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Neoliberal Economy and Inequalization[1]: The Experience of Underprivileged Global Regions during 1985-2008

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Abstract
The perspective of plausible new paradigm of inflated unequal economic growth during the era of globalization produced a mounting paradoxical order of persistent inequality in a new form. The paradigm of massive historical process spurred by the Neo-liberal doctrine deteriorated the developing regions with sheer experience of the concentration of poverty and social insecurity. The most tragic aspect is that it eroded the hope of success of the poor regions by creating their dependency institutionalized with the institutionalization of ever-growing gap between countries and within countries. However, the usual consequence of the crises of neoliberal financial market capitalism led to a new political dimension of 'Post-neoliberalism'. Focusing briefly on these key-issues, the present article attempts to explore the consequential effect of the unleashed capital over the developing and underprivileged global regions. Finally, the article concludes with the need for the accomplishment of the solidarity of common development towards the space of social security and a real democratic global environment. Hence, the approach towards social solidarity would invariably be an alternative paradigm of today's global society.

Keywords: Alternative Paradigm, Inequality, Post-Neoliberalism, Social Insecurity, Social Solidarity, Unleashed Capital

1. Introduction

1. 1. Globalization, Its Voyage and the Reality

As a massive historical process, the voyage of world capitalism is tremendous. It is capable enough to explore the new model in place of an old one to defend its uncompromising 'rights' and 'privileges' and to promote its expansion ruthlessly. In reality, in the process of its prospect, once it brought about the so-called commercial revolution and ensured its transition to the industrial revolution in the course of its development. This gave rise

[1] Ralf Dahrendorf used the terminology, 'Inequalization' to denote the new form of social exclusion caused from economic globalization which endangered civil society in the multi-dimensional ways (Dahrendorf, Ralf (1995). *Economic Opportunity, Civil Society and Political Liberty*. Discussion Paper 58, March, UNRISD.

to a hegemonic order based on the dominant ideology of liberalism. It is needless to say that it was the manifestation of 'mature' capitalism of Keynesianism which conveyed a device of historical compromise between the policies of laissez-faire and domestic control which gained momentum during the Bretton Woods world order in the post-war period. However, since the beginning of the 1980s, this principle of compromise has been eroded sharply with the deregulatory market-driven strategies as a response to the growing dissatisfactions over the capacity of the welfare state. However, spurred by Neo-liberal doctrine and based on the myth of greater interconnectedness of the people and interdependence of the global states, the new paradigm tends to project a conscious political tool in the name of 'new opportunity' with the enormity of transnational capital and ruthless expansion of corporations that are mostly 'non-transparent'. – This is a self-creating and self-regulating arrangement that is popularly known as globalization – a neoliberal consensus that established a 'new political play field' (Sader, 2009) with the demands for the 'retreat of the state'. It is more likely a scenario of the shift from 'mature' capitalism to transnationalism or global capitalism. Emir Sader tells us that this paradoxical order which caused the shift brought about a number of displacements.[2] Ralf Dahrendorf found a complexion of the 'new forms of inequality' and 'new kinds of social exclusion' associated with the growth of an 'underclass' of which people are 'truly disadvantaged' (Dahrendorf, 1995). The author expressed vigorously the arguments that in this fragile system, "the rich can get richer without them; government can even get re-elected without their votes; and GNP can rise and rise and rise" (ibid.). This whole complexion of uncompromising order that the present world is experiencing is, however, the consequence of new choices of unilateral power-relations, Dahrendorf called it "perverse choices" (ibid.).

But, a reality of understanding of different nature developed when the transnational individual states needed to reassert their power especially after the epoch-making international affair of 11 September, 2001 following the skeptical policy of protection. However, the climactic device of the retreat of the state has been eroded away when the dominant states have found adequate reasons to rationalize and legitimize the policy of protectionism in an order of 'new globalization' – really, an era of confusions.

These plausible arrangements are continuing the legacy of unreal growth followed by squeezing policy measures with the exacerbating multi-variant inequalities and widening gaps mostly in the developing and underdeveloped countries. Because, in the ever-changing global perspective, the globalizers have to measure 'success' not in the light of hope of the hapless millions but how the weak nations have swallowed medicines, as if "that would cure their ills" (Byres, 1997) or, how far these countries have succeeded in reducing themselves in size and their scope. In this perspective, either these countries are trying to catch up with equality measures or they have lost their ways in the labyrinth.

2. Literature Review

The Neoliberalism which embraces a game of unequal power relations in the global arena in the name of 'equality of opportunity' produced ultimately a mounting paradox. Bjorn Hettne viewed it as the self-creating and self-regulating arrangement which articulated the interests of the 'strong economic actors' (Hettne, 1997). Joseph A. Camilleri commented that the jargon of the new economy has resulted in the complexion of predominance of "mutually-reinforcing power of transnational capital…" (Camilleri, 2000). This situation has ultimately resulted in the massive commercialization of human relations and deepening concentration of global capital what Douglas Hellinger called, a fragile arrangement of "just to go into deregulated markets and make a quick profit and get out" (Douglas, 1995). Consequently, the new order intimately associated with the policy of free market about which Raff Carmen commented that it has not freed the markets rather 'enslaves countries' (Carmen, 1996). – Dilip S. Swamy called it a hidden global agenda of recolonization 'without occupation' (Swamy, 1997).

