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A Study of the Relationship between Political Institutions and Democratic Amalgamation in Bangladesh

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Abstract

In almost all political systems political institutions play an important role in promoting democracy and democratization. The political institutions are the groups in a political system that create, enforce, and apply laws for the benefit of the society. They regularly arbitrate conflict, make governmental policies on the local and national economies and socio-political systems, and then offer representation for the people of the country. In general, democratic political systems are divided into two forms: presidential which is headed by a president; and parliamentary which is headed by a parliament. Party systems can be two-party or multiparty and the political parties can be strong or fragile depending on their level of inner harmony. The political institutions are those bodies, parties, parliaments, and heads of government, that create the entire apparatus of the present-day governments. In terms of political system, Bangladesh has been trying to exercise the democratic polity. Its legislature is unicameral where the Prime Minister is the head of government and the President is the head of the state. Besides, it is a developing country with enormous socio-economic and political problems that need to be addressed to reach the goals of millennium development and sustainable development. In this paper the relationship between the political institutions and democratic amalgamation has been discussed. And at the end of the study some policy recommendations have been provided to strengthen the prevailing democratic culture.

Keywords: Bangladesh, Political Institutions, Democratic Amalgamation, Parliament, Judiciary, Civil Society, Bureaucracy

I. Introduction

“Democracy is a continuous political process, which can only be sustained and developed by giving due attention to certain issues which is very important to people’s concern. Though Bangladesh has passed several

decades of its independence, it has failed to institute democracy as a political tradition. The political history of Bangladesh in the last half century divulges a country wedged in a pendulum swing between democracy and dictatorship, between hopelessness and optimism, and between mass lethargy and violent collective action. In order for democracy to be sustainable, democratic practices have to have a democratic society. Politicization of crime and criminalization of politics have exacerbated the crisis of democracy in the country. To make the sense of democracy as a political tradition in Bangladesh, it is needed to expedite the democratic culture within the periphery of its political apparatus with fair and accountable political leadership. Bangladesh was born through a revolution comprising a dream of a society promised upon equality, liberty, and fraternity that died quickly. Unfortunately, the country is now passing through a phase of democratic altercation” (Ahamed and Datta, 2015). However, political institutions comprise political party organizations, executive bodies, legislatures, the judiciaries, (upper courts and lower courts) and trade unions. The word 'political Institutions' can likewise refer to the familiar configuration of rules and doctrines within which the above system of governments function, comprising such ideas as the democratic right to vote, an accountable government, and responsibility. Political organizations and systems have a straight influence on the commercial atmosphere and socio-economic and political activities of a country. For instance, a political system which is frank and evolving while it approaches to the spontaneous political involvement of the people of all corners of the country adds to positive economic development in its region. All societies must have certain forms of political systems so that they may allot resources and continuing procedures suitably. A political organization sets the guidelines in which a systematic society observes and eventually takes decisions and governs the laws and regulations for those people who otherwise do not obey the laws. In addition, the starring role of political institutions modifies the relationship between state and society to favor the rise and conservation of democracy. One way it does so, is by reducing nepotism and bureaucratic corruption, and more generally, by changing the zero-sum nature of the electoral struggle (Mosca, 1939). North (1990) defined institutions as rules. He was cautious to point out that the being of a formal rule meant little if it could not be enforced. The significance of this observation is often missed. Most countries have many rules that are very good rules on paper. In practice the reality is often very different. The discussion about governance urgencies is thus both about the precise rules that a developing country desires to enforce to hasten growth and development, and also about the governance capabilities that essential to be developed to enforce particular rules (North, 1990). These consequences of states-corruption, abuse of power, economic stagnation and crisis, ethnic conflict, electoral fraud, and political violence-heavily elucidate the failures of democracy thrice in Ghana, twice in Nigeria and Uganda, and more generally throughout the African continent (Chazan, 1988; Diamond, 1988b; Kokole and Mazrui, 1988). Structures of representation, divisions of power, legal policies, and the packages of rights and responsibilities allied with citizenship all differ significantly among regimes that are generally recognized as democratic. And these institutional arrangements may have an impact on the sustainability of democracy. Democracy becomes sustainable when its institutional basis promotes normatively desirable and politically preferred purposes, but also these institutions are adept in dealing with crises that occur when such objectives are not being come into effect. The institutional distinction that appears particularly important is that between presidential and parliamentary systems. (Diamond, 1988). It is contended that the other circumstances of consolidation are much more likely to be satisfied where there are also found a bureaucracy usable by democratic leaders and an institutionalized economic society (Linz and Stephan 2001). State of Governance in Bangladesh report (2008) identified three main causes of poor political governance in Bangladesh: (1) the design of the state and its institutions, (2) the clientelist nature of politics driven by greed and (3) the nature of confrontational politics (IGS 2008). There are also complications like inside democracy, financial transparency and totalitarian decision making practice within the political parties. The existing internal administrative structure of parties permits little scope to hold the party leaders internally responsible and the party chiefs of the two major parties enjoy and exercise total power in captivating all major decisions. Moreover, the fund raising and financial transactions of the parties are abstruse and the party leadership enjoys absolute freedom and generosity to spend party funds (Diamond, 1988). The Global Integrity report 2010 proposes that the party financing in Bangladesh has been categorized as very weak with scoring 41 out of 100 in 2010 while it has scored only 17 in 2007 and 20 in 2008 (Global Integrity 2010). Firstly, they want to create their 'own' force in administration to materialize their political agenda and secondly, their financial interests are being served with the help of this force. (IGS, 2008) However, 2001-2006 BNP-led coalition government set a new record by making 978 officers OSD. (IGS, 2008) According to the Failed State Index 2011 of Fund for Peace, the Civil

