



Journal of Social and Political Sciences

Usman, Sahibzada Muhammad. (2020), Russia and NATO Strategic Corporation. In: *Journal of Social and Political Sciences*, Vol.3, No.2, 497-505.

ISSN 2615-3718

DOI: 10.31014/aior.1991.03.02.186

The online version of this article can be found at:
<https://www.asianinstituteofresearch.org/>

Published by:
The Asian Institute of Research

The *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* is an Open Access publication. It may be read, copied, and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license.

The Asian Institute of Research *Social and Political Sciences* is a peer-reviewed International Journal. The journal covers scholarly articles in the fields of Social and Political Sciences, which include, but not limited to, Anthropology, Government Studies, Political Sciences, Sociology, International Relations, Public Administration, History, Philosophy, Arts, Education, Linguistics, and Cultural Studies. As the journal is Open Access, it ensures high visibility and the increase of citations for all research articles published. The *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* aims to facilitate scholarly work on recent theoretical and practical aspects of Social and Political Sciences.



ASIAN INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH
Connecting Scholars Worldwide



Russia and NATO Strategic Corporation

Sahibzada Muhammad Usman¹

¹University of Pisa, Italy, Ph.D. in Geopolitics. Email: usmangull36@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper examines Russia and NATO strategic partnership by investigating both sides perspectives, long-standing hindrances and opportunities. Russia and NATO relations stay to be one of the main strands of global security in the 21st century. Nowadays, given the more perplexing dangers to global security, the increasing energy demand and reliance of Europe, and expanding foreign business between the groups, Russia's links with the West, as a major petroleum exporter and nuclear nation, have become progressively significant. The new security condition of post-September 11 has arranged a shared ground for a strong partnership between old foes. In any case, the endeavors from the two sides have been not able to move beyond a specific degree of collaboration. This paper answers whether it is workable for NATO and Russia to make a decisive victory of lasting legacies of deep-seated hostility and doubt, move beyond historical, religious, cultural differences, and establish the frameworks of an enduring sound partnership.

Keywords: NATO, EU, Russia, Difference, Opportunities

Introduction

Russia and NATO relations establish one of the major segments of the 21st century's security design in the region of Euro-Atlantic, particularly for the those who respect the destiny of Europe and its connecting areas important to world harmony. The new security condition has arranged a shared ground for a strong partnership between old adversaries. In any case, the endeavors from the two sides have been not able to move beyond a specific degree of participation. This paper will try to enlighten the significance and probability of the Russia and NATO vital partnership under the 21st century's security contemplations by dissecting the mutual interests, expectations, and concerns for the groups and the origins of the erosion in the light of vital developments and events over the most recent two decades.

Since the finish of Cold War, NATO sought after an eastbound enlargement, incorporating the previous Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and looked to make a steady space appropriate for democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and market economy to prosper, while attempting to avoid conflict with Russia. Moscow generally thought about NATO's expansion as a danger to its national interests and security. The relations of Russia and NATO have advanced on a rough way during the two decades after the Berlin Wall, wavering between strong partnership in a time of asymmetric, eccentric, transnational dangers to global security, and waiting recollections of old hostility and doubt.

Moscow always stayed the main element in Allied calculations (Sloan, Stanley R., 2010). Despite its crumbled economy and intensely debilitated military, Russia has kept up its potential for improving its monetary development and renewing its strategic criticalness as a nuclear influence and a natural asset-rich nation. America and NATO hold 90% of the world's nuclear resource. Furthermore, Lionel Ponsard declares that the future of NATO not just relied upon its capacity to adjust to the new global condition. Yet, it firmly identified with the turn of its future links with the Russian Federation (Ponsard, Lionel, 2007)." NATO also sought after a useful demeanor towards Russia and tried to avoid any genuine confrontation.

This examination is appropriate because of the indispensable job of Russia and NATO relations for the future of both Russia and the West. The new danger recognitions and security framework presented by the attacks of terrorist on September 11 have required close partnership and cooperation globally. The new dangers to world security are characterized as unusual, nonconventional, transnational, and asymmetric. In this new setting, this investigation looks to light up the mutual interests and difficulties of the two previous adversaries that unite them in a period of vulnerability. It examines the viewpoints of Moscow and Brussels by investigating their desires and worries under the light of significant occasions and advancements in the previous two decades.