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[2] The displacements about which Emir Sader spoke of, are: the state "by the market, workers and citizens by consumers, rights by competition, work and electoral documents by credit cards, public squires by shopping centers, human companionship by television, social policies by private corporate welfare, the national by the global, social integration by social exclusion, equality by discrimination, justice by inequality, solidarity by selfishness, humanism by consumerism, social parties and movements by NGOs and volunteer organizations" (Sader, Emir (2009). Postneoliberalism in Latin America. *Development Dialogue,* No. 51).

In this order of unequal trade liberalization, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank - the twin patronages and mostly controversial lending institutions became more and more intrusive when they introduced the package of stabilization with 'insistent cross conditionalities' during the 1980s. During its new inception, despite wide ranging debates as it was expressed in the 'Arusha Initiative',[3] the IMF began to impose 'medicines' for the sick nations with monopolistic overtones of decision-making. Therefore, the developing world had to face new precarious IMF arrangements about the history of which Ismail-Sabri Abdalla called "the international monetary disorder" (Abdalla, 1980).

With this paradoxical order of crises, globalization contextualized itself more in the developing countries in the name of 'stabilization' which tended to give rise to "Structural Adjustment Programmes" (SAPs). In practice, as Hiemenz stated, "stabilization" is a device of the SAPs for the implementation of imposed programmes …. a new paradigm of unilateral massive process on a regular basis for the reduction of state interventions, "privatization of statal enterprises, liberalization of foreign trade and international capital transactions, devaluation of national currencies, deregulation of the domestic capital market and a slimming of public administration in the broadest sense" (Hiemenz, 1993).

Strikingly enough, in 1998, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acknowledged the order of widening income gaps. While the situation of extreme inequality heightens the importance of the policy of equity, the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department tried to exalt the argument that the 'policy choices are not always so easy' (IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, 2004). Therefore, it prescribed the medicines: "the most effective tool for redistributing income is fiscal policy" (ibid.). Killick and Malick identified the complicated and varied degree of effects of SAP measures which caused the poor to be at high risk (Killick and Malick, 1991). Ngaire Woods meaningfully analyzed the role of the IMF, World Bank and other international organizations like, WTO, G-8, and the EU that these "will manage globalization but in the interests of their most powerful members. Institutions will only accommodate the needs and interests of weaker states where in so doing they do not diminish the dominant position of powerful states" (Woods, 2005).

3. Research Problem and Purpose

However, the question is unequivocally significant – what is the 'historical' order of globalization and how far has it exacerbated inequality – the threat of 'new' socio-economic insecurity and growing 'new' inequality faced by the teeming millions in the developing and underdeveloped countries during the so called epoch making era of globalization? Hence, the study of the nature of the socio-economic inequality in the developing world during the period under study (1985-2008), is likely to yield a prognostication closer to the reality of poverty and the socio-political and economic trend.

4. Research Method

As the objective of the study suggests that the research question thought to be addressed, the present study is the combination of descriptive and diagnostic research. The descriptive method is used for describing the trend of global poverty in general and the intensity of inequality, widening gap and the threat of insecurity in the underprivileged global regions in particular during the period selected for study. The study also intended to diagnose the impact of Neoliberal Economy over the regions. In fine, the research design that was followed was an eclectic design to describe and diagnose simultaneously so that the objective of the study could be properly addressed.

[3] The 'Arusha Initiative' was taken up in the South North Conference on "The International Monetary System and the New International Order" held in Arusha, Tanjania from 30th June to 3rd July, 1980. In the 'Arusha Initiative' it was found inadequacies of the IMF that it "is not scientific …. not objective …. not neutral …" and "a basically political institution …" ("Arusha Initiative — A call for a United Nations Conference on International Money and Finance". *Development Dialogue*, 1980: 2).

5. Analytical Discussions and Results

5. 1. Historical Disorder of Global Inequality - Population factor and Development Domain

During the late 1950s, the understanding of over-population as a threat and the calculation of doubling and further doubling of population in the countries led to the realization of a rational interlink between population and the protection of the population in the early 1970s. However, the literature on the discourses on population, like Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb,* contributed to the understanding of the fear of global disaster. (Ehrlich, 1968). In 1972, the Club of Rome to its credit offered explicitly the idea of the world as a 'system' of which existence was endangered as a consequence. It is worth noting that despite some achievements on some indicators, like economic growth, literacy, child mortality etc. in the developing counties up to the mid-1970s which happened 'historically', low rates of per capita income continue due to the high rates of population growth (Trainer, 1997).

Table 1.1: Demographic Trend and the Growth of Population

Region	**Total population (millions)**			**Annual population growth rate (%)**		**Total fertility rate (births per woman)**	
	1975	2003	2015[a]	1975-2003	2003- 15[a]	1970-75	2000-05
Developing Countries	2967.1	5022.4	5885.6	1.9	1.3	5.5	2.9
Least Developed	355.2	723.2	950.1	2.5	2.3	6.6	5.0
Arab States	144.6	303.9	386.0	2.7	2.0	6.7	3.7
East Asia and the Pacific	1310.4	1928.1	2108.9	1.4	0.7	5.0	1.9
Latin America and the Caribbean	318.4	540.7	628.3	1.9	1.3	5.1	2.5
South Asia	838.7	1503.4	1801.4	2.1	1.5	5.6	3.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	313.1	674.2	877.4	2.7	2.2	6.8	5.5
Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS[b]	366.6	406.3	396.8	0.4	-0.2	2.5	1.5
OECD[c]	925.7	1157.3	1233.6	0.8	0.5	2.6	1.8
High Income	781.8	948.3	1005.6	0.7	0.5	2.2	1.7
Middle Income	1849.6	2748.6	3182.5	1.4	0.8	4.5	2.1
Low Income	1440.9	2614.5	3128.5	2.1	1.6	6.0	3.9
World	**4073.7**	**6313.8**	**7219.4**	**1.6**	**1.1**	**4.5**	**2.6**

Notes: (a) Data refer to medium–Variant projection; (b) Commonwealth of Independent States; (c) Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Source: UNDP Human Development Report – 2005, Oxford University Press.

