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# Crisis Management of Disaster Communication in Mitigation of Covid-19 Pandemic in Indonesia

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## Abstract

This study aims to determine the crisis management of disaster communication in mitigating coronavirus outbreak. Situational Crisis Communication Theory serves as the basis for reviewing prevention through the situation and conditions of Covid-19 transmission, with descriptive qualitative method and narrative analysis, to help provide an explanation of the pandemic crisis. The reality of mitigation using the constructiveness paradigm must provide dialectics of the management and availability of vitamins, drugs, oxygen, hospitals, and health workers as part of public information security. Results show the lack of public awareness and disinformation, as well as suboptimal coordination on issues of policies regarding large-scale social restrictions, New Normal, restrictions on community activities. These issues were used on social media by the skeptical public and opposition groups under in the guise of democracy. As recommendations, crisis handling should be integrated, through the construction of reality with management of crisis and communication. Using an approach to cultural values, and societal norms, maximizing the use of socialization by government officials, through mass media, social media, and direct action, as well as providing the needs of the community to counter the political issues.

**Keywords:** Disaster Communication, Crisis Management, Mitigation

## 1. Introduction

Since Covid-19 pandemic hit in Indonesia in March 2020, the government has attempted to mitigate the disaster. This is in response to the government's decision to raise the status of Covid-19 pandemic as a non-natural disaster (Arifin, 2020). Mitigation steps that were taken namely by taking crisis policies such as regarding large-scale social restrictions (Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar or PSBB), New Normal, and restrictions on community activities (Pemberlakuan Pembatasan Kegiatan Masyarakat or PPKM) on various levels (Micro level or Emergency up to level 4). The determination of the policy is an answer to the crisis conditions that occurred. Due to the rapid spread of transmission to the community, so that the government took integrated actions with various planning, organization, and action and evaluation; such as distributing the Ministry of Social Direct Cash Assistance (Bantuan Langsung Tunai or BLT), diverting Village Funds as assistance to the community, procurement of vaccines and drugs to prevent transmission, as well as socializing health protocols.

These actions are an integrated policy in mitigating artificial disaster, and are a strategic step to prevent virus transmission, as well as reduce the adverse impacts on social and economic lives. These steps also prompted criticisms from the public, especially the opposition, due to the constantly high number of positive cases, lack of oxygen, hospitals overwhelmed by patients, and unavailability of medicine and supplements.

News of this policy almost every day becomes the consumption of mass media and social media, which provides information on prevention developments and about the impacted community, both those who are infected, go to the hospital and those who die. However, the news on mitigation that aims to reduce the spread of the virus, encounters a balance of obstacles from information that does not support policies, so that miscommunication can occur in the community.

Prominent members of the public have voiced their concerns on the (in)effectiveness of social or activity restrictions in the early months of the pandemic. Robert Budi Hartono, one of Indonesia's richest men, wrote a letter to President Joko Widodo rejecting PSBB, saying that it was not effective to reduce the transmission rate of Coronavirus (Trans-siber.com, 2020). One of the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia even voiced their stance that New Normal is still inappropriate to make peace with the rising Covid-19 positive rates (Saputra, 2020). In the general, New Normal meet with various reactions, both positive and negative. A social media analysis study resulted in 54% positive sentiment and 38% negative sentiment on New Normal on Twitter (Sandyawan, 2020). This means that the New Normal in general accepted positively and is dominated by emotions of trust and anticipation, supported by hashtags that show the government's commitment, especially from the Indonesian armed forces. One year into the pandemic, the situation has not significantly improved, as cases still rising continually. Even then, rejections for activity restrictions are still rampant, amidst news of hospitals overwhelmed and overcapacity. The patients were left waiting for hours or even rejected to be admitted, scarcity of oxygen tanks to support Covid-19 patients with respiratory problems, to scarcity of medicine and supplements to treat and prevent Covid-19 (Bona, 2021; Jelita, 2021; Tuter, 2021). Besides that, disinformation and hoaxes on Covid-19 vaccinations were also widespread, hindering the government efforts to reach herd immunity. As much as 50,000 information about Covid-19 vaccines that were spread among the public was not factually accurate (Situmorang, 2021).

The reality of the pandemic as an artificial catastrophe was inevitable for humans to anticipate, provoking uncertainties in the life of the community. The uncertainty of the situation indicates that there is a crisis of knowledge and awareness of humans as individual beings and social beings as part of the greater universe. The life of democracy with technological developments that are glorified by humans as a sign of the postmodern era is evidence of artificial crises that can destroy claims of successful inventions and the success of the order of human civilization. The signs of crisis management are already apparent, as well as the need for integrated disaster communication as a strategy. In doing so, it is possible to anticipate and prevent coronavirus transmission in an optimal manner.

The development of information and communication technology paved the way for freedom of interaction and information dissemination that could go uncontrolled in social media. This information overload can contribute to the erosion of social values and pose serious risk when those who are anti-vaccines and refuse to believe or conform to the government roam outside without proper health protocols. The reality of Covid-19 pandemic is proof that the public and the government must synergize and filter the flow of information to counter those oppositional views on government policies. This condition of disaster needs careful planning, dynamic organizing, measured actions and accuracy, precise evaluations, and the right communication strategy, so that the prevention of virus transmission and harmful disinformation can be alleviated, to give the sense of security and trust to the public through proportional reporting.

## **2. Research Objective**

Based on the explanation given above, this research focused on online media news on disaster communication and crisis management in mitigating the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia. The research questions are as follows: 1)

How is the mitigation of disaster communication of Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia as portrayed in news on online media?; 2) how is the crisis management in mitigation of disaster communication of Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia as portrayed in news on online media?

The focus and research questions led to the research objectives, which are to analyze online media news on disaster communication and crisis management in mitigating Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia.

The reality of the pandemic as an artificial catastrophe was inevitable for humans to anticipate, provoking uncertainties in the life of the community. The uncertainty of the situation points to a crisis in the knowledge and consciousness of humans as individual beings and social beings as part of the greater universe. The life of democracy with the development of technology that is glorified by humans is a sign of the postmodern era. It is evidence of an artificial crisis that can destroy the claims of success in the invention and the success of the order of human civilization. The sign of a management crisis has been already visible, as well as the need for integrated disaster communication as a strategy. In doing so, optimal anticipation and prevention of coronavirus transmission can be achieved.

The development of information and communication technology paved the way for freedom of interaction and information dissemination that could go uncontrolled in social media. This information overload can contribute to the erosion of social values and pose serious risk when those who are anti-vaccines and refuse to believe or conform to the government roam outside without proper health protocols. The reality of Covid-19 pandemic is proof that the public and the government must synergize and filter the flow of information to counter those oppositional views on government policies. This disaster condition requires careful planning, dynamic organization, measurable action and accuracy, proper evaluation, and appropriate communication strategies. So that the prevention of virus transmission and harmful disinformation can be reduced, to provide a sense of security and trust to the public through proportional reporting.

### **3. Method**

#### *3.1 Literature Review*

Disaster defined as “as an abrupt and calamitous incident that seriously disrupts the functions of a community or society” (Moorthy, Benny, & Gill, 2018, p. 53). These incidents may result in massive loss of lives and their belongings and the environment, which overwhelms the community’s ability to manage and use their own resources. Disasters can be natural or man-made/non-natural. To reduce adverse effects of disasters, disaster management must be formulated and implemented. Disaster management is an activity or series of activities that are comprehensive, integrated, and continuous, comprising a cycle of activities including 1) before the disaster which is prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and vigilance; 2) at the time of the disaster starting from giving early warning, evacuation, rescue, and searching for victims; and 3) after the disaster, it requires rehabilitation, healing, sponsorship, and reconstruction of human settlements (Fauzi & Rusdy, 2020).

Communication is a key component in disaster management. One of the crucial challenges in responding to natural or man-made disasters is communication (Moorthy et al., 2018). It is present in all aspects of disaster management from prevention and mitigation to response to disaster, to post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction (Fauzi & Rusdy, 2020). Fauzi and Rusdy (2020, p. 134) further defined communication as the process of delivering messages which always involve communicators and communicants, carried out continuously in an ongoing and endless manner. Communication also takes place in a situational context, where communicators must pay attention to the situation factors where the communication takes place. Additionally, communication is conveying information (informative), as well as persuasive, aiming to change the communicant’s understanding to follow what is desired by the communication. It is also important to note that communication is always changing, dynamic and complex. Communication must be a two-way process, which in simpler terms involves sending messages from one person and receiving the message as the feedback (Dainty, Moore, & Murray, 2006).

Therefore, disaster communication is crucial in the management of disasters at all levels of occurrence. Disaster communication then becomes an essential feature of natural or man-made disaster mitigation, preparedness,

response, and recovery (Houston, Schraedley, Worley, Reed, & Saidi, 2019). In this case, disaster communication refers to the information disseminated to the public by governments, emergency management organizations, disaster responders and the information shared, created, and distributed by the mass media and the public. Crisis is analogous to disaster. The two terms occasionally used interchangeably, but generally the key distinction is that a crisis refers to something that happens to an organization, whereas disaster is community-based (Mason et al., 2019). Crisis is mainly a situation or event that possess more negative implications to an organization, that not only affects the organization itself, but also its public's, products, services, or reputation (Luhukay, 2009). Furthermore, Luhukay (2009) asserted that crisis could lead to an organization's success or demise, depending upon how the management perceive and respond to the crisis situation. If management can see the potential of a crisis or disaster, then they will see the importance of crisis management as part of strategic planning and allocate the necessary resources for it.

Crisis management involves intentional, particular planning to face and handle potential crises. It is part of the organization's strategic planning, which must be realized by the leadership or management (Taneja, Pryor, Sewell, Recuero, & Texas, 2014). Communication is a key component to organizational success in crisis management. According to Berge (1991, p. 31)) as cited in Taneja et al. (2014), to handle the crisis and minimize its impact, organizational leaders should be prepared and follow the four keys of crisis communications, namely "speed, accuracy, credibility, and consistency."

To understand the role of crisis communication in crisis management, the theoretical framework used is Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT). Developed by W Timothy Coombs, SCCT provides a framework and mechanism for anticipating how stakeholders will react to crises that threaten an organization's reputation. Then projects how people will react to the strategies used to manage crises to provide crisis communication guidelines (Coombs, 2007). Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) tries to map crisis response strategies that can be used to protect reputation and build what was once called image restoration but is now known as image repair (Benoit & Pang, 2008). SCCT combines attribution theory and is divided into crisis, response strategies, and recommendations. Crisis can be divided into different types based on the level of responsibility, factors in the history of the crisis, history of the relationship, and severity. Ten possible response strategies, grouped into three (reject, reduce, and agree), are available to managers. Crisis response recommendations offer guidance based on the situation and the chosen response strategy. While every crisis is unique and must be responded to appropriately, the prescriptive guidelines offered by the SCCT can help leaders protect reputation asset crises and can assist in preparing for and responding to crises (Coombs, 2007).

While initially derived from management and public relations and crisis relating to organizations, SCCT has been used in previous studies as a theoretical framework to explain crisis communication of larger disasters, including the Covid-19 pandemic. Hirschfeld (2021) found through online experiment that SCCT can adequately describe the effects of communication strategies on reputation of local government officials during a pandemic. Through a quantitative study in the US, Bickham and Francis (2021) researched the public's perceptions of government officials' communication in the wake of Covid-19 pandemic through early news coverage about the pandemic from local, state, and federal government officials. In Indonesia, the strategy of crisis communication of the West Java Provincial Government in social media was studied, with findings that showed the government more concerned with public safety rather than organizational reputation (Maulida, 2021). While Bukar (Bukar, Jabar, Sidi, Nor, & Abdullah, 2021) formulated a social media crisis communication model for building public resilience, asserting that social media usage has a positive effect on resilience and people's ability to recover from crisis like Covid-19 pandemic. A study centered on analyzing narratives in the media was done to analyze narratives concerning coronavirus as presented in public news media in Sweden and Denmark to find out how media can influence, one country implemented and adhere to stricter restrictions than the other did (Radlovacki, 2020). This shows the potential of narrative analysis of media and government in response to Covid-19 pandemic.

### *3.2 Descriptive Qualitative Approach*

This research utilized descriptive qualitative approach using constructivism paradigm. Narrative analysis method was used to answer the research objective. A qualitative approach was used to describe humans and their actions,

as well as events in social life. Descriptive qualitative methodology aims to form new concepts or refine concepts that the data reveal, to make the concepts and theories more explicit without interpretation or theoretical analysis (Neuman, 2013, p. 562). Conceptualization then becomes an integral part of data analysis which involves collecting, sorting, analyzing, and understanding data. This research was based on constructivism paradigm. The philosophical paradigm of constructivism as a research approach asset that people construct their own understanding and knowledge about the work through experiencing things and reflect on those experiences (Dickson, Yeboah, & Ankrah, 2019). In constructivism, reality is subjective from the individual perspectives of participants of the study. This subjective reality is what the researcher is trying to find, by collecting meanings of phenomenon through interactions with others in the social and cultural context. To do this, we employed narrative analysis. Narrative is a form of rhetoric and a general form of logic, referring to explanations by combining descriptions of theories of events followed by their explanation (Neuman, 2013). Narratives take on a special meaning that depends on the social context, and they provide meaning to members of that social context (Treadwell, 2014). Furthermore, according to Treadwell (2014), narrative analysis of message content – such as disaster communication – in the rhetorical framework provides insight on whether the content might or might not be effective.

Data in this research is in the form of text, namely text from online media news randomly curated since the start of pandemic in March 2020 to July 2021. Data collection technique used in this study is documentation technique. Documentation technique is analyzing the data from secondary sources like textbooks, magazines, or other documents relevant to the study (Dickson et al., 2019). Interview After the data is collected, the data is then analyzed using inductive analysis. Inductive analysis involves making sense of the specifics to create a generalization of the phenomenon (Treadwell, 2014). To do this, Bogdan and Biklen (1998) reminds us that in data analysis using constructivist paradigm, we are constructing the description of the phenomenon that was formed while collecting and examining the data. To ensure the validity of the research from the data collection process to analysis-interpretation process, triangulation is used (Kriyantono, 2006). In this case, researcher triangulation is used as well as methods triangulation. Researcher triangulation is used through employing different researchers to understand the phenomenon being studied.

#### **4. Results**

The results of this study are first, construction of disaster mitigation requires accuracy and critical intelligence to develop a series of plans, organizations, and actions by detecting various possible policies with various considerations in accordance with the understanding and knowledge built. Disasters (in the Law of The Republic of Indonesia Number 24 Year 2007 on Disaster Management) are said to be an event or a series of events threatening and disturbing the community life and livelihood, caused by natural and/or non-natural as well as human factors resulting in human fatalities, environmental damage, loss of material possessions, and psychological impact. Meanwhile, non-natural disasters are a non-natural event or a series of non-natural events such as technological failure, modernization failure, and epidemics. Further mitigation is stated in the law, namely a series of efforts to reduce risk, either through physical development or by providing awareness and increasing capacity to deal with threats.

Policies such as PSBB, New Normal, and PPKM are a series of crisis management actions taken in facing the pandemic by using prevention communication models applied by describing the complexity of communication theories. It shows that the structure and environment of the organization or community and other stakeholders to influence the crisis management efforts both positively and negatively. Strategic flexibility in crisis management can enhance leadership efforts, while the more tangible aspects of the organization or community (Lee & Makhija, 2009; Rhee & Valdez, 2009). In the case of Covid-19 pandemic, strategic flexibility in crisis management and reliable organizing can enhance integrated leadership efforts with more tangible aspects such as social assistance and coordination in reducing blockages in larger communication channels that hinder leadership efforts during crisis.

News reports on mitigating disease outbreaks in a crisis, the government has designed a series of policies with various alternative conditions that occur in the community. However, the policies taken are still subject to

distortion and dis-communication. In Shannon and Weaver's terms, this is called noise (Severin & Tankard, 2011). Noise was caused by the emergence of social media information and television news, which causes policies to always face challenges and obstacles. In addition to the weakness of the communication model applied, there are many interests of political actors who take advantage of the momentum of democracy as an image building and take advantage of the skepticism of opposition groups that fuel the sensitivity of hatred in the instability of the problem's complexity.

Secondly, many factors contribute to instability in the relationship between political communicators and audience members, and the ebb and flow of political insider interest and ambivalence towards political communication itself. Political messages decreased, politicians and journalists are under pressure to adjust output by shortening the message and making it more interesting and relevant. Changes in people's support for political institutions, and the weakening of political parties in competitive democracies and trust in politicians' statements that encourage adaptive maneuvers. Crisis management can be done by perfecting the communication model and communication theory. Changes in the political communication system can be accounted for through the disposition of three main actors, namely: politicians, journalists, and members of the public, to respond adaptively to perceptions and behaviors that continue to evolve with each other, in a constantly changing environment, the dynamics of which relate to technology, politics and sociology.

The Covid-19 pandemic is a non-natural factor, causing a significant number of victims and disrupted economic and social development. To alleviate this, corrective management actions must be taken. Rodney Overton (2008, p. 5) stated that management is an art and a science. It is the art of making people more effective, and the science is the act of doing it. There are four basic pillars in management: planning, organizing, directing, and monitoring.

One aspect of management in crisis communication is knowledge management. In pandemic times, communication of knowledge is important to ensure everyone has the right literacy to be informed of the latest government policies. Hence, knowledge management is crucial. Knowledge management is an explicit and systematic management process that enables collective and individual knowledge recourses to be identified, created, stored, shared, and used (Girard & Girard, 2015). Other than knowledge management, health management of crisis must also be understood. Health crises and stigmatize people and create adverse social impacts, so communicating health crisis to the public needs extra careful planning (Efstathiou, 2014). It is imperative that policymakers and those in the field to make needs assessments on the effect of communities and be able to monitor aid, determine humanitarian needs, and approach equity in the distribution of aid (Garfield, 2007). In addition, decisions must be made taking into account the human factor, emotional involvement with human suffering and loss. The health crisis must immediately take responsible action against individuals and the public. This means that crisis management must be faced with crisis management. Policy actions from the central government to the village are integrated. Sociocultural and religious values must unite public awareness. Partial action will not be able to contain the spread. Vaccination as part of the body's immunity must provide a solution, supported by health protocols, hospitals, oxygen, medicines, and supplements that can be available and meet the needs of the community.

As reported on the Government of Indonesia's official website on Covid-19, the number of deaths from the disease has reached 110.619 as of 10th August 2021 (National Covid-19 Task Force, 2021). Around 51 million people have received the first dose of Covid-19 vaccine, while almost 25 million have received a second dose of the vaccine. Mustinda (2021) reported that survey data for vaccine refusal is 67% still unsure and 33% refuse to be vaccinated, according to a survey conducted by the Indonesian Ministry of Health from April to May 2021. From the survey results, almost 99% of respondents already knew information about vaccination, but around 7.6% of respondents still refused the vaccine. Based on education level, the highest percentage of people who refused vaccination came from respondents with groups who completed Diploma and Bachelor level education and above. The percentage figure is 18%, higher than the group with a lower level of education. This may be due to reading too many hoaxes that add to the vaccine's uncertainty. Example can be found in the interview with a village head who is the Chairman of Village Head Association in Serangpanjang District in West Java:

Citizens refuse to be vaccinated because: 1) there is information in social media which claimed that vaccines are not halal, 2) there are citizens who have comorbid diseases, 3) socialization on vaccines still unfinished. After we conducted socialization on increasing community consciousness to be vaccinated, citizens enthusiastically come to vaccination locations, we were even out of vaccines due to that. In Ponggang Village there are 1,800 citizens vaccinated from the initial number of 78, whereas in Telagasari Village just 50% of citizens already vaccinated, around 1,000 from population of 2,000.

Although the percentage of vaccine reservations is still high, the government continues to accelerate the vaccination program. The government targets 2-3 million vaccinations per day, even though it is constrained by the emergency PPKM policy.

## 5. Discussion

The integration of various aspects such as, culture, social capital, trust, social media, mass media and political actors and communication models into a series of policies in implementing crisis management albeit the division of different meanings still find communication distortions that motivate people's unconsciousness in participating in pandemic prevention. Communication plays an integral role in health. Health communication involves the study and use of communication strategies to inform and influence individual and community decisions in improving their health, including health practices and attitudes in contributing to disease prevention and health improvement (Thomas, 2006). Health communication is the process of delivering health messages by communicators through certain channels or media to the communicant with the aim of leading to a healthy state, both physically, mentally, and socially. If used properly, health communication can influence attitudes, perceptions, knowledge, awareness, and social norms that act as drivers or precursors in behavior change (Suryanto, 2015). Health communication looks at the creation of shared meaning and impact of messages about health itself and about health services. Communication is key because it plays a role in creating, collecting, and sharing health information. Health information is the most important resource in health services and promotion because health information is needed to guide health behavior, health care and health-related decision-making. This communication process also allows the creation of various persuasive messages that are disseminated through the main channels to provide the target audience with relevant health information that can positively influence their health knowledge, attitudes, and behavior (Neuhauser & Kreps, 2003).

The foundation of health communication in Indonesia is Law Number 23 Year 1992 Article 23 on the development of health information systems to support health management and efforts using information and communication technology (Fatmah, 2014). Furthermore, Fatmah (2014:15) identified key aspects of health communications, namely 1) inform and influence decision-making (both individual and community), 2) motivate, 3) change behavior, 4) increase knowledge and comprehension on health problems, 5) empower the community, 6) information exchange and two-way dialogue. According to Bandura (2004), theoretically there are two ways how health communication can change health behavior, namely in a direct way or socially mediated. Through direct channels, communication media drive change by informing, modeling, motivating, and guiding personal change. Whereas in the socially mediated pathway, communication media connect people to social networks and communities that provide personalized guidance, reasonable incentives, and social support for desired change (Bandura, 2004). It is mostly in this social realm that most behavioral changes occur (Bandura, 2009).

In the context of pandemic, media play as role in communication of this health disaster. Media can play an important role before, during, and after disaster or crisis, but that role is often misunderstood in ways that result in critical information gaps or flawed narratives (Monahan & Ettinger, 2018). Although media can play a positive role in health communication including in the face of a health crisis as explained above, on the other hand, the media may do more harm than good when reporting these disasters. This could be in the form of a tendency for media reports to promote misinformation, propagate myths, spread rumors, and generally favor sensationalistic visuals and human-interest storylines over measured, fact-based reporting (Monahan & Ettinger, 2018).

Communication theorists make an analogy between the human communication process and the electronic telecommunications process, in which information is sent from transmitter to receiver while being mediated by

noise or distortion (Severin & Tankard, 2011). In this case, though, communication is seen as a more dynamic concept through a transmitter and continuously receiving feedback (though still moderated by noise). This view offers communication that is more representative of the reality of the process, because it considers that communication occurs between transmitter and receiver.

Social media have changed how the public participate in disasters. They are not just the passive victims and communicants, but active and empowered communicators, as social media enables new forms of information seeking and sharing including exchanges of assistance. Disaster communication now not only involves designing and disseminating messages but using data from the public to best tailor those messages and make the disaster communication more effective, a field known as crisis informatics (Palen & Hughes, 2018). On the other hand, the nature of social media meant anyone can create and distribute any kind of information, without a proper gatekeeping mechanism to ensure the information is factually correct and acceptable. This resulted in an overabundance of information – where the accurate and erroneous all mixed together – that occurs during an epidemic, a term we call infodemic (Galvão, 2021). This overabundance of information meant that inaccurate information, hoaxes, and misinformation can propagate freely in social media. Authorities have tried to curb the spread of this infodemic, but it is inevitable. The problem is, this infodemic could be as deadly as the coronavirus itself. A viral video of a medical doctor LO spreading misinformation about the pandemic spread in social media such as Tiktok, Instagram, and YouTube. This hoax spread by Doctor LO allegedly caused a man in Tegal to die, as he refused treatment and hospitalization, making his condition worsen to the point that he could not be saved, as told by his son on social media (Wareza, 2021). What we can do is to distill the sheer quantity of information, which according to Eysenbach (2020) occurs on four levels namely (1) science, (2) policy and practice, (3) news media, and (4) social media. To do this, then efforts need to be done using the four pillars as foundations for these four levels. In the first pillar, we can facilitate the accurate knowledge translation, which means articles and research produced on Covid-19 must also be as accurate and factual as possible. The second pillar involves knowledge refinement and quality improvement processes through fact checking and peer review to create effective public policy. The third pillar is capacity building of science literacy and eHealth literacy to combat inaccurate and biased media coverage. While the fourth pillar is careful and systematic information monitoring (infoveillance) and social listening on social media.

Based on the description above, that health communication is part of the crisis, so that the coverage and delivery of information must be very careful. Mass media must check and re-check the resource persons as part of communication security. So that the results of the coverage and events presented do not cause a new crisis to the current situation and conditions. The role of the media as a means of information, education, entertainment, and social control must not be separated from the prevailing communication system so that it can provide a positive assessment of the responsibility of the press as the second power after democracy.

## **6. Conclusion**

This study identified two conclusions in the analysis of online media news on disaster communication and crisis management in mitigating Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia. Firstly, non-natural disaster mitigation in disease prevention requires crisis management in understanding various aspects of planning, organizing, acting, and evaluating various policies to avoid distortions and disinformation that occur in disaster communication.

Secondly, integrated with various aspects of social, cultural, belief, and strict law enforcement, it takes the role of understanding the distortion of communication by government officials from the center to the village that is synergistic and consistent with educating health communication. Thirdly, social assistance must provide support for public awareness to participate in carrying out and following vaccinations through credible communication channels.

Lastly, the role of the mass media can provide enlightenment of knowledge to the wider community to be maximized by checking and re-checking the news and still being carried out in accordance with democracy and the responsibility of the press. As recommendations, it is important for crisis management to integrate cultural values, social capital, norms, and local community beliefs in educating and socializing vaccine programs and

health protocols to reduce communication crises due to disinformation and social media noise in vaccination refusals.

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# Inter-Religious Mate Selection Negotiating Process Relationship in Indonesia

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## Abstract

This research explores the process of inter-religious mate selection and the important role of third parties as social forces in the process among individuals in urban areas in Indonesia. The scope is sociology of family using hybrid typology for the process and Kalmijn (1998) for the third parties. The article enriches those elaborated by Netting (2010), Tsutsui (2013) and Casier et al. (2013) on combination of traditional and love mate selection process, and Kalmijn (1998), Connolly (2009), Yahya and Boag (2014) on the third parties in intermarriage. A qualitative field research with snowball method by doing retrospective interviews in greater Jakarta is conducted among 4 individuals from Islam and Christian. The period of research is from the year 2018-2021. It is revealed that all of the individuals going through the hybrid mate selection process which starts from the love typology and ends in the traditional typology. The process begins with individual choosing his/her mate on his/her own and in the end only able to get married by approval of his/her family. It is revealed individuals' capability to negotiate his/her standpoint to preserve the relationship until succeed to marry, with several and multilayer third parties specially his/her conjugal family and the state. The process reflects the existence of inter-religious tolerance. A mate selection theoretical contribution on how hybrid process and negotiating with the third parties as social forces also applies in inter-religious context, are also elaborated.

**Keywords:** Mate Selection, Social Forces, Third Parties, Inter-Religious, Inter-Religious Mate Selection, Relationship, Islam, Christian

## 1. Introduction

Mate Selection is an important process towards marriage or other forms of partnership because it is become the baseline of a permanent, loving, and supportive relationship (Lamanna & Riedmann, 2009, 2012). Choosing a mate from the same religion can show the tendency of the endogamy of the group. On the other hand, choosing a mate from different religion can show interaction between different religious groups and also show how far the social acceptance between different religious groups exist, without seeing the other group more high or low compared to their group (Kalmijn, 1998).

Indonesia has characteristics of multi religions (Badan Pusat Statistik [BPS] Census, 2010). The composition is Islam followers 87,1%, Christian Protestant 6,9%, Catholic 2,9%, Hindu 1,7%, Buddha 0,7%, Confucian 0,1%

and other religion is 0,1% (<http://sp2010.bps.go.id>, 2016). The follower of Islam and Christian religions have become the two biggest percentages in Indonesia based on 2010 Indonesia census data.

Religion is essential for Indonesian people (*Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies [CRCS]*, 2008; Alvara Research Center, 2017; Grim, 2014; tempo.co, 30 January 2017). CSRS report shows that religion has become important aspect for Indonesian people (CRCS, 2008). Alvara Research Center also show 95% Islam follower in Indonesia believe religion has important role in their daily lives (Alvara Research Center, 2017).

The variety of the religion in Indonesia makes it possible to have an interaction between people from different religions. Choosing a mate from different religion is not advice and prohibited, but still there are people who have inter-religious relationships ranging from friends, mates, until marriages (Parker, Hoon dan Raihani 2014; Yahya dan Boag 2014). Mate selection and marriage in Indonesia generally desire with the same religion (Kardha, 2002; Parker, Hoon and Raihani, 2014), meanwhile Indonesian people common to against, disapprove and often cause pro and cons on inter-religious mate selection and marriage (Nurcholish dan Baso (Ed), 2010; Affan & Franciska, 2015).

Indonesia marriage law stated that marriage is legal in Indonesia if it is performs based on each religion law and believes (Undang-Undang Pokok Perkawinan, 1996). The law gives an important role to the religion institution to legalize the marriage. The implication of this law is, the marriage from the couple who has the same religion can be legalize by the religion institution, but on the other way around, when couple has different religion then many religions do not want to legalize the marriage (Nurcholish and Baso (Ed), 2010)

### *1.1. Literature Review*

Previous studies on the process of mate selection have shown there are three typologies. First arranged or traditional, second love or free will and third hybrid or combination. The scope of arranged or traditional typology is a gradations mate selection form entirely depending on the family specially the parents or third parties to be able to marry, until only the necessary or the obligation of getting approval from the family (parents). The love or free will typology is a process where form of mate selection entirely depends on the individual (couples). The last, scope of hybrid or combination typology is a blend or combination form of mate selection between arranged or traditional and love or free will. Practically, the typologies can be classified into two categories. First category is dichotomies between arranged or traditional and love or free will (Winch dan Ktsanes, 1954; Kerckhoff and Davis, 1962; Murstein, 1980; Sprecher dan Hatfield, 2017). Second category is combination of arranged or traditional and love or free will (Lee and Stones, 1980; Murstein 1980; Netting 2010; Tsutsui, 2013; Casier dkk, 2013).

The previous studies show that the conceptual framework of the mate selection process was changing from the earlier time seeing it as dichotomies between traditional and love, and then become the combination of them in the recent years. Several previous recent studies shown that in the context of Asia society, the typology of mate selection process tend to be in the form of combination between love and traditional with the characteristic of the subject is tend to be general. Therefore, the mate selection process in the context of Indonesia society specially on inter-religious relationship still need exploration.

Furthermore, previous studies state there are many intermarriage research conducted because this type of research can help people to find the answers to several questions about social life inside one group or between groups like race, religion, citizenship, and the origin of a group (Cretser and Leon, 1985; Kaljmin, 1998; Parker, Hoon and Raihani, 2014). Several intermarriage studies are being focused only on the process aspect (Marcson, 1951; Cavan, 1970; Cavan, 1971; Parker, Hoon and Raihani, 2014). On the other hands there are also intermarriage researches that cover not only the process aspect but also the role of the factors in the intermarriage (Kaljmin, 1998; Connolly, 2009; Yahya dan Boag, 2014).

Previous studies about intermarriage cover many aspects such as race, religion, citizenship, etc. but in the context of Indonesia society that has characteristic seeing religion as important aspect in their daily life in the recent studies, then it is become important to explore about how the process of inter-religious mate selection relationship occur and how is the roles of social forces shapes the process of the relationship. The social forces in this context refer to the third parties. Any type of a group outside the couple relationship that has interest to keep their internal cohesion and homogeneity of a group is call the third parties (Kalmijn, 1998). The third parties tend to direct or encourage individuals to marry endogamy.

Base on elaboration above, exploration and explanation on mate selection process and the roles of third parties in the context of inter-religious relationships in Indonesia are still limited. This article is filling the lack of this area studies. Therefore, the research question of this article is how the process of inter-religious mate selection happen and how is the roles of third parties play their part in the process specially on Moslem and Christian individuals in urban areas. Mate selection process in this study is limited to heterosexual dating relationship period when looking for a husband or wife until they are success marry inter-religiously. In this case specifically individuals who follow Islam and Christian religion who live in urban areas during the time of the research.

## 2. Method

This article is based on research that being conducted from 2018-2021. The research uses qualitative approach (Creswell, 2003; Creswell, 2007). There are two main reasons behind the using of this approach. First, the topic of this article is considered a sensitive issue where there are not many people who want to disclose their experiences. Second, qualitative approach is suitable to be used to capture the process comprehensively.

Interview is being held on individuals who undergo inter-religious mate selection until successful marriage inter-religious between Moslem and Christian. The type of the interview is retrospective to be able to capture the whole process comprehensively. Informant is found using snowball method through researcher network. The total number of informants is four individuals consist of two informants from Islam religion and the other two informants are from Christian Religion. There is one male and female informant on each of religion group.

Primary data on this research is based on interviews of the informants. Researcher also used secondary data to complete the primary data and to support literature review and conceptual framework (Neuman, 2014). The form of secondary data among others are photos, documents and relevant reports that has relevant connection with the research to complete the primary data; and also include books, article, journal, research reports to support literature review and conceptual framework.

This research has limitation. It is only limited to study inter-religious mate selection on Islam and Christian informants. Therefore, this study only covers two religions although Indonesia has multiple religions. The reason behind this limitation is Islam and Christian are two religions that have two biggest followers in Indonesia cover 96,9% of Indonesian population.

## 3. Results and Discussion

This research is involving four informants. The general characteristics of the four informants are presenting below,

Table 1: Informant General Characteristics

Informant	Ti	Sh	Al	Se
Sex	Man	Woman	Man	Woman
Religion	Islam	Islam	Catholic	Catholic
Last Education	Undergraduate	Undergraduate	Undergraduate	Undergraduate

Source: Kardha, 2022

The process of the informants' mate selection begins with individual attractiveness and compatibility to the potential mate until they agree to become a couple and dating exclusively as the boyfriend or the girlfriend. For informants, religion is not an issue or they are ignoring it at this phase. Like informant Al stated,

"I like smart woman. I met her at campus. I still a bachelor student at that time. I also worked as assistant lecturer. I am class of 94 and she is class of 98. Very simple, I very easy to fall in love with smart woman. I feel connect with her, we have many the same logic and believe." (Interview with Catholic man Al, November 11, 2018)

After the relationship starts and grow along the way, the relationship begins to become more and more serious. After reaching this phase, then religion becomes an issue that likes it or not informants have to deal with it in order to progress the relationship into marriage. Like informant Ti stated,

"I talked to my father and told him I have a girlfriend from different religion. I am planning to be more serious with her and marry her. My father hasn't immediately said yes (agree). Because of that, then I repeated many times, over and over again, tell him about my intention and my planning (to marry my girlfriend). ..... and then, I also told my girlfriend about the situation. Make sure if she wanted to continue the relationship, then we will find the solution together. In the end, at that time, we decided to talk to each of our families." (Interview with Moslem man Ti, October 19, 2018).

Informants are facing the challenges from the family relating to the religion differences along the mate selection process. Family approval especially the parents become important in this period. Like informant Ti stated,

I was asking for my father permission (blessing) over and over again. .... what I want in my life, it is my choice and it will become my consequences, but for me, the most important thing is parents blessing. I don't care if everybody talks about me." (Interview with Moslem man Ti, October 19, 2018)

Some of informants' parents are against informant relationship, other have more subtle stand points to approve informant's relationship. the religion value in the conjugal family especially the parents can be either support or against inter-religious mate selection and marriage. But as long as the parents believe that inter-religious mate selection and marriage is not against sacred text in the holy book, in the end they all willing to give their approval for their son or daughter relationship.

Family is the first challenge that informants and his/her mates have to face. Other challenges are people around the informants' circle. The challenge come from informant's extended families and friends. Some of the extended families and friends disapprove of informant relationship, but others have more subtle stand point either they tend to disapprove, be neutral or approve the relationship. Like the statement of informant Se about her boyfriend's extended family,

His cousin being asked to separate me and D (my boyfriend). So, we don't date, not continue our relationship, not marry inter-religious. So, it is like a trial (for my boyfriend), why my boyfriend chooses me, as if there is no one else from the same religion (Interview with Catholic woman Se, November 22, 2018).

also, like informant Sh statement about her friends,

Our friends are supportive. So.... I talked to my friends, chat, share my stories; and then I told my friend about our problem. They helped. They helped us find the information, such as "I think at that place you can find this...." So, we have many sources, and many solutions to be honest (Interview with Moslem woman Sh November 4, 2018).

Although extended families and friends influences on informants are not that strong compared to informant's parents but their opinions and stand point matter for the informants in the context it can become a support for the informants to overcome the obstacle of his/her relationship when they tend to have neutral or approve stand point. Meanwhile, Informants tend to disregard opinions from their extended families and friends who are against informant's relationship. Informants also feel that they have support from their friends who succeed to get married inter-religious in the context they are not alone who has to deal with this challenge and also it is possible for them to be able to get married inter-religious in Indonesia. Like informant Sh stated,

"We met with my friend that has just married inter-religious. We talked.... and then at that time we said "that's it. We just copy them (their way). .... That's it. We just copy them, because from the

beginning we were dating, from the first until third years, we were looking for a way out (to be able marry inter-religious). So, we were not just dating. The whole three years being used to find a way out.” (Interview with Moslem woman Sh November 4, 2018).

The next challenge is from the religion institution including the individuals that are related to it. According to Indonesian marriage law, Individuals who want to get married has to do religious ceremony with religion institution to be able to get married legally in Indonesia. Religion institution is an authorized institution by the state to perform a marriage and issue a marriage certificate. Individuals only able to register their marriage to the state after they have marriage certificate from religion institution. The problem is almost all religion institutions the facto is disapproved of inter-religious marriage although it is not written literally but become more common consensus.

Informant’s journey to find a way to be able to get married inter-religious will have to face with this situation. Informants have to face that it is impossible to be able to get married if it is fully based on the regulation, therefore informants actively searching for alternative ways to overcome this obstacle. Informants searching for individuals who relate with the religious institution to explore the possibilities to be able to get married inter-religious, especially the person who is neutral or approve of inter-religious marriage. Parallel with this quest, informants also looking for foundation from their religious values to support their relationship and their plan to marry inter-religious. They are actively searching this information of religious values from individuals that have relations with religion institutions especially from those who approve of inter-religious marriage. These individuals such as priest and *ustad* can be considered religious leaders although they are not the one that have mainstream thought relating to inter-religious marriage. All the informants find information that basically inter-religious marriage is not against their religion values and also, they can perform inter-religious marriage in Indonesia based on their encounter with these individuals. This information later becomes one of informant’s tools to persuade and negotiate their situation with their parents so the family eventually will approve their plan to get married. This information also become their tools to deal with other third parties.

It needs to be noted that there are informants that have encounters with individuals who oppose the inter-religious marriage. For this experience, informants tend to gather only the information but disregard it. Like informant Ti stated,

“When someone in the position disagree with me, I am considering them as we have different ways of thinking. Not in the context of disapprove, because they don’t have any right to talk about approval or disapproval. .... there is small amount of (my) friend from the office and university that has not so good respond (about my inter-religious relationship).” (Interview with Moslem man Ti, October 19, 2018)

Furthermore, few informants tend to make some space or do not continue the interaction with these types of individuals.

As soon as informants have found one or few ways to get married inter-religious and found certain individuals who will be able to help them processing inter-religious marriage, then the challenge can almost be overcome. The key to being able to go further to apply inter-religious marriage is approval from Informant’s parents, therefore as long as informants already have their parents’ approval, they can execute the process of marriage. The process of persuading and negotiating with the parents is not something that is easy to be done. Like informant Sh stated,

“We bring data to the family about how to marriage inter-religious (in Singapore). My boyfriend talks to his family about he wants to do the marriage this way, but turn out his proposal still resulted in pro and cons in the family. Why only do civil marriage? Why there is no certificate from the church, why this, why that. So.... at that time, the problem is still existed. (Then we) search again (the way out). .... From my family, my parents hope that if I will marry using Christian marriage ceremony, then I should also do Islam marriage ceremony. So.... finally (we) met someone from P (institution). “Oh.... I can marry you. I already held many inter-religious couple marriages.” Ok, finally (we) married in S (city). In S (city) there are two wedding ceremonies, Christian ceremony and then Islam ceremony. Those

ceremony is being witness and attend by both our families.” (Interview with Moslem woman Sh November 4, 2018).

On this phase, it becomes important for informants to have adequate information relating to inter-religious mate selection, inter-religious marriage dan religion values relating to inter-religious relationships. This is where the information from some extended families, some friends, certain individuals relating to religious institutions, and other information from various sources become important to informants as their tools to discuss and persuade their parents. From the four cases, it is revealed that in the end all of the informants are able to persuade and negotiate the situation with their parents. As soon as informants have the family approval, the next step is more to execution of the inter-religious marriage plan and administrative procedures relating to legalize marriage in Indonesia.

Table 2: Informant Interaction with The Mate and Third Parties

Interaction Informant with	Ti	Sh	Al	Se
The Mate	Relationship-based on compatibility: similarity and complementary	Relationship based on compatibility: similarity and complementary	Relationship based on compatibility: similarity and complementary	Relationship based on compatibility: similarity and complementary
Conjugal Family (The Parents/Parent)	Religion is not a problem because suit with religious value that Moslem man is able to marry Christian woman In the beginning father disapprove of inter-religious mate selection and marriage, until at certain point give in for the happiness of his son. Ti asking for approval repeatly. Note: Mother has passed away	Religion is not a problem because suit with religion value that Islam is not against inter-religious marriage In the beginning mother disapprove in subtle way of inter-religious marriage and father is more flexible, but slowly they become approve Sh’s plan to get marriage inter-religious. slowly parents are seeing that inter-religious marriage is not against their religion values.	Religion is not a problem because religion institution allows to legalized inter-religious marriages In the beginning mother disapprove in subtle way of inter-religious marriage, but father approve it. Slowly mother become approve Al’s plan to get marriage inter-religious.	Religion is not a problem because religion institution allows to legalized inter-religious marriages Mother not against inter-religious mate selection and marriage. Note: Father has passed away
Extended Family	Many extended families have similar position with Ti’s father which is disapprove inter-religious marriage. There is extended family that have neutral dan support position.	Many of extended families disapprove of inter-religious marriage.	Many of extended family have neutral or support on inter-religious marriage. Few extended families tend to disapprove, but in the end they are not against it.	Se extended families not against inter-religious marriage.
Friends	Close friends support Ti. Few friends from the office and university not support	Friends support Sh. Many Sh friends are having inter-religious marriage.	Al basically ignores friends’ opinions. Many of his friends not against inter-	Few of Se friends regret why Se choose to marry inter-religious.

Interaction Informant with	Ti	Sh	Al	Se
	Ti		religious relationship and marriage	Close friends not against inter-religious marriage.
Individuals related to religion institution	Ti find individual from independent institution who can help him to apply inter-religious marriage in Indonesia.	Sh find individuals from independent institution who can help her to apply inter-religious marriage in Indonesia.	Al knows some individuals from independent institution who can help him to apply inter-religious marriage in Indonesia.	Se find individuals from independent institution who can help her to apply inter-religious marriage in Indonesia.
State	Marriage registers in State Civil Registration office as Christian Marriage	Marriage registers in State Civil Registration office as Christian Marriage	Marriage registers in State Civil Registration office as Catholic Marriage	Marriage registers in State Civil Registration office as Catholic Marriage

*Source: Kardha, 2022*

Based on four cases, this research supports the hybrid (combination) typology mate selection in the context of inter-religious mate selection relationship in urban area Indonesia. All the four cases going through similar process where in the beginning Informants develop romantic relationship based only on informants' preferences on similarity and complementary traits on their mate. On this period, religion issue is not a problem or at first informants ignore it. When the relationship begins to become more serious, then religion issue become an issue that like it or not informants have to deal with it.

As the relationship develops to marriage oriented, informants have to deal with several and multi layers third parties along the way. This research also reveals that challenges from the multiple and layers third parties have important roles in setting the path of the informant's relationship. The first one is conjugal family especially the parents, the second is the extended families and or friends, the third is religion institution including individuals who related to it, and in the end the state.

The first third party is the conjugal family especially the parents. The blessing from informants' parents is important and essential for the informants to take the first step into the phase of marriage. Parents become play an important role in informants' relationship. Parents have power to give the approval or disapproval of the inter-religious relationship based on religious values they believe. Dealing with this situation, it doesn't mean informants don't have capability to discuss and negotiate with the condition. The dynamic interaction in discussing and negotiating informants' relationship between informants and their family especially their parents is able to soften the stand point of their parents so informants are able to apply inter-religious marriage with the approval of their family. The research confirms that hybrid mate selection typology not only exist in general mate selection cases but also exist in inter-religious one. This research support and enriches Netting (2010), Tsutsui (2013) and Casier et al. (2013) point of views about the process of combination mate selection between love and traditional typology specially in inter-religious context.

The second third parties are the possibility challenges from the extended families and friends. Extended families and friends also can shape either directly or indirectly informants inter-religious mate selection relationship by having either pro or cons about inter-religious mate selection and marriage. They can have supportive, neutral or against point of view about inter-religious mate selection and marriage. Their point of view become the consideration for informants to maintain their relationships.

The next challenge is the third party from religion institution including individuals who related to the institution. informants look for an alternative way out relating to religion institution since religion marriage ceremony is a

requirement to be able legally marry in Indonesia. Their journey have made them found individuals who related to the religion institution that can help them to get married in Indonesia legally. On the other hand, there is possibility informants can also meet with the one who against inter-religious marriage so they don't want to help. Informants also possible meet with the one who has more subtle or neutral position so they also cannot help because they bound with the regulation of religion institution.

The last challenge is from the state. Informants will taking care administrative procedure require by the state only after informants already can cope with all other challenges. It is because to register the marriage to the state require a marriage certificate from religion institution. The challenges from this last third party relatively manageable as long as challenges from the other third parties are already resolved.

Each of the party has certain role that can be either support, neutral or against inter-religious mate selection and marriage, but one of the most crucial third party is conjugal family specially the parents. The four cases support and enrich Kalmijn (1998), Connolly (2009), Yahya and Boag (2014) on the important of the third parties in intermarriage relationship. The success of inter-religious mate selection process becoming an inter-religious marriage at the end mainly is depending on the couple negotiation, parent's approval and the religion values in the conjugal family.

#### **4. Conclusion**

This article adding the new understanding about inter-religious mate selection process and the roles of several third parties in the process specially between Islam and Christian in urban area Indonesia. Base on the result of the research, inter-religious mate selection process of the four informants is all having hybrid typology. In the beginning of the process, it appears in the form of love typology between informant and their mate, but in the end the process being closed by traditional typology in the form of the important of family approval especially the parents to be able to move forward to the marriage.

The research also reveals the important of several and multilayer third parties' roles in the inter-religious mate selection process. They all in certain level shaped the form of informant's inter-religious relationship. The first third party that has to be encounter is the family specially the parents. The second one is the possibility of the roles from the extended families and/or friends. The third is religion institution including individuals who has been consider possess deeper knowledge about the religion. The last third party is the state who has the authority to legalize marriage in Indonesia. From several third parties, approval from the family especially the parents and religion values in the family who support inter-religious mate selection and marriage become crucial aspect to be able to success marry inter-religious. In the end it is mainly depending on the couple negotiation, parent's approval and the religion values in the family. All the third parties have become social forces in the inter-religious mate selection relationship of the informants.

This context reveal that it is a complicated and challenging process to form inter-religious mate selection relationship in Indonesia. Although it is challenging but this reality reveals the existence of tolerance between religion in one of the intimate dan romantic relationship forms. One of the forms that build a family as one of the core institutions in the society.

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## Appendix

### Few Informants Transcripts

Moslem Man Ti (free translation):

“She was one of my friends. Playmate friends. So... she is not someone that I just know. Before I was his boyfriend, we were playmate friends. .... At that time, we didn't really make the dating relationship officially on verbal. We just live it. Along the way and then we just think and realizing it that we were having a serious dating relationship. But in the beginning, we were just friends.” (Interview with Moslem man Ti, October 19, 2018).

“In my family is more complex. Both of them (father and late mother) have strong faith so the respond is we kind of have a fight. They expect me to find a girlfriend from the same religion. The normal things” (Interview with Islam man Ti, October 19, 2018)

Moslem female Sh (free translation):

“The first time I meet him it was an accident. I was meeting my friend S in PIM. When I arrived, I saw my friend was with him. So.... My friend was introducing me to him. Turn out my friend and him is friends. After the meeting, turn out he called my friend to asked for my phone number. At that time, I didn't give him my phone number because I feel it is not right to give my phone number to the person I just know. One year later, we got connected again because of the social media. Turn out he was still asking for my phone number. So... finally we meet. At first, we met the three of us, me, my friend s and him. After that we become closed and more closed until finally, we are dating exclusively.” (Interview with Moslem woman Sh, November 4, 2018)

So... we gathered all the data (about inter-religious marriage). After got all the data than we start to have the courage to talk to each of our family. We gathered the data from his priest, my priest, and also our friends study case that successfully marriage inter-religious. To be honest, it was not easy. In the beginning the family not really approve our relationship. But after we talk and having a discussion with them slowly, they can accept us. But in the beginning, it is very-very difficult.” (Interview with Moslem woman Sh, November 4, 2018).

Catholic Man Al (free translation):

I like smart woman. I met her at campus. I still a bachelor student at that time. I also worked as assistant lecturer. I am class of 94 and she is class of 98. Very simple, I very easy to fall in love with smart woman. I feel connect with her, we have many the same logic and and believe.” (Interview with Catholic man Al, November 11, 2018)

“My dad is .... laissez faire. For him it is the same (any religion). There is no different. My mom is different. She believes her son should be married with Catholic, but she never closed any door to everybody.” (Interview with Catholic man Al, November 11, 2018)

Catholic Woman Se (free translation):

“In the beginning I was his boss in event division on P radio. Suddenly I got many crews from broadcast division including him. So.... When I trained the crews, I was though on them and many of them cannot stand it and left. Only him and few feminine guys who can able to deal with me. .... so... during those time, every day he drove me home. After few months, in the end we were dating exclusively.” ..... (I like him) because of his Mr right. First of all, I like him physically. He is handsome. Since I was teenager, I never have boyfriend. I only have “sleeping buddy”. So.... I never experience romance. When I met him, he is very caring at me.” (Interview with Catholic woman Se, November 22, 2018)

“When I was dating him, for my mom, inter-religious differences are not a problem, but his divorced parents are a concern to her because in my family, there is no divorced cases.” (Interview with Catholic woman Se, November 22, 2018)

# Development Strategy of the Widhya Asih Orphanages Program Through Voluntourism

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## Abstract

The Numbers of voluntourists from several developed countries shows promising growth before the pandemic Covid-19. Tourists who carry out voluntourism activities are increasing and this shows that voluntourism has an opportunity to be developed. Bali as a world tourist destination can take the opportunity to develop voluntourism as a promising product. The early observation indicated that one of the places that are interesting to be used as volunteer activities is the Orphanage. The Widhya Asih Orphanages foundation in Bali has 6 Orphanages that have potential opportunities to make voluntourism programs to support sustainable tourism development in Bali. This study focus on how far the perceptions and motivations of the Widhya Asih Orphanages managers see voluntourism as a strategy for developing the program in contributing and supporting sustainable tourism development in Bali. The method used in this research is a qualitative method through Data Collection Procedures which includes qualitative observations, qualitative interviews, and qualitative documents. Data collection was focused on the perceptions and motivations of the Widhya Asih Orphanages Managers, the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats faced by Widhya Asih Orphanages in adapting voluntourism activities. Through this research, it is hoped that Widhya Asih Orphanages can develop its program strategies more openly through voluntourism to attract tourists to choose Widhya Asih Orphanages as a place to carry out voluntourism activities. Besides that, this research also gave a model of organizing voluntourism for Orphanages in general.

**Keywords:** Perception, Motivation, Strategy, Voluntourism, Sustainability

## 1. Introduction

The world tourism industry before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic at the end of 2019 showed a positive direction but has decreased since 2020. Based on data highlights from the UN-WTO (2021) the number of world tourists in 2019 increased by 4% (1.5 billion) compared to in 2018 which reached 1.4 billion. While in 2020 it decreased to 381 million, decreased by 74%. The decline was a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. This positive growth before 2020 is supported by the emergence of various new tourism products such as voluntourism. Interest in voluntourism tourists before the Covid-19 pandemic from several developed countries showed promising growth (Holmes, et al., 2009). Tourists who carry out voluntourism activities are increasing and this shows that

voluntourism has the opportunity to be developed. Bali as a world tourist destination can take the opportunity to develop voluntourism as a superior product. The results of the observation show that one of the places that are interested in volunteering is The Widhya Asih Orphanages that managed by Widhya Asih Foundation.

The Widhya Asih Foundation through their Orphanages has potential opportunities to support tourism development in Bali with voluntourism activities. So far, Widya Asih Orphanages programs or activities are still limited to routine learning and education activities, even though so far they have also received tourist visits who carry out social work activities but are not programmed and structured as they should be. To be able to capture better opportunities and develop in the use of voluntourism tourists, it is necessary to conduct research studies on voluntourism programs that can become an added value for the Widya Asih Orphanages so that it is beneficial for the development of the Widhya Asih Orphanages program, the community and industry players, tourism, and at the same time support the development of the quality of sustainable tourism development in Bali.

This research was conducted to determine the perception and motivation of Widhya Asih managers to see voluntourism as a strategy in contributing, and supporting sustainable tourism development in Bali. Based on this goal, it is hoped that the development of the Widya Asih Orphanages program can be an attraction for voluntourism tourists in supporting the quality of tourism development in Bali through social work activities at the Widhya Asih Orphanages. This study also provides a model and strategy for developing a voluntourism program at the Widya Asih Orphanages as an excellent alternative program in supporting the development of sustainable tourism in Bali. The answer to the formulation of the problem in this study is based on several theories, namely voluntourism, voluntourism principles, perception, motivation, consumer behavior, tourism demand and supply, sustainable tourism development.

## **2. Method**

This research was conducted at 6 (six) Widhya Asih Orphanages spread across Melaya, Blimbingsari, Badung, Bangli, Singaraja, and Amlapura. The research method used is qualitative methods which is a form of research design through several stages of the process starting from collecting, analyzing, and integrating qualitative data in a study. Data collection techniques were carried out through observation, interviews, questionnaires, and documentation. In this study, the clarity and adequacy of the theory are combined or modified with the experience of the leaders of the Widhya Asih Orphanages, perceptions and motivations of the organizers of the Widhya Asih Orphanages, and approaches to other aspects such as motives, experiences, and impacts of the implementation of voluntourism that has been carried out. The approach taken is also intended to help understand the experiences of those who are being researched and can then be applied and used as a better management model.

The analyzed data is presented in two forms, namely an analysis of the perception and motivation of the Widhya Asih Orphanages organizers, and an analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats. The two forms are combined to produce a strategy for developing voluntourism products in the Widhya Asih Orphanages, and also a model for organizing voluntourism in the Widhya Asih Orphanages.

## **3. Results and Discussion**

The results of the study included field observations, filling out questionnaires, and supported by in-depth interviews with the leaders of the Widhya Asih Orphanages. The main respondents and informants are the Chairperson while the supporting informants are members of the community and foreign student tourists from Dhyana Pura University who have carried out voluntourism activities at the Widhya Asih Orphanages. Observations were made in all 6 Widhya Asih Orphanages while filling out the questionnaire and more in-depth interviews were conducted in four Orphanages. Observations have been made since early 2020 shortly after the Covid-19 pandemic, while questionnaires and in-depth interviews were conducted at Orphanages in Melaya, Blimbingsari, Badung, and Bangli due to the implementation of the Health protocol. The results of further research are described as follows.

### 3.1 Profile of the Widhya Asih Orphanages

#### 3.1.1 History of Establishment

Seeing a large number of school-age children in several places in Bali who have not been able to receive a proper education, the leaders of the Protestant Christian Church in Bali (GKPB), took the initiative to establish a dormitory to accommodate and help poor and neglected children so that they can get a proper education. The hostel was first established in 1975 under the name Widhya Pura Asrama. Then on its way, it grew to 6 which are located in 6 districts in Bali. At first, this dormitory was shaded by the Widhya Pura Foundation which was in charge of Widhya Pura Education and Widhya Pura Dormitory. In 1990, the Widhya Pura Dormitory Division (Orphanage) separated itself from the Widhya Pura Foundation by forming a new Foundation with the name "Widhya Asih Orphanages" at Notary K. Rames Iswara, SH, with Deed Number 117, dated January 25, 1990, and since being registered with the Bali Provincial Department of Social Affairs, since then all Widhya Pura dormitory units have been changed to the Widhya Asih Orphanages and are under the auspices of the "Widhya Asih Orphanage" Foundation. Foster children are children who come from economically disadvantaged families, orphans, and neglected.

#### 3.1.2 Vision and Mission

Vision: To become a social institution that works to help reduce poverty in people in Bali.

Mission: Helping underprivileged children to be able to help themselves break the wheel of poverty by providing: 1. Care and protection of children in Widhya Asih Orphanages and family- based; 2. Providing nutritious food and Physical and Spiritual Health; 3. Formal education; 4. Life skills training; 5. Provide a comfortable, safe, and clean place to live.

#### 3.1.3 Number of Fostered Children

Table 3.1: The total number of Foster Children, Employer, and Volontourists Widhya Asih Orphanages 2021

WIDHYA ASIH ORPHANAGES BALI								
DATA: Number of Childrens, Employer, Volontourists								
No.	Name of Orphanages	No of Childrens	Boys	Girls	Number Employer	Number Volontourist (3)	Number Days (4)	Average Days (5)
1	Blimbingsari	75	42	33	10	131	641	4.9
2	Singaraja	94	39	55	9	86	577	6.7
3	Badung	40	18	22	5	84	491	5.8
4	Melaya	77	31	46	10	200	442	2.2
5	Bangli	30	16	14	3	2	10	5.0
6	Amlapura	22	11	11	3	24	259	10.8
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>527</b>	<b>2,420</b>	<b>4.59</b>

Based on the data above, the total number of foster children (1) is 338 consisting of 157 male foster children and 181 female foster children. This comparison of numbers is a note for both organizers, and volontourists that the

activities carried out in the orphanage and outside the orphanage are paid attention to the form of activities that are followed by the composition of the interests of men and women.

The number of volunteers who carried out voluntourism activities (3,4,5) in 2019 (before the Covid 19 Pandemic) the total number was 527 people who carried out voluntourism activities in a total of 2,420 days or an average per year person per day is 4.59 days. From these data, the average interest of voluntourists in voluntourism activities is quite promising to be considered by orphanage managers in designing more focused voluntourism activities.

Based on the location of the orphanage, the highest interest in volunteering for volunteer activities (3) chose Melaya (West Bali) of 200 people, followed by Blimbingsari of 131 people, Singaraja (North of Bali) 86 people, Badung (South of Bali) 84 people, Amlapura (East of Bali) 24 people, and Bangli (Middle of Bali) 2 people. This composition can help the manager of each orphanage to design volunteer activities that can attract more volunteers to visit. The caretaker of an orphanage with a small number of voluntourists can study observation at an orphanage that receives more voluntourist visits. The countries of origin for the volunteers are Australia, Japan, Singapore, Germany, China, and Indonesia itself. From the results of interviews, volunteers from Japan dominated the visit, followed by tourists from Germany, Australia, Singapore, and China. Orphanage managers can start collaborating with educational institutions to increase knowledge about cross-cultural understanding by studying the cultural characteristics of tourists from these countries so that they can open their horizons in accepting voluntourism activities.

### 3.1.4 Observations of voluntourism activities at Widhya Asih Orphanages

All Heads of Widhya Asih Orphanages have held voluntourism activities in their respective for both foreign tourists and domestic tourists which are coordinated and recommended by the Head of the Widhya Asih Foundation, and also the volunteer sending agency recommended by the Head of the Widhya Asih Foundation. The period time for the implementation of voluntourism varies from less than a week to several weeks. Some of them are carried out periodically every year. But since the Covid-19 pandemic, voluntourism activities at all Orphanages have not been allowed.

The Heads of Widhya Asih Orphanages have not made the voluntourism program a routine and planned program even though they know that voluntourism activities provide benefits to Orphanages and the surrounding community based on experience in previous implementations. Widhya Asih Orphanages does not yet have a flow model for organizing voluntourism activities so the activities carried out so far are not structured so that they do not guarantee a sense of security and comfort in organizing voluntourism activities. Volunteer age restrictions have not been implemented and all voluntourists are accepted without going through proper screening.

### 3.2 Perceptions of Widhya Asih Orphanages Leaders

The perception of the leadership of Widhya Asih Orphanages about efforts to make voluntourism a potential routine program to support the development of the tourism industry in Bali shows a positive thing. The results of the study show that volunteerism has a great opportunity to be a potential choice that can enrich the form and type of the Widhya Asih Orphanages program because so far voluntourism activities are highly favored by volunteers and the children of Widhya Asih Orphanages students because the benefits obtained can be felt directly both institutionally and directly. Personally by Widhya Asih Orphanages leaders and students. For them, it is a matter of pride that voluntourism activities can play a positive role in supporting the quality of sustainable tourism development in Bali. Widhya Asih Orphanages need volunteers to provide experience and reinforcement for students and also for tourists.