Service of Bangladesh has scored only 1.7 out of 10 with 1 being the worst, and categorized as poor-the least performance among all categories (Blandford and Jaeger, 2011).

II. Study Method

Methodically it is qualitative research which usually collected data at the sight, where we, the participants were experiencing issues or problems of democratic amalgamation in Bangladesh. Moreover, as qualitative researchers, we typically gathered a few forms of data, such as interviews, observations, and documents. This kind of research technique works to solving multifaceted issues by breaking down into significant implications that is definitely readable and tacit by altogether. This research is based on secondary data such as books, magazines, journals, daily newspapers and research papers on democracy and the relationship between political institutions and democratic amalgamation in Bangladesh have been used. The benefit is that plenty of the contextual research work required has previously been done, such as literature reviews or case studies. The information might have been used in published manuscripts and the statistics could now be brought in valuable individual contacts. Secondary data is vital in the idea of data improvement, which is where datasets from secondary bases are linked to a study dataset to progress its accuracy by accumulating key characteristics and principles. Thus we have carried out this study by secondary sources of data and method.

III. Role of Political Parties and Democratic Amalgamation in Bangladesh

In the politics of Bangladesh the key political parties are: Bangladesh Awami League, Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Jatiyo Party and Bangladesh Jamat-E-Islami, previously known as Jamat-E-Islami Bangladesh. Awami League which started its political activities since 1949 through which it has become the first and major political party in the country. Because of what it enjoys extensive popular supports and all-out political cooperation from grass root level. The party played a leadership role in the bloody war of liberation in 1971 (Maniruzzaman, 1975:43). Since then an armed fight for the liberation started and it continued for nine months. Through this war of liberation Bangladesh became an independent and sovereign state on the 16th of December 1971 (Maniruzzaman, 1975: 95-96). Afterward the Awami League as a leading political party was in power between 1972 and 1975 and between 1996 and 2000 and now for 2008-2020 terms. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party was established in 1978 under the leadership of late army general Ziaur Rahman, who later became the President of Bangladesh. With his strong leadership Bangladesh Nationalist Party succeeded to establish itself as one of the major and popular and nationalist political parties in Bangladesh politics. This political party was in state power during the periods of 1979-1983, 1991 -1995 and 2001-2006 (Mst Quamrun Nahar, 2017). Besides, there are lots of other minor, personality- focused parties that work under the shadow, in co-operation with or by the charm of the other large parties. Moreover, there are some fragmented socialist parties that characterize the ideology of socialism. While there are existing a number of political parties in Bangladesh, in the real sense the country has efficiently continued the practice of democracy, with some criticisms from the different political segments at home and abroad, till now mainly with a two-party system under the leadership of Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Subsequently the collapse of President General Ershad in 1990, either the Awami League or the Bangladesh Nationalist Party formed the governments in alliance with other political parties. Almost all of the political parties in pre- war of liberation and post- independence Bangladesh have endured susceptible to political factionalism. However, there were some occasions while opposing parties functioned together so as to attain specific national goals, for instance, during the anti-Ershad democratic movements in the second half of the 1980s (Rahman, 2010:1). Most of the political parties would involve in negotiations on issues and problems which they see affecting dynamic national goals and propose means to resolve them (Chowdhury, 2012:18). Mostly the course of democratic change began in Bangladesh with the collapse of Ershad government after a protract movement for democratization (Siddiqui, 2013:261). The true dream of democratic political system confronted troubles soon after its independence in 1971. Though it started its political system of governance with the Westminster model of democracy, Bangladesh took slightly more time to turn itself into a one- party restart in 1975. The charismatic leader Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was ferociously killed with most of the family members by some military officers in 15 August 1975. As of 1975 to the fall of Ershad rule in 1990, the country went back and forth between military and civilian rule. The

