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# Household Transfer to Family in Indonesia: The Parental Role Model

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## Abstract

In this paper, we study the impact of parental transfer on the behavior of their next generation's transfer using corrected data from Indonesian Family Life Surveys (household size), and an inter generations pairing method based on the demonstration effect theory. Our findings support the existence of parental role models, particularly transfers given to family members living outside households (parents, siblings or children). Specifically, the transfer decision of adults living independently from their origin household is positively affected by their membership in the origin household. This parental role model exists after controlling endogeneity problems contained in the role model estimation framework. This finding empirically confirms the vital role of parents in preserving altruism in society.

**Keywords:** Family Transfer, Role Model Effect, Endogeneity

## 1. Introduction

In developing countries, private transfers are functional to poverty alleviation together with limited state budgets. A half century ago, Boulding et al., (1972) have proved that a voluntary income distribution pattern increases social welfare better than a perfectly competitive market. Cox et al., (1990) also found that social capital had become a form of social safety net like employment insurance, health insurance, or cash transfer programs provided by the government. Recently, Nikolov et al., (2020) emphasized that governments' poverty reduction programs should be social capital friendly because the crowding effect in developing countries are various such as 0%-25% of private transfers in Vietnam (Van den Berg et al., 2011) or even 88% in Mexico (Mejía-Guevara, 2015). In addition, even though the poverty alleviation budget has been increasing like in Indonesia, it has not been followed by a steep reduction in poverty, indicating ineffective programs (Nasution, 2016). Governments should adjust public transfers to private transfers for optimum social welfare by understanding the community's social participation and using that information to evaluate social programs.

However, the relationship of households transfer to family members (parents, siblings, or children) between an origin household and its immediate generation is empirically less studied than other topics related to private transfer. The most prominent reason is the limited private transfer data. Indonesia also has had this problem resulting in underreported household participation in zakat, infaq, and alms (types of household transfers based on

the Quran) from its potential during the last decade based on the National Amil Zakat Board Annual Report in 2020. This report admitted that households tend to donate directly to recipients or through unofficial institutions. In contrast, an international non-government organization called Charity Foundation International placed Indonesia as the most generous nation in the world in 2017 as resumed from the private transfer conducted by Indonesians.

Efforts to understand individuals' factors to transfer resources to other family members have been made by researchers (see, e.g. Deb et al., 2010). They believe these factors are essential because transfer to family is a proven alternative to social safety nets in developing countries like Indonesia. It is theoretically categorized as one of the purest altruisms compared with other types of private transfer (transfer to strangers and community participation) that tend to return for the donors in the future. However, the focus is on preserving private transfers with the presence of public transfers like cash transfers from the government (the study on the crowding-out effect of government cash transfers on private transfers). The relationship between transfers to family of two generations is not only quite neglected but also vital. The empirical nature of intergenerational transmissions of social values within this transfer is significant in designing friendly public policies to existing social values.

In this paper, we present updated evidence on two aspects of household transfer to family members. First, we clarify the role of family in building this transfer behavior to immediate generations. This clarification is based on the several transmission mechanisms such as parents-initiated or children-initiated transmission (Cox et al., 1998; Jellal et al., 2000), income and wealth (Grawe et. al., 2002), or shared tastes and preferences. This study uses updated datasets from Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) containing corrections on the calculation of household size (number of household members) as one of the aspects affecting transfers to family. Second, as an effort to clarify this role, we find that unobservable factors are important in determining the results of the analysis. Specifically, the assumption of endogeneity used in tackling these factors gives different results of estimation. In their study, Deb et al. (2010) provided the implication of this assumption in role model estimation. The endogeneity of origin household transfer provides statistically significant estimation parameters while the opposite occurs (if exogeneity is applied in the estimation).