By and large, this paper inspects the theory that, in spite of numerous dangers and obstructions, the advance of relations and accomplishment of a more grounded cooperation and key partnership is as yet conceivable and significant in the Russia and NATO relations, and requires just positive methodologies from the two elements. There are numerous open doors for reconstructing trust and fortifying relations, just as numerous hindrances. Both sides need to focus on circumstances and shared traits as opposed to over-concentrating on snags and contrasts, on the off chance that they are to advance harmony and solidness in Europe. NATO needs to recognize that Russia develops contrastingly and should stay persistent as Russian journeys to predictability and democracy. It additionally must be prepared to perceive a more noteworthy say for Russia in its structures for frictionless, supportable relations and a stable and harmony advancing Europe. Russia, then again, should set aside old abhorrence's, limit its goals, and handle how expensive it could be for it to extend the cleavages. Lionel Ponsard contends that by building certainty between the two groups about one another's expectations, cooperative security can manage attitudes that maybe some way or another lead to confusion. In this perceptive, the NRC (NATO–Russia Council) can fill in as a medium, which is significant for the elimination of predispositions, concern, and confusions.

Methods and Sources

This paper depends on a qualitative investigation that incorporates the basic examinations of factors influencing Russia and NATO relations and utilize both secondary and primary resources. The statement and remarks of leaders, an official statement of NATO, official documents, press releases and conferences will be utilized as main sources.

The Russian Assessment

The settled and uncertain conflicts inside and around the Russian borders have a significant effect on its strategic perceptive. Russia has the greatest regional space and longest borders on the planet. Since the collapse of the USSR, many borders difference between Japan and China stay uncertain. There are unstable areas as Chechen stan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia that bear a high capability of returning clash. Especially, the contention over Russian troops in Chechnya upset a great part of the post-Soviet period. It remembers that for the cold, current and possible regional claims and the solidified conflicts in the previous Soviet space have an incredible impact on Russian strategic perceptive (Trenin, Dmitri, November 2007).

Another significant issue influencing conventional Russian thinking is the geopolitical elements and progressing change in the security condition around Russia. The developing impact of the E.U. and NATO in the West, rising political and financial impact of China, and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the region have constrained Russia to reevaluate its geopolitical needs and national policies. Moreover, Russia's loss of strategic impact and ground in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Eastern and Central Europe have exasperated its strategic place and

made its deep uncertainty. The leaders of Russia have stayed incredulous, especially, in relations with nations of West and security associations, which they fault for exploiting Russia's impermanent weakness in the prompt result of the breakdown of the USSR.

China is a developing worry of the policymakers of Russia which can't be neglected, regardless of apparently great relations and close participation and association among Beijing and Moscow. Russia thinks about its collaboration with China as a major addition; yet, it stays conflicted about the fate of the relationship and wouldn't like to turn into a junior accomplice of its rising neighbor.

Mainly, Russia considers NATO and America as strategic contenders and is worried about its political and military presence close to Russian borders. Russia wouldn't like to take part in an agreeable relationship with both and looks for equality in its connections with all other political elements, regardless of whether it is China, America or NATO. As Dmitri Trenin, the representative chief of the Carnegie Moscow Center stated that "As opposed to being sandwiched between two big powers, Moscow plans to be a significant player and perhaps a mediator between the two (Trenin, Dmitri, November 2007)."

All these regional conflicts, debates, and the geopolitical elements around Russia's outskirts have strengthened Moscow's profound sense of instability and molded its strategic needs in the 21st century. In such geopolitical dynamism and possible conflicts, Moscow has attempted to support its strategic prevention and military abilities. It has been updating its military and putting resources into satellite, space frameworks, atomic and digital innovation for a decade. Taking everything into account, given the developing insecurity and dynamic dangers around its borders and possible conflicts in previous Soviet area, it is best for Moscow's interest to have stable and peaceful relations towards the West. Moscow has no other choice, however, to fix and solidify its links with the West. No one can contend that America and Russia or other NATO coalition against China is irrelevant or impossible.

Despite the fact that the strategic policymakers of Russia value *Machtpolitik* and organize power, prominently military force, over each other international strategy device, their awareness in regards to the financial and social means for using political impact is expanding. In this context, they are agreeable to keeping up and improving soundness in Europe. Thus, Russia is happy with the general course of the links with NATO and the E.U. that has permitted Moscow increasing, if not totally, equivalent since the foundation of North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The policies of Russia are not anti-anything, Moscow is available to any relationship, collaboration or association that fits in its benefits and depends on the standard of equity.