then President Ziaur Rahman encountered a number of mutinies and rebellion attempts. He was killed in Chittagong in May 1981. Amid 1972 and 1992 the cabinet was rearranged 87 times (Bichitra, 1992). A nine-year long mass movements ultimately played a significant role to the collapse of the Ershad's military regime. Through the general election which was held in 1991, the country was once again on the path to democracy; and the election was, of course, free, fair and transparent compared to the elections held during the Ershad's regime (Rahman, 2010:2). All political party as an association has its own values, culture and behavior. The members of the party are, of course, influenced by the values and conduct of the organization. All local members of local groups try to follow the group activities and attitudes of the central group smoothly. The Awami League led a political coalition with some left wing secular political parties, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party led an alliance with the right wing Nationalists Islamic Political Parties (The Daily Star 2007). Both the major political alliances have different political ideology, values and culture. At this point Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party are the main party or group. The central political party makes the national, divisional and district level policies and decisions to be implemented strictly in the whole party where the local group always suggests and influences to abide by the central commands and decisions. This type of chain of command is followed in almost all of the political organizations. Many questions may arise about the involvement of the group members in the decision-making and policy implementation process. In the newly formed democracies, partisan political culture affects both the polity and political deeds. Institution becomes power-oriented in the sense that influence turns out to be the driving force at every stratum of administrative setup. The political activists, on the contrary, become inspired to use political influence as an intermediate of political power, influence and in some cases property for assembling more resources in their bags. Regrettably Bangladesh has experienced a very unfortunate traditions of growing leadership through democratic practices in the parties instead, the chiefs are raised up to their positions under the protection of what is an established hereditary culture efficiently spreading these undemocratic structure of power to the each party level and successively as the incumbent political leader at state level (Chowdhury, 2012:46). Moreover, the party is closely involved in political recruitment and selection of the political leadership in whose hands power and policy decisions will be vested to a large extent (The Daily Star 2007). The political culture and the practice of democracy in Bangladesh present contradictory images of political parties. On the one hand, political parties have a constructive image for their contributions to our nationalist struggles and in our movements for understanding democracy. Political parties organized mass supports in favor of the Bengali nationalist movements. It is the mass mobilization that shaped the political will in favor of establishing Bangladesh as an independent and sovereign state in 1971. In addition, the political parties that mobilized and continued people's support for the restoration of democracy when Bangladesh was ruled by military regimes during 1975 to 1990. Nevertheless, after the reinstatement of electoral democracy in 1991, the political parties have dropped shortly in turning their democratic promises into real practice. All of the political parties have not been very successful to improve democratic practices in the parliament and outside the parliament and practices in promoting intra party democracy (Feroz, 2012:210). Both print and electronic media have regularly reported on political, economic and administrative corruption and criminal activities of the both ruling and opposition party activists and their impunity from fair trials which showcased their role in jeopardizing the rule of law and true democracy in the country. Inter-party relationships step by step became vastly confrontational which disallowed parties from settling their differences through democratic dialogue and debate. Definitely many witnesses have acknowledged the undemocratic practices within the political parties as key aspects constraining the consolidation of democratic culture in Bangladesh. On the other hand, with those self-contradictory images we are also put into several challenges with many political parties' undemocratic practices that are puzzling the democratic theories of political party and political development. (Jahan, 2015:6-7). The significant contributions made by political parties to representative democracies are that they make probable rational policies and are become accountable to the elected representatives. If there were single independent members in the parliament or several small groups, they would form unbalanced alliance to pursue their politico-economic interests and policies according to shifting preferences. They could not set forward and get public endorsement for the case of consistent policies. They would blame others and return to their positions. Lucid policies would not be practical and parties held liable if the legislations were individual interests-oriented (Rahman, 2008: 96-97). Democracy has no meaning without party democracy. However in the case of Bangladesh every political leader or party, popular or unpopular, large or minor, in or out of state power, debates about democracy constantly into practice, political parties voted into power to strengthen democracy have all not been successful to inspire its norms (Ahmed, 1995:364). In