One comprehensive datasets to analyze this problem is the Indonesia Family Lifetime Survey (IFLS). The survey is panel data on various information regarding households (including household transfers) from 1993 to 2014. Deb et al. (2010) conducted the most relevant research using the 1997 IFLS. The study found that parental transfer positively affects children's transfer, selecting only sibling households (excluding parents and children households from the family) as the recipients. They found that the transfer of origin households to siblings positively influences the transfer of their split-offs to their siblings by inserting the amount of parental household transfer as an affecting variable in the split-off transfer using the same IFLS wave (the second/1997) data.

In contrast, the theory of role models mentioned that the transmission of the benefits of giving transfers to the next generation occurs when the next generation observes the origin. Therefore, using the same year data for origin households and their split-off in a role model theory has a potential drawback in presenting the learning process. Alternatively, applying multiple IFLS waves in the analysis of role model theory could find different results. Cox et al., (2005) also have emphasized in the demonstration effect theory that the prerequisite for intergenerational transmission is that the learning process must occur from childhood. Parents realize their influence on their children's behavior.

Therefore, this study revises the findings on household transfer in Indonesia by using a different research method that benefits five waves of IFLS. This research reviews the transfer relationship between parents and children in households, particularly for families as recipients. This study uses updated datasets from IFLS 5 that suggest a correction on the calculation of household size (number of household members) as one of the aspects affecting transfers to family. However, this study anticipates many determinants of children's prosocial preferences and behavior such as information media, technology, and even heredity. Therefore, this research carefully concludes this causal relationship.

Our results on this type of private transfer suggest the important role model of the original household on the

immediate generation with respect to transfer to family. Children observe and follow their parents' transfer to family positively. The more transfer to family conducted by origin households in the past induces more transfer to family made by children in the future. The novel pairing method between parents and children used in this study produced more logical results even though the assumption of exogeneity was used.

The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we provide the conceptual framework of role model estimation using IFLS data. In Section 3, we describe the data and model of estimation including selected variables, econometric issues regarding unobservable variables and the solutions. We describe the results and discussion in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and recommends further research.

## 2. Conceptual Framework

The recipients of household transfers can be family, strangers, and the community. This study focuses on the first recipient because data on the last two recipients are rare. Related to motives, Frankenberg et al., (2002) and Park (2003) found several backgrounds for household transfer to family. The first motive is impure altruism; donors (either as parents or adult children) expect returns when experiencing shocks in the future. Another motive is the exchange of money in which the recipients repay the transfer by doing donor household errands. Third, the motive is reciprocation by the child to parents for the child's education. Purer altruism exists in the transfer to siblings. Furthermore, Witoelar (2013) used IFLS 1, 2, 3, and first difference and two-stage least squares (2SLS) methods to find a consumption risk-sharing practice between the donor and relative households. Donor households generate additional utility by maintaining households' consumption. Concerning labor supply, Cameron et al., (2008) used IFLS 1 and the maximum likelihood estimation method in estimating financial and time assistance from family members who are still in the same house. The study found that these assistance could not reduce parents' time allocation in the workforce.

Deb et al. (2010) simultaneously analyzed transfers to relatives and communities as a pioneer and found two main conclusions. First, the role model of parental household transfer to their split-offs exists. The more an origin household makes a transfer to family, the more a split-off household makes a transfer to family. Second, the correlation between unobserved heterogeneities of transfer to relatives and the community indicates that those heterogeneities are complementary. They paired the parent household and their split-off using the IFLS 1993 (origin only) and IFLS 1997 (origin and split-off). Then they used only the 1997 wave to test the role model effect. Chiteji et al., (1999) emphasized that children's learning process from their parents (limited to asset ownership) should take adequate time. Using only one cross-section of data could not reveal the impact of the learning process. This is the main reason for this study, to give adequate time for the learning process reflected in the data used.