Russia finds the present system ineffective in addressing the issues and is in the quest for another security design for another era, which in any case has a few elements of the old. Medvedev reported in 2008 that Russia's appeal for another pan-European security system dependent on military and political combination of entire Euro-Atlantic territory. Two fundamental reasons fortify Russia's opinion on this. Initially, Russia has started its role in the 21st century in an unexpected way. After the union of political and monetary power, it is sure of its regional geopolitical impact and his capability to be a worldwide one. It has changed Russia's observation viewing Euro-Atlantic security configuration too. Subsequently, Russia has fitted a more confident and dynamic job in Euro-Atlantic itself. Presentation of such a plan would ensure an equivalent status for Russia. The subsequent explanation is the conviction of Moscow that the present worldwide system, its instruments and structures, isn't working. Russia's proposition for new security design by declaring the lack of Euro-Atlantic security design, in such manner, is significant. This activity underscores Russia's interests about being left uninvolved of the decision process of Euro-Atlantic security, contentions about its fracture, and disarray in the motivation of existing associations. It is likewise a response to American unilateralism and tries to make more multi-polar security structure (Andrew Monaghan, January 2010).

NATO Assessment

From the primary strategy record after the Cold War to the most recent, Russia has stayed a significant subject in Allied calculations. Yet, post-Cold War strategic models have dealt with Russia with an alternate nature and

methodology. In the next decade, such new dangers as ethnic clashes, monetary concern, and the rise of WMD and changed the strategic risk perceptions.

Then again, the unpredictability of the difficulties and the encounters in the Balkans uncover the requirement for cooperation and dialogue among Russia and NATO that stretches out beyond basic rhetoric. In the end, this was reflected in the 1999 strategic model as an affirmation of Russia's exceptional position and its job in Euro-Atlantic security, and as an away from to reinforce relations based on mutual interest and transparency in the structure of the Founding Act.

In 2009, at the NATO's summit in Kehl, members accepted on the requirement for filtering the strategic position of the Alliance and entrusted the secretary-general with another strategic model. Qualified specialists, under the administration of previous U.S. secretary of state, created suggestions for the NATO secretary-general in an exchange oriented procedure. The strategic model, "dynamic commitment, updated defense," focuses on the changing condition of the security and the Alliance role. It is a result of an era formed by the new security dangers, emergency management experiences in Afghanistan and Balkans, and the advantages of cooperative associations (Wittmann, Klauss, 2011:02).

Adrian Hyde stated that the New Strategic Concept and the Lisbon Summit, "Modern Defense, Dynamic Engagement," were colored by two main worldwide events: the moving worldwide level of influence and the worldwide downturn. These two elements give way to understanding a large number of the strategic and political choices reached in Lisbon, and are critical in characterizing the structural setting in which the Alliance currently works (Hyde-Price, Adrian, 2011:02)." It is critical to ponder the new strategic model under the light of such realities as the power change to a multi-polar one portrayed by the rise of China, India, Russia, and Brazil and worldwide financial downturn.

It sums up the agreement reached in Lisbon; it introduces new methodologies without setting out a fixed timetable and positions in the security condition of the 21st century. It additionally depicts NATO's main principles and tasks, qualities, and its strategic targets for the following decade in a developing security condition (Katsioulis, Christos, January 2011). The substance of the document bases on three main tasks: initial, deterrence and defense that underlines the protective union role, and second, emergency management that calls attention to the need of making a move during clashes that posture dangers to its security. At long last, advancing global security through teamwork requires the foundation of agreeable discoursed and associations with nations (Wittmann, Klauss, 2011:02).

As far as Russia and NATO relations, the last task, mutual security, deserves more consideration. It fairly identified with the political party of the Alliance. NATO focuses its political endeavors in three territories: first, weapons control, non-proliferation, disarmament; second, growth; and third, partnerships. NATO worries on the requirement for development in relations with Russia and nations that its purpose is to build up a "genuine strategic association" in light of basic interests and difficulties. Therefore, the strategic concept proposes more noteworthy transparency as far as weapons stores and proportional demilitarization, more prominent concentration for regular arms-control governments, and more extensive discussion with Russia. Thereupon, it underlines the significance of the NATO-Russia Council and lists full usage of it (Katsioulis, Christos, January 2011). Moreover, in contrast to the past one, it doesn't specify fast approaching joining of new nations, despite emphasizing its open-door strategy to every European democracy. Especially, it doesn't allude to Ukraine and Georgia by name, observing Russia's affectability.

