspects of the faith (USDOJ, 2018). This move by the CP holds validity in the country as the bulk of the population remains unaffiliated with any religion (CIA, 2021) and considers it to be beneficial.

The Chinese constitution guarantees the freedom of religion to all its inhabitants alongside the protection of normal religious activities. However, it prohibits making use of faith to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system of the state. The CP misuses this constitutional arrangement to target the religious machinery within the state that does not conform to their standards.

The CP has criminalized certain aspects that often form part of the daily routine of the average minority. In north-western Xinjiang, a region with a majority Muslim population, people are not allowed to wear veils or grow long beards as the Party terms this to be a form of extremism (Wang, 2018). The Party prohibits children

from learning and reading religious texts and does not allow pilgrimages to Mecca unless it is state-organized (Wang, 2018). The government justifies its actions by saying that it is necessary to eliminate terrorists by eradicating ideological viruses of incorrect Islamic beliefs (Wang, 2018). Using words like virus, vermin, and tumors, the Party garners majoritarian support to carry out these activities. In some parts of Xinjiang, the Han population formed neighborhood watches to keep these minorities in check. The CP started an official campaign known as the "Research the people's conditions, improve the people's lives and win the people's hearts" campaign, to spread Party propaganda, eliminate rural poverty and promote ethnic harmony (Dooley, 2018), consisting only of members from the Han Community (Dooley, 2018).

The violators of the targeted laws of the CP, being Muslims, were dealt with extremely harshly. In most cases, their extremism was treated as a disease and not a crime of choice. This arrangement opened up a new domain for the CP to eradicate the very foundational ideologies they oppose, which meant that they needed to roll out extensive campaigns to identify the people with the disease of extremism (Wang, 2018).

3.2. Campaigns Targeting Ethnic Minorities

The CP works hard to ensure that the minority population has no say in their own lives. After the Baren Township riots and the subsequent declaration of Muslim minorities as terrorists, religion in its totality faces multiple issues within the country. We know about the many repressive campaigns by the CP to ensure ill-prosperity amongst its minorities and the subsequent death of their faith. Here we shall elaborate on those campaigns and hopefully shed light on what goes on behind the curtains of the CP.

The most extensive campaign endorsed by the CP is the Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism, or *SHAVT*, campaign launched in May 2014 ("China Steps Up 'Strike Hard' Campaign in Xinjiang", 2014). The call for the *SHAVT* campaign stems from requests made by members of the CP and the Han community following the Ürümqi riots of 2009. Xi Jinping, then the leader of the CP, recognized the importance of such a campaign while saying, "We must be as harsh as them, and show absolutely no mercy" (Khatchadourian, 2021).

The *SHAVT* gave the local authorities in Xinjiang the power to search any residence without a court order based on suspicion, arresting/detaining them on arbitrary charges. The number of arrests has tripled in the five years after introducing the *SHAVT* compared to the five years before beginning the *SHAVT* ("Eradicating Ideological Viruses", 2018). During the implementation of the *SHAVT*, the CP also released a list of 26 sensitive countries to improve border control (Figure 3). The CP began issuing passports to the residents of Xinjiang. Previously, it was uncommon for the CP to allow a passport to an inhabitant of Xinjiang ("Eradicating Ideological Viruses", 2018).

The CP has a commanding influence over other countries. During the initial phases of implementing the *SHAVT*, the CP began compelling Chinese citizens of Kazakh and Uyghur ethnicity living abroad to return ("Eradicating Ideological Viruses", 2018). The Party, exercising its influence over certain countries, got the Egyptian authorities to round up dozens of Uyghur students in the country at their behest, forcing at least 20 to return ("Egypt: Don't Deport Uyghurs to China", 2017).