Conceptually, there are several mechanisms of transmission of prosocial behavior between generations. First, children observe the prosocial behavior of their parents from childhood until they form a new household. The observation can happen intentionally or unintentionally. Second, parents intentionally influence children's giving behavior (Cox et al., 1998). The third mechanism looks at income and assets as the determinant of household transfers. Parents' income and wealth tend to be passed down to their children, and so does the behavior of giving to other households (Grawe et al., 2002). Finally, this transmission mechanism can occur from internal and external factors of parents - children who both shape the character of parents - children in donating. An example is the similarity of hobbies, preferences, and other supporting factors.

Transmission can succeed and fail depending on many factors. A successful one is when a child's behavior reflects the values from parents and vice versa. Environmental factors, scientific advances, shocks, and even disruptions can influence the transmission positively or negatively. Researchers must control them in estimations of parental transfer impact on children's transfer. Transmission can also occur intentionally or unintentionally. Children can observe parental behavior and naturally imitate it in the future without parental encouragement. They realize the benefits of following the behavior of their parents. On the other hand, parents may not explicitly or unconsciously have transmitted values to their children. This study focuses on the transmission result without considering intentional or unintentional factors in the process.

An important point to underline is that the child begins receiving the transmission with the endowment of social capital. Then, the transmission of social values from parents combined with external factors occurs during childhood, adolescence, and adulthood until the child forms a new household. The theoretical basis of the role model can be described in the equation model as follows:

$$Aware_{net} = \alpha \text{ parents} + \text{environment} - Aware_0 \quad (1)$$

The left side of the linear equation model (1) is the net level of child awareness on the benefit of giving transfer as the result of the influence of parents and environmental factors, minus the initial level of child awareness (characteristic of the child or endowment). The symbol  $\alpha$  measures children's ability to absorb parental transmissions and describes the characteristics of the child. This accumulation of awareness affects the behavior of the child in the future.

Equation (1) can be applied in household transfers. Parents make transfers to relatives within a period observable by children. Parents have motivation in making the transfer, either pure or impure altruism. The child observes this behavior over time and gains awareness of its benefits. Simultaneously, external factors influence this learning process until children leave their parents to form a new household. If children are fully aware of the benefits of household transfers, their future household transfer behavior is affected by the role model of their parents. In contrast, if children gain no awareness of the benefits or values of household transfers, their parents' role models have no impact on their future household transfer behavior.

This condition can be described in the equation function as follows:

$$Transfer = \text{function}(Aware_{net}, \text{character}) \quad (2)$$

where:

$$\frac{\partial Transfer}{\partial Aware_{net}} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial Transfer}{\partial \text{character}} > < 0$$

The transfer behavior of children's households is affected by information obtained from parents and their characteristics. The transmission of benefits information of household transfers from parents positively affects the transfer behavior of children. Characteristics of children also theoretically and empirically influence household transfer either positively (income, education, age, sex, residence) or negatively (i.e. household size, per capita expenditure).

### 3. Data, Method and Estimation

The data used in this research is taken from Books 1, 2, and 3 of IFLS 1 (1993) – 5 (2014) (see Frankenberg et al., 1995; Frankenberg et al., 2000; Strauss et al., 2004; Strauss et al., 2009; and Strauss et al., 2016). The data of split-off households in IFLS 1 (878) and IFLS 2 (307) were excluded from the analysis because the numbers were smaller than IFLS 3 (2,646), IFLS 4 (4,033), and IFLS 5 (4,003). Thus, this study uses pairing households of split-off households that occurred from IFLS 3 (2000) until IFLS 5 (2014). The focus is on pairs of parents and children who form a new family or split off. Together with death and moving, sample selection used in IFLS could cost samples lost enormously. However, tracking the target respondents who move residence has minimized the attrition threat (see Thomas et al., 2012). Children's households also have overtaken the number of missing samples resulting in the number of household samples increasing in each wave.