The Widhya Asih Orphanages results of the study show that the managers of Widhya Asih Orphanages understand the voluntourist views on the implementation of voluntourism activities at Widhya Asih Orphanages on their previous experiences. For the manager of Widhya Asih Orphanages, voluntourism activities are closely related to individual beliefs about all the risks associated with the experience, especially feelings or emotional components (eg, uncertainty, worry, anxiety) and the possibility of failure of plans that have been planned (Pieniak et al., 2008).

The perception of Widhya Asih Orphanages manager emphasizes the importance of organizing voluntourism that can fulfill voluntourist satisfaction in the form of security and comfort in carrying out voluntourism activities. The perception of Widhya Asih Orphanages organizer Widhya Asih Orphanages also shows that the approach taken by volunteering requires a special approach, especially communication that must be carried out before the volunteer activity is carried out.

Activities carried out by voluntourists are carried out through a cognitive-normative approach as stated by Plog (1972) in Pitana (Pitana, et al., 2009, 48), so all voluntourism activities can be (1) Allocentric, namely tourists who want to visit places that unknown, adventurous, and utilize the facilities provided by the local community; (2) Psychocentric, namely tourists who only want to visit tourist destinations that already have facilities with the same standards as those in their own country. They travel with a definite program and take advantage of facilities with international standards; (3) Mid-centric, located between allocentric, and psychometric. Thus it can be said that Volunteer Tourism is a travel activity associated with various social work activities in various forms (such as culture, education, environment, etc.) together and with a group of people who are left behind in a tourist destination and its surroundings without expecting anything in return. On the contrary, provide some of the funds that come from himself or on his initiative to dig up funds to finance his social work activities based on the principles of sustainable tourism development.

From the description above, the organizers of Widhya Asih Orphanages understand that the implementation of voluntourism is not only centered on the safety and comfort of the implementation of voluntourism but is also influenced by the forms and types of activities that can fulfill tourist satisfaction in the planning and selection process of voluntourism activities carried out with the community by considering various integrated approaches. Which not only satisfies tourists but also provides clear benefits to the receiving community.

### *3.3 Motivation of Widhya Asih Orphanages Leaders*

The Motivation of Widhya Asih Orphanages Leaders has a strong motivation to accept and organize voluntourism activities carried out in the Widhya Asih Orphanages Leaders environment because directly and indirectly, these activities provide benefits for students to gain experience interacting with tourists which strengthens their enthusiasm and desire to excel. For institutions, the benefits in the form of programs, funds, and tourist support make Widhya Asih Orphanages leaders motivated to make volunteerism a positive value and can raise the quality of services and take part in contributing to improving the quality of tourism development in Bali. Their motivation is supported by pride that Widhya Asih Orphanages can be a way for voluntourists to carry out social activities and gain experience not only for vacations but also new experiences by taking part in doing social activities with the community at Widhya Asih Orphanages. The relationship that exists between tourists and Widhya Asih Orphanages students is based on the authenticity approach of the relationship that exists not only when the activity is carried out but also continues with tourists and follow-up activities. The constructive relationship that exists between tourists and Widhya Asih Orphanages is one of the reinforcements that voluntourism can be an option favored by tourists. The results of the interview also show that tourists want inter-personal and intra-personal relationships that are built based on an existence that can strengthen each other so that tourists and Widhya Asih Orphanages get benefits and new experiences that can change their understanding of quality tourism. Voluntourism can be an alternative when voluntourism activities are aimed at strengthening and improving the quality of Widhya Asih Orphanages program activities.

For the organizers of Widhya Asih Orphanages, motivation is very important because motivation affects the level of responsibility for the successful implementation of volunteer activities, especially the importance of maintaining communication with volunteers for the continuation of similar programs in the future. This result is also in line with the opinion of Sidhi Turker (2021) who said motivation has an important role in planning a voluntourism activity because it is related to fulfilling the wishes of tourists to carry out successful and efficient voluntourism activities. The right motivation will be able to produce maximum results in an organization of voluntourism activities. In volunteer tourism activities, tourists are given motivation that can provide confidence that their wishes will be maximally accounted for, and therefore management is needed that can plan, organize and carry out these

voluntourism activities. Every activity carried out by voluntourists cannot be separated from the impetus and attitude to carry out activities in meeting the tourists' self-actualization needs.

The need for self-actualization is a person's full potential and personal ambition. Self-actualization needs can be in the form of creativity, spontaneity, and also problem-solving abilities. McClelland classifies human needs into three types, namely achievement, affiliation, and power. Need for achievement or the need for achievement is a need where humans want to achieve or show their competence to others. The need for achievement encourages a person to do things better to be recognized by others and by himself. While affiliation is the need for love, belonging, and social acceptance. The need for affiliation makes a person motivated to perform a behavior to be recognized by his social environment. In terms of power or the need for power or the need for power is the desire of someone to get power and have a higher authority than others.

Meanwhile, Maslow (in Samantha Lee, 2017) ranks human needs starting from the bottom to the top, namely (a) Physiological needs. This need is a basic need that concerns human survival such as oxygen, food, sleep, clean water, homeostatic abilities, and secretions; (b) Security requirements. This need is the fulfillment of a sense of human security in various forms including personal security, security in the financial sector, welfare, work, family security; (c) Social needs. As humans, social needs are manifested in interactions between humans in the form of friendship, the need to be loved, good family relationships, to relationships with colleagues; (d) The need for appreciation. This need is the fulfillment of the appreciation received by a person in the form of self-confidence, respect for others, respect and respect, and also a feeling of being recognized for having talents and abilities.

Based on the previous experience of organizing voluntourism, Widhya Asih Orphanages managers have a very positive and good motivation to do their best for voluntourism activities in Widhya Asih Orphanages environment because they understand the positive impact and benefits of voluntourism activities can be felt for the foster children and the continuation of the program. Widhya Asih Orphanages program in the future, moreover, voluntourism activities also provide quality for sustainable tourism activities in Bali.

### *3.4 Application of Voluntourism in Widhya Asih Orphanages*

As a non-profit activity, voluntourism activities at Widhya Asih Orphanages need to be planned through a process specifically designed for the Widhya Asih Orphanages environment. In realizing the desire of volunteers to carry out their activities in Widhya Asih Orphanages support from various parties is needed, especially organizations sending and receiving volunteers. This is in line with the statement by Wearing (2001) which says that the approach and special handling of voluntourism activities are carried out by those who have experience and high social skills with receiving communities where voluntourism activities are a combination of travel and voluntary work activities with the community. Recipient organizations need to provide the energy, energy, and enthusiasm needed to realize the goals of voluntourism including offering the community involvement that is needed to fulfill their mission effectively. Therefore, sending and receiving organizations need cooperation to bring in voluntourism tourists. Sidhi Turker (2021) emphasized that this collaboration requires two approaches, namely (1) the voluntourism market, and (2) strategies to increase, manage, and retain volunteers. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a deeper exploration of the issues related to volunteers and explain the new paradigm needed to balance the supply and demand for volunteerism.

The results of interviews with tourists as stated by Sidhi Turker (2021) show that the interest of volunteers to serve in Orphanages is quite high. This opportunity is a challenge for Widhya Asih Orphanages managers to observe and approach the voluntourism market, especially concerning the supply and demand of voluntourism tourists. Widhya Asih Orphanages managers need to know in advance the needs of volunteers on the one hand and the other hand the needs of the community around Widhya Asih Orphanages. To understand this, it can be done by understanding the needs of voluntourists and the community based on several theoretical foundations such as voluntourism, voluntourism principles, consumption behavior, sustainable tourism development. These theories become the rationale for explaining the concept of research to see how tourists, tourism industry stakeholders, and voluntary tourist receiving institutions in Widhya Asih Orphanages implement their activities by principles of sustainable tourism development.

Concerning to the theory of voluntourism and the principles of voluntourism, voluntourism activities in Widhya Asih Orphanages require a separate approach because the Widhya Asih Orphanages' vision and mission have specific understandings and objectives that are different from the case if carried out in the community or tourist village. However, the principles of implementation have similarities, including the characteristics or characteristics of the activities displayed by Widhya Asih Orphanages. Sarah (2010) suggests that there must be at least 8 (eight) things that must be done and require deep attention that underlies Volunteer Tourism activities so that they have their characteristics, namely Service, Experience, Investment, Repetition, Passion, Purpose, Authenticity, and Learning.

The eight principles are (1) Service is the heart between voluntourism and tourism without service, success will not be achieved and satisfactory; (2). The Experience here refers to two aspects, namely experiences that are obtained personally (what occurs) and experiences in thinking patterns (wisdom, personal insight, and others). Each of these aspects is interrelated with each other and influences each other between volunteering and touristic activities; (3) Investment is a product that can be measured financially and is valid over time and investment is very important in the context of voluntourism and tourism industry. Although money is important, time is also an important commodity that supports the future sustainability of Volunteer Tourism as a new industry; (4) Repetition is the life and death of voluntourism. Volunteers need to maintain existing relationships and return to continue their mission and activities. For volunteers, this condition is a kind of dogma that they must return to that place; (5) Passion is a form of readiness for patience inside and out and requires its sacrifices which have to be prepared from the start by volunteers because without this patience, everything feels flat, aimless, and utterly disappointing, not only for the person concerned but for all the people involved in the process. the Volunteer Tourism activities; (6) Purpose colors the direction of a person's goals for participating in Volunteer Tourism activities. The purpose here is to give meaning and color and at the same time answer why someone does Volunteer Tourism activities; (7) Authenticity is a challenge for the volunteers how they can keep everything running according to the choices and plans so that the continuity of the activity can take place continuously; (8) Learning is a continuous learning process and the experiences gained by volunteers are part of self-forging and contribute to personal development as part of life-long learning that takes place continuously.

Furthermore, the use of perception and motivation theory is used to see the extent to which Widhya Asih Orphanages organizers can see voluntourism opportunities as an activity that can support the presence of Widhya Asih Orphanages as an institution that can adopt the interests and needs of volunteers to carry out holiday activities and social work at Widhya Asih Orphanages and how it can fulfill their wishes and needs. volunteer satisfaction. Positive perceptions and motivations become the basic strength for Widhya Asih Orphanages organizers in planning voluntourism activities so that they are successful and efficient under the character and needs of the Widhya Asih Orphanages itself. Wearing (2001) says that the form of Voluntourism activities must be imbued with character building based on history, nature, and tradition for the needs of the community itself. The opinion above implies that tourism is not just a collection of commercial activities; it is also the ideological framing of history, nature, and tradition; a framing that has the power to reshape culture and nature according to its own needs. Although basically, voluntourism is non-profit, the activity should also provide economic benefits, therefore administrators need to understand as well as possible how the process of voluntourism demand and supply, as well as voluntourism tourist behavior, is outlined in offering forms of voluntourism activities and voluntourism tourists for institutions such as Widhya Asih Orphanages. The ability to understand and explore the workings of voluntourism is a principal thing to know. Sidhi Turker (2021) asserts that the voluntourism market is wide open for tourists from developed countries because voluntourism activities for tourists are a source of pride and personal satisfaction that is taught in their daily family life. Therefore, the interests and expectations of voluntourists need to be matched with voluntourism activities that can answer their needs. Stein (2009) sees the proportion of voluntourism activities as having a variety of forms according to the interests of the tourists themselves. Some tourists carry out these activities with the support of their funds or receive assistance from certain organizations that are designated with the terms and conditions set by donor agencies. The use of the theory of supply and demand for tourists and tourist behavior is used to ensure that voluntourism activities are directed towards the results and benefits received by tourists and Widhya Asih Orphanages as a unit.

### 3.5 *Voluntourism Implementation Strategy at Widhya Asih Orphanages*

The results of the study show that Widhya Asih Orphanages has strengths, weaknesses, challenges, and at the same time opportunities to make voluntourism activities a new force in improving the quality of the Widhya Asih Orphanages program with foster children and also in socializing with tourists who can provide new understanding for managers and children. foster Widhya Asih Orphanages about the impact and benefits of voluntourism activities. The following describes the results of the study as follows:

#### 3.5.1 Strengths of Widhya Asih Orphanages as a venue for voluntourism

- Widhya Asih Orphanages has experience doing voluntourism activities
- Widhya Asih Orphanages has a variety of program offerings that can be carried out by volunteers, for example providing cooking training, making snacks, language courses, and so on that can be collaborated with or with the community.
- Widhya Asih Orphanages can be reached easily
- Widhya Asih Orphanages has collaborations with educational institutions which can be included in various voluntary cooperation activities
- Widhya Asih Orphanages as part of the church institution has a partner in cooperation with various institutions abroad, especially developed countries that send a lot of voluntourism tourists.

#### 3.5.2 Weaknesses of Widhya Asih Orphanages as venues for voluntourism

- Widhya Asih Orphanages does not yet have a model format for organizing voluntourism activities
- Widhya Asih Orphanages personnel are limited so they do not have special supervisors
- Widhya Asih Orphanages has limited funds in full support of voluntourism activities
- Widhya Asih Orphanages cannot provide many activities because of the limited number of students and the age limit cannot do all types of voluntourism activities
- Limitations of direct communication due to limited internet services.

#### 3.5.3 Opportunities for Widhya Asih Orphanages to make volunteerism a flagship program

- Voluntourism can raise the quality of Widhya Asih Orphanages services to increase public trust
- The cooperation that is owned by both educational institutions, other institutions, and partners from abroad through the parent organization makes it very possible for this voluntourism program to be carried out by Widhya Asih Orphanages.
- Bali as a leading tourist destination has its charm. Moreover, research results (Sidhi Turker, 2021) show that interest in volunteering in Orphanages is quite positive.
- Widhya Asih Orphanages can combine voluntourism activities by spending time visiting tourist attractions around Widhya Asih Orphanages and can also introduce nearby tourist villages by combining various kinds of cultural activities.

#### 3.5.4 Widhya Asih Orphanages challenges in developing volunteerism as a flagship program

- The main challenge is the weather because the implementation of voluntourism activities during the rainy season cannot be predicted.
- Voluntourism activities need to be handled carefully to minimize negative impacts that may occur, for example in predators, sex abuse, and other negative things.
- To carry out multi-voluntourism activities, Widhya Asih Orphanages managers need to increase cooperation with tourist villages, or stakeholders to increase mutually beneficial cooperation.


Based on the results of a study on the strengths, weaknesses, threats, and challenges faced by Widhya Asih Orphanages also the results of a study on perceptions, motivations of Widhya Asih Orphanages, some strategies can be applied. The voluntourism program in this new era has attracted the attention of stakeholders to pay attention to the holistic approach to Safety, Health, Hygiene, Brand, Value, and Capacity Management. In interviews with the managers of Widhya Asih Orphanages, the form and type of outdoor voluntourism activities require new strengthening of Standard Operating Procedures for Safety and Hygiene without reducing the meaning

of social relations with the community. Sidhi Turker (2022) mentions that all of these approaches require time, process, and cooperation from tourism stakeholders. For organizers, what is currently being carried out in the community is to socialize the CHSE Protocol (Cleanliness, Health, Safety, Environmental) from Indonesia Care through outreach and publications, training, simulations, and trials of volunteerism programs. The organizers of voluntourism are very aware that they are facing new opportunities and challenges in choosing a voluntourism program in the community based on the CHSE protocol while still paying attention to the principles of sustainable and quality tourism development.

Therefore, the organizers of voluntourism must be able to become a mediator between tourists and the community along with other stakeholders to build a form of sustainable cooperation. Yuwono (2020) stated that Indonesia is a potential place for the development of voluntourism because of the many activities that can be offered, especially environmental programs such as forestry programs, flora and fauna conservation activities. In line with that, The International Ecotourism Society supports voluntourism activities associated with ecotourism activities by issuing the Voluntourism Guidelines Project which emphasizes Uniting Conservation, Communities, and Sustainable Travel. They also emphasized that voluntourism activities are “responsible travel to natural areas that conserves the environment and improves the well-being of local people.” For Indonesia, which is in the Pacific “ring of fire” circle, natural disasters often occur which require the support of volunteers to help deal with the recovery process due to various disasters. This opportunity also provides an opportunity for volunteers to carry out social work activities and at the same time travel. One form of strategy that can strengthen the presence of voluntourism in the development of sustainable tourism in Bali is to apply the model of organizing voluntourism as shown in Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 below.

### 3.6 Model of organizing voluntourism in Widhya Asih Orphanages

Figure 3.1: Flow Model for Voluntourism Activity Venue Selection In Widhya Asih Orphanages




From Figure 3.1 above, it can be explained that the model for organizing voluntourism at Widhya Asih Orphanages is as follows:

1. Widhya Asih Orphanages is legally under the responsibility of the Widhya Asih Foundation so all forms of cooperation and activities that come from outside parties are required to be approved by the Widhya Asih Foundation because it is responsible for all internal and external activities of Widhya Asih Orphanages. That's why there are volunteers who come from individuals and institutions through the Widhya Asih Foundation.
2. The Widhya Asih Foundation will delegate the voluntourism activities according to the request of the voluntourist or sending agency which will then follow up on the voluntourism activities according to the plan.
3. In its implementation, Widhya Asih Orphanages can collaborate with educational institutions, communities, and other community organizations.

If we compare the model above with the Voluntourism Chain model published by the APEC Tourism Working Group (Milne, et al., 2018) as illustrated in the image below, the Voluntourism Implementation Model at the Orphanage has differences in the acceptance process because the Orphanage is under a Foundation which is legally responsible for all activities inside and outside the orphanage.


Figure 3.2: Voluntourism Chain APEC Tourism Working Group, 2018



Sources: *Voluntourism Best Practices: Promoting Inclusive Community-Based Sustainable Tourism Initiatives, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Tourism Working Group.*

The Voluntourism Chain model from the APEC Tourism Working Group can be a material for discussion between the Orphanage managers and the Protective Foundation and other stakeholders in producing a flow that is under the needs and needs of the institution and in this case according to the needs of the orphanage. Meanwhile, Sidhi Turker (2022) describes the Voluntourist Acceptance Model in the context of the tourism industry, especially in supporting sustainable tourism development as shown in Figure 3.3 below.

Figure 3.3: Flow Model for Voluntourism Activity Venue Selection



The diagram above illustrates the flow of voluntourist acceptance in tourist villages. VT tourists have the freedom to choose where to carry out voluntourism activities. They can choose the implementation site directly (in this case a tourist village), or through the sending institution which will forward it to the receiving institution. Recipient institutions will contact tourist villages that are of interest to tourists for vacations and voluntourism activities. This model is very open in nature and cannot be applied in Orphanages. However, orphanage managers need to study the model as shown in Figure 3.3 above to get a broader understanding.

#### 4. Conclusions and Suggestions

##### 4.1 Conclusion

Based on the discussion of the research results and discussion, it can be conveyed the conclusions of the research results regarding the development strategy of the Widhya Asih Orphanages Program as follows:

1. The perception of the organizers of the Widhya Asih Orphanages towards the implementation of voluntourism in Bali shows a positive thing and provides benefits for Orphanages in general. Voluntourism activities with orphanage children and the community are not only centered on the safety and comfort of the implementation of voluntourism but are also influenced by the forms and types of activities that can fulfill the satisfaction of tourists doing something through voluntourism activities with foster children.
2. The motivation of tourists in making volunteerism an interesting activity at the Widhya Asih orphanage shows high and positive interest because they can combine vacation activities and social work activities.
3. Voluntourism activities at the Widhya Asih Orphanage provide real and positive benefits. The experiences of tourists and voluntourism organizers show that voluntourism activities have a positive value not only for voluntourists but also for foster children and the surrounding community. Multi-effect benefits are obtained not only in the form of activity but various benefits in the economic, social, cultural fields, cultural exchange experiences, and communication.
4. Voluntourism can be used as a new strategy for the manager of the Widhya Asih Orphanage in supporting the sustainable development of Bali's tourism industry. This strategy is further strengthened by the findings of a model for organizing voluntourism in the Widhya Asih Orphanages environment which can be used as a reference and further developed by stakeholders, especially the organizers of voluntourism activities.

##### 4.2 Suggestions

Based on the results of the study, suggestions can be submitted that can complement the implementation and implementation of voluntourism activities by the manager of Widhya Asih Orphanages as follows:

- a. Voluntourism to be developed continuously with the manager of Widhya Asih Orphanages through collaboration with the surrounding community, educational institutions, and other related parties whose implementation is based on the principles of community-based tourism and sustainable tourism development through a holistic approach with related parties so that the goals and focus of the benefits of volunteerism are successful and efficient.
- b. The application of health protocols. The CHSE (cleanliness, Health, Safety, Environmental) guidelines from Indonesia Care are recommended to be socialized and implemented as a necessity for new forms of tourism, especially by voluntourism organizers by implementing strict health protocols to provide a sense of trust, safety, comfort for tourists to carry out activities volunteerism in Bali.

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# Social Anhedonia among Academics: The Role of Type A Personality, Age & Gender Differences

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## Abstract

The study aimed to determine the role of Type A personality TAP, age, and gender differences in social anhedonia (SA). Participants: University of Baghdad non-patient academics (Number = 400) (females = 250, Males = 150) at ages 25-60, with a mid-range of 42.5 years old. Measures: The Revised Social Anhedonia Scale (40 items) and Howard Glazer Questionnaire (20 items) were applied. Data Analysis: The validity and reliability have been examined. When applying the Pearson Correlation,  $r$  between SA and TAP was 0.347. Type A1 personality ( the highest score on TAP scale ) had the highest score in SA. Results: There is a weak positive correlation between Type A personality and SA. Age can affect SA; older individuals tend to be more anhedonic. Females had higher scores on SA than males. Discussion: the relationship between SA and TAP required several studies of larger samples in different environments to determine the nature of this relationship and to ensure the positive correlation between them.

**Keywords:**Anhedonia, Type A, Gender, Personality, Non-Patient, University

## 1. Introduction

Anhedonia is a personality feature characterized by a decreased sense of pleasure (Rey et al., 2010). SA is a significant factor in psychopathologies like depression and schizophrenia (Zhang et al., 2016). It refers to taking less pleasure in social activities. In addition, it is related to maladjustment and psychopathological disorders (Goldstein et al., 2021). Individuals with SA also tend to be alone and choosing that even when others are with them, rendering them more isolated (Martin et al., 2016).

To study SA's relationship to other variables, especially personality types, Lussier and Loas (2015) tested the connection between Type D personality and Anhedonia; they found that social inhibition can be a predictive factor. Kwapil et al. (2008) tested the relationship between SA and the Five-Factor Model of personality dimensions. SA correlated negatively with extraversion, openness to experiences, and agreeableness. Silvia and Kwapil (2011) also found a negative correlation with positive emotions and warmth.

Social isolation also correlated with SA. Olson et al. (2021) examined the relationship between SA and social network diversity among participants with a history of trauma; they found that SA correlated negatively with social network diversity. Higher SA correlated with a weaker social network, which may lead to isolation.

Social Isolation SI also correlated with many personality traits (Buecker et al., 2020). Traits such as neuroticism were related to SI, while agreeableness and extraversion were related with social interactions (Whaite et al., 2018). As a result, the risk of isolation was increased (Petticrew et al., 2012).

The typical Type A lifestyle may also be a risk factor for SA. The TAP individual is often a workaholic who is frequently aggressive and hostile (Kanten et al., 2017; McLeod, 2021). TAP individuals also tend to be work under pressure and suffer from mental health issues and social impairment (Amir et al., 2011, 2010-2008). TAP is also seen in individuals who seek success and struggle with time management. They become angry at any delay in accomplishing their work (Batigün & Şahin, 2006). TAP individuals seem to be more concerned with the usual situation and feel more hatred (Schiraldi & Beck, 1988).

Freidman and Rosenman demonstrated in many studies that people with TAP suffer from high blood pressure and cardiovascular disease more than other personality types (McLeod, 2021).

### ***Hypothesis 1: Type A personality tend to have SA.***

#### *1.1 Social anhedonia and age*

Other variables like age have received a lot of attention in studies of depression but not in SA. Research has demonstrated that SA increases in older age; almost a third of the elderly suffers from this disorder (Dotson, 2018). One study examined the age factor and its contribution to SA; Dodell-Feder and Germine (2018) showed that younger age often has a higher frequency of SA than older age.

### ***Hypothesis 2: Age may affect SA.***

#### *1.2 Social anhedonia and gender*

A few studies examined the relationship between SA and gender. Rueda (2019) refers to prior studies that are conflicted about the role of gender in SA. Langvik et.al. (2016) found no gender differences in SA. However, Rueda (2019) indicated that women might be more likely to suffer from Anhedonia due to their higher vulnerability to depression compared to men, while Dodell-Feder and Germine (2018) maintained that women have lower SA scores than men because of their particular social skills and their ability to enjoy interactions with others.

### ***Hypothesis 3: Males tend to score higher for social anhedonia than females.***

## **2. Method**

### *2.1 Characteristics of participants*

Four hundred non- patient participants were University of Baghdad academics (females = 250, Males = 150) ages 25-60, with a mid-range of 42.5 years old. The sample was divided by age into four groups: 30 teachers aged 25-30 years old, 155 teachers aged 31-40, 120 teachers aged 41-50, and 95 teachers aged between 51-60 .

### *2.2 Sampling procedure*

The random sample method was used, collecting data through Google Forms and online questionnaires in the academics' scientific groups in Facebook, through other social media, and emails. Personal interviews were also conducted with many of the participants.

### 2.2.1 Measures and Covariates

Self-Report Measures: The two scales below were applied:

- Social Anhedonia scale: the author applied the Revised Social Anhedonia Scale (Eckblad, Chapman, Chapman, & Mishlove, 1982) which contains 40 items that measure the inability to experience pleasure from social activities such as interactions with people, sharing emotions, or simply conversing (Chmielewski et al., 1995). The response was True/ False choice.
- Type A Personality scale: the author applied the Howard Glazer Questionnaire "The Glazer Stress Control Life-Style Questionnaire" (1978) to measure Type A behavior. The scale contained twenty items, each consisting of two phrases, placed at opposite ends of a continuum ranging from extreme Type A behavior pattern to its absence. Participants were asked to rate themselves on every twenty items on 7-point Likert scale. The lowest score was twenty, while the highest was 140. The results can be divided into five personality types: A1= 109-140, A2 = 80-108, AB = 60-79, B2 = 30-59, B1 = 20-29 (Glazer, 1979).

### 2.2.2 Research Design

Method Approach: Survey method applied online using Google forms.

Demographic Information: The age and gender data were supplied by the participants in Arabic.

Control Variables: Participants were asked if they were subject to symptoms of depression. The condition that they all shared was occupational fatigue and this variable does not affect the study.

## 3. Results

### 3.1 Recruitment

The period of recruitment and follow up was three months, while data analysis requires several more months.

### 3.2 Statistics and Data Analysis

Validity: To examine the validity for the SA and TAP scales, Construct Validity was constructed by using the Pearson correlation coefficient to measure items related to the total score. T- Calculated  $> 1.97$  ( $\alpha = 0.05$ , D.F.=398), meaning all the items of the SA and TAP scales were significant.

Translation Validity: The author presented both scales to an English language specialist for translation into Arabic and then re-translated it into English to check the compatibility of the two translations. As a result, a version suitable for the environment of Iraqi society was reached.

Reliability: The author used the Split-Half method for SA scale; the Pearson correlation coefficient was (0.79). By using the Spearman–Brown prophecy formula, the reliability coefficient was (0.88) and the Alfa Cronbach was (0.79).

Additionally, the author examined the reliability of the TAP scale by using the Pearson correlation coefficient, (0.73). The Spearman–Brown prophecy formula was (0.84) and the Alfa Cronbach was (0.89).

Size: Given the size of the population, the author used the Cochran formula to determine the sample size.

Using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 20 for results, the author extracted mean and standard division values for TAP. A1 was the most popular ( $n=150$ ), while B1 was the less ( $n=0$ ).

Table 1: The number of participants for each type, means and standard divisions, and lowest-highest scores on the TAP scale:

TAP	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Lowest Score	Highest Score
A1	150	115.58	4.78	110	124
A2	133	97.52	6.87	80	108
AB	84	70.58	5.38	62	78
B2	33	38.18	2.38	30	46
B1	0	-	-	-	-
Total	400	93.74	24.14	30	124

To examine the relationship between TAP and SA, the author applied the Pearson correlation coefficient for TAP with SA scales. The TAP mean was 93.74, the SA mean 19.34, and the t calculated value > 1.97 at 0.05.

Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, D.F., and T values for SA and TAP

Scale	M.	S.D.	T Calculated value	D.F.	T Table value	Significance
SA	93.74	24.14	59.85	798	1.97	Significant
TAP	19.34	5.93				

The general correlation between TAP and SA was positive ( $r = 0.347$  / weak positive). A1 was the highest correlated with SA, others had no significant correlation (A2-B2), while AB had a negative correlation with SA ( $r = -0.659$ ).

Table 3: The relationship of each type with SA,  $\alpha = 0.05$ 

TAP	$r_{\text{Pearson}}$	Calculated T Value	T Table value	D.F.	Significance
A1	0.347	4.5	1.97	148	Significant/ weak positive correlation
A2	0.145	1.68	1.97	131	Non-significant
AB	-0.659	7.93	1.99	82	Significant/ negative correlation
B2	-0.037	0.21	2.04	31	Non-significant
B1	-	-	-	-	-

To investigate the relationship between age and SA, the author applied the Two - Way ANOVA to test the differences in the groups' means.

Table 4: T-W ANOVA, D.F.= 3, 396, 399,  $\alpha = 0.05$ 

Sources of Variation	Sum of squares	Degree of freedom D.F.	Mean sum of squares	F-ratio	Significance
Between	163.565	3	54.522	1.512	Not Significant
Within	14275.225	396	36.049		
Total	14438.790	399			

F ratio (1.512) < (2.64) at  $\alpha = 0.05$ , D.F. = 3,396, meaning there were no significant differences among age groups in the SA scale.

Although there were no age differences in SA, the older group ( $m= 20.66$ ) tended to be more socially anhedonic than other age groups. This result matched with several studies (Lampe et al., 2001; Sharpley et al., 2017) that have shown that the level of anhedonia can be affected by age.

Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations of age groups

Age Group	Mean	Standard Deviation
25-30	18.83	5.37
31-40	19.12	5.23
41-50	19.42	5.83
51-60	20.66	7.43

To reveal on relationship between gender & SA, the author used the T- Test for independent samples to test the gender differences.

Table 6: T- Test for independent samples,  $\alpha= 0.05$ .

Gender	Sample Size	Mean	Standard Deviation	Calculated - T Value	Degree of Freedom	T- Table Value	Significance
Female	250	20.42	7.26	3.19	398	1.97	Significant
Male	150	18.51	1.16				

The Calculated T value ( $3.19 > 1.97$  (T- Table value)) meant that there was a difference in SA between females and males. The female group mean was 20.42. greater than 18.51 for the male group mean. Females tended to be more socially anhedonic than males in their daily life. This result did not match with many studies (Cvjetkovic-Bosnjak et al., 2016; Dodell- Feder & Germine, 2018; Goldstein et al., 2021) which confirmed that males scored high on SA scale compared to females.

#### 4. Discussion

The relationship between SA and TAP requires several studies on a larger sample in different environments to determine the nature of this relationship and to ensure the positive correlation between them. The " Hard- Work" person may feel more depressed; W.H.O. reported that negative work environments might create depressed employees and lead to a reduction in productivity (Lindberg, 2021).




Figure 1: Scatter Plot of SA scale and TAP scale scores

The size of the sample in this study may be the reason for the weak positive correlation in this scatter plot. study. Determining the relationship between SA and TAP requires further research. Yet, although the correlation is weak, it is still positive, confirming the link between the TAP lifestyle, especially A1 with SA.




Figure 2: SA means according to age variable

Age is also a risk factor in SA. Older people tend to be more anhedonic compared to younger people. Social isolation has increased recently due to low income, separation from families, migration to live and work in other places, and the loss of loved ones over time (Fakoya et al., 2020). Gender can be an additional determinant in SA syndrome. In this study women tend to be more anhedonic and isolated than men; these results oppose a number of previous results (Vandervoort, 2000; Henning-Smith et al., 2018). This could be the nature of community from which the sample came.




Figure 3: SA means according to gender variable

#### 4.1. Theoretical contributions:

The relationship between Type A1 and SA may be predictable because of the TAP lifestyle. TAP individuals tend to be obsessive workaholics who prefer work to social interactions. As a result, they may be at risk of isolation (Petticrew et al., 2012).

The role of age in anhedonic behavior is somewhat unclear and neutral. However, the high mean of the older age group on the SA scale may be attributed to several factors, including the decrease in social engagement due to old age. This result agreed with many studies that assessed the nature of social activities in aging. Marcum (2011) reported on the differences in the type of activity between younger and older age, and (Benjamins et al., 2003) also supported the idea of the withdrawal of older age especially when it is associated with other factors such as low general health.

Gender differences are often influenced by societal culture. In general, females in eastern societies suffer much more than males from a lack of social interaction and activities, which affects their reactions to social events. The lack of resources in Arab psychological environments and gender studies may prompt a reconsideration of directing studies towards this environment.

It is important to remember that it is not only the gender factor that is the cause or contribute in SA, but rather the nature of the combined factors in this sample in terms of educational level, age and environment, which contributed on SA level gender differentiation.

Stress in daily life also plays a significant role in killing pleasure. People who suffer acute- chronic stressors can be less likely to feel pleasure (Grillo, 2016). SA usually conforms with stress and follows it (Grillo, 2012). People in a country such as Iraq- who suffer from wars and endless conflicts (World Health Organization, 2007) - often suffer from painful, unsafe events for an extended period, affecting mood and well-being and making them more liable to suffer from SA.

Types of employment may affect SA. The academic's work is characterized by the necessity for accuracy, focus, and preoccupation with scientific research. The environment of academic life may contribute to a kind of isolation. Spending time alone may affect mental health; 40% of academics may feel lonely and isolated in their work environments (Sibai et al., 2019).

#### *4.2 Practical implications*

The finding that TAP was associated with SA has important implications that could lead to the discovery of factors that may influence SA and enhance the importance of the personality field in diagnosing developing or precipitating depression. Furthermore, this discovery contributes to the understanding of gender differences in Anhedonia and its connection to personality. Safety environments also may affect SA by increasing the anxiety levels. Many societies through the world suffer from deteriorating security situations due wars or political conflicts, and that can be a new direction to study these impacts on SA levels. Finally, these results may contribute to a deeper understanding of how academia impacts an individual's mental health, making it possible to improve the environment of university academics.

Due to the curfew enforced during the COVID-19 pandemic, and following safety measures during the epidemic crisis; handing out forms on the university campus became a challenge. Hence, the author used Google Forms method and incomplete forms were excluded. Sample type was another problem; in general, the Middle Eastern participants found it difficult to respond and interact with the psychological scales and often did not cooperate with the research, especially when filling out answers online. According to the author's view; this may be due to their somewhat secretive nature and their inability to express themselves normally. It may also be due to their lack of actual certainty in the field of scientific research and its results.

#### *4.3 Directions for future research*

The relationship of SA to personality types should also be studied extensively, as well as the study of SA's connection to the emotional, practical and material relationships of the individual. It is also important to study TAP and its link to depression.

SA is often the result of an uncomfortable work environment. It is not always linked to a specific age nor to a specific gender. Individuals with SA share many characteristics, among them an intellectual preoccupation and a strong predilection for work. A low level of social support may also be a contributing factor. These ideas require more investigation.

Only a few studies analyze the relationship between SA and personality types, as well as the role of age and gender in this syndrome. This study is the first of its kind to examine these relationships in the Arabic environment.

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## The Conflict of Interest

The author declared that there are no potential conflicts of interest concerning this article's research, authorship, and publication.

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# The Use of Social Capital and the Victory of Female Representative Candidates in East Nusa Tenggara's Regional Representative Body during the 2019 Elections

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## Abstract

This research is based on the success and feats of female legislative candidates in East Nusa Tenggara's 2019 elections, despite the deeply-rooted patriarchal culture. The increase in female representation in East Nusa Tenggara's Regional Representative Body heralds good news because the number increased from 9 to 12. This research assesses how four female representative successfully became legislative members using their social and moral capital. This research uses Robert Putnam's social capital theory and Claudia Derichs', Andrea Fleschenberg's and Momoyo Hustebeck's moral capital theory as the main theories. This study uses a qualitative method with a case study and in-depth interviews with the four female representatives. The principal findings of this research reveal that patriarchy contributed to the success and victory of these four female representative candidates, nothing that the men (husbands and fathers of these women) have social influence as a regional leaders, public figures, cultural figures, and religious figure. Furthermore, moral capital also plays a vital part because these women are role models and have honorable professions as teachers, lawyers, and/or activists that are deeply connected with the people.

**Keywords:** Social Capital, Moral Capital, Female, Representation

## 1. Introduction

The victory of female representatives in the elections in Indonesia marks a monumental moment in electoral politics. The reason is that female representation brings about new colors in policy-making. Budiarti wrote that female representation in the legislative body is very strategic because the way they socialize and their experience are very different. Women are assumed to bring different values, experiences, and skills (Budiarti, 2011).

Women's presence in the parliament is necessary to realize the interests and needs of women. The ability to utilize social capital, whether in the form of connections, norms, or trust is vital in these women's victory in the elections.

The victory of female representatives has been previously studied in the West Java Province, specifically in Indramayu (Nurmalasari, 2011), as well as in the West Sumatera Province (Putri, 2018). The focus of these studies elaborates how social capital, whether through connections, norms and the constituents' trust is a major contributor of the female representatives' victory in the elections. Social capital among the people is described as the readiness to live side by side—evident in the local culture that promotes togetherness, cooperation, and social relationships. Social capital could manifest in the form of having connections with a public/cultural figure and organisations that could become a political resource for the female representatives. Social capital is the catalyst to collective action and cooperation through the exchange of information and knowledge, and is the basis of trust in a political process—this can be seen in West Sumatera, specifically in Bundo Kanduang, an area that uses a matrilineal system. In this article, the success of these female representative candidates in East Nusa Tenggara despite the patriarchal culture is particularly interesting. The reason is that patriarchy contributed to these women's entrance in politics, until they were elected as legislative members.

The number of women elected in East Nusa Tenggara's legislative elections has not fulfilled the 30 percent quota. However, during the 2014 and 2019 elections, the number of female representation in the East Nusa Tenggara's regional legislative body increased significantly. In the 2014 elections, there were only six female representatives, while in the 2019 elections, the number increased twofold and reached 12. This heralds good news because in spite of East Nusa Tenggara's patriarchal culture, the number of female representation increased. This article aims to explain how social and moral capital contributed to the success of these female representatives in the 2019 elections.

## 2. Method

The approach of this article is qualitative in nature and the type of research uses case studies. The source of data uses primary data gathered from in-depth interviews with four female representative members of East Nusa Tenggara's regional legislative body that was incumbent in the 2014-2019 period, namely Adoe Yuliana Elisabeth, Kristien Samiyati, Ana Waha Kolin, and Inche D.P. Sayuna. The data relates to the social and moral capital possessed by these women and is analyzed using an analytical and descriptive method (Creswell, 2014).

## 3. Results

### 3.1. Female Representation in Politics

Women's representation in politics has been frequently discussed globally. One of the figures that discussed female representation is Hanna Pitkin. In her classical book "The Concept of Representation," Pitkin identified four kinds of representation: formal, substantive, symbolic, and descriptive (Pitkin, 1967). The first two kinds of representation describes representation as a 'way of acting' or 'acting for,' while the last two is described as 'way of being' or 'standing for.' In order to understand the meaning of these concepts, we must first be aware of the contexts in which these types of representation are placed upon.

Formal representation is defined as the institutional rules that are conducted before and after the commencement of representation. This type of representation has two dimensions, namely authorization and accountability. Authorization refers to how a representative is able to gain her position and status. Accountability is the ability of constituents to punish their representative for acting against the interests of the constituents or for not being responsive towards the needs and choices of the constituents.

Symbolic representation is the way a representative 'stands for' her constituents or her electors. A symbol can represent a cause or idea, or realize it by way of representation, even when it does not exist. Descriptive representation refers to representation that is based on commonalities or similarities between the representative and her constituents. In this type of representation, the representative does not act on behalf of someone else, but she stands for a certain cause. Hence, she presents something that is nonexistent by using similarities or commonalities.

Substantive representation, also known as ‘acting for’ representation is a concept which shows that activities conducted by a representative are carried on behalf of her constituents. Her role is as an agent and a substitute for who or what she is representing. In this representation, collective issues that are geographical (district) or other kinds of collectivity are not taken into account. The types of representation put forward by Pitkin are forms of representation that are incited by the notion of an activity, such as creating a descriptive or symbolic representation (Suseno, 2013). Political representation has several issues relating to the relationship of the representative and her constituents, how the interests of the constituents can be realized by their representative in the political process. Representation is said to be related to presence and absence. The responsibility of a representative is to make present the interests of her constituents in the policy-making process (Wardhani, 2018).

There are three arguments on the importance of female political representation in the parliament. First, there is no true democracy and no true people’s participation in the government and in development, without equal participation of men and women. Hence, in order to realize politics that is democratic, female representation is a necessity. Second, the goal of development will never be achieved without female representation, not only in the development itself but also in determining the goal of development. A proportional number of women are required to determine the perspective and goal of development that sides with women’s interests. Third, female participation in decision-making bodies will prioritize and give new perspective that sides with the people, especially women and children. The significant result that is expected from female representation is the realization of gender equality through the parliament (Subono, 2013).

In East Nusa Tenggara’s context, the increase of female political representation to 12 people in the parliament during the 2019 election heralds good news. The number increased from 6 during the 2014 election. Below is a list of the 12 women elected in NTT’s 2019 legislative election.

Table 1: Female Representatives of the East Nusa Tenggara Province in 2019

No	Area of Election	Name	Party	Sequence
1	East Nusa Tenggara I (Kupang City)	Adoe Yuliana Elisabeth	PDIP	1
2	East Nusa Tenggara II (Kupang, Rote Ndao, Sabu Raijua District)	Maria Saku	Perindo	1
3	East Nusa Tenggara III (Sumba Island, which consists of East, Central, West, and South West)	Kristien Samiyati Pati	Nasdem	1
4	East Nusa Tenggara III (Sumba Island, which consists of East, Central, West, and South West Sumba)	Rambu K. A. Praing	PAN	2
5	East Nusa Tenggara III (Sumba Island, which consists of East, Central, West, and South West Sumba)	Oktaviana Lyet Vinsiana Kaka	Perindo	3
6	East Nusa Tenggara IV (Manggarai, West Manggarai dan East Manggarai District)	Yeni Veronika	PAN	1
7	East Nusa Tenggara IV (Manggarai, West Manggarai dan East Manggarai District)	Jimur Siena Katrina	PAN	4
8	East Nusa Tenggara V (Sikka, Ende, Ngada, Nagekeo District)	Angela Mercy Piwung	PKB	5
9	East Nusa Tenggara VI (East Flores, Lembata, Alor District)	Ana Waha Kolin	PKB	1
10	East Nusa Tenggara VIII (South Central Timor)	Inche D.P. Sayuna	Golkar	1
11	East Nusa Tenggara VIII (South Central Timor District)	Emelia Julia Nomleni	PDIP	1
12	East Nusa Tenggara VIII (South Central Timor District)	Reny Marlina Un	Demokrat	1

Source: processed from KPU East Nusa Tenggara Province, 2019

During the 2019 elections, there were 12 women, four of which were re-elected for the second time. From eight electoral areas in East Nusa Tenggara, there is only one area that does not have female representation. However, women have represented each of their electoral areas in East Nusa Tenggara. With regards to the sequence number, other than the social and moral capital possessed by these women, being first or in the top sequence is one of the major factors that contributed to their election.

This article uses a case study on four female candidates that were elected in 2019. First, Adoe Yuliana Elisabeth from PDIP, listed first in the sequence, and was the administrator for East Nusa Tenggara's regional elective body and a candidate in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections. She was first elected in 2019. Second, Kristien Samiyati from Nasdem, listed first in the sequence, was an incumbent member. Third, Ana Waha Kolin from PKB, listed first in the sequence, was the Head of East Nusa Tenggara Province's Women Political Caucus from 2009 to 2024, and was a candidate in the 2009 and 2014 elections. Fourth, Inche D.P. Sayuna from Golkar, listed first in the sequence, was Golkar's secretary for the East Nusa Tenggara Province and a representative in East Nusa Tenggara Province's 2009 elections.

The area of election is of particular importance because East Nusa Tenggara consists of four major islands, namely Flores Island, Sumba Island, Timor Island, and Alor Island. Adoe Yuliana Elisabeth is from the electoral area of East Nusa Tenggara 1 (Kupang District). Kristien Sumiyati is from electoral area III (East, Central, West, and South West Sumba District). Ana Waha Kolin is from electoral area VI (East Flores, Lembata, Alor District). Inche D.P. Sayuna is from the electoral area of East Nusa Tenggara VII (South Central Timor District). The choice of electoral areas is important in assessing how the culture and perspectives of the people of each area views women and politics.

### *3.2. Social Capital: The Support of the People Towards Female Representative Candidates*

In "Social Capital, Economic Growth and Regional Development" by Sriya Iyer, Michael Kitson and Bernard Toh, which is published in the *Regional Studies Journal* (2015), it is mentioned that social capital is defined as institutions, relationships, attitudes, and values that facilitate interpersonal interactions in order to increase welfare through economic development and the people itself (Iyer, Kitson, & Toh, 2005). Additionally, there are several figures that have a role in introducing the concept of social capital, such as Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, and Robert Putnam.

Bourdieu, a French sociologist, defined social capital as resources, whether actual or potential, connections and relations that are attentive. The actors involved in the connection yearns for social relations that can be utilized as a resource that could bring about economic or social gains. Social capital, according to Bourdieu, is social relations that can be utilized by an actor to achieve his interests. Hence, social capital can become a tool for class struggle. Bourdieu defines social capital as a resource that is owned by an individual or group by utilizing interrelated networks or relationships, and the members acknowledge one another.

Robert Putnam, a political science expert, shows that social capital is inherent in social relations. Social capital is built through a social network that encompasses: 1) trust or positive values that appreciates development or achievements; 2) social norms and obligations; 3) social networks that becomes a platform for social activities, especially in the form of voluntary associations. Putnam believes that voluntary associations has a vital role in the development of social capital. Not only is it effective for flow of information, it is also an event where the actors can interact and make transactions.

Bourdieu and Putnam mentioned that social capital is an actor's individual asset, which could later develop into a group or collective asset. The closeness of a relationship is vital in identifying social capital because it signifies trust, norms, and a reciprocal relationship. With regards to its function, social capital functions as an agent of change and could support an individual actor or group in achieving their goals and fulfilling their interests.

Social capital that takes on the form of network, norms, and trust is possessed by the four female representatives. It consists of interpersonal relationships, norms that applies in East Nusa Tenggara on women in politics, and trust

that there are potential benefits that could arise between the four female representatives and the members of the network. The social capital possessed by the four women has realized their familial relationships and social organizations. The interaction that is conducted by these women and public figures gave rise to trust on the basis of common values. There are factors that affect the victory of these women in the use of their social capital, namely their proximity with the networks. All four had built a relationship with social groups from far before their candidacy. When they were campaigning, it was much easier for these women to socialize their candidacy.

These four women entered politics because they received the support of their husbands, fathers, and extended family. The political parties of each of these women supported them by giving them a choice to select their area of election: Adoe Yuliana Elisabeth in Kupang City, Kristien Samiyati in Sumba Island, Ana Waha Kolin in Flores Island, and Inche D.P. Sayuna in South Central Timor District.

The support of the constituents towards these four women originated from the male members of their families, which is social capital based on trust. It means that the support they gained is a result of trust that is gained through the extended family of their husbands and fathers, who are public figures in each of their selected electoral areas, as stated by Adoe Yuliana Elisabeth from PDIP:

“I was fully supported by my husband’s family and my siblings. I also have a lottery gathering and groups of friends there. There are also other lottery gatherings that supported me” (Interview with Adoe Yuliana Elizabaeth, 27<sup>th</sup> October 2021).

Kristien Samiyati from Nasdem also received the support of the people, which mainly originates from her father’s family who is a senior politician, a Sumbanese, and a public figure in Sumba:

“I entered politics and received support because my parents and extended family are from South West Sumba. So, it was not difficult for to socialize” (Interview with Kristien Samiyati, 15<sup>th</sup> October 2019).

Ana Waha Kolin from PKB also received the full support of her extended family and the alumni of the school in Lembata District where she was raised:

“My parents and family were very supportive. They told me to come back to my electoral area because they are all retired and are ready to assist me. So, my family and alumni formed a team that would be my counter path in the field so I could be successful in 2019 elections. I also had social capital because I was in the same organization as my friends. Our organizations became a strong capital in achieving my success in the 2019 elections” (Interview with Ana Waha Kolin, 24<sup>th</sup> August 2021).

Inche D.P. Sayuna from Golkar is a senior politician that already possesses social capital because she joined Golkar from a young age and was elected as legislative member at the age of 31, and the support she received came from her parents’ extended families in the South Central Timor District, as well as the church where she was a religious figure in:

“I come from my electoral area, and it is also where my extended family lives. Furthermore, I am known as a key figure in Timor’s Church of Masehi Injili, which has the largest congregation in East Nusa Tenggara. I am also a lecturer in the faculty of law and have many students from South Central Timor, so they voted for me” (Interview with Inche D.P. Sayuna, 24<sup>th</sup> August 2021).

The social capital owned by these four women is reciprocal and cooperative in nature and is conducted through a network of social bodies. This article shows that trust between the four women and their constituents resulted from their husbands, fathers, extended families, friends, and communities. The trust of the constituents is the reciprocity of the common values, tribe, organization, and church communities they have. As a social capital, trust is based on their husband’s and father’s figures. For example, Adoe Yuliana Elisabeth utilized her husband’s family’s lottery gathering (people from Manggarai Flores that resides in Kupang City); Kristien Samiyati is the child of a renowned politician and public figure in Southwest Sumba; Ana Waha has an extensive network that encompasses her father’s extended family, alumni, community, and organizations in her parents’ hometown; Inche D.P. Sayuna had joined Golkar from a young age and was elected as a legislative member by her extended family, her students, and her church community.

Aside from the constituents’ support she gained from her family (the status and influence of their husbands and fathers), these women also have capital in the form of their political party’s elite’s trust and support.

PDIP, through an interview with Emanuel Kolfidus, the vice secretary of PDIP's East Nusa Tenggara Province's Regional Representative Body, states that the party supports women in politics, from when they were first trained and recruited:

"After the 30 percent quota was enacted, the party continuously searched, recruited, and trained women as a response to the affirmative action on quota. This was done on a national level. Back then, there many challenges in female candidacy. I know that female representative candidates had to start from from the bottom" (Interview with Emanuel Kolfidus, 16<sup>th</sup> October 2019).

Nasdem made sure to provide space for all citizens, including women. as mentioned by Kasimirus Kolo, the party's efforts to increase female participation in the elections were conducted according to the law:

"Nasdem is a political party that is open. It means that when we face a political event every 5 years, we are open to all citizens that have capacity, integrity, and electability. This party accommodates all citizens to participate in the elections, including women, especially because the law requires a 30 percent quota for women in the parliament. For us, it is very reasonable" (Interview with Kasimirus Kolo, 22<sup>nd</sup> October 2019).

Yucundianus Lepa, an elite in PKB, mentions that the party encourages women in politics because women, as citizens, must actively participate not only for herself but also her family:

"In principle, we encourage women in NTT to participate actively. This means that if they want women and children to be taken care of and have their interests fought for, women are the most suitable for it" (Interview with Yucundianus Lepa, 30<sup>th</sup> July 2019).

Ince D.P. Sayuna, who is also the Secretary General of Golkar's East Nusa Tenggara's Regional Representative Body, states women, as citizens, are a political asset because they have a certain appeal in society:

"Women are a political asset for their political parties and have a certain appeal to the public. Golkar sees that in order to garner the support of the people, we must focus on women and young children. Golkar's 2019 political campaign's tagline was "Women and young children." As a result, almost all women are key administrators of the party. However, in order to become a candidate in the elections, they have to undergo training to prepare their mentality and skills as a politician. Furthermore, there is a sub-organization in Golkar called Golkar's Women's Union, so there are always female representative candidates" (Interview with Ince D.P. Sayuna, 25<sup>th</sup> July 2019).

The social capital of women in their respective political parties can be seen from the trust of the elite's political parties (most of them are men) who placed women in the top sequence. In the 2019 elections, Adoe Yuliana Elisabeth, Kristien Samiyati, Ana Waha Kolin, dan Inche D.P. Sayuna were all in the number one sequence. The sequence is important because it reflects the party's trust towards women and that they have a high electability rate. This shows that these women have loyal constituents and that the political party trusts that they will be elected.

### *3.3. The Moral Capital of the Four Female Representative Candidates*

After explaining the social capital owned by the four female candidate, we will discuss about moral capital from the perspective of Derichs, Fleschenberg and Hustebeck, where moral capital for female politicians is an asset and strategy for victory. In many cases, female politicians have the ethics to serve because they are more sensitive towards the gender issues in their areas. The reason is that female politicians are assumed to be more caring and are ready to nurture and serve. The concept of 'care' becomes a potential strategic tool for female politicians in gathering support (Dewi, 2019).

Other than social capital, the success of these four female candidates can be contributed to moral capital arising from their professions as teachers, advocates and activists. These professions are seen as honorable and has deep connections with the people. This can be seen from their campaign, where they portray themselves as mothers that provide comfort and do not deceive. These women took advantage of their image in order to approach the people. Even after being elected, they returned to their respective areas to assist and listen to the aspirations of their people. Adoe Yuliana Elisabeth is an activist and is used to social empowerment activities (including those involving cultural groups and women's empowerment). During the campaign, she socialized by directly visiting the people from one house to another:

“During the campaign, our socialization was only by way of visiting the people’s home from door to door. Of course, it was challenging because it was time-consuming. There were 10 to 15 people in one point and I was assisted by my family’s lottery gathering” (Interview with Adoe Yuliana Elisabeth, 27<sup>th</sup> October 2021).

Kristien Samiyati was a teacher in Manggarai District’s High School and returned to her father’s hometown in Southwest Sumba. With her background as a teacher, she brought up issues relating to women’s education and health:

“During the campaign in Sumba District, I brought up issues on health and focused on mother and children. Because I come from the educational field, I am very socially inept, so I utilized various medium in my campaign. Lately, I have been raising awareness on reproductive health for girls because they are our true capital. They should understand its importance because they are the future mothers of our generation” (Interview with Kristien Samiyati, 15<sup>th</sup> October 2019).

Ana Waha Kolin is an activist that advocates humanitarian works and she also works as a consultant who conducts various social empowerment activities:

“It was not difficult for me because I communicated with my connections, such as organisations, alumni, and my extended families in Larantuka, Alor, and Lembata. So, I campaigned in areas where I was deeply connected and received support from my family, friends, and public figures” (Interview with Ana Waha Kolin, 24<sup>th</sup> August 2021).

Inche D.P. Ayuna also conducted similar activities. As a senior politician, law school lecturer, and lawyer, she did not face many challenges during her campaign. She received support from her extended family, students, church, and the people she has assisted and advocated for:

“I was active in my church community and GMIT. They had the largest congregation in East Nusa Tenggara, which boasts almost all of the citizens of East Nusa Tenggara. Secondly, I was active as a lecturer in the faculty of law. The students in my faculty are mostly from South Central Timor, and they were the ones who voted for me” (Interview with Inche D.P. Sayunda, 24<sup>th</sup> August 2021).

All four women were successful in the campaign and could influence the people to vote for them. With the professions that they have, they are able to gain the trust of their constituents, especially because their profession is deemed to be “honorable” and were role models for the people of East Nusa Tenggara. Teachers, lawyers, and activists have deep connections with the people and are their asset in achieving victory. Furthermore, these women are very consistent. They returned to their electoral areas after being elected in order to hear the aspirations of their constituents.

#### 4. Conclusion

The success of these four female representative candidates in the 2019 elections in East Nusa Tenggara originates from the social capital, namely the trust of their constituents, which has been built by men (husbands and fathers). This trust arises because of commonalities in values and tribe (Manggarai, Sumba, Larantuka/Lembata, and Timor Tribe). Adoe Yuliana Elisabeth utilized her husband’s tribe through the family’s lottery gathering in Kupang City; Kristien Samiyati made use of their father’s extended family in Southwest Sumba; Ana Waha Kolin took advantage of her father’s extended family in Larantuka/Lembata and Inche D.P. Sayunda used her father’s and husband’s family in South Central Timor. Additionally, their proximity to various organisations (church communities, social organizations, and schools), as well as their close relationship with cultural and public figures in their electoral areas is also a major contributor.

Other than social capital, moral capital is also a key to these women’s success. Their professions as teachers, lawyers, and activists are deemed to be “honorable,” enabling them to form deep connections and assist the people. This is also evident in the fact that they returned to their respective electoral areas after being elected in order to assist the people.

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# The Future of China's Minorities with the Growing Power and Breadth of Technology

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## Abstract

This paper investigates the different methods used by the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China to subjugate its ethnic minorities. Through this, it predicts the situations of minorities with the growing breadth of technology within the People's Republic of China and globally.

**Keywords:** Subjugation, Minorities, CP, Uyghurs, IJOP, Social Credit, Campaigns, Genocide

## 1. Introduction

China always finds itself in the headlines for various reasons, right from maritime disputes in the South China Sea to land border disputes with neighboring countries. There is one field in which China has consistently been making headlines for years in a row, which is the field of human rights or lack thereof. The Chinese mistreatment of its religious minorities has been among the topics of discussion at various human rights conferences worldwide, and numerous experts have commented on this dire situation.

Numerous recent leaks of documentation have revealed a great deal about what truly goes on inside the Chinese borders, especially the condition of its minorities. These leaks have consistently laid light on the multiform methods used by the Communist Party, or *CP*, to subjugate its religious minorities. The *CP*, however, maintains the narrative that there is nothing illegal taking place within its border and everything that happens is within the bounds of the law, calling any claims absurd (Uighurs: Chinese foreign minister says genocide claims 'absurd', 2021).

While the international community makes an effort to mitigate a solution that guarantees fundamental rights to the Chinese religious minorities, other countries, and world leaders are reluctant to take punitive action against the Chinese government due to their influence in worldly affairs. There are many studies on the different methods used to target China's religious minorities. However, these are often fragmented studies dealing with specific methods. This paper aims to fill this gap by consolidating this information to describe the condition of these minorities. While doing so, it aims to predict the future of these religious minorities with the growing breadth, and power, of technology. This paper argues that the advancement of technology in China would lead to further subjugation of its minorities on a much larger scale.

## 2. Demography of China and the History of Hate

China is an East Asian country bordering the East China Sea, Korea Bay, Yellow Sea, and the South China Sea, between North Korea and Vietnam. It consists of a total land area of approximately 9.6 million square kilometers with a 15,400-kilometer coastline. China's climate is diverse, with a tropical climate in the south and a subarctic climate in the north. It consists of a majority of mountains, high plateaus, deserts in the west. And plains, deltas, and hills in the east (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021).

An overwhelming percentage of the population resides in the eastern part of the country and is scarce in the western regions due to the mountainous terrain and vast deserts. Although China has the highest population globally, of close to 1.4 Billion, its population density is lower than most Asian countries. The regions with the highest population densities lie along the Yangtze and Yellow River valleys, the Xi Jiang River delta, the Sichuan Basin (around Chengdu), the areas surrounding Beijing, and the industrial area around Shenyang (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021).

China has a limited ethnic distribution with a large majority, almost 92% of the whole population belonging to the Han Chinese ethnicity. All other ethnic groups contribute the remaining 8% (Figure 1). The majority of the Chinese demography, close to 52%, conforms to no religion and remains unaffiliated. Approximately 22% account for folk religions and 18% for Buddhists. The remaining 8% account for other religions such as Christianity, Islam, Hindu, and others (Figure 2) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021).

The recent history of hate in China, especially towards minorities, stems from a rather unconventional source than one might attribute. Initially, the Uyghurs meted out hate toward the Hui Muslims in China. The Hui and the Han shared the same neighborhoods while the Uyghurs would keep themselves distanced, considering the Hui to be inferior, hostile, and threatening (Bellér-Hann, Community matters in Xinjiang, 2008).

In the mid-1900s, reciprocity was fundamental in the social community structure in China (Bellér-Hann, Community matters in Xinjiang, 2008). The Uyghurs shunned interactions with the Han community and kept their distance from them, especially any piryotki, also known as Han-Uyghur children (Westerlund & Svanberg, 1999) (Bellér-Hann, Situating the Uyghurs, 2007).

The Baren Township riots served as the beginning of the modern conflict between the Uyghurs and the CP. The Chinese side termed this conflict as a terrorist attack in which 200 Uyghur terrorists, armed with advanced weaponry, attacked military and local police establishments around the town of Baren (Patrick, 2010). The Uyghurs called this a protest in which 200 men from the East Turkistan Islamic Party stood against the mass influx of Han Chinese into Xinjiang.

Ethnicity	Percentage of Population
Han	91.60%
Zhuang	1.30%
Hui, Manchu, Uighur, Miao, Yi, Tujia, Tibetan, Mongol, Dong, Buyei, Yao, Bai, Korean, Hani, Li, Kazakh, Dai, and other nationalities	7.10%

Figure 1: Breakdown of different ethnic groups in China

Religion	Percentage of Population
Buddhist	18.2%%
Christian	5.1%%
Muslim	1.8%%
Folk Religion	21.90%
Hindu	<0.1%
Jewish	<0.1%
Others (includes Daoist)	0.70%
Unaffiliated	52.20%

Figure 2: Breakdown of different religious groups in China

Other sections of the Uyghur community call these protests the result of the forced abortion imposed upon 250 pregnant Uyghur locals in Xinjiang (Guo, 2015) and local Uyghurs not being allowed in Mosques ("Uighur Developments in the 1990s", n.d.). The Baren Township riots effectively laid the foundation for a bleak future for the Uyghurs as the CP could now categorize them as terrorists. After the riots ended, close to 8000 Uyghurs were arrested for "Criminal activities of ethnic splittists and other criminal offenders" ("Uighur Developments in the 1990s", n.d.) (Sulaiman, 2017).