It appears from the Table 1.1 that the occurrence of the rapid growth of population is mainly concentrated in the middle and low income countries. The records in the Table 1.1 demonstrate that the rate of growth (in percentage) of population in the regions where incidence of poverty is high between 1975 and 2003 corresponded to the high fertility rate. There we find that Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS and the OECD countries show a low annual growth rate (0.4% and 0.8% respectively) between 1975 and 2003 and an estimate of population (- 0.2% and 0.5% respectively - annual growth rate) between 2003 and 2015 with low fertility rate. By contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia where "extreme poverty is heavily concentrated" (Sen, 2006), show grievous records of annual growth rate (2.7% and 2.1% respectively) between 1975 and 2003 with high rate of fertility. One thing is clear that the developing and the least developed countries which constitute 91 percent of the world's population (2003), are still carrying out the evidences of rapid growth of population and "exhibit no perceptible approach to the demographic transition" (Eswaran, 2006). This situation 'blights the lives' of many people in large regions of the world which is also a strong evidence of the continuation of impoverishment and "underdeveloped living conditions" (Trainer: op.cit.). It attributes to the agreement that the indicators failed to ensure a real effect, as Trainer told, "if satisfactory development were taking place the force of the most important factor generating the population problem would diminish" (ibid.). While these two factors are reinforcing to each other, the story of the ever-growing number of sparrows in the developing and underdeveloped global house continues and multiplies.

5. 2. Global Poverty – The Reality

UNDP has made the implication of poverty crystal clear and emphasized more on the 'situation' which holds up individual from the 'basic needs' that ultimately causes poverty of manifold nature. However, the totality of the multidimensional concepts [4] of manifold poverties [5] has been analyzed by Isidro Morales as 'situational syndrome' (Morales, 1994). Majid Rahnema conceived of 'four dimensions of poverty' of which the first and foremost is 'the materialities', lack of which is perceived as poverty which may be of 'non-material' and of 'material' in nature. The non-material factors indicate 'one's inability to meet one's end and 'material' factors include "discrimination, inequality, political or other forms of oppression and domination, absence of entitlements…" etc. (Rahnema, 2000).

While the traditional concept of development conceived of the myth of sharing through 'increased productivity' and many modern analysts viewed about 'trickle-down effect', Robert Chambers spoke of the 'deprivation trap' of poverty in which the factors, like 'powerlessness', 'vulnerability', 'physical weakness', 'poverty' and 'isolation' construct webs and interact with each other (Chambers, 1983). The conceptual framework of poverty was further rigidly grounded by scholars like Dreze and Sen who raised the question of 'deprivation' in the forefront and viewed that poverty is ultimately a matter of "capacity deprivation" (Dreze and Sen, 1998), Caroline Thomas called it "society focused approach" which considers the problem in the light of distribution system (Thomas, 2005). More significantly, in 1997, UNDP focused attention on various forms of deprivation as it reported, "deprivation in basic capacities encompasses deprivation in years of life, health, housing, knowledge, participation, personal security and environment. When these different kinds of deprivation interact, they severely constrain human choices." (UNDP, 1997).

These conceptual analyses indicate about the fact that the present world is passing through a more appalling contrasts – while a few are markedly prosperous and have their immense economic abundance, many have to survive on sub-standard incomes. However, the greater regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia etc., commonly known as 'poor regions' are variously described as 'backward', 'underdeveloped', and 'developing' regions. As UNDP reported, the regions of South Asia, East Asia and, South-East Asia and the Pacific combined had 960 million of the 1.3 billion people who existed on the income of less than US $1 a day. Some 840 million lived with hunger and the number was growing from the middle of 1990s. In Latin America, Poverty had been growing and the Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest incidence of both human poverty and income poverty (UNDP, 1998). As the UNDP (2005) stated that while in 2003 the High Income and High Income OECD countries recorded the mortality rate of under-five (per 1000 live births) only 6 in number, it is recorded 183 in Low Human Development Countries and 179 in Sub-Saharan African countries (UNDP, 2005). While the World Bank's (2006) estimate of inequality between countries showed a trend of steady decline from 78 percent in 1988 to 74 percent in 1993, and 67 percent in 2000 (World Bank, 2006), and the orthodox group's measurement of extreme poverty shows also a declining trend during 1990s, Caroline Thomas revealed the fact that the scenario is "uneven" (Thomas, 2005: op. cit.).

However, the above discussion refers to the situation when a large part of the world's population did not have the money to satisfy their basic needs, dollar was growing evermore as a result of globalization. Consequently,

[4] It comprises the concepts, like absolute standard of poverty, relative concept of poverty, secondary poverty, temporary poverty, chronic poverty, etc. — (For fuller conceptualization, Vide, Scott, Wolf (1981). *Concepts and Measurement of Poverty*. UNRISD).

[5] The Hammarskjold Foundation explained poverty of manifold, which are: Poverty of subsistence (due to insufficient income, food, shelter, etc.), Poverty of protection (due to bad health system, violence etc.); Poverty of affection (due to authoritarianism, oppression, exploitative relations with the natural environment, etc.); Poverty of understanding (due to poor quality of education); Poverty of participation (due to marginalization and discrimination of women, children and minorities); Poverty of identity (due to imposition of alien values upon local and regional cultures, forced migration, political exile, etc.). (For details, Vide, Development and Human Needs – Reflection on a New Perspective, *Development Dialogue*, 1989: 1).

the new global construction of market economy generated a gap that caused inequality which is ultimately both a cause and consequence of poverty.