Bangladesh politics, main political parties constantly have a propensity of opposing without any lawful motive. They are accustomed to boycott the parliament on ground of their political or individual or business interest or without any reason. If we analyze the real situation, we would be able to find a severe lacking of culture of democratic practices within the parties. Although the major parties always debate in favor of transparency and accountability in the activities of political parties (Karim, 2004).

IV. Role of Election Commission and Free, Fair and Transparent Elections in Bangladesh

Holding elections concomitantly is another very significant issue for nurturing democratic interdependence and cohesion. Typically, an independent EC is viewed as sufficient of a protection for conducting free and fair elections and in Bangladesh the standard accountability of holding all national and local elections lays with Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC). It has been constitutionally allocated mandate to do its function. Article 118 gives the provision for setting up an Election Commission which is independent in the exercise of its job. The Commission has to be contingent on the government with admiration to the appointment of Chief Election Commissioner and other Commissioners as well as employing staffs for the commission secretariat. Besides, the BEC personnel are frequently at the threats of demotion, dismissal and OSD (Officer in Special Duty) from the politicians (IGS, 2008; Zakaria, 2013). The Global Integrity report 2010, suggests that the election process in Bangladesh has been fragile with scoring 69 out of 100 with 70 being moderate, 80 being strong and 90 being very strong. It has improved little from its earlier position-scoring 60 in 2007 and 63 in 2008. The voting and citizen participation and election integrity has shown rather some promise with scoring 79 and 86 respectively. Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, on the contrary, has associated the global electoral process and practice and pluralism and ranked the countries individually.

V. Rule of Law and Democratic Amalgamation in Bangladesh

Article 27 of the Constitution of Bangladesh says that, "all citizens of the country are equal before the eyes of law and are fairly entitled to the equal protection of law". Accordingly article 33(1) provides, "no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed and produced before the courts, as soon as may be, of the grounds of such arrest." There are a set of articles in Bangladesh Constitution, including 31, 32, 33(2), and 35 etc., which assures the important rights of the citizen. However, in difference the activities of violations of human rights and law execution misuse is widespread and every democratic regime is to share some blame. Such kinds of abuses are smoothed by legislation such as the 1974 Special Powers Act, which permits arbitrary detention without charge, as well as Section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which permits imprisonment without a warrant. An Anti-Terrorism Act passed in 2009 includes an overly broad definition of terrorism and generally did not meet international standards and allows a room for suppression of oppositions. Security forces including the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) have been criticized for excesses like extrajudicial executions-from 2004 to March 2011, human rights watchdog body Odhikar reported that RAB allegedly executed at least 732 people accusing them of being the victim of crossfire (Odhikar 2010). All these impede democratic amalgamation in Bangladesh.