This history of hate, blame, and crime along with numerous misunderstandings and misinterpretations results in a dire situation. The religious minorities of China, especially in Xinjiang face unimaginable levels of cruelty. The CP views Xinjiang not only as a region that houses extremists but also as one of great strategic importance. Xinjiang is located in north-western China and borders Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India among others (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021). Considering the disputes with India over Kashmir as well as its strong ties with Pakistan, gaining complete control over Xinjiang is a key task for the CP as it serves as a buffer to protect the geopolitical core of China (Xinjiang Geopolitical Importance in China's Ambitions, 2020). Economically, Xinjiang is a key region for the energy sector as well as the gateway to the middle east making it one of the most valuable regions for the CP.

### 3. Methods of Subjugation

#### 3.1. Disparity in Laws

The simplest way for a state to subjugate its minorities would be to have specific laws that target these minorities. China, a firm believer in this logic, does exactly this. For apparent implications in the international community, China cannot directly ban a religion. However, they have found an ingenious way to do so. Rather than outlawing the religion itself, the CP has banned certain aspects of the faith (USDOJ, 2018). This move by the CP holds validity in the country as the bulk of the population remains unaffiliated with any religion (CIA, 2021) and considers it to be beneficial.

The Chinese constitution guarantees the freedom of religion to all its inhabitants alongside the protection of normal religious activities. However, it prohibits making use of faith to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system of the state. The CP misuses this constitutional arrangement to target the religious machinery within the state that does not conform to their standards.

The CP has criminalized certain aspects that often form part of the daily routine of the average minority. In north-western Xinjiang, a region with a majority Muslim population, people are not allowed to wear veils or grow long beards as the Party terms this to be a form of extremism (Wang, 2018). The Party prohibits children

from learning and reading religious texts and does not allow pilgrimages to Mecca unless it is state-organized (Wang, 2018). The government justifies its actions by saying that it is necessary to eliminate terrorists by eradicating ideological viruses of incorrect Islamic beliefs (Wang, 2018). Using words like virus, vermin, and tumors, the Party garners majoritarian support to carry out these activities. In some parts of Xinjiang, the Han population formed neighborhood watches to keep these minorities in check. The CP started an official campaign known as the "Research the people's conditions, improve the people's lives and win the people's hearts" campaign, to spread Party propaganda, eliminate rural poverty and promote ethnic harmony (Dooley, 2018), consisting only of members from the Han Community (Dooley, 2018).

The violators of the targeted laws of the CP, being Muslims, were dealt with extremely harshly. In most cases, their extremism was treated as a disease and not a crime of choice. This arrangement opened up a new domain for the CP to eradicate the very foundational ideologies they oppose, which meant that they needed to roll out extensive campaigns to identify the people with the disease of extremism (Wang, 2018).

### 3.2. Campaigns Targeting Ethnic Minorities

The CP works hard to ensure that the minority population has no say in their own lives. After the Baren Township riots and the subsequent declaration of Muslim minorities as terrorists, religion in its totality faces multiple issues within the country. We know about the many repressive campaigns by the CP to ensure ill-prosperity amongst its minorities and the subsequent death of their faith. Here we shall elaborate on those campaigns and hopefully shed light on what goes on behind the curtains of the CP.

The most extensive campaign endorsed by the CP is the Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism, or *SHAVT*, campaign launched in May 2014 ("China Steps Up 'Strike Hard' Campaign in Xinjiang", 2014). The call for the *SHAVT* campaign stems from requests made by members of the CP and the Han community following the Ü rümqi riots of 2009. Xi Jinping, then the leader of the CP, recognized the importance of such a campaign while saying, "We must be as harsh as them, and show absolutely no mercy" (Khatchadourian, 2021).

The *SHAVT* gave the local authorities in Xinjiang the power to search any residence without a court order based on suspicion, arresting/detaining them on arbitrary charges. The number of arrests has tripled in the five years after introducing the *SHAVT* compared to the five years before beginning the *SHAVT* ("Eradicating Ideological Viruses", 2018). During the implementation of the *SHAVT*, the CP also released a list of 26 sensitive countries to improve border control (Figure 3). The CP began issuing passports to the residents of Xinjiang. Previously, it was uncommon for the CP to allow a passport to an inhabitant of Xinjiang ("Eradicating Ideological Viruses", 2018).

The CP has a commanding influence over other countries. During the initial phases of implementing the *SHAVT*, the CP began compelling Chinese citizens of Kazakh and Uyghur ethnicity living abroad to return ("Eradicating Ideological Viruses", 2018). The Party, exercising its influence over certain countries, got the Egyptian authorities to round up dozens of Uyghur students in the country at their behest, forcing at least 20 to return ("Egypt: Don't Deport Uyghurs to China", 2017).

Thailand, Malaysia, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Cambodia, India, and the United Arab Emirates are amongst many nations that have round-up and deported Uyghurs at the behest of the CP ("European Lawmakers Urge Bulgaria Not to Deport Chinese Uyghur Asylum Seekers", 2018) ("India to Deport Three Asylum-Seeking Uyghurs to China", 2016) ("Uyghur Asylum Seeker Detained in Dubai Feared Deported to China", 2018) (Wong & Amatatham, 2015) (Matta, 2015) ("Malaysia: Don't Send 11 Detainees to China", 2018) ("Thai Officials: Uyghurs Will Be Deported to China", 2016). In 2016, the CP began the Becoming Family campaign ("Eradicating Ideological Viruses", 2018). The BF campaign is, in simplest terms, a compulsory homestay where a member of the Han community spends at least five days every two months in the homes of Xinjiang residents, primarily in the countryside, to ensure that the community members in Xinjiang remain good Chinese citizens

("Eradicating Ideological Viruses", 2018).

The *SHAVT* and the BF campaign are two of the largest in Xinjiang following the Ürümqi riots, and numerous others often flow under the radar. Campaigns have a strategic design to gain complete control over the Uyghurs and other minorities, furthermore, the entire region of Xinjiang, even if it results in the sacrifice of these minorities. These campaigns grow larger and larger with the growing influence of technology over them as logistical tasks become easier to handle. This reduction in efforts means that even more of these minorities can be targeted efficiently in order to reduce the associated costs and between utilise their manpower.

The technological campaigns and the discrepancies and inequalities in the law place these minorities in a position of no hope where every action has a dire consequence. Their only hope is for the *CP* as well as the International community to grow a spine and influence one another to be accountable for their actions and their ignorance.

### 3.3. Re-education Hospitals

The Chinese ethnic cleansing campaigns aim to instill the ideologies of the perfect Han Chinese in all its inhabitants. First, they need to identify the minorities that would stay true to their faith and then eradicate their beliefs. The former happens through the numerous campaigns put forward by the *CP*, while the latter happens in a rather unconventional manner. Previously, we spoke about how the *CP* treats a person with strong, or even minor, religious ideals as someone that has a disease. Additionally we shall look into the unconventional method used to eradicate the faith from people on a furthermore foundational level.

We spoke earlier about the deportation of Uyghur students from countries under China's political influence and the ambiguity behind this step. Some of these students noticed one or more of their loved ones missing from their homes after arriving home. They, worrying about the welfare of their loved ones, began approaching the local authorities, and to their surprise, the local authorities knew exactly where these missing people were. After further inquiry, most of these students leave with superficial answers.

They hear that their loved ones were at a government training school while the officials stress that their relatives are not criminals but could not leave these schools (Ramzy & Buckley, 2019). They also learn that there is no need for anyone to worry about their loved ones as they are being taken care of at the behest of the *CP*, which provides three meals a day and sponsors their tuition (Ramzy & Buckley, 2019). These local officials also helped arrange video meetings between the students and their loved ones and threatened them, implying that their behavior could either shorten or extend the detention of their relatives (Ramzy & Buckley, 2019).

These clandestine disappearances exist in families with re-turning students and numerous other families where religious expression was existent. All these disappearances complement a sudden rise in the construction of mega-structures. These mega-structures serve as the newest editions to the *CP*'s anti-religion campaign and are known as re-education hospitals (Inside China's Police State Tactics Against Muslims, 2021).

The *CP* categorizes religion as a disease. In speeches made alongside the Politburo, Mr. Xi has referred to religion as a drug and called its effects uncontrollable, adding that "you lose your sense, go crazy and will do anything" (Inside China's Police State Tactics Against Muslims, 2021). He has also said that "People who are captured by religious extremism— male or female, old or young — have their consciences destroyed, lose their humanity, and murder without blinking an eye" (Inside China's Police State Tactics Against Muslims, 2021).

These speeches elevate the hate for religion within the country and give foundation to the *CP*'s control over the minds of the majority, which helps justify these inhumane actions. The *CP* and its leading voice, Mr. Xi, define these excellent practices as vocational skills, education training, and transformation centers, asking his forces to "Stick to rounding up everyone who should be rounded up" (Inside China's Police State Tactics Against Muslims, 2021). One might wonder who is rounded up and put into these hospitals and what their actual ethnicities are. Simply saying they are a majority of Uyghurs is not enough to convince a reader.

Afghanistan	Libya	Thailand	Algeria	Malaysia
Turkey	Azerbaijan	Nigeria	Turkmenistan	
Egypt	Pakistan	United Arab Emirates	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan
Indonesia	Russia	Uzbekistan	Kazakhstan	South Sudan
Iran	Saudi Arabia	Yemen	Kenya	Syria
Iraq	Somalia			

Figure 3: List of 26 sensitive Countries

Details on the information of those who are the victims of the hatred of the CP are in detail below; however, for the sake of the above argument, we shall only consider the relevant data here. Since 2017, approximately 14,100 people have been arrested and detained on bogus charges (Xinjiang Victims Database, n.d.), and close to 13,650 are ethnic minorities (Xinjiang Victims Database, n.d.), accounting for 97% of all victims. The remaining 3% account for people of unknown ethnicities and some Han Chinese, at around 290 (Figure 4).

The above data and that given in the table show the prevalent bias towards religion and its propagation. One might be wondering what goes on within the walls of these re-education hospitals, and the concise answer is that they forcefully alter their opinions and faith to embody the ideal Han Chinese (Zhangrun, 2020). A handful of interviews were given by few who were fortunate enough to be let out of these camps and few reporters who were allowed access to these camps, and it is their stories and experiences upon whom we shall base the remaining of this section.

Most of these people share similar experiences from the day they set foot in these re-education hospitals, and the common purpose of their term is to study how not to be a Muslim (Thum, 2018). Most prisoners here do not know why they are serving such terms, and in most cases, there are no fixed terms, where some people are allowed to leave in a few months while others have been there for years (Thum, 2018).

When one arrives at one of the re-education hospitals in the consolidated busses, the authorities process them, allot them bunks, and give them the timetables and rules for their different activities in their stay (Haitiwaji, 2021). These bunks are nothing but rooms that often house up to 12 people (Haitiwaji, 2021). These rooms only had a window with a metal shutter that was permanently closed and a bucket to excrete with two cameras constantly panning from the highest point in the room (Haitiwaji, 2021). There was no furniture, no sink, no mattresses, no toilet paper, and no sheets; it was merely those 12 people behind heavy metal cell doors (Haitiwaji, 2021). The training at this school consists of two fields. One being physical education and the other formal theoretical classes. The physical education is straight out of military training where the prisoners would march across a room for eleven hours a day as two Han soldiers kept their time. The guards would require the prisoners to stand still for hours as those who succumbed to exhaustion were mercilessly thrashed while those who failed to regain consciousness disappeared. The theoretical education involves the prisoners sitting in a closed classroom for hours, repeating the exact phrase repeatedly until their only thoughts and beliefs are the words they read (Haitiwaji, 2021).

Additionally, they have to sing pro-China anthems and speak with great praise of the CP and its leadership (Thum, 2018). There have been numerous reports of prisoners being subject to torture in these camps (Gong, 2020). Including, physical torture where the prisoners are subjects of physical abuse, made to drink alcohol (Drinking alcohol is against the rules of Islam), forced to eat pork (Eating pork is against the rules of Islam), and numerous forms of mental torture (Correspondant, 2018).

Women in re-education camps have a worse lifestyle where they are subject to all forms of abuse. There have been cases noted where women have been subject to systematic rape and other forms of sexual abuse (Hill, Campanale, & Gunter, 2021). If not abused, they are subject to mistreatment if they are pregnant, and there have

been cases of separation of the mother and child at birth. In addition to all those stated above, one of the worst forms of inhumane treatment in these camps, where ethnic minority women are force-sterilized (Xu, Cave, Leibold, Munro, & Ruser, 2020) (Hill, Campanale, & Gunter, 2021).

Another form of torture that these prisoners face is forced labor. Coincidentally, numerous factories that employ manual labor spawn around these re-education camps. There are many accounts of busses leaving the camps and heading for these factories, which force prisoners to work for days without pay (Ochab, 2020). This form of torture is not limited to their stay at the camps but follows them even after leaving. In December 2019, the CP announced that the trainees from these camps would be graduating. After which, 80,000 Uyghurs were shipped to the industrial parts of China directly from the camps (Simonds, 2020).

Brands worldwide are known to use these forced laborers and set up factories in China for lower costs than anywhere in the world. (Xu, Cave, Leibold, Munro, & Ruser, 2020). Nike has set up a factory in Qingdao, where over 600 ethnic minority workers were employed (Xu, Cave, Leibold, Munro, & Ruser, 2020). Over 700 ethnic minority workers were transported from Loop County in Xinjiang to work at an O-Film factory in Jiangxi, where Apple has its camera modules manufactured. Nike and Apple are a few of the 83 brands implicated in forced labor of ethnic minorities, including Adidas, BMW, and many others (83 major brands implicated, 2020). The question that arises would be how the CP gets away with this grave mistreatment and their crimes against humanity. The following section deals with precisely this.

Ethnicity		Gender	Population				
Han		Male	90		302		
		Female	208				
		Unknown	4				
Islamic	Hui	Male	15		33		
		Female	18				
	Uyg	Uyghur	Male	8020		10981	
			Female	2958			
			Unknown	3			
		Uyg-x	Male	5		9	
			Female	9			
	Others	Male	1895		2624		
		Female	680				
		Unknown	49				
	Others		Male	49		146	
Female			19				
Unknown			78				

Figure 4: Breakdown of the victims of ethnic subjugation by ethnicity and gender

#### 4. Role of Technology in Ethnic Subjugation

##### 4.1. Censorship and Propaganda

The CP is well known for its blatant disregard for human rights. However, there is another aspect they are equally well known for, which is always to have control of the narrative. The CP can achieve high levels of domination over the narrative by utilizing two methods: censorship and propaganda. Censorship allows them to ensure that no conflicting opinions or narratives get any foundation, while propaganda ensures that the majority population considers them the epitome of truth.

Both these methods are age-old in their effectiveness and help justify all their cruelties towards their ethnic minorities. The CP employs numerous different methods to ensure the effective censorship of conflicting content. Furthermore, their biggest censorship organ is the Great Firewall. The Great Firewall is a tool that the CP uses to censor any content it determines as problematic. It is a marvelous tool that seamlessly performs numerous tasks, using different methods. First, it completely blocks all access to international social media websites

and applications such as Facebook, YouTube, and Skype. The Great Firewall goes through the different URLs on the internet, analyzing them along the way, filtering and blocking URLs containing problematic content (Hoffman, 2017). Looking at an online tool that determines if a website faces censorship in China (WebSitePlus, n.d), we see that <http://en.wikipedia.org> is accessible from within China [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet\\_censorship\\_in\\_the\\_People's\\_Republic\\_of\\_China](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_in_the_People's_Republic_of_China) is not accessible, showing the breadth of the Great Firewall.

Second, it ensures that the people trying to access these websites remain in the dark about these deliberate blockages. Chinese netizens, in numerous instances, have understood the aspect of blocking websites and try their level best to bypass any such systems. The *CP* is evolving and has the Great Firewall actively working to redirect these methods. They use different methods such as DNS poisoning, IP access blocking, connection resetting, and blocking VPNs, among many others (Hoffman, 2017). Because of the lack of access to international social media websites, the majority Chinese population is under compulsion to use the websites that the *CP* endorses (Griffiths, 2017).

Last but not least, it searches the entirety of these alternate websites using different methods for specific keywords and blocks those posts and the ability for one to interact with these posts. As the *CP* has complete access to all information that passes through the international alternatives created by them, they can strengthen their grip over opinions by directly integrating the Great Firewall into these systems. They can directly employ keyword censorship to block out problematic content.

One might now be wondering how they censor private messages between two individuals. The *CP* achieves this form of censorship by applying a method known as deep packet inspection. Around the world, information travels in secure, yet accessible, packets. With warrants, law enforcement officers can access these packets to intercept communication between two or more individuals. The Great Firewall employs a similar method but with no oversight. It analyses and inspects every packet going across the internet and censors and redirects those packets that contain problematic keywords. Deep packet inspection can block specific messages after someone sends them, even before the receiver gets them.

The Great Firewall is a classic example of the government overstepping and pushing its narrative. The *CP* has complete control over which keywords they term problematic and which are not and can conveniently censor posts that go against their line of thought. It is problematic when people speak in support of the Uyghurs and other minorities and are automatically silenced by an algorithm. This tool, unlike many others, is imperfect, and people have been able to bypass it; However, the Great Firewall closes any loophole swiftly as it is an ever-evolving entity.




Figure 5: Complete graph of censorship data from WeiboScope




Figure 6: Data from WeiboScope between June 2020 and July 2020

Numerous keyword censorship trackers exist watching for keywords that the Great Firewall has censored. The largest and oldest social media platform that serves as an alternative to international websites is Weibo. Hong Kong University invests a great deal into tracking the censorship across Weibo and has done so since 2018 (Figure 5). We note a rise in censored keywords between June and July 2020 when the cluster of cases was reported in Beijing, with close to 6.5 new posts facing censorship each day (Figure 6) (BBC, 2020). We must also note that these numbers are of those posts that the algorithm could find and is merely an estimate.

Censorship and propaganda are like two sides of a coin, where when lying flat on a surface, one always stays hidden while the other shows: censorship in hiding and propaganda being visible. Propaganda takes form in many ways, and the CP remains active in finding newer ways periodically. Chinese propaganda uses terminologies to classify the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities to be not only terrorists but also a disease to the Chinese ways of life. The CP uses words like vermin, virus, cancer, and rats to describe these ethnic minorities associating a sense of disgust towards them. This process results in the same attitudes carrying forward at the majority level where ethnic minorities are viewed as diseases that must be eradicated.

The CP uses propaganda to attack its minority and launch offenses against foreign media (Huang, 2021). They discredit these outlets to ensure that their majority population does not hold them with any regard. This process further ensures that theirs is the only narrative that people consider to be truthful. The CP also uses propaganda in its re-education hospitals to brainwash the minority prisoners it holds. As we know, a large part of the re-education experience is the transformation of beliefs, and the CP uses propaganda for this very reason. They force these prisoners to chant pro-CP repeatedly, among other iterative functions forcing these beliefs to replace any pre-existing ones.

Propaganda is also widespread in Chinese cyberspace, where citizen users of Weibo receive remuneration for posting pro-CP content. This type of pro-CP content is also spread by the official government handles on these platforms. The CP also releases numerous forms of content like short movies, videos, posters, and slogans that criticize Western and other foreign beliefs. This method ensures intolerant behavior towards western opinion and a strong resonance towards that of the CP.

From past studies (Inouye, 2017), we know that censorship and propaganda together find their use as an opinion directing mechanism more than a suppressive mechanism. Criticisms of the CP methods are welcome; however, any criticism and belief that may cause public uproar and threaten the stability of those in power face censorship (Inouye, 2017). We are in no way justifying the actions of the CP, and we recognize that their methods are a violation of their citizens' fundamental rights. Censorship and propaganda, along with discrepancies in their laws and numerous subjugating technologies, destroy any hope that these minorities may have left.

#### 4.2. Integrated Joint Operations Platform

The Integrated Joint Operations Platform or the *IJOP* is one of the leading applications of technology in China for the subjugation of minorities. The *IJOP* is a system of systems that tracks every movement of an individual in their everyday life and finds patterns of movement and behavior (Dholakia & Wang, 2019). The *IJOP* plays a vital role in the judicial department of the *CP* as its task is to predict and pick out people that are most likely to commit a crime shortly and supply this information to the local police.

The *IJOP* employs an application that tracks a person's private and personal data such as their location, blood type, how much fuel they use if they are on birth control, and many others. Using this data and external surveillance data such as CCTV cameras, equipped with facial detection and police checkpoints, the *CP* can coherently track their citizens. Along with tracking its citizen's movements, the *IJOP* is also available to find discrepancies and, if suspicious, notify the local authorities (Dholakia & Wang, 2019).

The discrepancies in the habitual patterns can be even the most minor and will still trigger the *IJOP*, which determines the level of suspicion. The nature of what the *IJOP* determines suspicious is wholly unknown. However, there have been unverified reports that discrepancies like exercising longer than usual, using the back door of one's house over the front are some of what *IJOP* flags. The *IJOP* collects and stores all this data on a shared database accessible to the entire judicial body of the *CP* across all regions of the country (Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region, 2018).

The *IJOP* also receives data from numerous police checkpoints at different parts of Xinjiang, where the local authorities rigorously go through the mobile devices of the people passing through (Ma, 2019). Alongside physical checks, scanners allow for the automatic collection of information on the identity of those that pass through (Ma, 2019). All this data feeds into a shared database that determines the level of suspiciousness (Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region, 2018).

One aspect of the *IJOP* known from the numerous data leaks from the *CP* is that the *IJOP*'s analysis wing is artificial intelligence (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2019). AI determines who is suspicious and who is not (Shu, 2019). One might argue that these algorithms remove inherent cognitive biases present in humans; however, research shows that algorithms have an inherent bias due to different factors (Knight, 2019). Thus, the *CP* convinces the layman that this bias-less algorithm is an absolute determinant of one's levels of suspiciousness, thus garnering majority support.

The suspicious people are usually brought in for questioning by the local authorities and are, in most cases, sent to re-education camps (Ma, 2019). Sources claim, in particular reports, that the local authorities are given daily arrest quotas that they have to fulfill, only adding to the layers of proof of ethnic subjugation (Grauer, 2021). The *IJOP* also fuels another entity under the *CP* known as the Social Credit System, which we shall discuss in the next section.

#### 4.3. Social Credit System

The Chinese Social Credit System, or *SCS*, is a regional extension of the *IJOP*. However, the key differences between the *IJOP* and the *SCS* are that:

- The *IJOP* works on the concept of suspicion while the *SCS* works on the concept of trustworthiness (Lee, 2020);
- The *IJOP* is a centralized system, while the *SCS* is a regional system with different similar systems existing across regions around the country (Kobie, 2019).

The *SCS* works using information from the same parent database as the *IJOP*, and by analyzing this information, it scores a person on a scale of their trustworthiness on a scale of meritocracy across numerous

factors that influence daily life. The parameters that determine how the score of trustworthiness changes are set by the local administrative wings. The *SCS* has seen no accurate updates since 2014 and was due for an update in 2020. However, due to the outbreak of COVID-19, this update was put on indefinite hold (Reilly, Lyu, & Robertson, 2021).

The *SCS* aims to be a comprehensive system that can automatically determine a person's and companies' trustworthiness on a numeric scale. This system is currently working on a regional basis accessing the different databases present in the region to produce these numeric values (Donnelly, 2021). Since this is still in its developmental stages, there is great speculation around the full breadth of this system and its implications on the Chinese commoner. There have been numerous leaks of documentation and personal accounts of people living with this system.

For a corporate setting, numerous aspects determine the trustworthiness of a given company, and the implications of such a score are also imaginable. All these aspects on which the *SCS* judges companies are standard regulatory and compliance criteria that the authorities already, legally, require them to fulfill. These include, but are not limited to, passing all government inspections, paying taxes on time, fulfilling environmental protection requirements, and other industry-specific requirements (Chipman, 2019).

Adhering to all these given requirements ensures that the *SCS* scores for the given company remain high. At the same time, deviating from these means that their *SCS* scores take a hit, whose severity depends on the violations. In any credit system, those with scores lower than a specific threshold find themselves on a blacklist. This list exists in the *SCS* as well, where companies whose score drops below a specific threshold find themselves on a blacklist (Chipman, 2019).

A company ending up on the blacklist has multiple impacts, most of which are still unclear to the public. However, some functions that blacklisting affects are surfacing through numerous leaks from citizens and local authorities. Companies that find themselves on the blacklist face more frequent audits and regulatory checks, exclusion from public procurement opportunities, the inability to access and benefit from government incentives, and are subject to public shame and humiliation (Chipman, 2019).

For individuals, in 2015, the Chinese Supreme Court put forward a system of blocklists to foster the creation of a *SCS* (Weatherby, 2020). The reason for them choosing a system of blocklists rather than a score is relatively unknown. In this system, people that fail to abide by their court rulings find themselves on certain lists, whose severity tends to increase with the violation of the rulings. There are numerous lists accounted for, some of which restrict a person's ability to use public transport, travel by air, take a loan, avail of accommodation at five-star residences, among others (Sun, 2021).

The modern *SCS* works on a similar basis where meeting specific requirements ensures high scores. Here, a system of slabs exists, rather than that (Weatherby, 2020) of blacklists or red-lists, where people find themselves in a particular slab based on their scores. These slabs do not have specific definitions and vary drastically across different regions. However, through certain leaks, examples of real-life *SCS* scores have come to light within some areas of China. There exists a scoring system on the scale of 600-1300, where the former and latter are the lowest and highest scores, respectively. Every individual entering the *SCS* system, by default, starts at a score of 1000 that reduces or increases depending on their behavior (Weatherby, 2020). **Some aspects that can increase one's score are** (Weatherby, 2020): Engaging in charity work; Taking care of elderly family members; Positively influencing one's neighborhood; Donating blood; Praising the government on social media; Helping the poor; Having a good financial credit history; Committing a heroic act.

**With an *SCS* score in the higher regions, one can expect** (Weatherby, 2020):

Priority for school admissions and employment; Easier access to cash loans and consumer credit; Deposit free bike and car hire; Cheaper public transport; Shorter wait times in hospitals; Fast-track promotions; Tax breaks.

Some aspects that can decrease one's *SCS* score are (Weatherby, 2020): Traffic offenses; Illegal protests; Not visiting parents regularly; Posting anti- government messages on social media; Spreading rumors on social media; Insincere apologies for crimes committed; Participating in anything the authorities deem to be a cult; Being in contact with people with lower credit scores; Cheating in online games;

**With an *SCS* score in the lower regions, one can expect (Weatherby, 2020):**

Denial of licenses and some permits to some social services; Exclusion from booking some flights or high-speed train tickets; Less access to credit; Restricted access to public services; Ineligibility to government employment; No access to private schools; Public shaming where their ID numbers are displayed online; Forceful change of caller tunes to broadcast that they are dishonest.

Looking at the aspects that may lower one's *SCS* score, we see specific criteria that may raise significant flags. Participating in anything the authorities deem to be a cult serves as a somewhat ambiguous statement that the *CP* uses to target minorities, giving them lower *SCS* scores. Expanding on this idea, groups with religious beliefs, according to the *CP*, are cults, and anyone that practices their religion is part of a cult. Thus anything they do for the sustenance and propagation of their religion is an activity associated with cult behavior. Thus, the authorities use these ambiguous definitions of untrustworthy behavior to target religious minorities strategically.

In another aspect, associating and interacting with someone with a lower *SCS* score can affect a person's score. Keeping this in mind, we can see that living in a religious neighborhood can affect one's *SCS* scores as one's proximity to people with cult-like behavior, having lower *SCS* scores, increases. Lowered *SCS* scores force people to move to lower-income neighborhoods as they cannot afford housing in other regions. This lower score also affects their employment opportunities and the educational opportunities of their children. One's family member or neighbor being sent to a re-education camp further reduces their *SCS* scores.

Thus, we can see a cycle of bias and discrimination built into the same system present here, and this gives enough evidence for us to determine that the government's motive behind the *SCS* is not only to determine trustworthiness but is also to subjugate their religious minorities further. At this juncture, we see a fragmented version of the *SCS*, which works merely at a regional level (Drinhausen & Brussee, 2021).

The *CP* had elaborate plans for the *SCS* with the aim of materializing them by 2020. However, due to the pandemic, these had to be put on hold. With newer technological advancements and the passing of the pandemic, there is no definite timeline for when the new system will come into effect. This new system would be unified and would exist not only in Xinjiang but around the whole country, further targeting minorities that managed to move out of Xinjiang and make a life for themselves. It is imperative, for the sake of the Chinese minority population that this system is put on an indefinite hold.

## **5. Conclusion**

As we have seen, the situation of the ethnic minorities in China is dire and the *CP* does not show any signs of deviation from the path they have taken. We are at a juncture in time where technology is ever-evolving and it is safe to assume that the *CP* is adapting to these changes. Recent developments in DNA collection (Cyranoski, 2020) and emotional studies (Tobin & Matsakis, 2021) point towards new forms of technology in the mix with deeper levels of surveillance (Kannan, 2020).

China's impact and influence on the international community make them a formidable enemy of humanity as no other member of the international community will speak against them. The *CP* strategically ensures that they constantly garner the support of the majority public, resulting in no internal foundation for anyone to stand up against this grave injustice. As we read these lines, innocent Uyghurs are losing everything they have, right from their religion to their identity and beliefs. As members of the international community, the onus falls on us to

hold these subjugators accountable for their actions.

The future holds numerous campaigns like the *SHAVT* and the *BF* to further destroy the rights of these minorities and in order to ensure these stop, we need to ensure that religion is accepted and not equated to extremism. We as a community need to practice and preach secularity and religious tolerance, without which these Chinese methods will spread around the world like wildfire. We already see spawns of such methods around the world like the *CAA-NRC* in India and the Hijab ban in Switzerland (Oltmann, 2021) alongside numerous other nations (Iftikhar, 2020) among many others. It is time we catch these dire signs and make the world a better place. The ever-growing victims database and the details it divulges show nothing but darkness for the Chinese ethnic minorities. The future looks bleak, to an extent that all ethnic minorities will disappear from China, leading to a completely Han ruled state with only Han inhabitants. This is terrible on the world scale as this may inspire other nations to do the same to their minorities. The Middle Eastern countries expelled Hindus' and Christians, the Western countries expelled Muslims, and all other countries expelled their respective minorities opening up for World War Three to be fought because of religious differences. Involving nuclear arsenal at that stage would lead to the end of the world and humanity, as we know it.

This paper investigates the numerous methods in which the *CP* subjugates its minorities and extrapolates these different aspects to predict the future of the Chinese ethnic minorities. In order to be concise, only significant technologies and methods are under consideration. Sources of information here are through primary research for which adequate references are given, or directly through leaked documentation available online.

We investigate the implementations of the *IJOP*, re-education hospitals, *SCS*, different campaigns, disparities in laws, censorship, and propaganda. These topics will require further research to further verify all claims here as well as present the true scale of the technology involved in ethnic subjugation, or what it truly is, genocide. I recommend that readers of this paper, as well as other academics, further research these different topics to produce empirical data to support these findings. I extend prayer and support to the ethnic minorities in China and around the world and hope that we are able to make the world a better, more tolerant, place for everyone to live in.

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# What is ‘Self-Help’? Self-Help Group Case-Study in Phnom Penh with Applying Most Significant Change Analyze

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## Abstract

The study explores the dynamism of Self-Help and Self-Help Groups in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, by drawing on multiple narratives of International Organizations, NGOs and Self-Help Groups (n=11). The research is qualitative in nature, conducting semi-structured interviews and attempts to depict the developmental processes of SHG with applying the originally customized Most Significant Change methodology. The result indicates ‘*sangkhum*’ (‘confidence’ and ‘hope’ in Khmer) is a key element for Self-Help spirit, which developed itself through encountering significant persons and social participation. It is also recognized that the concept of Self-Help ought to be grasped as a dynamism of continuum with listening-thinking-action in dialogical interaction with existing society fueled by passion for innovation (pathos of novelty).

**Keywords:** SHG, Self-Help Group, Most Significant Change, Cambodia, South-East Asia, Indochina

## 1. Introduction

Under a rapid expansion of globalization which has been lessening the gap between developing and developed nations, the theoretical study of Self-Help Group (SHG) requires a reframing of the perspective into a more integrated, cross-disciplinary manner. A concept, ‘Self-Help’ (SH) itself evokes various facets of human activities and this nature is inclined to cause fragmentation of the studies within different disciplines, especially between social-welfare and development studies (Yokoyama 2016). The reasons can be recognized in a scarce number of cross-cultural and of cross-disciplinary comparative studies. One of the earliest attempts on cross-cultural studies undertaken by Gidron et al. (1991, p.668) remarks ‘cross-cultural comparative studies are essential in order to delineate and account for the commonalities and universality of the self-help experience as well as the unique features of self-help in different societies.

The theoretical study, however, has been developed exclusively in the West so far (Hyman, 1990; Oka & Borkman, 2000). Before commencing the comparative/ inter-cultural studies, the model ought to be proposed from the indigenous perspective of Asians to avoid any possible cultural conflict and orientalism. Nayar et al. (2012) attempt an application of SHG theory established in social welfare field in the developed nations and warns that ‘the transfer of a concept that originated in Western, individualistic societies to a very different societal context

will bring disappointing results' (p.9). Unstable social welfare and health care system in the developing countries obscures roles and responsibilities of government and public services by scapegoating 'self-responsibility' of the citizens, thus would enforce premising neo-liberalism stream. This type of vigilance reveals the fundamental difference of environmental/ cultural status between the place where accepts supportive intervention under the umbrella of international aid and the Western-America where underlines self-decision and voluntary participation with names of 'SH/ SHG.'

Gidron and Chelsler (1995: xv) once posited 'recruitment and mobilization of peers in an informal and non-hierarchical setting and sharing of their common experiences are basic building blocks for almost all forms of self-help, in all nations and cultures.' SHG is employed in referring to 'communities of interest and belief' that transcend geographical boundaries. On the other hand, Ames, et al. (2005) request a cultural consideration more carefully to grasp an indigenous recognition of 'self-help.' Katz (1992) also indicates a possibility of a differently shaped emergence of 'self-help' in developing countries where mutual-aid within kinship and communal accountability prevail, contrasted with the developed nation where has been already industrialized with strong accessibility to professional knowledge and technology (Katz 1984, 233) (Gidron & Chesler 1995: 23).

In the above debate, it should be considered that Cambodia is extremely dependent on international aid; the government obtained net aid of 94.3 percent of the national budget from 2002 to 2010 (Rothstein 2014). It is, seemingly, arduous to begin cultural comparative study from scratch, since the sense of SH/ SHG has already been constructing its recognition under the process of westernization and modernization in the nation. Proceeding research regarding SHG in Cambodia mainly target saving groups (Pickens 2004; Ban, Gilligan & Rieger 2015) or the groups with disabilities (Pit et al. 2012). However, few of them approaches toward a clarification on how the people understand the terms of SH/ SHG. There is an acute demand for depicting common SH structural process between different type of the groups, as shown in practical research in Cambodia (Bullen & Sokheang 2015). This study sets the purpose on modeling the SH/ SHG dynamics through elucidating the recognition on SH/ SHG from multiple perspectives of International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs, those who are involved in Self-Help Group development policies, in addition to of different thematic SHGs (disability, HiV, saving group) in Cambodia who implementing those policies in field communities. By collecting the narratives on SH/ SHG from IOs, NGOs and SHGs, the study expects to approach the multi-dimensional aspects of the terms.

The study conducts qualitative research by interviewing international organization (n=2), NGOs which support SHGs (n=3) and leaders of SHGs (n=6) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The research looks to answer how the meaning of SH/ SHG is recognized in international organization, NGOs and SHGs as well as the dynamism of its developmental process.

## **2 Research Methodology**

### *2.1. Research Design*

It is considered that qualitative research is suitable for pioneering research (Oka 2003, 111) in self-help group studies. There is recent similar research with this study (Nicolai 2017) which pursues life changes of survivors after suffering an acute heart-attacking in Germany. Le. et al (2015) conduct open-ended interview research in Vietnam, is also referenced for this research methodology.

In order to explore the recognition of SH/ SHG from multiple perspectives in Cambodia, this research collected narratives from cross-sectoral agents of IOs, NGOs, and different thematic SHGs. With policy makers from IOs and NGOs, the author asked mainly two questions, 'what is SH/ SHGs?' and 'what is your methodology to develop the people's self-help.' On the other hand, in the interview with SHGs, the study records the recovery stories through interviewing the SHG's leaders, who serve to management position in the groups or run own SHG.

Reviewing Nicolai (2017) teaches us that data-coding process tend to be closed in researcher's thinking, therefore the interview adopts customized Most Significant Change (MSC) method, which is originally utilized in Monitoring & Evaluation of participatory appraisal (Davies & Dart, 2005). MSC has an advantage in discovering

unexpected results and outcomes which are typically excluded by pre-determined assumptions of developers or researchers (Serrat, 2009). Originally MSC not only suggests face-face interviews, but widely involves stakeholders in workshops and hold open questions/ open-discussion on ‘what is the most significant change?’ after the period of particular project or intervention. It enables us to clarify the perceptions as what is ‘significant’ for participants from their own perspectives (Lennie, 2011).

In this research, MSC among SHG leaders provides narratives for phenomenological/ linguistic analyze on their life story and understanding what can be considered as ‘self-help’ in their stories. During the interview, the author casted an open question, ‘what is the most significant change after having crisis/ problem occurs?’ and ‘when did it occur?’ to detect a certain life event. The findings are eventually linked to his or her comments on the second question, ‘what is self-help for you?’.

## 2.2. Sampling

SHG is supposed to be embedded in the informal social structure, and it is challenging to extract samples from public information (Gidron, et al, 1991) (Gidron & Chesler, 1995). In Cambodia, NGOs are mandated to register at Ministry of Interior, however, the list does not explain which groups can be classified to SHGs. Eschler & Pratt (2017) adopts snow-ball sampling<sup>2</sup> in analyzing psychological facets of youth adult cancer survivors; This research also does by asking ‘to introduce SHG which you consider it is.’ This sampling method is effective in collecting discourses especially of those who are marginalized from the mainstream in society (Atkinson et al. 2001). As a result, in addition to initial interviews with IOs (n=2), NGOs (n=3), five SHGs (n=5) were introduced (Table 1).

Table 1: Interviewee List: Research Period: from 10<sup>th</sup> Aug 2016 to 3<sup>rd</sup> Feb 2017, total 11 organizations.

Sector	No	Organization	Interviewees*	Field	Key Question
International Organization	1	UNAIDS Cambodia	Community Mobilization and Networking Adviser	HIV	Expected Role of SHG
	2	ILO Cambodia	National Project Coordinator / C-BED program coordinator	Labor	Expected Role of SHG
NGO	3	Salvation Center for Cambodia (SCC)	Mr. Tep Monyrotha, Director and Mr. Som Chea (Monk Team Leader)	General Mental Health	Methodology
	4	TPO Cambodia	Ms. Taing Sopheap (Research-Monitoring-Evaluation-Coordinator)	General Mental Health	Methodology
	5	Mariknoll Cambodia	Ms. Leonor Montiel (Director)	HIV and others	Methodology
SHG	6	Ta Prohm Souvenir	Ms. Kong Chim (Owner)	Disability (Landmine)	MSC
	7	Wathan Artisans Cambodia (WAC)	Mr. Taing Phireak (Sales Manager)	Disability (Landmine)	MSC
	8	Seeing Massage	Mr. Sin Wattana (Owner & Executive Manager)	Disability (blind)	MSC
	9	Friends Help Friends (FHF)	Mr. Kok Tha (Director)	Saving Group	MSC
	10	Lady Saving Group (LSG)	Ms. Bonnarath Virak (an elected Chairwoman)	Saving Group	MSC
	11	Cambodian People Living with HIV Network (CPN+)	Mr. Seum Sophal (Program Officer)	HIV	MSC

\* All interviewees agreed to show their name in this paper, except their age

All the interviews were mostly conducted in English, whilst the interviewees were also informed in advance to use Khmer language in case of their English vocabularies were not able to express their feeling and notion. After taking interview notes, the abstract and conduct coding were made along with the following analysis framework.

### 2.3. Ethical Consideration in Research

During the research interviews, the researcher respected the privacy of those who participate in the research process. All interviewees have given permission to show their name in the manuscript. The interviewees also cooperated in checking the records of this manuscript and secure their control on their providing information.

### 3. Framework for Analyzing

MSC methodology recommends writing a story in order to respect writers' point of view. But this is inclined to depict frameless narratives if applied as it is. After focus-discussion in SCC (Salvation Center Cambodia) office with the director, Mr. Tep Moni Rotha and Mr. Som Chea, the MSC framework was originally customized and structured as sorting life change phases into ① 'input' (*śrutamayī-prajñā* in Pali, means 'listening') and an event bringing MSC, ② changes in 'thinking' and 'consciousness' (*cintāmayī-prajñā*) and ③ in 'action' (practice) or 'behavior' (*bhāvanāmayī-prajñā*) according the following time line.

Table 2: MSC Analytical Framework

<i>śrutamayī</i> (input/ incident for a change)	<i>cintāmayī</i> (thinking/ consciousness)	<i>bhāvanāmayī</i> (action/ behavior)
	Past way of thinking and consciousness before MSC	Past practice or behavior before MSC
Most Significant Change (MSC)		
	Changed way of thinking and consciousness after MSC	Changed practice or behavior after MSC

### 4. Research Outcomes

#### 4.1. The Recognitions of SHG and its expected role in Context of Governance

UNAIDS Cambodia and ILO Cambodia commonly expect SHG to be 'a place' where the people discuss the shared issue, dispelling stigmatization and discrimination in the community and identifying their hope/ future-vision. The dialogue produces psychological empowerment. SHG functions to extract needs of those who directly experience social problems and inform the society of the collective voices by crystalizing their advocacy. International organizations are catalysts to conveying this message to the government through the development of national programs.

SHG is also supposed to be autonomous and spontaneous as well as financially sustainable under member's ownership. The features are considered are quite effective in sustainable development. The conceptual 'self-help' essentially bears a contrastive sense with 'dependence.' Yet, most of the SHGs tend to be dependent on a long term financial aid for full functionality in Cambodia, according to ILO Cambodia.

The full potential is recognized as 'dispelling difficulties, discovering self-resolution to unlock sustainable resource mobilization.' The fundamental steps for the full-realization as follows.

- (1) sharing experiences and identifying a cause of common difficulty
- (2) developing the strategy and plan to overcome the cause of suffering
- (3) carrying out the strategy in association with income-generating activity

At the third stage above, SHG inevitably confront with an external societal/ political environment and a need for communication with the community and society. The members ought to have 'logic' to ameliorate other's consciousness and behavior through the persuading process. Moreover, the economic activity evokes member's reflections on their Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT). 'SHG is a living organism' (remarked by ILO), thus, cannot ward off changing itself in adapting external environment.

#### 4.1.2. The Developmental Process of SHG

UNAIDS Cambodia considers that 'confidence' is a crucial psychological factor which allows SHG to communicate with the external society.

*'Confidence' sets up SHG's members to personalize their selves and spontaneous participation in the society. In most of time, 'human right' is linked to individual life story, rationalizing their voicing of their hope and declaration. In this sense, human right is a concept which forges foundation of 'confidence.' The painful experiences, for instance, once exposed to severe violence, is objectified by human right, and the governmental/ public services provide provisional supports. Community mobilization through the formation of SHGs plays a critical role in incrementing the welfare and quality of life (UNAIDS) .*

The discourse above indicates the two phases of SHG's formation, firstly, emotional 'sharing' of painful experiences, and secondly rational 'objectification.' The process clearly shows in TPO's methodology in developing the people's self-help.

TPO employs, at the first stage of SHG formation, a group work named 'River of Life.' In the workshop, five or six participants depict their life events by visualization and exchange their life stories. Each participant comes to understand that every life story is full of various events, while one certain event has been continuously governing his/ her life with an obnoxious and painful manner (as trauma). 'River of Life' work generates 'a place of compassion' is founded on a domain of sufferings among participants and creates 'trust' as a safety place where the people can feel a sense of security in speaking on personal and emotional matters in their mind.

After establishing the place, TPO regards it as 'a united domain' to identify the cause of sufferings and resolution to overcome them. The dialogue about suffering creates social bond among them, as if different streams of the rivers flow into a big river. Thus, 'suffering' changes into 'bond.'

Individual suffering and need can differ, and the facilitator has to explore 'a common place' to set in. The topics of discussion flexibly emerge in the workshop and the facilitator is required to prepare materials to harmonize the different needs of the participants.

After the 'sharing' life history and emotion, TPO provides human right & science-based education, mainly based on Psychology such as the definition or typology of violence, the typical causes of depression, symptoms and way-outs from daily suffering. The education does not supply mere scientific knowledge but fosters critical thinking which bestows self-awareness of the violated right by discrimination and violence in past. Science-based thinking mirrors the reality and demarcates SHGs from other societies or communities through identification of the common challenge.

*The biggest role of science education is to identify 'enemy' dwelling in individual mind, and to enable confrontation with a body of the scientific knowledge (such as causality and problem identification). Scientific education and intervention uncover the cause of sadness and uneasiness in life, and heal sufferings, rather than simply one-way informative provision of knowledge. 'Science' also gives 'confidence' as a common language used in global communities, such as NGOs and international associations, notifying SHG is not isolated from the world.*

All interviewees, in this study, of international organizations and NGOs attach weight to a spiritual foundation first, before following science-based education and vocational training which also boost 'confidence.' 'Human right' and 'science' are general concepts and knowledge shared in international society, but another key component provided by NGOs is recognized as religious wisdom.

SCC was established in 1994 by two university students successfully mobilizing monks and has developed SHG support methodology based on Buddhism. The monks conduct face to face counseling and mindfulness exercises to raise self-awareness to various sufferings by teaching a value of *karma*, the cycle of reincarnation, and of non-possession, i.e. forsaking tangible assets. A good karma circulates by good deeds, bringing basic-human needs (food, house, health etc.) and peace, contrary to a bad karma which invites suffering. SCC gives lecture to the group (usually from ten to twelve participants) in pagodas. But more priority is given to intensive one-to-one spiritual support if the case is serious.

*In any suffering the people facing with, we say 'don't worry, it's a nature of human-being. Everything flows like a river and keeps birth and rebirth, as same as memories you look back now. Try to cultivate yourself, your mind, and your behavior, and just make good deeds and maintain discrete mind to consider what action you should take. Live in small life with the least materials.'*

HIV patients of those who SCC mainly mobilizes seek for 'motivation to survive spiritually' in stigmatization and isolation. 'Self-help' refers, for SCC, to 'effort to cultivate value at the bottom of spirits.'

One of the female SHG members has started working in SCC because of her tireless effort to cultivate knowledge capital and existing culture in the community. Such attitude promotes to build trust from surroundings. Poverty appearing as a mere chasing of daily necessities is originated from a lack of self-help spirit and cultivation of the mind, therefore fail to upgrade such life. Hence, the suffering becomes a permanent cycle (as the bad karma). According to Mr. Som Chea (a monk team leader of SCC), in daily life, there are many 'voices' already calling around the poor people, such as 'how to cope with emergency in disaster,' 'how to activate SHG meeting' and 'how to improve working performance.' The reason why the population fails to 'listen' to these voices is a lack of respectfulness toward others and inactive 'thinking.' Cultivation of self-help is a continuum resonance of listening-thinking-action.

*There are so many Ph.D. holders and educated people coming from outside Cambodia, and they know many things, having a plenty of science-based knowledge with logical thinking, however, wisdom (panya) does not accompanied with their body (kāya-kamma), speech (vacī-kamma) and mind (mano-kamma) . Even if such person knows many things with logical thinking, they may be harmful to civilian just like Pol pot regime. They believe they do good things for the Cambodians but being unaware of what is 'good' or 'bad' in the first place, just due to the absence of cultivated wisdom. These people are not philosophy of doctors for us. In this sense, poor farmer sometimes activates self-help pursuing wisdom more than educated people, then, the educated people are rather poorer than farmers. Our monks are not working for eradicating poverty, but upgrade society by cultivating our wisdom.*

Thus, SHG members are taught following the framework of 'listening,' 'thinking' and 'action (*pariyatti*)' to implement self-cultivation of morality and wisdom. (In the interviewee describes the process by coining 're-knowledge' and 're-intelligence' of the people).

After completing this spiritual education, SCC starts a science-based lecture and vocational training as same as TPO does. It is noteworthy that the SCC's methodology at this phase is to 'show the successful model of actual practitioner' after the SHG members elaborating problem-solving plan and scheme by their selves. SCC has the vocational program for children on gardening, agriculture, handy-craft and tourism development, since the children are the shared hope for HIV survivors. This vocational training is also, consistently a 'cultivation' of a tradition in the community in search of indigenous values.

Another example of an NGOs that stresses the importance of spiritual wisdom is Maryknoll Cambodia, a Catholic non-profit mission aid organization. The Maryknoll has started its operation since 1995, approaching vulnerable populations such as people with HIV, disabilities, and polio victims by offering the vocational program.

*At the initial days in Cambodia, the team thought much of 'mutual aid,' literally help each other, while another slogan says "it's not charity" since the age was a stage of "re-starting" the nation. Business development entails a sense of holistic human development and social progress in such an early stage where most of the population was struggling for necessities to survive. We did not have the prepared materials for the education and kept try and error in the program by seeing participant's face every time, and discussing 'ok, let's coordinate this next time' or 'implement this type of knowledge next time.' After all, our conclusion reached to a keen perception on the impact of psychological heal and spirituality. We told just simply "value yourself." All the capacities take hold in the core spirit, "self-help" as awaking and discovering uniqueness of the individual potential and this also requires 'value others' in same way. The successful factors in the initial projects produced SHG's leaders who led a hope during 1995-1998.*

The Maryknoll methodology also adopts a mixed counseling of one to one and group workshop. Unlocking characteristic potential of individuals leads to business development and social participation and increases 'confidence' and 'self-respect' among the group members at the same time.

#### 4.2. Result of Interviews with SHG leaders

##### 4.2.1. Encountering Significant Other

A representative of HIV self-help group, CPN+, Mr. Sophal was diagnosed with HIV in 2006, and immediately fell into severe depression and isolation, spending life 'just to survive'<sup>3</sup>. His MSC occurred by SCC's home-care treatment; The caregiver persistently rallied and stood by Sophal even while traveling and going for a simple walk. He was always with him whenever he was feeling uneasy in isolation. Sophal was able to grow in 'confidence' and got rid of isolation, improving his life gradually. He was recovered to start working at a provincial office of SCC in 2009 and moved to CPN+ in 2013. Currently, the volunteer leaders in CPN+ also adopt similar 'stand-by' care as he once received from the caregiver, accepting phone calls for almost 24 hours a day from the SHG members. A sense of 'oneness' bonds members as if they are one family members. Sophal answered that 'self-help' is 'to participate in social life and political, economic, cultural development and improve own and other's life.'

Ms. Kong Chim injured her leg by stepping on a landmine in 1982 at 12 years old and went to Phnom Penh to receive prosthetic legs and rehabilitation. She lived in a shelter for orphans until 16 years old. Two year later, she attended another vocational training in the pagoda, a tailor in the Maryknoll Skill Training Program at Wat Than 1995-2002<sup>4</sup>. Chim especially recalled the days and her MSC was triggered by meeting Ms. C [anonym], a staff member of Maryknoll. C always encouraged Chim as her close friend, beyond a trainer-trainee relationship; For instance, bringing medicines, and standing by her side all day when Chim got sick. Chim describes the closeness as 'she always stood behind me,' which more precisely described by the Khmer phrase '*neak kraoy khnang*,' literally meaning 'someone standing behind.' The phrase indicates a close friendship with a person as supporter or mentor in Khmer culture. The relationship had given 'confidence' to Chim to live positively.

After she opened her own retail shop as a place where the people with disabilities cooperate in income generating business in 2004, she named it "Ta Prohm Souvenir," Chim undertook a behavioral change. She began to consider her customers as '*Pukk-mak*' (Khmer word means 'dear friend'), it was most important change to treat other's not as a mere business partner, but as respectful close person. 'After stepping on the landmine at twelve years old, I have not been able to set a proper course of education like others. But human relationship had helped me move forward, they brought me to the outside world always...I don't have self-help my own, just borrowing hands of others. This is my way of self-help.' Chim answered also, self-help is to 'contribute to others by his or her unique capacity, as it's also my pleasure to keep working for my dear customers, responding to their order by customizing and improving my hand-made products. This also produces my confidence.'

The Maryknoll Wat Than project was handed over to other Christian-based NGO, World Vision Cambodia, and developed into the Watthan Artisans Cambodia (WAC) as an alternative-business run by the SHG with land-mines victims and the people with physical disabilities. Mr. Taing Phireak, a current sales manager of WAC, lost his arm in 2005, when he was 19 years old after stepping on a landmine. He was depressed when he imagined the life without one arm, however, his MSC was given when meeting eighteen friends in the same situation, all who participated in the three-month World Vision workshop with him.

One day, he confessed his grief and anxiety for his future, then one friend answered, ‘you do spend normal life now and what is wrong with you?’ The words awakened him and healed his melancholic and isolated state; He gained ‘confidence’. ‘My safety place was the relationship I had there, I could share anything and then my negative mind went away.’ After the training, World Vision offered him a receptionist job in 2007 and having a role to participate in the society. Having social role further strengthened his confidence. ‘I feel I am in a net of the relationship, tied to general society. Here is the place to stand on.’

#### 4.2.2. Encountering reflective other, future model

In 1990, at 21 years old, having survived the Pol Pot era, Mr. Wattana Sin was just about to finish his architecture course in his university: At the time, his eyesight had suddenly begun to fade. He went to see a doctor and it turned out that he has a problem in the back of his eye, and eventually lost sight. Four years of depression and loneliness ensued.

In 1994, a year UN and international NGOs started their operation in Cambodia; the Maryknoll Rehabilitation of Blind Cambodians (RBC) Skills Training Centre was opened. One of his friends introduced him to the training. There he learned English, orientation (how to walk with a support stick) and education for personal development which tells how to live independently.

In 1996, He took a 166-hour Basic Anatomy and Physiology Massage Training Program, from January to August. His trainer was Mr. Sous Sothi, a blind Khmer who studied *Shiatsu* massage in Japan and then moved his residence to Canada. At that occasion, Sothi was back in Cambodia to visit his family. The program invited a massage technician from Japan as well, who taught Japanese style massage, “*Shiatsu*” and “*Anma*.”

The most significant change for him was an upgrade of his notion on the massage job. He noticed it is a professional work like a ‘doctor’ after meeting Sothi and the Japanese massage. The Japanese trainer delivered a spirit of hospitality, understanding customers mental/body problems from the professional views of physiology and anatomy. It brought the significant change in his identity in that the blinded people can play a characteristic role in the society. He determined to be a doctor of body, and this was a most encouragement for him. The change enabled his recovery from depression to be a vision provider as a representative of blind people.

*I was hooked on learning and knowing on human body at that time. And knowing was healing for my mentality. I always had an image training what I learned by the books. I kept feedback between learning and practicing. Then I also came to know, during working-time, that the different customers have various emotions and mental status when they come to receive my massage. I considered why he or she chose “today” and “now” to receive massage. Then I felt I was becoming a doctor, who solves people’s troubles in body and mind, and communicate without seeing his or her face, instead, through using my hand as eyes. I realize my eye is blind, but not my heart is. I got a permanent confident.*

After finishing an internship in Singapore, Sin returned to Cambodia in 1997, as a local trainer who train other blind people. He found he became Sothi, a model for others<sup>5</sup>. Sin became one of the founders of ‘Seeing Hands Massage’ company in cooperation with National Centre for Disabled Persons (NCDP). The concept was built on self-help and mutual-aid spirits, and now coordinates 11-12 members of SHGs in different provinces as massage spa business units.

*Through this mutual aid system, the blind people who were supposed to live with family, can gain financial and social independence. They gain confidence, and confidence is a crucial base for participation in general society. The confidence comes up with professional mind and attitude.*

Sin defines 'self-help' as 'knowing own characteristic role in the society and putting an effort to be professional, developing self-realization,' but also remarks 'many young blind people don't realize this self-help spirit, spending time in chatting, listening to music with smart phone. Is this a generation gap? There is a different grade of the spirits and passion to be professional.'

#### 4.2.3. Encountering new concept and idea

Friends Help Friends(FHF) is a saving group organized by graduate students, launched by 10 members with \$200 deposit, rapidly growing to 161 members with \$ 230,000 until June 2016. After graduating from high school, Mr. Kok Tha dreamed to enroll in university, regardless of his parent's limited financial support. Private loans set monthly interest-rates of 5%-10% and some of his friends dropped out in the middle of the university course due to such high-rates loan. He was irritated at his unfortunate circumstance and his emotion got self-abandoned. He even felt a tie between him and society being cut.

His MSC was brought to him in 2004, when he received a lecture of Dr. Yang Saing Koma, a founder of CEDAC (Cambodian Center for Study and Development in Agriculture). In the workshop, Dr. Koma explained his original notion regarding a concept of 'self-development.' Despite this lecture, for the following five years, Tha had become aimless, having no life-goal and gambling with friends. But the lectured concept 'stayed capturing' him during this period. In 2009, he launched FHF with friends, including those who were playing and gambling with him.

The core philosophy he inherited from Dr. Koma; 'think about social value,' not self-pursuing interest in an individual closed perspective. Tha reinvented this philosophy by adapting to youths living in urban areas of Phnom Penh, after considering how the concept should be applied and customized to expand to younger generations living in urban area.

FHF does a saving money; however, it is more than sharing economic benefit. The membership is limited to those who have personality possessing 'consciousness of society.' Literally, FHF identifies itself as social business platform to promote the youth to contribute to the society. Every monthly meeting arranges discussion on different social issues, exchanging ideas to cope with stress, learning techniques to instill self-confidence. The discussion fuels motivation of the members to achieve their future dreams. The meeting also invites guest speakers. 'Such dialogues enable youth to speak emotion and dissatisfaction freely and generates a place of dialogue that reflects society.'

*Self-help, contrasted with 'begging' and 'dependence on donors' or 'receiving pity' from society, is to drive the people's participation in the society and to foster a spirit of pride. Mutual help is, of course, important, but self-help is a pre-requisite. We cannot depend on others for our entire live. Only the person who exerts self-help can help others, hence can have the right to ask help from others, to transform from dependence to independence, and then from independence to interdependence. Self-help is a kind of spiritual 'thinking' which links individuals to society, a condition for having social consciousness.*

Responding to the FHF philosophy, the initial members have started their own SHGs in their own areas. One of them, Ms. Narath, who was also inspired by Dr. Koma's speech, especially from the concept of 'Quality of Life,' achieved an establishment of 'Lady Saving Group' (LSG) with eight graduate female students in 2010. The ladies held dialogue about their future dreams; ideal jobs and hopes for further education. The group concluded that the shared obstacle is financial limitation before pursuing their self-realization. Many women have no choice but dropping out of school and giving up their dream, settling in housekeeping or gourmet factories. Women in Cambodia are charged with the multiple burdens of housework, child rearing, caring for parents with dependence on their husband's income. These factors substantially hinder self-realization, and therefore LSG posits 'collective

saving' as a common mean to overcome the hindrances of the individual. The core philosophy was set as 'self-reliance.' This philosophy also campaigns against the currently expanding trend of business-centered MC/MF, that dismisses the future of the consumers and their quality of life, hence perverting ends and means.

LSG had deepened Dr. Koma's concept of 'Quality of Life' composed of 'Health' (*sok*), 'Knowledge' (*chom*), 'Friendship' (*mitta*), 'Money' (*louy*) as a holistic human development by adding 'Woman Right' as the original fifth component. It means an introduction of gender perspective into the 'Quality of Life' concept.

Their developed philosophy is reflected on the unique system of saving & loan. LSG policy encourages women to pay contributions to wedding expenses in scope of fostering a sense of responsibility. As the custom in Cambodia, the wedding expense is generally paid by male counterpart and/or her family, thus woman has not been given value due to exemption from financial burden. LSG sets a special low interest-rate on borrowing money for use of wedding expenses with a condition of husband participation in the meeting. Another tax incentive sets on those who develop their start-up for social enterprise. Both system encourages self-reliance and self-help among females.

## 5. Analyze

### 5.1. The Developmental Process of SH/SHG

Analyzing above personal narratives, common elements are sorted Table 3 to categories of internal/ external development stages of SHGs. It is noticeable that all MSC of SHG interviewees are triggered by 'encountering other,' and analytical explanations along with type of encountering are below.

Table 3: Internal & External Developmental Structure of SH/SHG

MSC categorized as encountering other	Input as intervention/ development methodology	Thinking & consciousness as key psychological transition	Practice & behavior	Domain of spiritual nature	Time orientation
		Despair and isolation			
(1) Significant other	Bonding 'place of compassion'	Safety	Participation in SHG	Pathos (emotional)	past
(2) Reflective other	Scientific education, identification	Critical consciousness	Knowing/ learning	Logos (rational)	present
(3) Ideal other	Ideal concept and vision,	Confidence /Hope	Social participation	Pathos for novelty	future

#### 5.1.1 Encountering Significant Other (ESO)

It is commonly found that recovering process starts from emotional bonding and compassion with a significant other(s), close friendship, as an initial attempt to overcome the past traumatic event which incurred spiritual crisis. The safety place of human relationship should be secured for increasing confidence to survive and to share any emotions without rejection and oppression by others<sup>6</sup>. TPO's formation methodology, 'River of Life,' is an epitome of the following SCC and CPN+ methods as well as Chim's encountering are all the examples of this type of encountering. ESO commonly implies that a significant other(s) who listen closely to the personal sadness and emotions play a role of compassion and of spiritual platform for self-affirmative sense of 'confidence.'