The selection of parent-child pairs in this study is assumed random. A parent-child pair exists only if a child leaves the original household. Children have free rights and are not limited to specific socioeconomic and demographic conditions. For example, two individuals (children) with identical characteristics except for domicile (one lives in a rural area and the other in an urban area) have no difference when deciding to marry/leave their original household. This applies to age, gender, level of education, religion, and income.

The estimation in this study modifies the transfer equation by Deb et al. (2010) with two transfer equations mentioned in (3) and (4). The left-hand and right-hand variables are the corresponding means for each pairing criterion (2000, 2007, and 2014). The rule for matching origin and split-off to their IFLS waves is when the split-off leaves the origin household. If a child left the origin in 2000, the data used for the origin is from IFLS 1993-1997 and the data used for the child is from IFLS 2000-2014. If a child left the origin in 2007, the data used for the origin is from IFLS 1997-2000 and the data used for the child is from IFLS 2007-2014. Finally, if a child left the origin in 2014, the data used for the origin is from IFLS 1993-2007 and the data used for the child is only from IFLS 2014.

$$\widehat{Tf}_p = \gamma \widehat{Z}_p + \widehat{u}_p + \widehat{\varepsilon}_p \quad (3)$$

$$\widehat{Tf}_{p1} = \gamma \widehat{Z}_{p1} + \rho \widehat{Tf}_p + \widehat{u}_{p1} + \widehat{\varepsilon}_{p1} \quad (4)$$

Equations (3) and (4) are the parents and children's transfer to family equation, respectively. The symbol  $\widehat{Tf}_p$  and  $\widehat{Tf}_{p1}$  are means of transfer to families by parents and children, respectively. The symbols  $\widehat{Z}_p$  and  $\widehat{Z}_{p1}$  are characteristics of parents and children, respectively. Symbols  $u$  and  $\varepsilon$  are components of the error term, in which  $u$  are unobservable variables other than  $Z$  that influence  $Tf$ . The symbol  $u$  represents the heterogeneity in each equation. Variable  $u$  is assumed uncorrelated with  $\varepsilon$ . The symbol  $\varepsilon$  is a composite error term with zero expectations. The symbol  $\gamma$  in (3) and (4) is the coefficient of each characteristic of parents or children. Symbol  $\gamma$  indicates the effect of these characteristics on their transfers to families. The impact of parents' transfer on children's transfer is estimated by inserting  $\widehat{Tf}_p$  into (4). Symbol  $\rho$  indicates whether there is an effect or not, and if so, how does it affect. Variables  $u$  are assumed not to change over time so that the average value does not affect the estimate. The variable  $\varepsilon$  was initially to have a zero so that the mean also does not affect the estimation if the dependent and independent variables use the mean.

Endogeneity might exist in (3) and (4) because of measurement errors of the independent variables, relevant independent variables exclusion, a reciprocal causality between the independent and dependent variables, and the inclusion of dependent variables of (3) into (4) as additional independent variables. Concerning measurement errors, data cleaning and transformation of monetary values are steps to balance the data. For example, this study excludes household transfers in terms of goods because their value validity is low. Other than that, IFLS has been a reference for various international researches signaling the quality of the data. For the second reason, expenditure, age, years of education, sex, residence, household size, and marital status are the most relevant and available data that affect household transfers. Concerning reciprocal causality between transfers and expenditure, this research assumes that the latter affects transfers, and the opposite does not apply. Also, the transfer of a child does not affect the transfer decision of the parent household. A correlation between parental transfer and other independent variables can exist after inserting the dependent variable of (3) into (4) (as an independent variable). The error term in equation (4) cannot be zero. Thus, this research uses the instrumental variable approach. Following Deb et al. (2000), this study selects the independent variables in (3) to instrument parental transfers in (4). Age, gender, education level, domicile location, religion, household burden, and expenditure (all in the parental generation) empirically and theoretically affect parent transfers but are uncorrelated with the error term of the equation for child transfers.