In handy terms, Adrian Hyde proposes, The Lisbon Summit was the event for rearranging the NATO and Russia relationship, in light of three unmistakable territories of cooperation: first, patching up the NATO and Russia Council, which has for some time been viewed as an inadequate discussing shop. Second, teamwork on missile defense. Third, teamwork on Afghanistan: Moscow will help NATO with supply routes for different material (Hyde-Price, Adrian, 2011:02). To finish up, NATO's point of view with respect to Russia grasps a non-conflict relationship, which would ideally change into a "genuine strategic association," based on shared trust that is fundamental for stability and peace in the region of Euro-Atlantic. Aware of their disparities and issues and ready

to finish them through the time, NATO considers Russia to be a possible strategic accomplice that constantly should be observed.

Geopolitics and Geography

Russia's geopolitics and geography give an aloof home to its people. Even though the nation is brimming with natural assets, a brutal climate and shortage of the arable grounds in addition strategic disservices have driven the people of Russia to experience a history of sorrowful and violent days than happy and glorious ones. The attacks of Nordic groups, Western armed forces (Hitler and Napoleon), and Eastern Nomadic countries (Turks, Mongols, and Tatars) and the abuse of their leaders have driven them to experience intense lives in brutal geography. Refined from past understanding and current geopolitical real factors, Russian conceptualizations of the worldwide order and universal relations can be characterized in rather a rationalist and realistic terms.

As the geopolitical and geographical situation of Russia is two main determinant factors in understanding foreign policy conduct of Russia in the 21st century. They have given both opportunities and obstacles to Western-Russian relations by affecting foreign policy conduct of Russia both legitimately and in a roundabout way. Their immediate effect is identified with its regional elements and its geographic position, which decides its neighbors and the territorial environment of politics. Then again, in a roundabout way, their impact on the culture, economy, defense, and security of Russia by adding to the foreign-policy conduct. Furthermore, the understanding and perceptions of the elites are the significant factors that shape the foreign policy, dominantly depend on geographical and geopolitical conditions. Henceforth, Joseph Noguee and Robert Donaldson propose "The Russian foreign policy — regardless of whether in its Soviet, its tsarist, or its democratic structure is an articulation in some proportion of certain moderately fixed geopolitical real factors (Donaldson, Robert H. and Noguee, Joseph L, April 18, 2009). " It is difficult to ignore the feeling of weakness, positively entrenched into the strategic thinking of Russia over the hundreds of years, particularly in the foreign-policy thinking of the policymakers and elites of the 21st century. This profound seated anxiety discovers scenes of articulation in Eurasians and Centrist philosophies, the most grounded supporters of which are intelligence services, security, and military elites, for example, Mankoff stated that, more than monetary development and other components, Sir Halford John Mackinder's statutes about "controlling the heartland" despite preoccupy the concentrations of policymakers and elites in Russia (Mankoff, Jeffrey, 2009). Thus, it is reasonable to assert that the feeling of weakness, a natural result of Russia's geopolitical and geography goals, impacts foreign-policy conduct in the 21st century by subsiding into the mentalities of the elites who are the principal players in the foreign policy of Russia.

China and Russia associations need more elaboration. Beijing is the unavoidable potential risk for Moscow, particularly in its Far East, regardless of apparently great relations between the two countries. Like other worldwide powers, the rise of China implies a lot to Russia. Its nearness to the borders of Russia and its key backyard (Central Asia) causes fear and concern, regardless of whether the Kremlin doesn't allow it to appear. China's developing interest, monetary, political impact, and investments in the energy of Central Asia, for example, which Moscow believes its backyard, subvert Russia's benefits and deprive it of the political influence it has been utilizing against Central Asian nations (Kaczmarek, Marcin, Mar/Apr 2012: 3). Long-standing regional issues in the Far East, despite they were settled during Putin's government and the developing political, economic, and demographic impact of China, both in the previous Soviet space and eastern border of Russia, ignite worries in the path of the Kremlin, regardless how much the government of Putin attempts to keep it down and build up better links with China. All things considered, Russia has no other choice. Lo Bobo stated that, it is the main path for Russia to accommodate a rising China and make a defensive instrument against this rising power along its eastern outskirts (Lo, Bobo, 2008). Kaczmarek declares that Russians know about the move of balance for China and the vanishing of America authority that "filled in as glue" for Chinese-Russian collaboration; in any case, they do not have the ability to end this commitment (Kuchins, Andrew). Then again, as per Kuchins, Moscow's close commitment with Beijing has been viewed as a portion of its counterbalancing conduct against Western predominance (Kaczmarek, Marcin, Mar/Apr 2012: 3). In entirety, strategic comfort, logic, and a shared trait of interests fill in as the reason for the China-Russia association in the present geopolitical context.