#### 5.1.2 Encountering Reflective Other (ERO)

Human rights and science or traditional (religious) wisdom in the general society enables SHGs to reflect on their situation and intervene in the reality through 'objectification' of the sufferings. Encountering others who give such

general concept can be called as ERO. ERO is not a mere information-knowledge provision; It is an implementation of essential orientation which enables the people to detach the sufferings and to revitalize the subjective emotion up to logical thinking to critically identify the oppressive structure from present perspective. Tha and Narath met Dr.Koma and developed the life policy into the ideal model for young generations. The stories show a good example of ERO.

### 5.1.3. Encountering Ideal Other (EIO)

EIO is a type of encountering which envisions a concrete model for the future, symbolically depicted by the story of the personal encountering with Sothi for Sin. EIO forges a ‘hope’ toward ideal future, also relativizes the present status from the perspective of the future. The process brings up motivation to re-participate in the society. SCC takes the step in the education by showing the successful example of a person or SHG to other members and this methodology also can be considered as an intentional invitation of EIO.

The next chapter will elucidate the details of codes along with the three encountering above.

## 5.2. Analyzing Psychological Process Along with the Framework

All interviewees, more or less, mentioned the term ‘confidence’ and passion to show the representational practice to change the social recognition which marginalizes the vulnerable population. The message indicates a significant function of behavioral encouragement to participate in society. Social contribution and discovery of characteristic role in the society probably impacts on self-help spirits. Another accentuated term is to ‘respect’ to welcome MSC, which details the importance of both self-respect (value yourself) and respect others (value others) as shown in the comments given by Mariknoll and SCC as well as Chim’s narrative. The next Table 4 categorizes these key terms into (1) ‘input/ event’ as a trigger for a change’ (*śrutamayī*), (2) ‘thinking/ consciousness’(*cintāmayī*) and (3) ‘action/ behavior’ (*bhāvanāmayī*).

Table 4: Coding along The Analytical Framework

	(1) input/ event	(2) thinking/ consciousness	(3) action/ behavior
Before MSC		① <b>Despair and Loneliness</b>	② <b>respect other</b>
When MSC occurs	<b>Encountering Other</b>		
After MSC		③ <b>Confidence and hope</b>	④ <b>Social Participation</b>

### 5.2.1. Despair and Loneliness

After problematic incident brought crisis, the people commonly experienced depression and isolation. To be ‘cut’ (in Khmer កាត, *kat*) from the society causes ‘isolation’ (*ekhao*) and it is the main emotional cause of the sufferings. Considering the Khmer word សង្គម (*sanjkum*), ‘society’ connotes a multiple sense of ‘communication,’ ‘intimacy’ and ‘universal agreement/ harmony’ as aspects of the generative term, ‘សង្គម’ [*sanjkamii*]). ‘Individual’ (‘បុគ្គល’ *bokkol* in Khmer<sup>7</sup>) aspires to social integration and peaceful life in the community/ society. There are no exact English terms which directly translate these aforementioned “individual” and “society” in Khmer.

According to the old Khmer-French dictionary (Pou 1992), ‘*toc, tvoc*’ (means ‘cut’) meant ‘detaché,’ in addition to ‘isolé, solitaire’. Even in present, it contains negative nuance when we say ‘cut face’ in Khmer ‘កាតមុខ’ (*moukhe-keat*) which indicates ‘to interrupt conversation or communication,’ at the same time, ‘strong disrespectfulness’. Losing social bond is strongly felt as isolation and disrespect in Khmer spiritual context.

5.2.2. Respect


To ‘respect’ others is an indispensable attitude to live in a strong hierarchical society of Cambodia. The point was emphasized by Mariknoll, both Chim’s and Sin’s stories during interviews; ‘Respect’ in Khmer ‘ករកម្ម’ (*karkorp*) contains a nuance of ‘obey’ in the context of Khmer culture where the first person (‘I’ in Khmer ‘ខ្ញុំ’ (*khnhom*) has a sense of ‘slave,’ whilst ‘you,’ ‘អ្នក’ (*neak*) is a generative word from ‘anak’-‘qnak’-‘nak(a)’ originating from ‘Naga’ (ancient legendary serpent). Already the numerous literatures regarding Khmer community have designated the ‘patron-client’ relationship, called ‘ខ្សែ’ (*Khsae*), which means ‘string,’ implying a connection of one person to one person in the vertical/ hierarchical/ social structure. Probably, it symbolizes a shape of Naga. We can understand it from the Khmer phrase introduced by Chim, ‘someone who stands *behind*,’ ‘*neak kraoy khnang*’ that represents naga body, a line of the social body (picture)



Photos taken by the author in Phnom Penh city, 6<sup>th</sup> Nov, 2016

5.2.3. Confidence and Hope

All the MSCs of the interviewees in this research brought about a change of consciousness in recovering ‘confidence’ and discovering ‘hope.’ Chim, Wattana and SCC requested to use intentionally the Khmer word of ‘សង្គម’ (*sangkhum*) [sɔŋk<sup>h</sup>im] since this word means ‘confidence’ and ‘hope’ at the same time. Various factors in the personal life can be considered to foster ‘*sangkhum*.’ Before Chim launched her retail shop, for example, she had already experienced same type of business in NCDP, also once tried a small hand-made child-toy’s business with her friends. These accumulated experiences let finally her ‘think it is time to do by myself.’ Sin dramatically realized ‘*My eye is blind, but not my heart is*’ in his most significant change in gaining ‘confidence’ and ‘hope’ through his profession. Such ‘*sangkhum*’ persuades us to consider the liaison of ‘confidence’ and ‘hope’ is dissolved into intuitional transition and it also can be comprehensible in our common sense in universal experience. The following Figures1-3 depicts further analyze on relation above ‘confidence/ hope’ and ‘social participation.’



**Figure1:** The picture describes an individual as a small circle and a society where the individual stands/ lives in as a bigger circle. ‘Before Crisis Happens,’ individual stands on the society in harmony with a sense of oneness without any disturbance in the community.


**Figure2:** After crisis occurs to the individual, there generates a chasm and discontinuity between the individual and society. The particular suffering cut (ตัด) the individual off the society and his or her self-realization is hampered in the loss of self-respect.

**Figure3:** When SHG covers the intersection as the place of compassion through sharing common fundamental experiences, SHG becomes an alternative place to stand, where was once lost in isolation, and to reconnect the individual to others/ society. SHG has two dimension and orientation to give confidence/ hope, one toward the individual as bringing spiritual peace and a recovery from the crisis, while the second toward society as a platform to delineates the way of social participation in future.

#### 5.2.4. Social Participation

Considering the discourses in the interviews, the social participation can be classified into two different modes; Firstly, *economic participation*<sup>8</sup> through alternative business with a characteristic role accompanied by a sense of professional to work in the society. This mode realizes an income generation. Secondly, *symbolical participation* to combat social stigmatization and change the existing value system which marginalizes them from an ordinary life by proposing new model or idea. However, both can be complementary. Social participation through SHGs provides both economic and psychological empowerment and the society appreciates the participation by giving confidence to the individuals in SHGs. There is a ring circulation between the individual and the society and then SHG becomes the catalyst of this circulation. (Figure 4)

Figure 4: Dynamics of the Circulation between SHG and the Society



The isolated individual recovers confidence and discovers hope (*'sangkhum'*) through compassion as discusses the above. In order to activate this circulation, SHG should not merely stay being a 'place of compassion,' but shift to a new foothold to the external/ general society. Looking back to the ideal concepts of human right and science, or also 'Quality of Life,' these concepts commonly come from general (external) society to catalyze individuals to participate into society. The concept calls for individual to develop new idea and urges reflection on the problematic situation identified in the group dialogue. Consequently, the society and the concepts can be thought to be in dynamic interaction; in other words, the ideal concept changes its shape through the reflection between SHG and the society. From the view of the society, the society changes itself by producing ideal concept to call for characteristic social participation of the suffered people.

### 5.3. Ecological Dynamics of the Development of SHG

The symbolical facet of social participation embodies historical dynamics of the society. It is important to grasp the dynamism of SHG by incorporating the historical axis in the ecological perspective. In 1990s, when Cambodia entered the national resurgence period, the leaders that established their self-help business such as Sin and Phireak have been struggling with the generation gap with young participants in the group. The young generation shows less motivation to work and show less pride for their profession. Sin has been struggling to maintain the service quality in massage business, when his staffs tend to spend time in listening to music with smart phone, chatting during working hours. Chim has been also challenging to compete with a great number of similar 'self-help' businesses that have already saturated the market in the tourism industry in Phnom Penh; The situation has been inflicted losses on her business.

It was a huge challenge for vulnerable people to participate in the society and to sustainably work to earn their basic need independently in the national resurgence age. But the sense of 'self-help' has changed its meaning in present when social participation of the challenged (such as a handy-craft business by the people with disabilities) has become banal. In other words, the past ideal perception has prevailed enough in the society. For this, the representation of 'self-help' transforms in responding to the situational/ historical environment and transition of the society. Thus, there is an ecological interaction between SHG and the society.

In the case of the saving groups, the self-help is buttressed by passion to innovate society, or can be called as, 'pathos of novelty' in this paper, to embody the ideal concepts like 'Quality of Life.' The young generation pursues the realization of it by catalysing the concept to reflect their specific status-quo in the society. 'Self-Help' is fuelled by such pathos, leading a hope and change, and need to be updated through an interaction with the changing society.

Considering the above, SCC seems to adequately describe 'Self-Help' as the active-process of listening-thinking in cultivating wisdom and practicing dissolving into one action. Self-Help is contingent on such reflective thinking in dialogical interaction with the society.

## 6. Conclusion

The study explored the recognition of 'Self-Help' and 'Self-Help Group' by bringing a light to the concepts from the multiple narratives from IOs, NGOs and SHGs. It is examined through applying the analytical framework based on the Most Significant Change method to model the dynamics of SHG.

The multiple discourses reveal 'autonomous,' 'sustainable' and 'advocative' natures of SHG, while the capacity development implemented by relevant NGOs shows the multiple phases of;

1. Compassion Phase: forging 'a place of compassion' through sharing personal emotion and creating sense of trust and security.
2. Objectification Phase: identifying a cause of problem through 'objectification' with logical/ critical thinking, and 'reflection' with human rights concept and science-based education.
3. Innovative Phase: Communicating with and Participating in the general society, through income generation activities or advocacy with symbolic/ innovative idea.

The above phases are comparable to the three types of most significant events in personal life stories of recovering process, as well as personal spiritual recovery process as following Table 5.

Table 5: The Self-Help Developmental Phases with MSN and Spiritual Process

	Trigger Encountering for MSN	Spiritual Process
(1) Compassion Phase	Significant Other	Confidence
(2) Objectification Phase	Reflective Other	Hope
(3) Innovation Phase	New concept and Idea	Social Participation

In conclusion, Self-Help is not considered as a static concept but rather an active dynamism throughout spiritual crisis to social re-integration. It can be defined as a type of action-intuition which intuitively captures the encountering event into personal recognition (listening), thinking and action dissolved into one continuum. There is a nested reflection between individual, SHGs, and society. The process commences from 'sangkhum' (confidence and hope) obtained in individual consciousnesses and it is triggered by encountering with others. The encountering encourages the confidence and critical objectification extending to a generative 'pathos of novelty' as a hope for ideal future of the society. Thus, SHG can be defined as the continuum of endogenous development from pathos to logos and to 'pathos of novelty' which leads a change in the society.

The catalyst of ideal concepts, such as human right, envisions an ideal future of society and ought to be embodied in a practical manner by SHGs in response to historical social transition. The SHG with such ideal concept is supposed to face with dialogical participation phase in the changing society, and a logic of the new vision should be sophisticated to be comprehensible for the present society. In this sense, SHG is 'a living organism' (the phrase remarked by ILO Cambodia in the early part of this paper) and compelled to enter the dialogical interaction with the external society. Otherwise 'Self-Help' would decline due to the weakening passion for innovation. In other words, ceaseless encountering with external others are indispensable for a survivability of Self-Help spirit.

In spite of the aforementioned findings, this research has limitations in sampling and in the specification of targeted area in the urban Phnom Penh in Cambodia to sufficiently endorse the proposed result and conclusion, as well as lacking comparative analysis with existing SHG theories. The author plans to further case-studies by utilizing the proposed framework and propositions.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Bullen & Sokheang (2015: 13) implies a need for shared approach and recognition by remarking 'NGOs new to self-help group concepts appear to be willing to unquestionably adopt methodology that includes flaws that have crept into the system.'

<sup>2</sup> A technique for finding research subjects, by asking one subject to give the researcher the name of another subject, who in turn gives the name of a third, and so on. (Vogt 1999)

<sup>3</sup> Sophal's life story is also available in a booklet named "20 years Plus Living Positively" (2015) published by CPN+

<sup>4</sup> According to the newspaper article, 'Program Gives Disabled a Second Chance,' April 19, 2001, *Cambodia Daily*, the training adjusted to the demands of the business market, and a comprehensive menu including English, math, accounting and computing

<sup>5</sup> Since French colonial era, the leader in Cambodia is supposed to be required to study outside their own village. (Osborne, 1978: 217-243)

<sup>6</sup> Facilitation guideline designed for HIVS workshop also signifies that '...the workshops to provide a safe environment allowing community sector participants to feel that they can speak freely,' in addition to require the facilitator to grasp a structure and a multi-sectoral context of the issue. (Greenall, 2007:1-10)

<sup>7</sup> 'Individual' originates from 'ꠘꠣ' (bokkol) also comes from Pali 'puggala,' distinguished from sangha" (multitude) or 'parisa' (sitting around, surrounding people). (Davids and Stede, 1992:437, 463, 667)

<sup>8</sup> Any types of SHGs are not necessarily involved in income generating activities including CPN+ in this research, but also does not depend on apparently the issues which SHGs deals with. For instance, SCC runs a handy-craft shop in Siam Reap owned by the SHG with HIV patients.

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# Internal Capability of the State Matters in International Relations: Evidence from East African Tri-national Border Zone

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## Abstract

The realist theoretical perspective suggests that the ‘inside’ of the state is not a critical variable since, unlike the anarchical international system, the domestic arena entails a sovereign entity in form of a government which is able to exercise effective authority, secure compliance from citizens, and guarantee internal order. However, studies continue to expose a litany of states especially in the developing world, whose weaknesses can be attributed to domestic antagonism. Consequently, the states face external security threats due to such internal incapacity gaps. This article draws data from Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan to demonstrate that internal capacity of states matter in international relations. The study establishes that the three states have been unable to establish effective authority over the pastoral Turkana, Karamojong and Toposa who reside in their respective territorial jurisdictions and this weakness has a corresponding effect on the ability of the state to promote its national interest, which is mainly security. The article therefore, argues that while realism still remains a compelling theoretical perspective for conceptualizing security in the international system, it could be strengthened by paying attention to the domestic variable.

**Keywords:** External Capability, Internal Capacity Nation State, Security

## 1. Introduction

The dominant contemporary political framework for the organization of domestic affairs of different societies and for pursuit of national interests in the international system is the nation state (Stirk, 2015). While the nation states bear the same institutional and functional characteristics namely fixed borders, permanent population, internal control and sovereignty, notable differences exist between them especially their level of institutional development and the consequent capability to fulfill their mandate. In the West, the nation state projects more effective capability in pursuing national interests in the international arena than its counterparts in non-Western world. The developing countries therefore face more formidable difficulties in realizing favorable terms and outcomes of engagement in the highly competitive and insufficiently regulated international stage. In the case of African nation states, these weaknesses have contributed to the constrained capability of the state to fulfill its external mission as

a primary actor in the international system in conformity with the central argument in the realist interpretation of international politics (Morgenthau 1973, Said 2013). Despite this, the realist scholarship has so far paid little attention to the development phase of nation-states. The nation-state is still introduced in the literature as a mature and accomplished political unit, presumably ready and capable of achieving dominant presence and action in comparison with non-state actors (Carr 1939, Waltz 1979, Valensi 2015).

Indeed, there is an underlying presumption in the realist argument to the effect that the formation of the nation-state that is mostly an internal process has been completed in all the three primary dimensions, namely definitive citizenry, territory, and an effective structure and authority of government (Hobsbawm, 1992). It is presumed that the accomplishment of these three factors has enabled the nation-state to realistically project outwards into the international arena its fourth dimension, namely sovereignty and the defense of national interest which realism restricts to security. Very little attention has been paid to the internal characteristics of the nation-state itself as the basis for achieving the desired outward conduct (Hassan, 2006). However, internal weakness of the nation-state can directly translate into weakness in external projection and inhibit the realization of the goals expressed in the classical Treaty of Westphalia, that is, peace and security through internal control and external sovereignty (Croxtton, 1999).

The nation-state in the West has experienced long evolutionary processes and are thus regarded as internally developed. In the developing world, however, the nation state is at once new and inadequately developed in respect of internal dimensions (Chabal & Pascal 1999). The nation-state formulation emerged outside Western Europe generally, through establishment of the colonial state, complete with legal and institutional system of government, borders, and a defined subject population. Upon independence, these features of the colonial state were inherited by the newly established nations mostly during the post-World War II period. The African nation state is therefore a new, post-colonial construct with *acquired* attributes that are at early stages of development (Wimmer & Feinstein, 2010).

Whereas states are perceived as entities that meet the traditional criteria of statehood namely fixed borders, permanent population, internal control and sovereignty, some - especially in the developing world - show evidence of shortfall in one or more of the preconditions stated above (Moravcsik, 1996). Consequently, these states are weaker than their Western counterparts. The weakness of these states arises much less from external factors than from their internal conditions. This is the situation that Rotberg (2002) describes as “internal antagonism.”

This article presents data collected from a study of local pastoralist communities along the Kenya-Uganda-South Sudan tri-national border zone. Using this research context, the study demonstrates the effect of weak internal capacity to exercise governmental authority and control in the adjoining states on their capability to respond to cross-border international security threats.

This article begins by revisiting the realist and liberal theoretical debates around the conundrum between the domestic capacity and external capability of states. Subsequently, section two provides an exposition of pastoralist lifestyle and its contradiction of the security regime introduced and advanced by the modern state. Lastly, section three evaluates the effect of the domestic (political) variable on the capability of states to pursue international (security) interest by providing an exposition of the external security threats that face the adjoining states due to their incapacity to manage internal antagonism.

## **2. Classical postulation of the nation state and security**

Realist scholarship privileges the nation state as the fulcrum around which security and order in the society revolves. In the classical approach, security by definition is and should be about the state and the state is and should be about security (Buzan et al, 1998). The classical contribution of Thomas Hobbes on the absence of a central authority in the conceptual ‘state of nature,’ leads to unqualified conflict, and the imperative for ‘order,’ is achievable through establishment of the *Leviathan* (Hobbes, 1952). This postulation, ideally set in the internal arena of a state, is often extrapolated to the study of interactions of states in the international system. This leads to

concepts such as anarchy, insecurity which is defined as potential military aggression by other states, unlikelihood of cooperation, and balance of power (Sheehan, 2005). The classical tradition emphasizes military and political connotations of security. To the realists, the dilemma of security is inescapable in the context of anarchy, that is to say, lack of a world government analogous to the national government of states, which can maintain law, administer justice, and prevent large scale outbreak of violence. States are therefore condemned to engage in balance of power politics. The tragic consequence of their defensive efforts is a general condition of insecurity that serves as a breeding ground for war. Exercising self-help which include efforts to outmaneuver, contain or eradicate adversaries are available to states, apart from more cooperative ventures to preserve the balance of power (Booth, 2005).

In the perspective of realists, military force represents the central component of state power. By this, it enables a state and its leaders to protect and promote their particular interests, to defend national sovereignty and identity, to influence, and where necessary, to compel others into their way of thinking. Survival of the state thus overrides all other policy considerations. Military power may also be employed to defend states or governments against non-military threats to their existence. This includes challenges from citizens (Ayoob, 1995). As Buzan (1995) observes, such a move is justified because the state has its own claim to a right of survival and self-defence. This is different from the sum total of the individual rights to security. Realists assume that the state is the safe haven that protects citizens from the intrusion of anarchy and disorder. It is also presupposed by realists that the states are surrounded by other states and architects of transnational crime and private violence that threaten their citizens. States are therefore so crucial that people without them strive to establish their own sovereign communities since they provide a 'roof' for a culturally defined people (Anderson, 1991).

From the foregoing, it is apparent that realists perceive the nation state as inevitable, natural, and the final and perfect stage of a given evolutionary process. Consequently, attempts to theorize on its nature and the sources and extent of its autonomy from the domestic society are rejected *a priori* manner (Ashley, 1983). For instance, Keyman (1997) asserts that "the state does not need to be theorized because it speaks for itself – just as facts do in positivism." The state is, therefore, taken for granted and no theoretical questions are raised about its precise nature and the basic characteristics of the social formation in which it is embedded, that is, the extent of its autonomy from the domestic sphere.

Not only do the realists reject the absolute division between the domestic and external or *innenpolitik* and *aussenpolitik*." (Hoffmann, 1965), but also consider the analytical tools of domestic politics neither appropriate nor desirable for describing international phenomena. Whereas some theorists concede that domestic considerations sometimes influence foreign policy, mainstream realism insists that such factors should be strictly subordinated to systemic ones. Waltz (1959) for instance, dismisses an attempt to focus on the aims, policies and actions of states as "simple descriptions from which no valid generalizations can logically be drawn." He insists that the empirical reality must be simplified and reduced to the system. According to Waltz, therefore, systemic pressures determine foreign policy behavior of states.

Katzenstein (1976) has joined this genre of scholars through his notable claims to the effect that: "governments are unencumbered by the society which they rule and the bureaucracies they control. Therefore, states are presumed to be cohesive collectivities in pursuit of rational political strategies." Moreover, neorealists further posit that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy are primarily driven by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities (Rose, 1998). These assertions seem to suggest that the domestic sphere is not significant in a country's external action.

This realist externalist fixation has generated intense debate in IR between conservative realists who insist that the nation-state is a unitary and all-capable actor which cannot be constrained by domestic politics, and the emerging liberal scholarship inclined towards including the domestic variable in the analysis of the external relations of the nation state. For instance, Zakaria (1992) observes that it is fast becoming commonplace to assert the importance of domestic politics and call for further research on the subject. He concludes that "...the domestic politics of states are the key to understanding world events."

While examining the relationship between national attributes and war behavior, Jack Levy laments that domestic political variables are not included in any of the leading theories of the causes of war. He observes that: “This gap is troubling as a greater recognition of domestic factors by political scientists would increase the *explanatory power*” (Levy, 1988). Moreover, Moravcsik (1996) has noted that “the unit and the system interact as to render quite difficult the autonomy of each... So international and comparative politics have always been intertwined, still do, and always will.”

Classical realism is also criticized for the erroneous presumption that the state is autonomous from the society, resulting into what Keyman describes as “reductionist institutionalist essentialist” approach that denies us the opportunity to include civil society, or citizens, in the analysis (Keyman, 1997). Hobson (2000) adds that “the perception that the state is autonomous and independent from the domestic sphere leads to a false dichotomy between the state and society.”

In summary, the contribution of the liberal scholars has influenced newer debates that tend to emphasize the complex interactions between systemic and domestic factors. Indeed, an increasing number of scholars tend to agree that the phenomena of interest in international relations are often result from complex interactions between domestic and systemic factors, which means that international politics and domestic structures affect each other (Chaudoin et al, 2015).

This study is premised on the assumption that internal characteristics of nation states influence the capacity of these states to realize their interests in the international arena. It is also proposed that an internally more developed nation state has greater capacity to realize external interests. Internal development of the nation state is considered in this regard on the basis of a set of three criteria that are in turn applied in assessing internal capacity of the state. These criteria include affirmation of own definite citizenry, exercise of effective administrative authority, and controls over the population through monopoly of legitimate violence. Sufficient development of these internal features of the nation state accord the state internal capacity for effective outward projection of national interests in the international arena. The projection of national interest is defined in this paper according to the criteria of security of the state, that is, the protection of borders against external violations through unauthorized cross-border migration, armed incursion and own citizens’ attack on neighboring communities and interests.

### 3. Study Site

This paper is based on a study of the Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan border zone that is inhabited by the Turkana of North Western Kenya, the Karamojong of North-eastern Uganda, and the Toposa of the southern tip of South Sudan. These communities together spread over an area measuring approximately 124,000 square kilometers and sections of each community spread across the international borders into the three neighboring countries. While the three nation-states are new entrants in this region, the local communities have resided here for centuries. (Lamphear, 1976). The Turkana inhabit the north-western corner of Kenya, an area of about 67, 000 square miles. They border the Karamojong to the west, Toposa and Nyangatom to the North, the Samburu to the South-east and the Pokot to the south. The population of the Turkana in 2019 was 926,976(Kenya National Population Census, 2019).

The Karamojong inhabit the Karamoja region in north east Uganda which measures approximately 27,700 square miles. They border the Turkana to the east, the Toposa to the north east, the Pokot to the south east, and the Didinga to the north. Unlike the Turkana and the Toposa, the Karamojong are not an ethnically homogenous group. Rather, they are composed of a cluster of ethnically and culturally interrelated peoples found in the Karamoja region such as the Dodoth, the Jie, the Matheniko, the Pian and the Bokora. The population of the Karamojong is approximately 850,000 according to the 2011 Uganda National Population census results. (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2016).

The Toposa are part of the larger group in South Sudan known as Ateker who include the Nyangatom and the Jie. The community is found in Kapoeta East County which is the southernmost semi-arid regions of South Sudan along the Kenya and Uganda border measuring approximately 29,637 square miles. The Toposa border the

Didinga, Nyangatom and Murle on the southern border. Like the Turkana, the Toposa are a pastoral community whose social and economic livelihood revolves around livestock. The population of the Toposa stood at 750,000 as per the 2011 census. The three communities have common cultural characteristics that are relevant to the thematic concerns of this paper.

#### **4. Methodological approach**

This article has developed from the author's doctorate field research which draws experience from Kenya-Uganda-South Sudan border zone to analyze the conundrum between internal capacity and external capability of states. Both primary and secondary methods were applied to yield data in respect of internal development of the nation-state and its capacity to manage internal security threats. The first category of primary data comprised oral presentations from respondents drawn from among government officials and members of local communities. Archival material were also used to generate information about the formation of the nation-state in East Africa, especially the delimitation of Kenya-Uganda-Sudan boundaries and how the boundaries have changed over time; the establishment of colonial administrative infrastructure in the study zone, and; experiences of the colonial government at the initial stage of state formation, particularly effort to impose colonial authority over the Turkana, Karamojong and Toposa communities.

Target interviews were held with senior government officials, church leaders; representatives of non-government organizations operating in the study zone and, local community leaders. The researcher established local towns - Lodwar, Moroto and Kapoeta- as his base for reaching into interior sections of Turkana, Karamoja and Toposa respectively.

Government security officials were a crucial source of information about government policies and activities that relate to establishment of control and civil order in their respective jurisdictions, while interviews with community leaders yielded useful information about the interface between indigenous systems of local governance and the institutional structures and hierarchy of authority of the state. The latter category of respondents comprised Chiefs (called Paramount Chiefs in Toposa), representatives in local government assemblies and national parliaments, kraal leaders, village elders, diviners, and youth and vigilante leaders.

Kraal elders, village elders, diviners (traditional religious authorities), and youth/vigilante leaders provided useful information about their individual roles in security management and the way in which traditional authority is structured, organized, mobilized and coordinated in defense of the community and its values, especially during security emergency situations caused by cattle raids, disarmament, and outbreak of cattle diseases, and drought. The main information sought from ordinary households was their notion of security and self-fulfillment, the traditional role of each social group in the traditional setting, and whether they regard the state, neighbors and other exogenous institutions as partners or obstacles to their security interests.

Focus group discussions were held in Turkana, Karamoja and Toposa. Each FGD comprised between 12 and 15 people representing different categories of respondents that included the youth, women, elders, NGOs officials, church leaders, kraal leaders, selected government personnel drawn from various ministries and, informal local defense organizations such as Karamoja's Local Defense Unit and Kenya Police Reservists. The main purpose of the focus group discussions was to counter-check and verify information obtained from different sources; to seek clarification on issues that did not come out clearly during interviews; to obtain additional information about security dynamics in each area and future projections.

Direct participant observation complemented oral interviews. This method proved very useful in terms of exposing reality beyond respondents' verbal expressions captured in the oral interview. For instance, the researcher stayed overnight in Turkana and Karamoja cattle kraals to acquire firsthand experience of how the warriors guard their cattle at night. Further, the researcher visited official Kenya-South Sudan border post at Nadapal and sections of the unmarked Kenya-Uganda border and the disputed Elemi Triangle which serves as the boundary between Kenya

and South Sudan. By so doing, the researcher was able to see, feel and appreciate security dilemma confounding the adjoining states and the local communities under study.

Secondary data was an important complementary to primary data. The most important information sought from secondary sources included theories of the nation-state, modernity and its key pillars, the emergence and evolution of the modern state in Europe; the initiation of nation-state project in East Africa and; post-colonial literature on the challenges of state and nation-building in Africa and the Third World at large.

### **5. Pre-state Notions of Security among the Turkana, Karamojong and the Toposa**

This section entails a summary of the socio-economic lifestyle of the Turkana, Karamojong and Toposa as well as their perception and construction of security. The main purpose of the section is to demonstrate how this traditional pastoralist lifestyle that has been sustained into the present not only makes them difficult to bring under civil administration but also undermines the external security interests of the adjoining states.

The Turkana, Karamojong and Toposa initiate boys into adulthood through an elaborate rite of passage. The rite of passage symbolizes submission, sacrifice, and service to the community. In so doing, males pass from boys (*osorokit*) in Turkana to warriors (*ekajion*) in Karamojong. The primary obligation of the young adult initiates is to protect the community and its livestock. The elders distribute political functions to the younger generation by allocating the responsibility of grazing, defending the community, its livestock, and grazing zones and raiding neighboring communities for cattle.

The highest source of authority in these three communities is the council of elders. Power is exercised by an assembly of elders while executive power is the prerogative of the warrior class. The elders derive their authority not only from their age but also their duty and capacity to organize people into age categories each of which bears a chain of responsibility. The authority of the elder is exercised on various occasions. These include at public ritual meetings, council meetings and public dispute settlement gatherings. The decisions and sanctions of the elders are carried out by the sub-senior age-sets who adhere to the norms of obedience established with age rankings. The elders are also considered to have divine authority - or at least to be closely associated with divine authority. It is therefore the responsibility of the elders to maintain good relations with the deity for the protection of the community and their cattle.

Since life in the community is almost unimaginable without livestock, socio-economic activities of the Turkana, Karamojong and Toposa generally revolve around the animals and their protection. It is the obligation of male adults to move around - occasionally traversing territorial boundaries - in search of pasture and water. Men graze while protecting their cattle against wild beasts and raiders, or anything that can threaten the wellbeing and size of their herds. While on the move, they sleep in the open at night, but build rough camps with thorn hedges to protect their cattle. Communal myths, tales, songs, and dances are conjured up to extol bravery, courage and skills in protecting livestock from raiders, reclaiming livestock after raids, and acquiring more herds through raids and husbandry.

Owing to the predominance of pastoralist lifestyle, the local meaning and configuration of security also revolves around livestock. The community is considered to be at peace (*ekisil* in Toposa) in the absence of actual or eminent threats of attack from a rival community and also when it enjoys safety from natural calamities. Security is also assured when there is plenty of pasture and water for their livestock and when the animals are healthy and safe from threats of animal disease. The simultaneous increase in the number of livestock through husbandry or cattle raids and general wellbeing of the society are also considered as indicators of security. The converse situation or absence of these factors implies insecurity. The security referent objects are members of the community, the numbers and health of livestock and territory.

The pastoralists maintain a strong feeling of belonging not only to their group but also possession and/or dominion over their territory. The survival of these people depends on their capacity to get access to all or large swathes of

their territories which they use for grazing, hunting, and performing cultural activities. Access to pasture and water points is therefore open to all community members at any time. However, elders may regulate the use of grazing land and water in order to avoid conflicts and resource depletion.

The concept of territory encompasses land that the pastoralists presently occupy as a community. It also includes areas that may lie outside their jurisdiction but to which they lay claim because they once grazed or organized a cultural activity there according to oral narratives passed down from one generation to another. These perceptions tend to ignore colonial boundaries delimited by beacons and post-colonial tribal administrative boundaries established by the colonial and post-colonial administrations to manage inter-tribal relations.

Boundaries of the pastoralists' territory are marked by physical features such as hills, mountainous ranges, rivers, lakes, valleys, rocks and trees. Beyond these physical features dwell the neighbors who are often perceived as the enemy. Furthermore, the communities enjoy sovereignty over their land and territory. Neighbors may thus only access water and forage for their livestock through negotiated agreements initiated by elders. The territory is therefore the object of protection to keep away the enemy from incursion and to protect scarce water and forage reserves on which the livelihood of animals depend. Besides territory, the entire community or group is also the focus of protection. The community provides both the philosophy for rationalization of the individual's existence and the theatre for self-actualization. The individual lives for himself and also for the community. Each person has a role in the protection of the community and its values irrespective of gender, social status and age-group while labour is divided along gender distinctions.

Under the prevailing philosophy of 'group security', intra-communal violence is culturally intolerable because it weakens the community and exposes it to external threats. The *threat* to the local community is often construed in the image of the *neighbour* and the number of such actual or potential enemies is limited to communities that dwell in the neighborhood and whose livelihood also revolves around livestock. While the Turkana, Karamojong and Toposa perceive each other as cross border enemies, each community may also face security threats from internal neighbors as is often the case with Karamojong sub-clans in Karamoja district or the Turkana against the Pokot of Kenya.

Young men aged between 17 and 35 (*nkiliok* in Turkana) have the duty to ensure livestock are well watered and protected in the face of challenges from the natural environment and neighboring communities. The youth are prepared for their future role in the community through rigorous socialization that begins in childhood. They absorb into their subconscious highly cherished community values of heroism, courage, endurance, "manliness", and herding skills.

Children thus grow into adulthood, shaped and conditioned by customs and expressions idealizing the qualities associated with involvement in cattle rustling. The day-to-day discourse is replete with sayings that encourage men to take part in such adventures irrespective of the risks involved. Initiation rites, weddings and other rituals and social events are opportune occasions to glorify those who have proved themselves courageous in rustling missions by chanting and singing about them. On these public occasions, the heroes themselves boast of the booty they have been able to bring home and the brave manner in which they accomplished the feat.

It is against the background of these traditional modes of political organization, authority structures and notions of security that the modern state was superimposed during colonialism. In essence, the modern state was superimposed on a traditional government replete with its own structures of authority, philosophy and perceptions of security. Kenya, Uganda and Sudan inherited the Turkana, Karamojong and Toposa respectively as their citizens upon attainment of independence when those structures and notions were still dominant. Notwithstanding attempts to extend governmental institutions and security apparatuses in these communities in the post-independence period, the pastoralists still dwell predominantly in the pre-nation state form.

The next section analyses how the foregoing resilient lifestyle has made the pastoralists difficult to bring under state control and more importantly, how it has undermined the external security interest of the adjacent states.

## 6. Internal Capacity Challenge and Implications on External Security Interest of the State

States are recognized under international law by their capability to maintain clearly defined boundaries, secure their territories, and protect citizens. The ability to perform these roles forms the basis upon which states are categorized as strong, weak, fragile, or failed (Rotberg, 2004). The capacity to maintain border security is a particularly critical function of the state since it involves border control, border management, border monitoring and border protection. As Wafula Okumu succinctly puts it, “the purpose of border control is to facilitate or limit the movement of people, animals, plants, and goods in and out of a country (Okumu, 2010). By extension, immigration control aims to impose conditions under which people legally cross borders.

Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan have made significant efforts to exercise immigration controls in order to protect their citizens and the territorial integrity of their respective states (Kenya Immigration Act 1967, Constitution of Kenya 2010, Uganda Passports Act 1982, Constitution of Uganda 1995, South Sudan Nationality Act, 2011). The existing immigration laws in Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan apply to the Turkana, Karamojong and Toposa respectively since they are today considered citizens of their respective sides of territorial boundaries rather than free indigenes of the previously unmarked region before the establishment of colonial rule. Indeed, the post-colonial maps of the three countries clearly show that the three communities belong to their respective territorial states and what appears in the maps in regard to citizenship has been further confirmed by government security policies targeting these communities.

Obligations of citizenship demand that the three communities that are the subject of this study should confine their operations to respective host countries. They should thus cross international borders only under clearly defined exit and entry rules because they are aliens and foreigners once they cross the border. Similarly, citizenship claims by the adjoining states over the communities impose responsibilities on each state to control cross-border immigration exit and entry. This is meant to avert illegal exit of nationals to countries where they are aliens, and to prevent illegal entry of foreigners into neighboring countries at border control points, especially if such entries may be injurious to the security of the state. In other words, Kenya is responsible for the administration of the Turkana, Uganda for the Karamojong and South Sudan for the Toposa. By extension, the host state should be responsible for the exit of their nationals across the border and all immigrants must meet the entry requirements and conditions set by the receiving state before they are cleared at official border control points. Aliens from the three countries should submit travel documents (including travel passports) to immigration officers at designated Border Control Points (BCPs) before they are cleared for entry, and no persons are allowed to enter or depart from a country except through the points of entry and exit which are prescribed by the government.” (South Sudan Passports and Immigration Act, 2011). Herdsmen who cross the border with firearms which can be used for cattle rustling and other illegal activities all fall under the category of persons who do not qualify for exit or entry visas.

Despite the existence of elaborate immigration rules that apply to all citizens and aliens indiscriminately, the study confirms massive violation of laws that govern entry and exit by the pastoralist communities in the zone. Border control points are far apart and are poorly manned by state security agencies. For instance, the Kenya-Uganda border has only two immigration control points, one at Loya and another at Moroto-Loima. Both Kenya and South Sudan have only one official immigration control point at Nadapal, while Uganda-South Sudan border has four immigration check points (Nimule, Elegu, Musingo and Oraba) but with very weak security control arrangements. Large sections of Kenya-South Sudan, Uganda-South Sudan and Kenya-Uganda borders are therefore not manned by government security forces.

Owing to these lapses, the Turkana, Karamojong and Toposa avoid boundary control points and simply move back and forth across the imaginary international borders in search of water and pasture for their livestock. What is particularly worrying is that these communities immigrate with weapons and stolen goods (livestock). While abroad illegally, these pastoralist ‘foreigners’ not only deplete water and forage resources which are reserved for the host nationals, they also commit cattle theft and murder especially when they engage in cattle rustling. The case of the Dodoth of Karamoja who currently occupy Toposa villages in South Sudan and the annual unauthorized Turkana immigration into Uganda deserve elaboration.

A section of Dodoth herdsmen numbering about 5,000 migrated from Karamoja region of Uganda in 2012 and forcefully occupied a village in South Sudan among the Toposa in their endeavor to avoid disarmament operations launched by the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF). While in South Sudan, the Dodoth have continued to organize internal raids against their 'host' (the Toposa) as well as cross-border raids against the Turkana of Kenya and the Jie sub-clan of Karamoja. The Toposa community feels very insecure with the Dodoth in their midst and have appealed to the Government of South Sudan to come and flush them out without success.

In May 2016, the Ugandan Government threatened to cross over the border into South Sudan to disarm the Dodoth and recover livestock raided from the Jie if the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) was unable to drive them back to Karamoja. Acting under pressure from Uganda, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) appealed to the Toposa to move away from villages occupied by the Dodoth so as to avoid imminent reprisals from the Ugandan army. GoSS further pleaded with the Toposa to join the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in mobilizing a strong force that can drive back the Dodoth to Uganda. The County Commissioner for Eastern Equatoria warned the Toposa to act fast against the Dodoth because if the UPDF attacked them for illegally harboring these foreigners, South Sudan would not be in a position to protect them. He also appealed with the Toposa to investigate and establish the number of Dodoth immigrants among them and their level of armament in advance of preparations to drive them back to Karamoja. The study confirmed that while some Dodoth pastoralists had voluntarily returned to Karamoja by December 2021, an unknown number still illegally reside in South Sudan.

Another case in point is the annual cross-border immigration of the Turkana of Kenya to Karamoja district of Uganda where they are hosted by the Matheniko. Both communities made a peace agreement in 1973 after many years of hostility inspired by counter raids. In this pact, the elders agreed not only to stop mutual cattle raids but to allow one another free access to water, forage and protection if need arose. The period following the agreement has witnessed annual movement of the Turkana to Moroto where the Matheniko are found. Mount Moroto receives reliable rainfall throughout the year and has abundant grass and water during periods of scarcity in Turkana region. Since 1974, the Turkana illegally stay in Uganda for three to four months depending on the longevity of the drought on the Kenyan side of the border. For instance, in March 2006, over 600 Turkana families left their homes and crossed the border into Uganda with their livestock and firearms. While in Karamoja, they raided the Jie, Dodoth, Bokora and other Karamojong sub-clans around Mt. Moroto as they would raid their Pokot neighbors in Kenya. The fact that this immigration arrangement is initiated by Turkana and Matheniko elders without involving or informing Kenyan and Ugandan authorities makes it illegal and an affront on the Ugandan territorial integrity.

These two examples confirm that the states in which pastoralists are nationals do not monitor the movement of their citizens and have failed to impose pre-exit rules. At the same time, the host states are less responsible for whatever security risks their citizens are exposed to while abroad (Kenya Animal Disease Act, 1972). More importantly, the receiving states in the zone do not keep records of the number of people who cross international borders into their territory from time to time. These armed pastoralists qualify to be regarded as criminals who threaten the security of the receiving state because the guns, spears and arrows that they wield are not only used to conduct cattle raids abroad but also to stage armed combat against state security officers who threaten their security. In addition, inoculation requirements for both immigrants and their livestock are never adhered to yet unchecked herds may transmit deadly diseases abroad that can undermine the health of livestock in the receiving state especially when they mix with local stocks.

The study established that the Turkana, Karamojong and Toposa still defiantly cross borders to graze and water their livestock in neighboring territories because they believe that *grazing has no boundary*. The prevailing perception suggests that the adjacent states have done little to impose a sense of citizenship among their respective communities. Lack of citizenship consciousness has embedded a culture in which cross border communities do not mind staying in a neighboring state as long as they can reliably access grass and water for their livestock. The survival needs of these communities are so pressing that the Turkana do not mind being called Ugandans neither do the Dodoth mind changing citizenship to become South Sudanese so long as their permanent stay abroad can guarantee their safety and good health of their livestock.

Border management challenges are commonplace in the zone. While borders indicate the geographical spread of a state hence the jurisdiction under which the state is permitted conduct its international security surveillance obligation, the three countries have been unable to determine the international borders between them. Physical beacons that definitively mark the Kenya-Uganda, Kenya-South Sudan and Uganda-Sudan borderlines have not yet been marked on the ground, more than half a century since independence and more than one century since they were mooted. The vagueness of the border complicates government intentions and efforts to counteract cross-border security threats to territorial integrity and to exercise both external sovereignty and security of the population.

The unresolved ownership of the Elemi Triangle located between Kenya and South Sudan has made it one of the most insecure areas in the zone. The Kenya government established a border post at Nadapal in 2009 to defend its territorial integrity and to contain incursions by the Toposa into the Triangle. The decision by Kenya has sparked off a diplomatic row between Nairobi and Juba (South Sudan Administrative headquarter) with the latter claiming that the Kenya-Nadapal border post is 'inside' South Sudan. On 30<sup>th</sup> July 2009, two Kenyan cabinet ministers visiting Nadapal to survey a suitable area for the establishment of the border post were stopped and harassed by Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) troops (Daily Nation July 31, 2009) Later, on 29 June, 2011, Kenyan security forces engaged SPLA personnel in one-hour gun fight around Nadapal after SPLA soldiers crossed the Kenyan border in pursuit of Turkana cattle rustlers.

The local Turkana and Toposa communities have joined their respective governments in the border contestation of the Elemi Triangle. While the Turkana insist that Narustown in South Sudan (25km north of Nadapal border) is their traditional boundary with the Toposa, the Toposa elders maintain that their boundary with the Turkana is as far down south as Kakuma, which is about 100 kilometers inside Kenya. Meanwhile, both communities defiantly cross the contested international border to graze in the Elemi Triangle and beyond because they still lay emotional attachments to lands where their ancestors once grazed and hunted but which have since fallen under either Kenyan or South Sudanese territorial jurisdiction.

Representatives of both communities, therefore, insist that the current Nadapal border, whether permanent or interim, cannot hold because it limits their grazing rights. In October 2012, some armed Toposa people invaded the newly-established Kenyan border post and killed 16 Kenyan military officers. A second attack occurred a week later. While the Turkana warriors have not attacked the South-Sudan border post, they continue to attack Toposa cattle camps located near Nadapal and further north. This happens in open violation of South Sudan's territorial integrity. These developments confirm that border posts alone are unable to control illegal immigration by pastoralists who operate in the zone if a sense of citizenship is not instilled.

In all the three countries, the borders lack access roads and the few security officers deployed in these areas are unable to counter illegal cross-border movement. The work of isolated security patrol team is further complicated by poor mobility from one border post to another. This impedes the officers' ability to patrol and secure the borders from illegal immigrants. Under the prevailing conditions, the role of isolated security officers is simply reduced monitoring and reporting incursions. Cross-border communities thus do not strongly feel the presence of host states before they cross and the receiving state once they enter a foreign land to which they are aliens. This trend confirms that the adjacent states lack capacity to prevent illegal migrations and to make immigrants comply with immigration regulations, which exist in law but are poorly enforced on the ground.

From the foregoing, it is clear that pre-nation state notions are still dominant in the study zone. They thus pose a challenge to the nation-state institutions that were established a century ago that were intended to override, subdue and supplant these traditional institutions.

## **7. Conclusions**

This paper has interrogated the capacity of three adjacent states to control security threats imposed by pastoralists who still maintain traditional notions of security despite the existence of established modern nation states. The

paper confirms that established local institutions of the state have been unable to regulate movement across the borders and thus secure the immigration control function of the state. On one hand, the Turkana, Karamoja, and Toposa pastoralists avoid the formal immigration stations and habitually violate immigration and citizenship laws and requirements of the state while on the other, the security and immigration institutions and officials of the state are unable to enforce compliance with the laws and regulations. Local institutions of the state are unable to regulate movement across the borders and therefore cannot secure the immigration control function of the state. Furthermore, both restricted and prohibited goods including firearms and live animals cross the border without customs verification thereby placing the security of the state and the local population in danger.

The paper has demonstrated that the greatest challenge to the intrusion of the state arises from the vibrancy of traditional forms of government and authority which either directly oppose or compete with the modern state. The state has therefore gained less than complete control of the population and preexisting notions of security and structures of governmental authority that compete with and even undermine the authority of the institutions of the state. This internal weakness of the state adversely affects the capacity of the state to exercise power and authority over international cross-border affairs, namely citizenship and immigration.

This study has shown that realism overlooks internal processes yet they determine external processes. While the challenges along the Kenya-Uganda- South Sudan border show that state formation is an incomplete process, realism presumes that the nation-state is an already accomplished entity and is the main actor in international relations. The evidence from the study area challenges these realist notions since the nation-state is still disregarded by the local community on both sides of the border. Whereas realism talks about external anarchy, internal anarchy prevails in the zone and it has implications for security. The security condition in the zone cannot, therefore, be explained adequately from the standpoint of classical realism. The state has to build its authority internally in order to address its external challenges adequately. In a nutshell, internal capability of states directly affects their external relations.

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# The Ukraine Crisis: Causes, Conundrum and Consequences

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## Abstract

Located at the geopolitical centre of Eurasia, Ukraine has been an important arena for great power game for nearly three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The West, principally the United States and Europe, and the Russian Federation have therefore been heavily involved in Ukraine's internal and external development. Their ideological, economic, and geopolitical interests clashed in a fierce battle that led to multiple political regime changes in Ukraine, and ultimately plunged Europe into an intractable security situation. This paper takes the rivalry between the US, Europe and Russia in Ukraine as a starting point to examine the dilemma facing European security in the context of the great power game, the root causes behind the Ukraine crisis, its far-reaching consequences for geopolitics and global patterns and the implications for regional peace in other parts of the world.

**Keywords:** European Union, Geopolitics, Global Governance, International Patterns, NATO, Regional Security, Russia, Sanctions, Ukraine, United States, World Economy

## 1. Introduction

As the conflict is on the surface between the Russian Federation (hereinafter Russia) and Ukraine, it is in essence the outcome of a tug-of-war between two camps in Europe. The current Ukraine crisis represents the culmination of the deterioration of bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine since 2014. Specifically, there are three components at the root of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The First is Ukraine's membership in NATO. The second concerns the disputed territorial status of Crimea and the independence of eastern Ukraine. The third lies in the security interests of Russia. The United States (hereinafter U.S.) and NATO may bear unshirkable responsibility for the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, which occurs as a result of the prolonging encroachment of the U.S. on Russia's security space. With the exception of a brief honeymoon period after the end of the Cold War, Russian-American relations have evolved against the backdrop of constant confrontation throughout the past three decades. Following the Ukrainian revolution in 2014, the relations between Russia and the U.S. were spiraling into a hostile state, marked by political vilification, diplomatic expulsion, economic sanctions, and military confrontation.

## 2. The Roots of Russo-Ukrainian Conflict

In the early period following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the region was left in a political and economic

chaos. Though all post-Soviet states have achieved independence, they remain closely associated with Russia due to the long-lasting influence of the Soviet planned economy. A major concern of the U.S. at that time was that, if the former Soviet Republics were not drawn in, the Russian Federation might unite them again to form a "new Soviet Union". The former adviser on Russia to the Clinton administration, Strobe Talbott (2003), held that along with containing Russian efforts to assert its influence in former Soviet sphere, the U.S. must also endeavour to preserve the independent status of the post-Soviet states in order to prevent the re-emergence of Eurasian powers that dominate global affairs. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997, p.51), the former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in 1977-81, also wrote that "In the short run, the United States should consolidate and perpetuate the prevailing geopolitical pluralism on the map of Eurasia... preventing the emergence of a hostile coalition that could challenge America's primacy."

Since the Clinton administration, the U.S. has been concentrating on forging closer ties with post-Soviet states and has engaged in campaigns to limit the influence and control of Russia over these countries. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Russia did not expand westward nor did it pose any immediate threat to EU security prior to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Even so, NATO has not halted its eastward expansion. By adopting a unilateral security policy exempting Russia, the U.S. increased NATO membership from 16 to 30, gradually expanded its sphere of influence beyond Western, Southern, and Central Europe to include Eastern and South-eastern Europe, and extended from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea region, thereby completely encircling Russia. Upon rapidly absorbing countries in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO enlarged its gaze to the post-Soviet space. Many of the post-Soviet states are now part of NATO's "partnership for peace". The West has drawn on their historical grievances and territorial disputes with Russia to encourage their NATO enrolment, with Ukraine and Georgia among the strongest proponents. In the wake of the 2014 Crimea crisis, Ukraine clearly sought membership in NATO. In 2020, NATO accepted Ukraine as the sixth Enhanced Opportunity Partner.

America's strategy towards Russia is primarily based on three factors: the economy, public opinion, and geography. In the economic field, the country constructed new gas pipelines for post-Soviet states to ease their transition off of Russian energy; the former Soviet Union received substantial political and financial support from the country to bring the pro-American forces to power. On the geopolitical level, the U.S. has deployed weapons and equipment closer and closer to Russia's borders, increasing the acute sense of insecurity within Russia. It is the aim of US strategy to disrupt, and perhaps even weaken, the checks and balances among countries in the region in order to place the U.S. in an advantageous position as an offshore balancer. In enlarging NATO eastward, the U.S. stimulated and intensified the reaction of Russia, which in turn enhanced Europe's opposition against and hostility towards Russia and gradually gave rise to the current Russia-Europe tensions.

Unlike the US, where militaries and power space rule in squeezing Russia's geographical space, the EU focuses more on economic, cultural, and political pressure on Russia. For example, they encourage post-Soviet states to adopt EU technical and regulatory standards as a counterweight to the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union; and encourage these states to participate in the European integration process and thwart Russia's attempts to integrate the former Soviet space economically and politically. Through accession prospects, economic assistance, and visa facilitation among other measures, the EU promotes democratic transitions and colour revolutions in former Soviet Republics to pry them away from Russia. It was not the strategic objective of the EU to deter Russia, but rather it was ideological, which was considered by some Russians as anti-Russia policy. As a result, the EU, Germany, Poland, and other countries actively intervened in the 2004 Ukrainian election and launched the Orange Revolution, which prevented the pro-Russian Yanukovich from gaining power and supported the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko. This provided a strong stimulus to the Kremlin. Upon the expansion of the EU to the east, not only have the Baltic states, Poland, and other countries become part of the union, but also their fears and animosities toward Russia have been accommodated. A sense of insecurity prevails in these countries due to their history and geography. However, starting from an adversarial mindset, they have only been concerned with their own security, disregarding Russia's, thereby reinforcing the insecurity of both sides. Consequently, the EU is prevented from engaging in a constructive dialogue with Russia. French president Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly called for a change in EU policy and a thaw in relations with Russia, but to no avail. As recently as June 2021, France and Germany proposed holding an EU-Russia summit to promote pragmatic cooperation and

enhance mutual trust, but it didn't go forward owing to the vehement opposition from Poland and the Baltic states.

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has made European countries realize that NATO expansion and economic sanctions cannot bring Russia to its knees since it is one of the few countries in the world that is completely self-sufficient in natural resources. Natural gas reserves in Russia are among the world's largest, making up about one quarter of the world's total proved reserves (EIA, 2016, p.15). "Russian crude and condensate output reached 10.5 million barrels per day (bpd), accounting for 14% of the world's total supply" as of 2021 (IEA, 2022a, para 2). Russia is also home to as much as 30% of the world's iron, 65% of apatite, likely 25-40% of the world's unmined gold supply, and 15.2% of coal (geohistory, 2019; Mining Technology, 2021). Russia exports the largest amount of wheat in the world, nearly 20% of worldwide supplies (Duggal & Haddad, 2022). It is clear that even if Russia is economically decoupled from the west, the country is still capable of maintaining economic and trade ties with other nations by making use of its resource advantages. The EU had already imposed tough sanctions on Russia following the Ukraine crisis in 2014, which remains in place to this day. Due to close economic ties and energy dependence on Russia, sanctions are always a double-edged sword, with varying impacts for each member state. In 2020, around 45% of gas imports and close to 40% of gas consumption, 25.5% of petroleum and 54% of solid fossil fuels were met by Russia, with Germany importing about 55% of its consumption as of 2022 (CLEW, 2022; IEA, 2022b). Germany stands to lose the most in view of its close connection with Russia.

There is no way for European nations to militarily weaken Russia, as it still has a robust defence industry. Although the conventional weapons of Russia are vastly inferior to those of NATO, it is currently the world's largest nuclear power, with over 500 land-based intercontinental missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and airborne ballistic missiles. This is why NATO is keen to avoid direct conflict with Russia, which also explains Russia's restraint, viewed by some analysts, in the conflict with Ukraine. Actions taken by the U.S. and Europe towards Russia have created a political atmosphere of solidarity within Russia. There is no doubt that, in comparison with the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and Europe, the security threats facing Russia are greater than that of economy, and survival needs are greater than development needs, which rendered Russia's deployment of troops in Ukraine a legitimate decision. If Russia's invasion of Crimea served only as a warning about the NATO expansion, the Russia-Ukraine war is a more explicit manifestation of the country's rivalry with the U.S. and Europe.

Russian interference in the internal affairs of former Soviet Union has been attributed to the fact that these countries fall into Russia's traditional sphere of influence (Solchanyk, 1998, p.21). Russians view it unacceptable to have the U.S. and Europe establish "outposts" in the heartland of Russian power. Neither czarist Russia nor contemporary Russia have ever treated Ukraine as a foreign country. Historically, Russia and Ukraine are both Slavic nations. Although Russia has a larger population and a larger area, Ukraine is considered the birthplace of the Slavic people. From a geopolitical point of view, Russia is no longer a Eurasian power once it loses Ukraine. Should Ukraine, with over 45 million residents, vast natural resources, and access to the Black Sea, fall back into Russian hands, Russia would once again possess sufficient resources to rebuild its eponymous "Soviet empire". Despite having broken Russia's illusion of regaining the territory of the former Soviet Union, the U.S overlooked the establishment of a regional security framework beneficial to both Russia and the post-Soviet states, nor did it address the possibility that Russia would use force to prevent former Soviet Republics from joining the Western alliance. In sending troops to Ukraine for a second time, Moscow sent a clear signal to the U.S. and Europe: Continuing to increase Russia's sense of insecurity will further intensify a serious security crisis in Europe.

### **3. European Security Dilemmas and Strategic Blind Spots Behind the Conflict**

In addition to exposing Europe's strategic blind spot and security dilemma, the current crisis in Ukraine has exacerbated tensions between Europe and Russia, further entrenched the dominance of the US in European security affairs, and more importantly, severely tarnished the international image of the EU.

Regardless of how it ends, the prospects for finding a lasting solution to the conflict are dim. In the heart of Europe, geopolitical confrontations are erupting from point to point and from outside to inside, leaving it to develop into a

more polarized and confrontational continent. Rather than closing, the geopolitical fault lines between East and West Europe are extending and deepening along the Polish-Ukrainian border or along the Dnieper River. Perhaps Russia's goal is to smooth geopolitical boundaries and alter the unjust and unreasonable security order in Europe, but the approach is beyond the capability and the expectations of the majority of countries in Europe, and further fragmenting of the European geopolitical landscape seems inescapable. It may not be the Iron Curtain of the Cold War due to the fact that there are still energy agreements between Russia and Europe, and a hotline between Moscow and Paris continues to offer a glimpse of hope for a détente; but the current situation and trends seem to be moving further away from Russia's goals.

After the end of the Cold War, Europe never achieved a common security that penetrates the Eurasian continent and includes Russia. However, through economic and trade cooperation, energy supply and social exchanges, Europe and Russia have maintained a constantly tangled relationship between them. Since the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and the Crimea Crisis of 2014, mutual understanding between the two sides has deteriorated and mutual trust has faltered repeatedly, however energy dependence has not subsided but increased, and the "ease on Russia" set of positive policies has still been able to maintain a state of cold peace. Now the slowly building hostility between the two sides has reached a critical point due to the increase of NATO presence by the Biden administration and the pursuit by Ukraine of security protection. A fragile cold peace in Europe is becoming more volatile and likely to give way to a new Cold War.

As disappointing as it is, the changes in geopolitics taking place in Europe are out of keeping with what Europe intended and are in stark contrast to the lessons of Europe to promote prosperity and peace after two world wars. In the gradual quantitative change of EU-Russia relations, Europe has not been able to prevent the small things from being stifled and has not shown a sense of humility in taking security concerns seriously of all parties. At the onset of the crisis, Europe failed to play a major role as a whole. Instead, self-centred, strategic alliance of the US led it in the opposite direction of its own interests and watched the crisis being brewed, catalysed, and detonated.

The conflict brought about a tremendous shock to the European security order established following World War II. By imposing sanctions on Russia or supplying arms to Ukraine, the EU, Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland broke with tradition. Likewise, Germany raised its defence budget to 2% of its GDP. President Biden openly discussed the possibility of Finland and Sweden joining the NATO. Contrary to the U.S and Ukraine, Europe, which has deep geopolitical and economic ties with Russia, was much more likely to advocate for a peaceful solution to the crisis by means of negotiations. The French and German leaders had conducted intensive diplomatic mediation since February in an attempt to alter the status quo dominated by the U.S. and Russia. As the conflict erupted, however, the EU's mediating role, and its pursuit of "strategic autonomy", were jeopardized. The U.S. was convinced that Europe faced a serious security threat. Even if Europe were to recognize even more the importance of "strategic autonomy", it will not be easy in the short term to break free from its reliance on the U.S. in the area of defence, and it can only remain deeply bound. In order to ensure their security interests, European countries must sacrifice their economic interests. The U.S. is very successful at mobilizing western solidarity against Moscow. The U.S. and Europe have actually demonstrated a high level of coordination and consistency in their actions relating to major issues concerning the security of the global system and the stability of the fundamental order, which has exceeded Russia's expectations. Unless Russia abandons the controversial concept of "uniting Europe to check America", a miscalculation may result and a disastrous outcome may ensue.

Ideally, the lasting security of Europe should be overall security that lies in a comprehensive approach, as a partially safe Europe cannot be a secure one. An effective regional security architecture cannot exclude any country within the realm. At a time when economic globalization binds the destinies of all countries together, Europe ought to focus more on developing a balanced, collaborative, and sustainable regional security architecture that can promote lasting peace in Europe and throughout Eurasian continent. NATO exists to prevent threats from hostile countries and ensure the security of some member states. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO lost its rationality. Some European countries hope that NATO will transform into a political organization, capable of promoting economic and social integration. History shows that security created by military power is temporary, and economic cooperation and integration are long-term. While the Europeans were celebrating the victory of the

Cold War more than 30 years ago, they failed to recognize that the U.S. had its own plans for the future of European security. In Washington's view, European security can only be created within the framework of a US-governed NATO. At this year's Munich Security Conference, US Vice President Harris (2022) declared that America would defend any NATO territory as if it were its own. Western Europe has been beset by wars for more than 2,000 years, and the 75 years of relative safety following World War II have lasted longer than any other period in European history. However, most of this cannot be attributed to the Europeans themselves, but rather is dependent upon the U.S., or the balance between the U.S. and Russia. After participating in the Munich Security Conference for 19 consecutive years, Russia refused to attend this year, which not only caused a structural imbalance in the Munich Security Conference, but also symbolized that the Russia-US relationship, which has a large impact on European security, has seriously out of control in the European region. This sword of Damocles hangs over European security.