Table 2.1: Number of People Living on US $ 1 a Day and Its Change during 1990s

Region	**Number (millions)**			**(%)[a] of people Below Poverty Line**		
	1990	1999	Change	1990	1999	Change
Sub-Saharan Africa	241	315	(+) 74	47.4	49.0	(+) 1.6
East Asia and the Pacific	486	279	(-) 207	30.5	15.6	(-) 14.9
South Asia	506	488	(-) 18	45.0	36.6	(-) 8.4
Latin America and the Caribbean	48	57	(+) 9	11.0	11.1	(+) 0.1
Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS[b]	31	97	(+) 66	6.8	20.3	(+) 13.5
Middle East and North Africa	5	6	(+) 1	2.1	2.2	(+) 0.1
Total[c]	**1286**	**1145**	**(-) 141**	**27.2[d]**	**22.9[d]**	**(-) 4.3[d]**

Notes: (a) Percentage of total regional population; (b) Measured using $ 2 a day poverty line, the international poverty line- also, a more appropriate extreme poverty line for central and Eastern Europe, and the CIS; (c) Data for all the regions are based on $ 1 a day poverty line and (d) Data show average of the regions.
Source: UNDP (2003), Human Development Report – 2003, Oxford University Press.

The Table 2.1 demonstrates that during the period specified, the total number of People living on US $ 1 a Day declined from 1286 million to 1145 million which means the reduction of 141 million (or, 4.3% reduction in average) people below the poverty line. But, it does not indicate overall progress, because much of the positive records, as UNDP cited, had been driven by China which recorded the lifting of 150 million people out of poverty during 1990s with 9 percent annual economic growth (UNDP, 2003). However, it appears from the Table 2.1 that East Asia and the Pacific carried a significant record of improvement in poverty reduction (or, 14.9% reduction, from 30.5% to 15.6% or, 486 million to 279 million). The other regions showed an overall bleak scenario. The DFID (2001) estimated the poverty trends during 1990-1998 of middle-income countries. It revealed that though income poverty during the period 'has fallen by over one-third' in aggregate, one of the reversed records also revealed that it had been more than double in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (DFID, 2001). Likewise, in our present analysis, it appears that in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the number of people below poverty line (measured with $ 2 a day) increased disappointingly by 66 million which had more than tripled (or, as records demonstrate, 13.5% increment) the number in 1990. Further, it appears from the DFID study that on overall basis, the number of people living below US $1 a day declined by 41 million (from 179 to 138 million, with 3% reduction - estimated) but, according to the poverty line estimated below US $ 2 a day, the regions recorded an additional increase of 40 million people.[6] Thus, the records are no cause for complacency.

Isidro Morales estimated that in Latin American Countries 'the intensity of poverty declined' during 1970-80 but increased from 1980-86 by 2 percent as compared to 1980 and it 'became more acute' – the records of which contrasted to the CEPAL (Commission for Latin America) figures (Morales, 1994: op.cit.). In our estimate, it appears that in Latin America and the Caribbean, the records (Table 2.1) had been disappointing during 1990-99, the decade of growing globalization. Even though the percentage of people compared to the total regional population below the poverty line stayed almost similar during the period, more 9 million people had been added to the figure of 1990. The Middle East and the North African Countries demonstrate an almost similar picture with the addition of 1 million poor people.

For the Sub-Saharan region, the end of colonial domination of the European powers, especially by Britain, France, Portugal, Holland and Belgium, had been symbolized with the 'wind change' in 1960. However, in

[6] DFID used the data of Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2001 – Data are based on 1993 purchasing power parity.

reality, the process of decolonization and the transition to independence of these sick countries had been hindered either by the 'different attitudes' of predominance of these external powers or by the indigenous prolonged conflicts. The powers which wanted to preserve their empires followed the strategy of withdrawing military dictatorship from the regions, at last. But, the infant countries faced unprecedented domination of 'Mercenarism' in the era of globalization. In fact, this 'mercenarism' in Africa was "an instrument of foreign policy and a neocolonialist device of western government" (Francis, 1999). Whether legitimate or legal or not, the mercenary companies with their corporate nature got stronghold legitimacy as these are "privately approved by the western governments and international financial institutions (ibid.). The Strategic Resource Corporations (SRC), the parent multinational firm which comprises a large number of companies, followed the device of making Africa safe for investment for financial gains from diamond, oil and other rich mineral resources in the name of their fragile arrangements of stability, economic prosperity and security.

This had been genuinely a precarious situation in which the globalizers forged justice and deprived the teeming millions of being liberated constitutionally as the mercenaries were 'opposition to self-determination'. Joseph Stiglitz, the noble laureate and eminent economist rightly commented, "historically, Africa is the region most exploited by globalization: during the years of colonialism the world took its resources but gave back little in return…" (Stiglitz, 2006). This story of exploitation still continues without territorial occupation.