Thailand, Malaysia, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Cambodia, India, and the United Arab Emirates are amongst many nations that have round-up and deported Uyghurs at the behest of the CP ("European Lawmakers Urge Bulgaria Not to Deport Chinese Uyghur Asylum Seekers", 2018) ("India to Deport Three Asylum-Seeking Uyghurs to China", 2016) ("Uyghur Asylum Seeker Detained in Dubai Feared Deported to China", 2018) (Wong & Amatatham, 2015) (Matta, 2015) ("Malaysia: Don't Send 11 Detainees to China", 2018) ("Thai Officials: Uyghurs Will Be Deported to China", 2016). In 2016, the CP began the Becoming Family campaign ("Eradicating Ideological Viruses", 2018). The BF campaign is, in simplest terms, a compulsory homestay where a member of the Han community spends at least five days every two months in the homes of Xinjiang residents, primarily in the countryside, to ensure that the community members in Xinjiang remain good Chinese citizens

("Eradicating Ideological Viruses", 2018).

The *SHAVT* and the BF campaign are two of the largest in Xinjiang following the Ürümqi riots, and numerous others often flow under the radar. Campaigns have a strategic design to gain complete control over the Uyghurs and other minorities, furthermore, the entire region of Xinjiang, even if it results in the sacrifice of these minorities. These campaigns grow larger and larger with the growing influence of technology over them as logistical tasks become easier to handle. This reduction in efforts means that even more of these minorities can be targeted efficiently in order to reduce the associated costs and between utilise their manpower.

The technological campaigns and the discrepancies and inequalities in the law place these minorities in a position of no hope where every action has a dire consequence. Their only hope is for the *CP* as well as the International community to grow a spine and influence one another to be accountable for their actions and their ignorance.

3.3. Re-education Hospitals

The Chinese ethnic cleansing campaigns aim to instill the ideologies of the perfect Han Chinese in all its inhabitants. First, they need to identify the minorities that would stay true to their faith and then eradicate their beliefs. The former happens through the numerous campaigns put forward by the *CP*, while the latter happens in a rather unconventional manner. Previously, we spoke about how the *CP* treats a person with strong, or even minor, religious ideals as someone that has a disease. Additionally we shall look into the unconventional method used to eradicate the faith from people on a furthermore foundational level.

We spoke earlier about the deportation of Uyghur students from countries under China's political influence and the ambiguity behind this step. Some of these students noticed one or more of their loved ones missing from their homes after arriving home. They, worrying about the welfare of their loved ones, began approaching the local authorities, and to their surprise, the local authorities knew exactly where these missing people were. After further inquiry, most of these students leave with superficial answers.

They hear that their loved ones were at a government training school while the officials stress that their relatives are not criminals but could not leave these schools (Ramzy & Buckley, 2019). They also learn that there is no need for anyone to worry about their loved ones as they are being taken care of at the behest of the *CP*, which provides three meals a day and sponsors their tuition (Ramzy & Buckley, 2019). These local officials also helped arrange video meetings between the students and their loved ones and threatened them, implying that their behavior could either shorten or extend the detention of their relatives (Ramzy & Buckley, 2019).

These clandestine disappearances exist in families with re-turning students and numerous other families where religious expression was existent. All these disappearances complement a sudden rise in the construction of mega-structures. These mega-structures serve as the newest editions to the *CP*'s anti-religion campaign and are known as re-education hospitals (Inside China's Police State Tactics Against Muslims, 2021).

The *CP* categorizes religion as a disease. In speeches made alongside the Politburo, Mr. Xi has referred to religion as a drug and called its effects uncontrollable, adding that "you lose your sense, go crazy and will do anything" (Inside China's Police State Tactics Against Muslims, 2021). He has also said that "People who are captured by religious extremism— male or female, old or young — have their consciences destroyed, lose their humanity, and murder without blinking an eye" (Inside China's Police State Tactics Against Muslims, 2021).