Next, the non-trivial zeros of household transfers (censored from below) indicate Tobit estimation as the suitable method for estimating (3) and (4), particularly the ivTobit (instrument variable Tobit). The value for each variable is the average according to the split-off cut-off. This research also estimates transfer equations using the exogeneity of parental transfers assumption as a comparison for the endogeneity assumption. This study uses STATA in the model estimation, the cleaning, and balancing of the data and presents the results in tables and interpretation by comparing them with other relevant research results.

There are other potential variables in IFLS to approach the transfer variable of the household. Following Wittoelar (2013), business assets and community facilities can be instrument variables for household transfers. However,

using business assets produces insignificant estimation for children transfer because measurement errors of assets are potentially high in IFLS. Concerning community facilities, there is a significant reduction in parent-child pairs when banks and post offices are in the equation. Thus, this research excludes both as instrument variables.

The solution for sample selection bias is using IFLS data from five waves of 21 years. The usage of five waves minimizes the decision of a child's household not to live at home with their parent's household, for example, because they already have children, get work, and want to live independently from their parents. Also, this provides sufficient time to capture the dynamics of the decision to transfer to parents' households and children's households. Given a longer observation duration, the number of parent-child pairs increases significantly. Around 767 pairs resulted from Deb et al. (2010), but this study generated up to 4,033 pairs.

The dependent variable is the transfer to the family made by households. A family is limited to parents, siblings, and children from both sides of the husband and wife living outside the house. The independent variables are age, sex, religion, residence, years of schooling, per capita consumption, and household size. The number of transfers from parents is an additional independent variable for the transfer equation for children. The unit of analysis is at the household level. Time transfer and goods/services transfer are excluded from the analysis because the proportion of parents and children who gave or received time assistance to relatives was minute and may have measurement error. Children tend not to give their time to their parents. Children exchange the education investment from their parents with money. The proportion of households who make time transfers to relatives is smaller than those who make money transfers (Elizabeth F. et al., 2002).

#### 4. Results and Discussion

Based on Table 1, the values of socio-economic variables and amount of transfer to a family from children households are better off than their parents. First, the household members of children are always smaller than parents since 2000 with a difference of about two people. This smaller household size might be the credit for split-off households to allocate more money for transfer to family. The sex of the head of both generations is dominantly male. Concerning age, split-off families are at least 10-20 years younger than parent households. Split-offs' heads are below 40 years old and decrease until the early 30s in 2014. Their origin households' heads are always near their 50s. More young couples form a family during this period. Origin households are always near their 50s. Split-offs tend to be unmarried than origin households. They might leave their origins because of school, work, and divorce/separation. For religion, the domination of Islam in split-off and origin households existed from 2000 until 2014. For the location, origin households tend to live in rural areas, unlike their offspring who tend to live in rural areas. This preference for living indicates massive urbanization during this period. Children are also better educated than their parents by nine to ten years of schooling compared to only nearly six years of schooling for their parents. Ten years of school is equivalent to the second grade of senior high school, unlike their parents who have only graduated from elementary school. To income (approached with expenditure), children are better off from 2000 until 2014, while their parents are worsening. This expenditure is in line with the transfer to families of split-off households than origin households. In short, children are much better off than their parents.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variables	Split in 2000		Split in 2007		Split in 2014	
	Obs.	Mean	Obs.	Mean	Obs.	Mean
Split Off						
Household Members	2,646	3.64 (1.59)	4,033	3.30 (1.46)	4,003	3.02 (1.66)
Sex (1=male)	2,646	0.85 (0.36)	4,033	0.79 (0.40)	4,003	0.83 (0.37)
		39.52		36.06		32.77