However, if not failed altogether, the Sub-Saharan African Countries showed a worrying instance with the record of dismal economic performance. All independent studies and institutions revealed the records of both income poverty and human poverty. As the UNDP (2003) noted that during 1990s, the per capita income fell in 54 countries of which "32 are top priority countries facing economic crises. Many are extremely poor, and most are in Sub-Saharan Africa" (UNDP, 2003: op. cit.). Emmerij, Jolly and Weiss estimated that despite 'costly' SAP policies followed by most countries to integrate the global economy, a bulk of population of Sub-Saharan African countries lacked the basic needs and, thereby, the number of people with below US $1 a day rose from about 240 million to more than 290 million during 1990–98 (Emmerij, Jolly and Weiss, 2001). It appears from our present analysis that the number had risen from 241 million to 315 million between 1990 and 1999 or, an additional about 74 million poor people had been recorded over the years (estimated) (Table 2.1). In percentile terms, the countries recorded 1.6 percent increment of the people with US $ 1 a day during 1990-99. Mentioning the estimates of Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula (2007), the World Bank illustrations with US $ 1 a day poverty line demonstrated similar growing trend of the number of poor in South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries during 1993-2002. It revealed the fact that the subsequent decline of the rate of poverty in the developing countries (from 28 percent in 1993 to 22 percent in 2002) was mainly the result of the declining trend of rural poverty (from 37 percent to 29 percent). Whereas, the urban rate of poverty remained almost constant (at 13 percent) during the period (1993-2002). However, strikingly, the illustrations also revealed the reality that only the East Asia and the Pacific have driven this positive change of large decline (from 1036 million in 1993 to 883 million in 2003). In South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries, the number of poor people in rural areas continued its rising trend (World Bank, 2008).

However, of the 48 Sub-Saharan countries, 15 countries have been selected (by using purposive sampling method), most of which are 'Top' and 'High' priority countries, to see the trend of incidence of poverty by using both National Poverty Line of the individual countries and the International Poverty Line (People living below US $ 1 and 1.25 a day). Available records of the selected countries of Sub-Saharan Africa during the period specified in the Table 2.2 differently for each country illustrate that the incidence of poverty increased almost in every country enormously. This trend of increasing poverty confirms that the enormity of poverty is probably because of the progress of the global 'winners'. As per data available, the Table 2.2 in our present study provides a clear message about the 21st century trend of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the selected countries, nine countries, i.e. Burundi, Chad, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia had disappointingly recorded more than 60 percent people below poverty line (estimated with National Poverty Line) – strikingly, it is more than 70 percent in Madagascar and Sierra Leone (71.3% and 70.2%

Table 2.2: Number of People Living below Poverty Line and the Present State of their Living Below US $ 1 and 1.25 a day in some Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries (in %)

Countries	**HDI[a] rank**	**HPI[b] rank**	**National Poverty Line (People Below Poverty Line)**			**People Below $1[c] and $ 1.25[d] a day**		
			Year	**Number (%)**	**Change (%)[e]**	**Year**	**Number (%)**	**Change (%)[f]**
Botswana	125	75	1987-2000	N.A.	_	1990-2001	23.5	(+) 7.7
	125	81	2000-2006	N.A.		2000-2007	31.2	
Burundi	171	80	1987-2000	N.A.	_	1990-2001	58.4	(+) 22.9
	174	116	2000-2006	68.0		2000-2007	81.3	
Cameroon	142	58	1987-2000	N.A.	_	1990-2001	33.4	(-) 0.6
	153	95	2000-2006	40.2		2000-2007	32.8	
Central African Rep.	168	85	1987-2000	N.A.	_	1990-2001	66.6	(-) 4.2
	179	125	2000-2006	N.A.		2000-2007	62.4	
Chad	165	88	1987-2000	N.A.	_	1990-2001	N.A.	_
	175	132	2000-2006	64.0		2000-2007	61.9	
Lesotho	137	83	1987-2000	N.A.	_	1990-2001	43.1	(+) 0.3
	156	106	2000-2006	68.0		2000-2007	43.4	
Madagascar	149	57	1987-2000	71.3	00	1990-2001	49.1	(+) 18.7
	145	113	2000-2006	71.3		2000-2007	67.8	
Malawi	162	82	1987-2000	65.3	00	1990-2001	41.7	(+) 32.2
	160	90	2000-2006	65.3		2000-2007	73.9	
Mozambique	170	87	1987-2000	N.A.	_	1990-2001	37.9	(+) 36.8
	172	127	2000-2006	54.1		2000-2007	74.7	
Namibia	124	62	1987-2000	N.A.	_	1990-2001	34.9	(+) 15.0
	128	70	2000-2006	N.A.		2000-2007	49.9	
Niger	174	94	1987-2000	N.A.	_	1990-2001	61.4	(+) 4.5
	182	134	2000-2006	63.0		2000-2007	65.9	
Rwanda	158	77	1987-2000	N.A.	_	1990-2001	35.7	(+) 40.9
	167	100	2000-2006	60.3		2000-2007	76.6	
Sierra Leone	175	N.A.	1987-2000	N.A.	_	1990-2001	57.0	(-) 3.6
	180	128	2000-2006	70.2		2000-2007	53.4	
Tanzania (United Rep. of)	160	59	1987-2000	41.6	(-) 5.9	1990-2001	19.9	(+) 68.6
	151	93	2000-2006	35.7		2000-2007	88.5	
Zambia	163	89	1987-2000	72.9	(-) 4.9	1990-2001	63.7	(+) 0.6
	164	110	2000-2006	68.0		2000-2007	64.3	

Notes: (a) Human Development Index – a composite Development Index measured by UNDP; (b) Human Development Index – a composite Poverty Index measured by UNDP; (c) International Poverty Line: people below US $ 1 a day is less than US $ 1.08 a day at 1993 International Prices. (Data in Column 8, related to the period during 1990-2001 in Column 7, refer to the population below US $ 1 a day); (d) The International Income Poverty Line is people below US $ 1.25 a day, at 2005 International Prices adjusted for PPP (Purchasing Power Parity). (The data in Column 8 related to the period during 2007-2007 in Column 7, refer to the population below US $ 1.25 a day); (e) Calculated on the basis of data in Column 5 of different periods; (f) Calculated on the basis of data in Column 8 of different periods. Here, the International Poverty Lines of US $ 1 a day and US $ 1.25 a day, produced by the World Bank for poverty measures, are considered for comparative analyses and (g) NA - (Data) Not Available.