Russia and NATO cooperative security

Neorealist hypothesis highlights the role of formation of the worldwide framework in relations between nations and recommends that interstate links will be a shift when a change happens in the configuration. Humankind saw this change in the late twentieth century when the Berlin Wall destroyed. It "constrained both Russia and NATO to survey their way to deal with each other, the previous willing to prevent the reappearance of the foe, and the last wish not to be separate from the new global order (Ponsard, Lionel, 2007)." After this period, the cooperative-security idea has given numerous chances to NATO and its foe Russia.

For a period of cooperation and advancing stability and peace in the Euro-Atlantic region, and discussion are the fix, if not the solution, while vulnerability about the expectations of the enemy, shared doubt, and social contrasts cause an escalation of common political outrage and comprise the essential deterrents to cooperation. NATO, the most conspicuous security and political organization of the last 50 years, has accomplished moderately soft progress from the unsteady, bipolar, and pragmatist minded security condition of the Cold War to a progressively steady, peace-advancing one by concentrating on a solution. Especially in Europe, it has meant to amplify its effective reach as peace, stability, democracy promoter, to the drawback of Russia, while attempting to abstain from offending it. In such manner, its cooperative activities since the finish of 1960s, especially after the 1990s, have done very well. In opposition to early NATO-USSR relations before 1990, a new time of NATO-Russian relations has been set apart by dialogue and cooperation, regardless of numerous disappointments and traps. Holger Mölder brings up, NATO with the another Strategic Concept accepted in the Rome Summit in 1991, and went into another level (Mölder, Holger, 2006).

Mölder suggests four models in the security condition of Europe: cooperative security actions, security communities, security complexes, and collective security actions. He states that cooperative security actions are the best models for security networks looking for peace and keeping away from the rise of security difficulties in their neighborhood since they don't require values sharing and the obligations of settlements while having comparative certifications for their security as members of security networks. Ponsard additionally guarantees that the idea of cooperative security doesn't require responsibility from members beyond a specific degree of affirmations. It doesn't require high institutional components, for example, a membership, or consistence to supranational strategies. Rather it requires close cooperation and defensive activity if there should be a danger to global security and peace.

Mölder believes that "Cooperative security actions that advance reliance and cooperation have substantiated themselves as viable measures to set up zones of peace, relieve the opportunities for clashes and keep away from the rise of foes (Ponsard, Lionel, 2007)." Three primary qualities distinguished by Mölder shows that how cooperative security actions give ideal roads to the relationship between Russia and NATO: first, critical thinking to solve the problem, not defensive one against an assailant; second, they organize mutual beliefs over basic standards, and basic standards over mutual identity; third, they rise around the security networks. Eventually, cooperative security actions offer NATO "a custom-fitted arrangement" between stability and quick enlargement (Mölder, Holger, 2006).

Other than hypothetical clarifications, the historical proof has likewise shown that a mutual security strategy reduces the creation of peace and stable promoting space in Eastern and Central Europe, without prompting significant conflict between the previous enemies. This strategy, which started with the Harmel Report and finished in the foundation of the Russia-NATO committee, can be recognized in three stages: the late and post-Cold War time, and post-September 11. During the last four decades in the connection between NATO and Russia, dialogue, cooperation, and transparency have expanded, while shared doubt, opposition, and contrasts have diminished.

Future of Russian and NATO Strategic Cooperation

NATO's current come back to regional defense in Europe and its consolation of Eastern and Central European partners, Russian policy documents and statements portrayed NATO amplification and augmentation of US

missile defense endeavors in Europe as undermining basic Russian security interests. Cooperation would be possible if America considered Moscow as an incredible power whose defense interests completely considered (Andrew Radin/Clint Reach, 2017).