VI. Role of Civil Society and Democratic Amalgamation in Bangladesh

Civil society can contribute to democratic amalgamation only if other institutions are also favorable, and if actors in civil society behave in a "civil" way, respecting the law and other social and political players whereas accepting and not looking for to seize or conquer democratic political authority. In transitional democracies, there are, however, financial and political weaknesses of civil society which hinder its evolution (O'Donnell, and Schmitter, 1986). Direct international assistance to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the cooperative linkages loom increasingly large in the quest for democratic consolidation. Zakaria (2012), discussed the significance of civil society elaborately in his recent article on Arab democracy's inherent weaknesses at *Time Magazine* to underpin arguments as to why Arab world lacks democratic consolidation. He asserted that, "The term civil society was coined to describe the activities of private businesses, an independent force that existed between the government and the family. The Middle East countries today has strong and established families and strong bureaucracies and governments, but everything in between are underdeveloped and immature (Zakaria

2012). Yet, the civil society leaders in Bangladesh are considered as less powerful and placed in a lower position than the politicians, administrators and donors. Besides, the relationship between larger and smaller NGOs is more like particularistic patron-client ties (White, 1999). However, although the law, society, donor initiative, social tradition has led to the proliferation of civil society organizations, confrontational politics played by the two major political parties through the instruments of clientelism, patronage, nepotism corruption, violence have co-opted, politicized, weakened and polarized the civil society and non-partisan groups undermined their ability and moral strength to participate in political process, contribute to governance and democracy spontaneously (Tasnim, 2007).

VII. Role of Media and Promotion of Democracy in Bangladesh

With hundreds of daily and weekly publications, the privately owned print media continue to present an array of views, although political coverage at a number of newspapers is highly partisan and presenting views that were critical of the government faced some pressure in 2009.

Table 1: Freedom of Media scenario in Bangladesh from 2001-2011

<i>Year</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Injured</i>	<i>Assaulted</i>	<i>Attacked</i>	<i>Arrested</i>	<i>Abducted</i>	<i>Threatened</i>	<i>Sued</i>	<i>Misc</i>	<i>Total</i>
2011	0	139	43	24	01	0	53	23	08	291
2010	4	118	43	17	02	1	49	13	16	263
2009	3	84	45	16	01	2	73	23	19	266
2008	0	38	25	09	04	0	30	02	07	115
2007	0	35	35	01	12	0	83	13	05	184
2006	1	183	53	28	06	0	114	111	0	496
2005	2	142	53	15	11	4	249	130	0	606
2004	5	111	32	25	09	2	293	120	0	597
2003	0	65	41	0	19	2	90	62	0	279
2002	3	102	39	0	26	1	138	139	1	449
2001	2	113	0	0	04	0	0	0	0	119
Total	20	1130	409	135	95	12	1172	636	56	3665

Source: Odhikar, 2012, also cited in S. M. Zakaria, 2013.

International Press Institute (IPI)'s Executive Director, Alison Bethel McKenzie recently expressed her concern that, "partisan journalism and lack of security of the journalists are the major threats to quality journalism flourishing in Bangladesh (The Daily Star, 2012). Accordingly to Odhikar report 2010, at least 02 journalists were killed while 52 others were injured, 35 threatened and 29 were assaulted. 15 journalists were also attacked (Odhikar 2012). The above figures accumulated by Odhikar from diverse news reports of ferocity against journalists display that, the journalists are not safe in this part of the world. Though the media in Bangladesh has been blossoming over the last couple of decades, this kind of intimidating realism disheartens impartial journalism which in turn deters a culture of strong argument and openness in society.

VIII. Role of Good Governance, Political Stability, Economic Growth and Democratic Amalgamation in Bangladesh

Meager quality of governance, on the other hand, is maybe even more of a block today than it had been previous this decade. Whether it is political unpredictability, corruption, deteriorating law and order, or supervisory or bureaucratic burdens on private agents -firms and consumers alike, it is stiff to envisage that things have upgraded in the current decade. Defending political steadiness and good governance along with active structural reforms to inspire entrepreneurship and ease efficient resource allocations, are also key policy challenges identified by Mujeri and Sen (2003). Yet, political stability and good governance require institutional changes and cultural norms that can take many years, even generations, to become established; and investment in human capital is not likely to harvest outcomes until a new generation of better skilled workers enter the workforce. Not