Sources: UNDP (2003), Human Development Report – 2003, Oxford University Press, and UNDP (2009), Human Development Report – 2009, Palgrave Macmillan.

respectively). While globalization has exposed 'more risks' (Stiglitz, 2006: op.cit.) to these countries and generated more markets at the same time, our present estimate (Table 2.2) shows the records of persistent extreme poverty or its ever-growing trend in the region (estimated with International Poverty Line – people below US $ 1 a day and 1.25 a day) when compared to the poverty trend of 1990-99 (Table 2.1). Among the total countries selected for analyses, 11 countries saw average incomes fall - Cameroon saw almost stagnation and only 2 countries, Central African Republic and Sierra Leone experienced a reduction of poverty between 1990-2001 and 2000-2007. But, in Burundi, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda and Tanzania, available records illustrate a trend of rapid increment of extreme poverty during the period specified between 1990-2001 and 2000-2007 with additional 22.9 percent, 18.7 percent, 32.2 percent, 36.8 percent, 15.0 percent, 40.9 percent, and 68.6 percent respectively. However, the situation of the countries, especially Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda and Tanzania as the records demonstrate, had more been worsened with doubling or even with tripling the rate of increment which was further multiplied with the growing trend of population in the countries (UNDP, 2009). Consequently, the share of world poverty of Sub-Saharan Africa had risen rapidly and the overall situation had further been deteriorated with the sheer experience of the concentration of poverty and social insecurity in these countries.

It is argued that the new global development paradigm has created a paradoxical space – "as the links grow closer and faster … the gaps grow wider" (Emmerij, Jolly and Weiss: op. cit.). The gaps were between the haves and have-nots, internationally, nationally and regionally. The irony is that while a rich individual country or the Group of 8 (G8) put the issue of globalization of economies on the global agenda, Burkina Faso faced fragile economies. As a result, it felt insecurity and a need for a new policy perspective of 'Millennium Development Compact' – really, a 'real' division but the division "between the winners and losers" (Desai, 1997).

The most tragic aspect is that the global economy has eroded the hope of success of the poor regions in general and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular by creating their dependency institutionalized with the institutionalization of poverty and ever-growing gap for which Thierry Lemaresquier and Alejandro Grinspun held the view that the task of poverty elimination becomes "increasingly difficult" (Lemaresquier and Grinspun, 1999). However, the traditional aristocratic tone associated with dominant influence has been a cause for creating the regions of marginalization and greater insecurity with manifold nature from within and from outside. We may call this a situation of a hopeless future.

5. 3. Success in the Latin American and Caribbean Countries — Rhetoric and the Reality

While there is a consensus on hope and the dire need of success of the teeming millions, the varied evidences do not confirm a uniform global improvement and the improvement of the standard of living of the majority people in the developing countries. Guy Standing viewed that "the meaning of 'success' was being vociferously challenged by the 1980s" and, however, the subsequent decades – 1980s and 1990s "became as an era of insecurity" (Standing, 1997). Yet, groups in the individual developing countries are not diminished altogether because of different capacities of different groups to hold their share in national income, and the impetus of creating gaps within countries offered by the west. However, the global agenda of 'success' explain considerable progress in some developing countries but without internal solidarity and balance.

It seems that the market economy was a fallacious arrangement as it worked and generated a periphery of a global-game which was unashamedly creating all cleavages, especially in the underprivileged regions. The experiences tended to raise the pertinent questions: are the neoliberal steps mutually consistent with the hopes and desires of the commoners since these were spurred with the new spirit - 'gain wealth, forgetting all but self'? Moreover, how can the 'success' of 'exceptional growth' in the developing world guarantee of a positive environment since an order of within country reality of inequality demonstrates an odd?

However, the tragic projection of 'economic miracle' in Asian countries and the success stories of Latin American 'new globalizers' may easily be supported by their external behaviour of industrial policies, foreign investment and economic growth. But, the order of within country reality of them demonstrates an odd as it is a stem which created ample scope of 'eureka' of the extortioners and native exporters and professionals by creating rapid share of income differentials. However, the growing inequality in the share of income and consumption tended to become as a stimulus to unreal growth associated with the smugness of the new globalizers.

Joseph Stiglitz noted the failure of Africa, Latin America and the countries of economies in transition and celebrated the 'commendable' success of Asia as "today, the developing countries around the world are looking to Asia, to the examples of success, to see what they can learn" (Stiglitz: op. cit.). In a comparative estimate between Latin America and East Asia Birdsall and Sabot found high inequality in the income distribution and unequal distribution of education which 'constrained economic growth in the region' of Latin America. The scholars suggested, "The challenge in Latin America is to find ways to reduce inequality, not by transfers, but by eliminating consumption subsidies for the rich and increasing the productivity of the poor" (Birdsall and Sabot, 2007). Also, the World Bank estimates (2006) found a declining trend of international inequality during the 1990s as a consequence of 'inequality reducing effects of income growth in China and South Asia' (World Bank, 2006: op. cit.).