After the Ukraine emergency Russia-NATO cooperation with Moscow was frozen, initially even contacts with regards to the Russia-NATO Council, even though the Russia-NATO Shared Relations, Security and Cooperation were not suspended. In 2016, that the Council began intermittently meeting once more, however so far there have been without a doubt, constrained outcomes. Military links remained frozen until the high-level Russia-US military meeting in 2017. After some time particularly the drawn-out absence of military-military links has been addressed, as various events have been accounted for which could without much of a stretch have prompted a greater crisis in the Baltic region. For instance, an absence of transparency in military activities on the side of Russia has added to such feelings of dread. Yet, even the restart of meetings of the Russia-NATO Council has added to encouraging new discussion on security and confidence-building measures focused on upgraded transparency in Eastern and Central Europe.

An absence of transparency in the aims of Russia towards the Baltic nations and dangers radiating from Russia against the closer partnership between NATO and its accomplices Finland and Sweden have just condition worse. This is likewise the situation with continued Russia endeavors to militarize in the north (Kaliningrad) and attached in the south (Crimea) with the point of expanding Russian choices for Anti-Access Denial to probable NATO fortifications in an emergency circumstance. "War unintentionally" out of nowhere turns into a genuine possibility. Kimberly Marten called attention to various possible measures to diminish strains between NATO and Russia, including by reinforcing deterrence from one perspective and simultaneously going into discussion with Russia to promise Moscow that its authentic security interests will be considered (Kimberly Martin, March 2017). Yet, any such activity would infer the leadership of America within NATO and in a reciprocal structure with Russia in moving in the direction of more transparency and the end towards another arms control government in Europe.

Comparable proposals for future Russia-US cooperation were offered in a new report by CSIS, introducing as possible activities: 1) improving transparency and emergency communications measures; 2) keeping up atomic non-expansion and arms control discussion; 3) cooperating in the Arctic (CSIS, March 2017). But the government of the US build up a complete Russia strategy and follow up on it in close links with NATO Partners. In this way, America takes the lead, but, such initiative can't be accepted from a White House where each move towards Russia profoundly examined, both by the media and in Congress, as long as conceivable agreement between Russian experts and the Trump team in the election period continues.

The efforts on a wide worldwide alliance against ISIS in Syria and Iraq additionally now appear to be an exceptionally far-fetched topic for Russia-NATO collaboration, especially after the current incorporation of NATO as an association in the US-drove coalition against ISIS. Moscow's policy to support the government of Assad and its strikes against all opponent groups, including those bolstered by the West, may have to move Moscow into one of the most significant powers in the Middle East. However, current moves by America to come back to the Middle East by allying with Sunni powers not helping to discover common belief with Moscow and its Middle Eastern accomplices. Besides, Turkey's current strategies in Iraq and Syria make it harder to shape any mutual NATO opinion on Syria, which nearly precludes this theme from any genuine conversation with Moscow in the Russia-NATO Council. In this circumstance, the possibilities for the Russia-NATO Council are fairly grim and will be muddling without US authority within NATO.

Conclusion

Since the finish of the Cold War and Collapse of the Soviet Union, the security condition and dangers to the security of nations, alliances, and the whole world have changed intensely. Geopolitical and technological change reformed risk observations and methods for consoling security. The moderately stale and unsurprising nature of the Cold War changed by unpredictability and vulnerability. Regional ethnic clashes all around the globe, the rise of transnational terrorist groups, religious radicalization, the move in worldwide economic balances, increase of atomic weapons, and the rising interest for water and energy supplies all posture extraordinary dangers to

worldwide peace and security. This new time of capriciousness and vulnerability has set up a shared view for the old foes NATO and Russia and is gradually uniting them.

Recently, revelations after the 2010 Lisbon Summits, the 2012 Chicago Summit, and recent yearly NRC reports uncover for the need of nearer organization and participation. For example, the last draft of the 2010 Strategic Concept, which was embraced at the Lisbon Summit, formally deciphers the longing of the NATO nations to improve useful relations with Russia and move towards an undeniable vital association. The recent proclamations of political pioneers and elevated level authorities from Moscow are in accordance with these summit reports and announcements. All strategic ideas, statements of leaders, summit declarations, and top-level authorities underline the criticalness of improvement of the Russia-NATO relations.