Age (years old)	2,646	(11.51)	4,033	(10.96)	4,003	(11.92)
Marital Status (1=married)	2,646	0.81 (0.39)	4,033	0.73 (0.45)	4,003	0.75 (0.43)
Religion (1=Islam)	2,646	0.89 (0.32)	4,033	0.89 (0.31)	4,003	0.89 (0.31)
Location (1=urban)	2,646	0.61 (0.49)	4,033	0.58 (0.49)	4,003	0.66 (0.47)
Years of Education	2,646	8.92 (4.23)	4,033	9.64 (3.97)	4,003	10.01 (3.81)
Per capita Expenditure (Rupiah)	1,698	6,706,124 (5,445,878)	3,273	9,399,091 (9,083,975)	4,003	13,000,000 (14,200,000)
Transfer to Family (Rupiah)	1,698	1,726,635 (4,450,443)	3,273	2,582,952 (5,802,017)	4,003	3,827,281 (10,900,000)
<b>Origin</b>						
Household Members	2,646	5.84 (2.22)	4,033	5.73 (1.83)	4,003	5.43 (1.74)
Sex (1=male)	2,646	0.81 (0.39)	4,033	0.88 (0.33)	4,003	0.84 (0.37)
Age (years old)	2,646	49.60 (11.72)	4,033	47.70 (10.64)	4,003	47.51 (10.06)
Marital Status (1=married)	2,646	0.89 (0.31)	4,033	0.88 (0.33)	4,003	0.85 (0.35)
Religion (1=Islam)	2,646	0.89 (0.31)	4,033	0.89 (0.31)	4,003	0.88 (0.32)
Location (1=urban)	2,646	0.49 (0.50)	4,033	0.46 (0.50)	4,003	0.40 (0.49)
Years of Education	2,646	5.77 (4.20)	4,033	5.87 (4.03)	4,003	5.90 (3.83)
Per capita Expenditure (Rupiah)	2,602	5,223,880 (5,207,348)	3,919	1,613,217 (1,524,799)	3,845	2,406,420 (1,748,480)
Transfer to Family (Rupiah)	2,602	683,957 (5,358,650)	3,919	217,535 (648,203)	3,845	584,568 (7,988,667)

Note: Standard error in parentheses

\*Inflated to 2019 price.

Pairing rules result in three analyses of role models. The first analysis is for the pair of parent-children splitting in 2000, the second is in 2007, and the third is in 2014. The focus is on the results difference between endogeneity and exogeneity assumptions. The role model of parental transfer to family assuming exogeneity of parent's transfer to family in the children's transfer to the family is in Table 2 for the first pair rules (2000). This assumption is



relaxed and put in the last column of each splitting year. The tables consist of parameter values for each variable and their significance.

The coefficients of Ln\_Transfer To Family (Origin) in the estimation of Ln\_Transfer To Family (Split Off) mean that the transfer to family by parents positively and significantly affects the transfer to family by children in the endogeneity assumption. On the contrary, they are always statistically insignificant and weaker when treated as exogenous. In 2000, a ten percent increase in the transfer to family by parents in the past would increase the transfer to family by children by eleven percent. It does not apply if transfer to family by parents is assumed exogenous. In 2007, a ten percent increase in transfer to family by parents in the past would increase the transfer to family by children by six percent. It also does not apply if transfer to family by parents is assumed exogenous. A unique finding in 2014, the assumption of exogeneity resulted in a positive and statistically significant coefficient of the variable. However, the coefficient is smaller than in endogeneity.

Education background and per capita expenditure are relatively more influential for origin households than for split-off households. Both are the only significant factors (positively) for transfer to family by origin households in 2000, followed by marital status (being married) and religion (Islam) in 2007 and 2014. For split-off families, gender of the head significantly affects their transfer to family. A male head of household transfers more than a female head of household. Variable age (with a decreasing rate) and place of residence become significant in affecting transfer to family in 2014. Marital status (married) begins to affect transfer to family in 2007 and 2014. Religion (Islam) affects only in 2007 and place of residence (urban) in 2014. Like their ancestors, education and per capita expenditure positively affect their transfer to family for all pairings.