These speeches elevate the hate for religion within the country and give foundation to the *CP*'s control over the minds of the majority, which helps justify these inhumane actions. The *CP* and its leading voice, Mr. Xi, define these excellent practices as vocational skills, education training, and transformation centers, asking his forces to "Stick to rounding up everyone who should be rounded up" (Inside China's Police State Tactics Against Muslims, 2021). One might wonder who is rounded up and put into these hospitals and what their actual ethnicities are. Simply saying they are a majority of Uyghurs is not enough to convince a reader.

Afghanistan	Libya	Thailand	Algeria	Malaysia
Turkey	Azerbaijan	Nigeria	Turkmenistan	
Egypt	Pakistan	United Arab Emirates	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan
Indonesia	Russia	Uzbekistan	Kazakhstan	South Sudan
Iran	Saudi Arabia	Yemen	Kenya	Syria
Iraq	Somalia			

Figure 3: List of 26 sensitive Countries

Details on the information of those who are the victims of the hatred of the CP are in detail below; however, for the sake of the above argument, we shall only consider the relevant data here. Since 2017, approximately 14,100 people have been arrested and detained on bogus charges (Xinjiang Victims Database, n.d.), and close to 13,650 are ethnic minorities (Xinjiang Victims Database, n.d.), accounting for 97% of all victims. The remaining 3% account for people of unknown ethnicities and some Han Chinese, at around 290 (Figure 4).

The above data and that given in the table show the prevalent bias towards religion and its propagation. One might be wondering what goes on within the walls of these re-education hospitals, and the concise answer is that they forcefully alter their opinions and faith to embody the ideal Han Chinese (Zhangrun, 2020). A handful of interviews were given by few who were fortunate enough to be let out of these camps and few reporters who were allowed access to these camps, and it is their stories and experiences upon whom we shall base the remaining of this section.

Most of these people share similar experiences from the day they set foot in these re-education hospitals, and the common purpose of their term is to study how not to be a Muslim (Thum, 2018). Most prisoners here do not know why they are serving such terms, and in most cases, there are no fixed terms, where some people are allowed to leave in a few months while others have been there for years (Thum, 2018).

When one arrives at one of the re-education hospitals in the consolidated busses, the authorities process them, allot them bunks, and give them the timetables and rules for their different activities in their stay (Haitiwaji, 2021). These bunks are nothing but rooms that often house up to 12 people (Haitiwaji, 2021). These rooms only had a window with a metal shutter that was permanently closed and a bucket to excrete with two cameras constantly panning from the highest point in the room (Haitiwaji, 2021). There was no furniture, no sink, no mattresses, no toilet paper, and no sheets; it was merely those 12 people behind heavy metal cell doors (Haitiwaji, 2021). The training at this school consists of two fields. One being physical education and the other formal theoretical classes. The physical education is straight out of military training where the prisoners would march across a room for eleven hours a day as two Han soldiers kept their time. The guards would require the prisoners to stand still for hours as those who succumbed to exhaustion were mercilessly thrashed while those who failed to regain consciousness disappeared. The theoretical education involves the prisoners sitting in a closed classroom for hours, repeating the exact phrase repeatedly until their only thoughts and beliefs are the words they read (Haitiwaji, 2021).

Additionally, they have to sing pro-China anthems and speak with great praise of the CP and its leadership (Thum, 2018). There have been numerous reports of prisoners being subject to torture in these camps (Gong, 2020). Including, physical torture where the prisoners are subjects of physical abuse, made to drink alcohol (Drinking alcohol is against the rules of Islam), forced to eat pork (Eating pork is against the rules of Islam), and numerous forms of mental torture (Correspondant, 2018).

Women in re-education camps have a worse lifestyle where they are subject to all forms of abuse. There have been cases noted where women have been subject to systematic rape and other forms of sexual abuse (Hill, Campanale, & Gunter, 2021). If not abused, they are subject to mistreatment if they are pregnant, and there have

been cases of separation of the mother and child at birth. In addition to all those stated above, one of the worst forms of inhumane treatment in these camps, where ethnic minority women are force-sterilized (Xu, Cave, Leibold, Munro, & Ruser, 2020) (Hill, Campanale, & Gunter, 2021).