Russia has consistently been aware of its situations; among financial and basic issues and its grandiose objectives, it has tried to adjust itself step by step with the West all together not to be confined and to partake in establishing the new security frameworks of post-September 11. Its reactions to NATO's productive steps, thusly, have been mostly positive. There have been a few variables prompting rhythmic movement in the Russia-NATO relationship. While the conventional frailty and pragmatist perspective of leaders of Russia and social differentiation of Russia from the West block the improvement of links beyond a specific level, contemporary geopolitical real factors and Russia Westernization methods compel Moscow to draw nearer toward the West. In general, Russia has needed to structure a reasonable foreign policy, which in many regards, favors agreeable, non-conflict relations with the Asia and West, and simultaneously, praises its driving role in the previous Soviet space and worldwide matters. Therefore, foreign policy of Russia is the result of the mix of geopolitical, religious, cultural, and historical variables with the reasonable decisions of the Russian people and elite. Alongside the legacies of the Soviet eras, current ideological flows among the citizens and elites with respect to what identity of Russia is and how the foreign policy impacts the needs and plans of the Putin government.

Generally speaking, despite many obstacles and dangers, the advancement of relations and accomplishment of more grounded participation and genuine strategic association is as yet conceivable and significant in the Russia-NATO relations and requires just positive methodologies from both sides. There are many open doors for modifying trust and reinforcing relations, just as many obstructions. The groups need to focus on circumstances and shared characteristics rather than over-concentrating on contrasts and obstacles, in the event that they are to advance stability and peace in Europe. In such a manner, small phases can have a combined impact, and the groups should not anticipate abrupt changes and enhancements. It is especially significant for NATO to recognize that Russia develops diversely and stay persistent during political progress toward democracy. It likewise perceives a more noteworthy state for Russia in its security plans for frictionless, economic relations, and peace-promoting steps. Cooperative security measures offer Russia and NATO a fitted arrangement between keeping up stability in Europe and foreign-policy standpoints and advance their association, gradually.

References

- Andrew Monaghan (January 2010), Introduction to "Indivisibility of Security: Russia and Euro-Atlantic Security." Forum Paper No.13, 5–25. NATO Defense College.
- Andrew Radin/Clint Reach (2017), 'Russian Views of the International Order', RAND, Santa Monica, California. www.rand.org/t/RR1826.
- CSIS (March 2017), 'Recalibrating U.S. Strategy Toward Russia. A New Time for Choosing', Washington D.C.
- Donaldson, Robert H. and Noguee, Joseph L (April 18, 2009), *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests*. NY: M.E.Sharpe.
- Hyde-Price, Adrian (2011:02), "NATO's Political Transformation and International Order." In *NATO's New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment*, edited by Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, 45–55. Danish Institute for International Studies Report.
- Kaczmarek, Marcin (Mar/Apr 2012: 3), Domestic Sources of Russia's China Policy. *Problems of Post-Communism*. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1013444519?accountid=12702>.
- Katsioulis, Christos (January 2011), "The New NATO Strategy: A Temporary Compromise." *International Policy Analysis*, Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

- Kimberly Martin (March 2017), 'Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO', Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report 79, New York.
- Kuchins, Andrew, "Russian Perspectives on China: Strategic Ambivalence." In *The Future of China-Russia Relations*, edited by Bellacqua.
- Lo, Bobo (2008), *Axis of convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics*. London, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Mankoff, Jeffrey (2009), *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*. NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.
- Mölder, Holger (2006), "NATO's Role in the Post-Modern European Security Environment, Cooperative Security and the Experience of the Baltic Sea Region." *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, Volume 8. <http://www.bdcsl.se/files/docs/bsdr/1-NATO, European Security and the Baltic Sea Region-Holger Molder.pdf>.
- Ponsard, Lionel (2007), *Russia, NATO and cooperative Security: Bridging the Gap*. London and New York, NY: Routledge.
- Sloan, Stanley R. (2010), *Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama*. New York, NY: Continuum.
- Trenin, Dmitri (November 2007), "Russia's Threat Perception and Strategic Posture." In *Russian Security Strategy under Putin: U.S. and Russian Perspectives*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub829.pdf>.
- Wittmann, Klaus (2011:02), "An Alliance for the 21st century? Reviewing NATO's New Strategic Concept." In *Nato's New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment*, edited by Ringsmose and Sten Rynning. Danish Institute for International Studies Report.