From Myers to Slaughter – An Argument over Separation of Powers or a Disguised Frontal Assault on the Administrative State: A Financial and Legal Analysis

John H. Shannon, Richard J. Hunter, Jr.

Seton Hall University, University of Tulsa

This article argues that the Supreme Court's century-long arc of decisions on presidential removal power — from Myers v. United States (1926) through Trump v. Slaughter (2026) — represents not merely an evolving constitutional debate over separation of powers, but a sustained, ideologically coherent assault on the administrative state in service of entrenched business interests. The paper begins with an examination of the major cases in which the Court has ruled on the theory of the unitary executive, tracing the doctrinal line from Myers v. United States (1926) and Humphrey’s Executor (1935) through Seila Law (2020) and Collins v. Yellen (2021), and finally through Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook in June of 2026. It then situates this constitutional evolution within two broader contexts: first, the legislative history and business-community opposition to landmark financial regulation — Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) and Dodd-Frank (2010) — and second, the long-term intellectual and institutional infrastructure built in response to Lewis Powell’s 1971 memorandum to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The authors further examine the Supreme Court's curtailment of agency authority through the rejection of Chevron deference, the possible revival of the non-delegation doctrine, and the emergence of the major questions doctrine. The article concludes that the cumulative effect of these developments — expanding presidential control, contracting agency authority, and shifting interpretive power to the courts — has produced a fundamental realignment of American governance in favor of corporate interests, with potentially lasting consequences for economic regulation and democratic accountability.

Article link: https://www.asianinstituteofresearch.org/lhqrarchives/from-myers-to-slaughter-%E2%80%93-an-argument-over-separation-of-powers-or-a-disguised-frontal-assault-on-the-administrative-state%3A-a-financial-and-legal-analysis