essentially, according to research by the Kennedy School of Government's Dani Rodrik and his colleagues. For example, Hausman et al. (2004) look at 83 cases between 1957 and 1992 when annual GDP growth increased by at least two percentage points and the higher growth was sustained for at least eight years. What set off these economic accelerations? More investment and exports, and a competitive real exchange rate, can give a temporary boost to growth. Financial liberalization helps for a while. A rise in the terms of trade can spur growth that quickly fizzles out. And political changes matter—turbulence is not good for a growth take-off, and movement towards democracy helps, but movement away from democracy helps even more!

Developing countries in general are embracing inclusive growth as a key development goal in response to growing income inequalities and aggregate anxiety that these could weaken the long- sustainability of their growth and development. Unequal socio-economic and political opportunities arise from social marginalization and exclusion associated with market economy, institutional, and policy failures. Simply put, inclusive growth means growth with equal opportunities; it focuses, therefore, on both creating equal opportunities and making all kinds of opportunities accessible to all. Growth is inclusive when it actually allows all members of a society, irrespective of their ethno-religious identity, to participate in and contribute to the growth and development process. More precisely, growth is inclusive when the economic opportunities created by the growth are available to all, the poor in particular.

IX. Role of Parliament and Democratic Amalgamation in Bangladesh

The parliament of Bangladesh, which has failed to attract any stern public attention in the first two decades of independence, has presumed distinct implication since the democratic elections of the fifth parliament in 1991 where all political parties took part. It is more noticeable and ideally possesses more potential to influence policy outcome than ever before (Ahmed, 2011). But the recent experiences from 2006 to 2020 show that it still finds substantial complications in affirming its power and authority. There remains a serious gap between mass people expectations about the role of the parliament and the method it has truly managed. The general public has become doubtful regarding the capability and skill of the parliament to become a significant and useful national institution for all regardless of party affiliations. This, however, is not to debate that the current parliaments cannot claim any success and achievement. On the other hand, they have fared well than their ancestors in nearly every respect. Many vital reform policies have also been undertaken by the parliamentary committees in recent years, these should preferably help parliament attain and exercise superior policy influences. These reforms have the prospective to promote the prestige of parliament from a secondary to a more substantial actor. In overall, still, there remains a significant gap between the prospects and the performance of the parliament. Numerous measures have been recommended to advance the capability of the parliament to carry out its functions. These range from democratizing the political parties and amending Article 70 to the Constitution, so as to permitting more freedom to MPs, to providing satisfactory facilities to MPs and changing the rules of procedures to give and to create more space for them to be proactive and more serious (Ahmed, 2011). Several reforms have long been campaigned by diverse civil society organizations, although without plentiful success and achievement. These reforms are, yet, an essential but not an enough condition to make the parliament more effective and efficient. What is required is to take on reforms in other 'political' sectors, particularly the political parties and the civil-military bureaucracy, which have long remained unreconstructed. Parliamentary reforms and transformations in Bangladesh have progressed at a much faster rate than changes in other 'political' sectors, particularly the civil-military bureaucracy and the political party. The latter provide severe constrictions to the effective and efficient working of the parliament. Experience shows that those proposing reforms and changes of the two sectors are likely to witness serious opposition. As examples, reference can be prepared to the abortive effort by the last caretaker government of Fakhruddin (2007–2008) to reform the political parties and bureaucracy (Ahmed, 2010) and the failure of the consecutive governments to reform the bureaucracy (Khan, 2009). As long as these two important state-institutions, which have self-regulating capacity to impact the behavior of parliament and parliamentarians, remain totally unreformed, no fundamental progress in the operation and effectiveness of the parliament can be anticipated. There is seemingly an 'ambiguous' consensus and compromise among the main political parties, permitting the two influential institutions behave the way they usually do now. This consensus and agreement must change to permit the parliamentary committees to institutionalize parliamentary norms and contribute to democratic amalgamation (Ahmed, 2011).