Although the Cold War has ended, its spectre has never truly left Europe. The current Russia-Ukraine war is a continuation and a culmination of a process that has been in existence for some time, an old account based on American planning. While Russia and the U.S. are owed security obligations, Europe and Ukraine are not the real protagonists in this incident. Europe is fundamentally incapable of determining its own security, which may sound frustrating, but it is an irrevocable fact of history. Assuming that the "back to the future" option is conceivable, what Europe would need is a sustained peace effort anchored by a common market, a security order capable of accommodating and balancing the concerns of both Russia and Ukraine, a safety mechanism that can be designed, constructed, and maintained independently.

#### **4. Challenges to the Reconciliation between the U.S., Europe, and Russia**

Today, the U.S. stands out as the only superpower in the world capable of waging war unilaterally, as well as creating regional conflicts. At the junction of geopolitical plates, the conflict and its evolution can be divided into two levels: the first is the greater intensity of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine until they confront each other on a tangible battlefield; the other is the showdown on the system between Russia and the Western world spearheaded by the U.S.

On March 16, President Biden signed the federal budget for the 2022 fiscal year worth up to \$1.5 trillion. In this 2,741-page bill, US defence spending has the biggest budget amounts to \$782 billion, an increase of 5.6, and \$730 billion in non-defence spending, making up less than half of the budget (Probasco, 2022; Pramuk, 2022). Intriguingly, the budget proposal that was finally put to a vote was altered, eliminating the \$15.6 billion budget for fighting the pandemic, and spending \$13.6 billion on Ukraine and other Eastern European nations (Probasco, 2022; Pramuk, 2022).

In light of current situation, throughout the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a bloodthirsty machine was developed from American financial capital, production capital, and military-industrial complexes. Firstly, join forces with major allies to impose economic and financial sanctions on Russia in turn, thereby crippling Russia's foreign economic links, interrupting Russia's financial lifeline, and removing obstacles to low-cost legal theft of Russian assets. Secondly, cut off Russia's economic connections with Europe to resume Europe's economic dependence on the U.S. Several countries, such as Germany and France, were caught in the middle as they sought to reduce their dependence on Russian energy while taking action to cushion the blow of rising energy prices. The U.S. then announce joint action "on enhancing European energy security and reducing its dependence on Russian oil and natural gas" (Reuters, 2022a). On the surface, it seems to alleviate Europe's worries, but it took the opportunity to export liquefied natural gas to Europe at inflated prices (De Luna & Chestney, 2022; De Luna, 2022; Woodward, 2022). The shipments of US LNG to Europe have jumped to more than 10 times higher than a year ago for three consecutive months (Rinke, Abnett & Renshaw, 2022). The largest U.S. exporter, Cheniere Energy, has signed numerous long-term contracts to sell LNG in recent months, making it one of the top beneficiaries of this surge (Rashad, 2022). The third stage is to create tensions in the international financial market and to guide capital from Europe to return to the U.S. by raising interest rates. Recently, echoing the fourth round of the EU sanctions against Russia, the credit rating of the Russian government and all its companies has been completely removed, directly

cutting off the financing channels of the Russian government and enterprises in the international financial markets. Around this time, the U.S. initiated interest rate hikes on the grounds of tackling inflation and signalled that Federal Reserve's balance sheet would be drastically reduced (Cox, 2022). A rate hike by the Federal Reserve at a time when most equities markets are experiencing high uncertainty implies US confidence in the endogenous growth momentum it has achieved within its own economy, which also sends a powerful signal to other strong economies around the globe: the U.S. still dominates the global economy and monetary policy; global capital will accelerate the flow of capital into the US market, which will further prolong the cycle of US dollar hegemony while bolstering financial stability.

In instances where capital needs war to survive, this may also indicate a new period of shuffle is imminent. In this military conflict, Russia has been forced to expose its own weaknesses to the world, and its international status and deterrence will be impaired accordingly. Despite its vast arsenal of nuclear weapons, energy, food, and other bargaining chips, time is running out for Russia if it fails to obtain technical and economic support from other channels. In any case, Russia has failed economically, diplomatically and politically, no matter the outcome on the battlefield.

The first is a failure in the way in which the war was fought. As can be seen, Russia implemented the methods of Afghanistan, the Prague Spring, and even World War II in this war. However, Ukraine is fighting a decentralized, flat war in which artificial intelligence is prominently involved under high-tech conditions. Russia's traditional approach to combat can be considered backward in this conflict. The second is the failure of national power. In the structural power system consisting of four factors - security, production, finance, and knowledge - Russia trails behind in production, finance, and knowledge, except in the military sphere. Thirdly, the underlying logic of strategic culture has failed. It is still the Russian strategic culture to focus on territorial expansion and natural resource monopolies. Yet, in the 21st century, great power struggles have been reframed by technology, finances, and the ability to influence global governance structure. Clearly, Russia is at a distinct disadvantage in these areas. In the fourth place is the failure of the Russian way of thinking. Recently, there is a popular contention that Aleksandr Dugin's thinking, one of modern Russia's most influential thinkers, has been instrumental in influencing Putin and Russia's decision-making (Von Drehle, 2022; Zabala & Gallo, 2022). Dugin's ideas are a melange of the Russian Messiah, Neo-Eurasianism, Slavic superiority, Russian exceptionalism, post-Soviet imperialism, and "Living Sphere" or "Living Space" (Lebensraum) in a German "Geobiological Environment". (Dunlop, 2004; Shekhovtsov, 2014; Scott, 2018; Lewis, 2020). A concept of interdependence under globalization, a proposition of harmonious coexistence of different civilizations, and the principle of modernity in the context of industrial civilization and post-industrial civilization are absent from his philosophy. In this regard, many Russians are still trapped in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Nonetheless, Russia has demonstrated its readiness to use nuclear weaponry over the course, controlling the situation to a considerable extent. This indicates that a war-like disposition to employ nuclear weapons will prove powerful as a negotiating instrument in the future international game. Apart from Russia's energy, food, and control of Eastern Ukraine and the Black Sea, the country is still somewhat capable of resisting so long as there is no regime change. It is anticipated that the game between Russia and the U.S. and Europe will be protracted.

The greatest obstacle to Russian rapprochement with the U.S. and Europe lies in that both sides are extremely hard-line on the issue of post-Soviet statehood: the former believes it has military superiority while the latter believes it possesses economic and political clout. Even if the two sides were to come to terms, it should be noted that the interests of the former Soviet Republics cannot be reliably assured. In the case of reconciliation at the expense of the former Soviet Union, such an outcome is tantamount to appeasement. In its capacity as a major stakeholder in the war, Ukraine should play a primary role in facilitating reconciliation between Russia, the U.S., and Europe. Nevertheless, Ukraine has adopted an opportunistic approach to the question of integration with the West or cooperation with Russia, seeking both economic benefits from Western countries and political benefits from Russia. To avoid becoming a proxy in the great power game, Ukraine would do well to maintain a friendly, equidistant relationship with Russia, the U.S., and Europe. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (2014) considers that internationally pursuing "a posture comparable to that of Finland...cooperat[ing] with the West in most fields but carefully avoid[ing] institutional hostility toward Russia" would still be a viable solution even to

the current crisis, and Ukraine could strive to bridge the East and the West. A non-aligned Ukraine would be beneficial to all parties.

Regardless of the outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War, matters on the battlefield must be addressed through negotiations. Military restraint on the part of Russia in Ukraine is intended to limit the scope of the conflict and open the way for negotiations. Negotiations at the moment are conducted primarily through Russia's strategy of "promoting talks through forces". If it were not for the continual advancement of the Russian army, Ukraine would not necessarily offer to negotiate with Russia. Ukraine, on the other hand, is delaying negotiations in order to gain more support from the U.S. and Europe. If the U.S. and Europe continue to encircle and intercede with Russia, call upon more countries to join a coalition of sanctions against Russia - some post-Soviet states may be forced to act as "vanguards" against Russia - or provide substantial military assistance to Ukraine, Russia would be most likely to retaliate with more "tit-for-tat" measures. Not only will this intensify confrontations and contradictions within Europe, yielding a zero-sum game, but it may also stimulate the formation of new political alliances in other regions, thus creating a more complex multipolar cold war pattern. If the war between Russia and Ukraine continues for a prolonged period of time, NATO countries bordering Russia could view Russia's military presence in Ukraine as a potential security threat, and "NATO will depend on U.S. support as will the anxious and imperilled countries of Europe's east... Eastern member states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, will likely have substantial numbers of NATO troops permanently stationed on their soil. A request from Finland and Sweden to...join NATO would be impossible to reject" (Fix & Kimmage, 2022).

A more realistic course of action is to move away from threats and extortions towards reciprocal favours. If this step is to be accomplished, it will require practical concessions from all parties. As an example, the U.S. and Europe reduced sanctions against Russia or reduced military aid to Ukraine; in response, Russia reduced countersanctions against the U.S. and Europe, or reduced military operations against Ukraine; and at the same time, Ukraine actively pursued neutrality. For Europe to restore security and peace, it should fully leverage its strength as the most influential political and economic force in the region, unite with neighbours and the international community for peace talk, encourage the creation of trust rather than aggravate hostilities, and push for an early cease-fire. Considering that Europe and Russia are inseparable neighbours, European countries would need to manage risks such as expanding sanctions against Russia and increasing military assistance to Ukraine in a rational and prudent manner, as well as establishing a regional security structure on an equal footing with Russia. More importantly, resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict could constitute a significant step towards enabling Europe to achieve its long-sought strategic autonomy and a notion of subjectivity necessary for redefining the regional security. Europe is in a more powerful and sensible position than any other actor in the world to exert pressure on the U.S. and urge them to assume its responsibilities not to escalate conflict, not to avoid its dissonances with Russia and not to endanger European security.

The outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War has once again exposed the failure of the international order with the United Nations at its core. Although Russia participates in the existing system, it is not a beneficiary, and, thus, it is free to wage war without much consideration of its impact on the system whatsoever. This in mind, the actors involved in conflict should devise a more robust regional security architecture, establish an effective regional crisis management mechanism, and negotiate more stringent terms on arms control. Otherwise, the world might witness a coexistence of a "cold war" and a "hot war".

In the long run, no matter how the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is resolved, Russia-Ukraine relations will never be the same again, and Europe's geopolitical structure and security pattern will undergo profound changes. It was of greater concern to the U.S. to maintain its dominant position in the international and regional order, and other countries were subordinate to its strategic interests. The present conflict represents another manifestation of Russia's long-standing dissatisfaction with the US-led world order and the European landscape. In the wake of the current Ukraine crisis, the European security order will be challenged, Russian-European relations will continue to deteriorate, prospects for Russia-Europe cooperation in energy will be slim, and the landscape of global energy will undergo a fundamental transformation.

## 5. The Reconfiguration of Europe and the World by the Crisis

Among the major beneficiaries of the conflict with Ukraine would be NATO, which could be given a clearer mandate to defend Europe. In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO could leverage the conflict as a pretext and justification for a substantial increase in its forward presence along Russia's periphery. In the current political climate, the membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO has become an urgent policy option rather than merely an after-dinner topic. In expanding to the north, NATO would complete its C-shaped encirclement of Russia, which was obstructed by Ukraine in its eastward expansion. Direct and intense confrontation between the two parties would also become more common.

### 5.1 *The Conflict and the Eurasian Transformation*

What is more noteworthy, however, is that the EU's construction of "strategic autonomy" is being pushed in an anti-Russian and militarized direction. Over the past few years, the difficulties in accurately identifying security threats and the lack of clarity regarding strategic objectives have been the recurring problems for the EU to be quick to speak and slow to act when designing and implementing strategic autonomy. Despite not being originally conceived with Russia as its only imaginary foe, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has provided the EU with an opportunity to unify its internal positions and to focus on potential security threats, creating a great need to build hard power and set up a geopolitical entity within the EU. A policy shift in Germany may be one of the biggest drivers of the EU's strategic autonomy to target Russia. Following its economic heft in the debt crisis in 2009 and its diplomatic heft in Crimea in 2014, Germany's security breakthrough in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is symbolic of the history-making process of "normalizing" the state since the end of World War II. Even though Germany will remain determined to meet its security ambitions through the "EU way" and will still do its best to avoid the outside world from drawing too many connections between reality and history, its economic and industrial strength will inherently contribute to the development of the Russia-EU relationship, which is currently in the throes of geopolitical confrontation. After the Cold War ended, a new issue arose for the European security architecture: how to guarantee Russia's security needs? The "Common European home" and a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" are somewhat of a utopian fantasy. Russia was not only unable to integrate into the original European security system but has also been gradually expelled from that system. For Russia, European security is divided; American and NATO security is based upon Russian insecurity, and Russia's security concerns are not being adequately addressed. In this sense, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is an outburst of the general security tension that has developed between Russia, the U.S., and NATO, but has reached a certain intensity, signalling a return to the Cold War in Eurasian geopolitics.

In addition to having profound impacts on the European security structure and Eurasian geopolitics, the Russia-Ukraine conflict will also reshape the global geopolitical pattern in some way. Relations between Russia and the U.S. will change more fundamentally than in any other time since the end of the Cold War. In the event that Russia, the U.S., and the West come to blows, there will be severe repercussions for the original political ecology of peace and for the development of global politics. This will result in new eras in global politics and economic development. A pronounced trend of geopolitical division and confrontation in Europe has accelerated the transition of international relations from a globalized era with geoeconomic cooperation as the central theme to a post-globalized era with geopolitical competition. Developed economies have employed a broad range of tools against Russia other than direct military means, including financial attack, energy diversion and export control, which are extending and deepening the geopolitical confrontation while systemically destroying the geoeconomic foundation. The end result of this occurrence will interact with supply chain security issues that have been created by the pandemic, making regionalization and collectivization of the global economy increasingly plausible.

A long period of time will probably elapse before the EU is able to play a vital role in international affairs as an independent pole; instead, it will have to rely on the U.S. for major strategic decisions. Russia-Ukraine conflicts will lead to a Europe in greater need of assistance and support, as well as the increasing dislocation between the U.S. and Europe over the Indo-Pacific issue. In the eyes of U.S., its positioning towards Europe remains a tool of great power competition, and its strategic alliance with Europe should serve the Indo-Pacific strategy, which is

dominated by competition with China. A marked increase in sense of insecurity and defence awareness has taken hold throughout Europe as a result of the current conflict. By empowering Europe through the framework of NATO, the U.S. hopes its allies can shoulder more defence responsibilities and share its pressure in Europe, so that allow the country to steadily shift its strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific may not be the centre of attention for Europe. A clear example of this occurs in the economic and trade sphere, where Europe's energy dependence on Russia cannot be eliminated within a short period of time, and there will be hardships associated with the energy transition. The serious economic backlash of Europe's sanctions against Russia will continue to manifest themselves, and the continent itself will be adversely affected. Food shortages generated by the crisis is likely to put inflationary pressure on the eurozone, and the millions of refugees from Ukraine will put the solidarity and social cohesion of Europe to the test once more. As a result, Europe will become increasingly focused on domestic affairs for some time to come and be less able to match America's ambitious efforts in the Indo-Pacific.

In the long run, the U.S. will be severely hindered in its quest to balance its "two-ocean strategy" over time. During the conflict, Europe's dependence on the U.S. will likely be heightened in the short term, yet a loose alliance between the U.S. and Europe and a so-called "thematic alliance" will remain in place in the long term. Europe has become increasingly aware of the fragility of mutual dependence and unwilling to rely permanently on the U.S. for security protection. Though the pace of pursuing strategic independence has been disrupted, the direction is becoming clearer and more determined. The "strategic awakening" occurring in Germany and other countries relating to defence matters does not aim to ensure the security of the U.S., but to give Europe a sense of autonomy in terms of security and so to gradually move away from the hegemony of the U.S. in strategic affairs. This outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine will further accentuate the differences between the U.S. and Europe on the matter of China, which is likely to become a fundamental division between the two on the future orientation of the Indo-Pacific strategy, and seriously impair the implementation of US "two-ocean strategy". The Ukraine crisis has led Europe to recognize Russia as the most pressing threat, whereas for the US, China remains the greatest obstacle.

The great power game may be evolving in its underlying logic. Over the last few decades, countries have moved from a state of hard confrontation to soft confrontation. They are no longer squabbling over military positions and political influence, but competing for the right to speak on finance, media, cyberspace and ideology.

### *5.1 The Conflict and the Changes in Geopolitics*

The Ukrainian conflict arose ostensibly due to NATO's five rounds of eastward expansion following the Cold War, which severely curtailed Russia's strategic buffer space, causing Russia to lash out. Nevertheless, the fundamental structural contradiction at the heart of this war is the clash between the liberal imperial order erected by the U.S. and the traditional imperial order of Russia which resorted to nationalism, civilizationism, and territorial logic. What has changed about geopolitics as a result of the Ukraine crisis? First, it overturns a fundamental component of geopolitics, the idea of geographical space. Russian-Ukrainian hostilities uniquely exemplify the nature of modern hybrid warfare, that is, the application of small-scale mobile warfare, information warfare, cyber warfare, economic warfare, and technological warfare at the same time. Thus, the essence of the Russia-Ukraine conflict reaches beyond the Eurasian plateau itself, for there has been a delocalization and regionalization of conflict, where the latter is the nature of geopolitics, namely, the power relations between states in geographical space. Geographical space is blurred, and geopolitics is becoming global. A conflict in one part of the world could reverberate across the globe. The power relationship between Russia and Ukraine has evolved from a merely bilateral relationship to a global one. Those countries planning for the future will have to consider the consequences of friction at the border in terms of global impact.

Second, it changed the states as the main actors in geopolitics. There has been a significant amount of damage caused by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, including the loss of weapons, refugee problems, environmental damage, food crises, and the stimulation of international terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. Non-state actors have played a variety of roles. On March 26, the White House (2022) announced that

in response to Russia's military action against Ukraine, the U.S., the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and Canada decided to exempt some Russian banks from the SWIFT payment network. As a neutral international organization, the SWIFT covers more than 200 countries and regions around the world but now becomes a conduit for conflict. Multinational corporations, for example, have also withdrawn from the Russian Arctic gas project due to the US sanctions on Russian energy. Most states will be required to assess even the smallest trade frictions from the responses of various actors in international relations. A reflection of a state's financial strength, financial sanctions are not only a common external tool used to safeguard national strategic security but are also an effective instrument in performing great power plays. Financial sanctions will continue to be in place for as long as geopolitical conflicts persist.

Third, it revolutionized the essence of geopolitics - military conflict. The U.S. has once again asserted the dominance of liberal ideologies in the world, especially in the "post-truth age" when public opinion is at its most volatile. From the perspective of cognitive warfare, all countries in the world have actively or passively participated in the conflict, transmitting all kinds of true and false signals, deceptive and valid information deliberately released by both sides to compete for international discourse hegemony, moral commanding position and public opinion support at home and abroad. "social media companies had to 'pick a side'; and cast a blind eye to propaganda and disinformation coming from the anti-Russian side" (Pappin, 2022). Ukrainian President Zelensky stands out in virtual space. He released regular material through various social media, expressing his determination to stay in Kyiv, winning the favour of Ukrainians and the Western world. Using video calls, he addressed the European Parliament as well as the British, Canadian, American, German, Israeli, and other international parliamentary bodies. Ukraine "is winning the war" in managing ideas to control public mental and leader images. The military battle has evolved into the cognitive battle, and only the cognitive battle can fundamentally shape the concept of geopolitics and national security and mobilize the people of all countries. Russia-Ukraine conflict has provided inspiration and reference for other countries on how to improve their international communication and construct discourse power.

### *5.2 The Conflict and International Patterns*

In time, the deep impact of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the world pattern will coalesce. As for the international community, it will not only have to deal with the short-term political, economic, and security shocks caused by this war, but will also likely be faced with the in-depth transformation of global governance, international order, and world structure. The shadow of a "new Cold War" will become a defining sign that the world is entering a period of turbulence and change. The extent of the revolution in the international balance of power, the urgency of the change in the international order, the competitiveness of the change in national development paradigms and values, and the complexity of the changes in the game of great powers will be unprecedented. Conflict between Russia and Ukraine is confined to "aggression and counter-aggression" as exaggerated by some politicians and the public at large. The identity differences pertaining to the "winners" and "losers" of the Cold War, the cognitive contradiction between Russia and Europe regarding the indivisibility of security, the rationality of NATO's existence and the external effect of the "open door policy", as well as the imperative to rebuild the European security framework have not been seriously discussed and taken into account. The theme of peace and development continues to be prevalent, nonetheless, the environment in which such goals can be attained will become increasingly complex. The outbreak of military conflicts and the increase of traditional security risks will intensify the clash of ideologies and values and will further accentuate trends of group politics and camp confrontation around the world. The all-round isolation of Russia by the U.S. and Europe, as well as the accelerated reorientation of the universal anti-war voice to the systematic anti-Russian movement, may also lead to small and medium-sized countries trapped between the searing arrows of great powers seeking to safeguard their own security through "group self-defence". Therefore, collisions between various ideas about order, value, and security will create more uncertainties around the globe.

On the political and security front, Russian-Ukrainian conflict may also alter the existing system and development trends. Following the crisis, the debate over whether the international system should return to a regime of block-partition states akin to that of Yalta or return to a mode of great power coordination comparable to that of Vienna

will intensify, and the risks and challenges caused by Cold War thinking, hegemonism and power politics will become more acute. The U.S. and NATO condemned Russia in response to Putin's order to put his nuclear forces on high alert, causing widespread concern about nuclear war and the outbreak of another world conflict (Smith, 2022). But nuclear tensions between the U.S. and Russia will also continue to exert an influence on global strategic stability.

In the area of trade and finance, because of the comprehensive and indiscriminate implementation of sanctions against Russia as well as the inability to end the conflict in the short term, the prices of bulk commodities continued to rise, and international logistics were isolated due to the mutual closure of airspace. As a result, the structural risks of the world economy will continue to escalate, and some countries' plans for economic and production capacity recovery will be forced to slow down. The demands for re-securing of international industrial chains, supply chains, innovation chains, and value chains will rise, and the incentives for cost-driven inflation and systemic financial risks will surge. Multinational corporations and various international investment and financing activities will find themselves faced with the dilemma of choosing sides, with attempts to passively decoupling and actively building walls will increase in frequency. A heavyweight blow to expel large economies from the SWIFT may prompt countries to implement a parallel system independent of the US dollar hegemony.

The world economy and finance have become intrinsically linked as a result of economic globalization. The irreversible energy dependency of Europe on Russia, the interdependence of global supply chain and industry chain make this financial game a global affair. These extreme practices of freezing foreign exchange reserves and cryptocurrencies have profoundly impacted traditional financial thinking, civilization, and order, and deviated from the principles of borderless technology, decentralization, and free trading enshrined in internet finance. They undermined the essentials of the contract. Irrespective of the outcome of the current round of financial sanctions, it indicates the dysfunction of the international order led by the U.S., which leaves the foundation of American hegemony vulnerable, resulting in potential changes to the international monetary and financial systems. To begin with, the dollar's hegemony will be challenged. Due to the excessive overdrafts in US credit and the capricious nature of monetary policy, the international credit monetary system with the dollar at its core has been seriously weakened, and dedollarization is becoming a trend. In particular, Russia's anti-sanctions measures are designed to directly counter the "petrodollar" with "gas roubles" and "gold roubles". Should other energy powers follow suit, the dollar's status will suffer greatly. Secondly, financial sanctions are losing their marginal benefits. It brings chaos and turbulence to the global economy and finance when financial sanctions are introduced and countermeasures are applied. In this sense, the actual effect of sanctions would be considerably diminished if one were to inflict damage on the enemy while enduring a lesser but comparable level of damage on one's own side. However, it should be noted that despite the conflict significantly shaking up the international economic and political landscape and to some extent affecting the hegemony of the US dollar, it has not fundamentally altered the role of the U.S. in global governance.

A long-held basic consensus in science, technology, and humanities, including "science knows no borders", "keep politics out of sports", and "speech is free", has been completely repudiated under the comprehensive sanctions against Russia. Future nations will have greater demands for independent and controllable developments of science and technology, as well as greater emphasis on the principle of sovereignty in cyberspace, which will pose more derivative challenges. A consequence of indiscriminate sanctions will also intensify ideological conflicts, culture-identity tensions and nationalistic antagonisms throughout the world, limiting the reasonable pursuit of the common values of humanity.

### *5.3 The Conflict and Global Governance*

A change in the focus and agenda of global governance may also result from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The plight and decline of the liberal international order have become more visible in recent years. The emergence of exceptionalism and double standards has had a deep effect on the development and transformation of the international system. Global governance has become increasingly out of tune with and asymmetrical to the changing international environment. It has now become an urgent task for mankind to overcome and address the

deficits in governance, trust, peace, and development. At this point, synchronizing the process of breaking away from outdated thinking and ideas and all institutional ailments with fostering new standards and mechanisms to meet constant changes in the global governance system has become increasingly more difficult. In the midst of increasing doubts about the deteriorating credibility of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the diminishing relevance of multilateralism, the peace agenda will become a priority for all countries to participate in international affairs, and attention to global issues will be obliged to return to traditional security concerns. Specifically, increased need for energy security could change the trajectory of global decarbonization efforts; non-traditional security governance could be overshadowed by geopolitical agenda; addressing climate change, public health, strategic stability and non-proliferation, as well as global governance are hardly priorities for the U.S., Europe, and Russia to shed geopolitical constraints and achieve limited interaction. In general, a conflict between Russia and Ukraine will reshape the European regional security pattern and not only impact the equilibrium between Russia and the West but will also change the differentiation and combination of global forces, the shattering and reassembling of orders, the collision and fusion of ideologies, and the turmoil and transformation of the world caused by the spillover effects. More efforts should be made on the part of the international community to promote talks and defuse potential humanitarian crises. Countries will need to adjust their strategic positioning and take action to adapt to the new normal of post-conflict world.

In terms of Russian-Ukrainian relations, this war will result in a complete breakdown of relations between the two nations, which have had a tangled and difficult relationship historically. It is expected that Ukraine may not join NATO after the war but will instead join the EU. A post-war Ukraine would be more inclined to embrace the European path of development. In the case of international sanctions, Russia is likely to enter a state of relative isolation, becoming a "Russian island." Accordingly, the dividing line between Christianity and Eastern Orthodoxy in eastern Europe will shift eastward again. Russia may suffer from a significant negative impact of sanctions in the short term; however, over time Russia will eventually adapt to the environment and resume economic activity with new normal under new external constraints, although the quality of growth cannot be guaranteed.

In two respects, this war was also a watershed in the development of post-Cold War world. The fragmentation of systems will further aggravate the issue of international security. The NATO alliance in Europe was reunited and strengthened during the war, and the US status within the transatlantic security system was further enhanced. At the same time, many countries around the world have questioned the role of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. It is likely that the reform of the UN, including the Security Council, will proceed at a fast pace in the future, which will have a major impact on the global security governance system established after World War II. Reshaping the regional and international security system will become an important global issue in the coming years. Having international institutions available can be advantageous for countries that intend to pursue their interests and achieve cooperative security between nations. At this juncture, in a turbulent environment of numerous challenges confronting international security, staying abreast of the latest developments is vital to keep institutions and mechanisms responsible for maintaining global and regional security afloat. In general, it manifests on two levels. In one dimension, global, regional, and national security arrangements should focus on specific issues, so as to match the institutions with threats, such as shifting from coordinating traditional security relations between countries to emerging non-traditional global security concerns. In a second dimension, it is equally important that the global and regional security order and institutions conform to the development course of world power structure. Improving and innovating security order, systems, rules and norms should prioritize the development of harmonious relationships between traditional developed countries and emerging developing countries in global security governance, realizing their active participation and ensuring expertise and power sharing in the process. As can be seen, reshaping the regional and international security is a multi-layered strategic agenda, which should evolve as time progresses in order to mitigate uncertainty in the global economic sphere, eliminate conservatism on the level of political and security concepts. Although the content of each field may differ, the core idea remains the same, which is evaluating actively and objectively the power, intentions, and motivation of oneself and others and maintaining self-help as the guiding principle in international security.

Globalization will further diverge at the economic level. Russia-Ukraine conflict accelerates the reorganization of global economic landscape. The multilateral system centred on the United Nations, the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade, World Trade Organization and the Bretton Woods system established after World War II have fostered the slow but steady growth of global economy and allowed developing countries to gradually industrialise. Yet, the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict poses a serious challenge to the existing international norms, and some multilateral rules have even been weaponized to implement sanctions. Consequently, there is possibility that the post-war multilateral system will return to its bilateral status before World War II, and the rule-based multilateral governance will revert to traditional geopolitical and economic arrangements. In the recent trade war between China and the U.S., we have seen the US attempt to "de-Sinicize", however China is so thoroughly integrated into the global economic system that a complete decoupling is difficult. And now we are seeing a "de-Russification". The country was severely affected even in areas where energy plays such a significant role and where Russia was thought to have a competitive advantage. A rapid reorganization is occurring in global supply chains, especially energy supply chains. The effectiveness of energy sanctions against Russia depends on the global energy prices: if energy prices rise due to sanctions, Russia will still benefit from higher prices even if the sanctions reduce its energy exports, rendering sanctions meaningless; however, if the U.S. succeeds in driving prices downward substantially, China will be the biggest beneficiary - something that the U.S. is obviously unhappy with. These factors lead to clear limits to Western economic sanctions against Russia.

American strategic goals in the Russian-Ukrainian war - crushing Russia or bringing Russia to its knees in a prolonged conflict, are at odds with how the U.S. intends to accomplish these goals. Clearly, the U.S. is aware that without direct participation in the war, it is exceedingly difficult to defeat Russia merely by supporting Ukraine's politics, armaments, intelligence, and public opinion. For that reason, from the beginning the U.S. has focused upon coordinating its allies to sanction Russia. Such sweeping sanctions are, however, difficult to sustain over the long term. Not only do many countries around the world remain on the sidelines and are unwilling to take part, or the US most important partner, Europe, has difficulty maintaining sanctions against Russia over the long run, but, perhaps more importantly, because the cornerstone of the US economy and its position as a global leader, dollar hegemony, struggles to sustain credible long-term comprehensive sanctions against Russia. As the world's most open and largest economy, the U.S. is not immune from the inflation caused by sanctions against Russia. In the event that the US sanctions do not achieve desired outcomes and are not able to last for long, the impact on economic globalization will be limited. Fundamentally, dollar hegemony cannot be understood in isolation from economic globalization.

## **6. Conclusion: An Implication for the Asia Pacific**

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict poses a must-answer to the world: the world needs to find a new development path. The hostilities between the two will have a far-reaching impact on the mentality and policies of Asia-Pacific countries, like a mirror. While it may sometimes be justifiable and necessary for governments to address issues of "hegemony" using "power," it may be more pressing for the overwhelming majority of countries to create a new international order of pacifism, cooperation, and development. It may be true that the trend of collectivization and the possibility of an arms race cannot be excluded in the Asia-Pacific region, but the general outlook of the countries in the region longing for peace and development remains the predominant scenario. Against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, all countries will appreciate and cherish the valuable and hard-earned environment for peace and development. It follows that, if the U.S. continues to promote an Indo-Pacific strategy with overtones of exclusivity and confrontation, it will find itself treading a very precarious tightrope, and will not be welcomed by other nations. Improving regional security mechanisms and advocating win-win cooperation are the right strategies for addressing common challenges and achieving prosperity for all. A number of implications may be derived from the conflict between Russia and Ukraine for regional peace in other parts of the world.

First of all, to cope today's challenges, countries in the region must fully grasp and properly employ their strategic instruments, as well as raise awareness about the importance of national financial security. A regional perspective on security should support multilateralism and emphasize mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination, as well as contest hegemonism and power politics, to promote a more just and equitable international order. As countries rise peacefully, they should avoid confrontations that are purely antagonistic in nature. An immediate duty for the region is to prevent the recurrence of geopolitical conflicts in Asia, to guard against the West

interjecting themselves with camp confrontations into Asia, to defeat the impure motive of manipulating Asia as a geopolitical chessboard, to unite all forces and underline the need for early intervention in possible crises, disputes, and conflicts. The region should benefit from the provision of more international public goods by big powers. It is true that Asian powers such as China, Japan, and India are in a state of intense competition, but this competition is largely healthy and beneficial on the whole. The countries within the domain should always be open. Globalization is inimical to a value-based grouping. A number of late-developing countries, including China, must first safeguard their right to development, which ought to include the freedom to pursue a development path different from that of western liberal modernization. On this basis, the future world will likely be one of cooperation, coexistence, competition, and exchange between different types of modern nations.

Secondly, more attention should be given to the country's political security. Russian concerns about NATO's eastward expansion are primarily political in nature. To Russia, the consequences for its domestic politics of neighbouring countries becoming members of NATO are unaffordable. It is imperative that one respects the core interests of the other when managing state-to-state relations. In its capacity as a big power, Russia certainly cannot allow other nations to threaten its core interests. Russian interests in the current conflict revolve primarily around political security, but a certain degree of military security is also concerned. Russia's military action against Ukraine is primarily motivated by the threat posed to its core interests by NATO's planned expansion eastward. Countries from other parts of the world may also need to take each other's core interests into account if they are to handle their external relationships effectively, and to avoid encroaching upon each other's core interests as much as possible. In the Asia-Pacific, it is crucial to understand the relationship and manage the differences between big powers and smaller ones. Large countries need to acknowledge that smaller countries often resort to or invite external powers to seek protection. This is understandable in some respects, however, while large nations tolerate small nations, it is equally important for smaller ones to be aware of that the big neighbours have their own security considerations. The threat of a small state disregarding the security of a bigger state and acting as a proxy for a foreign power outside the region creates unrest in the surroundings and the small state itself could also be at risk of losing its own security.

A third revelation is that the use of force to resolve conflicts between countries, particularly when it entails changing the borders of nations by force, will neither resolve the problem nor achieve the goal, and will result in disaster for both the country and all humanity. This indicates that countries from other regions of the world should practice peaceful negotiation when interacting with each other, and refrain from resorting to force. Countries in the Asia-Pacific should avoid picking side. Picking a side will only intensify contradictions and conflicts between big powers, causing instability in the region. As national governments, they are responsible for determining their own judgment and act based on the merits of the specific case and national interests, rather than taking ideological position. Meanwhile, regional actors are obliged to carefully manage their relationships with the U.S. America has been in Asia for centuries and has never left. Countries in the region should play their roles in steering the military contests that the U.S. desires to see and is confident to win toward economic competition, since economic competition tends to be a win-win scenario, whereas military contest is typically a zero-sum game. In dealing effectively with the vast number of developing countries in the future, the construction of a new international system needs to prevent from falling into the trap of simple mercantilist thinking and pure economic logic, but instead promote a new discourse system, value concept, and order vision. Only in this way will the concerns of other countries about a particular country of increasing strength and size be allayed.

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### Notes

Note 1. Normalization of Germany’s European identity pertains primarily to international responses to the perception of changes in Germany’s postwar commitment to Europe, particularly the expression of Germany’s national interests and national identity in a more elaborate manner.

Note 2. Common European home is a Soviet thinking espoused and much used in the diplomacy of former Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev towards Western Europe.

Note 3. Charles De Gaulle, France’s President from 1958 to 1969, viewed Europe as a product of history and geography transcending artificial and ephemeral divisions and stated in 1959 that “it is Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals ... which will decide the fate of the world”.

Note 4. NATO’s Open Door Policy refers to that the door to NATO membership remains open to other European countries who are ready and willing to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership and whose



# Pakistan and Indian Ocean Region: A Study in Contested Orientations

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## Abstract

The proposed study will direct particular attention to firstly, geographical contexts of a state, and its perceptions and policies will be identified via consideration of various set of factors like Geographical—the description, evaluation and changing value and changing perception of locational and regional factors including, for example, proximity, relative location, degree of control of strategic waterways and to degree of access to strategic resources. The Economic—the stability and change of economic linkages in order to maximize economic security. The Political—causes of regional peace and conflict and changing threat perceptions. Secondly, State perceptions and policies will be especially concerned with the perceived global and regional positions. For instance, Pakistan's perception of its 'regional centrality' in South Asia and its sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean. Further, the state policy documents which identify particular orientations or changes in orientations in geopolitics, geoeconomics and geostrategic terms. These analyses, will lead to an increased understanding of the behaviour of Pakistan as a state in the Indian Ocean Region. That will contribute to an environment of peace and stability in the region.

**Keywords:** Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, Geostrategy, Indian Ocean Region, Pakistan

## 1. Introduction

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) possesses considerable and often underrated geopolitical significance, if only because of its use as a maritime highway. Given its location and the fact that it provides a relatively short and thus economic link between the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans, it is perhaps not surprising that not only does the ocean account for the transportation of the major tonnage of commodities in the world, but that more than three-quarters of this extra-regional trade. The Indian Ocean is known to contain natural resources, the significance of which is yet to be fully determined. The maintenance of safety and security of the sea-lanes and associated choke points is especially significant for the movement of commodities, especially oil to North-east Asia, Western Europe and North America. There are several possible threats to the security and safety of sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean including of piracy, inter or intrastate conflicts, terrorism and creeping jurisdiction. In overall, the Indian Ocean proved a wide range of collaborative prospects.

Given the varied set of circumstances and Pakistan's continental mindset initially-land orientations of military

strategy (especially army) in case of Pakistan, led to wars between the two nations. However, the Pakistan navy in comparison to the army and air wings does not share the memories of war and conflict that the other two services do. The naval engagement was not as intense as the army and the air forces. The chance of naval encounter is increased because of the political disputes and outstanding issues. In addition to this, since the inception of Pakistan as a state the primary bone of contention between the two countries (India and Pakistan) are territorialized threats. But there are other issues as well that relate mainly to naval dimension as well in recent times. Such issues have been categorized as military and non-military at sea that poses concern to India with the member of western blocs in 1950s and nexus of China- Pakistan gradually emerged as all-weather friendship. The right from the beginning Pakistan's quest for parity with India was in its security dilemma. This security dilemma and strategic balance has increased more after the dismemberment of Pakistan during in 1971.

As a part of the globalization the world order has changed so fast. The last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century has witnessed a resurgence of regionalism in world politics. Since the end of the Cold War, there had been a significant acceleration in the institutionalization of regional relations beyond Europe. The mid-1990s marked the beginning of a new phase in regional diplomacy of the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Pakistan's current moves towards the development of a cross-cultural, regional dialogue across the Indian Ocean have to be understood also in the context of changes in the global power structure, and sweeping structural reforms of the global economic order. Yet the emerging regional economic institution and geopolitical reconfigurations are ones that many policy-makers and foreign policy analysts, both inside and outside the IOR suggest a set of geopolitical equations, coordinates a relationship that is more relevant to grappling with the post-cold war realities. However, for purpose of the present study, it becomes very pertinent to define the term 'Orientation' here in this regard. The Reader's Digest Oxford Wordfinder (1993:1072) defines the term orientation as, "the act or an instance of orienting; the state of being oriented; a relative position; a person's attitude [for that matter the attitude(s) of various intellectuals and institutions of statecraft] or-adjustment in relation to circumstances, especially politically or psychologically." Fairly diverse orientations could be – and often are – produced and propagated by both state and non-state actors dealing with both 'home' and 'foreign' affairs -be they political, strategic or economic. While it is useful to study such orientations in their written form – the text(s) – it is equally significant to pay attention to the institutional and material contexts in which they are produced.

The proposed study taking Pakistan and Indian Ocean as its research study in brief, aims at problematizing the taken-for-granted meaning or common sense understanding of 'policy', or 'policy making', through a critical examination of various orientations that are often found to be competing with one another for greater visibility, salience and even hegemony. Such a study, it is hoped, will lead to a better understanding of a complex, two-way relationship between perceptions and the perceived. To elaborate the point, a little further, Pakistan, for example, by virtue of its physical location, apparently qualifies to be an Indian Ocean littoral or rim state. However, physical location, which could be pin-pointed in terms of latitudes and longitudes and described in terms of certain natural endowments, is only one among several, possibly diverse locations. States -Pakistan being no exception-- do not occupy a single place within an unchanging geopolitical structure. It is conceivable that a country has diverse positioning or locations, which, in turn, keep changing due to domestic, regional and global contexts or circumstances. For example, Pakistan vis-a-vis Indian Ocean appears to be simultaneously 'positioned' in diverse geopolitical geostrategic and geo-economic discourses, and the practices that flow from them. Each one of these locations seems to offer its own specific 'view' of the Indian Ocean as well as understanding of its power-capability-security generating aspects. It's against this backdrop the present research work tries to unfold briefly the Pakistan's contested orientations within the IOR

### *1.1. Objectives of the Study*

1. Firstly, to discuss in brief a conceptual-analytical framework of the present work.
2. Secondly, the present study tries to critically enquire into the nature, scope and substance of Pakistan's orientations-geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic towards the 'Indian Ocean'.

3. Finally, the research study will take into account the degree of convergence and/or divergence among such orientations through various phases of Pakistan's existence as a post-partition, post-colonial, 'nation-state'.

## 2. Methodology

The proposed research will be based on data collected from various primary and secondary sources pertaining to government, non-governmental organizations. One of the major sources of data for the proposed thesis will be the state policy documents, reports, parliamentary speeches and debates of Pakistan which identify particular orientations or changes in orientation.

## 3. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

A comprehensive survey of the varied uses of the term 'geopolitics' reveals that, 'in all cases, geopolitics are about power and space, usually about the state and its territory, often about power relations between states'. (Mamdouh 1998:246). For the purposes of the proposed thesis, however, we look at Geopolitics as politics using geographical reasoning for the purposes of defining and positioning a 'national' identity. As David Newman (2000:305) puts it, "the geopolitical imagination and positioning of a country is, to a great extent, dependent on the way in which the individual identities are defined and understood, both internally (by the residents of a country) and externally (by other countries in the global system). While the geopolitical imagination of a state may be determined from within, its actual positioning within the regional and global system is largely determined from without. The so-called 'national' identity and interests are formed in interaction with one another. The geopolitical imagination of a country's political elites may often contrast with the geopolitical positioning of that state by other states within the system, resulting in inter-state tension on the one hand, and attempts to become accepted on the other. In short, the fact that the position accorded to the state does not necessarily coincide with preferred location of the state, as reflected in its geopolitical imagination(s), may often be the cause for conflict and tension.

The term geo-economics has been popularized, rather sensationalized, by 'defense intellectuals' like Edward Luttwak, (1990,1993) who argue that "old fashioned" geopolitics has been displaced by the new phenomenon of geo-economics, with disposable capital becoming more important than firepower, civilian innovation more significant than military-technical advancement, and market penetration a greater mark of power than the possession of garrisons and bases. We are told that states compete with each other for economic power, and no more for territorial power. Without undermining in any way, the appeal of such arguments to many Western intellectuals and institutions of statecraft, however, for the purposes of proposed thesis, we tend to draw more from the insights offered by Timothy Luke (1997,1998) Luke argues that economic, cultural and political globalization, and the move to more informational and transnational form of corporate capitalism, are transforming such traditional anchoring principles of world politics as state sovereignty, territorial integrity and place-bound communities. Power, Luke notes, is no longer bound to place but also often more placelessly beneath, behind, between and beyond boundaries set into space as new senses of artificial location become very fluid or mobile. Accordingly, one needs to pay greater attention to interplay between states, commercial enterprises and markets. Put simply, geo-economics is the analysis of the economic strategies of the states.

Whereas, the term geostrategy implies the application of geographical reasoning to the setting-up of a national defence scheme (Foucher 2000:165). What often figure as central to geo-strategic calculations are factors of size and location, and the militarily important terrain, maritime choke points, and areas containing critical resources (Harkavy 2001:37). Geostrategy relates to concrete practices in places -terrestrial as well as maritime-- that are analysed as theatres of operation, actual or potential. It thus considers spatial, physical and human configurations in terms of war and defence.

## 4. Results and Discussion

### 4.1. Locating Pakistan: Geopolitical Contexts and Constraints

The new state of Pakistan, demanded on the basis of two-nation theory, and achieved through a bloody partition (more than one million died due to communal violence and more than ten million were displaced) was indeed a bizarre geopolitical entity; a country – “created by the stroke of a pen”(McGrath 1996:3). Despite the mythical aspirations of the two-nation theory and the partition formula of Muslim majority contiguous areas, the idea of Pakistan was eventually realized in the form of a ‘moth-eaten’ geo-body. It consisted of two wings, located at the opposite western (comprising ethno-linguistically different Sindh, Baluchistan, NWFP and partitioned Punjab) and eastern (comprising Bengali speaking Muslim populations, culturally closer to Bengali speaking Hindu than to Pashto speaking Pathan) ends of the vast alluvial Indo-Gangetic plain; or allegedly hostile geopolitical space occupied by ‘Hindustan’. Despite, and in some ways perhaps due to, such territorial truncation, Indian Ocean -the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal—seemed to carry considerable geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economics implications for Pakistan: especially before emergence of Bangladesh in 1971.

As Paul Bracken (1999:210) puts it, -The Cold War had its own geography... Asia disappeared in the mental map of the West, in its place arose the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia... Likewise, the Middle East, a term originally coined by American naval strategist Alfred Mahan in 1902 to describe the lands surrounding the Persian Gulf, also received a new geographic unity in the Cold War... Geographic designation drove strategic declarations.” Once Pakistan chose to embrace the Western geopolitical discourse of ‘containing the evil empire’, and thereby perhaps also aspiring to contain ‘hostile’ India, its location on the regional as well as global geo-strategic chessboard was ‘fixed’ ‘more or less in accordance with Western perceptions of threats as well as ‘appropriate’ responses to those threats.

Pakistan’s reaction--as a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)--to ‘super-power rivalry’ in the Indian Ocean, and militarization/nuclearization that followed was therefore one-sided and biased. Located on the vital trade and oil supply routes from the Persian Gulf, Pakistan also remained acutely aware of its close proximity to Islamic world (an ideological location of critical importance for Pakistan right from the beginning) as well as geostrategic as well as geo-economic importance of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and maritime choke-points.

Today’s Pakistan appears to be facing a series of crises. For the past decade and more, Pakistan’s economy has suffered from serious stagnation in growth and payments crisis. Even Bangladesh and Nepal have been able to manage growth rates above five’ percent per annum in the last decade of 20<sup>th</sup> century (See Special Issue of *Himal: South Asia*, July 2002). According to some analysts, Pakistan has the requisite wherewithal and potential for a middle power, but a great incongruity exists between its external facade of a regional achiever and fundamental internal contradictions. The fractured nature of its internal politics, “myth of constitutionalism” (Maluka 1995), derailment or hijacking of otherwise feeble democratic institutions at regular intervals by highly politicized army or ‘geopoliticians in uniform’, extraordinary regional imbalances and inability to create a national ethos even after 64 years, are reflected most dramatically in the frequent ethnic violence in Sindh -especially the port city of Karachi--and sectarian clashes in Punjab (Nasr 2002). Pakistan’s biggest systematic weakness remains in that its power structure continues to be elitist, feudal, militaristic and unrepresentative of the masses. Even though the extent to which Talibanization is going to overtake or overrun the polity and society of Pakistan remains uncertain and debatable (Shafqat 2002), development of this kind could have far reaching implications, especially after 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2001, for Pakistan’s competing geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic (re)orientations towards what Robert Harkavy (2001) calls the ‘Greater Middle East’-the sum of the core Middle East, North Africa, the African Horn, South Asia and ex-Soviet Central Asia – and the surrounding Indian Ocean rim. According to Oliver Roy (2002:149):

*The Pakistani support for the Taliban since 1994 can be explained at two levels: (1) a geo-strategic perspective, designed at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with the aim of asserting the regional influence of*

*Pakistan by establishing a kind of control on Afghanistan through a fundamentalist, Pakhtun-dominated movement. (2) An ideological and religious, connection provided by extending the informal network of madrasas in Pakistan, which at the same time challenge the Islamic credentials of the Pakistan Government and provide it with non-governmental tools of influence in the region.*

The collapse of Soviet Union, the end of Cold War, emergence of 'Islamic' Central Asia, the so-called war against 'global terrorism' on the one hand, and the growing scope and salience of 'corporate globalization' are likely to have a significant bearing on the trajectory and thrust of geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic orientations of Pakistan towards the Indian Ocean. Whereas the 'hegemony of trans-nationalism' has reinforced the economic importance of the Indian Ocean -forcing some observers to comment that geo-economics is fast replacing geopolitics in some parts of the region-the so-called 'war against terrorism' appears to have pushed the Indian Ocean once again in the direction of militarization.

While Pakistan's response to the Indian Ocean component of its 'external security' environment appears to be still in the making, the geostrategic significance of Pakistan location at the cross-roads between the volatile Middle East and Gulf, the resource-rich but land-locked central Asian countries and South Asia, seems to have increased in the eyes of major powers, especially those in closer proximity to the region like China. Its endemic internal turbulence notwithstanding, there are indications that Pakistan is rethinking its foreign policy objectives in order to be able to play a wider role in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The priority given by Pakistan's power elite to deriving maximum possible political-economic leverage from Central Asia is rather obvious, Pakistan looks at the Central Asian Muslim states as critical new space for launching various diplomatic and economic initiatives. At the same time Pakistan as a spatial-have-not vis-a-vis India perceives in Central Asian Republics a vital 'strategic depth', while tempting these republics to pursue shortest possible outlet to the sea, provided of course Afghanistan is successfully brought within the dominant U.S.-lead post-Cold War geopolitical order as a partner; something easier desired than achieved.

One of the key Pakistani responses to above mentioned, rapidly changing, and circumstances are the so-called 'Look East' policy. Especially during 1999, friendly relations between Pakistan and the South East Asian countries continued to grow. Despite the South Asian regional economic meltdown and difficulties faced by Pakistan in the aftermath of the 'nuclearization' of South Asia, Pakistan continued to make consistent efforts to strengthen its political, economic and even military links with the region. That Pakistan's 'look East' policy, as an increasingly significant component of foreign policy was yielding some, result was evident in the high level of exchanges and agreements signed between Pakistan and the countries of south-East Asia.

As Pakistan looks East, it is to be expected that the country's most likely to be affected by such a policy would also show a greater sensitivity towards what Pakistan has to offer in a term of a number of important issue-areas. A large volume of international long haul maritime cargo, bound for Africa, South East Asia, North America and Europe passes through the Persian Gulf, and in close proximity to Pakistan. The third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) has not only provided Pakistan with extended maritime zones (including 200 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic Zone), but also entrusted the country with a range of obligations -including the protection of marine ecosystems – as a coastal state. Whether Pakistan is sensitive and sensible enough to recognize the necessity for international co-operation, in order to meet the challenge of ecologically sustainable development and management of fast-multiplying uses (shipping, recreation, living and non-living resources etc.) of the Indian Ocean remains to be explored.

#### *4.2. Geo-economics Replacing Geopolitics?*

In this post-Cold War period, Pakistan geo-economic orientations are being increasingly driven and dictated by the search for new markets. On the one hand, emergence of Central Asian Republics (CARs) and the withdrawal of Russians from Afghanistan is increasingly seen by Pakistan as an opportunity to increase its geo-economic, political, religious and diplomatic influence in the new Muslim states. By the end of 1992, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) comprising Pakistan, Iran and Turkey were reactivated and expanded to include

Afghanistan and six Central Asian republics of the former USSR (Pomfret 2000). In order to meet the maritime trade requirement of landlocked Central Asian republics, the cargo facilities at Karachi port are being modernized and expanded.

As far as the import and export of its bulk items are concerned, there is no doubt that Pakistan relies on the Indian Ocean. Its import includes oil, steel, minerals, and machinery. Its exports are cotton, cotton yarn, its manufactures and rice. The lion's share of these goods is transported via sea routes. Pakistan's Federal Minister of Commerce Abdul Razzaq Dawood announced on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2002 (Islamabad-Internet Source: A), that in accordance with the objectives of Pakistan's trade policy for the year 2001-2002, the country was slowly but surely moving from traditional market to non-traditional markets. Pakistan's exports partners for the year 2010 includes U.S. 15.8 percent, Afghanistan 8.1 percent, UAE 7.9 percent, China 7.3 percent, U.K. 4.3 percent, Germany 4.2 percent. Pakistan's imports partners for the year 2010 includes China 17.9 percent, Saudi Arabia 10.7 percent, UAE 10.6 percent, Kuwait 5.5 percent, US 4.9 percent, Malaysia 4.8 percent.

Pakistan's geopolitical orientation towards the East or search for a new national and regional identity is not entirely devoid of developmental-commercial concerns. Ever since Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) was established in the Indian Ocean region (IOR), it has been accompanied by a measure of controversy over membership. The preamble to its Charter, adopted at the First Ministerial Meeting in Mauritius in March 1997 (by the governments of Australia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Yemen) reads in part:

*Conscious of historical bonds created through millennium, peoples of the Indian Ocean, with a sense of recovery of history; cognizant of economic transformation and speed of change the world over, which is propelled significantly by increased intensity in regional economic cooperation and... Conscious of their responsibility to promote the welfare of their peoples by improving their standards of living and equality of life: the governments... hereby establish ... IOR-ARC).*

The rationale for the formation of the IOR-ARC is said to lie with the ascendancy of economic issues, and the trend towards regional economic cooperation and integration in the post-Cold War world. The fear of being economically marginalized, and an attempt to wield greater influence through collective action led urgency to the association. More recently, however, there are indications of dwindling interest in the IOR-ARC on the part of all the three major actors namely, India, Australia and South Africa (Kelegama, 2002). Whether the Sri Lankan proposal to make IOR-ARC a result-oriented Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) association will eventually be a reality remains to be seen, especially in view of the fact that many IOR-ARC countries are already members of PTAs, such as ASEAN, SAARC, GCC, SADEC, and so on.

It appears that sharp political tensions and conflicts are often the underside of the aspiration for greater economic and political cooperation. Pakistan has not been allowed to join the IOR-ARC. China, although not strictly a littoral state, has negotiated a form of informal membership, while more distant states like the U.S. and members of the EU have been unable to refashion the map in a way that would allow western powers to become part of the Indian Ocean region.

#### *4.3. Geo-strategic Dynamics and Dimensions: Growing Salience of Pakistan Navy?*

Ever since 1947, the Navy wing of Pakistan's armed forces was somewhat undermined and neglected, also because of predominantly land-oriented strategic thinking. It never received the share of the resources it demanded and deserved. The Indian victory in the 1971 war and consequent dismemberment of the country provided an enormous push forward to what Ayesha Jalal (1992) has rightly termed as 'Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence' which has been meticulously nurtured in direct reference to Indian hostility. The net result was a substantive increase in military power, especially between 1972 (When the war with India was over) and December 1979 (when the Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan), when the size of the army nearly doubled, the navy grew three times and the air force grew one-and-a-half times (Chawla 2001:705). After the loss of its eastern wing in 1971, Pakistan ceased

to be exposed directly to the eastern Indian Ocean and the South East Asian landmass, and was now firmly ensconced in the Arab Muslim world with which it always had proudly proclaimed its more intimate identity and emotional affinity.

However, an unprecedented rejuvenation and modernization of Pakistan's navy have taken place during the 1990s. So much so that Navy has come to acquire the biggest share in the major equipment procurement. Pakistan is currently investing heavily in naval expansion. During 1994-95, it purchased three Agosta-90 diesel/electric-powered submarines from France, worth \$950 million-for which a loan was provided by the French to be paid in five to six years- which are to be armed with Exocet SM-39 anti-ship missiles (Siddiqi-Agha 2001:162). The air independent propulsion (AIP) Agostas was planned to be commissioned into Pakistan Navy from 1998 onwards, qualitatively improving its offensive capability and significantly outclassing the numerically superior Indian Navy. Pakistan's submarine fleet is said to be the most prestigious part of its Navy.

Pakistan also acquired six type-21 frigates from the UK in 1993-94 for about £50 million, after its lease on nine US warships expired (Bedi 1996:136). Pakistan has also upgraded its fixed wing naval aircraft and received an injection of sophisticated naval hardware, among other military equipment, worth \$ 368 million from the U.S. after waiver of the arms embargo under the Pressler amendment. In June 1999, the government of Pakistan made an announcement regarding giving the Navy a nuclear role. This was in anticipation of the development of future Indian capabilities (Siddiqi-Agha 2001:191).

Why has the navy suddenly received attention, despite having been marginalized in the military-strategic planning for more than four decades? In other words, how do we account for a critical shift in the strategic calculations whereby it is considered necessary to enhance Navy's defense capabilities? Is it due to the perceived need to secure the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), which have acquired new meaning and significance in the context of corporate globalization? But security against whom or what kind of threats? It is important to raise this question because only five to ten percent of the country's trade is actually carried out by its own merchant navy, and "Pakistan Navy's strategic planning had before never gone beyond defense of the SLOCs-a limited role natural for a small navy"(Siddiqi-Agha 2001:160). May be the rejuvenated Pakistani navy is a reaction, grounded in suspicion, to the build-up of blue water navies by India. One of the recurrent themes in dominant geostrategic discourse in Pakistan relates to the alleged Indian designs to establish a regional hegemony in the Indian Ocean-from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca. It also appears that the memory of the Indian naval blockade of Karachi during 1971 war is still fresh in the minds of the Pakistani navy's top brass, which remains of the view that a fourth war with hostile India could be a long one, with India holding Pakistan under siege through the sea.

It has been argued that if India continues to develop a sea-based nuclear weapon capability, Pakistan may opt to respond in the same coin. (Siddiqi-Agha 2001:191). The Indian Navy has one aircraft carrier, 26 surface combat ships, and 40 patrol and coastal craft to counter Pakistan's eight surface combat ships, nine submarines, and 10 patrol and surface vessels. Upgrading naval capabilities and acquiring a nuclear arm are likely to appeal to Indian policy-makers. Major projects include the development of sea-launched cruise and ballistic missiles and the construction of indigenous nuclear-powered submarines. Pakistan sees such developments as highly threatening. Islamabad, which makes no claim to being a regional power, is said to be alarmed by New Delhi's technological acquisitions. Pakistani analysts believe that, with its growing naval power and blue-water capability, India would be able to throttle its smaller adversary, if war comes. Ninety-seven percent of Pakistan's trade is by sea. With the memory of the blockade of the single seaport at Karachi during the 1971 war, appears to be fresh in the minds of certain naval planners, who continue to push the government for funds to enhance the service's capabilities.

According to Siddiqi-Agha (Siddiqi-Agha 2001:192), in view of country's lack of resources and the orientation of military-strategic planning towards land war, Pakistan's naval leaders are considering adopting the poor man's option, adapting surface ships to launch Shaheen and Ghauri missiles, which were primarily developed for the army. It is important to note that Pakistani navy was 'assigned a nuclear role' in May 1999, an action taken to give the impression that Islamabad was thinking of developing a nuclear triad. After the nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistani policy-makers, it seems, felt pressured to appear capable of managing nuclear deterrence. Pakistan's lack of

strategic depth makes nuclear deterrence important vis-a-vis India, but the government has not yet initiated any work on developing a sea-launched missile capability or procuring a platform capable of handling nuclear weapons.

It is the Arabian Sea segment of Indian Ocean that is specifically highlighted in the naval-strategic discourses as Pakistan's 'heart' which is pumping life into its economy through its exports/imports. The scope of Indian Ocean related geographies of fear, which otherwise are predominantly India-centred, is also sometimes expanded to include the imagination of fast-depleting land-based resources and how this will compel Pakistan in future to turn to sea in order to secure its legitimate share and to protect its EEZ. General Musharraf proclaimed on May 5<sup>th</sup>, 2001 that "main objective of the letting the Chinese develop the Gwadar (port) was that when needed Chinese Navy would be in Gwadar to give the benefiting reply to anyone". In his view, ships operating from Gwadar could pose serious threats to trade, oil and gas supply during the crisis situation.

To move from the realm of discourse to practices, Islamabad seems to be vying for regional influence in the Indian Ocean through augmenting naval cooperation with Indian eastern neighbour, something not done since East Pakistan became Bangladesh. Ever since the military took power in Myanmar in 1988, General Musharraf's visit to India's easterly neighbour is the first by a leader of a nation other than China or an Asian country. A Pakistani frigate, submarines and fleet tanker have concluded a port call to Myanmar. Apparently, Pakistan's navy is on a modernizing mission. According to some commentators, a new Cold War is already going on in the Arabian Sea, and Pak-China nexus appears to have posed already a serious concern to New Delhi.

In the wake of 11<sup>th</sup> of September, the inauguration of a new security partnership with the U.S., has posed an unprecedented dilemma before the ruling elite of Pakistan, positioned as it is, between the deep and the devil, the manner in which the intellectuals and institutions of statecraft in Pakistan would respond the pressures emanating from fundamentalist groups on the one hand and the geopolitical imperatives of solidarity with the universe of Islam remains to be seen. Pakistan, as one of the founding members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), with 56 Muslim States as members and four Observers, established in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco, on 25<sup>th</sup> September 1969, has shown abiding interest in all its activities and programmes. Relations with the Islamic world have remained one of the corner stones of Pakistan's 'foreign' policy. As a founding member of the OIC, Pakistan is said to have 'an abiding commitment to the purposes, principles and objectives of its Charter. Pakistan's image of itself appears to be that it has always played, and will continue to play, an important role in strengthening cooperation among Muslim States by its active participation in the programmes and activities of the OIC'. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that a large number of OIC member countries (including Yemen, Iran, Maldives, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Malaysia, Maldives, Indonesia, Iran, Bangladesh) are located in the Indian Ocean region. In the wake of 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2001, according to a keen observer of geo-strategic environment of the IOR.