Table 3.1: Share of Income and the Trend of widening gap in selected 10 Latin American and Caribbean Countries of High Human Development and Medium Human Development

Countries	**HDI[a] rank**	**Year**	**Share of Income in (%)**		**Inequality measure[b] (Richest 10% to Poorest 10%)[c]**	**Change (%)[d]**
			Poorest 10%	**Richest 10%**		
Uruguay	50	1998	1.6	33.8	20.12	(-) 0.65
		2007	1.7	34.8	19.47	
Mexico	53	1998	1.2	41.6	33.67	(-) 13.62
		2007	1.8	37.9	20.05	
Costa Rica	54	1997	1.7	34.6	19.35	(+) 3.32
		2007	1.5	35.5	22.67	
Panama	60	1997	1.2	38.4	31.0	(+) 19.75
		2007	0.8	41.4	50.75	
Colombia	77	1996	1.1	46.1	40.9	(+) 15.48
		2007	0.8	45.9	56.38	
Peru	78	1996	1.6	35.4	21.13	(+) 3.14
		2007	1.5	37.9	24.27	
Ecuador	80	1995	2.2	33.8	14.36	(+) 20.72
		2007	1.2	43.3	35.08	
Jamaica	100	2000	2.7	30.3	10.22	(+) 5.73
		2007	2.1	35.6	15.95	
El Salvador	106	1998	1.2	39.4	31.83	(+) 4.17
		2007	1.0	37.0	36.0	
Bolivia	113	1999	1.3	32.0	23.61	(+) 63.59
		2007	0.5	44.1	87.2	
Average of selected 10 Countries	**Previous State**	–	**1.58**	**36.54**	**34.96**	**(+) 3.09**
	Present State		**1.29**	**39.34**	**38.05**	

Notes: (a) Human Development Index – a composite development index measured by UNDP – HDI Rank is noted as per data of UNDP (2009) *Human Development Report –2009*; (b) Calculated on the basis of data in columns 4 & 5; (c) It shows the ratio of income share of the richest group to that of the poorest and (d) Calculated on the basis of data in column 6.
Sources: UNDP (2003), Human Development Report – 2003 and UNDP (2005), Human Development Report – 2005, Oxford University Press, and UNDP (2009), Human Development Report – 2009, Palgrave Macmillan.

But, Stewart and Berry arguably contextualized the effects of liberalization on developing countries and categorized these countries into four[7] all of which in many ways face the worsening of income distributions. It

[7] Stewart and Berry divided the developing countries into four types for analyses: (i) Manufacturing-goods export producers (MEP), like Thailand; (ii) Primary-goods export producers (PEP), like Ghana and Uganda; (iii) Mineral exporters (MINEX), like Zambia and Nigeria and (iv) Import-substitution industrializing countries (IS) – many Latin American countries are in this category (Stewart, Frances & Berry, Albert (2000). Globalization Liberalization, and Inequality: Expectations and Experience. In Hurrell, Andrew and Woods, Ngaire (eds.), *Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics.* Oxford University Press.

simultaneously created privileged classes of higher income groups in varied nature in different categories of countries and offered them considerable advantages (Stewart and Berry, 2000). While UNDP (2003) analyzed the larger disparities within China between coastal and inland regions and significant growth of metropolises, like Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin (UNDP, 2003: op. cit.), Caroline Thomas viewed that the 'new globalizers', like China, India and Mexico ensured significant growth "but the benefits were not well distributed within those countries" (Thomas, 2005: op. cit.). Likewise, in case of India, the World Bank calculations pointed out the persistent concentration of poverty in the poorer states - Assam, Bihar, Orissa etc. when compared to the richer states, like Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka etc. which indicated that the overall reduction of poverty with uneven progress in many states did not rule out the possibility of impoverishment among regions (World Bank

Development Policy Review, 2004). The calculations of R. Radhakrishna and K. Hanumantha Rao, on the basis of data of the Planning Commission (2002) showed impoverishment of many Indian states and found widening gaps and urban-rural disparities (Radhakrishna, and Rao, 2006). Deaton and Dreze found strong evidences of "a pervasive inequality" and the intensification of regional disparities in the nineties (Deaton and Dreze, 2003). Even though Dreze and Sen intended to go beyond the arguments 'both for and against' the reforms, pointed out the government's 'insufficient' and 'ineffective' effort in the basic areas i.e. education, health care, social security, land reforms etc. And, therefore, the authors emphasized the need for expanding 'social opportunities' and acknowledged the persistent widespread deprivation and 'social inequality' in India (Dreze and Sen, 2002).

For the selected 10 developing countries (Table 3.1) on the whole, the records show the trend of income inequality and the persistent widening gaps between the richest and poorest people. Colombia, Peru, Equador and El Salvador – 4 countries of the same region experienced a severe worsening of the income distribution. The records demonstrate that the bottom 10 percent population in each country had a share in national income and the estimated inequality measure is recorded a growing trend. On the whole, the records of share in income of the poorest in Colombia and the estimated inequality are comparable to Bolivia. In fact, the estimated inequality measure is recorded very high in Bolivia during the period. Our estimate indicates that the share of the richest 10 percent (36.54% previous state on overall basis and 39.34% in 2007) shows a growing trend on overall basis. Further, Jamaica is a Sub-Saharan country with uneven economic development where the share of income of the richest 10% had been growing rapidly (30.3% in 2000 and 35.6% in 2007) during the period under study.