Another form of torture that these prisoners face is forced labor. Coincidentally, numerous factories that employ manual labor spawn around these re-education camps. There are many accounts of buses leaving the camps and heading for these factories, which force prisoners to work for days without pay (Ochab, 2020). This form of torture is not limited to their stay at the camps but follows them even after leaving. In December 2019, the CP announced that the trainees from these camps would be graduating. After which, 80,000 Uyghurs were shipped to the industrial parts of China directly from the camps (Simonds, 2020).

Brands worldwide are known to use these forced laborers and set up factories in China for lower costs than anywhere in the world. (Xu, Cave, Leibold, Munro, & Ruser, 2020). Nike has set up a factory in Qingdao, where over 600 ethnic minority workers were employed (Xu, Cave, Leibold, Munro, & Ruser, 2020). Over 700 ethnic minority workers were transported from Loop County in Xinjiang to work at an O-Film factory in Jiangxi, where Apple has its camera modules manufactured. Nike and Apple are a few of the 83 brands implicated in forced labor of ethnic minorities, including Adidas, BMW, and many others (83 major brands implicated, 2020). The question that arises would be how the CP gets away with this grave mistreatment and their crimes against humanity. The following section deals with precisely this.

Ethnicity		Gender	Population				
Han		Male	90		302		
		Female	208				
		Unknown	4				
Islamic	Hui	Male	15		33		
		Female	18				
	Uyg	Uyghur	Male	8020		10981	
			Female	2958			
			Unknown	3			
		Uyg-x	Male	5		9	
			Female	9			
			Unknown				
	Others		Male	1895		2624	
			Female	680			
			Unknown	49			
	Others		Male	49		146	
Female			19				
Unknown			78				

Figure 4: Breakdown of the victims of ethnic subjugation by ethnicity and gender

4. Role of Technology in Ethnic Subjugation

4.1. Censorship and Propaganda

The CP is well known for its blatant disregard for human rights. However, there is another aspect they are equally well known for, which is always to have control of the narrative. The CP can achieve high levels of domination over the narrative by utilizing two methods: censorship and propaganda. Censorship allows them to ensure that no conflicting opinions or narratives get any foundation, while propaganda ensures that the majority population considers them the epitome of truth.

Both these methods are age-old in their effectiveness and help justify all their cruelties towards their ethnic minorities. The CP employs numerous different methods to ensure the effective censorship of conflicting content. Furthermore, their biggest censorship organ is the Great Firewall. The Great Firewall is a tool that the CP uses to censor any content it determines as problematic. It is a marvelous tool that seamlessly performs numerous tasks, using different methods. First, it completely blocks all access to international social media websites

and applications such as Facebook, YouTube, and Skype. The Great Firewall goes through the different URLs on the internet, analyzing them along the way, filtering and blocking URLs containing problematic content (Hoffman, 2017). Looking at an online tool that determines if a website faces censorship in China (WebSitePlus, n.d), we see that <http://en.wikipedia.org> is accessible from within China http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_in_the_People's_Republic_of_China is not accessible, showing the breadth of the Great Firewall.

Second, it ensures that the people trying to access these websites remain in the dark about these deliberate blockages. Chinese netizens, in numerous instances, have understood the aspect of blocking websites and try their level best to bypass any such systems. The *CP* is evolving and has the Great Firewall actively working to redirect these methods. They use different methods such as DNS poisoning, IP access blocking, connection resetting, and blocking VPNs, among many others (Hoffman, 2017). Because of the lack of access to international social media websites, the majority Chinese population is under compulsion to use the websites that the *CP* endorses (Griffiths, 2017).