*The IOR is also becoming more strategically significant because it is home to the world's greatest concentration of Muslims. Some decades ago, this may not have been a consideration of importance. Today, however, for a variety of reasons, Islamic civilization often finds itself at odds with the West -including Israel—and Hindu India, and it will be in the IOR that this contest frequently will play out ... The Indian Ocean thus, may be seen -depending upon your view point—as on the front lines in (a) struggle against terrorism: or (b) the West's "crusade" to contain the world of Islam (Berlin 2002:30).*

Pakistan has approved the OIC Convention on Combating International Terrorism (concluded in June 2002), thereby committing itself to 'not to execute, initiate or participate in any form in organizing, financing, committing, instigating or supporting terrorist acts whether directly or indirectly'. Pakistan is also a party to as many as nine other conventions on terrorism. Having noted that, the proverbial billion-dollar question remains whether Pakistan could afford to see eye to eye with the United States on latter's interpretation of 'friends' and 'foes' in the IOR in the war against terrorism.

## 5. Conclusion: The Way Forward

At a conceptual-analytical level, the proposed research tries to unfold the insights offered by what has come to be known as a 'critical' perspectives or approaches Geopolitics. Even the very existence of the Pakistan as a territorial construct is challenged. There are some scholars, think that the state borders do not amount to anything much in the global economy or that states are undermined by the rise of supranational and subnational authorities, whereas others consider that the features of the state as an ideological construct is much more important than the territorial component. Correspondingly, some argue that geo-economics is said to be superseding more and more geostrategy as the twin sister of geopolitics. But the fact is that Pakistan foreign policy and IOR policy is still dominantly embedded in its geopolitical orientations and its territorial construct. Simultaneously, converging and diverging with its geo-economic and geostrategic orientations.

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# A Study on the Livelihood Status of Elderly People in Slum Area of Bangladesh: Evidence from Chattogram City

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## Abstract

The elderly people living in slum areas are exposed to a substandard living conditions. This paper examined the livelihood status of elderly people in slum areas of Chattogram city. The empirical data were collected from a sample of 52 people in purposive manner in five slum areas (*Arefin Nagar, Motihorna, Jhautola, Chandranagar and IW Colony, Sholosahar*) through survey and observation method. The study examined the various aspects of the livelihood status of the elderly people in slum areas of Chattogram city. The findings showed that majority of the respondents did not get old age allowance. The study found that the basic civic facilities like water, gas, garbage disposal and access to toilet vary from slum area to slum area. All the respondents had access to electricity, while two-third of the respondents had no access to the use of natural gas. The study revealed that a vast majority of the respondents preferred to go to pharmacy rather than government medical hospital as the source of treatment. It is significant to note that a vast majority of the respondents were not neglected in their family. Therefore, the study recommends that old age allowance, health care facilities, social security, basic civic services and infrastructural facilities should be increased to upgrade the substandard livelihood condition of the elderly slum dwellers in Chattogram city.

**Keywords:** Chattogram City, Elderly People, Livelihood, Slum Area

## 1. Introduction

The elderly people aged 60 years or over in Bangladesh are gradually increasing due to the continual progress in the life expectancy at birth (Islam, 2005). The total population of Bangladesh is 166.50 million (estimated 2019) with the life expectancy 72.6 years (BER, 2020). The proportion of the elderly people in total population of Bangladesh increased from 4.43 percent in 1951 to 6.13 percent in 2001 (Islam, 2005). The traditional responsibility to serve the elderly people in family has tremendously been changed in the recent years in urban industrial society. This results dissatisfaction, depression and loneliness for the elderly people in the family. As C.N. Sankar Rao (2006: 559) has remarked, "Proper opportunities and suitable conditions are not created for utilizing the experience and wisdom of our older people." Traditionally, the elderly people depends on the extended

family for their basic facilities and services. Nowadays, the ideological shift for rapid urbanization and industrialization has moved away joint family system to nuclear family system. Consequently, more and more elderly people are neglected or rejected in the family (Siddiqui, 2003).

Urbanization is linked with the economic growth and industrialization of a country. But, urbanization policy in most of the developing countries is partial, uncoordinated and undesirable (Afsar, 2000). There is a connection among urbanization, poverty and migration (Chandra, 2011). In Bangladesh, employment opportunities and rural poverty force the rural poor people to migrate to large metropolitan areas. Rapid and unplanned urbanization lead people to concentrate in a small, hazardous and unhealthy location. It also creates an enormous burden on its infrastructure amenities (Khondaker, Wadud & Barua, 2011). However, the investment in development expenditure in urban areas has not benefited the poor (Pramanik, 1982; Islam, 1996) and the migrants in urban areas were mostly unexperienced and backward in socio-economic position (Das, 2003). These people try to manage any kind of informal job for their living in the city and continue to live in slum settlement. The slum dwellers in urban areas bear the human cost and the consequences of air, water, land and noise pollution (Jahan and Maniruzzaman, 2007). Upgrading slum or informal settlement is required for the strong base of cities (Uddin, 2018).

In Bangladesh, Chattogram is the second largest city with a population of 2581643. The area of the Chattogram city is 155.40 sq.km with 41 wards and 238 mahallas (BBS 2014). It is the centre of trade, industry and commerce. The slum dwellers in Chattogram city came to Chattogram for the rural push factors and urban pull factors. Some slum dwellers are noticed as refugees of Indian and Burmese origin (Ashraf 1995). Rapid urbanization in Chattogram city makes heavy pressure on the basic urban facilities like transport, education, health, sanitation, gas, electricity, garbage disposal, water, sewerage, etc. Corruption, mismanagement and discrimination are prevalent on a massive scale in all the sectors (Islam, 2012). A significant proportion of the migrants in Chattogram city are forced to live in slum areas. The slums in any city is characterized by an area with low quality houses, high density, unhygienic environment, lack of civic amenities, poverty, deviant behavior, unemployment, poor health, fatalism, superstition, etc. The slum dwellers are involved in informal labour market in the city. (Das, 2003; Alamgir, Jabbar & Islam, 2009). The elderly people in slum areas face unusual difficulty in respect of food, cloth, residence, treatment and control of wealth. They are not getting separate living places. Their living condition is unhealthy. Moreover, they feel unhappy and detached within their family environment. They face unusual situations for the insufficient family care (Hossain, Akhtar & Uddin, 2006).

The study conducted on elderly slum dwellers in Chattogram city is distinctive as it provides a new horizon of knowledge for the policy makers to improve the livelihood status of the elderly slum dwellers in Bangladesh. Furthermore, it provides an insight into the future work for academics in this field. In this background, this paper is an attempt to explore the livelihood status of the elderly people in slum areas of Chattogram city.

## **2. Objectives**

The main objective of this study is to explore the livelihood status of elderly people in slum areas of Chattogram city. Other specific objectives are:

1. To know the socio-economic background of the elderly slum dwellers.
2. To find out various problems faced by the elderly people in the slum areas.
3. To bring out the capabilities to meet the basic needs of the elderly people in the slum areas.

## **3. Materials and Methods**

In Bangladesh, a total of 15.90% (two thousands two hundreds sixteen) slums are in Chattogram City Corporation and 127,585 households live in these slums (BBS 2015). For the study, only five slum areas named Arefin Nagar and Chandranagar (Bayzid thana), Jhautola and Motijhorna (Khulshi thana), and IW Colony, Sholoshahar (Panchlaish thana) in Chattogram city were purposively selected. The respondents (age of sixty and above) were selected in purposive manner and the sample size for this study was 52 (see Table 1).

Table 1: Composition of Sample Respondents

Slum Areas	Male	Female	Total
Arefin Nagar	10	6	16
IW Colony, Sholoshahar	9	4	13
Motijhorna	8	1	9
Jhautola	7	1	8
Chandranagar	4	2	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>52</b>

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Survey and observation method were used for primary data collection. For supporting the primary data, various research papers, research books, encyclopedia and various statistical reports were used in supporting primary data. An interview schedule was administered to collect data. Both structured and unstructured questions were used in this schedule. For the accuracy of data collection, the schedule was pre-tested on five respondents (one respondent in each slum area). A team of six interviewers was carefully chosen for the data collection. The collected data were modified manually and descriptive statistics were used to analyse data. Data collection was conducted during the period from January to February, 2022. The interviewers interviewed the elderly slum dwellers after obtaining their permission. The study is not free from limitations. Firstly, the data were collected only from five slum areas and sample size was small. Secondly, the data were collected in winter season. So, it was not possible to observe the difficult situations of the elderly slum dwellers in summer and rainy seasons.

#### 4. Results and Discussion

##### 4.1. Age, Sex, Religion, Educational level and Marital Status

The study found that the elderly people aged between 60-69 years constituted the leading segment (65.4%) and it was evident that they were in young old category. Majority of the respondents (73.1%) were male and Muslims were the dominant figures (88.5%) in slum areas. Data revealed that more than two-third of the elderly slum dwellers were married (80.8%) followed by widowed (17.3%). More than half (65.4%) of the elderly slum dwellers were illiterate and only 7.7% were in secondary category (see Table 2).

##### 4.2. Present Occupational Status, Monthly Income and Daily Working Hour

The study showed that a vast majority (94.2%) of the respondents were involved in different types of jobs in informal sectors. The dominant figures are beggar (23.1%) and small trader (17.3%), followed by hawker (15.4%) and rickshaw puller (11.5%). The monthly income of the more than two-third (71.1%) of the elderly slum dwellers were in the range of 9001-17000 and only 3.8% elderly slum dwellers were fully dependent on their family members. The daily working hour of one-third (36.5%) of the respondents were more than eight hours (see Table 2).

##### 4.3. Family Structure, Head of the Family, Size of the Family and Adoption of Family Planning Method

Among elderly living in slum areas, majority (84.6%) of them were in nuclear family. In *Jhautola*, all of the respondents were the head of the family, while in *Arefin Nagar*, only fifty percent respondents were the head of the family. It was found that a little more than two-third (69.2%) of the respondents were in a family with 4-6 members and all of the respondents did not adopt any family planning method in their life (see Table 2).

##### 4.4. Old Age Allowance and National Identity Card (NID)

Among elderly living in slum areas, more than two-third (88.5%) of the respondents did not get old age allowance. A vast majority (96.2%) of the respondents had national identity card (NID). This may be due to their consciousness about their rights as a resident/citizen of the country (see Table 2).

## 4.5. Area of Origin

The study showed that more than two-third (71.2%) of the respondents were from Chattogram division (Chattogram, Cumilla, Cox's Bazar, Rangamati, Chandpur, Brahmanbaria). In *Jhautola*, all the elderly people were from Chattogram district (see Table 3).

Table 2: Socio-economic profiles of elderly slum dwellers

Socio-economic profiles	Slum Areas					Total (n=52)(%)
	Arefin Nagar (n=16)(%)	IW Colony, Sholosahar (n=13)(%)	Motijhorna (n=9)(%)	Jhautola (n=8)(%)	Chandranagar (n=6)(%)	
<b>Age (Years)</b>						
60-69	7 (43.7)	13 (100.0)	5 (55.6)	6 (75.0)	3 (50.0)	34 (65.4)
70-79	9 (56.3)	-	4 (44.4)	1 (12.5)	2 (33.3)	16 (30.8)
80-89	-	-	-	1 (12.5)	1 (16.7)	2 (3.8)
<b>Sex</b>						
Male	10 (62.5)	9 (69.2)	8 (88.9)	7 (87.5)	4 (66.7)	38 (73.1)
Female	6 (37.5)	4 (30.8)	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	2 (33.3)	14 (26.9)
<b>Religious community</b>						
Muslim	15 (93.8)	10 (76.9)	8 (88.9)	7 (87.5)	6 (100.0)	46 (88.5)
Hindu	1 (6.2)	2 (15.4)	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	-	5 (9.6)
Buddhist	-	1 (7.7)	-	-	-	1 (1.9)
<b>Marital status</b>						
Married	12 (75.0)	10 (76.9)	8 (88.9)	7 (87.5)	5 (83.3)	42 (80.8)
Widow	4 (25.0)	2 (15.4)	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	-	8 (15.4)
Widower	-	1 (7.7)	-	-	-	1 (1.9)
Divorced	-	-	-	-	1 (16.7)	1 (1.9)
<b>Educational level</b>						
Illiterate	11 (68.8)	9 (69.2)	5 (55.6)	6 (75.0)	3 (50.0)	34 (65.4)
Primary	4 (25.0)	4 (30.8)	2 (22.2)	1 (12.5)	3 (50.0)	14 (26.9)
Secondary	1 (6.2)	-	2 (22.2)	1 (12.5)	-	4 (7.7)
<b>Present occupational status</b>						
Housewife	-	1 (7.7)	-	-	1 (16.7)	2 (3.8)
Domestic Worker	1 (6.2)	-	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	-	3 (5.8)
Small trader	4 (25.0)	3 (23.1)	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	-	9 (17.3)
Day Labor	1 (6.2)	1 (7.7)	1 (11.1)	-	1 (16.7)	4 (7.7)
Hawker	2 (12.5)	3 (23.1)	2 (22.2)	1 (12.5)	-	8 (15.4)
Rickshaw Puller	1 (6.2)	1 (7.7)	1 (11.1)	2 (25.0)	1 (16.7)	6 (11.5)
Washman	-	-	-	-	1 (16.7)	1 (1.9)
Beggar	3 (18.8)	3 (23.1)	2 (22.2)	2 (25.0)	1 (16.7)	12 (23.1)
Caretaker	1 (6.2)	-	-	-	-	1 (1.9)
Driver (CNG)	-	1 (7.7)	-	1 (12.5)	-	2 (3.8)
Cook	1 (6.2)	-	-	-	-	1 (1.9)
Unemployed	2 (12.5)	-	1 (11.1)	-	1 (16.7)	3 (5.8)
<b>Monthly income (in BDT)</b>						
Upto 1000	2 (12.5)	1 (7.7)	-	-	-	3 (5.8)
1001-5000	1 (6.2)	-	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	1 (16.7)	4 (7.7)

5001-9000	1 (6.2)	2 (15.4)	1 (11.1)	-	-	4 (7.7)
9001-13000	8 (50.0)	5 (38.5)	5 (55.6)	4 (50.0)	5 (83.3)	27 (51.9)
13001-17000	3 (18.8)	3 (23.1)	2 (22.2)	2 (25.0)	-	10 (19.2)
17001-21000	-	2 (15.4)	-	-	-	2 (3.8)
No income	1 (6.2)	-	-	1 (12.5)	-	2 (3.8)
<b>Daily working hour</b>						
1-4	1 (6.2)	-	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	1 (16.7)	4 (7.7)
5-8	7 (43.8)	7 (53.8)	6 (66.7)	2 (25.0)	2 (33.3)	24 (46.2)
9-12	6 (37.5)	4 (30.8)	2 (22.2)	4 (50.0)	3 (50.0)	19 (36.5)
Not Applicable	2 (12.5)	2 (15.4)	-	1 (12.5)	-	5 (9.6)
<b>Family structure</b>						
Nuclear	10 (62.5)	12 (92.3)	8 (88.9)	8 (100.0)	6 (100.0)	44 (84.6)
Joint	6 (37.5)	1 (7.7)	1 (11.1)	-	-	8 (15.4)
<b>Head of the family</b>						
Self	8 (50.0)	9 (69.2)	7 (77.8)	8 (100.0)	5 (83.3)	37 (71.2)
Son	3 (18.8)	2 (15.4)	1 (11.1)	-	1 (16.7)	7 (13.5)
Daughter	2 (12.5)	1 (7.7)	1 (11.1)	-	-	4 (7.7)
Husband	3 (18.8)	1 (7.7)	-	-	-	4 (7.7)
<b>Size of the family</b>						
1-3	3 (18.8)	4 (30.8)	2 (22.2)	2 (25.0)	2 (33.3)	13 (25.0)
4-6	11 (68.7)	9 (69.2)	6 (66.7)	6 (75.0)	4 (66.7)	36 (69.2)
7-9	2 (12.5)	-	1 (11.1)	-	-	3 (5.8)
<b>Adoption of the family planning method</b>						
Yes	-	-	-	-	-	-
No	16 (100.0)	13 (100.0)	9 (100.0)	8 (100.0)	6 (100.0)	52 (100.0)
<b>Old age allowance</b>						
Yes	2 (12.5)	1 (7.7)	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	1 (16.7)	6 (11.5)
No	14 (87.5)	12 (92.3)	8 (88.9)	7 (87.5)	5 (83.3)	46 (88.5)
<b>National Identity Card (NID)</b>						
Yes	16 (100.0)	13 (100.0)	9 (100.0)	6 (75.0)	6 (100.0)	50 (96.2)
No	-	-	-	2 (25.0)	-	2 (3.8)

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 3: Area of origin of the elderly slum dwellers

Area of origin (District)	Slum Areas					Total (n=52)(%)
	Arefin Nagar (n=16)(%)	IW Colony, Sholosahar (n=13)(%)	Motijhorna (n=9)(%)	Jhautola (n=8)(%)	Chandranagar (n=6)(%)	
Chattogram	5 (31.3)	7 (53.8)	2 (22.2)	8 (100.0)	1 (16.7)	23 (44.2)
Cumilla	3 (18.8)	-	2 (22.2)	-	1 (16.7)	6 (11.5)
Manikganj	-	-	1 (11.1)	-	-	1 (1.9)
Habiganj	-	1 (7.7)	-	-	-	1 (1.9)
Cox's Bazar	1 (6.2)	-	-	-	1 (16.7)	2 (3.8)
Gaibandha	1 (6.2)	2 (15.4)	-	-	-	3 (5.8)
Kishoregonj	-	1 (7.7)	-	-	-	1 (1.9)
Kushtia	1 (6.2)	-	-	-	-	1 (1.9)

Rajshahi	-	-	1 (11.1)	-	-	1 (1.9)
Kurigram	-	1 (7.7)	-	-	-	1 (1.9)
Rangamati	-	1 (7.7)	-	-	-	1 (1.9)
Mymensingh	-	-	1 (11.1)	-	1 (16.7)	2 (3.8)
Chandpur	1 (6.2)	-	1 (11.1)	-	2 (33.3)	4 (7.7)
Brahmanbaria	1 (6.2)	-	-	-	-	1 (1.9)
Bhola	2 (12.5)	-	-	-	-	2 (3.8)
Netrokona	1 (6.2)	-	1 (11.1)	-	-	2 (3.8)

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

#### 4.6. Housing Profile

Majority (55.8%) of the respondents were living in *kutcha* (Wall: Tin/Wood/Bamboo, Roof: Tin) house, followed by semi *pucca* (Wall: Brick, Roof: Tin) (38.5%) house. Only 5.8% of the respondents were living in *jhupri* houses and these houses were found in *Arefin Nagar*. More than two-third (75.0%) of the respondents use one room for their living. It was observed that the elderly slum dwellers (25.0%) who used two rooms, their family members were more than 5. It was also observed that the condition of housing of the respondents was unhealthy. Data revealed that majority of the respondents were living in a house by paying rent. In case of the rent of housing, BDT 2001-2500 was the leading segment, followed by BDT 2501-3000 (27.5%) and BDT 3001-3500 (17.5%) (see Table 4).

Table 4: Housing profile of the elderly slum dwellers

Housing Profile	Slum Areas					Total (n=52)(%)
	Arefin Nagar (n=16)(%)	IW Colony, Sholosahar (n=13)(%)	Motijhorna (n=9)(%)	Jhautola (n=8)(%)	Chandranagar (n=6)(%)	
<b>Housing structure</b>						
Semi <i>pucca</i> (Wall: Brick, Roof: Tin)	3 (18.7)	3 (23.1)	4 (44.4)	8 (100.0)	2 (33.3)	20 (38.5)
<i>Kutcha</i> (Wall: Tin/Wood/Bamboo, Roof: Tin)	10 (62.5)	10 (76.9)	5 (55.6)	-	4 (66.7)	29 (55.8)
<i>Jhupri</i> (Thatch houses)	3 (18.7)	-	-	-	-	3 (5.8)
<b>Number of rooms per family</b>						
One	10 (62.5)	12 (92.3)	8 (88.9)	5 (62.5)	4 (66.7)	39 (75.0)
Two	6 (37.5)	1 (7.7)	1 (11.1)	3 (37.5)	2 (33.3)	13 (25.0)
<b>Access to housing</b>						
Free of cost	2 (12.5)	1 (7.7)	1 (11.1)	8 (100.0)	-	12 (23.1)
Paid	14 (87.5)	12 (92.3)	8 (88.9)	-	6 (100.0)	40 (76.9)
<b>Rent of housing (BDT)</b>						
1001-1500	3 (21.4)	-	-	-	-	3 (7.5)
1501-2000	3 (21.4)	-	-	-	2 (33.3)	5 (9.6)
2001-2500	5 (35.7)	4 (33.3)	1 (12.5)	-	3 (50.0)	13 (32.5)
2501-3000	2 (14.3)	5 (41.7)	3 (37.5)	-	1 (16.7)	11 (27.5)
3001-3500	1 (7.1)	3 (25.0)	3 (37.5)	-	-	7 (17.5)
3501-4000	-	-	1 (12.5)	-	-	1 (2.5)

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

#### 4.7. Access to Basic Civic Facilities

The study found that a vast majority (88.5%) of the respondents had access to deep tubewell as their source of water. In *Motijhorna*, two-third (66.7%) of the respondents had access to use the water of WASA. In *Motijhorna*, a maximum (44.4%) of the respondents had access to use public standpipe. Data revealed that all the respondents had access to electricity, while two-third (71.2%) of the respondents had no access to the use of natural gas. Among elderly slum dwellers, majority (73.1%) of the respondents mentioned about common toilet and it was observed that about four to six family use common toilet in slum areas. In *Jhautola*, all of the respondents had access to owned toilet. It is significant to mention that only 1.9% of the respondents use open space/hanging toilet. In case of access to garbage disposal, drain (75.0%) was the leading segment, followed by dustbin (38.5%). In *Jhautola*, all of the respondents had access to use dustbin (see Table 5).

Table 5: Access to basic civic facilities of the elderly slum dwellers

Basic Civic Facilities	Slum Areas					Total (n=52)(%)
	Arefin Nagar (n=16)(%)	IW Colony, Sholosahar (n=13)(%)	Motijhorna (n=9)(%)	Jhautola (n=8)(%)	Chandranagar (n=6)(%)	
<b>Access to water*</b>						
Deep tubewell	16 (100.0)	13 (100.0)	5 (55.6)	6 (75.0)	6 (100.0)	46 (88.5)
Water supply (WASA)	-	-	6 (66.7)	3 (37.5)	-	9 (17.3)
Public standpipe	-	-	4 (44.4)	-	-	4 (7.7)
*Note: Multiple responses						
<b>Access to electricity</b>						
Yes	16 (100.0)	13 (100.0)	9 (100.0)	8 (100.0)	6 (100.0)	52 (100.0)
No	-	-	-	-	-	0
<b>Access to gas</b>						
Yes	-	5 (38.5)	6 (66.7)	-	4 (66.7)	15 (28.8)
No	16 (100.0)	8 (61.5)	3 (33.3)	8 (100.0)	2 (33.3)	37 (71.2)
<b>Access to toilet</b>						
Owned toilet	2 (12.5)	2 (15.4)	1 (11.1)	8 (100.0)	-	13 (25.0)
Common toilet	13 (81.3)	11 (84.6)	8 (88.9)	-	6 (100.0)	38 (73.1)
Open space /Hanging	1 (6.2)	-	-	-	-	1 (1.9)
<b>Access to garbage disposal*</b>						
Drain	16 (100.0)	12 (92.3)	9 (100.0)	-	2 (33.3)	39 (75.0)
Street	-	3 (23.1)	3 (33.3)	-	1 (16.7)	7 (13.5)
Dustbin	-	-	7 (77.8)	8 (100.0)	5 (83.3)	20 (38.5)
*Note: Multiple responses						

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

#### 4.8. Health Profile

The study showed that all the respondents were suffering from physical problems. Majority (51.9%) of the respondents were suffering from high blood pressure, followed by arthritis (42.3%) and weakness (42.3%). Moreover, a vast majority (90.4%) of the respondents were suffering from mental problems. In case of the nature of mental problems, depression was the leading segment, followed by anxiety (40.4%) and insomnia (34.0%). As the source of treatment, pharmacy (94.2%) was the dominant figure, followed by NGO clinic (78.1%), quack

(73.1%) and government medical hospital (65.4%). In case of the yearly expenditure for treatment, BDT 6001-11000 (46.2%) was the leading segment, followed by BDT 1001-6000 (34.6%) and BDT 11001-16000 (15.4%). As the caregiver in illness, wife (65.4%) was the dominant figure, followed by sons and/or daughters (61.5%). Majority (65.4%) of the respondents mentioned about their harmful habits. In case of the nature of harmful habits, smoking (88.2%) was the leading segment. It is noteworthy to mention that all the respondents in *Jhautola* were addicted to *ghul*. Data revealed that the yearly expenditure for harmful habits of a maximum (44.1%) of respondents was BDT 6001-11000, followed by BDT 11001-16000 (41.2%). A vast majority (92.3%) of the respondents took Covid-19 vaccination (see Table 6).

Table 6: Health profile of the elderly slum dwellers

Health Profile	Slum Areas					Total (n=52)(%)
	Arefin Nagar (n=16)(%)	IW Colony, Sholosahar (n=13)(%)	Motijhorna (n=9)(%)	Jhautola (n=8)(%)	Chandranagar (n=6)(%)	
<b>Suffering from physical problems</b>						
Yes	16 (100.0)	13 (100.0)	9 (100.0)	8 (100.0)	6 (100.0)	52 (100.0)
No	-	-	-	-	-	0
<b>Nature of physical problems*</b>						
High blood pressure	8 (50.0)	7 (53.8)	4 (44.4)	5 (62.5)	3 (50.0)	27 (51.9)
Diabetes	4 (25.0)	1 (7.7)	3 (33.3)	3 (37.5)	2 (33.3)	13 (25.0)
High Cholesterol	3 (18.8)	4 (30.8)	1 (11.1)	-	1 (16.7)	9 (17.3)
Headache	-	3 (23.1)	2 (22.2)	1 (12.5)	-	6 (11.5)
Diarrhoea	1 (6.2)	3 (23.1)	1 (11.1)	-	-	5 (9.6)
Gastric	1 (6.2)	2 (15.4)	-	1 (12.5)	1 (16.7)	14 (26.9)
Scabies	3 (18.8)	4 (30.8)	2 (22.2)	2 (25.0)	1 (16.7)	12 (23.1)
Arthritis	7 (43.8)	8 (61.5)	3 (33.3)	2 (25.0)	2 (33.3)	22 (42.3)
Asthma	2 (12.5)	2 (15.4)	-	1 (12.5)	-	5 (9.6)
Coronary heart disease	-	1 (7.7)	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	-	3 (5.8)
Chronic kidney disease	1 (6.2)	1 (7.7)	-	1 (12.5)	-	3 (5.8)
Visual impairment	2 (12.5)	4 (30.8)	1 (11.1)	2 (25.0)	-	9 (17.3)
Hearing impairment	1 (6.2)	2 (15.4)	-	-	-	3 (5.8)
Cough	1 (6.2)	2 (15.4)	1 (11.1)	-	1 (16.7)	5 (9.6)
Weakness	8 (50.0)	6 (46.2)	2 (22.2)	3 (37.5)	3 (50.0)	22 (42.3)
Loss of appetite	1 (6.2)	2 (15.4)	2 (22.2)	-	1 (16.7)	6 (11.5)
*Note: Multiple responses						
<b>Suffering from mental problems</b>						
Yes	15 (93.8)	11 (84.6)	8 (88.9)	8 (100.0)	5 (83.3)	47 (90.4)
No	1 (6.2)	2 (15.4)	1 (11.1)	-	1 (16.7)	5 (9.6)
<b>Nature of mental problems*</b>						
Depression	11 (73.3)	9 (81.8)	5 (62.5)	4 (50.0)	4 (80.0)	33 (70.2)
Dementia	3 (20.0)	3 (27.3)	1 (12.5)	-	-	7 (14.9)
Anxiety	5 (33.3)	5 (45.5)	3 (37.5)	4 (50.0)	2 (40.0)	19 (40.4)
Mood disorder	1 (6.7)	2 (18.2)	1 (12.5)	1 (12.5)	-	5 (9.6)
Insomnia	3 (20.0)	5 (45.5)	5 (62.5)	2 (25.0)	1 (20.0)	16 (34.0)

\*Note: Multiple responses

**Sources of treatment\***

Government medical hospital	11 (68.8)	10 (76.9)	5 (55.6)	5 (62.5)	3 (50.0)	34 (65.4)
Pharmacy	14 (87.5)	13 (100.0)	9 (100.0)	8 (100.0)	5 (83.3)	49 (94.2)
Quack	12 (75.0)	10 (76.9)	7 (77.8)	7 (87.5)	2 (33.3)	38 (73.1)
Homeopath	5 (31.2)	3 (23.1)	4 (44.4)	1 (12.5)	1 (16.7)	14 (26.9)
NGO clinic	12 (75.0)	9 (69.2)	5 (55.6)	4 (50.0)	5 (83.3)	25 (78.1)

\*Note: Multiple responses

**Yearly expenditure for treatment (in BDT)**

1000-6000	6 (37.5)	2 (15.4)	4 (44.4)	4 (50.0)	2 (33.3)	18 (34.6)
6001-11000	8 (50.0)	6 (46.2)	4 (44.4)	3 (37.5)	3 (50.0)	24 (46.2)
11001-16000	1 (6.2)	4 (30.8)	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	1 (16.7)	8 (15.4)
16001-21000	1 (6.2)	1 (7.7)	-	-	-	2 (3.8)

**Caregiver in illness\***

Wife	10 (62.5)	8 (61.5)	6 (66.7)	6 (75.0)	4 (66.7)	34 (65.4)
Husband	2 (12.5)	2 (15.4)	-	-	2 (33.3)	6 (11.5)
Sons and/or daughters	11 (68.8)	8 (61.5)	6 (66.7)	3 (37.5)	4 (66.7)	32 (61.5)
Sister	1 (6.2)	2 (15.4)	-	1 (12.5)	1 (16.7)	5 (9.6)
Daughter-in-law	2 (12.5)	5 (38.5)	2 (22.2)	1 (12.5)	2 (33.3)	12 (23.1)
Neighbour	1 (6.2)	2 (15.4)	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	-	5 (9.6)
Relatives	4 (25.0)	4 (30.8)	3 (33.3)	2 (25.0)	3 (50.0)	16 (30.8)

\*Note: Multiple responses

**Harmful habits**

Yes	7 (43.7)	9 (69.2)	7 (77.8)	8 (100.0)	3 (50.0)	34 (65.4)
No	9 (56.3)	4 (30.8)	2 (22.2)	-	3 (50.0)	18 (34.6)

**Nature of harmful habits\***

Smoking	7 (43.7)	9 (100.0)	7 (100.0)	4 (50.0)	3 (100.0)	30 (88.2)
Drug addiction	-	-	1 (11.1)	-	-	1 (2.9)
Gul	-	-	-	8 (100.0)	-	8 (23.5)

\*Note: Multiple responses

**Yearly expenditure for harmful habits**

1001-6000	1 (14.3)	-	-	4 (50.0)	-	5 (14.7)
6001-11000	5 (71.4)	4 (44.4)	2 (28.6)	2 (25.0)	2 (66.7)	15 (44.1)
11001-16000	1 (14.3)	5 (55.6)	5 (71.4)	2 (25.0)	1 (33.3)	14 (41.2)

**COVID-19 vaccination**

Yes	15 (93.8)	13 (100.0)	8 (88.9)	6 (75.0)	6 (100.0)	48 (92.3)
No	1 (6.2)	-	1 (11.1)	2 (25.0)	-	4 (7.7)

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

#### 4.9. Responsibilities to the Elderly Slum Dwellers in Family and Society

The study showed that a vast majority (90.4%) of the respondents mentioned the importance of their opinion in decision making of the family and majority (92.3%) of them were not neglected in their family. Data revealed that two-third (67.3%) of the respondents were involved with various social activities. In case of the responsibilities of family for the elderly people, assistance in basic needs (86.5%) and companionship (80.8%) were the dominant figures, followed by mental support (44.2%) and help in housekeeping (40.4%). Furthermore, in case of the responsibilities of society for the elderly people, majority (61.5%) of the respondents mentioned about the arrangement for the basic civic services, followed by arrangement of old age allowance (53.8%) and respect for the elderly people (53.8%) (see Table 7).

#### 4.10. Security Profile

The study showed that a vast majority of the respondents (86.5%) mentioned social insecurity in slum areas. In case of the social insecurity in slum areas, fear of theft (91.1%) was the leading segment followed by fear of eve teasing (68.9%) and harassment (64.4%). It is significant to note that 46.7% of the respondents mentioned the slum area as the safe place of drug dealing (see Table 8).

#### 4.11. Activities in Leisure Time

Among elderly residing in slum areas, watching TV (88.5%) was the dominant activity in leisure time. Other significant activities were gossiping with family members and neighbors (82.7%), Prayer (63.5%) and sleeping (34.6%) (see Table 9).

Table 7: Responsibilities to the elderly slum dwellers in family and society

Responsibilities	Slum Areas					Total (n=52)(%)
	Arefin Nagar (n=16)(%)	IW Colony, Sholosahar (n=13)(%)	Motijhorna (n=9)(%)	Jhautola (n=8)(%)	Chandranagar (n=6)(%)	
<b>Opinion in decision making of the family</b>						
Yes	14 (87.5)	11 (84.6)	8 (88.9)	8 (100.0)	6 (100.0)	47 (90.4)
No	2 (12.5)	2 (15.4)	1 (11.1)	-	-	5 (9.6)
<b>Negligence in family</b>						
Yes	-	1 (7.7)	1 (11.1)	2 (25.0)	-	4 (7.7)
No	16 (100.0)	12 (92.3)	8 (88.9)	6 (75.0)	6 (100.0)	48 (92.3)
<b>Involvement with various social activities</b>						
Yes	2 (12.5)	6 (46.2)	4 (44.4)	4 (50.0)	1 (16.7)	17 (32.7)
No	14 (87.5)	7	5 (55.6)	4 (50.0)	5 (83.3)	35 (67.3)
<b>Responsibilities of family for the elderly people*</b>						
Mental support	4 (25.0)	6 (46.2)	4 (44.4)	4 (50.0)	2 (33.3)	23 (44.2)
Assistance in basic needs	14 (87.5)	12 (92.3)	6 (66.7)	7 (87.5)	6 (100.0)	45 (86.5)
Help in housekeeping	6 (37.5)	6 (46.2)	4 (44.4)	1 (12.5)	4 (66.7)	21 (40.4)

Regular monitoring in medications	3 (18.8)	3 (23.1)	4 (44.4)	2 (25.0)	2 (33.3)	14 (26.9)
Companionship	13 (81.2)	11 (84.6)	6 (66.7)	7 (87.5)	5 (83.3)	42 (80.8)
<i>*Note: Multiple responses</i>						
<b>Responsibilities of society for the elderly people*</b>						
Good neighborhood	2 (12.5)	6 (46.2)	6 (66.7)	4 (50.0)	1 (16.7)	19 (40.4)
Arrangement of Old age allowance	10 (62.5)	10 (76.9)	4 (44.4)	2 (25.0)	2 (33.3)	28 (53.8)
Medical facilities	8 (50.0)	6 (46.2)	3 (33.3)	4 (50.0)	3 (50.0)	24 (46.2)
Awareness building regarding elderly people	1 (6.2)	4 (30.8)	3 (33.3)	2 (25.0)	1 (16.7)	11 (21.2)
Arrangement for the basic civic services	7 (43.7)	10 (76.9)	7 (77.8)	6 (75.0)	2 (33.3)	32 (61.5)
Respect for the elderly people	5 (31.2)	8 (61.5)	7 (77.8)	5 (62.5)	3 (50.0)	28 (53.8)
<i>*Note: Multiple responses</i>						

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 8: Security profile of the elderly slum dwellers

Security profile	Slum Areas					Total (n=52)(%)
	Arefin Nagar (n=16)(%)	IW Colony, Sholosahar (n=13)(%)	Motijhorna (n=9)(%)	Jhautola (n=8)(%)	Chandranagar (n=6)(%)	
<b>Social insecurity in slum</b>						
Yes	15 (93.8)	13 (100.0)	9 (100.0)	4 (50.0)	4 (66.7)	45 (86.5)
No	1 (6.2)	-	-	4 (50.0)	2 (33.3)	7 (13.5)
<b>Nature of social insecurity*</b>						
Fear of theft	15 (100.0)	11 (84.6)	7 (77.8)	4 (100.0)	4 (100.0)	41 (91.1)
Harassment	12 (80.0)	4 (30.8)	9 (100.0)	2 (50.0)	2 (50.0)	29 (64.4)
Fear of fire	5 (33.3)	11 (84.6)	6 (66.7)	3 (75.0)	2 (50.0)	27 (60.0)
Safe place of drug dealing	8 (53.3)	4 (30.8)	6 (66.7)	3 (75.0)	-	21 (46.7)
Fear of eve teasing	9 (56.2)	5 (38.5)		4 (100.0)	4 (100.0)	31 (68.9)
Forced eviction	12 (80.0)	4 (30.8)	3 (33.3)	-	4 (100.0)	23 (51.1)
<i>*Note: Multiple responses</i>						

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 9: Activities in leisure time of the elderly slum dwellers

Activities	Slum Areas					Total (n=52)(%)
	Arefin Nagar (n=16)(%)	IW Colony, Sholosahar (n=13)(%)	Motijhorna (n=9)(%)	Jhautola (n=8)(%)	Chandranagar (n=6)(%)	
<b>Nature of activities in leisure time*</b>						
Watching TV	15 (93.8)	11 (84.6)	9 (100.0)	6 (75.0)	5 (83.3)	46 (88.5)
Prayer	11 (68.8)	9 (69.2)	5 (55.6)	5 (62.5)	3 (50.0)	33 (63.5)
Gossiping with family members and neighbors	14 (87.5)	10 (76.9)	7 (77.8)	6 (75.0)	6 (100.0)	43 (82.7)
Sleeping	4 (25.0)	4 (30.8)	5 (55.6)	2 (25.0)	3 (50.0)	18 (34.6)
Walking	3 (18.8)	4 (30.8)	2 (22.2)	-	2 (33.3)	11 (21.2)

\*Note: Multiple responses

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

## 5. Conclusion

The study tried to explore the various aspects of livelihood status of the elderly slum dwellers in Chattogram city. The elderly people living in slum areas faced various forms of deprivation in their daily life. A vast majority of the respondents were involved in various forms of job in urban informal sector to survive their life. Majority of the respondents were deprived to get old age allowance. The housing condition of the elderly slum dwellers were substandard. The basic civic facilities like water, gas, garbage disposal and access to toilet vary from slum area to slum area. In *Motijhorna*, two-third of the respondents had access to use the water of WASA, while in *Arefin Nagar*, *Jhautola*, *Chandranagar* and *IW Colony*, *Sholosahar*, all the respondents had access to use the water of deep tubewell. All the respondents had access to electricity, while two-third of the respondents had no access to the use of natural gas. In *Arefin Nagar* and *Motijhorna*, drain was the leading segment in case of the access to garbage disposal, while in *Jhautola*, all of the respondents had access to use dustbin. In *Chandranagar*, *Arefin Nagar*, *Motihorna* and *IW Colony*, *Sholosahar*, common toilet was the leading segment in case of the access to toilet, whereas in *Jhautola*, all of the respondents had access to owned toilet. All the elderly slum dwellers were suffering from physical problems. Furthermore, a vast majority of the respondents were suffering from mental problems. Depression was the leading segment in case of the nature of mental problems. As the source of treatment, a vast majority of the respondents preferred to go to pharmacy rather than government medical hospital. Majority of the respondents had harmful habits and smoking was the leading segment. A vast majority of the respondents were not neglected in their family and majority of them mentioned the importance of opinion in decision making of the family. Assistance in basic needs and companionship were the dominant figures in case of responsibilities of family for the elderly people in slum areas. In *Arefin Nagar*, *Jhautola* and *Chandranagar*, all the respondents mentioned the fear of theft as the nature of insecurity in slum areas. Watching TV and gossiping with family members and neighbors were the dominant activity in leisure time for the elderly people living in slum areas. The study recommends that health care facilities, old age allowance, social security, basic civic services and infrastructural facilities should be increased to improve the living condition of the elderly slum dwellers. Furthermore, policy makers should take all-inclusive approach involving all the stakeholders to upgrade the substandard livelihood condition of the elderly slum dwellers in Chattogram city.

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# The Role of Informal and Formal Mechanisms in Transitional Justice Related to the 1965-1966 Incident in Indonesia: The Case of Palu

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## Abstract

This article discusses the role of the informal mechanism introduced by the solidarity for victims of human rights violations of Central Sulawesi and the formal mechanism of the Palu Regional Government, which succeeded in realising restorative justice related to the 1965-1966 incident in Palu through truth-seeking, grassroots reconciliation, apology, and victims' reparations. How did this local initiative succeed amid the stagnation of the national initiative? This research applied a qualitative method. This study found the critical elements of the local initiatives' success in Palu: First, the use of the informal and formal transitional justice mechanisms. Although informal mechanisms could play a significant role in actualising restorative justice in Palu, the role of formal mechanisms remained irreplaceable because particular aspects could not be done through informal mechanisms, such as victim reparations. Collaborating between the two mechanisms made the local initiatives more effective and broader impact. Another essential element behind the realisation of restorative justice in Palu is the role of political actors, namely Rusdy Mastura, Palu' mayor (2010-2015) and Nurlaela Lamasitudju (General Secretary of SKP-HAM). The strong political will of the Palu Mayor was depicted through an apology and reparations program for the 1965-1966 victims, and the lobbies that have been carried out by the general secretary of SKP-HAM have an essential role in realising restorative justice related to the 1965-1966 incident in Palu.

**Keywords:** Transitional Justice, Restorative Justice, Informal Mechanism of SKP-HAM, Formal Mechanism of Palu Regional Government, The 1965-1966 Victims

## 1. Introduction

For 32 years, President Soeharto ruled Indonesia by taking power after a wave of violence against civilians, allegedly in retaliation for the 1965 coup attempt (starting now G30S/1965) by the Indonesian Communist Party (starting now PKI). After G30S/1965, hundreds of thousands of people accused of being PKI were killed, while others were imprisoned without trial (Cribb, 2002). Several scholars agree that this massacre was one of the enormous mass killings of the twentieth century. Western governments welcomed the violence and continued to support Soeharto until he fell from the presidency in 1998 (Webster, 2017). There is no exact record of how many victims died from 1965-to 1966. In 1966, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) reported that about one million people had died in the incident. While Oei Tjoe Tat, a former member

of the Fact-Finding Commission, puts it at 500,000 to 600,000 people (Cribb, 2002). The most recent estimate by scholars is about 500,000 people (Robinson, 2018). This massacre, which claimed an estimated 500,000 - 1,000,000 lives, is one of the most forgotten human tragedies of the twentieth century.

After the Suharto regime fell in 1998, Indonesia transitioned to democracy. Various demands emerged to resolve massive human rights violations, particularly in the 1965-1966 incident. There were calls for a thorough investigation into the violence of the New Order regime, the rewriting of the history of the events of 1965, the prosecution of those who had committed serious crimes, state apologies, compensation to victims, and reconciliation (Robinson, 2018). According to Budiawan (2004), a good democratisation process requires the importance of resolving past serious human rights violations. This is to ensure that the past is no longer a burden because it no longer haunts the present. Nagy (2002) added that it is essential to build solidarity, form a collective identity, and make a shared commitment to overcome and prevent the recurrence of past violence. The state must also be committed to bringing justice to those accused of these offences. Transitional justice is one way to solve the dilemma between resolving past grave human rights violations and avoiding provocations from the remnants of past regime forces (Farid & Simarmata, 2004). For countries that are in a difficult transition period because there are still remnants of the old regime's power, such as Indonesia, transitional justice is the proper way out so that the settlement of past gross human rights violations does not lead to new violence. Transitional justice is not a particular form of justice but rather a justice concept adapted to the context of a society that is transforming itself after going through periods of severe human rights violations. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparation programs, and institutional reform (ICTJ, 2009; Teitel, 2000).

Responding to public demands, the Indonesian reform government has adopted various transitional justice mechanisms to resolve the past regime's gross human rights violations, including the case of the 1965-1966 incident, which claimed the lives of 500,000 to 1,000,000 people. Various mechanisms have been adopted, including retributive justice by enacting Law No. 26/2000, considering the human rights court; restorative justice mechanisms by the promulgation of the TRC Law on October 6, 2004; and truth-seeking, the Indonesian national human rights commission (starting now Komnas HAM) has conducted an investigation related to the events of 1965-1966, from June 1, 2008, to April 30, 2012. The results showed sufficient preliminary evidence to suspect that crimes against humanity had occurred, violating gross human rights. Based on this conclusion, Komnas HAM recommended that the Attorney General follow up the research results with an investigation (Komnas HAM, 2012). However, although Indonesia has undergone five leadership successions, starting from President Habibie to the second term of Joko Widodo's administration, there is no certainty regarding the resolution of gross human rights violations in the 1965-1966 tragedy. Amid this uncertainty, a local initiative for transitional justice emerged from civil society and several regional governments.

Several studies about transitional justice in Indonesia have been carried out previously. Budiawan (2004) looked at the cultural reconciliation between Banser NU and ex-PKI initiated by Syarikat Indonesia (santri community for people's advocacy). This study revealed that a challenge faced by the reconciliation process in the context of the 1965 incident is the persistence of anti-communist discourse in society. The enduring anti-communist discourse results from the indoctrination process carried out by the New Order regime. The strategy used to perpetuate this discourse is propaganda that communists are atheists, enemies of religion, and contrary to the ideology of Pancasila.

Wahyuningroem has also conducted several studies on transitional justice, including "Seducing for Truth and Justice: Civil Society Initiatives for the 1965 Mass Violence in Indonesia". This study examines civil society initiatives that attempted to deal with mass violence in 1965-1966 and how the central government has sporadically responded to several initiatives from civil society groups and initiated policy reforms to support these initiatives. However, this response was not sustainable, and any suggested program consistently failed to be implemented (Wahyuningroem, 2013); "From State to Society: Democratisation and the Failure of Transitional Justice in Indonesia." This study explains the failure to implement transitional justice measures in post-authoritarian Indonesia, starting from the beginning of the political transition in 1998 to 2009. State-sponsored transitional justice has only succeeded in procedural terms but failed miserably substantially. The failure was due to the nature

of the political transition in Indonesia in 1998, which was a combination of replacement and trans placement models. Indonesia's transitional justice process was politically superficial and adopted only to respond to domestic and international pressures for accountability of the new regime (Wahyuningroem, 2018); "Towards Post-Transitional Justice: The Failures of Transitional Justice and the Roles of Civil Society in Indonesia." This study discusses "towards post-transitional justice" which describes the failure of state initiatives and the emergence of various civil society initiatives (Wahyuningroem, 2019). The following studies were about "Victim's Reparation of The 1965-1966 Gross Human Rights Violations in Palu City from the Perspective of International Law (Sujatmoko, 2020); The Politics of Transitional Justice in Post-Suharto Indonesia. The study explains that Indonesia is a success story in adopting the transitional justice paradigm, but not in its implementation (Suh, 2012); Accounting for Atrocities in Indonesia, the quality of accountability is low and has little impact on the rule of law and democracy (Linton, 2006).

This study discusses the role of the informal mechanism of Central Sulawesi solidarity for victims of human rights violations (starting now SKP-HAM) and the formal mechanism of the Palu regional government, which succeeded in resolving the 1965-1966 incident through a restorative justice mechanism. As a contextual background for the study, the study previously discusses the stagnation of the central government initiative for transitional justice in Indonesia.

## 2. Method

The type of research used is the qualitative method. According to Creswell (2019), there are five types of qualitative research: narrative, phenomenological, grounded theory, ethnographic, and case studies. The research applies a qualitative case study design. Research data is divided into two types of data, namely primary data and secondary data. Primary data is the data resulting from interviews with key informants. While secondary data consists of the results of previous studies and various documents related to research studies such as the decentralisation law, regional autonomy law, the National Human Rights Action Plan (RANHAM), Mayoral Regulations Palu Number 25 of 2013 which contains 17 articles, entitled "Regional Action Plan for Human Rights (RANHAMDADA), other documents related to the Palu City Government's programs and policies related to reparations for victims of 1965-1966 in Palu city. Researchers will also collect documents from SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi related to the grassroots cultural reconciliation program and activities for handling victims of the 1965-1966 events in the city of Palu, photos of activities, and clippings from national and local print and online media, as well as visual recordings, and documentaries. Qualitative research data collection procedures involve four types of strategies (Creswell, 2019), namely qualitative observation, qualitative interviews, qualitative documentation, qualitative audio and visual materials, and Focus Group Discussion (FGD).

## 3. The Stagnation of the Central Government National Initiative for Transitional Justice in Indonesia

In responding to public demands to resolve the past regime's gross human rights violations, the Indonesian Reformation Government has established several policies related to transitional justice. During his leadership, President B. J. Habibie passed Law Number 39 of 1999 concerning Human Rights and Law Number 26 of 2000 concerning Human Rights Courts. With the enactment of these laws, Indonesia has a basis for prosecuting severe human rights violations perpetrators.

The categories of gross human rights violations in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) include genocide, crimes against humanity, and aggression (UN, 1998: 3-8). Furthermore, the Final Report of The International People's Tribunal that was held in Den Haag, Netherlands, mentions nine types of crimes against humanity that occurred in the 1965-1966 incident: (1) murder, (2) slavery, (3) imprisonment, (4) anguish, (5) sexual violence, (6) torture, (7) forced disappearance, (8) hate propaganda, and (9) other state complications. The 1965 IPT Panel of Judges decided that the 1965-1966 violent incident was genocide and recommended that the Indonesian government apologise to the victims (Yayasan International People's Tribunal, 2016). However, until the end of the transitional government of President B. J. Habibie, there has been no judicial or non-judicial settlement regarding gross human rights violations cases in the 1965-1966 incident.

Furthermore, during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), there was a political will from Gus Dur to resolve the past regime's serious human rights violations and build national reconciliation, including with the ex-PKI. As a first step towards actualising this idea, President Gus Dur decided on several policies: (1) granting permission for political exiles to return to Indonesia and regain their citizenship; (2) the disbandment of Bakorstanas (Coordination Board for the Consolidation of National Stability), and the termination of Litsus, a screening method, where the requirement to become a civil servant or public official is never to have been involved with the PKI; (3) President Gus Dur also apologised to the families of the victims of the 1965-1966 massacres and those imprisoned without trial; and (4) a proposal was made for the revocation of MPRS Decree Number 25 of 1966 (Budiawan, 2004).

Gus Dur's policies were based on the significance of upholding human rights. This is because many policies inherited from the New Order were discriminatory and disregarded the civil and political rights of ex-tapol and their families. For example, the label ET (ex-tapol/ex-political prisoner) was included on ID cards, and the prohibition for family members of political prisoners to become civil servants and have careers in the military and police. Therefore, legal products and state institutions that were the basis for widespread acts of discrimination had to be abolished. All civil and political rights of every citizen should have been returned as they should be. However, all of his ideas failed to be realised because he was removed from his position as President through the Special Session of the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly), which was held on July 23, 2001.

Megawati Soekarnoputri replaced President Gus Dur in October 2001 after most of the parties abandoned Gus Dur and ousted him from the presidency. Megawati played a significant role in national initiatives for transitional justice. One of the essential policies during her presidency was the promulgation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (starting now TRC) Law on October 6, 2004. The establishment of the TRC Law was the mandate of TAP MPR (the Decree of the Peoples Deliberative Council) Number V/MPR/2000, Chapter V Paragraph (3) and Law No. 26 of 2000, Article 47 paragraphs (1-2) mandates the establishment of TRC, as an alternative to resolving cases of human rights violations out of court. Ironically, however, Megawati's policy actions coincided with an increase in political conservatism and the reconsolidation of the military's political role. This was a period of a shift in civil-military relations favouring the armed forces. Because she distrusted the civilian alliance that had ousted President Gus Dur, Megawati granted concessions to TNI in anticipation of potential challenges. Most of her policies ultimately left open the possibility for the military elite to exercise their power and influence (Wahyuningroem, 2018).

Furthermore, in his two presidential terms (2004-2009 and 2009-2014), President Susilo B. Yudhoyono established a framework to promote the National Human Rights Action Plan (starting now RANHAM). However, RANHAM had existed before his leadership period. There are several Presidential Decrees (Keppres) related to RANHAM: (1) Presidential Decree No. 129 of 1998; (2) Presidential Decree No. 40 of 2004; and (3) Presidential Decree Number 23 of 2011 (KontraS, 2014: 8). Although in his two terms of leadership, President Susilo B. Yudhoyono had established two RANHAM, in its implementation, it seems that there has been neglect in handling victims of gross human rights violations, including the victims of the 1965 incident. According to the working paper of KontraS (2014):

(a) From 2004-to 2014, the files from Komnas HAM were returned by the Attorney General's Office seven times because an ad hoc human rights court had not yet been established. (b) There was a failure to implement the DPR Recommendation for the settlement of missing person cases. On September 30, 2009, the Indonesian House of representatives sent four recommendations for the settlement of forced disappearances from 1997 to 1998. However, the President did not implement the recommendations. (c) There was a shift in the legal settlement process to a political path. The President ordered the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs to form a small team to resolve severe human rights violations. (d) The decision of the Supreme Court regarding the restoration of the rights of the victims of the 1965 incident was not implemented. The 2012 Supreme Court decision ordering the President to revoke Presidential Decree No. 28/1975 regarding the treatment of those involved in the G30S/PKI Group C was not implemented. During the leadership of President Susilo B. Yudhoyono, the Constitutional Court (MK) also annulled the TRC Law through Decree No.006/PUUIV/2006.

Meanwhile, the agenda for resolving cases of past gross human rights violations during the presidency of Joko Widodo was dominated by the discourse of settlement through a reconciliation mechanism without going through the judiciary process. The Attorney General's Office initiates reconciliation without the accountability of the perpetrators by building the argument that there is no evidence and witnesses to corroborate cases of serious human rights violations (KontraS, 2018).

In 2016, President Jokowi's administration held a national symposium on the history of the 1965 tragedy. The 1965 Tragedy Symposium aimed to resolve the G30S/1965 incident through reconciliation because the evidence and perpetrators were difficult to find. This symposium resulted in recommendations that concluded that the state had committed gross human rights violations, so it was necessary to apologise and rehabilitate the victims. Unfortunately, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan (the Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs) rejected this conclusion. Luhut, who also initiated the symposium, emphasised that the state's involvement in the 1965 tragedy was a long time in the past, so the state does not need to apologise. In addition, the government cannot immediately carry out rehabilitation because it has to look at the overall government budget and consider the military victims (KontraS, 2018: 65-67).

The events of 1965-1966 are very complicated cases intertwined with various interest groups, such as the Army, Islamic groups, remnants of the New Order regime, and community groups indoctrinated with anti-communist discourse. Therefore, various resolution initiatives always face substantial challenges. Even since the Constitutional Court annulled the TRC Law, there has been no significant effort from the central government to resolve past gross human rights violations in the 1965-1966 incident.

The stagnation of efforts to resolve human rights violations of the incident of 1965-1966 was most likely caused by two things. First, there was strong resistance from anti-communist groups, as happened when President Gus Dur took the initiative to revoke the 1966 TAP MPRS, which was allegedly one of the causes of his removal from the presidency (Robinson, 2018). This incident became a consideration for the post-Gus Dur government to be more careful in resolving the 1965-1966 incident cases. Inaccuracies in the policy of resolving the 1965-1966 cases can create new chaos instead of solving them. Second, amid the still strong anti-communist group that opposes the resolution of human rights violations in the 1965-1966 incident, the most rational choice to prevent new conflict is to delay or even ignore the entire process of resolving the 1965-1966 incidents.

Amid the stagnation of the national initiative of transitional justice related to the 1965-1966 incident in Indonesia, a local initiative from SKP-HAM of Central Sulawesi, in collaboration with the Palu Regional Government, succeeded in implementing transitional justice with a restorative justice mechanism.

#### **4. The Role of Informal Mechanism of SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi.**

Quinn (2005:8) divided the transitional justice mechanism into two models: the formal mechanism carried out by a state/international body and the informal mechanism carried out by civil society. In transitional justice discourse and practice, informal mechanisms are often considered only complementary to the state's formal mechanisms. However, in the case of local initiatives in Palu, informal mechanisms can play a significant role in almost the entire process of realising restorative justice. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the role of the formal mechanism (Palu Regional Government) remains irreplaceable because there are things that cannot be done through informal mechanisms. Collaborating the two mechanisms makes local initiatives for restorative justice in Palu more effective and have a broader impact.

##### *4.1. Truth-Seeking*

In actualising transitional justice, one of the essential mechanisms to apply is the disclosure of the truth. Revealing the truth is an important way of dealing with a dark past. Telling the truth can end the suffering of victims and survivors who have no information about who is responsible for the crimes. Truth-telling can also serve as reparation for those not actually involved in the alleged crime (Zalaquett, 1995). In the society's efforts to

overcome the legacy of violent violations of gross human rights, they must face their past, overcome it, and move forward from these violent incidents. Therefore, for a better future, whatever the reason and however painful it is, the past violence is essential to uncover (Quinn, 2005). SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi made several attempts to seek the truth (truth-seeking) related to the violence related to the 1965-1966 Incident in Palu. Some of them are through village discussions, publishing biographies of victims and perpetrators, and conducting research and verification of victims of 1965-1966 in Palu.

#### 4.1.1. Village Discussion

The village discussion is one of the methods used by SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi to seek the truth regarding the violence that occurred in the 1965-1966 incident in Palu. SKP-HAM started its local initiative by fighting for women who survived the 1965-1966 incident who were arrested, detained, or whose husbands were arrested, detained, or killed. As it is well known, after the G30S/1965 incident, there were arrests, murders, and imprisonments of PKI people or those affiliated with PKI. The clean-up occurred systematically and was widespread in almost all parts of Indonesia, including Palu and its surroundings. To reveal the bitter experiences of the women who survived the 1965-1966 incident, Nurlaela (General-Secretary of SKP-HAM) met them in Palu, Sigi Regency, and Donggala Regency (interview with General-Secretary of SKP-HAM, 2021)

Furthermore, since 2006 the survivors' meetings have been held at the SKP-HAM secretariat. In the meetings held on the 13<sup>th</sup> of every month, telling stories is a method of revealing the truth from survivors. From this meeting, SKP-HAM obtained much information about the number of victims, places of detention, shooting locations, victims afraid to leave their homes after being detained, and even victims who committed suicide. From these stories, an idea emerged to have reconciliation at the family level. The so-called "village discussion", a local approach to truth-telling, was also carried out from one house to another house of the survivors (Surya, 2016). SKP-HAM also meetings with village leaders (*lurah* and *camat*) and religious leaders to discuss issues related to human rights. The topics included national laws related to human rights, the truth and reconciliation commission, and, more specifically, the 1965 mass violence (Wahyuningroem, 2018).

#### 4.1.2. Publishing the True Story of The 1965-1966 Victims and Perpetrators in Palu

The SKP-HAM interviewed the 1965-1966 incident victims and perpetrators in Palu. The results of this interview have been published in the book "Sulawesi Bersaksi" (Sulawesi Witnessing). This book reveals the never-to-be-revealed true story of 13 victims and the various acts of violence experienced by them and the recognition of a perpetrator and his courage to express the execution carried out against 3 PKI Palu leaders. "I am a Muslim, and I do not want to lie, three PKI people are actually not lost, or run away, but have been killed. I'm the one who digs the hole" (Sukanta, 2013: 27-40). The publication of the book "Sulawesi Bersaksi", the story of the victims and perpetrators, is also an effective means of revealing the truth about the existence of citizens of the nation who have been victims of human rights violations in the 1965-1966 Incident. The publication of this book not only reveals the truth that will be known by the current generation but also to the future generation.

#### 4.1.3. The Research and Investigation of the 1965-1966 Victims in Palu

After the G30S/1965, a failed coup in which PKI was accused of being the mastermind, a wave of protests demanding the disbandment and purge of PKI and its entire organisation occurred in almost all parts of Indonesia. Protests and demonstrations also took place in Palu from October 1965 – to February 1966, followed by a wave of arrests, detentions, and imprisonments of PKI members and their sympathisers.

Mass violence related to the 1965 incident in Palu occurred in four waves. First, the arrests and detentions that occurred in late 1965 targeted PKI leaders and members of their supporting organisations. In the second wave, arrests and detentions in 1966-1967 targeted PKI members and their supporting organisations. In the third wave, there were arrests and detentions from 1969-to 1970; the targets were members of the Brawijaya Military Unit, Battalion 711 Raksatama Palu, who were accused of being involved in PKI. The fourth wave occurred in 1975;

arrests and detentions were made based on the "New Style PKI Movement" in Central Sulawesi, targeting Indonesian National Party (PNI) activists (Surya, 2016:117).