X. Financial Institutions, Economic Development and Democratic Amalgamation in Bangladesh

Apart from the relationship between political institutions and democratic amalgamation in Bangladesh, we observe that there are strong relationships among the role of financial institutions, and the role of economic growth. Higher economic growth leads to political development and democratic amalgamation, particularly in the newly independent countries rapidly developing economies. Thus, importance should not merely be given to the strengthening of political institutions but also to the strengthening of financial institutions which play a pivotal role in economic growth and development within the ambit of political institutions and executive organ of the state. Therefore, it might be said that Bangladesh should invest more, particularly on education, and there may be a lot of gains to be had by increasing trade. Mahajan (2005), in regards to economic development and democratic consolidation in Bangladesh, starts with estimating a standard specification of cross-country growth regression based on the neoclassical framework of Mankiw et al. (1992). Their data covered from 1981 to 2000. They added to the basic equation a number of additional variables to proxy policy reforms in financial sector; foreign direct investment (FDI); governance and the rule of law; macroeconomic stability; and regulatory and bureaucratic hindrance against investment. We conclude that the country's policymakers should devote their attention to tackle infrastructure bottlenecks; open new export markets, maintain existing ones, and resist protectionism; and decreasing regulatory and bureaucratic problem on the private enterprises. Further, significant research is needed on understanding the interplay between democratic consolidation and economic outcomes in the Bangladesh context. Future studies will also help from contributions from consultants with in-depth country experience. And finally, further analysis should explicitly take into account distributional aspects of different policies.

XI. Conclusion

Whereas the essay found that there is a clear positive relationship between the role of political institutions and democratic consolidation in Bangladesh. Besides, not only the strong role of political institutions plays a vital role in democratic amalgamation but also economic growth plays the equal role as well. In addition, inequality and the (non-) distribution of coordination goods are the two decisive factors that can make or break the likelihood and success of a democratic transition. As a result of these findings, the essay suggests that economic policies aimed at democratic nation-building have to be rethought. Conditions attached to the dissemination of loans from IMF or World Bank should not be based on purely neoliberal prescriptions that can spur economic growth but at the same time drastically increase inequality within countries (Reuveny and Thompson, 2007; Fuchs, 2008; Koechlin, 2013). Supporting neoliberal policies that increase inequality within a country are counter-productive and only help a country's ruling class, elite and upper bourgeoisie to get richer and increase their incentives to blockade any possibility of a democratic transition as they have the most to lose by a democratic redistribution of wealth. In this line, the austerity measures imposed on Greece, Spain and other ailing EU states, a clearly neoliberal approach to tackle the current crisis (itself ironically triggered by neoliberal politics), should also be rethought as this only increases the already widening gap of inequality within those countries. This further contributes to the ever increasing popular frustration with the current democratic system that can have far-reaching consequences even for some of the allegedly stable, consolidated democracies in the EU. Decision-makers in politics and finance have to provide economic development assistance in such a way that it reaches broad classes of the population and increases equity within a state—only then, strong role of political institutions and economic development can be a formula to establish and maintain democratic structures in the long-term (Latouche, 1998). Although some other factors play roles, per capita income is by far the best predictor of the survival of democracies. On the contrary, education helps public to survive independently of income, and a balance among the political forces makes them more stable. Institutions also matter, presidential democracies are less likely to survive under all circumstances we could observe than are parliamentary ones. These may be idiosyncratic, impossible to catch in a statistical analysis; but on the other hand, they might be systematic, and we may simply have failed to find them. From the above discussion and analysis, it may be said that democratic consolidation is depending upon the strong, free, fair, transparent and responsible role of all political institutions including the judiciaries, lower and higher courts; and, of course, development with egalitarian distribution of resources in Bangladesh. Not only the government, but also other stake holders such as

public and private entrepreneurs, national and international NGOs, civil society, big business, teachers and bureaucrats including all citizens of the Bangladesh, should come forward to contribute to the democratic consolidation in Bangladesh by active participation in politics and decision making process in all spheres of public life. In a nutshell, it might be said that despite the huge problems in Bangladesh politics, the democratic consolidation is obviously illuminating through economic growth and development in Bangladesh; and it will continue to be enlightening.

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