Last but not least, it searches the entirety of these alternate websites using different methods for specific keywords and blocks those posts and the ability for one to interact with these posts. As the *CP* has complete access to all information that passes through the international alternatives created by them, they can strengthen their grip over opinions by directly integrating the Great Firewall into these systems. They can directly employ keyword censorship to block out problematic content.

One might now be wondering how they censor private messages between two individuals. The *CP* achieves this form of censorship by applying a method known as deep packet inspection. Around the world, information travels in secure, yet accessible, packets. With warrants, law enforcement officers can access these packets to intercept communication between two or more individuals. The Great Firewall employs a similar method but with no oversight. It analyses and inspects every packet going across the internet and censors and redirects those packets that contain problematic keywords. Deep packet inspection can block specific messages after someone sends them, even before the receiver gets them.

The Great Firewall is a classic example of the government overstepping and pushing its narrative. The *CP* has complete control over which keywords they term problematic and which are not and can conveniently censor posts that go against their line of thought. It is problematic when people speak in support of the Uyghurs and other minorities and are automatically silenced by an algorithm. This tool, unlike many others, is imperfect, and people have been able to bypass it; However, the Great Firewall closes any loophole swiftly as it is an ever-evolving entity.




Figure 5: Complete graph of censorship data from WeiboScope




Figure 6: Data from WeiboScope between June 2020 and July 2020

Numerous keyword censorship trackers exist watching for keywords that the Great Firewall has censored. The largest and oldest social media platform that serves as an alternative to the international websites is Weibo. Hong Kong University invests a great deal into tracking the censorship across Weibo and has done so since 2018 (Figure 5). We note a rise in censored keywords between June and July 2020 when the cluster of cases was reported in Beijing, with close to 6.5 new posts facing censorship each day (Figure 6) (BBC, 2020). We must also note that these numbers are of those posts that the algorithm could find and is merely an estimate.

Censorship and propaganda are like two sides of a coin, where when lying flat on a surface, one always stays hidden while the other shows: censorship in hiding and propaganda being visible. Propaganda takes form in many ways, and the CP remains active in finding newer ways periodically. Chinese propaganda uses terminologies to classify the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities to be not only terrorists but also a disease to the Chinese ways of life. The CP uses words like vermin, virus, cancer, and rats to describe these ethnic minorities associating a sense of disgust towards them. This process results in the same attitudes carrying forward at the majority level where ethnic minorities are viewed as diseases that must be eradicated.

The CP uses propaganda to attack its minority and launch offenses against foreign media (Huang, 2021). They discredit these outlets to ensure that their majority population does not hold them with any regard. This process further ensures that theirs is the only narrative that people consider to be truthful. The CP also uses propaganda in its re-education hospitals to brainwash the minority prisoners it holds. As we know, a large part of the re-education experience is the transformation of beliefs, and the CP uses propaganda for this very reason. They force these prisoners to chant pro-CP repeatedly, among other iterative functions forcing these beliefs to replace any pre-existing ones.

Propaganda is also widespread in Chinese cyberspace, where citizen users of Weibo receive remuneration for posting pro-CP content. This type of pro-CP content is also spread by the official government handles on these platforms. The CP also releases numerous forms of content like short movies, videos, posters, and slogans that criticize Western and other foreign beliefs. This method ensures intolerant behavior towards western opinion and a strong resonance towards that of the CP.

From past studies (Inouye, 2017), we know that censorship and propaganda together find their use as an opinion directing mechanism more than a suppressive mechanism. Criticisms of the CP methods are welcome; however, any criticism and belief that may cause public uproar and threaten the stability of those in power face censorship (Inouye, 2017). We are in no way justifying the actions of the CP, and we recognize that their methods are a violation of their citizens' fundamental rights. Censorship and propaganda, along with discrepancies in their laws and numerous subjugating technologies, destroy any hope that these minorities may have left.