From the data compiled by SKP-HAM, 1,210 political prisoners became victims of human rights violations, starting from Palu, Sigi, Donggala, and Parigi Moutong. Human rights violations also continued with the stigmatisation of victims and their families. The types of human rights violations and the number of the 1965-1966 victims can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1: Types of Human Rights Violations and the Number of Victims

No.	Types of Violations	Number of Victims	
		Male	Female
1.	Forced labour	650	143
2.	Compulsory reporting	577	204
3.	Torture	247	23
4.	Arbitrary arrests	219	28
5.	Arbitrary detentions	117	19
6.	Taking and ending sources of livelihood	43	6
7.	Inhumane treatment	20	15
8.	Extortion	20	2
9.	Theft/ looting/ robbing of goods	10	2
10.	Unfair trials	11	0
11.	Lack of income	10	0
12.	Forced disappearance	4	0
13.	Sexual violence	0	4
14.	Burning and damage of homes and personal belongings	3	0
15.	Attempted executions	1	0
16.	Rape	0	1

Source: SKP-HAM of Central Sulawesi.

#### 4.2. Grassroots Reconciliation

To publicise the grassroots reconciliation, SKP-HAM held a public event/ open dialogue with the title "Stop Human Rights Violations" in Gelora, Palu, on March 24, 2012. In this dialogue forum, SKP-HAM invited the victims and perpetrators. One of the perpetrator's representatives, Sergeant Bantam, and a victim's representative, Rafin, testified on stage. The two parents embraced as they stood on the stage to testify, even shedding sad and happy tears. According to Rafin, Bantam was not only a soldier who looked after the prisoners but also became a friend to him. At the same time, Bantam said that hundreds of PKI people in Palu were good people, including the four leaders who were killed. This testimony was witnessed and heard by dozens of guests, ranging from students, journalists, artists, culturalists, NGO activists, party activists, regional representative council members, and the mayor of Palu. Next, in his greeting, the mayor of Palu, Rusdi Mastura, apologised to the victims and survivors of the 1965-1966 incident. Because at that time, as a student who was active in the boy scouts, he received orders to arrest PKI people and hold them in detention. Furthermore, he promised to make a reparation program, including rehabilitating survivors who had been labelled as criminals and atheists. Before Rusdy Mastura apologised, Shinta, one of the children of the perpetrators of the 1965-1966 violence, also apologised to the victims on behalf of her father, a retired police officer (interview with Lamasitudju, Secretary General of SKP-HAM, 2021).

The open dialogue showed a grassroots reconciliation: the testimony of Sergeant Bantam (a perpetrator) and Rafin (a victim) embracing on the stage, and the apology delivered by Shinta (the daughter of a retired police officer who perpetrated violence) shows that there has been the grassroots reconciliation. Previously, Shinta had also met and apologised to the 1965-1966 incident victims on behalf of her father.

The success of SKP-HAM in actualising the truth-telling and the grassroots reconciliation, which later developed into structural reconciliation in Palu, proves that informal mechanisms can play a significant role, not just a complementary one to formal mechanisms initiated by the state. The SKP-HAM informal mechanism is a community-based conflict resolution model to address past gross human rights violations and restore social cohesion in the community. However, it must be acknowledged that informal mechanisms also have limitations, especially in terms of the authority to decide on political policies such as conducting reparations for victims and other political policies. Formal institutions hold this kind of authority. Therefore, collaborating with formal and informal mechanisms can make the two mechanisms complement each other.

## **5. The Role of Formal Mechanism of the Palu Regional Government**

### *5.1. Apology from the Mayor of Palu*

The formal initiative of the Palu regional for restorative justice in Palu was started by the mayor of Palu's apologising. Rudy Mastura, both personally and on behalf of the Palu regional government, apologised to the 1965/1966 incident victims in Palu (Gumilang, 2016). In addition, he also admitted his involvement as a perpetrator because, at that time, as a scout, he was also tasked with capturing and guarding PKI people and those affiliated with them. His apology was not based on any particular political tendencies but for the sake of humanity. Rudy Mastura has a powerful political will to follow up his apology by actualising the program for the recovery of the victims of 1965-1966.

According to Tavuchis (1991), offering an apology in the reconciliation process is the most straightforward way to admit guilt. A good apology requires at least an acknowledgement of the fact of human rights violations and responsibility by the wrongdoer and an expression of remorse.

### *5.2. Reparation Program for the 1965-1966 Victims*

The consequence of an apology is fulfilling the victims' human rights so that they are no longer citizens who experience discrimination and stigmatisation. Palu Mayor Rudy Mastura (2010-2015) has a powerful desire to realise the reparation of the victims of 1965-1966. However, the program for the recovery of victims of 1965-1966 is not easy to carry out, as this is still a sensitive political issue. There are also other issues related to legal footing and budgeting for its implementation. The local government of Palu faces two main problems. First, no specific legal basis can be used as a basis for reparations for the victims of 1965-1966. Second, there is no local government budget nomenclature that can specifically be used to finance the implementation of reparations for the victims of 1965-1966.

#### **5.1.1. Legal Basis for the 1965-1966 Victims Reparation Program**

The problems did not dampen Rudy Mastura's determination to realise the reparation program for the victims of 1965-1966. The RANHAM Work Group (Pokja), formed with Mayoral Decree Number 180/1691/Hkm/2011, was tasked with finding legal references that could be used as the basis for the reparation program for the victims of 1965-1966. The Pokja members consist of elements of the government, civil society, academics, and religious leaders. SKP-HAM is part of this RANHAM Work Group, representative of civil society.

When seeking a legal foothold, the RANHAM Work Group considered the Regional Government Law as the first option to become the legal basis for the victim recovery program (Interview with Lamasitudju, General-Secretary of SKP-HAM, 2021). Based on Law Number 23 of 2014, regional autonomy is the right, authority, and obligation of an autonomous region to regulate its government affairs and the local community's interests in the system of

the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). The realisation of the principle of decentralisation in the administration of the government applies the concept of regional power-sharing, which divides the power of a country vertically into "central government" and "local government" powers. Based on the law, the local government has the right, authority, and obligation to regulate the local community's interests. According to Kjellberg (1995: 40), regional autonomy has three essential values: liberty, democracy, and efficiency. Liberty concerns regional autonomy, while democracy relates to local community participation in various local government policies and efficiency from regional autonomy and democratisation. Unfortunately, Law No. 23 of 2014 concerning the Regional Government does not regulate the authority of the regional government to decide on political policies related to the rehabilitation and reparation of human rights victims, especially the victims of 1965-1966. Political policies like this fall under the central government's authority, so if they are forced, there are fears that they will be brought before the law in the future (Interview with Lamasitudju, General-Secretary of SKP-HAM, 2021).

The regional government law can only be an entry point for local initiatives for transitional justice. However, it cannot be the legal basis for the victim reparation program because it does not regulate the regional government's authority regarding reparations for the victims of 1965-1966. In addition, there is also no budget nomenclature for program financing. Therefore, another legal basis is needed that can be used for reparations and has a budget nomenclature to finance the program. Finally, based on considerations which are most likely to be carried out without crossing the limits of the authority of the regional government, the RANHAM Work Group decided on Presidential Regulation No. 23 of 2011 concerning RANHAM (National Action Plan on Human Rights) as a legal reference for the creation of Mayoral Regulation No. 25 of 2013 concerning RANHAMDA (Regional Action Plan on Human Rights), which became the basis for the reparation program for the victims of 1965-1966 in Palu. This choice was a "tactical-strategic" effort of the RANHAM Work Group to fulfil the human rights of the victims of 1965-1966.

Mayoral Regulation No. 25 of 2013 concerning RANHAMDA contains 17 articles. Three articles contain regulations regarding fulfilling the victims' rights of human rights violations (Firdaus et al., 2015). RANHAMDA also regulates the cooperation of civil society organisations with state institutions to fulfil the human rights of victims. Through this RANHAMDA, the program for reparations for the victims of 1965-1966 could be carried out without violating the Palu Regional Government's budget nomenclature. Meanwhile, the budget for the recovery of the victims is included in the government's social assistance program for poverty alleviation. It is referred to as a "tactical-strategic" effort to fulfil the rights of the victims to recover through three complementary legal bases.

The implementation of the 1965-1966 victim reparation program is based on RANHAM and RANHAMDA. However, it should be added that this can be done in the context of decentralisation and regional autonomy as regulated in the regional government law. Without decentralisation and regional autonomy, all political authority related to reparations for the victims of human rights violations from 1965 to 1966 falls under the authority of the central government. Based on this argument, local initiatives for the restorative justice process, including reparations for the victims of 1965-1966, are based on three legal principles: regional government law, RANHAM, and RANHAMDA with their respective functions. The regional government law is the entry point for local restorative justice initiatives, while Presidential Decree No. 23 of 2011 concerning RANHAM and Mayoral Regulation No. 25 of 2013 concerning RANHAMDA became the basis for implementing the reparations program. Without the local government law, local initiatives are impossible. On the other hand, without RANHAM and RANHAMDA, the victim reparations program cannot be implemented because there is no specific nomenclature related to budgeting for the 1965-1966 victim reparations program.

Looking at the dynamics of searching for legal references, which is very complicated, it is almost impossible for the Palu Regional Government to carry out reparations for the victims of 1965-1966, apart from the fact that there is no legal footing specifically for the 1965-1966 victim reparation program, nor is there a budget nomenclature to finance the program. However, the existence of a strong political will from the mayor of Palu and the tactical-strategic efforts of the RANHAM Work Group to find loopholes from the three legal bases, namely the regional

government law, Presidential Decree No. 23 of 2011 concerning RANHAM, and Mayoral Regulation No. 25 of 2013 concerning RANHAMD, what was almost impossible to do has finally been realised.

#### 5.1.2. Data Collection and Verification of the Victims of 1965-1966

The first step taken by the Palu Regional Government to actualise the victim recovery program was to record and verify the number of victims of the 1965-1966 incident. Research and verification of the victims were carried out by the Palu Regional Government and Central Sulawesi SKP-HAM as part of Mayoral Regulation No. 25 of 2013 concerning RANHAMD. The verification purpose is to ascertain the number of victims as a basis for implementing the 1965-1966 victim recovery program in Palu.

The Research and Verification Team for the Victims of Human Rights Violations of the 1965/1966 incident in Palu classified the victims into three categories. First, there are direct victims, namely those who have experienced human rights violations directly. Second, the affected victims are the victims' nuclear families (children and wife/husband). Third, some victims are affected indirectly, namely the descendants of the victims' close family members (the victims' grandchildren) and other relatives (Firdaus et al., 2015).

The data collection and verification were conducted in two stages. The first stage was done in September-October of 2014, and the second stage was carried out in January-March of 2015. The data collection and verification were carried out by 18 enumerators, most of whom were victims and family members of the victims of human rights violations who were members of the Central Sulawesi SKP-HAM. The data collection started from the data from the Central Sulawesi SKP-HAM documentation conducted from 2006-to 2010, where there were 500 names of victims recorded. This data was then added with secondary data from the Military District Command (Kodim) of 1306 Donggala-Palu and added from the victims' testimonies. The final verification results noted that there were 768 names consisting of 500 names from SKP-HAM, 134 from Kodim, and 134 names from the victim information. However, only 485 victims were willing to be verified and provide further information (Firdaus et al., 2015).

#### 5.1.3. Socio-Economic Condition of the Victims of the 1965-1966 Incident in Palu.

During the 32 years of the New Order government, those deemed to have links to PKI had to live in systemic discrimination. Some discrimination models included the ET (ex-tapol) sign on their identification cards. The inclusion of these marks made them unable to register as civil servants or have other jobs in the government. This showed the occurrence of systemic impoverishment efforts of the New Order regime. Likewise, their access to various public services was minimal. However, in the reform era, slowly, all of the New Order's discriminatory policies towards the victims of 1965-1966 began to be revoked.

From research and verification of the number of victims of the 1965-1966 incident in Palu, information was also obtained on their social and economic conditions, which were generally at the lower level. In the northern part of Palu, where the majority of the victims were occupied, especially the Kayumalue Ngapa and Kayumalue Pajeko Village Districts, their education level was only junior high and high school. They worked as small traders, labourers, farmers, and fishermen with an average monthly income of not more than one million rupiahs. But for the victims' families who lived near the city centre, their socio-economic conditions were at the lower middle level. There were some children and grandchildren of the victims who became civil servants (something that was impossible in the New Order era). Besides having average socio-economic conditions at the lower level, some victims also experienced physical disabilities such as tooth loss and reduced hearing and vision functions as a result of being tortured while they were detained. One of the victims was even forced into labour in 18 different places, starting from 1966-to 1979 (Firdaus et al., 2015).

Seeing the socio-economic conditions and physical impacts experienced by the victims of 1965-1966, the recovery program for the victims of the 1965-1966 incident is something that must be done just as part of the mandate of Mayoral Regulation No. 25 of 2013, but also to demonstrate the validity of the apology from the mayor of Palu.

The validity of an apology submitted by a state representative is shown by the acknowledgement of the existence of human rights violations and the responsibility of the state to restore the rights of the victims.

#### 5.1.4. The Implementation of the Reparation Program for Victims of the 1965-1966 Incident.

The promise made by the mayor of Palu, Rusdy Mastura, to give reparations to the victims of the 1965-1966 incident was finally carried out. The reparation program for the victims of 1965-1966 by the Palu Regional Government was in the form of fulfilling basic rights, which included: health insurance (BPJS), scholarships, house renovations, the construction of toilets and bathrooms, small business capital, startup assistance, free ID cards, free birth certificates, clean water assistance, free electricity assistance, a subsidised rice program (Raskin), free land certificates, and free marriage administration fees. The program implementation was based on verifying the needs of the victims and the availability and capacity of the Palu Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD). Due to the limitations of APBD, the reparation program was carried out in stages. Victims whose rights had not been fulfilled in the first stage would be budgeted in the next stage. Even though there was a change in the mayor of the city, the local government of Palu continued to fulfil the rights of the victims, but the fulfilment strategy differed from one mayor to another. For example, in the second stage of implementing government assistance such as BPJS (health insurance), subsidised rice assistance, and BLT (direct cash assistance) were handled through the village office so that all the 1965-1966 victims who met the criteria as poor people received the assistance.

Meanwhile, during the period of Mayor Hidayat Toamir (2016-2021), the Palu regional government gave victims the right to express their own needs through the inclusive Musrenbang (Development Planning Consultation). Two victim representatives who attended Musrenbang and other meetings were Asman and Kadarusman. This shows that there is no longer any discrimination and stigmatisation of the victims of the 1965-1966 incident in Palu. The verification and realisation of the 1965-1966 victim reparation program can be seen in Table 2.

Table 2: Reparation Program for the Victims of the 1965-1966 Incident

No	Program	Verification	Realization
1	Scholarships	101 people	25 people
2	BPJS (health insurance)	74 people	74 people
3	House renovations	82 houses	50 houses
4	Livelihoods	119 people	-
5	Toilets and bathrooms	37 families	7 families
6	Community empowerment	2 people	-
7	Family hope aid	106 families	-
8	Subsidised rice aid	22 families	22 families
9	Farming seeds	7 people	-
10	Free birth certificates	50 people	-
11	Clean water aid	14 houses	7 houses
12	Free electricity aid	2 families	2 families
13	Skilled training	10 people	3 people

*Source: From SKP-HAM and interview with the coordinator of the 1965-1966 victims in Palu*

Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that despite its success, the local initiative for restorative justice in Palu has at least two limitations. First, the rehabilitation of the reputations of the 1965-1966 victims has not been carried out. Second, there is no budget nomenclature that can specifically be used for the 1965-1966 victim reparation program, making its implementation still reliant on poverty alleviation programs, so that its realisation is still not optimal, not commensurate with the suffering of the victims as a result of violence, discrimination, and stigmatisation that they have so far experienced.

## 6. Conclusion

The central government's initiative to resolve the incident of 1965-1966 has consistently failed in the middle of implementation. This stagnation is very likely due to the still strong resistance from anti-communist groups. In this situation, the government's rational choice to prevent new conflicts is to delay the process of resolving the incident of 1965-1966. Amid the failure of the national initiative, the local SKP-HAM of Central Sulawesi and the local government of Palu emerged, which succeeded in bringing about restorative justice related to the 1965-1966 incident in Palu through truth-telling, grassroots reconciliation, an apology from the mayor of Palu, and reparations for the victims. This study proved that informal mechanisms could play a significant role in actualising restorative justice in Palu. Informal mechanisms from civil society (NGOs and associations of human rights victims) could play a significant role in realising restorative justice through truth-seeking and grassroots reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. However, it must be acknowledged that formal mechanisms' role remained irreplaceable because particular aspects could not be done through informal mechanisms, such as victim reparations. Therefore, collaborating between the two mechanisms is needed for the effectiveness of restorative justice implementation. Another essential element behind the realisation of restorative justice is the role of political actors, namely Rusdy Mastura (Palu's mayor) and Nurlaela Lamasitduju (General-Secretary of SKP-HAM). The strong political will of the Mayor of Palu (2010-2015) was depicted in an apology and the reparation program for the victims of 1965-1966, and the lobbies that the General Secretary of SKP-HAM had been carried out have an essential role in realising restorative justice related to the 1965-1966 incident in Palu.

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# Confidence Issues on using Maternity Waiting Home Service: A Case in Wonogiri

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## Abstract

Maternity waiting home is a program designed to decrease maternal mortality. This program is implemented in several Indonesian districts, including the Wonogiri regency. It is not unusual for its execution to encounter barriers posed by diverse parties. This study employs a qualitative, descriptive approach to describe the maternity waiting home service. This study aims to understand why there are trust issues in the maternity waiting home service. Focus group discussions (FGD) and interviews were done to acquire samples of data from diverse stakeholders. In actuality, the maternity waiting home service in wonogiri regency has hurdles, most notably the lack of user confidence. Numerous pregnant ladies are hesitant to utilize the maternity waiting home service for a variety of reasons. There is mistrust in the service for a variety of reasons. This study indicates that maternity waiting home service stakeholders in wonogiri regency should address and resolve this critical issue by strengthening maternity waiting home service awareness campaigns.

**Keywords:** Maternity Waiting Home, Confidence Issues, User

## 1. Introduction

Maternity waiting home refers to a space or room that acts as a temporary housing solution for pregnant women and their companions before and after the birth of their children. The development of the maternity waiting home has as its primary objective the reduction of maternal death rates caused by delays in obtaining delivery assistance from health workers in geographical areas with limited access to health care facilities. These delays can be caused by the fact that there are fewer health care facilities available.

Because most regions have limited infrastructure and difficult geographical conditions, which results in delays in handling health problems and leads to death due to the many complications that occur, the development of maternity waiting home is a strategy to bring health services closer to the community used by high-risk maternity mothers or living far from health facilities. This is because death can occur due to the many complications that occur. Maternity waiting home was developed as a strategy to bring health services closer to communities used by high-risk maternity mothers.

The use of maternity waiting homes has been studied in a variety of locations, particularly in developing countries, as of late. It is believed, in the country of Zambia, that the waiting home birth service may make a substantial contribution to the solution of the issues that arise during labor (Scott et al., 2018). It is possible for the maternity waiting home in Malawi to lower maternal death rates (Singh et al., 2016). It is estimated that the maternity waiting home in Ethiopia can bring the country's maternal death rate down by more than 80 percent (Dadi et al., 2018). Additionally, maternity waiting at home has the potential to be beneficial and successful in Liberia (Lori et al., 2013; 2014).

Maternity waiting home is a technique designed to offer health services to communities that are used by high-risk pregnant mothers or that are located a significant distance from health facilities. During the moment of birth, which might occur at any point during the pregnancy due to the unpredictable nature of childbirth. We are in a position where we are aware that one of the factors contributing to Indonesia's still high. Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) is the delay in referral caused by geographical issues (Edi and Sukoco, 2018).

According to research that looked at the effect of maternity waiting home in reducing the risk of maternal mortality and neonatal mortality in Ethiopia, the use of maternity waiting home by mothers was associated with a lower risk of maternal mortality and newborn mortality in that country. When maternity waiting home was utilized, the rate of maternal mortality was 89.9 per 100,000 live births, but the rate of maternal mortality among mothers who did not utilize maternity waiting home was 1,333.1 per 100,000 live births. This difference in maternal mortality rates was because maternity waiting home was utilized. Those mothers who used maternity waiting homes had an infant mortality rate of 17.6 per 1,000 live births, whereas those who did not use maternity waiting homes had an infant mortality rate of 191.2 per 1,000 live births. Those mothers who did not use maternity waiting homes also had a higher rate of stillbirths. The findings demonstrated that maternity waiting home successfully lowered the rates of maternal and infant mortality in settings in which mothers were more closely monitored by midwives and could make a prompt decision to be referred to a hospital if there were any concerns regarding the health of either the mother or the baby. The findings also demonstrated that maternity waiting home was successful in lowering the rates of maternal and infant mortality in settings in which mothers were more closely monitored by midwives and could make a prompt decision to be referred to maternity waiting home.

Since maternal death causes a country to lose several productive employees, which increases the morbidity and mortality rates among children, the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) is an indicator of women's health state. In addition, the MMR is an indicator of the health status of women. According to the Indonesian Health Demographic Survey (IDHS), the Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) in Indonesia is 359 for every 100,000 live births, while the Infant Mortality Rate is 35 for every 1,000. Both of these rates are significantly higher than the Suicide Rate. Compared to the levels seen in earlier years, both the MMR and the IMR have been declining. However, compared to one of the previous Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) targets, namely the reduction of the MMR to 102 per 100,000 live births and the IMR to 34 per 1,000 births in 2015, they have not shown results that are significant enough to be considered successful. This target was part of the reduction of the MMR to 102 per 100,000 live births and the IMR to 34 per 1,000 births in 2015. (Kemenkes RI, 2016).

It is possible for mothers to lose their lives if they do not have access to high-quality medical treatment, particularly quick emergency care. This is especially true in situations where the mother is giving birth. This can be brought about by a number of different things, such as a delay in getting to medical facilities, a delay in receiving medical care once they have arrived at medical facilities, a delay in identifying danger indicators, and a delay in making decisions. In addition, the "4T criteria" state that the cause of maternal death is inextricably linked to the condition of the mother and must always be considered together. These factors include having births too close together, being over the age of 35, being under the age of 20, being too old, and having more than three children in total. This paper aims to explore the challenges and prospects of the maternity waiting home in Wonogiri, Central Java. This challenge needs to be observed so that it does not hinder the development of birth waiting homes in the area so that these health facilities can serve the community well.

## 2. Method

This qualitative descriptive study aims to analyze social life by portraying the social world from the perspective or interpretation of persons in their natural environment. This analysis of Maternity Waiting Home services is based on data collected from informants. This research used purposive sampling. Through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, data was collected (FGD). There are a total of seven key informants. This study's informants included physicians, midwives as managers of Maternity Waiting Home services, the community, particularly women as care recipients, local health officials as government representatives, and non-governmental organizations. This collection data lasted in one year. The Miles and Huberman (1994) paradigm for data analysis was utilized, which included data gathering, data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion drawing.

## 3. Results

The Wonogiri district includes the sub-districts of Purwantoro, Wonogiri, Pracimantoro, Wuryantoro, and Baturetno. These are the areas where maternity waiting homes have been discovered. The maternity waiting home facility that is situated in Wonogiri has been operating continuously since the year 2017. (Pujihartati, 2019; 2020). The degree of community engagement that is directly associated with maternity waiting home facilities has been shown to have increased over time. Maternity waiting home collaborates with residents of the area who have expressed an interest in renting out their homes for the purpose of utilizing them as sites for these services. Since the maternity waiting home officers are recruited from the puskesmas, one can infer that this is where the officers originate. The maternity waiting home facilities and the equipment that was used have been operated and fitted in line with the requirements, therefore the timetable that was linked with those facilities has been maintained.

According to the information received from a variety of sources, the number of maternity waiting home patients varied, with the range being anywhere from six to ten different persons. The total number of patients who have Jampersal as their primary insurance provider is displayed here. Patients who have Jampersal insurance have a better probability of accessing food and beverage facilities throughout their stay at maternity waiting homes. Patients who have BPJS insurance, on the other hand, do not receive these advantages during their time at maternity waiting homes. Patients with BPJS are not counted since they are unable to use food and drink facilities during their treatment. This is one of the reasons why there is a low participation rate among the public, namely among pregnant women, in order to make use of the services that maternity waiting home gives. Specifically, this is one of the reasons why there is a low participation rate among pregnant women. Patients who have BPJS insurance are said to regularly go to or stop by the maternity waiting home, as stated by the source. Patients who need to use the maternity waiting home facilities within the permitted amount of time are often told to wait if they need to use the facilities within the allotted time, even if their situation is an emergency. This is done because there is a lack of available space. People whose situations are different from Jampersal are unable to benefit from maternity waiting homes.

The problem occurs when future mothers-to-be put their trust in maternity waiting homes. A significant amount of trust is required in order for an maternity waiting home to maintain the continuity of the services it provides. A high degree of trust makes it easier to access a diverse range of resources; as a result, a network with a high level of trust will function more effectively and with less friction than one with a low level of trust (Field, 2011).

During the entire process of putting maternity waiting home into effect in the Wonogiri district, a crisis of trust occurred, particularly among pregnant women. It has been reported to Marmi by an informant that the distance between the puskesmas and the community is not very great, and as a consequence, the puskesmas typically return to their houses. When a pregnant woman and her husband have responsibilities that need to be done at home, such as taking care of the children, they will typically choose to stay at home together and tend to their responsibilities rather than sending one of them out to find work. This is because staying at home together allows them to more effectively divide and conquer their duties. In the case that someone traveled back to the residence, the informant was able to gauge how far away it was and determine whether or not it was located in close proximity to the maternity waiting home.

According to Nunuk, a maternity waiting home officer who works in the Pracimantoro section, the degree to which an individual believes is directly related to their level of trust. Issues with one's self-assurance, such as refusing instructions to wait at maternity waiting home. Despite the fact that there have been cases of women giving birth in the middle of the road while they were on their way back to the maternity waiting home, he claims that the medical staff is powerless to do anything if the patient refuses to remain. He says this even though there have been instances of women refusing to remain. There is no way to know in advance what the results of these occurrences will be.

When asked about trust, the maternity waiting home officer who worked in the Purwantoro section answered, in a slightly different way, that it was much simpler for maternity waiting homes in the Ponorogo district to access locations than it was for maternity waiting homes in that area. This was the explanation given by the maternity waiting home officer. According to him, the possibility exists that this is due to the fact that the cross-province is situated in a more convenient proximity to Ponorogo than either Jampersal or BPJS, depending on whether one can get there first. If you are traveling in the direction of Ponorogo and the Jampersal office is going to Wonogiri, it will take you twenty minutes to reach Ponorogo from where you are now. Despite the fact that maternity waiting home Purwantoro's physical facilities are of a very high standard, access to them is restricted because of the location's remote geographic position.

Problems with trust may also be related to the preferences that individuals have towards the medical care that they receive from physicians or midwives. Many pregnant women make the decision to go home when they still do not show any signs that they are close to giving birth. If the process takes a long time and they do not want to use Jampersal or BPJS, then they make the decision to go to the general public or to a doctor so that they can be treated quickly. This is due to the fact that they are able to receive treatment more rapidly if they go to the general public or to a doctor. The location of the maternity waiting home is yet another one of the factors in play here. Some people are aware of the location of the maternity waiting home despite the fact that it is situated directly in front of the inpatient unit, which is where the officers are positioned; nevertheless, some people are not aware of its positioning. In spite of the fact that there is law enforcement personnel present at the scene, the mothers have decided to go back to their homes because they feel better at ease in their own environments.

#### **4. Discussion**

Basen on research finding, A person's level of trust is exactly proportional to their level of belief. Confidence issues, such as ignoring instructions to wait at a maternity waiting home. In spite of the fact that women have given birth in the middle of the road while returning to the maternity waiting home, he asserts that the medical team is helpless if the patient refuses to remain. Even if there have been cases of women declining to stay, he asserts this. There is no way to predict the outcomes of these incidents in advance. Maternity waiting homes in Wonogiri are eligible, exceptionally on trust issues, because: (1) The location is in close proximity to a puskesmas that is able to provide delivery assistance or to a Regional or Central General Hospital; (2) A resident's house or a house built by the village government; and (3) Has a room bed, kitchen, bathroom, latrine, clean water, and ventilation, in addition to a source of lighting (electricity) (Probolinggo, 2016).

Anderson's theory provides a model for describing the structure of the health care system. The following three factors have the most significant impact on patients' utilization of healthcare services: (1) predisposing factors, such as age, education, occupation, degree of knowledge, ethnicity, and gender parity are all taken into consideration. (2) supporting variables such as income and insurance participation; (3) needs features such as individual evaluation and delivery challenges (Notoatmodjo, 2014).

The characteristics that are linked with the utilization of maternity waiting home include travel time, the cost of transportation, the distance to maternity waiting home, the age of the respondent, the respondent's education, income, and parity, according to the findings of a study that was carried out by Sukoco (2017). While this is going on, research that was carried out by Harahap (2018) finds a number of factors that are connected with the adoption of maternity waiting homes. Knowledge, attitudes, income, parity, access to services, comfort, friendliness,

security, and assistance from puskesmas police, support from community leaders, and support from family members are all included in these criteria.

During the time that they are waiting for the delivery to take place, pregnant women who are at an increased risk of experiencing complications during labor and their companions may choose to stay at a residential transitional kit (maternity waiting home), which is a location that is located in close proximity to a medical facility. Maternity waiting home's mission is to make it simpler for women who are pregnant, mothers who are giving birth, postpartum patients, and infants to receive the care they need, especially in areas where it can be difficult to travel to medical facilities, and to eliminate any unnecessary delays that may occur as a result of this. Women who are pregnant and live in areas that are difficult to access are welcome to stay in maternity waiting homes, which is a temporary residences. They remain there until the beginning of their postpartum period (together with the baby that is born to them) so that they can remain in close proximity to a puskesmas or a Regional or Central General Hospital that can aid them with the process of giving birth.

## 5. Conclusion

According to the findings of the research, the conclusion is the Maternity Waiting Home program in Wonogiri Regency continues to struggle to gain the trust of pregnant women who utilize it as participants. Because they are more preoccupied with domestic issues and earnings, many of them have not made prioritizing this initiative one of their top priorities. For pregnant women who are at a higher risk of complications during delivery, it is critical for them to make use of a maternity waiting home. Appropriate and thorough socialization may be carried out to raise awareness of this issue.

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# Bibliometric Analysis: Symbolic Power Publication Trends in Scopus.com

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## Abstract

The purpose of this study is to explore references to one source that can provide benefits for researchers about symbolic power, it is in the interest to use bibliometric methods to map the specification of research, namely 1) to reveal the number of articles produced by symbolic power research. 2) Conduct mapping to review symbolic power research that has been done, and 3) reveal the collaboration map. The method provides objective parameters in controlling literature and provides opportunities to encourage increased accuracy and minimize the bias of researchers in scientific literature reviews by paying attention to the research results of scholars working in the field research area. This bibliometric method provided citation analysis guidelines, co-citation analysis, coupling bibliography, co-author analysis, and co-word analysis, as well as work guidelines. Bibliometric methods would complement the meta-analysis and review of qualitatively structured literature as a method for exploring and evaluating scientific literature. To demonstrate bibliometric methods, it was done with citation analysis and co-citation to map the intellectual structure of symbolic power journals. The results showed that the investigation of human-related symbolic power was shown by 109 events widely published by the scopus.com database during 2012-2022. From the mapping carried out through bibliometrics shows that the trend of research is related to the term human keywords.

**Keywords:** Bibliometric, Publication, Research Development, Symbolic Power

## 1. Introduction

Two concepts of political sociology and Bourdieu legitimacy as the production of power. This power cannot be separated from the practice of violence through the repressive state apparatus and symbolic violence created in civil society ideologically (Sullivan et al., 2019). Symbolic power is the choice of meaning produced by the agent's ego (Bergström et al., 2019). This symbolic power is a subtle practice of domination and is not even realized by social agents. But it is also maintained and accepted rationally (Molla, 2019). The development of research on symbolic power is widely done in relation to gender, social class, religion. Women's protection reasoning becomes a reference to gender attributes (Johnson, 2017). The social structure and involvement of women in a variety of ways, especially their role in the economy can overcome marginalization and even violence against women. The same social interactions can lead to changes in mindset, attitudes and social practices (Bradley et al., 2021). Mobility is also determined by material forces in the relationship of social processes and cultural, political, social, economic (Dunne et al., 2020; Grieco, 2016).

Social class is part of the social structure that determines the change of society. Certain social classes can be recognized through symbols, such as home appearance, means of transportation, how to dress, and social relationships (Mere & Ngarawula, 2015). Social space as a public domain, used as actualization to gain the social position of the agent and its success (Hjellbrekke & Korsnes, 2017). Success in its social position is a form of struggle to stay in power, influence, and control environmental change (Fernández, 2013; Gadea, 2013; Zapata & Romero, 2019). Religion is one of the social structures that influence the way religious practices. Religious practices in society carried out by its adherents often give birth to symbolic violence. The excessive behavior of individuals and social groups can sometimes be influenced by their religious experiences. For example, Islam as a religion forbids going beyond all the practices of life in various fields (Ramlee et al., 2019). Such as: the position of women in the patriarchy system is placed in other positions or subordinated as evidenced by the practice of women/wives' obedience in their religious beliefs towards their husbands (Nurmila, 2018). Therefore, the social representation of women and men's positions is largely determined by the mastery of capital as a form of dominance over women (Campos & Lima, 2018; Perrin et al., 2019).

Bourdieu is a figure who developed the concept of symbolic power supported by the concept of mastery of various capitals. This mastery of capital aims to obtain a certain agent's social position. The importance of harnessing the potential between significant capital and differences in social space (Pöllmann, 2013). The utilization of communication media with the largest platform is the practice of symbolic power (Ranji, 2021). Big data provides an overview of the sources of science, creativity, innovative ideas, and the tendency to change improvement and development. In context, the interpretation of digitalization artifacts is an asiosative reflection of the social space and competition scene (Macfarlane & Jefferson, 2022). The tendency to practice symbolic power through mastery of social, cultural, and political capital in a college environment often contrasts with the career needs of academics. Paradoxically this is an unavoidable form of competition (Ku, 2004; Stringfellow et al., 2015).

However, research on the topic of symbolic power using bibliometric methods has not been done so that no published articles have been found. Some research on symbolic power uses ethnographic methods, surveys, time series, regression analysis, and formal analysis (Golonka-Czajkowska, 2019; Morello SJ, 2019; Sikevich & Skvortsov, 2020; Woodfill, 2021). Open and critical attitude as one of the signs of modernity. But there is a tendency for progress and damage to be opened up to visualize positive and negative impacts (Barash & Antonovskiy, 2019). Open access to mapping specific social phenomena or problems, focuses on comparing and at the same time developing the results of existing and still little-studied research (Pearce et al., 2020). The novelty of this study uses bibliometric methods, and is also used for the study of search attraction (Chen & Song, 2019) corporate social responsibility and progress for survival, as well as future trends (Abad-Segura et al., 2019; Tayebi et al., 2019; Williams, 2020). In addition, other fields such as economics and econometrics are analyzed and published by individuals as academics in their research environment (Chan et al., 2015; Kauppi, 2018). Based on the growing research, the author aims to explore how much the development of international articles with symbolic topics of power from 2013 to 2022. The problem in these studies are (1) How is the trend of publishing articles about symbolic power, (2) How the author cooperates on symbolic power in 2013-2022. (3) What is the trendy keyword term author in the symbolic article of power, (4) How the abstract term trend in the article symbolic power.

## **2. Material and Method**

Bibliometric methods were used in this study. The data source used was sourced on the [www.scopus.com](http://www.scopus.com). The technique of collecting data by tracing the scopus. The data was then bibliometrically analyzed. The steps were as follows: search stage, filterization stage, bibliometric attribute review, and bibliometric analysis.

### *2.1. Search Stage*


Bibliographies are used for database searches in scopus. The use of scopus database sources was a top choice, as it is one of the largest databases by providing peer-reviewed literature and publications. This study was limited by several aspects. First, the types of sources used in scopus were journal articles, abstarck, and keywords. Second,

keywords used were symbolic power. Third, the use of English in the article as a restriction.

## 2.2. Filtering Stage


Filtering is used for the selection of journals to be analyzed. Bibliography options were article titles, abstracts, keywords, articles, or reviews. The initial stage in the search through scopus found 4970 articles through searches restricted to the keyword "symbolic power." and screening of the title of the article in English. In addition, for 10 years starting in 1013-2022 and in each year experiencing fluctuating, high publications in 2021 and in 2022 the trend decreased, such as table.1 below:

Table 1: Filtered Document Period.



Mapping the subject area was also done to find out quantitatively the theme of symbolic power in the data scopus.com. In this case, the number of articles that correlate in each subect area, including: social sciences, art and Humanities, mathematics, computer science, engineering, environmental science, medicine, business, management and accounting, and economic, psychology, and physics and astronomy. as in table.2 Subject Area. The highest symbolic power publication in the field of social science reached 884 articles, while the lowest in the field of physics and astronomy reached 61 articles as in table 2 below:

Table 2: Subject Area



The next step was to choose the creating menu. Then select creating a map base on bibliographic database file (input files that have been extracted from scopus in ris form. Click next, then select co-occurrence -co authorship/co citation, click next, click finish.

### 2.3. *Stage of Bibliometric Analysis*

This stage of bibliometric analysis is to provide a quantitative overview of the development of social and network studies. In addition, to map the position of the topic. In addition, identification can also be carried out relevance of the level of interaction and its influence on the sample (Machado et al., 2020; Tayebi et al., 2019). The Vos viewer application was used to visualize its analyst results. In addition, text-mining was used to describe relationships in article citations. Systemic data processing via computerization contributes to analyzing article trends in a journal and periodical international publications.

The data obtained from the above filtering is entered for analysis through the Vos viewer. The number of choices from keywords obtained every 692 keywords, the amount of power of co-occurrence links with other keywords can be calculated. The result was that the keywords with the largest total strength associated would be selected with a number of other key words selected to 692.

## 3. Results and Discussion

The visualization of this article is based on Vos's viewer application to map the tendency of symbolic power studies and link with other variables. Network visualization, overlay visualization and density visualization were developed by researchers in the last 10 years from 2013-2022. Based on the choice of data type in the scopus.com about symbolic power by making a mapping on the bibliometric data available. The author chooses this mapping for the type of analysis co-authorship and the unit is the author. While counting method with full counting. The result is a maximum number of authors per document of 25. Analysis of co-occurrence and keywords in full counting resulted in a minimum number of occurrences of a keyword amounting to 3 of the 8089 keywords, 692 meet the threshold. In terms of choosing number of keywords for each of the 692 keywords, the total strength of the co-occurrence links with other keywords will be calculated. The keywords with the greatest total link strength will be selected. Number of keywords to be selected 692 items. Obtained 9 clusters with details of clusters 1 (238), clusters 2 (214 items), cluster 3 (82 items), cluster 4 (51 items), cluster 5 (37 items), cluster 6 (35 items), cluster 7 (22 items), cluster 8 (11 items), and cluster 9 (2 items). In relation to cluster 9, the publication of his research related to beliefs and the Netherlands as the smallest cluster.

### 3.1 *Network Visualization: Symbolic Publication Trends and Authors Network*

Based on the figure 3., image provides information that the direction of the tendency of the study of symbolic power is related to 9 clusters. Based on gb 3, on symbolic power obtained cluster 6, 116 links, total link strength 195, and 80 occurrences. But in the same cluster of symbolic powers items in the form of plural there are differences in the number such as, obtained 34 links, total link strength 92, and 49 occurrences. In this symbolic power study, the most related to the term "human" amounted to 361 links, its position in cluster 3 with the number of link strengths as many as 1389 and 109 events.

Bourdieu cluster 1 items have 129 links and total link strengths of 231 and 52 occurrences. Studies developed related to theory symbolic power related to gender, violence, have been widely done, but related to human and controlled studies there are still very few publications.

Figure 3: Symbolic power Network Visualization





Figure 4. Visualization of author network after choosing threshold with number of documents of an author 3 of the 2807 author, 62 meet the threshold. For each of the 62 authors, the total strength of the co-authorship links with other authors will be calculated. The authors with the greatest total link strength will be selected. Number of authors to be selected 62. Some of the 36 items in this network are not connected to each other. The largest set of connected items consists of 22 items with (5 clusters). Cluster 1 (7 items), cluster 2 (6 items), cluster 3 (4 items), cluster 4 (3 items), cluster 5 (2 items). Author Drabkin, b only related to Seceleanu, a. both are authors who have the smallest link. Meanwhile, the author who has the largest link is Bocci, c as many as 6 links.


Figure 4: Author network visualization



3.2 Visualization overlay: Visualization trends

The label display is very useful for detailed examination of the map. In this visualization, it is displayed with clear and obscure labels, as well as circles. The clearer and greater the visualization, the more studies that have been done by the authors. Overlap can be avoided, the emergence of a subset of all labels.


Figure 5: Overlay visualization



### 3.3 Density visualization

Collaborative research cooperation can build the power of providing research funds and providing mutualistic benefits in the form of: data, skill ideas and infrastructure. Improving the quality of research and ideals at the international level can be achieved more effectively.

Figure 6: Visualization of density symbolic power



Symbolic power article data is searched through the international database scopus.com. From the search results, journal articles that have been collected and limited for the period 2013-2022 with all open access journals and gold and hybrid gold levels, are 1685 articles. As for the details of the search results in table 1. Furthermore, in the search of the subject area obtained the results from 10 scientific fields, as in table 2. In the table obtained the highest social science results in discussions related to symbolic power as many as 884 articles, the field of art and humanities second with the number of 487 articles, and the lowest order in physics and astronomy amounting to 61 articles.

On figure 5. The term human has a lot to do with symbolic power research and has the most links of 1389 in 109 events. Human is included in cluster 3 and there is information that the study is related to architectural design as the highest term, the 2nd rank is attitude of personal health, and the 3rd rank is behavior. The use of algorithms was developed and became a more advanced trend through architectural design in many scientific arenas regarding symbolic power (Bai et al., 2022). The study of onshore wind turbines against the wind that serves for tower congestion, the utilization of these turbines for the fulfillment of human needs (Ning & Petch, 2016). Methodology review is used by practitioners to develop prototypes sourced from commercial sensors and used to reduce costs (Demirel et al., 2021; Pérez-Valero et al., 2020). The internet network is designed as a communication medium providing a space for protest and conflict (Barash & Antonovskiy, 2019).

The term attitude of personal health is a personal view related to efforts to avoid various diseases. The extent to which the direction of development is related to symbolic power. The number of links owned is as many as 60 in 3 events. Symbolic material about social practices, especially relationships with nurses and hypertensive people develops asymmetrically (Borges et al., 2012). Symbolis is used as one of the analysis related to distribution and prevention in society (Caprara, 1998). Similar research, Public perception of clean hydropower infrastructure services and environmental protection of coal mining is related to people's helplessness over aesthetic symbolic eating, the environment, and tourism (Dubois et al., 2021). Research aims to explore multi-component interventions on risk behaviors, smoking, eating, exercise affecting health (Mikkelsen et al., 2021). The symbolic power of the patient and the public with respect to the power of the capitals owned by the patient (Locock et al., 2017). Nursing position with the study of the interconnection of political interests, knowledge of laws relating to gender sensitivity (Trisyani & Windsor, 2019).

Publication based on the term behavior with symbolic power links linked to 119 articles in 8 events, indicated by the researchers as follows; The strength of the actor in the implementation of the work program is determined by the symbolic power of religiosity integrated in the organizational system (Biygautane et al., 2020). The development of political career leadership theory and capital accumulation strategies is related to ideological and charismatic leadership (Mendes, 2021). Women's beauty symbols are exploited by the media and the advantages of global consumerism (Xu, 2019). Symbolic violence for university research careers occurred and mediated the market, performative, and managerial various modern neoliberal universities. (Gordon & Zainuddin, 2020). Research development directions were developed as well, such as: The use of perfectoid algebra with mixed analog characteristics over ordinary ambient ring cases (Ma & Schwede, 2018). The motivational aspect is an influential aspect for policymakers over independent authority (Lombardi & Moschella, 2017). The social position of agents on the mastery of economic capital accumulates higher and is not clearly defined with regard to economic status and access to resources (Veenstra, 2018).

The publication of research on symbolic power linked to other keywords amounted to 195 links and 80 occurrences. As for the direction of development of its publication, as follows: The power of symbols is awakened through the interaction and intensity of social collective actions (Schlieter, 2017). Heterosexual spaces and cultural differences give birth to changes in mobility to meet rights and obligations, as well as public policy support (Đurin, 2018). Social space is correlated with the power relations and social classes of thought of Foucault, Gramsci, Bourdieu, and Marx. used to express the life experiences of parents as they interact with food policy, rejection of stigmatization; and implications for policy and practice (Noonan-Gunning, 2019). The fear and violence experienced by women symbolized in the mobilization of marches as social spaces, is a criticism of society's inability to solve problems of gender relations and limited access (Sandberg & Coe, 2020). Research on the interaction of many young people's drinking habits and exercise and their implications, social and physical health is produced by the dominance of masculine (Cowley, 2019; Törrönen et al., 2021). The study of epistemological vigilance was developed by researchers related to symbolic power. Dialectics of symbolic, social, material and social structures (Wacquant, 2017, 2018). Different research on whether FC-metric weighted Phase Lag Index (wPLI) and Symbolic Mutual Information (wSMI) for analysis of functional differences in four stages of alertness - awake (W), NREM-N2, NREM-N3, and REM sleep - relation to each other and power-based features (Imperator et al., 2021). Symbolic entities are studied in terms of life, culture, psychological on the realities of life (Cowley, 2019). The use of protest symbols in the form of slogans requires understanding and thinking power over

the guarantee of transparency of protest functions (Barash & Antonovskiy, 2019). In addition, fatpoint is related to the concept of symbolic power regarding the study of generic early systems and lexicography (Mayes, 2016).

Publications of research on resurgen developed by researchers include, symbolic power and power of algebraic interests give symbolically for the benefit of students (Dumnicki et al., 2015). Likewise, The study of the superiority of coata on the functional and symbolic significance of the castle town in Burwel (Wright et al., 2016). Study of network nodes with symbolic implementation and combined with window detection techniques (Zeng et al., 2017), A study of symbolic power about the chaos of clicks on deep graphs and the similarity of results over the same ideal cover (Martínez-Bernal et al., 2019). Social change and the scope of modernity are studied through a symbolic hermeneutic approach to the field (Kokosalakis, 2020). In a different approach, such as ethnographic studies of ritual practices on the theme of the film world as a way religious categories are conceptualized (Moran, 2021). The attitude of responsibility, resilience, and symbolic power is a reciprocal nature relationship in building a community collective (King et al., 2021).

#### 4. Conclusion

Based on the results and discussions, it can be concluded that publications about symbolic power during the period 2013-20222 showed that the highest Scopus index of symbolic power publications in the field of social science reached 884 articles. The highest increase occurred in 2021. Bocci, c is the researcher who has the highest links. In the analysis of title trends, 9 clusters were formed. The most widely used term title in symbolic power articles is related to humans with 109 events. The authors suggest the need to add new keywords to get more research results so that they are more comprehensive. In terms of limitations this study has not revealed the mapping methods used in the research published by researchers in the period 2013-2022.

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# Reforming and Creating a Business-Friendly Environment: An Empirical Case Study of (*Non-Profit Organization*) in Nigeria

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## Abstract

As a religious country, the people's faith has influenced business behavior and actions. Some residents view their religion as a culture, way of life, trust-currency, and/or a segregation index. Previous studies have analyzed and attributed corruption in Nigeria as the primary cause of the dwindling economy, attributing a direct and sometimes indirect correlation to the nation's focus on religion as the catalyst of the country's problem. This article is an internal whitepaper of the Ane Osiobe International Foundation's activities, utilizing its costs of operation and estimated budget for future projects to analyze the economic impact of corruption on the Nigerian economy's business-friendly environment, attraction, and retention. The impact results show the direct, indirect, and induced effects of a hostile business environment as non-profit organizations try to help residents of the Nigerian economy, and the government places a heavy tax burden on their donations under section 12-A of the Nigerian tax code and the indirect bureaucratic corrupted processes on every activity that can promote economic growth and development within the region; which is simply an indirect, self-induced economic war against the Nigerian people that in turn creates a vicious domino-and-multiplier effect against the nation in the international market. The recommendation from the study builds on the premise that the most valuable asset to combat this hostile virtuous cycle is trust and transparency not only at the national level but where it is most needed, which is the individual level.


**Keywords:** Business-Friendly Environment, Religion, Economic Impact, Bureaucratic Activities

## 1. Introduction

Nigeria is a very religious [Christianity, Islam, and Paganism (polytheism or ethnic-tradition)] country. The nation is known for its rich culture, afro-music, natural resource, and multilingual ethnicity, but this study will be focused on its business environment from a non-profit perspective and how hostile the business environment is to stakeholders. The Nigerian business environment can be summarized in one word both from the banking, natural resource, education, and non-profit sector; "corrupt." According to the Transparency International Index, corruption is the abuse of entrusted power and privileges for private gain. Nigeria ranks 154 out of 180 countries with a score of 24/100 based on 2021 (Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 2022). Eighty-five percent of the participants believe corruption in the country keeps increasing based on the study trends (Transparency International (TI), 2015). According to the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), 43 percent thought corruption

increased in the previous 12 months, and 44 percent of public service users paid a bribe in the previous 12 months (GCB, 2019).


Figure 1: Corruption Perceptions Index



Source: (CPI, 2022)

Figure 1 shows the CPI of Nigeria; a low score out of 100 indicates that the country is highly corrupted, while a high score indicates that the country is transparent in its dealings. Researchers such as but are not limited to (Ajie and Wokekoro, 2012; Egger and Winner, 2005; Anokhin and Schulze, 2009); have indicated that corruption can be linked to the economy (natural resources, trade, and international agreements) and non-economic (religion, trust, and culture) factors which have had a net negative impact on the growth and development of the country. Hence, associating most emerging economies located in South America, Africa, and Asia with low CPIs, between 39 (*Colombia, Ethiopia, Guyana, Kosovo, Morocco, North Macedonia, Suriname, Tanzania, and Vietnam*) – 11 (*South Sudan*) with (*Denmark, Finland, and New Zealand*) ranking top of the list with 88/100 (CPI, 2022) in both the private and public sectors.


Figure 2: CPI 2022



Source: (CPI, 2022)

Figure 2 shows the CPI of the 180 countries on the continental map or the world with 100/light yellow meaning less corrupt or very clean and 0/dark red meaning highly corrupt for the year 2021. According to Transparency International, the global average of CPI remained the same for the last decade, at 43/100 points. Despite multiple commitments by sovereign governments, 131 nations have made zero significant progress against corruption in the last ten years (2011 – 2021). Two-thirds of countries on the world map and 100% of the countries in Africa score below 50, indicating severe corruption problems, while 27 countries are at their lowest score ever. Based on the Transparency International analysis (CPI, 2022), human rights are crucial in the fight against corruption: countries with well-protected civil liberties generally score higher on the CPI, while countries who violate civil liberties tend to score lower.

Figure 3: CPI 2022



Source: (CPI, 2022)

Figure 3 shows that Nigeria scores below the world's CPI average with a 24/100, tying with (The Central African Republic and Lebanon) which indicates that the country is highly corrupted with a declining trend see Figure 1.

Table 1: Top 25 worst Currencies in Africa

Ranking	Country (Name of Currency)	1 USD to
1	Sao Tome & Principe (Dobra)	20,901
2	Sierra Leonean (Leone)	10,105
3	Guinea-Bissau (West-African CFA Franc)	9,953
4	Guinea (Guinean Franc)	9,930
5	Equatorial Guinea (Central African CFA franc)	9,905
6	Malagasy (Ariary)	3,735
7	Uganda (Shilling)	3,671
8	Tanzania (Shilling)	2,319
9	Burundi (Franc)	1,944
10	Rwanda (Franc)	987
11	Malawi (Kwacha)	765
12	Nigeria (Naira)	625
13	Somali (Shilling)	585
14	Burkina Faso (West African CFA Franc)	541
14	Cote d'Ivoire (West African CFA Franc)	541
14	Togo (West African CFA Franc)	541
14	Benin Republic (West African CFA Franc)	541

14	Mali (West African CFA Franc)	541
14	Niger (West African CFA Franc)	541
14	Senegal (West African CFA Franc)	541
21	Gabon (Central African CFA Franc)	540
21	Cape Verde (Central African CFA Franc)	540
23	Cameroon's (West African CFA Francs)	539
24	Comoros (Comorian Franc)	407
25	Zimbabwe (Zimbabwean Dollar)	362

*Source: (Baha, 2022)*

Table 1 shows that the Nigerian Naira is the 12<sup>th</sup> weakest and list valuable currency in Africa, weaker than the Zimbabwean dollar. The monetary policy power of the Central Bank of Nigeria is so weak that the black market rate at the exchange market overpowers the CBN official rate. Today, the naira has little value among its pairs in Africa and is even weaker against other countries worldwide. According to the World Development Index (WDI), Nigeria is the biggest economy on the continent, ranked as the 26th-largest economy in the world in terms of nominal GDP, with 432.3 billion USD as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as of 2020 (WDI, 2022), most of its citizens live in poverty which has a high correlation to the level of the nation's corruption. Nevertheless, its leaders still borrow money from foreign nations like China and international organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), putting pressure on its local currency in terms of the interest rate. This effect is not due to borrowing but use of the funds. The evidence will show that the money is not used for capital investments but for consumption only, which is plagued with a high corruption CPI. As an effect of the weakening economy and public fund mismanagement, the nation is faced with a high rate of brain drainage.

The contribution of this study to the literature on business attraction, retention, and a business-friendly environment is that the research investigates how the corruption level in Nigeria has affected the country's business environment and the negative economic impact (direct, indirect, and induced) effects of deadweights on the economy. Our analysis utilizes the Ane Osioke International Foundation's ((AOIF) Financial Records (AOIFFR)) as a case study for empirical analysis. The limitation of the study is that some of the analyses are based on projected expenditure numbers and not actual expenditure figures.

## 2. Previous Literature

Corruption is a social phenomenon that is hard to define empirically or theoretically because what is corruption or unethical in a community can be seen as a way of life and ethical in another. Hence, to define corruption, factors like but are not limited to history, politics, social-and-cultural norms, beliefs, the rule of law, and the economic status quo need to be factored into the definition. A theatrical-based study asserts that democracy [which universally is more favored as an economic system compared to dictatorship] has primarily led to the reduction of corruption and promoted economic growth and development (Treisman, 2000), which can be supported by the current standard of living in most democratic western countries. Westernized countries like the United States, Canada, Switzerland, and Israel that practice western democracy are known for their higher level of residents' participation. As a result, their higher level of public participation in the nation's governance leads to economic growth and development (Scully & Slottje, 1991; Vorhies & Glahe, 1988). According to (Alesina et al., 2003), ethnic conflict is one of the essential determinants of political economy. Many believe that the lack of an ethical system that favors all residents in a nation will lead to fractured institutions, political instability, and a decline in economic growth and development. Alesina et al. (2003) support (Easterly & Levine's, 1997) analysis that per capita GDP has an inverse relationship with ethnolinguistic fractionalization in African countries, arguing that much of their economic growth and development failure is due to ethical conflict.

## 3. Methodology

The author used the IMPLAN software to estimate the direct, indirect, and induced economic impact(s) of a hostile business environment. The result depicts the economic deadweight due to the Nigerian government's hostile

dealings with businesses. The appropriateness of this model for this study is justified as IMPLAN is the only Input-Output data company that has the aggregate labor force information on Nigeria (Osiobe, 2018).

### 3.1. Data

The study used publicly available data from the foundations' audited financial reports from 2015 to 2021 (AOIFFR, 2022).

Table 2: Data 1

Year	Expenditure Report ₦	Donations Reports ₦	Total Expenditure ₦	Change in Total Expenditure ₦
2015	791,350.00	-	791,350.00	-
2016	2,029,300.00	250,000.00	2,279,300.00	188.03%
2017	2,430,603.00	650,000.00	3,080,603.00	35.16%
2018	4,410,327.00	91,400.00	4,501,727.00	46.13%
2019	2,923,132.00	1,200,000.00	4,123,132.00	-8.41%
2020	1,150,027.00	9,000,000.00	10,150,027.00	146.17%
2021	15,000,000.00	-	15,000,000.00	47.78%
<b>Total</b>	<b>28,734,739.00</b>	<b>11,191,400.00</b>	<b>39,926,139.00</b>	-

Source: (AOIFFR, 2022)

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Table 3: Data 2

Project Name	Estimated cost ₦
<b>Project – Nayomee</b>	101,000,000.00
<b>Project – Evergreen</b>	50,000,000.00
<b>Project – Woodbury</b>	50,000,000.00
<b>Transactional Cost</b>	49,000,000.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>250,000,000.00</b>

Source: (AOIF Unpublished Statements, 2022)

### 3.2. Methodology

The study methodology builds on (Osiobe, 2018 & 2019) while expanding on the model.

$$Y_i = \beta_i X_1 + \dots + \beta_{i25} X_{25} + \varepsilon_i$$

The Input-Output model shows the relationships/multiplier effect of the monetary transaction from one industrial sector within an economy that may translate [become an input] to another industrial sector within the same economy—showing how dependent each sector is on the other, both as a demander of outputs and as a supplier of inputs.

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} \beta_{1,1} & \dots & \beta_{1,25} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \beta_{25,1} & \dots & \beta_{25,25} \end{pmatrix}, B = \begin{pmatrix} b_1 \\ \vdots \\ b_{25} \end{pmatrix}, C = \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ \vdots \\ x_{25} \end{pmatrix}$$

Where:

A = input-output matrix

B = externa; demand vector

C = production level vector

$$Y = AC + B$$

Where:

$$A \text{ and } B \neq \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

The study also builds on the Leontief Model [Leontief Inverse Matrix or Total Requirement Matrix] (Leontief, 1966):

$$\begin{aligned} I_n Y - AC &= B \\ (I_n - A)Y &= B \\ Y &= (I_n - A)^{-1}B \end{aligned}$$

3.3. Model Information


Table 4: Model Information

<b>Software Year</b>	2011
<b>Model Status</b>	Multiplier
<b>Multiplier Specification</b>	SAM
<b>Gross Regional Production</b>	₦ 35,106,462,154,698
<b>Total Personal Income</b>	₦ 21,315,290,000,000
<b>Number of Industries in the model</b>	25
<b>Land Area (Square Miles)</b>	356,667
<b>Population</b>	206,100,000
<b>Average Household Income</b>	₦636,084

Source: (Implan 11 software and Database for Nigeria, 2022) & author's modification to current data (WDI,2022)

4. Findings

Figure 4: Expenditure Report



Source: (AOIFFR, 2022)

Figure four shows the expenditure report of AOIF from 2015 to 2021 as a percentage of the foundation's yearly spending. The pie chat shows 2021 at 52%, 2018 at 15%, 2019 at 10%, 2017 at 9%, 2016 at 7%, 2020 at 4%, and 2015 at 3%.

#### 4.1. 2015 Expenditure and Donation Economic Impact Results

Based on (AOIFFR, 2022), the economic impact of the AOIF activities in the year 2015 based on our empirical analysis (see Table 10, in the Appendix Section (AS)), shows that the total labor income was ₦ 87,491; the mean labor income was ₦ 29,163.33k; the median labor income was ₦ 3,940; the range of the labor income was ₦ 77,634 (with a min of ₦ 2,958 and max of ₦ 80,592). The total employment effect was 0.2, with a 0.1 direct effect on employment; zero indirect and induced effect on employment. The total value added was ₦ 855,391; the mean value-added was ₦ 285,130.7k; the median value added was ₦ 76,565; the range of the value-added was ₦ 636,891 (with a min of ₦ 70,968 and max of ₦ 707,859). The total output was ₦ 965,264; the mean output was ₦ 32,175.7k; the median output was ₦ 88,136; the range of the output was ₦ 705,572 (with a min of ₦ 85,778 and max of ₦ 791,350).

Based on the AOIF activities, the top ten industry gainers are (see Table 11, in the AS). On the aggregate level of the top ten industries, the total labor income was ₦ 86,312; the mean labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 8631.2k; the median labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 334; the range of the labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 81,626 (with a min of ₦ 26 and max of ₦ 81,652). The total value added of the top ten industries was ₦ 840,464; the mean value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 84,046.4k; the median value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 5,746.5k; the range value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 715,265 (with a min of ₦ 1,899 and max of ₦ 717,164). The total output of the top ten industries was ₦ 942,803; the mean output of the top ten industries was ₦ 94280.3k; the median output of the top ten industries was ₦ 7810.5k; the range output of the top ten industries was ₦ 798,298 (with a min of ₦ 3,455 and max of ₦ 801,753).


#### 4.2. 2016 Expenditure and Donation Economic Impact Results

Based on (AOIFFR, 2022), the economic impact of the AOIF activities in the year 2016 based on our empirical analysis (see Table 12, in the AS) shows that the total labor income was ₦ 224,357; the mean labor income was ₦ 74,785.67k; the median labor income was ₦ 10,104; the range of the labor income was ₦ 199,081 (with a min of ₦ 7,586 and max of ₦ 206,667). The total employment effect was 0.4, with a 0.2 direct effect on employment; 0.1 indirect effects on employment; 0.1 induced effect on employment. The total value added was ₦ 2,193,524; the mean value-added was ₦ 731,174.7k; the median value added was ₦ 196,339; the range of the value-added was ₦ 1,633,213 (with a min of ₦ 219,966 and max of ₦ 1,815,199). The total output was ₦ 2,475,277; the mean output was ₦ 825,092.3k; the median output was ₦ 226,011; the range of the output was ₦ 1,809,334 (with a min of ₦ 219,966 and max of ₦ 2,029,300). The economic impact of the AOIF donations shows total labor income of donations was ₦ 27,640; the mean labor income of donations was ₦ 9,213.33k; the median labor income of donations was ₦ 1,245; the range of the labor income of donations was ₦ 24,525 (with a min of ₦ 935 and max of ₦ 25,460). The total employment effect of donations was 0.1 and a zero direct, indirect, and induced employment effect on the economy. The total value added of donations was ₦ 270,232; the mean value-added of donations was ₦ 90,077.33k; the median value-added of donations was ₦ 24,188; the range of the value-added of donations was ₦ 201,204 (with a min of ₦ 22,420 and max of ₦ 223,624). The total output of donations was ₦ 304,942; the mean output of donations was ₦ 101,647.3k; the median output of donations was ₦ 27,843; the range of the output was ₦ 222,901 (with a min of ₦ 27,099 and max of ₦ 250,000).