In sum, the role model of parents to their children exists in the transfer to family. These results strengthen previous findings on the strong relationship between parents and children in Indonesia in transfer to family. However, this study uses a more complex family membership status from parents, siblings, and children than the study of Partha Deb et al. (2010) that used only siblings. The composition of a family in Indonesia that tends to be very mixed or inclusive with close and distant families is probably the reason for these behaviors. This finding indicates that split-offs put similar values for each type of family membership status in terms of giving transfers.

## **5. Conclusion**

There are three main conclusions about household transfer in Indonesia. First, the assumption of endogeneity of the parental transfer variable in the child's transfer equation and the observation time for children provides different results. These results empirically confirm a positive role model of parents towards their children in terms of transfer to family. This research recommends further research with the assumption of endogeneity of the parental household transfer and the time lag for observing children in determining parent-child pairs in a country identical to Indonesia to strengthen the importance of applying this research method to role model theory or related to this theory.

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Table 2: Results

Independent Variables	Transfer To Family								
	2000			2007			2014		
	Origin	Split Off		Origin	Split Off		Origin	Split Off	
		Exogenous	Endogenous		Exogenous	Endogenous		Exogenous	Endogenous
Sex (1=male)	0.23	0.32*	0.36**	0.57**	0.26***	0.27***	(0.01)	0.38***	0.39***
	(1.96)	(2.53)	(2.76)	(2.72)	(4.10)	(4.26)	(-0.05)	(5.01)	(5.11)
Age (years old)	(0.00)	0.02	0.02	(0.04)	0.02	0.02	(0.04)	0.06***	0.06***
	(-0.07)	(0.84)	(0.84)	(-1.40)	(1.30)	(1.40)	(-1.75)	(4.88)	(4.99)
Age (Squared)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	0.00	-0.00*	-0.00*	0.00	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(-0.12)	(-1.65)	(-1.64)	(0.48)	(-2.21)	(-2.31)	(0.94)	(-4.93)	(-5.05)
Marital Status (1=married)	0.21	0.12	0.14	0.43*	0.32***	0.31***	0.88***	0.37***	0.36***
	(1.31)	(0.85)	(0.97)	(2.03)	(4.74)	(4.65)	(5.88)	(4.60)	(4.37)
Religion (1 = Islam)	0.14	0.20	0.17	0.57***	0.30***	0.29***	0.91***	0.08	0.04
	(1.17)	(1.75)	(1.45)	(4.54)	(3.88)	(3.64)	(9.08)	(0.91)	(0.50)
Urban (1=urban)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.01)	0.00	0.01	0.23***	0.23***
	(-0.00)	(-0.08)	(-0.24)	(-1.54)	(-0.17)	-	(0.20)	(4.34)	(4.25)
Years of Schooling	0.10***	0.04***	0.04***	0.08***	0.06***	0.06***	0.09***	0.04***	0.04***
	(9.38)	(4.78)	(3.32)	(7.47)	(8.60)	(7.85)	(9.51)	(6.07)	(5.44)
LnPercapita Expenditure	0.92***	0.90***	0.87***	0.96***	0.84***	0.81***	1.00***	0.67***	0.66***
	(15.42)	(15.14)	(14.06)	(14.80)	(20.74)	(19.16)	(16.58)	(19.20)	(18.35)
LnTransfer To Family (Origin)		0.02	0.11**		0.00	0.06*		0.03*	0.06*
		(1.30)	(2.67)		(0.30)	(2.01)		(2.24)	(1.97)
Constant	-3.53***	(1.79)	-2.23*	-3.15**	(0.78)	(0.98)	-3.63***	01.05	0.84
	(-3.70)	(-1.73)	(-2.10)	(-2.86)	(-1.11)	(-1.37)	(-3.50)	(1.82)	(1.39)
N	2,156	1,380	1,380	3,640	2,880	2,880	3,700	3,098	3,098

\* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

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