4.2. Integrated Joint Operations Platform

The Integrated Joint Operations Platform or the *IJOP* is one of the leading applications of technology in China for the subjugation of minorities. The *IJOP* is a system of systems that tracks every movement of an individual in their everyday life and finds patterns of movement and behavior (Dholakia & Wang, 2019). The *IJOP* plays a vital role in the judicial department of the *CP* as its task is to predict and pick out people that are most likely to commit a crime shortly and supply this information to the local police.

The *IJOP* employs an application that tracks a person's private and personal data such as their location, blood type, how much fuel they use if they are on birth control, and many others. Using this data and external surveillance data such as CCTV cameras, equipped with facial detection and police checkpoints, the *CP* can coherently track their citizens. Along with tracking its citizen's movements, the *IJOP* is also available to find discrepancies and, if suspicious, notify the local authorities (Dholakia & Wang, 2019).

The discrepancies in the habitual patterns can be even the most minor and will still trigger the *IJOP*, which determines the level of suspicion. The nature of what the *IJOP* determines suspicious is wholly unknown. However, there have been unverified reports that discrepancies like exercising longer than usual, using the back door of one's house over the front are some of what *IJOP* flags. The *IJOP* collects and stores all this data on a shared database accessible to the entire judicial body of the *CP* across all regions of the country (Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region, 2018).

The *IJOP* also receives data from numerous police checkpoints at different parts of Xinjiang, where the local authorities rigorously go through the mobile devices of the people passing through (Ma, 2019). Alongside physical checks, scanners allow for the automatic collection of information on the identity of those that pass through (Ma, 2019). All this data feeds into a shared database that determines the level of suspiciousness (Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region, 2018).

One aspect of the *IJOP* known from the numerous data leaks from the *CP* is that the *IJOP*'s analysis wing is artificial intelligence (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2019). AI determines who is suspicious and who is not (Shu, 2019). One might argue that these algorithms remove inherent cognitive biases present in humans; however, research shows that algorithms have an inherent bias due to different factors (Knight, 2019). Thus, the *CP* convinces the layman that this bias-less algorithm is an absolute determinant of one's levels of suspiciousness, thus garnering majority support.

The suspicious people are usually brought in for questioning by the local authorities and are, in most cases, sent to re-education camps (Ma, 2019). Sources claim, in particular reports, that the local authorities are given daily arrest quotas that they have to fulfill, only adding to the layers of proof of ethnic subjugation (Grauer, 2021). The *IJOP* also fuels another entity under the *CP* known as the Social Credit System, which we shall discuss in the next section.

4.3. Social Credit System

The Chinese Social Credit System, or *SCS*, is a regional extension of the *IJOP*. However, the key differences between the *IJOP* and the *SCS* are that:

- The *IJOP* works on the concept of suspicion while the *SCS* works on the concept of trustworthiness (Lee, 2020);
- The *IJOP* is a centralized system, while the *SCS* is a regional system with different similar systems existing across regions around the country (Kobie, 2019).

The *SCS* works using information from the same parent database as the *IJOP*, and by analyzing this information, it scores a person on a scale of their trustworthiness on a scale of meritocracy across numerous

factors that influence daily life. The parameters that determine how the score of trustworthiness changes are set by the local administrative wings. The *SCS* has seen no accurate updates since 2014 and was due for an update in 2020. However, due to the outbreak of COVID-19, this update was put on indefinite hold (Reilly, Lyu, & Robertson, 2021).

The *SCS* aims to be a comprehensive system that can automatically determine a persons' and companies' trustworthiness on a numeric scale. This system is currently working on a regional basis accessing the different databases present in the region to produce these numeric values (Donnelly, 2021). Since this is still in its developmental stages, there is great speculation around the full breadth of this system and its implications on the Chinese commoner. There have been numerous leaks of documentation and personal accounts of people living with this system.

For a corporate setting, numerous aspects determine the trustworthiness of a given company, and the implications of such a score are also imaginable. All these aspects on which the *SCS* judges companies are standard regulatory and compliance criteria that the authorities already, legally, require them to fulfill. These include, but are not limited to, passing all government inspections, paying taxes on time, fulfilling environmental protection requirements, and other industry-specific requirements (Chipman, 2019).