Based on the AOIF activities, the top ten industry gainers are (see Table 13, in the AS). On the aggregate level of the top ten industries, the total labor income was ₦ 221,334; the mean labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 22,133.4k; the median labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 856; the range of the labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 209,317 (with a min of ₦ 67 and max of ₦ 209,384). The total value added of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,155,246; the mean value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 215,524.6k; the median value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 14,735.5k; the range value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,834,190 (with a min of ₦ 4,871 and max of ₦ 1,839,061). The total output of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,417,680; the mean output of the top ten industries was ₦ 241,768k; the median output of the top ten industries was ₦ 20,029; the range output of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,047,117 (with a min of ₦ 8,860 and max of ₦ 2,055,977). On the aggregate donations level of the top ten industries, the total donations labor income was ₦ 27,267; the mean donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,726.7k; the median donations labor income of the top ten

industries was ₦ 105; the range of the donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 25,787 (with a min of ₦ 8 and max of ₦ 25,795). The total donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 265,517; the mean donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 26,551.7k; the median donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,815.5k; the range donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 225,964 (with a min of ₦ 600 and max of ₦ 226,564). The total donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 297,845; the mean donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 29,784.5k; the median donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,467.5k; the range of donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 252,195 (with a min of ₦ 1,091 and max of ₦ 253,286).

Figure 5: Total Expenditure



Source: (AOIFFR, 2022)

Figure five shows an upward trend of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the form of donations flowing into the Nigerian economy.

#### 4.3. 2017 Expenditure and Donation Economic Impact Results

Based on (AOIFFR, 2022), the economic impact of the AOIF activities in the year 2017 based on our empirical analysis (see Table 14, in the AS) shows that the total labor income was ₦ 268,725; the mean labor income was ₦ 89,574.67k; the median labor income was ₦ 12,102; the range of the labor income was ₦ 238,450 (with a min of ₦ 9,086 and max of ₦ 247,536). The total employment effect was 0.5, with a 0.3 direct effect on employment; 0.1 indirect effects on employment; 0.1 induced effect on employment. The total value added was ₦ 2,174,162; the mean value-added was ₦ 875,767.7k; the median value added was ₦ 235,166; the range of the value-added was ₦ 1,956,187 (with a min of ₦ 217,975 and max of ₦ 2,174,162). The total output was ₦ 2,964,774; the mean output was ₦ 988,257.7k; the median output was ₦ 270,705; the range of the output was ₦ 2,167,138 (with a min of ₦ 263,465 and max of ₦ 2,430,603). The economic impact of the AOIF donations shows total labor income of donations was ₦ 71,863; the mean labor income of donations was ₦ 23,954.33k; the median labor income of donations was ₦ 3,236; the range of the labor income of donations was ₦ 63,767 (with a min of ₦ 2,430 and max of ₦ 66,197). The total employment effect of donations was 0.1, 0.1 direct effect, and a zero indirect and induced employment effect on the economy. The total value added of donations was ₦ 702,602; the mean value-added of donations was ₦ 234,201; the median value-added of donations was ₦ 62,889; the range of the value-added of donations was ₦ 523,130 (with a min of ₦ 58,292 and max of ₦ 581,422). The total output of donations was ₦ 792,850; the mean output of donations was ₦ 264,283.3k; the median output of donations was ₦ 72,393; the range of the output was ₦ 57,953 (with a min of ₦ 70,457 and max of ₦ 650,000).

Based on the AOIF activities, the top ten industry gainers are (see Table 15, in the AS). On the aggregate level of the top ten industries, the total labor income was ₦ 265,104; the mean labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 26,510.4k; the median labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,025.5k; the range of the labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 250,710 (with a min of ₦ 80 and max of ₦ 250,790). The total value added of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,581,456; the mean value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 258,145.6k; the median value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 17,649; the range value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,196,910 (with a min of ₦ 5,834 and max of ₦ 2,462,556). The total output of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,895,787; the mean output of the top ten industries was ₦ 289,578.7k; the median output of the top ten industries was ₦ 23,989.5k; the range output of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,451,944 (with a min of ₦ 10,612 and max of ₦ 2,462,556). On the aggregate donations level of the top ten industries, the total donations labor income was ₦ 70,894; the mean donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 7,089.4k; the median donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 274; the range of the donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 67,046 (with a min of ₦ 21 and max of ₦ 67,067). The total donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 690,341; the mean donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 69,034.1k; the median donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 4,720; the range donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 587,505 (with a min of ₦ 1,560 and max of ₦ 589,065). The total donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 774,403; the mean donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 77,440.3k; the median donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 6,415.5k; the range of donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 655,707 (with a min of ₦ 2,838 and max of ₦ 658,545).


#### 4.4. 2018 Expenditure and Donation Economic Impact Results

Based on (AOIFFR, 2022), the economic impact of the AOIF activities in the year 2018 based on our empirical analysis (see Table 16, in the AS) shows that the total labor income was ₦ 487,601; the mean labor income was ₦ 162,533.3k; the median labor income was ₦ 21,959; the range of the labor income was ₦ 432,667 (with a min of ₦ 16,487 and max of ₦ 449,154). The total employment effect was 1, with a 0.5 direct effect on employment; 0.2 indirect effects on employment; 0.2 induced effect on employment. The total value added was ₦ 4,767,239; the mean value-added was ₦ 1,589,080; the median value added was ₦ 426,708; the range of the value-added was ₦ 3,549,501 (with a min of ₦ 395,515 and max of ₦ 3,945,016). The total output was ₦ 5,379,579; the mean output was ₦ 1,793,193; the median output was ₦ 491,194; the range of the output was ₦ 3,932,269 (with a min of ₦ 478,058 and max of ₦ 4,410,327). The economic impact of the AOIF donations shows total labor income of donations was ₦ 101,051; the mean labor income of donations was ₦ 33,683.67k; the median labor income of donations was ₦ 4,551; the range of the labor income of donations was ₦ 89,666 (with a min of ₦ 3,417 and max of ₦ 93,083). The total employment effect of donations was 0.2, 0.1 direct employment impact, zero indirect, and induced employment effect on the economy. The total value added of donations was ₦ 987,967; the mean value-added of donations was ₦ 329,322; the median value-added of donations was ₦ 88,431; the range of the value-added of donations was ₦ 735,601 (with a min of ₦ 81,967 and max of ₦ 817,568). The total output of donations was ₦ 1,114,869; the mean output of donations was ₦ 371,623; the median output of donations was ₦ 101,796; the range of the output was ₦ 814,927 (with a min of ₦ 99,073 and max of ₦ 914,000).

Based on the AOIF activities, the top ten industry gainers are (see Table 17, in the AS). On the aggregate level of the top ten industries, the total labor income was ₦ 481,029; the mean labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 48,102.9k; the median labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,860; the range of the labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 454,914 (with a min of ₦ 145 and max of ₦ 455,059). The total value added of the top ten industries was ₦ 4,684,048; the mean value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 468,404.8k; the median value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 32,024.5k; the range value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 3,986,291 (with a min of ₦ 10,586 and max of ₦ 3,996,877). The total output of the top ten industries was ₦ 5,254,403; the mean output of the top ten industries was ₦ 525,440.3k; the median output of the top ten industries was ₦ 43529.5k; the range output of the top ten industries was ₦ 4,449,050 (with a min of ₦ 19,255 and max of ₦ 4,468,305). On the aggregate donations level of the top ten industries, the total donations labor income was ₦ 99,689; the mean donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 9,968.9k; the median donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 385.5k; the range of the donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 94,277 (with a min of ₦ 30 and max of ₦ 94,307). The total donations' value-added of the top ten industries

was ₦ 970,725; the mean donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 97,072.5k; the median donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 6,636.5k; the range donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 826,122 (with a min of ₦ 2,194 and max of ₦ 828,316). The total donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,088,925; the mean donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 108,892.5k; the median donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 9,021; the range of donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 922,025 (with a min of ₦ 3,990 and max of ₦ 926,015).

Figure 6: Change in Total Expenditure



Source: (AOIFFR, 2022)

Figure six shows the percentage change in the FDI flow into the nation due to the AOIF activities in the country.

#### 4.5. 2019 Expenditure and Donation Economic Impact Results

Based on (AOIFFR, 2022), the economic impact of the AOIF activities in the year 2019 based on our empirical analysis (see Table 18, in the AS) shows that the total labor income was ₦ 323,179; the mean labor income was ₦ 107,726.3k; the median labor income was ₦ 14,555; the range of the labor income was ₦ 286,768 (with a min of ₦ 10,928 and max of ₦ 297,696). The total employment effect was 0.6, with a 0.4 direct effect on employment; 0.1 indirect effects on employment; 0.2 induced effect on employment. The total value added was ₦ 3,159,691; the mean value-added was ₦ 1,053,230; the median value added was ₦ 282,819; the range of the value-added was ₦ 2,352,583 (with a min of ₦ 262,144 and max of ₦ 2,614,727). The total output was ₦ 3,565,545; the mean output was ₦ 1,188,515; the median output was ₦ 325,560; the range of the output was ₦ 2,606,279 (with a min of ₦ 316,853 and max of ₦ 2,923,132). The economic impact of the AOIF donations shows total labor income of donations was ₦ 132,671; the mean labor income of donations was ₦ 44,223.67k; the median labor income of donations was ₦ 5,975; the range of the labor income of donations was ₦ 117,724 (with a min of ₦ 4,486 and max of ₦ 122,210). The total employment effect of donations was 0.3 and a 0.1 direct, indirect, and induced employment effect on the economy. The total value added of donations was ₦ 1,297,112; the mean value-added of donations was ₦ 432,370.7k; the median value-added of donations was ₦ 116,103; the range of the value-added of donations was ₦ 965,779 (with a min of ₦ 107,615 and max of ₦ 1,073,394). The total output of donations was ₦ 1,463,722; the mean output of donations was ₦ 487,907.3k; the median output of donations was ₦ 133,648; the range of the output was ₦ 1,069,926 (with a min of ₦ 130,074 and max of ₦ 1,200,000).

Based on the AOIF activities, the top ten industry gainers are (see Table 19, in the AS). On the aggregate level of the top ten industries, the total labor income was ₦ 318,823; the mean labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 31,882.3k; the median labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,233; the range of the labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 301,514 (with a min of ₦ 96 and max of ₦ 301,610). The total value added of the top ten


industries was ₦ 3,104,553; the mean value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 310,455.3k; the median value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 21,226; the range value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,642,084 (with a min of ₦ 7,016 and max of ₦ 2,649,100). The total output of the top ten industries was ₦ 3,482,581; the mean output of the top ten industries was ₦ 348,258.1k; the median output of the top ten industries was ₦ 28,851; the range output of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,948,798 (with a min of ₦ 12,762 and max of ₦ 2,961,560). On the aggregate donations level of the top ten industries, the total donations labor income was ₦ 130,881; the mean donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 13,088.1k; the median donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 506.5k; the range of the donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 123,777 (with a min of ₦ 39 and max of ₦ 123,816). The total donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,274,475; the mean donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 127,447.5k; the median donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 8,713.5k; the range donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,084,625 (with a min of ₦ 2,880 and max of ₦ 1,087,505). The total donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,429,663; the mean donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 142,966.3k; the median donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 11,844; the range of donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,210,536 (with a min of ₦ 5,239 and max of ₦ 1,215,775).

#### 4.6. 2020 Expenditure and Donation Economic Impact Results

Based on (AOIFFR, 2022), the economic impact of the AOIF activities in the year 2020 based on our empirical analysis (see Table 20, in the AS) shows that the total labor income was ₦ 127,146; the mean labor income was ₦ 42,382; the median labor income was ₦ 5,726; the range of the labor income was ₦ 112,822 (with a min of ₦ 4,299 and max of ₦ 117,121). The total employment effect was 0.3, with a 0.1 direct effect on employment; 0.1 indirect effects on employment; 0.1 induced effect on employment. The total value added was ₦ 1,243,095; the mean value-added was ₦ 414,365; the median value added was ₦ 111,268; the range of the value-added was ₦ 925,559 (with a min of ₦ 103,134 and max of ₦ 1,028,693). The total output was ₦ 1,402,767; the mean output was ₦ 467,589; the median output was ₦ 128,083; the range of the output was ₦ 1,025,370 (with a min of ₦ 124,657 and max of ₦ 1,150,027). The economic impact of the AOIF donations shows total labor income of donations was ₦ 995,031; the mean labor income of donations was ₦ 331,677; the median labor income of donations was ₦ 44,812; the range of the labor income of donations was ₦ 882,929 (with a min of ₦ 33,645 and max of ₦ 916,574). The total employment effect of donations was 2; 1.1 direct, 0.4 indirect; 0.5 induced employment effect on the economy. The total value added of donations was ₦ 9,728,338; the mean value-added of donations was ₦ 3,242,779; the median value-added of donations was ₦ 870,769; the range of the value-added of donations was ₦ 7,243,341 (with a min of ₦ 807,114 and max of ₦ 8,050,455). The total output of donations was ₦ 10,977,920; the mean output of donations was ₦ 3,659,307; the median output of donations was ₦ 1,002,364; the range of the output was ₦ 8,024,444 (with a min of ₦ 975,556 and max of ₦ 9,000,000).

Based on the AOIF activities, the top ten industry gainers are (see Table 21, in the AS). On the aggregate level of the top ten industries, the total labor income was ₦ 125,432; the mean labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 12,543.2k; the median labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 485; the range of the labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 118,622 (with a min of ₦ 38 and max of ₦ 118,660). The total value added of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,221,402; the mean value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 122,140.2k; the median value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 8,350.5k; the range value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,039,457 (with a min of ₦ 2,760 and max of ₦ 1,042,217). The total output of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,370,128; the mean output of the top ten industries was ₦ 137,012.8k; the median output of the top ten industries was ₦ 11,351; the range output of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,160,124 (with a min of ₦ 5,021 and max of ₦ 1,165,145). On the aggregate donations level of the top ten industries, the total donations labor income was ₦ 981,620; the mean donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 98,162; the median donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 3796.5k; the range of the donations labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 928,328 (with a min of ₦ 295 and max of ₦ 928,623). The total donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 9,558,572; the mean donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 955,857.2k; the median donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 65,352k; the range donations' value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 8,134,685 (with a min of ₦ 21,602 and max of ₦ 8,156,287). The total donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 10,722,476; the mean donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,072,248; the median donations' output of

the top ten industries was ₦ 88,829.5k; the range of donations' output of the top ten industries was ₦ 9,079,022 (with a min of ₦ 39,292 and max of ₦ 9,118,314).



Source: (AOIFFR, 2022)


Figure seven shows the total donations to public schools made by the AOIF from 2015 to 2021. The pie chart shows 2020 at 80%, 2019 at 11%, 2017 at 6%, 2016 at 2%, 2018 at 1% and 2021 & 2015 at 0%.

#### 4.7. 2021 Expenditure and Donation Economic Impact Results

Based on (AOIFFR, 2022), the economic impact of the AOIF activities in the year 2021 based on our empirical analysis (see Table 22, AS) shows that the total labor income was ₦ 1,658,385; the mean labor income was ₦ 552,795; the median labor income was ₦ 74,686; the range of the labor income was ₦ 1,471,547 (with a min of ₦ 56,076 and max of ₦ 1,527,623). The total employment effect was 3.3, with a 1.8 direct effect on employment; 0.7 indirect, and 0.8 induced effect on employment. The total value added was ₦ 16,213,895; the mean value-added was ₦ 5,404,632; the median value added was ₦ 1,451,281; the range of the value-added was ₦ 1,471,547 (with a min of ₦ 56,076 and max of ₦ 1,527,623). The total output was ₦ 18,296,532; the mean output was ₦ 6,098,844; the median output was ₦ 1,670,606; the range of the output was ₦ 13,374,074 (with a min of ₦ 1,625,926 and max of ₦ 15,000,000).

Based on the AOIF activities, the top ten industry gainers are (see Table 23, in the AS). On the aggregate level of the top ten industries, the total labor income was ₦ 1,636,033; the mean labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 163,603.3k; the median labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 6,327.5; the range of the labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,547,213 (with a min of ₦ 492 and max of ₦ 1,547,705). The total value added of the top ten industries was ₦ 15,930,953; the mean value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,593,095; the median value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 108,920; the range value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 13,557,808 (with a min of ₦ 36,003 and max of ₦ 13,593,811). The total output of the top ten industries was ₦ 17,870,793; the mean output of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,787,079; the median output of the top ten industries was ₦ 148,049; the range output of the top ten industries was ₦ 15,131,703 (with a min of ₦ 65,487 and max of ₦ 15,197,190).

Figure 8: Estimated Cost



Source: (AOIFFR, 2022)

Figure-eight shows the AOIF unpublished estimated financial project activities that would have helped create new jobs and boost the Nigerian economy. However, due to the unfavorable business environment plaguing the nation, the foundation moved its business activities to a more favorable business environment.

#### 4.8. Anticipated Transactional Cost Economic Impact Results

Based on (AOIFFR, 2022), the economic impact of the AOIF unpublished activities in the year 2022 based on our empirical analysis (see Table 24, in the AS) shows that the total labor income was ₦ 1,151,431; the mean labor income was ₦ 383,810; the median labor income was ₦ 382,567; the range of the labor income was ₦ 665,153 (with a min of ₦ 51,855 and max of ₦ 717,008). The total employment effect was 32.7, with a 28.8 direct effect on employment, 3.3 indirect, and 0.6 induced effect on employment. The total value added was ₦ 49,042,545; the mean value-added was ₦ 38,720,827; the median value added was ₦ 9,387,742; the range of the value-added was ₦ 37,786,851 (with a min of ₦ 933,976 and max of ₦ 38,720,827). The total output was ₦ 60,503,444; the mean output was ₦ 20,167,815; the median output was ₦ 10,343,528; the range of the output was ₦ 47,840,084 (with a min of ₦ 1,159,916 and max of ₦ 49,000,000).

Based on the AOIF activities, the top ten industry gainers are (see Table 26, in the AS). On the aggregate level of the top ten industries, the total labor income was ₦ 1,080,923; the mean labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 108,092.3k; the median labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 22,913.5k; the range of the labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 716,556 (with a min of ₦ 583 and max of ₦ 717,139). The total value added of the top ten industries was ₦ 48,391,976; the mean value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 4,839,198; the median value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 365,635; the range value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 38,685,256 (with a min of ₦ 42,640 and max of ₦ 38,727,896). The total output of the top ten industries was ₦ 59,604,129; the mean output of the top ten industries was ₦ 5,960,413; the median output of the top ten industries was ₦ 440,959.5k; the range output of the top ten industries was ₦ 48,878,394 (with a min of ₦ 130,552 and max of ₦ 49,008,946).

#### 4.9. Anticipated Nayomee Project's Cost Economic Impact Results

Based on (AOIFFR, 2022), the economic impact of the AOIF activities in the year 2022 based on our empirical analysis (see Table 24, AS) shows that the total labor income was ₦ 10,879,202; the mean labor income was ₦ 3,626,401; the median labor income was ₦ 1,238,822; the range of the labor income was ₦ 8,660,478 (with a min of ₦ 489,951 and max of ₦ 9,150,429). The total employment effect was 31.3, with a 12.6 direct effect on

employment, 13.3 indirect, and 5.4 induced effect on employment. The total value added was ₦ 105,232,221; the mean value-added was ₦ 35,077,407; the median value added was ₦ 26,269,585; the range of the value-added was ₦ 61,313,431 (with a min of ₦ 8,824,603 and max of ₦ 70,138,034). The total output was ₦ 142,568,360; the mean output was ₦ 47,522,787; the median output was ₦ 30,608,987; the range of the output was ₦ 90,040,625 (with a min of ₦ 10,959,374 and max of ₦ 100,999,999).

Based on the AOIF activities, the top ten industry gainers are (see Table 25, in the AS). On the aggregate level of the top ten industries, the total labor income was ₦ 10,503,644; the mean labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,050,364; the median labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 132,943.5k; the range of the labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 9,153,251 (with a min of ₦ 6,245 and max of ₦ 9,159,496). The total value added of the top ten industries was ₦ 105,232,221; the mean value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 10,054,207; the median value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,089,431; the range value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 69,842,850 (with a min of ₦ 364,683 and max of ₦ 70,207,533). The total output of the top ten industries was ₦ 136,425,010; the mean output of the top ten industries was ₦ 13,642,501; the median output of the top ten industries was ₦ 2,597,650; the range output of the top ten industries was ₦ 100,660,635 (with a min of ₦ 439,444 and max of ₦ 101,100,079).

#### *4.10. Anticipated Evergreen & Woodbury Project's Cost Economic Impact Results*

Based on (AOIFFR, 2022), the economic impact of the AOIF activities in the year 2022 based on our empirical analysis (see Table 24 AS) shows that the total labor income was ₦ 5,385,744; the mean labor income was ₦ 1,795,248; the median labor income was ₦ 613,278; the range of the labor income was ₦ 4,287,365 (with a min of ₦ 242,550 and max of ₦ 4,529,915). The total employment effect was 15.5, with a 6.2 direct effect on employment, 6.6 indirect, and 2.7 induced effect on employment. The total value added was ₦ 52,095,159; the mean value-added was ₦ 17,365,053; the median value added was ₦ 13,004,745; the range of the value-added was ₦ 30,353,184 (with a min of ₦ 4,368,615 and max of ₦ 34,721,799). The total output was ₦ 70,578,396; the mean output was ₦ 23,526,132; the median output was ₦ 15,152,964; the range of the output was ₦ 44,574,567 (with a min of ₦ 5,425,433 and max of ₦ 50,000,000).

Based on the AOIF activities, the top ten industry gainers are (see Table 25, in the AS). On the aggregate level of the top ten industries, the total labor income was ₦ 5,199,823; the mean labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 519,982.3k; the median labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 65,813.5k; the range of the labor income of the top ten industries was ₦ 4,531,313 (with a min of ₦ 3,091 and max of ₦ 4,534,404). The total value added of the top ten industries was ₦ 49,773,299; the mean value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 4,977,330; the median value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,034,372; the range value-added of the top ten industries was ₦ 34,575,668 (with a min of ₦ 180,536 and max of ₦ 34,756,204). The total output of the top ten industries was ₦ 67,537,134; the mean output of the top ten industries was ₦ 6,753,713; the median output of the top ten industries was ₦ 1,285,965; the range output of the top ten industries was ₦ 49,831,997 (with a min of ₦ 217,547 and max of ₦ 50,049,544).

## **5. Conclusion**

An economic impact analysis story will not wholly show the picture to understand the Nigerian business environment. A psychologist, sociologist, and political scientist analysis is also needed. According to (Landes, 1998), the most significant resource a nation and its people should have, is trust; because the lack of that variable in the equation of doing business will inevitably lead to a hostile business environment. According to the (Boston University Global Development Policy Center (BUGDPC), 2022), in 2020, the Chinese loans to Africa database, which the BUGDPC manages, recorded eleven new loans to different African countries [with Nigeria making 5% of the pie] according to (Hwang et al., 2022).

Nigeria has borrowed over \$6.5 billion from China since 2002 to build power plants and transportation systems and, in recent news, to pay for its state's works. The nation's infrastructure backbone II project currently uses about 55% of its annual revenue to service debts which are projected to increase to 96% within the next decade. Today,

Chinese loans represent 10% of Nigeria's debt stock and account for 80% of bilateral loans instead of multilateral institutions. The effects of COVID-19 on African economies led to a 77% reduction in the \$8.2 billion agreement Chinese lending capacity may explain such a drastic drop in Chinese lending amounts to Africa in 2020 and currently moving away from investing in Nigeria (Nyabiage, 2022).

The word motivation seems to be thrown around when inspiring young entrepreneurs. Nigeria is estimated to be the most populated nation by 2030, with youths making up about 65% of its population. Hence the interesting question is, what motivates a nation to be trustworthy like Japan, and what makes a nation to be corrupt. Understanding the question well enough that you put one's-self as a Japanese or Nigerian national may be the key for nations like Nigeria to create a more friendly business environment; which in turn will translate to economic growth and development as it is well known that Japan, when compared to Nigerian, is a natural resource-poor nation but in comparison with Real Gross Domestic Product Japan is a wealthier nation.

Evidence suggests that ordinary Nigerians can be as trustworthy as Japanese nationals, but how do we best achieve this? Because this is fundamentally an issue of individual psychology, and one can not be motivated enough to put their country in order to the degree that is necessary [reducing brain drain, massive out-migration, and increased local corruption at every level of the economy] merely by attracted to the thing the western world [Norway, Finland, and Estonia] have or a potential African euphoria that might emerge as a consequence of Afriacaniess [a vision of heaven] no, a nation needs also be terrified of the hellish conditions its citizen faces of corruption is not reduced and the future of its next-generation on the world stage. Hence the solution is "YOU [the everyday Nigerian that says no to participating in corruption in their little (area/office) of power]" not them but YOU. Because if YOU don't right and take yourself with enough seriousness, the nation will continue to be one with a hostile business environment.

Generally, as a country that pried itself as a religious country in its culture and beliefs, people from the outside might say the nation is not really good at believing in what they say they believe<sup>1</sup> (speaking from the laws of the Torah and the New Testament beliefs). Hence one might argue with solid evidence that the nation is full of conflict and doubts and might not be able to articulate its culture, but its people's way of life is the bedrock of their culture. Hence the ways of the Nigerian government are synonymous with the ways of the Nigerian people at the individual level. Some argue that *"rights are attributed to YOU by the government, but the government is dependant on your actions [hence that statement of the Nigerian people (our government is corrupt)."* To believe that statement is also to believe that the state is an entity and the people are subordinates to the government. This can not be so in a democracy; *"the state is dependant on the individual to the proportion that the individual is dependant on the government,"* hence making the individual and the government one. The failure to see Nigerians within the Nigerian system as one is a step in the wrong direction in solving the country's corruption issues and creating a friendly business environment that will promote economic growth and development; because the individual is the active agent of the state (eyes, hands, mouth, and sense organs of the government).

### **Declaration of Competing Interest**

The author declares that they have no financial interest that could have appeared to directly or indirectly influence the work reported in this paper.

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<sup>1</sup> The divine sovereign individual.

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## Appendix:

Table 5: The Production Account of the Nigerian Economy 2021

Industry Code	Description	Employment	Output ₦	Employee Compensation ₦	Proprietor Income ₦	Other Property Type Income ₦	Tax on Production and Imports ₦
3000	<b>Total</b>	57,833,308.60	44,705,258,363,281	1,722,474,518,005	566,252,337,265	32,793,545,446,289	24,189,853,139
3001	<b>Agriculture</b>	14,369,937.00	2,468,390,750,000	4,461,256,348	4,015,268,555	612,179,375,000	(173,294,128)
3002	<b>Fishing</b>	156,437.20	45,030,437,500	782,185,974	199,231,476	35,102,457,031	7,093,147
3003	<b>Mining and Quarrying</b>	2,730,308.00	3,323,925,250,000	21,027,123,047	17,120,103,516	1,958,215,000,000	4,676,562,012
3004	<b>Food and beverages</b>	622,433.30	1,396,554,875,000	22,300,917,969	9,257,606,445	900,987,187,500	1,321,530,640
3005	<b>Textiles and wearing apparel</b>	255,813.30	222,037,843,750	9,165,431,641	2,303,702,637	153,209,062,500	122,806,641
3006	<b>Wood and paper</b>	529,971.50	444,207,593,750	18,988,138,672	4,878,076,660	354,374,687,500	246,928,253
3007	<b>Petroleum, Chemical, and Non-metal mfg.</b>	951,748.50	1,315,054,750,000	34,099,824,219	11,624,273,438	1,054,070,250,000	1,925,015,747
3008	<b>Metal products</b>	573,480.80	358,452,781,250	20,547,017,578	4,578,950,195	268,071,937,500	346,151,459
3009	<b>Electrical and machinery</b>	1,611,277.50	1,161,742,875,000	57,729,824,219	13,176,477,539	834,692,000,000	433,713,318
3010	<b>Transport equipment</b>	532,395.50	594,186,250,000	19,074,988,281	5,377,593,750	351,898,750,000	170,056,488
3011	<b>Other manufacturing</b>	259,879.70	242,399,546,875	9,311,125,977	2,615,573,730	160,224,062,500	112,877,800
3012	<b>Recycling</b>	457,500.60	101,882,968,750	1,152,485,840	78,491,653	13,303,948,242	15,993,661
3013	<b>Electricity, gas, and water</b>	7,747,352.00	714,770,562,500	19,516,289,063	11,772,144,531	560,155,875,000	1,724,247,314
3014	<b>Construction</b>	573,480.80	1,540,281,750,000	114,411,054,688	25,135,867,188	929,758,437,500	321,706,482
3015	<b>Maintenance and repair</b>	280,635.30	100,227,640,625	5,174,949,707	1,493,704,590	69,572,023,438	292,449,036
3016	<b>Wholesale Trade</b>	5,620,884.50	1,945,014,125,000	103,649,804,688	26,986,919,922	1,467,793,875,000	4,401,108,887
3017	<b>Retail Trade</b>	6,195,669.50	2,601,097,250,000	114,248,914,063	35,396,062,500	1,474,668,125,000	6,882,103,027
3018	<b>Hotels and restaurants</b>	255,813.30	1,612,281,125,000	68,624,554,688	20,268,449,219	859,927,187,500	2,800,576,660
3019	<b>Transport</b>	529,971.50	1,351,310,000,000	70,394,031,250	15,319,787,109	833,171,812,500	965,149,414
3020	<b>Post and telecommunications</b>	1,142,569.00	1,585,894,750,000	53,897,160,156	20,334,052,734	1,295,790,000,000	923,219,971
3021	<b>Financial intermediation and business services</b>	9,497,830.00	13,811,901,000,000	233,043,187,500	129,677,648,438	12,952,378,000,000	(5,587,405,273)
3022	<b>Public Administration</b>	532,395.50	2,363,247,250,000	285,745,656,250	94,258,789,063	1,390,981,750,000	1,044,419,678
3023	<b>Education, Health, and other services</b>	1,868,165.40	5,178,001,000,000	422,495,000,000	104,840,570,313	4,103,201,750,000	1,158,900,024
3024	<b>Private Households</b>	226,039.80	49,607,050,781	11,077,000,000	4,498,473,145	21,976,345,703	31,766,306
3025	<b>Others</b>	311,319.30	177,758,937,500	1,556,596,191	1,044,518,921	137,841,546,875	26,176,577

Source: (Implan 11 software and Database for Nigeria, 2022)

Table 6: The Social Account of the Nigerian Economy 2021

Code	Description	Industry Commodity Production ₦	Institutional Commodity Production ₦	Total Commodity Supply ₦	Net Commodity Supply ₦	Intermediate Commodity Demand ₦	Institutional Commodity Demand ₦	Total Gross Commodity Demand ₦	Domestic Supply/ Demand Ratio	Avg RP C	Avg RSC
3000	<b>Total</b>	44,705,258,363,281	(2,688,946,454)	44,702,569,416,827	39,669,734,276,934	9,598,792,278,992	33,343,992,374,877	42,942,788,653,870	-	-	-
3001	<b>Agriculture</b>	2,468,390,750,000	(177,980,423)	2,468,212,769,577	2,263,733,457,077	2,010,239,264,570	283,854,918	2,294,092,643,918	98.68%	98.68%	91.72%
3002	<b>Fishing</b>	45,030,437,500	(13,491,746)	45,016,945,754	43,807,105,178	37,231,801,382	10,626,413,917	47,858,215,298	91.54%	91.54%	97.31%
3003	<b>Mining and Quarrying</b>	3,323,925,250,000	(74,973,648)	3,323,850,276,352	6,649,276,352	6,625,447,189	8,496,330,551	15,121,777,740	43.97%	43.97%	0.20%
3004	<b>Food and beverages</b>	1,396,554,875,000	(208,727,707)	1,396,346,147,293	1,335,506,412,918	115,195,529,480	1,348,998,630,126	1,464,194,159,606	91.21%	91.21%	95.64%
3005	<b>Textiles and wearing apparel</b>	222,037,843,750	(33,319,256)	222,004,524,494	177,161,801,838	15,611,599,941	193,389,536,125	209,001,136,066	84.77%	84.77%	79.80%
3006	<b>Wood and paper</b>	444,207,593,750	(54,844,383)	444,152,749,367	428,793,571,632	389,218,790,839	136,834,791,893	526,053,582,732	81.51%	81.51%	96.54%
3007	<b>Petroleum, Chemical and Non-metal mfg.</b>	1,315,054,750,000	(70,227,440)	1,314,984,522,560	960,498,522,560	573,550,987,810	756,083,720,848	1,329,634,708,659	72.24%	72.24%	73.04%
3008	<b>Metal products</b>	358,452,781,250	(169,012,543)	358,283,768,707	343,637,556,793	430,703,113,739	49,012,651,947	479,715,765,686	71.63%	71.63%	95.91%
3009	<b>Electrical and machinery</b>	1,161,742,875,000	(426,447,113)	1,161,316,427,887	1,129,655,257,965	491,116,567,196	1,108,424,290,863	1,599,540,858,059	70.62%	70.62%	97.28%
3010	<b>Transport equipment</b>	594,186,250,000	(580,486,938)	593,605,763,062	580,064,094,116	82,016,621,381	736,626,088,501	818,642,709,882	70.86%	70.86%	97.72%
3011	<b>Other manufacturing</b>	242,399,546,875	(58,812,054)	242,340,734,821	236,975,717,243	63,219,907,199	226,482,288,616	289,702,195,816	81.80%	81.80%	97.79%
3012	<b>Recycling</b>	101,882,968,750	(119,094,223)	101,763,874,527	97,534,996,597	1,782,929,129	98,675,883,053	100,458,812,182	97.09%	97.09%	95.85%
3013	<b>Electricity, gas, and water</b>	714,770,562,500	(160,046)	714,770,402,454	708,919,408,313	219,184,951,584	549,737,655,263	768,922,606,848	92.20%	92.20%	99.18%
3014	<b>Construction</b>	1,540,281,750,000	(38,897)	1,540,281,711,103	1,504,795,933,759	240,271,707,866	1,445,949,780,108	1,686,221,487,974	89.24%	89.24%	97.70%
3015	<b>Maintenance and repair</b>	100,227,640,625	(2,701,929)	100,224,938,696	94,430,241,430	6,761,515,691	93,212,373,194	99,973,888,885	94.46%	94.46%	94.22%
3016	<b>Wholesale Trade</b>	1,945,014,125,000	(190,514,328)	1,944,823,610,672	1,880,817,216,141	501,755,487,610	1,521,737,164,719	2,023,492,652,329	92.95%	92.95%	96.71%
3017	<b>Retail Trade</b>	2,601,097,250,000	(32,665)	2,601,097,217,335	2,554,805,721,241	54,521,095,301	2,554,191,886,791	2,608,712,982,092	97.93%	97.93%	98.22%

3018	<b>Hotels and restaurants</b>	1,612,281,125,000	(30,473)	1,612,281,094,527	1,498,039,414,839	31,718,184,946	1,562,548,271,535	1,594,266,456,481	93.96%	93.96%	92.91%
3019	<b>Transport</b>	1,351,310,000,000	(24,375,132)	1,351,285,624,868	937,067,531,118	385,955,646,861	738,704,006,968	1,124,659,653,829	83.32%	83.32%	69.35%
3020	<b>Post and telecommunication</b>	1,585,894,750,000	(2,175,288)	1,585,892,574,712	1,481,399,621,587	416,787,923,949	1,140,093,836,421	1,556,881,760,370	95.15%	95.15%	93.41%
3021	<b>Financial intermeditation and business services</b>	13,811,901,000,000	(481,154,236)	13,811,419,845,764	13,758,686,240,295	3,429,157,042,684	10,628,106,302,673	14,057,263,345,357	97.88%	97.88%	99.62%
3022	<b>Public Administration</b>	2,363,247,250,000	(24,591)	2,363,247,225,409	2,347,405,312,323	2,163,830,302	2,680,704,059,748	2,682,867,890,049	87.50%	87.50%	99.33%
3023	<b>Education, Health, and other services</b>	5,178,001,000,000	(262,697)	5,178,000,737,303	5,074,350,651,365	49,327,865,230	5,275,884,063,479	5,325,211,928,708	95.29%	95.29%	98.00%
3024	<b>Private Households</b>	49,607,050,781	(17,008)	49,607,033,773	48,397,253,988	15,820,875	57,086,064,175	57,101,885,051	84.76%	84.76%	97.56%
3025	<b>Others</b>	177,758,937,500	(41,689)	177,758,895,811	176,601,960,264	44,662,646,239	138,532,904,015	183,195,550,254	96.40%	96.40%	99.35%

Source: (Implan 11 software and Database for Nigeria, 2022)

**Where:**

RPC = A Regional Purchase Coefficient (RPC) is the proportion of the total demand for a Commodity by all users in the Study Area that is supplied by producers located within the Study Area. Average RPC is the proportion of local demand for the Commodity that is currently met by local production.

RSC = The RSC, also known as the Local Use Ratio, indicates the proportion of the local supply of a Commodity that goes to meet local demands. It is calculated by dividing the Local Use of Local Supply by the Total Local Commodity Supply. Average RSC is the proportion of the local supply of the Commodity that goes to meet local demand.

Table 7: The Industry Account of the Nigerian Economy 2021

Code	Description	Household Demand ₦	Federal Government Demand ₦	Capital ₦	Inventory ₦	Foreign Exports ₦
3000	<b>Total</b>	24,659,713,678,178	3,554,503,279,812	2,678,719,313,926	2,206,621,819	5,033,015,641,993
3001	<b>Agriculture</b>	277,278,838,271	589,750,581	2,072,937,978	175,637,759	204,494,057,304
3002	<b>Fishing</b>	9,442,222,741	275,006,481	240,047	12,353,396	1,210,203,170
3003	<b>Mining and Quarrying</b>	3,533,823,314	74,876,402	94,382,906	2,967,800	3,317,275,823,665
3004	<b>Food and beverages</b>	1,230,428,602,580	141,888	168,202	190,411,127	60,848,828,781
3005	<b>Textiles and wearing apparel</b>	159,320,706,487	28,225,399	4,575,904,069	28,247,623	44,849,452,817
3006	<b>Wood and paper</b>	108,816,248,146	1,287,077,543	1,401,673,697	44,709,938	15,361,074,300
3007	<b>Petroleum, Chemical and Non-metal mfg.</b>	540,714,486,243	2,342,462,974	3,099,539,584	50,733,449	354,504,931,511
3008	<b>Metal products</b>	19,509,692,485	974,455,561	14,520,802,462	121,126,840	14,653,120,945
3009	<b>Electrical and machinery</b>	327,159,239,571	66,505,157,455	389,132,243,812	301,283,409	31,672,796,223
3010	<b>Transport equipment</b>	363,235,215,954	45,118,557,348	113,694,658,561	411,716,741	13,554,911,340
3011	<b>Other manufacturing</b>	149,748,781,695	8,075,909,422	27,434,130,392	48,119,797	5,366,319,578
3012	<b>Recycling</b>	94,897,730,640	902,411,930	172,359	115,763,350	4,233,826,984
3013	<b>Electricity, gas, and water</b>	506,838,285,482	141,778	185,144	147,557	5,850,995,451
3014	<b>Construction</b>	18,187,108,736	172,657,369,594	1,099,531,288,709	34,712	35,485,778,240
3015	<b>Maintenance and repair</b>	84,549,355,158	287,106,028	3,207,018,409	2,552,174	5,794,853,483
3016	<b>Wholesale Trade</b>	1,241,559,359,588	17,793,594,547	155,048,757,773	177,098,607	64,012,664,578
3017	<b>Retail Trade</b>	2,464,937,887,310	934,024,806	35,539,354,211	31,990	46,291,496,675
3018	<b>Hotels and restaurants</b>	1,468,232,371,611	3,130,511	179,201	28,634	114,241,681,847
3019	<b>Transport</b>	589,377,873,514	8,501,066,212	17,600,759,074	20,309,750	414,225,565,613
3020	<b>Post and telecommunications</b>	979,650,227,795	8,308,574,177	96,859,400,019	2,069,827	104,493,096,453
3021	<b>Financial intermediation and business services</b>	9,943,920,266,978	92,754,644,711	365,581,225,025	470,950,898	52,735,442,572
3022	<b>Public Administration</b>	71,417,536,498	1,982,946,902,918	291,147,608,237	21,516	15,841,913,251
3023	<b>Education, Health, and other services</b>	3,825,903,673,260	1,143,266,508,369	58,176,357,372	250,322	103,650,091,196
3024	<b>Private Households</b>	47,507,742,934	875,992,209	111,883	14,415	1,209,780,200
3025	<b>Others</b>	133,546,401,189	190,969	214,800	40,189	1,156,935,818
10001	<b>Households</b>	-	-	-	-	-
11001	<b>Government</b>	-	-	-	-	-
14001	<b>Capital</b>	-	-	-	-	-
14002	<b>Inventory Additions/Deletions</b>	-	-	-	-	-

Source: (Implan 11 software and Database for Nigeria, 2022)

Table 8: Multiplier by Top 25 sectors of the Economy in Nigeria

Code	Description	Direct Effect	Indirect Effects	Induced Effects	Total Effects	Type I Multiplier	Type SAM Multiplier
3001	Agriculture	1	2.26552	0.019125	3.284647	3.265522	3.284647
3002	Fishing	1	0.21416	0.030517	1.244682	1.214165	1.244682
3003	Mining and Quarrying	1	0.41285	0.032414	1.445264	1.41285	1.445264
3004	Food and beverages	1	0.67789	0.034659	1.712557	1.677898	1.712557
3005	Textiles and wearing apparel	1	0.29362	0.064353	1.357979	1.293626	1.357979
3006	Wood and paper	1	0.20831	0.062055	1.270371	1.208316	1.270371
3007	Petroleum, Chemical and Non-metal mfg.	1	0.16715	0.043117	1.210267	1.16715	1.210267
3008	Metal products	1	0.18217	0.081237	1.263416	1.182179	1.263416
3009	Electrical and machinery	1	0.21734	0.073315	1.29066	1.217346	1.29066
3010	Transport equipment	1	0.33583	0.060775	1.396611	1.335836	1.396611
3011	Other manufacturing	1	0.27966	0.065264	1.344928	1.279664	1.344928
3012	Recycling	1	0.78922	0.054936	1.844158	1.789222	1.844158
3013	Electricity, gas, and water	1	0.17374	0.053305	1.22705	1.173745	1.22705
3014	Construction	1	0.30305	0.108509	1.411568	1.303059	1.411568
3015	Maintenance and repair	1	0.24465	0.07947	1.324126	1.244656	1.324126
3016	Wholesale Trade	1	0.18046	0.077406	1.257867	1.180461	1.257867
3017	Retail Trade	1	0.38963	0.076328	1.465966	1.389638	1.465966
3018	Hotels and restaurants	1	0.51899	0.07527	1.594259	1.51899	1.594259
3019	Transport	1	0.32034	0.078807	1.399152	1.320345	1.399152
3020	Post and telecommunications	1	0.13764	0.05423	1.191879	1.137649	1.191879
3021	Financial intermediation and business services	1	0.03861	0.029505	1.068119	1.038615	1.068119
3022	Public Administration	1	0.25606	0.180207	1.436268	1.256061	1.436268
3023	Education, Health, and other services	1	0.10839	0.111374	1.219769	1.108395	1.219769
3024	Private Households	1	0.24682	0.340242	1.587071	1.246828	1.587071
3025	Others	1	0.21109	0.023672	1.234764	1.211092	1.234764

Source: (Implan 11 software and Database for Nigeria, 2022)

Type I Multiplier: are representative of indirect effects. This type looks only at business-to-business purchases and does not include the effects of local household spending. This Multiplier is calculated as (Direct + Indirect Effects) / Direct Effect.

Type SAM Multiplier: (where SAM stands for Social Accounting Matrix) is calculated by dividing the sum of the Direct Effects, Indirect Effects, and Induced Effects by the Direct Effects.

Table 9: Industry Coefficient of the Top 25 Sectors of the Economy in Nigeria

Code	Description	Coefficient	Supply Demand Ratio / Regional Purchase Coefficient
3001	Agriculture	0.681365	0.986766
3002	Fishing	0.000041	0.915352
3003	Mining and Quarrying	0.000017	0.439715
3004	Food and beverages	0.005098	0.912110
3005	Textiles and wearing apparel	0.000125	0.847660
3006	Wood and paper	0.002760	0.815114
3007	Petroleum, Chemical, and Non-metal mfg.	0.011805	0.722378
3008	Metal products	0.000830	0.716336
3009	Electrical and machinery	0.001108	0.706237
3010	Transport equipment	0.000126	0.708568
3011	Other manufacturing	0.000133	0.817998
3012	Recycling	0.000001	0.970897
3013	Electricity, gas, and water	0.001624	0.921965
3014	Construction	0.000638	0.892407
3015	Maintenance and repair	0.000075	0.944549
3016	Wholesale Trade	0.006856	0.929491
3017	Retail Trade	0.000280	0.979336
3018	Hotels and restaurants	0.000035	0.939642
3019	Transport	0.003237	0.833201
3020	Post and telecommunications	0.000444	0.951517
3021	Financial intermediation and business services	0.031361	0.978760
3022	Public Administration	0.000014	0.874961
3023	Education, Health, and other services	0.000308	0.952892
3024	Private Households	0.000000	0.847560
3025	Others	0.000349	0.964008
<b>Total Absorption Value</b>		<b>0.748629</b>	
<b>Value Added Coefficient</b>		<b>0.251371</b>	
<b>Total Production Function</b>		<b>1</b>	

Source: (Implan 11 software and Database for Nigeria, 2022)

Table 10 : Showing 2015 Expenditure Economic Impact

Impact Type	Employment	Labor Income ₦	Value Added ₦	Output ₦
Direct Effect	0.1	80,592	707,859	791,350
Indirect Effect	0	2,958	76,565	85,778
Induced Effect	0	3,940	70,968	88,136
<b>Total Effect</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>87,491</b>	<b>855,391</b>	<b>965,264</b>

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 11: Showing 2015 Top 10 Gainers from the Foundation's Activities by sectors of the economy

Sector	Description	Employment	Labor Income ₦	Value Added ₦	Output ₦
3023	Education, Health, and other services	0.1	81,652	717,164	801,753
3021	Financial intermediation and business services	0	2,352	86,298	89,555
3013	Electricity, gas, and water	0	178	3,379	4,071
301	Agriculture	0	26	1,899	7,556
3016	Wholesale Trade	0	566	6,942	8,424
3017	Retail Trade	0	435	4,747	7,569
3020	Post and telecommunications	0	388	7,159	8,282
307	Petroleum, Chemical and Non-metal mfg.	0	280	6,746	8,052
309	Electrical and machinery	0	249	3,186	4,086
306	Wood and paper	0	186	2,944	3,455

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 12: 2016 Economic Impact

Impact Type	Showing 2016 Expenditure Impact				Showing 2016 Donation Impact			
	Employment	Labor Income ₦	Value Added ₦	Output ₦	Employment	Labor Income ₦	Value Added ₦	Output ₦
Direct Effect	0.2	206,667	1,815,199	2,029,300	0	25,460	223,624	250,000
Indirect Effect	0.1	7,586	196,339	219,966	0	935	24,188	27,099
Induced Effect	0.1	10,104	181,986	226,011	0	1,245	22,420	27,843
Total Effect	0.4	224,357	2,193,524	2,475,277	0.1	27,640	270,232	304,942

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 13: Showing 2016 Top 10 Gainers from the Foundation's Activities by sectors of the economy

Sector	Description	Showing 2016 Expenditure Impact				Showing 2016 Donation Impact			
		Employment	Labor Income ₦	Value Added ₦	Output ₦	Employment	Labor Income ₦	Value Added ₦	Output ₦
3023	Education, Health, and other services	0.2	209,384	1,839,061	2,055,977	0	25,795	226,564	253,286
3021	Financial intermediation and business services	0.1	6,031	221,297	229,651	0	743	27,263	28,292
3013	Electricity, gas, and water	0	457	8,664	10,440	0	56	1,067	1,286
301	Agriculture	0	67	4,871	19,377	0	8	600	2,387
3016	Wholesale Trade	0	1,451	17,803	21,603	0	179	2,193	2,661
3017	Retail Trade	0	1,117	12,172	19,410	0	138	1,500	2,391
3020	Post and telecommunications	0	994	18,359	21,237	0	122	2,262	2,616
307	Petroleum, Chemical and Non-metal mfg.	0	718	17,299	20,648	0	88	2,131	2,544
309	Electrical and machinery	0	639	8,171	10,477	0	79	1,007	1,291
306	Wood and paper	0	476	7,549	8,860	0	59	930	1,091

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 14: 2017 Economic Impact

Impact Type	Showing 2017 Expenditure Impact				Showing 2017 Donation Impact			
	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺
<b>Direct Effect</b>	0.3	247,536	2,174,162	2,430,603	0.1	66,197	581,422	650,000
<b>Indirect Effect</b>	0.1	9,086	235,166	263,465	0	2,430	62,889	70,457
<b>Induced Effect</b>	0.1	12,102	217,975	270,705	0	3,236	58,292	72,393
<b>Total Effect</b>	0.5	268,725	2,627,303	2,964,774	0.1	71,863	702,602	792,850

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 15: Showing 2017 Top 10 Gainers from the Foundation's Activities by sectors of the economy

Sector	Description	Showing 2017 Expenditure Impact				Showing 2017 Donation Impact			
		Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺
3023	<b>Education, Health, and other services</b>	0.3	250,790	2,202,744	2,462,556	0.1	67,067	589,065	658,545
3021	<b>Financial intermediation and business services</b>	0.1	7,224	265,060	275,065	0	1,932	70,883	73,559
3013	<b>Electricity, gas, and water</b>	0	547	10,378	12,505	0	146	2,775	3,344
301	<b>Agriculture</b>	0	80	5,834	23,209	0	21	1,560	6,207
3016	<b>Wholesale Trade</b>	0	1,738	21,323	25,875	0	465	5,702	6,920
3017	<b>Retail Trade</b>	0	1,338	14,579	23,248	0	358	3,899	6,217
3020	<b>Post and telecommunications</b>	0	1,191	21,990	25,437	0	318	5,881	6,803
307	<b>Petroleum, Chemical and Non-metal mfg.</b>	0	860	20,719	24,731	0	230	5,541	6,614
309	<b>Electrical and machinery</b>	0	766	9,787	12,549	0	205	2,617	3,356
306	<b>Wood and paper</b>	0	570	9,042	10,612	0	152	2,418	2,838

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 16: 2018 Economic Impact

Impact Type	Showing 2018 Expenditure Impact				Showing 2018 Donation Impact			
	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺
Direct Effect	0.5	449,154	3,945,016	4,410,327	0.1	93,083	817,568	914,000
Indirect Effect	0.2	16,487	426,708	478,058	0	3,417	88,431	99,073
Induced Effect	0.2	21,959	395,515	491,194	0	4,551	81,967	101,796
<b>Total Effect</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>487,601</b>	<b>4,767,239</b>	<b>5,379,579</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>101,051</b>	<b>987,967</b>	<b>1,114,869</b>

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 17: Showing 2018 Top 10 Gainers from the Foundation's Activities by sectors of the economy

Sector	Description	Showing 2018 Expenditure Impact				Showing 2018 Donation Impact			
		Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺
3023	Education, Health, and other services	0.5	455,059	3,996,877	4,468,305	0.1	94,307	828,316	926,015
3021	Financial intermediation and business services	0.1	13,107	480,951	499,105	0	2,716	99,673	103,435
3013	Electricity, gas, and water	0.1	993	18,830	22,690	0	206	3,902	4,702
301	Agriculture	0.1	145	10,586	42,112	0	30	2,194	8,727
3016	Wholesale Trade	0	3,153	38,691	46,951	0	654	8,018	9,730
3017	Retail Trade	0	2,427	26,454	42,184	0	503	5,482	8,742
3020	Post and telecommunications	0	2,160	39,900	46,156	0	448	8,269	9,565
307	Petroleum, Chemical and Non-metal mfg.	0	1,560	37,595	44,875	0	323	7,791	9,300
309	Electrical and machinery	0	1,390	17,758	22,770	0	288	3,680	4,719
306	Wood and paper	0	1,035	16,406	19,255	0	214	3,400	3,990

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 18: 2019 Economic Impact

Impact Type	Showing 2019 Expenditure Impact				Showing 2019 Donation Impact			
	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺
Direct Effect	0.4	297,696	2,614,727	2,923,132	0.1	122,210	1,073,394	1,200,000
Indirect Effect	0.1	10,928	282,819	316,853	0.1	4,486	116,103	130,074
Induced Effect	0.2	14,555	262,144	325,560	0.1	5,975	107,615	133,648
<b>Total Effect</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>323,179</b>	<b>3,159,691</b>	<b>3,565,545</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>132,671</b>	<b>1,297,112</b>	<b>1,463,723</b>

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 19 : Showing 2019 Top 10 Gainers from the Foundation's Activities by sectors of the economy

Sector	Description	Showing 2019 Expenditure Impact				Showing 2019 Donation Impact			
		Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺
3023	Education, Health, and other services	0.4	301,610	2,649,100	2,961,560	0.1	123,816	1,087,505	1,215,775
3021	Financial intermediation and business services	0.1	8,687	318,771	330,803	0	3,566	130,861	135,801
3013	Electricity, gas, and water	0.1	658	12,481	15,039	0	270	5,123	6,174
301	Agriculture	0.1	96	7,016	27,912	0	39	2,880	11,458
3016	Wholesale Trade	0	2,090	25,644	31,119	0	858	10,527	12,775
3017	Retail Trade	0	1,609	17,534	27,959	0	660	7,198	11,478
3020	Post and telecommunications	0	1,432	26,445	30,592	0	588	10,856	12,558
307	Petroleum, Chemical and Non-metal mfg.	0	1,034	24,918	29,743	0	425	10,229	12,210
309	Electrical and machinery	0	921	11,770	15,092	0	378	4,832	6,195
306	Wood and paper	0	686	10,874	12,762	0	2281	4,464	5,239

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 20: 2020 Economic Impact

Impact Type	Showing 2020 Expenditure Impact				Showing 2020 Donation Impact			
	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺
Direct Effect	0.1	117,121	1,028,693	1,150,027	1.1	916,574	8,050,455	9,000,000
Indirect Effect	0.1	4,299	111,268	124,657	0.4	33,645	870,769	975,556
Induced Effect	0.1	5,726	103,134	128,083	0.5	44,812	807,114	1,002,364
Total Effect	0.3	127,146	1,243,095	1,402,767	2	995,031	9,728,338	10,977,919

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 21: Showing 2020 Top 10 Gainers from the Foundation's Activities by sectors of the economy

Sector	Description	Showing 2020 Expenditure Impact				Showing 2020 Donation Impact			
		Employment	Labor Income ₪	Value Added ₪	Output ₪	Employment	Labor Income ₪	Value Added ₪	Output ₪
3023	Education, Health, and other services	0.1	118,660	1,042,217	1,165,145	1.1	928,623	8,156,287	9,118,314
3021	Financial intermediation and business services	0	3,418	125,412	130,146	0.2	26,747	981,459	1,018,506
3013	Electricity, gas, and water	0	259	4,910	5,917	0.2	2,027	38,426	46,304
301	Agriculture	0	38	2,760	10,981	0.2	295	21,602	85,937
3016	Wholesale Trade	0	822	10,089	12,243	0.1	6,435	78,955	95,810
3017	Retail Trade	0	633	6,898	11,000	0.1	4,953	53,985	86,084
3020	Post and telecommunications	0	563	10,404	12,036	0	4,409	81,422	94,189
307	Petroleum, Chemical and Non-metal mfg.	0	407	9,803	11,702	0	3,184	76,719	91,575
309	Electrical and machinery	0	362	4,631	5,937	0	2,836	36,238	46,465
306	Wood and paper	0	270	4,278	5,021	0	2,111	33,479	39,292

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 22: Showing 2021 Expenditure Economic Impact

Impact Type	Employment	Labor Income ₪	Value Added ₪	Output ₪
Direct Effect	1.8	1,527,623	13,417,425	15,000,000
Indirect Effect	0.7	56,076	1,451,281	1,625,926
Induced Effect	0.8	74,686	1,345,189	1,670,606
<b>Total Effect</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>1,658,385</b>	<b>16,213,896</b>	<b>18,296,532</b>

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 23: Showing 2021 Top 10 Gainers from the Foundation's Activities by sectors of the economy

Sector	Description	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺
3023	Education, Health, and other services	1.8	1,547,705	13,593,811	15,197,190
3021	Financial intermediation and business services	0.4	44,579	1,635,766	1,697,510
3013	Electricity, gas, and water	0.3	3,378	64,044	77,173
301	Agriculture	0.3	492	36,003	143,228
3016	Wholesale Trade	0.2	10,725	131,591	159,684
3017	Retail Trade	0.1	8,254	89,974	143,473
3020	Post and telecommunications	0	7,348	135,704	156,981
307	Petroleum, Chemical and Non-metal mfg.	0	5,307	127,866	152,625
309	Electrical and machinery	0	4,727	60,396	77,442
306	Wood and paper	0	3,518	55,798	65,487

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 24: Showing Anticipated Future Expenditure Economic Impact

Impact Type	Nayomee Project				Woodbury & Evergreen Projects (Values X 2)				Transactions			
	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺
Direct Effect	12.6	9,150,429	70,138,034	100,999,999	6.2	4,529,915	34,721,799	50,000,000	28.8	717,008	38,720,827	49,000,000
Indirect Effect	13.3	1,238,822	26,269,585	30,608,987	6.6	613,278	13,004,745	15,152,964	3.3	382,567	9,387,742	10,343,528
Induced Effect	5.4	489,951	8,824,603	10,959,374	2.7	242,550	4,368,615	5,425,433	0.6	51,855	933,976	1,159,916
Total Effect	31.3	10,879,202	105,232,221	142,568,360	15.5	5,385,744	52,095,159	70,578,396	32.7	1,151,431	49,042,545	60,503,444

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 25: Showing Anticipated Top 10 Gainers from the Foundation's Project Activities by sectors of the economy

Sector	Description	Showing Nayomee Project Expenditure Impact				Showing Woodbury & Evergreen Project Expenditure Impact			
		Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺	Employment	Labor Income ₺	Value Added ₺	Output ₺
3014	Construction	12.6	9,159,496	70,207,533	101,100,079	6.2	4,534,404	34,756,204	50,049,544
3021	Financial intermediation and business services	4.2	478,427	17,555,196	18,217,846	2.1	236,845	8,690,691	9,018,736
301	Agriculture	3.5	6,245	457,099	1,818,420	1.8	3,091	226,286	900,208
3016	Wholesale Trade	2.8	193,213	2,370,600	2,876,691	1.4	95,650	1,173,564	1,424,104
308	Metal products	1.6	212,609	2,483,884	3,033,123	0.8	105,252	1,229,645	1,501,546
3013	Electricity, gas, and water	1.6	19,236	364,683	439,444	0.8	9,523	180,536	217,547

309	<b>Electrical and machinery</b>	1.1	141,515	1,808,261	2,318,609	0.5	70,057	895,179	1,147,826
3017	<b>Retail Trade</b>	1	75,550	823,525	1,313,190	0.5	37,401	407,686	650,094
307	<b>Petroleum, Chemical and Non-metal mfg.</b>	0.9	124,372	2,996,725	3,577,006	0.4	61,570	1,483,527	1,770,795
306	<b>Wood and paper</b>	0.7	92,981	1,474,563	1,730,602	0.3	46,030	729,981	856,734

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)

Table 26: Showing the Top 10 Foundation's Transactional Activities Impact by sectors of the economy

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Employment</b>	<b>Labor Income</b>	<b>Value Added</b>	<b>Output</b>
		<b>t</b>	<b>₱</b>	<b>₱</b>	<b>₱</b>
3025	<b>Others</b>	28.8	717,139	38,727,896	49,008,946
3021	<b>Financial intermediation and business services</b>	1.6	181,704	6,667,364	6,919,034
3013	<b>Electricity, gas, and water</b>	0.5	5,715	108,342	130,552
301	<b>Agriculture</b>	0.3	583	42,640	169,629
306	<b>Wood and paper</b>	0.3	40,289	638,931	749,873
3020	<b>Post and telecommunications</b>	0.3	57,371	1,059,556	1,225,683
3016	<b>Wholesale Trade</b>	0.3	17,649	216,542	262,771
308	<b>Metal products</b>	0.2	28,178	329,200	401,993
309	<b>Electrical and machinery</b>	0.1	15,608	199,435	255,722
307	<b>Petroleum, Chemical and Non-metal mfg.</b>	0.1	16,687	402,070	479,926

Source: (Author's Calculation, 2022)