Stewart and Berry stated about the extensive 'deterioration in income distribution' during the wave of liberalization in Mexico. The authors found uncertainty of primary income distribution and the evidences as the possible source of increasing inequality in this country including Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay etc. (Stewart and Berry, 2000: op. cit.). UNDP (2005) Report measured by Gini coefficient (using GDP per capita, PPP US $) UNDP's calculations about Mexico to explain income inequality between rich and poor people revealed the lower share of national income of the poorest with higher Gini coefficient value - 54.6. However, UNDP (2005) identified Mexico as a country of high income inequality (UNDP, 2005: op. cit.). Even though in our estimate Mexico and Uruguay demonstrate slightly a positive trend in terms of inequality measure during the period under study, Costa Rica and Panama, the two Latin American countries show the slowing down of share on income of the poorest 10% people (1.7% in 1997 and 1.5% in 2007 in case of Costa Rica and 1.2% in 1997 and 0.8% in case of Panama). For Panama, the record shows more worsening trend in income distribution with high inequality measure of richest 10% to poorest 10%.

However, the overall sub-national socio-economic data of the 10 developing countries in no way indicate the improvement of condition in terms of income inequality. Rather, it tended to create/continue a process of social exclusion which was defined "as the opposite of social integration, mirroring the perceived importance of being part of society, of being included" (Haan, 1999).

6. Observations, Possibilities and the Alternative

To our concern, while distributive system has an important consequential effect on the relationship between the share of income and poverty, the conflict between the unequal distribution of wealth and impoverishment is evident. Not very surprisingly, the new dimension of inequality, the consequence of the unjust victory of market forces received considerable attention among the globalizers who are conscious not to dispel the reality and to raise enormous arguments in favour of market economy which are mostly non-transparent. However, in case of failure of 'development' in any globalized developing country with which indigenous choice of space does not relate, the plausible arguments are inflated that it is because of 'opportunities being unequal', and market failure, or "unequal distribution of political influence" (World Bank, 2006: op. cit.*)*, or lack of 'civil society' or 'good governance' which 'exclude disadvantaged group'.

However, it is more imperative to point out the pervasive effect of the self-regulated global economy. Indeed, this has augmented the persistent inequality in a new form following an evident route which is not manageable and beyond control to the global disadvantaged groups. However, the unilateral disruptive measure denies distributive considerations but establishes the space of centralization – it "individualizes and centralizes at the same time" (Dahrendorf, 1995: op. cit.). Consequently, the space which appears can better be called 'new inequality' which is associated with 'new' social exclusion and insecurity. The far-reaching implication of this diverse world is that the global poorest will follow the path way of 'never-to-be-developed' but the richest will follow the track of re-development not 'de-development'. We do, however, agree with the meaningful assertion of Ralf Dahrendorf that "inequality can be a source of hope and progress in an environment which is sufficiently open to enable people to make good and improve their life chances by their own efforts. The new inequality, however, is of a different kind; it would be better described as Inequalization, the opposite of leveling, building paths to the top for some and digging holes for others, creating cleavages splitting" (ibid.).

While it is ironically awesome, a recent analytical perspective usually emerged as a consequence of the crises of neoliberal financial market capitalism which came in the limelight at the end of August 2008. Michael Brie pointed out the crises of neoliberal finance market capitalism which are: over accumulation crisis, reproduction crisis, integration crisis, democracy crisis and security crisis (Brie, 2009). This has led us to a new political dimension of 'Post-neoliberalism'. In this perspective, it may be addressed that whether 'Neoliberalism came to an end' (Altvater, 2009), or the 'delegitimation of neoliberalism' is taken place – are the issues of debate. But, it is important that in the 'Post-neoliberal' scenario, the pioneer countries of globalization, is confronted by the question of continuity of political and economic dominance at the global level. This situation coupled with the unleashed capital about which Michael Brie viewed that this 'will give rise to a further decivilization' (Brie, 2009: op. cit.). Nevertheless, while this situation is not conducive to the Washington consensus and the order of 'Post-neoliberal' perspective demands for the 'restructuring of Capitalism', Elmer Altvater observed, "Post-neoliberalism in financial markets is nothing less than a bundle of methods to save capitalist finance from the overshooting irrationality of financial neoliberalism. It might be post neoliberal, but it is not in the same instance a post capitalist order" (Altvater, 2009: op. cit.). Perhaps, this is a new reality which is more than globalization and new globalizing system.

Obviously, the twenty-first century dubious complexities tend to have perceived that the present scenario of the developing world is in high risk and fear. It is the risk of the new fashioned capitalism and the fear of suspicious arguments justifying the 'triumph' of the uncompromising market forces neglecting the 'continuing sources of social tension from deprivations and inequalities' (Bellamy, 2003). This comprehensively calls for what Bob Deacon called "a more humane and socially just new world order" (Deacon, 2000), or what Michael Brie hoped for the transition to a 'four-in-one perspective' which would ascertain an emancipated way of life. The elements which would cause social solidarity are: citizens' involvement, reproductive labour, associated goods and personal self-realization (Brie, 2009: op. cit.). Brie further viewed that the contemporary social and political struggles against capitalist globalization 'have helped the nuclei of participatory democracy to emerge' However, Brie asserted, "the decisive condition for the emergence of a new economic order and way of life is the struggle for the democratization of democracy" (ibid.).

To conclude, in order to construct a solid base of a valid alternative global paradigm, it is convincingly imperative for the regulation of global fierce competition and uneven growth between countries and within countries for achieving the goal of real social justice. However, the contemporary international environment needs the openness of approaches and realistic attitudes for the accomplishment of the 'solidarity of common development' and the creation of the space of social security and a real democratic environment which is free from all kinds of socio-economic threatening towards social solidarity. Otherwise, growth will be mounted but development will be in the horns of a dilemma.

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