Adhering to all these given requirements ensures that the *SCS* scores for the given company remain high. At the same time, deviating from these means that their *SCS* scores take a hit, whose severity depends on the violations. In any credit system, those with scores lower than a specific threshold find themselves on a blacklist. This list exists in the *SCS* as well, where companies whose score drops below a specific threshold find themselves on a blacklist (Chipman, 2019).

A company ending up on the blacklist has multiple impacts, most of which are still unclear to the public. However, some functions that blacklisting affects are surfacing through numerous leaks from citizens and local authorities. Companies that find themselves on the blacklist face more frequent audits and regulatory checks, exclusion from public procurement opportunities, the inability to access and benefit from government incentives, and are subject to public shame and humiliation (Chipman, 2019).

For individuals, in 2015, the Chinese Supreme Court put forward a system of blocklists to foster the creation of a *SCS* (Weatherby, 2020). The reason for them choosing a system of blocklists rather than a score is relatively unknown. In this system, people that fail to abide by their court rulings find themselves on certain lists, whose severity tends to increase with the violation of the rulings. There are numerous lists accounted for, some of which restrict a person's ability to use public transport, travel by air, take a loan, avail of accommodation at five-star residences, among others (Sun, 2021).

The modern *SCS* works on a similar basis where meeting specific requirements ensures high scores. Here, a system of slabs exists, rather than that (Weatherby, 2020) of blacklists or red-lists, where people find themselves in a particular slab based on their scores. These slabs do not have specific definitions and vary drastically across different regions. However, through certain leaks, examples of real-life *SCS* scores have come to light within some areas of China. There exists a scoring system on the scale of 600-1300, where the former and latter are the lowest and highest scores, respectively. Every individual entering the *SCS* system, by default, starts at a score of 1000 that reduces or increases depending on their behavior (Weatherby, 2020). **Some aspects that can increase one's score are** (Weatherby, 2020): Engaging in charity work; Taking care of elderly family members; Positively influencing one's neighborhood; Donating blood; Praising the government on social media; Helping the poor; Having a good financial credit history; Committing a heroic act.

With an *SCS* score in the higher regions, one can expect(Weatherby, 2020):

Priority for school admissions and employment; Easier access to cash loans and consumer credit; Deposit free bike and car hire; Cheaper public transport; Shorter wait times in hospitals; Fast-track promotions; Tax breaks.

Some aspects that can decrease one's *SCS* score are (Weatherby, 2020): Traffic offenses; Illegal protests; Not visiting parents regularly; Posting anti- government messages on social media; Spreading rumors on social media; Insincere apologies for crimes committed; Participating in anything the authorities deem to be a cult; Being in contact with people with lower credit scores; Cheating in online games;

With an *SCS* score in the lower regions, one can expect (Weatherby, 2020):

Denial of licenses and some permits to some social services; Exclusion from booking some flights or high-speed train tickets; Less access to credit; Restricted access to public services; Ineligibility to government employment; No access to private schools; Public shaming where their ID numbers are displayed online; Forceful change of caller tunes to broadcast that they are dishonest.

Looking at the aspects that may lower one's *SCS* score, we see specific criteria that may raise significant flags. Participating in anything the authorities deem to be a cult serves as a somewhat ambiguous statement that the *CP* uses to target minorities, giving them lower *SCS* scores. Expanding on this idea, groups with religious beliefs, according to the *CP*, are cults, and anyone that practices their religion is part of a cult. Thus anything they do for the sustenance and propagation of their religion is an activity associated with cult behavior. Thus, the authorities use these ambiguous definitions of untrustworthy behavior to target religious minorities strategically.

In another aspect, associating and interacting with someone with a lower *SCS* score can affect a person's score. Keeping this in mind, we can see that living in a religious neighborhood can affect one's *SCS* scores as one's proximity to people with cult-like behavior, having lower *SCS* scores, increases. Lowered *SCS* scores force people to move to lower-income neighborhoods as they cannot afford housing in other regions. This lower score also affects their employment opportunities and the educational opportunities of their children. One's family member or neighbor being sent to a re-education camp further reduces their *SCS* scores.

Thus, we can see a cycle of bias and discrimination built into the same system present here, and this gives enough evidence for us to determine that the government's motive behind the *SCS* is not only to determine trustworthiness but is also to subjugate their religious minorities further. At this juncture, we see a fragmented version of the *SCS*, which works merely at a regional level (Drinhausen & Brussee, 2021).

The *CP* had elaborate plans for the *SCS* with the aim of materializing them by 2020. However, due to the pandemic, these had to be put on hold. With newer technological advancements and the passing of the pandemic, there is no definite timeline for when the new system will come into effect. This new system would be unified and would exist not only in Xinjiang but around the whole country, further targeting minorities that managed to move out of Xinjiang and make a life for themselves. It is imperative, for the sake of the Chinese minority population that this system is put on an indefinite hold.

5. Conclusion

As we have seen, the situation of the ethnic minorities in China is dire and the *CP* does not show any signs of deviation from the path they have taken. We are at a juncture in time where technology is ever-evolving and it is safe to assume that the *CP* is adapting to these changes. Recent developments in DNA collection (Cyranski, 2020) and emotional studies (Tobin & Matsakis, 2021) point towards new forms of technology in the mix with deeper levels of surveillance (Kannan, 2020).

China's impact and influence on the international community make them a formidable enemy of humanity as no other member of the international community will speak against them. The *CP* strategically ensures that they constantly garner the support of the majority public, resulting in no internal foundation for anyone to stand up against this grave injustice. As we read these lines, innocent Uyghurs are losing everything they have, right from their religion to their identity and beliefs. As members of the international community, the onus falls on us to

hold these subjugators accountable for their actions.

The future holds numerous campaigns like the *SHAVT* and the *BF* to further destroy the rights of these minorities and in order to ensure these stop, we need to ensure that religion is accepted and not equated to extremism. We as a community need to practice and preach secularity and religious tolerance, without which these Chinese methods will spread around the world like wildfire. We already see spawns of such methods around the world like the CAA-NRC in India and the Hijab ban in Switzerland (Oltermann, 2021) alongside numerous other nations (Iftikhar, 2020) among many others. It is time we catch these dire signs and make the world a better place. The ever-growing victims database and the details it divulges show nothing but darkness for the Chinese ethnic minorities. The future looks bleak, to an extent that all ethnic minorities will disappear from China, leading to a completely Han ruled state with only Han inhabitants. This is terrible on the world scale as this may inspire other nations to do the same to their minorities. The Middle Eastern countries expelled Hindus' and Christians, the Western countries expelled Muslims, and all other countries expelled their respective minorities opening up for World War Three to be fought because of religious differences. Involving nuclear arsenal at that stage would lead to the end of the world and humanity, as we know it.

This paper investigates the numerous methods in which the *CP* subjugates its minorities and extrapolates these different aspects to predict the future of the Chinese ethnic minorities. In order to be concise, only significant technologies and methods are under consideration. Sources of information here are through primary research for which adequate references are given, or directly through leaked documentation available online.

We investigate the implementations of the *IJOP*, re-education hospitals, *SCS*, different campaigns, disparities in laws, censorship, and propaganda. These topics will require further research to further verify all claims here as well as present the true scale of the technology involved in ethnic subjugation, or what it truly is, genocide. I recommend that readers of this paper, as well as other academics, further research these different topics to produce empirical data to support these findings. I extend prayer and support to the ethnic minorities in China and around the world and hope that we are able to make the world a better, more tolerant, place for everyone to live in.

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